Caesar•LIBRI INCERTORUM AUCTORUM
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[1] Bello Alexandrino conflato Caesar Rhodo atque ex Syria Ciliciaque omnem classem arcessit; Creta sagittarios, equites ab rege Nabataeorum Malcho evocat; tormenta undique conquiri et frumentum mitti, auxilia adduci iubet. Interim munitiones cotidie operibus augentur atque omnes oppidi partes, quae minus esse firmae videntur, testudinibus ac musculis +aptantur+; ex aedificiis autem per foramina in proxima aedificia arietes immittuntur, quantumque aut ruinis deicitur aut per vim recipitur loci, in tantum munitiones proferuntur. Nam incendio fere tuta est Alexandrea, quod sine contignatione ac materia sunt aedificia et structuris ac fornicibus continentur tectaque sunt rudere aut pavimentis.
[1] With the Alexandrine War having been kindled, Caesar summons the whole fleet from Rhodes and from Syria and Cilicia; from Crete he calls up archers, and he summons cavalry from Malchus, king of the Nabataeans; he orders engines to be procured from everywhere and grain to be sent, reinforcements to be brought in. Meanwhile the fortifications are increased daily by works, and all the parts of the town that seem to be less firm are fitted with tortoises and musculi; moreover, from buildings through openings battering-rams are let into the neighboring buildings, and by as much space as is either thrown down by ruins or recovered by force, by so much the fortifications are advanced. For Alexandria is almost safe from fire, because the buildings are without flooring-beams and timber, and are held together by masonry and vaults, and are roofed with rubble or pavements.
Caesar was especially striving that the part of the town which the marsh, interposed on the south, made as narrow as possible, he might shut off by carrying forward works and vineae from the remaining part of the city—aiming first at this: that, when the battle-line had been divided into two parts of the city, it might be administered under one counsel and command; then, that relief might be brought to those hard-pressed and help be carried from the other part of the town; and, above all, that he might abound in water and fodder, of which things he had a scant supply of the one and absolutely no resource of the other; both of which the marsh could furnish in abundance.
[2] Neque vero Alexandrinis in gerendis negotiis cunctatio ulla aut mora inferebatur. Nam in omnis partis, per quas fines Aegypti regnumque pertinet, legatos conquisitoresque dilectus habendi causa miserant magnumque numerum in oppidum telorum atque tormentorum convexerant et innumerabilem multitudinem adduxerant. Nec minus in urbe maximae armorum erant institutae officinae.
[2] Nor indeed was any hesitation or delay found among the Alexandrians in conducting operations. For into all regions to which the borders of Egypt and the realm extend, they had sent envoys and recruiters for the purpose of holding levies, and they had conveyed into the town a great number of missiles and artillery engines, and had brought in an innumerable multitude. No less, in the city very large workshops for arms had been established.
Besides, they had armed full-grown slaves; to whom the wealthier masters furnished daily victuals and a stipend. With this multitude posted, they were guarding the fortifications of the more outlying quarters; the veteran cohorts they kept unengaged in the most frequented places of the city, so that, in whatever region fighting might occur, with fresh strength they could be set in opposition to bring help. Along all the streets and alleys they had drawn a triple rampart — it was, moreover, built of squared stone and had not less than 40 feet of height — and whatever parts of the city were lower, these they had fortified with the loftiest towers of ten stories.
[3] Urbs fertilissima et copiosissima omnium rerum apparatus suggerebat. Ipsi homines ingeniosi atque acutissimi quae a nobis fieri viderant ea sollertia efficiebant ut nostri illorum opera imitati viderentur, et sua sponte multa reperiebant unoque tempore et nostras munitiones infestabant et suas defendebant. Atque haec principes in consiliis contionibusque agitabant: populum Romanum paulatim in consuetudinem eius regni occupandi venire.
[3] The city, most fertile and most copious, supplied the apparatus of all things. The men themselves, most ingenious and most acute, by their skill were producing the things which they had seen done by us, to such a degree that our men seemed to have imitated their work; and of their own accord they were discovering many things, and at one and the same time they both infested our fortifications and defended their own. And these matters the chiefs were agitating in councils and public assemblies: that the Roman people were little by little coming into the custom of occupying that kingship.
That a few years before A. Gabinius had been in Egypt with an army; that Pompey had betaken himself to the same place in his flight; that Caesar had come with forces, and that by the death of Pompey nothing had been effected to prevent Caesar from sojourning among them. If they had not driven him out, a province would arise from the kingdom; and this must be pursued promptly: for he, shut off by storms on account of the time of year, cannot receive transmarine auxiliaries.
[4] Interim dissensione orta inter Achillan, qui veterano exercitui praeerat, et Arsinoen, regis Ptolomaei minorem filiam, ut supra demonstratum est, cum uterque utrique insidiaretur et summam imperi ipse obtinere vellet, praeoccupat Arsinoe per Ganymeden eunuchum, nutricium suum, atque Achillan interficit. Hoc occiso sine ullo socio et custode ipsa omne imperium obtinebat; exercitus Ganymedi traditur. Is suscepto officio largitionem in militem auget; reliqua pari diligentia administrat.
[4] Meanwhile, a dissension having arisen between Achillas, who presided over the veteran army, and Arsinoe, the younger daughter of King Ptolemy, as has been shown above, since each laid snares for the other and wished to hold the supreme command himself, Arsinoe forestalls him through Ganymedes, a eunuch, her fosterer, and puts Achillas to death. With him slain, without any associate or guard, she herself held the whole command; the army is handed over to Ganymedes. He, having undertaken the office, increases largess to the soldier; he administers the remaining matters with equal diligence.
[5] Alexandrea est fere tota suffossa specusque habet a Nilo pertinentis, quibus aqua in privatas domos inducitur, quae paulatim spatio temporis liquescit ac subsidit. Hac uti domini aedificiorum atque eorum familiae consuerunt: nam quae flumine Nilo fertur adeo est limosa ac turbida ut multos variosque morbos efficiat; sed ea plebes ac multitudo contenta est necessario, quod fons urbe tota nullus est. Hoc tamen flumen in ea parte erat urbis quae ab Alexandrinis tenebatur.
[5] Alexandria is almost entirely under-dug and has caverns/tunnels reaching from the Nile, by which water is conducted into private houses, which gradually in the lapse of time clarifies and subsides. This water the owners of buildings and their households are accustomed to use: for that which is carried by the river Nile is so limose and turbid that it brings about many and various diseases; but the commons and the multitude, of necessity, are content with that, because in the whole city there is no spring. This river, however, was in that part of the city which was held by the Alexandrians.
[6] Hoc probato consilio magnum ac difficile opus aggreditur. Intersaeptