William of Conches: Philosophia Mundi

Sunt et esse videntur corporalia, seu divinum seu caducum habeant corpus. Corpora namque subiacent sensui. Cum igitur in cognitione utrorumque sit philosophia, de utrisque disseramus inchoantes ab eis quae sunt et non videntur.

There are and seem to be corporeal things, whether they have a divine body or a caducous one. For bodies are subject to sense. Since therefore philosophy is in the cognition of both, let us discourse concerning both, beginning from those which are and are not seen.

Sunt autem haec creator, anima mundi, daemones, animae hominum.

But these are: creator, the soul of the world, daemons, the souls of men.

IV. QUID SIT PERFECTE ALIQUID COGNOSCERE

4. WHAT IT IS TO KNOW SOMETHING PERFECTLY

Sed quoniam creator omnibus prior est (omnia enim ab ipso habent existere et ipse a nullo), ab ipso incipiamus. Sed quia dicunt sancti in hac vita non posse deum perfecte cognosci, quid sit perfecte aliquid cognoscere ostendamus, ut innotescat, quare creator in hac vita perfecte cognosci non possit.

But since the creator is prior to all (for all things have to exist from him, and he from no one), let us begin from him. But because they say that the saints in this life cannot know God perfectly, let us show what it is to know something perfectly, so that it may become known why the creator in this life cannot be known perfectly.

Undecim sunt quae inquiruntur circa unamquamque rem: an sit, quid sit, quantum sit, ad quid sit, quale sit, quid agat, quid in ipsum agatur, ubi sit, qualiter in loco situm sit, quando sit, quid habeat. Perfecte ergo aliquid cognoscere est ista undecim de illo scire. Sed quamvis sciamus deum esse, quid sit, perfecte non comprehendimus; quantitas vero eiusdem, qui omnia implet, angustias nostri pectoris excedit; relationi illius explicandae humana sapientia deficit; qualitates illius non comprehendit; actionibus eius enarrandis infinitae linguae non sufficiunt; quid in ipsum agatur, non potentia agentis, sed permissio est volentis; ubi sit, qui supra omnia, infra omnia totus et integer; qualiter in loco sit, qui localis non est; de tempore vero illius, qui ante omne tempus est; quid habet, qui omnia palmo continet, nullus perfecte explicare potest.

Eleven are the things that are inquired concerning each thing: whether it is, what it is, how much it is, for what it is, of what sort it is, what it does, what is done upon it, where it is, how it is situated in place, when it is, what it has. Therefore to know something perfectly is to know these eleven about it. But although we know that God is, what he is we do not perfectly comprehend; but the quantity of the same, who fills all things, exceeds the narrowness of our breast; for explaining his relation human wisdom fails; it does not comprehend his qualities; for narrating his actions, infinite tongues are not sufficient; what is done against him is not the potency of the agent, but the permission of the willing One; where he is, who is above all things, below all things, whole and entire; how he is in place, who is not local; and as to his time, who is before all time; what he has, who contains all things in a palm, no one can perfectly explain.

Nec ergo illum omnino ignoramus, quem esse scimus, nec perfecte cognoscimus, de quo praedicta ignoramus.

Therefore we are not altogether ignorant of him, whom we know to exist, nor do we know him perfectly, with respect to whom we are ignorant of the aforesaid things.

V. QUIBUS RATIONIBUS PROBETUR QUOD DEUS SIT

5. BY WHAT REASONS IT IS PROVED THAT GOD EXISTS

Et quoniam diximus in hac vita sciri deum esse, rationes quibus etiam incredulis hoc possit probari aperiamus, scil. per mundi creationem et cotidianam dispositionem.

And since we have said that in this life it is known that God is, let us lay open the reasons by which this can be proved even to the incredulous, namely, through the creation of the world and its quotidian disposition.

Cum enim mundus ex contrariis factus sit elementis (calidis, frigidis, humidis, siccis), vel natura operante vel casu vel aliquo artifice in compositione mundi illa coniuncta sunt. Sed proprium est naturae semper contrarium fugere et simile appetere, non ergo natura contraria elementa coniunxit.

For since the world was made from contrary elements (hot, cold, humid, dry), either with nature operating or by chance or by some artificer, in the composition of the world those were joined together. But it is proper to nature always to flee the contrary and to seek the similar; therefore it was not by nature that the contrary elements were joined.

Casu vero coniuncta non sunt. Si enim casus mundum operatus esset, quare domum vel aliquid tale quod levius est, non faceret? Iterum: si casus mundum operatus esset, aliquae causae praecessissent mundum, quarum concursus operaretur illum.

But they are not conjoined by chance. For if chance had wrought the world, why would it not make a house or something of that sort which is lighter—that is, easier? Again: if chance had wrought the world, some causes would have preceded the world, whose concourse would have wrought it.

Est enim casus inopinatus eventus ex causis confluentibus. Cum ergo nihil praeter creatorem praecessit mundum, casu non est factus; igitur aliquo artifice. Artifex vero ille homo non fuit, ante enim mundus est factus quam homo.

For chance is an unanticipated event from confluent causes. Since therefore nothing besides the creator preceded the world, it was not made by chance; therefore by some artificer. But that artificer was not a man, for the world was made before man.

Deus ergo.

Therefore, God.

Per cotidianam vero dispositionem idem sic probatur: ea quae disponuntur, sapienter disponuntur; ergo aliqua sapientia; nihil enim sine sapientia sapienter disponitur. Est igitur sapientia, qua omnia disponuntur. Sapientia autem illa vel humana est vel divina.

But through the everyday disposition the same is thus proved: the things which are disposed are disposed sapiently; therefore by some sapience; for nothing is disposed sapiently without sapience. Therefore there is sapience by which all things are disposed. But that sapience is either human or divine.

Humana vero non est, quae res facit vivere et loqui. Etsi namque humana sapientia formam hominis vel alterius animalis operatur, motum illi et vitam conferre non potest. Divina ergo sapientia est, quae hoc agit.

But it is not human sapience that makes things live and speak. For although human sapience produces the form of a man or of another animal, it cannot confer motion and life upon it. Therefore it is divine sapience that does this.

Sed omnis sapientia alicuius est sapientia. Est ergo, cuius est illa sapientia, nec idem est homo. Deus ergo.

But all wisdom is the wisdom of someone. Therefore there is one whose that wisdom is, and he is not the same as a man. Therefore, God.

Sic per cotidianam dispositionem pervenitur ad divinam sapientiam, per sapientiam ad divinam substantiam. Unde divina sapientia dicitur signaculum et imago dei.

Thus by quotidian disposition one arrives at divine wisdom, by wisdom at the divine substance. Whence divine wisdom is called the seal and image of god.

In hac divinitate omnium conditrice et omnia gubernante dixerunt philosophi inesse potentiam operandi, sapientiam, voluntatem. Si enim non potuit et nescivit, quomodo tam pulcra fecit? Si iterum fecit et noluit, vel ignorans vel coactus hoc fecit.

In this divinity, the founder of all things and the one governing all things, the philosophers said there is inherent the potency of operating, sapience, and volition. For if it neither was able nor knew, how did it make things so beautiful? If, again, it made and did not will it, it did this either ignorant or under compulsion.

Sed quid ignoraret, qui etiam novit cogitationes hominum? Quis cogeret illum, qui omnia potest? Est ergo in divinitate potentia, sapientia, voluntas, quas sancti tres personas vocant vocabula illa a vulgari propter affinitatem quandam transferentes, vocantes potentiam patrem, sapientiam filium, voluntatem spiritum sanctum.

But what would he be ignorant of, who even knows the cogitations of men? Who would coerce him, who can do all things? There is therefore in the divinity power, wisdom, will, which the saints call three persons, transferring those vocables from the vulgar on account of a certain affinity, calling power the Father, wisdom the Son, will the Holy Spirit.

VI. QUARE POTENTIA DICATUR PATER

6. WHY POWER IS CALLED FATHER

Potentia dicitur pater, quia omnia creat et paterno affectu disponit.

Power is called father, because it creates all things and disposes them with paternal affection.

VII. QUARE SAPIENTIA FILIUS

7. WHY WISDOM IS THE SON

Sapientia vero dicitur filius a patre ante saecula genitus et tamen illi coaeternus, quia ut filius temporaliter est a patre, ita sapientia aeternaliter et consubstantialiter a potentia.

Wisdom indeed is called the Son, begotten of the Father before the ages and yet coeternal with him, because as the Son is temporally from the Father, so Wisdom is eternally and consubstantially from Power.

VIII. QUARE FILIUS COAETERNUS A PATRE GENITUS

8. WHY THE COETERNAL SON WAS BEGOTTEN FROM THE FATHER

Sed quia diximus filium gigni a patre et tamen coaeternum illi esse, de illa genitura aliquid dicamus, illud ante orantes, ne illud quod invenitur "Generationem eius quis enarrabit?" putetur nobis officere, illud enim dictum est non quia impossibile sit, sed quia difficile.

But since we have said that the Son is begotten from the Father and yet is coeternal with him, let us say something about that begetting, praying this beforehand, lest that which is found, 'Who will enarrate his generation?' be thought to hinder us; for that was said not because it is impossible, but because it is difficult.

Pater ergo genuit filium, i.e. divina potentia sapientiam, quando providit, qualiter res crearet et creatas disponeret. Et quia ante saecula hoc providit, ante saecula sapientiam, i.e. filium, genuit; et hoc ex se, non ex alio, quia neque alicuius doctrina neque usus experientia, sed ex propria natura hoc scire habuit. Ex quo autem fuit (si fas est dicere: de aeterno), ex eo hoc scivit, nec fuit quin ista sciret.

The Father therefore begot the Son, i.e., divine Power begot Wisdom, when He provided how He would create things and how He would dispose the things created. And because He provided this before the ages, before the ages He begot Wisdom, i.e., the Son; and this from Himself, not from another, because by neither anyone’s doctrine nor the use of experience, but from His own nature, He had this knowledge. Moreover, from the time that He was (if it is permissible to say: from eternity), from that [time] He knew this, nor was there [a time] when He did not know these things.

Si ergo aeternus est, et sapientia eius aeterna est. Sic igitur pater genuit filium coaeternum sibi et consubstantialem.

If therefore he is eternal, his wisdom also is eternal. Thus, then, the Father begot the Son coeternal with himself and consubstantial.

IX. QUARE VOLUNTAS SPIRITUS SANCTUS

9. WHY THE WILL IS THE HOLY SPIRIT

Voluntas vero divina dicitur spiritus sanctus. Est autem proprie spiritus halitus, sed quia in spiritu et anhelitu saepe hominis voluntas perpenditur (aliter enim spirat laetus, aliter iratus) divinam voluntatem translative vocaverunt spiritum, sed antonomasice sanctum.

But indeed the divine Will is called the Holy Spirit. Now properly, “spirit” is breath; but because in spirit and in breathing a man’s will is often weighed (for a joyful man breathes one way, an angry man another), they have called the divine will by transference “spirit,” but by antonomasia “Holy.”

X. QUARE SPIRITUS SANCTUS COAETERNUS AB UTROQUE PROCEDAT

10. WHY THE COETERNAL HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FROM BOTH

Spiritus iste a patre et filio procedit, quia voluntas divina et bonitas inde, quod ita potens est et sapiens deus, effectu ostenditur. Nihil enim aliud est spiritum sanctum a patre et filio procedere quam divinam voluntatem ex potentia et sapientia usque ad creationem rerum et gubernationem extendere.

This Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, because the divine will and goodness, from the fact that God is thus potent and wise, are shown by their effect. For the Holy Spirit’s proceeding from the Father and the Son is nothing else than to extend the divine will, out of power and wisdom, all the way to the creation of things and their governance.

XI. DE COAETERNITATE HORUM

11. ON THE CO-ETERNITY OF THESE

Haec bonitas et voluntas patri coaeterna est et filio. Non enim fuit ita potens et sapiens, quod non esset bonus, quia idem est deo et esse et bonum esse. Et ante tempora voluit quod fecit, nulla enim in eo est mutabilitas.

This goodness and will are coeternal with the Father and with the Son. For he was not so potent and wise as not to be good, because for God it is the same both to be and to be good. And before times he willed what he made, for there is no mutability in him.

Coaeterna est ergo praedictis voluntas et bonitas.

Therefore the will and the goodness are coeternal with the aforesaid.

Sed haec personarum trinitas est essentiae unitas. Una enim substantia est potentia divina et sapientia et bonitas.

But this trinity of persons is a unity of essence. For the divine potency and wisdom and goodness are one substance.

XII. QUARE QUAEDAM OPERA UNI DE PERSONIS ATTRIBUANTUR CUM UNA SINE ALIA NIHIL OPERATUR

12. WHY CERTAIN WORKS ARE ATTRIBUTED TO ONE OF THE PERSONS, SINCE ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER OPERATES NOTHING

Quae trinitas quamvis in omnibus cooperetur (numquam enim divina potentia aliquid agit sine sapientia et voluntate, nec sapientia sine potentia et voluntate, nec voluntas sine potentia et sapientia), tamen quaedam opera referuntur potentiae et sic patri, quaedam sapientiae et inde filio, quaedam voluntati et ideo spiritui sancto. Attribuitur potentiae, i.e. patri, filii missio, quam tamen operata est sapientia et voluntas.

Which trinity, although it co-operates in all things (for the divine power never does anything without wisdom and will, nor wisdom without power and will, nor will without power and wisdom), nevertheless certain works are referred to power and thus to the father, certain to wisdom and thence to the son, certain to will and therefore to the holy spirit. The sending of the son is attributed to power, i.e. to the father, which nevertheless was effected by wisdom and will.

XIII. QUARE FILIO ATTRIBUATUR INCARNATIO

13. WHY THE INCARNATION IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE SON

Attribuitur sapientiae, i.e. filio, incarnatio, quam tamen operata est potentia et voluntas; et merito sapientiae ascribitur, cum enim tam potens esset, quod de potestate diaboli humanum genus sola voluntate eripere posset, maluit tamen divinitatem coniungere humanitati, ut qui deum et hominem reconciliaret, in se quod hominis est et dei haberet. Si enim tantum deus esset, numquam diabolus in eum manus iniceret. Quippe quomodo servus in filium potentis domini cognitum manum mitteret?

Incarnation is attributed to Wisdom, i.e., to the Son, which nevertheless Power and Will operated; and deservedly it is ascribed to Wisdom, since he was so potent that by will alone he could snatch the human race from the power of the devil, yet he preferred to conjoin divinity to humanity, so that he who would reconcile God and man might have in himself what is of man and of God. For if he were only God, the devil would never lay hands upon him. Indeed, how would a slave lay a hand upon the recognized son of a powerful lord?

Unde scriptum est: "Si cognovissent, numquam filium dei crucifixissent". Si iterum tantum homo esset, quomodo captivus captivum liberaret? "Omnes enim peccaverunt et egent gratia dei". Redemptor ergo noster deus fuit et homo et adhuc est, ut ex divinitate salvare posset et ex humanitate latere diabolo, ut cum praeter ius et fas diabolus innocentem invaderet, potestatem sibi commissam iuste amitteret.

Whence it is written: "If they had known, they would never have crucified the Son of God." If, again, he were only a man, how would a captive free a captive? "For all have sinned and are in need of the grace of God." Therefore our Redeemer was God and man and still is, so that from his divinity he could save and from his humanity hide from the devil, so that when, contrary to ius and fas (human and divine right), the devil attacked the innocent, he might justly lose the power entrusted to him.

XIV. QUARE SPIRITUI SANCTO PECCATORUM REMISSIO

14. WHY THE REMISSION OF SINS IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE HOLY SPIRIT

Voluntati vero et bonitati divinae remissio peccatorum attribuitur, quia ex voluntate et gratia condonat quod ex potentia et sapientia quam cito factum est punire posset. Sed quia, dum loquimur de divinitate, angustias nostrae scientiae transgressi sumus, tacentes interim de ea ad reliqua transeamus, illud orantes ne, si aliquid quod scriptum non sit alibi, hic inveniatur, haeresis putetur; non enim quia scriptum non est, haeresis est, sed si contra fidem est.

But to the divine will and goodness the remission of sins is attributed, because out of will and grace he pardons what by power and wisdom he could have punished as soon as it was done. But because, while we speak about the divinity, we have transgressed the narrow limits of our knowledge, keeping silence about it for the time being let us pass on to the rest, praying this: that if anything which is not written elsewhere be found here, it not be thought heresy; for it is not heresy because it is not written, but if it is against the faith.

In partitione superiori de eis quae sunt et non videntur primum posuimus creatorem, deinde animam mundi. Finito ergo tractatu de creatore de anima mundi aliquid dicamus.

In the foregoing partition concerning the things which are and are not seen we first posited the creator, then the soul of the world. Therefore, the tractate on the creator being finished, let us say something about the soul of the world.

XV. DE ANIMA MUNDI

15. ON THE SOUL OF THE WORLD

Anima ergo mundi secundum quosdam spiritus sanctus est. Divina enim voluntate et bonitate (quae spiritus sanctus est, ut praediximus) omnia vivunt quae in mundo vivunt. Alii dicunt animam mundi esse naturalem vigorem rebus insitum, quo quaedam vivunt tantum, quaedam vivunt et sentiunt, quaedam vivunt et sentiunt et discernunt; nec est aliquid quod vivat et sentiat et discernat, in quo ille naturalis vigor non sit.

Therefore the soul of the world, according to some, is the Holy Spirit. For by the divine will and goodness (which is the Holy Spirit, as we have said before) all things live that live in the world. Others say that the soul of the world is the natural vigor implanted in things, by which some things live only, some live and feel, some live and feel and discern; nor is there anything that lives and feels and discerns in which that natural vigor is not.

In homine ergo est illa et propria anima.

Therefore in man there is that also, and a proper soul.

Si aliquis concludat: "Ergo in homine sunt duae animae", dicimus "Non", quia non dicimus animam mundi esse animam, sicut non dicimus caput mundi esse caput. Hanc dicit Plato ex dividua et individua substantia esse excogitatam et ex eadem natura et diversa. Cuius expositionem si quis quaerat, in glossulis nostris super Platonem inveniet.

If someone should conclude: "Therefore in man there are two souls," we say "No," because we do not say the soul of the world is a soul, just as we do not say the head of the world is a head. Plato says that this has been excogitated from divisible and indivisible substance, and from the same nature and a different one. Whoever seeks its exposition will find it in our little glosses on Plato.

Tertium genus de eis quae sunt et non videntur diximus daemones esse; de quibus tractare incipientes dicamus, quot illorum sunt ordines et quare vocati sint daemones.

The third kind among those things which are and are not seen we have said to be daemons; beginning to treat of these, let us say how many orders of them there are and why they are called daemons.

XVI. DE DAEMONIBUS

16. ON DAEMONS

Tres igitur daemonum ordines voluit Plato esse, a superiori usque ad imum nihil sine rationali creatura esse affirmans.

Therefore Plato wished there to be three orders of demons, affirming that from the highest down to the lowest nothing exists without a rational creature.

XVII. QUID SIT COELESTE ANIMAL

17. WHAT THE CELESTIAL ANIMAL IS

Dicit enim in firmamento esse quoddam rationale animal quod ita definit: animal rationale, immortale, coeleste, impatibile (stellas videlicet in firmamento, de quibus in loco suo dicemus, sunt enim de eis quae sunt et videntur).

For he says that in the firmament there is a certain rational animal, which he defines thus: a rational, immortal, celestial, impassible animal (namely the stars in the firmament, about which we shall speak in their proper place, for they are of those things which are and are seen).

XVIII. QUID AETHEREUM ANIMAL

18. WHAT AN AETHEREAL ANIMAL

Deinde dixit esse in aethere quoddam genus invisibilis animalis, i. e. a firmamento usque ad lunam, primum in ordine daemonum, quod ita definitur: animal rationale, immortale, impatibile, aethereum, cuius dicit esse officium soli divinae contemplationi vacare et de eius contemplatione delectari.

Then he said that in the ether there is a certain kind of invisible animal, that is, from the firmament up to the moon, the first in the order of daemons, which is thus defined: a rational, immortal, impassible, aethereal animal, whose office he says is to devote itself solely to divine contemplation and to take delight from that contemplation.

XIX. QUID SIT AEREUM ANIMAL

19. WHAT AN AERIAL ANIMAL IS

In inferiori vero loco, scil. circa superiorem partem aeris, vicinam lunae, dicit aliud esse genus, cuius haec est definitio: animal aereum, rationale, immortale, patibile, diligentiam hominibus impertiens, cuius est secundum eundem officium deferre preces hominum deo et voluntatem dei hominibus vel per somnia vel per signa vel per intimam aspirationem vel admonitionem, quod dicitur patibile, quia cum diligat bonos, congaudet illorum prosperitati, compatitur adversitati.

In the lower place indeed, namely around the upper part of the air, near to the moon, he says there is another genus, whose definition is this: an aerial animal, rational, immortal, passible, imparting solicitude to men, whose office, according to the same, is to carry the prayers of men to God and the will of God to men either through dreams or through signs or through inmost inspiration or admonition, which is called passible, because, since it loves the good, it rejoices together at their prosperity, it suffers-with their adversity.

XX. QUID HUMECTUM ANIMAL

20. WHAT A MOIST ANIMAL IS

Tertius ordo est in hac humecta parte aeris, quod ita definitur: animal humectum, rationale, immortale, patibile, cuius est officium humanitati invidere, ex invidia insidiari, quia unde descendit per superbiam, ascendit humanitas per humilitatem. Et est ita luxuriosum, quod aliquando commiscet se mulieribus et aliquos generat. Unde incubi dicuntur daemones qui sic concumbunt.

The third order is in this moist part of the air, which is thus defined: a moist animal, rational, immortal, passible, whose office is to envy humanity and, out of envy, to lay ambush; because by that whence it descended through pride, humanity ascends through humility. And it is so lascivious that at times it mingles itself with women and begets some. Whence demons who lie thus are called incubi.

Qui differunt ab aliis daemonibus in hoc, quod primi duo ordines dicuntur calodaemones, i. e. bonum scientes, calos enim bonum, daemon sciens; isti vero dicuntur cacodaemones, i. e. malum scientes, cacos enim malum est.

Who differ from the other daemons in this, that the first two orders are called calodaemones, i.e., knowing the good, for calos is good, daemon a knower; but these are called cacodaemones, i.e., knowing the evil, for cacos is evil.

Ne abhorreas nomen, quod isti et illi dicuntur daemones quasi scientes, cum isti et illi angeli dicantur, unde dicitur bonus angelus et malus. Inferiorem partem mundi, i. e. terram, habitat animal rationale, mortale, i. e. homo, de quo in loco suo dicemus.

Do not abhor the name, that these and those are called daemons as if knowing ones, since these and those are called angels, whence one says a good angel and an evil angel. The lower part of the world, i. e. the earth, is inhabited by the rational animal, mortal, i. e. the human being, about whom we will speak in his proper place.

XXI. UTRUM CORPORA SINT VEL SPIRITUS

21. WHETHER THEY ARE BODIES OR SPIRITS

De praedictis daemonibus quaeritur, utrum corpora habeant, cum animalia sint et omne animal dicatur corpus, an sint spiritus ut ait propheta: "Qui facit angelos suos spiritus". Inde dicunt quidam quod corpora sint, sed ita subtilia, quod sensu percipi non possunt. Unde respectu nostrorum corporum, quae spissa et grossa sunt, spiritus dicuntur, quemadmodum aer, quamvis corpus sit, propter subtilitatem vocatur spiritus. Et hoc confirmant auctoritate beati Gregorii, qui in Moralibus de angelis loquens ait: "Comparatione quidem nostrorum corporum spiritus sunt, sed comparatione illius et incircumscripti spiritus corpora sunt dicenda". Hoc iterum probant auctoritate beati Augustini, qui in Enchiridion quoddam tale ponit capitulum: "Qualia corpora angeli habeant". Alii dicunt illos non esse corpora, sed spiritus.

Concerning the aforesaid demons it is asked whether they have bodies, since they are animals and every animal is called a body, or whether they are spirits, as the prophet says: "He who makes his angels spirits." Hence some say that they are bodies, but so subtle that they cannot be perceived by sense. Whence, with respect to our bodies, which are dense and gross, they are called spirits, just as air, although it is a body, by reason of its subtlety is called a spirit. And this they confirm by the authority of blessed Gregory, who, speaking about angels in the Morals, says: "In comparison indeed with our bodies they are spirits, but in comparison with that uncircumscribed Spirit they are to be called bodies." This again they prove by the authority of blessed Augustine, who in the Enchiridion sets down a certain chapter to this effect: "What sort of bodies the angels have." Others say that they are not bodies, but spirits.

Sed qui ubique non sunt et de loco ad locum moventur, comparatione summi spiritus, qui ubique totus et integer est, a beato Gregorio corpora dicti sunt. Nec inde sequitur, quod corpora sint, sicut est illud "Sapientia huius mundi stultitia est apud deum": non quia deus sapientiam huius mundi stultitiam reputet, sed quia ad comparationem divinae sapientiae stultitia est. Nec tamen ideo sequitur, quod sit stultitia.

But those who are not everywhere and are moved from place to place, in comparison to the highest Spirit, who is everywhere whole and entire, have been called bodies by Blessed Gregory. Nor does it from that follow that they are bodies, just as in that saying, "The wisdom of this world is folly with God": not because God reckons the wisdom of this world to be folly, but because, in comparison to divine wisdom, it is folly. Nor yet does it therefore follow that it is folly.

De illo capitulo beati Augustini "Qualia corpora habeant angeli" dicunt beatum Augustinum loqui ibi de corporibus, quae assumunt, quando hominibus apparent, utrum vera sint corpora an non, nec tamen ideo dicit ea esse corpora.

Concerning that chapter of Blessed Augustine, “What sort of bodies the angels have,” they say that Blessed Augustine is speaking there about the bodies which they assume when they appear to human beings, whether they are true bodies or not; nor for that reason does he say that they are bodies.

Nos vero plus illorum sententiae accedimus, qui dicunt esse spiritus. Nec videatur alicui inconveniens, quod Plato dicit duo genera esse calodaemonum cum divina scriptura dicat novem esse ordines angelorum. Plato enim divisit ea secundum loca, sed divina pagina iuxta officia.

We, for our part, incline more to the opinion of those who say they are spirits. Nor let it seem unfitting to anyone that Plato says there are two genera of calodaemons, while divine Scripture says there are nine orders of angels. For Plato divided them according to places, but the divine page according to offices.

In duobus ergo illis generibus continentur novem ordines et e converso.

In those two genera, therefore, the nine orders are contained, and conversely.

Post tractatum de creatore et anima mundi et de daemonibus, restat tractare de anima hominis; sed quia de homine locuturi sumus, usque ad illum locum loqui de eius anima differamus, ut sit unus et continuus de homine tractatus.

After the treatise on the creator and the soul of the world and on the daemons, it remains to treat of the soul of man; but since we are going to speak about man, let us defer speaking about his soul until that place, so that there may be one single and continuous treatise about man.

XXII. DE ELEMENTIS

22. ON THE ELEMENTS

Hactenus de illis quae sunt et non videntur nostra disseruit oratio; nunc ad ea quae sunt et videntur stilus convertatur. Sed antequam initium dicendi faciamus, petimus, ut si loquentes de visibilibus, probabile et non necessarium dicamus, vel necessarium et non probabile, non inde vituperemur: ut philosophi enim necessarium, etsi non probabile ponimus, ut physici vero probabile, etsi non necessarium adiungimus. Sed illud videatur, si aliqui probabilius inter modernos inde tractaverunt.

Thus far our oration has discoursed about those things which are and are not seen; now let the stylus be turned to those things which are and are seen. But before we make a beginning of speaking, we ask that, if while speaking about visibles we say what is probable and not necessary, or necessary and not probable, we not on that account be reproached: for as philosophers we set down the necessary, even if not probable; but as physicists we add the probable, even if not necessary. But let this be considered, whether any among the moderns have treated it more probably.

Tractaturi igitur de eis quae sunt et videntur, quia illa corpora sunt et omnia corpora ex elementis constant, ab elementis sumatur exordium, et ostendamus, quid sit elementum, quare IIII sint elementa nec pauciora, quod fuit chaos elementorum et qualiter solutum.

Therefore, being about to treat of those things which are and are seen, since those are bodies and all bodies consist of elements, let the exordium be taken from the elements, and let us show what an element is, why the elements are 4 and not fewer, what the chaos of the elements was, and how it was dissolved.

Elementum ergo, ut ait Constantinus in Pantegni, est simpla et minima pars alicuius corporis simpla ad qualitatem, minima ad quantitatem; cuius expositio talis est: elementum est pars simpla, i. e. cuius non sunt contrariae qualitates. Sed quia †hoc totum videntur† habere ossa et similia, ut removeat illa, addit "minima", i. e. quae ita est pars alicuius, quod nihil est pars eiusdem. Unde litterae per simile dicuntur elementa, quia ita sunt partes syllabae, quod nihil est pars eiusdem.

Element, therefore, as Constantine says in the Pantegni, is the simple and minimal part of some body simple with respect to quality, minimal with respect to quantity; whose exposition is such: an element is a simple part, i. e. one of which the qualities are not contrary. But because bones and the like †seem to have this whole†, so as to remove those he adds "minimal," i. e. which is so a part of something that nothing is a part of the same. Whence letters by a likeness are called elements, because they are so parts of the syllable that nothing is a part of the same.

Voluit autem iste Constantinus ex IIII elementis constare humores, ex humoribus partes tam omiomiras, i. e. consimiles ut est caro, ossa, quam organicas, i. e. officiales ut manus, pedes et similia, ex utrisque vero partibus humanum corpus constare. Ergo secundum eum nullum ex his IIII quae videntur et a quibusdam elementa reputata sunt, elementum est, videl. neque terra nec aqua nec aer nec ignis, nullum quippe eorum est simplum qualitate, minimum quantitate.

Moreover, this Constantine wished the humors to consist of 4 elements, and from the humors the parts both homoeomeres, i. e. similar ones, as flesh, bones, and organic, i. e. official/functional ones, as hands, feet, and the like; and that from both kinds of parts the human body consists. Therefore, according to him, none of these 4 which are seen and by some have been reckoned elements is an element, namely neither earth nor water nor air nor fire; for none of them is simple in quality, minimal in quantity.

Etenim in terra aliquid est calidi, aliquid frigidi, aliquid sicci, aliquid humidi. Quod quia patens est lippis et tonsoribus, probationem illius praetermittamus, neque enim aperte vera neque aperte falsa probanda sunt, sed de quibus aliqua dubitatio est.

For indeed in earth there is something hot, something cold, something dry, something moist. Because this is patent to the bleary-eyed and to barbers, let us pass over the proof of it; for neither things openly true nor things openly false are to be proved, but those about which there is some doubt.

Non est ergo simpla qualitate, minima quantitate, cum ex tam magnis partibus constet: quantae sunt IIII illius partes vel V zonae! Nec ergo elementum est. Similiter de aqua et aere et igne probari potest.

It is not, therefore, simple in quality, least in quantity, since it consists of such great parts: how great are its 4 parts or 5 zones! Therefore it is not an element. Similarly it can be proved concerning water and air and fire.

Elementa ergo sunt simplae et minimae particulae, quibus haec IIII constant, quae videmus. Quae elementa numquam videntur, sed ratione divisionis intelliguntur. Dividitur enim, ut figuraliter dicatur, humanum corpus in organica, scil.

Therefore the elements are simple and smallest particles, by which these 4 things which we see consist. These elements are never seen, but are understood by the reasoning of division. For the human body, so to speak figuratively, is divided into organic parts, namely,

in manus etc., organica vero in omiomira, i. e. consimilia, videl. in particulas carnis et ossis etc., omiomira autem in humores, melancoliam etc., et humores in elementa, i. e. in simplas et minimas particulas. Cuius divisionis pars actu, pars sola ratione et cogitatione, fieri potest, corpus enim humanum in membra, membra in omiomira actus dividere potest, sed omiomira in humores, humores in elementa solus intellectus dividit, quia ut ait Boetius in commentario super Porphyrium "vis est intellectus coniuncta disiungere, disiuncta coniungere".

into hands, etc., but the organic into homoeomera, i. e. consimilar, namely into particles of flesh and of bone, etc.; moreover the homoeomera into humors, melancholy, etc., and the humors into elements, i. e. into simple and minimal particles. Of which division one part can be made in act, another part by reason and thought alone: for an actual act can divide the human body into members, and the members into homoeomera, but the intellect alone divides the homoeomera into humors, and the humors into elements, because as Boethius says in the commentary on Porphyry "the power of the intellect is to disjoin things conjoined, to conjoin things disjoined".

Sed quaerat aliquis: "Ubi sunt elementa?" Nos vero dicimus: "In compositione humani corporis et aliorum sicut littera est in compositione syllabae, etsi non per se". Sed sunt quidam qui ut rustici nesciunt aliquid esse nisi sensu possint illud comprehendere, quia animalis homo non percipit quae spiritus sunt, cum sapienti plus sint inquirenda insensibilia quam sensibilia.

But someone may ask: "Where are the elements?" We for our part say: "In the composition of the human body and of other things, just as a letter is in the composition of a syllable, though not by itself." But there are some who, like rustics, do not know a thing to be unless they can apprehend it by sense, because the animal man does not perceive the things that are of the spirit, whereas for the wise man the insensibles are to be inquired into more than the sensibles.

Cum ergo illae simplae et minimae particulae elementa sint quae est frigida et sicca, terra est; quae frigida et humida, aqua est; quae calida et humida, aer est; quae calida et sicca, ignis est. Cum igitur haec IIII quae videntur ex illis composita sunt, illud in quo particulae frigidae et siccae dominantur, nomine illius elementi dicitur terra; in quo frigidae et humidae, aqua; in quo calidae et siccae, ignis. Si ergo illis digna velimus imponere nomina, particulas praedictas dicamus "elementa", ista IIII quae videntur "elementata".

Since therefore those simple and minimal particles are the elements that which is cold and dry is earth; that which is cold and moist, water; that which is hot and moist, air; that which is hot and dry, fire. Since therefore these 4 which are seen are composed out of those, that in which cold and dry particles predominate is called by the name of that element earth; in which cold and moist, water; in which hot and dry, fire. If therefore we should wish to impose names worthy of them, let us call the aforesaid particles "elements," these 4 that are seen "elementated."

Sunt quidam, qui neque Constantini scripta neque alterius physici umquam legerunt, ex superbia ab aliquo discere dedignantes, et ex arrogantia quae nesciunt confingentes. Ne nihil dicere videantur, dicunt elementa esse proprietates istorum quae videntur, calorem scil., siccitatem, frigiditatem et humorem. Sed istis physicam velut in partem praedae detrahentibus reclamat eadem ore Platonis vocantis elementa materias, cum nullae qualitates materia alicuius esse possunt.

There are some who have read neither the writings of Constantine nor ever those of any other physicist, disdaining out of pride to learn from anyone, and out of arrogance fabricating what they do not know. Lest they seem to say nothing, they say the elements are the properties of those things that are seen, namely, heat, dryness, coldness, and moisture. But while these men, as if dragging Physics off as a share of booty, are detracting from it, that same discipline protests with the mouth of Plato, calling the elements “materials,” since no qualities can be the matter of anything.

Est etenim materia quod accepta forma transit in aliud. Reclamat item ore Ioannicii qui in Isagogis suis ait aliud esse elementa, aliud commistiones eorum, quae sunt calidae et siccae, et sic de aliis. Iterum reclamat ore Macrobii qui dicit: "Cum in singulis elementis essent diversae qualitates, talem unicuique dedit, ut in eo cui inhaererent, et cognatam et similem reperirent, ut aqua cum terra frigiditatem, aer cum aqua humiditatem, ignis cum aere calorem". Vide ut dixit elementa non esse qualitates, sed qualitates esse in elementis!

For indeed matter is that which, once it has received form, transits into another. Likewise he protests by the mouth of Ioannicius, who in his Isagoges says that the elements are one thing, the commistions of them another, which are hot and dry, and so with the others. Again he protests by the mouth of Macrobius, who says: "Since in the individual elements there were diverse qualities, he gave such a one to each, that in that in which they inhere they might find both a cognate and a similar one, as water with earth frigidity, air with water humidity, fire with air heat." See how he said that the elements are not qualities, but that qualities are in the elements!

Si ergo quod alicui inest, diversum est ab eo cui inest, non sunt qualitates elementa.

If therefore that which inheres in something is different from that in which it inheres, the elements are not qualities.

Sunt alii qui dicunt ista quae videntur esse elementa comprobantes hoc auctoritate Juvenalis qui de gulosis loquens ait: "Gustus per omnia elementa quaerunt", in terra scil. venationes, in aqua pisces, in aere volucres. Et quia ista sententia vera est nec auctoritati Constantini contraria, qualiter cum illa stare possit, exponamus: Constantinus igitur ut physicus de naturis corporum tractans simplices illorum et minimas particulas elementa quasi prima principia vocavit; philosophi vero de creatione mundi agentes, non de naturis singulorum corporum ista IIII quae videntur elementa mundi dixerunt, quia ex istis constat et ista prima creata sunt, deinde ex eis ut elementis cetera omnia vel creata sunt vel creantur vel creabuntur, ut in sequentibus ostendetur.

There are others who say that those things which seem to be the elements—corroborating this by the authority of Juvenal, who, speaking about the gluttonous, says: "They seek taste through all the elements," on land, namely, hunts, in water, fishes, in air, birds. And because that opinion is true and not contrary to the authority of Constantine, let us explain how it can stand together with that: Constantine, therefore, as a physicus, treating of the natures of bodies, called their simple and smallest particles elements, as it were first principles; but the philosophers, dealing with the creation of the world, not with the natures of individual bodies, called these 4 which seem the elements the elements of the world, because out of these it consists and these were first created; then out of them, as elements, all other things either have been created or are created or will be created, as will be shown in what follows.

Nulla ergo inter hos contrarietas.

Therefore there is no contrariety between these.

Sed dicunt contra: "Nullum istorum elementum est, quia nullum illorum est, quod ex IIII elementis factum non sit", quod probant sic: in terra aliquid de aqua est, quia aliquid humiditatis inde videmus exire. In eadem est aliquid aeris, quod probat fumus inde evaporans, et aliquid caloris, quod tactu percipimus. Similiter de aliis probant.

But they say on the contrary: "None of these is an element, because none of them is such that it has not been made from the 4 elements," which they prove thus: in earth there is something of water, because we see some humidity go out from it. In the same there is something of air, which smoke evaporating from it proves, and something of heat, which we perceive by touch. Similarly they prove concerning the others.

Hoc idem probant auctoritate Platonis qui ait: "Cum terra transeat in aquam et aqua in terram, quare magis dicatur terra quam aqua?" Nos vero dicimus contra in unoquoque illorum aliquid de aliis esse, nec tamen inde ea esse facta, quia non substantialiter, sed accidentaliter inest. Cum enim terra porosa sit et aquis circumdata, aliquid humoris aquae subintrat eam et aliquid aeris. Cum vero in medio mundi sit et ignis aequaliter ab ea ex omni parte distet, quid mirum si aliquid caloris inde recipiat?

They prove this same thing by the authority of Plato, who says: "Since earth passes into water and water into earth, why should it more be called earth than water?" But we, contrariwise, say that in each one of those there is something of the others, yet not that they are made from that, because it is present not substantially but accidentally. For since earth is porous and surrounded by waters, some moisture of the water enters within it and some air. And since it is in the middle of the world and fire is equally distant from it on every side, what wonder if it receives from there some heat?

Insunt ergo ista terrae accidentaliter, non naturaliter neque ex eis constat. Similiter de aliis licet probare.

Therefore these things are present in the earth accidentally, not naturally, nor does it consist of them. Similarly, one may prove the same about the others.

Sed quia brevitatem in hoc opere sectamur, quid in aliis de aliis sit et qualiter accidat eis, ingeniis aliorum inquirere dimittamus. Etenim principium a magistro, sed perfectio debet esse ab ingenio.

But since we pursue brevity in this work, let us leave it to the wits of others to inquire what in some is from others, and how it befalls them. For indeed the beginning is from the master, but perfection ought to be from ingenuity.

Quod iterum dicunt Platonem quaesisse, cur magis dicatur terra quam aqua, cum sic dissolvatur, sic intelligimus illum non loqui de elemento ibi, sed de parte elementi quae dissolvitur, numquam enim totum elementum dissolvitur. Dicit ergo id, quod dissolvitur, non esse terram, sed terreum i. e. partem terrae; sed quod remanet retinens proprietates terrae dicit terram et elementum. Sed de hoc deo annuente vitam satis dicemus.

As to what they again say that Plato asked, why it is more called earth than water, since it is thus dissolved, thus we understand him not to speak there of the element, but of the part of the element which is dissolved; for never is the whole element dissolved. He therefore says that that which is dissolved is not earth, but terrene, i. e. a part of earth; but that which remains, retaining the properties of earth, he calls earth and an element. But about this, God granting life, we shall speak sufficiently.

Sunt ergo elementa corporum praedictae particulae, ut ait Constantinus. Sunt autem elementa mundi quae videntur. De quibus huiusmodi tractatus habendus videtur, quare unumquodque factum sit, quare IIII nec pauciora.

Therefore the elements of bodies are the aforesaid particles, as Constantine says. But the elements of the world are those which are seen. Concerning which a treatise of this kind seems to be required: why each thing was made, why 4 and not fewer.

Sed quia firmior est sententia quae auctoritate sapientis innititur, quid inde Plato senserit, ostendamus. "Divini", inquit, "decoris ratio postulabat talem fieri mundum qui et visum pateretur et tactum". Ac si diceret: "Cum deus sola bonitate, non indigentia, mundum creare disponeret, quippe qui perfectum bonum est, talem voluit illum fieri, qui et videretur et tangeretur, ut homo etiam oculis in rerum creatione et gubernatione divinam potentiam et sapientiam et bonitatem percipiens potentiam timeret, sapientiam veneraretur, bonitatem imitaretur". Deinde subiungit: "Constabat autem nihil posse videri sine ignis beneficio neque tangi sine solido neque solidum esse sine terra". (Quomodo visus sine igne esse non possit nec tangibile sine terra, loquentes de sensibus corporeis ostendemus). Postea addit: "ldcirco iecit deus quasi fundamenta ignem et terram. Sed quoniam in eis sunt contrarietates quippe terra est corpulenta, obtusa, immobilis, ignis acutus, subtilis, mobilis vidit deus sine medio ea iungi non posse et ideo inter ea medium creavit".

But because the opinion that rests on the authority of a wise man is firmer, let us show what Plato thought thereupon. "The rationale of divine beauty," he says, "demanded that a world be made such as would admit both of being seen and of being touched." As if he were saying: "Since God, by sole goodness, not by need, arranged to create the world—inasmuch as He is the perfect Good—He wished it to be made such that it should both be seen and be touched, in order that man also with his eyes, perceiving in the creation and governance of things the divine power and wisdom and goodness, might fear the power, venerate the wisdom, imitate the goodness." Then he subjoins: "Moreover, it stood that nothing can be seen without the benefit of fire, nor be touched without the solid, nor be solid without earth." (How sight cannot exist without fire, nor the tangible without earth, speaking of the bodily senses we shall show.) Afterwards he adds: "ldcirco God cast down as it were foundations, fire and earth. But since in them there are contrarieties to wit, earth is corpulent, blunt, immobile; fire sharp, subtle, mobile God saw that without a middle they could not be joined, and therefore He created a middle between them."

Et quia de coniunctione illorum fecimus mentionem, dicamus, quid sit commistio, quid coniunctio contrariorum. Commistio ergo contrariorum est, quando ex duobus ita fit unum, ut neutrum remaneat id quod ante fuerat, ut si calidissimum frigidissimo misceatur, fit tepidum neque calidissimo neque frigidissimo remanente. Coniunctio vero contrariorum est, quando ex duobus ita fit unum quod utrumque remanet quod antea fuerat.

And since we have made mention of their conjunction, let us say what commixture is, what the conjunction of contraries is. Therefore commixture of contraries is when from two one is thus made, such that neither remains what it had been before; as if the hottest be mixed with the coldest, it becomes tepid, with neither the hottest nor the coldest remaining. But the conjunction of contraries is when from two one is thus made, such that each remains what it had been before.

Sed hoc in contrariis, habentibus agentes qualitates, sine medio esse non potest; sunt autem agentes qualitates calor, frigiditas; sed quare, loquentes de homine dicemus.

But this, in contraries having active qualities, cannot be without a medium; moreover, the active qualities are heat and frigidity; but the reason why we will say when speaking about man.

Si enim unum alteri apponatur, repugnant dissolvitque unum aliud. Oportet ergo, ut subsistant, medium esse. Quodsi tale fuerit quod plus habeat se ad unum quam ad aliud, paulatim transibit in aliud, ad quod plus se habet et ita dissolvitur illa coniunctio, ut si inter calidissimum et frigidissimum aliquid ponatur plus se habens ad calidum quam ad frigidum transeunte illo in naturam calidi peribit frigidum et dissolvetur illa coniunctio.

For if one is set beside the other, they are repugnant, and the one dissolves the other. It is necessary, therefore, that, in order for them to subsist, there be a medium. But if this medium be such as to have itself more toward the one than toward the other, it will gradually pass into the other toward which it has itself more, and thus that conjunction is dissolved, as if, between the hottest and the coldest, something be placed having itself more toward the hot than toward the cold: as that passes into the nature of the hot, the cold will perish, and that conjunction will be dissolved.

Sed si tale fuerit medium, quod aequaliter habeat se ad duo extrema non plus transiens in naturam unius quam alterius, coniunctionem illorum observabit.

But if the medium be such as to have itself equally toward the two extremes, not passing more into the nature of the one than of the other, it will observe the conjunction of those.

Volens ergo praedicta duo elementa non commisceri, sed coniungere, ut utrumque id quod est remaneret, medium inter illa creavit, non unum tantum, sed duo, scil. aquam et aera. Si enim solam aquam inter ea posuisset, cum pius ad terram quam ad ignem se haberet, habet enim commune cum terra corpulentiam, obtusitatem, cum igne mobilitatem, coniunctio illa non duraret.

Willing, therefore, that the aforesaid two elements not be commixed but conjoined, so that each might remain what it is, he created a medium between them—not one only, but two, to wit, water and air. For if he had placed water alone between them, since it would bear itself more toward earth than toward fire—for it has in common with earth corpulence and obtuseness, and with fire mobility—that conjunction would not endure.

Similiter si solum aera, habet enim commune subtilitatem et mobilitatem cum igne, cum terra obtusitatem.

Similarly, if air alone, for it has in common subtlety and mobility with fire, with earth obtuseness.

Sed dicet aliquis: "Etsi unum istorum non sufficeret, potuit deus facere aliud quod sufficeret". Sed dicimus nos non ponere terminum in divina potentia, sed dicimus, de illis quae sunt nullum potuisse sufficere nec iuxta naturam rerum posse esse aliud quod sufficeret.

But someone will say: "Even if one of these would not suffice, God could make another that would suffice." But we say we do not set a terminus to divine potency, but we say that, of those things which are, none could have sufficed, nor according to the nature of things could there be another that would suffice.

Sed quia iam ostendimus, quare unum ex istis solum non sufficeret, quare aliquid aliud esse non potest, aperiamus. Cum igitur inter aliqua duo sunt duae contrariae qualitates, quia binarius in duo aequa potest dividi, potest esse aliquid quod unam proprietatem uniuscuiusque retinens in medio sufficiat, ut cum terra et aer duas contrarias habent qualitates (est enim terra frigida et sicca, aer calidus et humidus) aqua habens commune cum terra frigiditatem, cum aere humorem, inter illa sola sufficit. Similiter ignis et aqua contrarias habent qualitates, est quippe ignis calidus et siccus, aqua frigida et humida.

But since we have already shown why one of these alone would not suffice, let us make plain why there cannot be something else. When therefore between certain two things there are two contrary qualities, since the binary can be divided into two equals, there can be something which, retaining one property of each, suffices in the middle; as when earth and air have two contrary qualities (for earth is cold and dry, air hot and moist), water, having coldness in common with earth and moisture with air, alone suffices between those. Similarly, fire and water have contrary qualities, for fire is hot and dry, water cold and moist.

Sed quia aer habet commune cum aqua humiditatem, cum igne calorem, inter utramque solus sufficit.

But because the air has humidity in common with water, and heat in common with fire, it alone suffices between the two.

Si vero inter aliqua sint tres contrariae sicut nec ternarius in duo aequa potest dividi, sic nec medium, quod aequaliter habeat se ad ea, potest inveniri, oportet enim quod de uno unam accipiat, de alio duas. Sic enim nec aliter in integra potest dividi ternarius. Qualitas vero per media non dividitur.

But if among certain things there are three contraries, just as the ternary cannot be divided into two equals, so neither can a mean that would stand equally toward them be found; for it must take from the one one [property], from the other two. For thus, and not otherwise, can the ternary be divided into whole parts. But quality is not divided by intermediates.

Non ergo potest esse medium nisi participans una et duabus.

Therefore a mean cannot exist unless participating in one and in two.

Iterum dicet: "Etsi secundum hanc sinzugiam trium qualitatum unum medium esse non potest, secundum illam, quae fit duabus qualitatibus illud habere potuerunt. Si enim inter ignem et aquam quae contrarias habent qualitates est aer qui participat una unius, una alterius, quare inter ignem et terram quae in sinzugia duarum qualitatum non habent omnino eas contrarias, unum medium quod utriusque unam accipiat, esse non potuit (est enim ignis calidus et siccus, terra frigida et sicca)? Nos vero dicimus nec secundum hanc medium fuisse necessarium, cum in aliquo conveniant, scil. in siccitate, nec esse potuit.

He will say again: "Even if according to this syzygy of three qualities a single medium cannot exist, according to that which is formed by two qualities they could have had it. For if between fire and water, which have contrary qualities, there is air which participates in one of the one, and one of the other, why between fire and earth, which in the syzygy of two qualities do not at all have those contraries, could there not be a single medium that takes one of each (for fire is hot and dry, earth cold and dry)? We for our part say that not even according to this was a medium necessary, since they agree in something, scil. in dryness, nor could it exist.

Si enim aliquid tale medium esset quod ab utroque aliquid acciperet, vel acciperet ab igne calorem, a terra siccitatem et idem esset in hoc quod ignis; vel a terra frigiditatem, ab igne siccitatem et sic idem esset quod terra; vel ab igne calorem, a terra frigiditatem (praeter hos, ut opinor, nihil potest confingi); sed impossibile est aliquid esse calidum et frigidum.

For if there were some such medium that would take something from both, either it would take heat from fire and siccity from earth, and would thus be the same in this respect as fire; or frigidity from earth and siccity from fire, and thus would be the same as earth; or heat from fire and frigidity from earth (beyond these, as I suppose, nothing can be contrived); but it is impossible for anything to be hot and cold.

Cum enim sint IIII elementa et IIII illorum qualitates, inde fiunt VI complexiones, quarum IIII quidem sunt possibiles, duae impossibiles. Sunt autem IIII possibiles: calidum et siccum, calidum et humidum, frigidum et humidum, frigidum et siccum; duae vero impossibiles sunt: calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum. Duo ergo elementa creator in medio posuit, quia unum praedictis rationibus in medio sufficere non potuit.

For since there are 4 elements and 4 of their qualities, from that there arise 6 complexions, of which 4 are indeed possible, two impossible. Now the 4 possible are: hot and dry, hot and humid, frigid and humid, frigid and dry; but the two impossible are: hot and frigid, humid and dry. Therefore the Creator placed two elements in the middle, because one alone could not suffice in the middle for the aforesaid reasons.

Elementorum vero talis est dispositio, quod inferiorem locum obtinet terra, deinde aqua, postea aer, superiorem ignis. Si enim aliquid inferius terra esset, naturaliter gravis, ad illud tenderet (gravia enim naturaliter tendunt deorsum). Si vero aliquid supra ignem, ex levitate ad illud tenderet et dissolvi ab aliis quaereret. Iuxta terram posita est aqua, quia cum naturaliter gravis sit, etsi non quantum terra, secundum locum obtinere debuit.

But indeed such is the disposition of the elements, that earth holds the lower place, then water, afterwards air, and fire the upper. For if something were below earth, being naturally heavy, it would tend toward it (for heavy things naturally tend downward). But if something were above fire, by its lightness it would tend toward it and would seek to be dissolved from the others. Water is placed next to the earth, because, since it is naturally heavy, although not as much as earth, it ought to obtain the second place.

Deinde est aer qui, quia gravior est igne et levior aqua, merito inter utrumque ponitur.

Next comes the air, which, because it is heavier than fire and lighter than water, is deservedly set between the two.

Et quoniam quid sit elementum docuimus et quot sint et quare plura non sint et causam ordinationis signavimus, de chao, i. e. elementorum confusione quae fuit in principio, dicamus communem sententiam proponentes, deinde eam improbantes, ad ultimum nostram rationem confirmantes.

And since we have taught what an element is and how many there are and why there are not more, and have marked the cause of the order, let us speak about chaos, i.e. the confusion of the elements which was in the beginning, proposing the common opinion, then disproving it, and at last confirming our own rationale.

Dicunt omnes fere elementa in prima creatione certa loca non obtinuisse, sed modo simul ascendere, modo simul descendere. Subiungunt etiam rationem, quare: ut creator videl. ostenderet, nisi sua potentia et sapientia et bonitas res ordinaret, quanta rerum confusio foret.

Almost all say that in the first creation the elements did not obtain fixed places, but that at one time they ascended together, at another they descended together. They also subjoin the reason why: namely, that the creator might show that, unless by his own power and wisdom and goodness he were to order things, how great a confusion of things there would be.

Deinde auctoritate Platonis hoc approbant qui in Timeo ait deum ex inordinata iactatione elementa redegisse in ordinem. Nos vero dicimus falsam esse sententiam quam proponunt, non convenientem esse rationem quam inducunt nec bene esse intellectam auctoritatem quam praetendunt. Prius ergo probemus sententiam esse falsam, postea rationem non esse convenientem, deinde auctoritatem non bene intellectam.

Then they approve this by the authority of Plato, who in the Timaeus says that God reduced the elements from disorderly agitation into order. We, however, say that the opinion they put forward is false, that the rationale they introduce is not congruent, and that the authority which they parade is not well understood. Therefore, first let us prove that the opinion is false, afterwards that the reason is not fitting, and then that the authority is not well understood.

Dic ergo, quisquis hoc affirmas: Elementa tunc erant corpora vel non? Si corpora non erant, spiritus vel proprietates spiritus aut corporis erant. Sed neque spiritus neque aliqua proprietas materia esse potest, nec ergo elementa.

Say therefore, whoever affirms this: Were the elements then bodies or not? If they were not bodies, they were spirits or properties of spirit or of body. But neither spirit nor any property can be matter, and therefore neither can the elements.

Corpora igitur erant et loca obtinebant (omne enim corpus in aliquo loco est)? Si in loco erant, vel ubi nunc sunt vel alibi. Sed extra elementa nullus locus est. Erant ergo elementa ubi nunc sunt; etiam si sic non essent disposita ut nunc sunt, in his IIII locis erant.

Bodies therefore existed and were occupying places (for every body is in some place)? If they were in a place, either where they are now or elsewhere. But outside the elements there is no place. Therefore the elements were where they are now; even if they were not disposed thus as they are now, they were in these 4 places.

Aliquod ergo obtinebat inferiorem locum, aliquod superiorem, duo media loca. Si ergo, ut affirmas, simul descenderent inferius, cum aliis descenderent; sed non est, quo descenderent. Similiter, si ascenderent superius, cum aliis ascenderent, sed non erat, quo ascenderent.

Accordingly, one occupied the lower place, another the higher, and two the middle places. If, therefore, as you affirm, they were to descend below together, they would descend with the others; but there is nowhere for them to descend. Likewise, if they were to ascend above, they would ascend with the others, but there was nowhere for them to ascend.

Nec ergo simul ascendebant nec simul descendebant. Falsa est ergo illorum sententia.

Therefore they were not ascending simultaneously nor descending simultaneously. Therefore the opinion of those men is false.

Inconveniens vero est ratio quam inducunt, scil. deum ad hoc fecisse, ut ostenderet, quanta rerum confusio foret, nisi bonitas eam ordinaret. Cui ostenderet?

Incongruous indeed is the reasoning which they introduce, namely, that God did this in order to show how great a confusion of things there would be, unless goodness ordered it. To whom would he show it?

Angelo? Sed angelus ex natura et gratia divinam voluntatem cognoscit. Homini?

To an angel? But an angel by nature and by grace knows the divine will. To a man?

Sed nondum erat homo. Et si, ut homini eam ostenderet facta esset, usque ad hominem servaretur. Sed ante creationem hominis ordinata est.

But man did not yet exist. And if, in order that he might show it to man, it had been done, it would have been preserved until man. But before the creation of man it was ordered.

Inconveniens igitur haec est ratio.

Therefore this rationale is unsuitable.

Auctoritas vero Platonis non bene ab eis intellecta est. Cum enim dicit Plato deum ex inordinata iactatione elementa reduxisse in ordinem, non ideo dicit, quod umquam inordinate iactarentur. Quis enim locus ullus esset inordinationi deo cuncta disponente?

But the authority of Plato has not been well understood by them. For when Plato says that God led the elements back into order from an inordinate tossing, he does not on that account say that they were ever tossed about inordinately. For what place at all would there be for inordination, with God disposing all things?

Sed quia esset, nisi sic ut nunc sunt a deo ordinata essent (cum enim terra naturaliter tendat deorsum ignisque sursum, nisi inferiorem locum terra obtineret et ignis superiorem, haec semper quaereret inferiorem, hic superiorem et sic esset inordinata iactatio), hanc redegit creator in ordinem conferendo terrae locum inferiorem, igni superiorem, ut hic non haberet quo descenderet, nec haec quo ascenderet.

But because there would be, unless they were ordered by God just as they now are (for since earth naturally tends downward and fire upward, unless earth were to occupy the lower place and fire the higher, the former would always seek the lower, the latter the higher, and thus there would be an inordinate tossing), the Creator reduced this into order by conferring on earth the lower place, on fire the higher, so that fire would have nowhere to descend, nor earth anywhere to ascend.

Ex inordinata igitur iactatione (non quae fuit, sed esse potuit) deus elementa redegit in ordinem, veluti si monitu alicuius nostri amici aliquid quod contingeret nisi ipse moneret, fugiamus, dicimus "Iste liberavit nos ab hoc malo", non quia hoc malum primum fuisset et postea nos inde liberasset, sed quia nisi iste esset, nobis accidisset.

Therefore from inordinate tossing (not that which was, but that which could be) God brought the elements back into order, just as, if by the monition of one of our friends we flee something which would befall were he not to warn, we say, "This man has delivered us from this evil," not because this evil first had been and afterward he had delivered us from it, but because, unless this man were, it would have happened to us.

Fuerunt in prima creatione ubi nunc sunt, sed non qualia nunc sunt. Etenim terra omnino cooperta erat aquis, aqua vero spissior quam modo sit et ad magnam partem aeris elevata; aer autem spissior quam modo sit et obscurior, quippe cum neque sol neque luna neque aliae stellae essent, quibus illuminaretur. Ignis similiter spissior erat quam modo sit.

They were, in the first creation, where they now are, but not such as they now are. For indeed the earth was entirely covered by waters, but the water was thicker than it is now and elevated into a great part of the air; and the air, however, was thicker than it is now and more obscure, since neither sun nor moon nor other stars existed by which it might be illumined. Fire likewise was thicker than it is now.

Id vero quod terra erat aquis omnino cooperta nec aliquo lumine illustrata nec aedificiis distincta nec suis animalibus repleta; quod aqua et aer spissi et obscuri erant; quod in superioribus stellae non apparebant vocaverunt chaos, i. e. confusionem elementorum. Unde Moyses: "Terra erat inanis et vacua et tenebrae super faciem abyssi".

But indeed that the earth was wholly covered by waters and illuminated by no light and not distinguished by edifices nor filled with its own animals; that the water and the air were thick and dark; that in the upper regions the stars did not appear they called chaos, i. e. a confusion of the elements. Whence Moses: "The earth was void and empty, and darkness upon the face of the abyss".

Hoc chaos sic et dissolutum: cum aqua usque ad maximam partem aeris esset elevata, aer vero spissus et ignis similiter, in ea spissitudine aliquid terreae substantiae et aqueae inerat, quae ex calore ignis et siccitate coagulata et durata corpora stellarum visibilia et lucida creavit. Quod vero in compositione stellarum et de inferioribus et de superioribus elementis aliquid sit dominante tamen superiori, ex hoc potest probari quod visibilia sunt et splendida et mobilia. Quod enim visibilia sunt, ex visibili vel invisibili habent.

This chaos was thus also resolved: when the water had been elevated up to the greatest part of the air, but the air was thick, and likewise the fire, in that thickness there was something of earthy and aqueous substance, which, coagulated and hardened by the heat of fire and by dryness, created the visible and shining bodies of the stars. But that in the composition of the stars there is something both from the lower and from the higher elements, the higher, however, being dominant, from this it can be proved that they are visible and splendid and mobile. For, as to their being visible, they have it from the visible or the invisible.

At ex invisibili nihil potest esse visibile, unde Lucretius: "Ex insensibili ne credas sensile nasci" et Macrobius: "Omnis qualitas geminata crescit, numquam contrarium operatur". Non ergo ex igne vel aere habent, quod visibilia sunt, haec quippe sunt invisibilia; ex visibili ergo, i. e. a terra et aqua. Similiter quod splendida sunt et mobilia ex obscuro et immobili non habent, ergo ex splendido et mobili, scil. ex aere et igne.

But from the invisible nothing visible can be, whence Lucretius: “From the insensible do not believe a sensible thing to be born,” and Macrobius: “Every quality, when twinned grows, it never operates the contrary.” Therefore they do not have, from fire or air, that they are visible—for these are invisible; from the visible, therefore, i.e., from earth and water. Likewise, that they are bright and mobile they do not have from the dark and immobile; therefore from the bright and mobile, namely from air and fire.

Facta sunt ergo ex IIII elementis, sed de inferioribus dominatur in eis aqua, de superioribus ignis, et hoc ex effectu probari potest, quod calorem terris conferunt, ad nutrimentum sui humorem attrahunt. Similia namque congaudent similibus.

They were therefore made from 4 elements, but of the lower ones water dominates in them, of the higher ones fire; and this can be proved from the effect, namely that they confer heat upon the lands and draw humor for their nourishment. For similar things rejoice with similars.

Hic subiciet aliquis: "Cum in aere sit humor spissior quam esset in igne, et calor, etsi non tantus, quare in aere corpora stellarum facta non sunt?" Nos vero dicimus quod, quamvis aer sit calidus, est tamen et humidus, non ergo potuit desiccando spissare et sic corpus lucidum et visibile creare. Veluti si argilla supponatur igni, spissatur saepe et vertitur in lapideam substantiam; sin autem supponatur alicui calido et humido, sicut aquae bullienti ita quod ab illo solo recipiat calorem, non spissabitur.

Here someone will object: "Since in the air there is moisture thicker than there would be in fire, and heat, albeit not so great, why were the bodies of the stars not made in the air?" But we say that, although the air is hot, yet it is also humid; therefore it could not, by desiccating, condense, and thus create a lucid and visible body. Just as, if clay be set under fire, it is often condensed and is turned into a lapideous substance; but if it be set under something hot and humid, like boiling water, such that it receives heat from that alone, it will not be condensed.

Vel secundum Constantinum: Cum sint ista IIII et in unoquoque duae qualitates, unam habent singularem ex se, aliam ab alio. Ignis ex se calidus est, siccus a terra; aer humidus ex se, calidus ex igne; aqua humida est ex aere, sed frigida ex se; terra vero est ex se sicca, sed ex aqua est frigida. Quod vero in unoquoque est ex se, plus in eo praevalet quam quod ex alio est.

Or according to Constantine: Since these are 4 and in each there are two qualities, they have one proper to itself, another from another. Fire is hot from itself, dry from earth; air is humid from itself, hot from fire; water is humid from air, but cold from itself; but earth is dry from itself, but from water is cold. But what in each is from itself prevails in it more than what is from another.

Cum ergo in aere humiditas sit ex se, calor ex alio quia ex igne, ergo praevaluit in eo humiditas nec potuit desiccando corpora stellarum creare.

Accordingly, since in air humidity is from itself, while heat is from another—namely from fire—humidity prevailed in it, and it could not, by desiccation, create the bodies of the stars.

Iterum, quod maius est: Non fuit voluntas creatoris stellas in aere esse. Cum enim vicinus sit terrae, si in eo stellae essent, ex vicinitate terram incenderent nec aliquid in ea vivere posset.

Again, what is greater: It was not the will of the Creator that the stars be in the air. For since it is adjacent to the earth, if the stars were in it, by reason of the vicinity they would set the earth ablaze, nor could anything live in it.

Corporibus stellarum sic creatis, quia igneae sunt naturae, ceperunt movere se et ex motu aera subditum calefacere. Sed mediante aere aqua calefacta est et ex aqua calefacta diversa genera animalium creata sunt. Quorum quaedam, quae plus habuerunt superiorum elementorum, aves sunt; unde aves modo sunt in aere ex levitate superiorum, modo descendunt in terram ex gravedine inferiorum.

With the bodies of the stars thus created, since they are of an igneous nature, they began to move themselves and, from their motion, to warm the subjacent air. But with the air mediating, the water was heated, and from the heated water diverse genera of animals were created. Of these, some which possessed more of the superior elements are birds; whence birds are at one time in the air by the levity of the superiors, at another they descend to the earth by the gravity of the inferiors.

Alia vero, quae plus habuerunt aquae, pisces sunt; unde in hoc solo elemento nec in alio possunt vivere. Sic ergo pisces et aves ex aqua facti sunt, unde scriptum est: "Magnae deus potentiae, qui ex aquis ortum genus partim remittis gurgiti, partim levas in aera".

But others, which had more of water, are fishes; whence in this element alone and in no other are they able to live. Thus therefore fishes and birds were made from water, whence it is written: "God of great power, who the race sprung from the waters you partly send back to the gulf, partly raise into the air."

Istis sic creatis ex aqua effectu superiorum, ubi tenuior fuit aqua ex calore et creatione praedictorum desiccata, apparuerunt in terra quasi quaedam maculae, in quibus habitant homines et alia quaedam animalia. Sed cum terra ex superposita aqua esset lutosa, ex calore bulliens, creavit ex se diversa genera animalium, et si in aliqua parte plus abundaverit ignis, colerica nata sunt ut leo; si terra, melancolica ut bos et asinus; si vero aqua, flegmatici ut porci. Ex quadam vero parte, in qua elementa aequaliter convenerunt, humanum corpus factum est, et hoc est quod divina pagina dicit, "Deum fecisse hominem ex limo terrae". Non enim credendum est animam, quae spiritus est et levis et munda, ex luto factam esse, sed a deo homini collatam, unde ait scriptura: "Formavit deus hominem ex limo terrae et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae". Unde, cum diversa animalia melancolica creata sunt et infinita flegmatica et colerica, unus solus homo creatus est, quia (ut ait Boetius in Arithmetica) "omnis aequalitas pauca est et finita, inaequalitas numerosa et multiplex". Sed quoniam quod est proximum aequalitati, etsi minus tamen aliquanto temperatum, ex vicino limo terrae corpus mulieris esse creatum verisimile est, et ideo nec penitus idem est quod homo nec penitus diversa ab homine nec ita temperata ut homo, quia calidissima frigidior est frigidissimo viro, et hoc est quod divina pagina dicit, "deum fecisse mulierem ex latere Adae". Non enim ad litteram credendum est deum excostasse primum hominem.

With these things thus created from water by the effect of the superiors, where the thinner water, dried out by the heat and by the creation of the aforesaid, there appeared on the earth, as it were, certain spots, in which humans and certain other animals dwell. But since the earth, made muddy by the superposed water, boiling from the heat, created from itself diverse kinds of animals: if in some part fire abounded more, choleric ones were born, like the lion; if earth, melancholic ones, like the ox and the ass; if indeed water, phlegmatic ones, like pigs. But from a certain part in which the elements met equally, the human body was made, and this is what the divine page says, "that God made the man from the slime of the earth." For it is not to be believed that the soul, which is spirit and light and clean, was made from mud, but that it was bestowed by God upon man; whence Scripture says: "God formed man from the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life." Hence, whereas diverse melancholic animals were created and infinite phlegmatic and choleric ones, one single man was created, because (as Boethius says in the Arithmetic) "every equality is few and finite, inequality numerous and multiplex." But since that which is nearest to equality, although lesser, is yet somewhat tempered, it is likely that from the neighboring slime of the earth the body of woman was created; and therefore she is neither entirely the same as man nor entirely different from man, nor so tempered as man, because the very hottest woman is colder than the very coldest man; and this is what the divine page says, "that God made the woman from Adam’s side." For it is not to be believed to the letter that God took the rib out of the first man.

Sed dicet aliquis eadem ratione plures homines et feminas tunc posse creari et adhuc posse. Nos dicimus verum esse, si divina voluntas esset, quia ut aliquid sit natura operante, necesse est divinam voluntatem praecedere.

But someone will say that by the same reasoning more men and women could then be created and could still be. We say this is true, if the divine will were present, since, for anything to exist with nature operating, it is necessary that the divine will precede.

Iterum dicet hoc esse divinae potestati derogare sic esse hominem factum esse dicere. Quibus respondemus e contrario, idem ei conferre, quia ei attribuimus et talem rebus naturam dedisse et sic per naturam operantem corpus humanum creasse. Nam in quo divinae scripturae contrarii sumus, si quid in illa dictum est esse factum, qualiter factum sit, explicemus?

Again he will say that this is to derogate from divine power, to say that man was made thus. To this we reply on the contrary, that we confer the same upon Him, because we attribute to Him both that He gave such a nature to things and thus through nature operating created the human body. For wherein are we contrary to divine Scripture, if, when something in it is said to have been made, we explain how it was made?

Si enim modo unus sapiens dicat aliquid esse factum et non explicet qualiter, alter vero dicat hoc idem et exponat quae in hoc contrarietas? Sed quoniam ipsi nesciunt vires naturae, ut ignorantiae suae omnes socios habeant, nolunt aliquem eas inquirere, sed ut rusticos nos credere nec rationem quaerere, ut iam impleatur illud propheticum: "Erit sacerdos sicut populus".

If, for instance, one wise man says that something has been made and does not explain in what manner, while another says this same thing and expounds it—what contrariety is there in this? But since they themselves do not know the powers of nature, so that their ignorance may have all men as partners, they do not want anyone to inquire into them, but that we, like rustics, should believe and not seek a reason, so that that prophetic saying may now be fulfilled: "The priest shall be like the people".

Nos autem dicimus in omnibus rationem esse quaerendam, si potest inveniri. Sin autem alicui deficiat quod divina pagina affirmat, sancto spiritui et fidei esse mandandum. Non enim ait Moyses: "Si agnus non potest comedi, statim igne comburatur", sed "Prius convocet vicinum, qui coniunctus est domui suae.

But we, however, say that in all things reason is to be sought, if it can be found. But if to someone there should be lacking what the divine page affirms, it is to be entrusted to the holy spirit and to faith. For Moses does not say: "If the lamb cannot be eaten, let it immediately be burned with fire," but "First let him call the neighbor who is joined to his house.

Et si nec ita sufficiant ad esum agni, tunc demum igne comburatur", quia cum de divinitate aliquid quaerimus, si ad illud comprehendendum non sufficimus, vicinum domui nostrae coniunctum convocemus, i. e. manentem in eadem fide catholica inquiramus. Sin autem neque nos neque ille ad id comprehendendum sufficiamus, tunc igne fidei illud comburamus. Sed isti multos habentes vicinos domui suae coniunctos ex superbia nolunt aliquem convocare maluntque nescire quam ab alio quaerere, et si inquirentem aliquem sciant, illum esse haereticum clamant plus de suo capucio praesumentes quam sapientiae suae confidentes.

"And if not even thus they suffice for the eating of the lamb, then at last let it be burned with fire", because when we inquire about something concerning the divinity, if we do not suffice to comprehend it, let us summon the neighbor joined to our house, i. e. let us inquire of one remaining in the same catholic faith. But if neither we nor he suffice to comprehend it, then let us burn it with the fire of faith. But these men, though having many neighbors joined to their house, out of superbia refuse to summon anyone, and they prefer not to know rather than to ask from another; and if they know someone to be inquiring, they cry out that he is a heretic, presuming more from their own cowl than confiding in their own wisdom.

Sed quaeso, ne habitui credas, iam enim in eis impletum est quod ait Satiricus: "Fronti nulla fides, quis enim non vicus abundat tristibus obscaenis?", et iterum: "Rarus sermo illis et magna libido tacendi".

But I beg, do not trust the habit; for already in them is fulfilled what the Satirist says: "No trust in the brow; for what street does not abound in gloomy obscenities?", and again: "Speech is rare with them and a great libido for keeping silence."

Et quoniam de prima creatione rerum fecimus mentionem quam diversis temporibus diversi diversis rationibus dicunt esse factam, doceamus, qui in quo tempore et quibus rationibus hoc dicant.

And since we have made mention of the first creation of things, which diverse persons at diverse times say to have been made with diverse rationales, let us show who says this, at what time, and by what reasons they say it.

Hebraei igitur et Latini dicunt in vere principium mundi fuisse, unde Virgilius loquens de diebus veris ait: "Non alios crediderim prima origine mundi illuxisse dies aliumve habuisse tenorem", deinde subiungit: "Ver illud erat, ver agebat". Horum ratio talis est: Quidquid oritur, aequalitate proportionum creari. Sed nullum tempus praeter ver temperatum est, in vere ergo nec in alio tempore anni creatio rerum facta est.

Therefore the Hebrews and the Latins say that the beginning of the world was in spring, whence Virgil, speaking about the spring days, says: "I should not think that other days shone at the first origin of the world or had another tenor," then he subjoins: "It was spring; spring was driving on." Their rationale is of this sort: whatever arises is created by an equality of proportions. But no time except spring is tempered; therefore in spring, and not in another time of the year, the creation of things was made.

Aegyptii vero dicunt in Iulio factam esse mundi creationem, quos secutus Macrobius dicit in natali die mundi Cancrum gestasse Lunam, Leonem Solem. Quorum haec est ratio: In prima creatione tantum fuisse humorem, quod terra erat cooperta aquis tantusque humor sine maximo calore non potuit temperari. Ergo in tempore anni, in quo est maximus calor, i. e. in aestate, facta est mundi creatio.

The Egyptians, for their part, say that the creation of the world was made in July; and following them Macrobius says that on the natal day of the world the Moon occupied Cancer, the Sun Leo. Their rationale is this: at the first creation there was only moisture, because the earth was covered by waters, and so great a moisture could not be tempered without the greatest heat. Therefore, in that time of the year in which there is the greatest heat, i.e. in summer, the creation of the world was made.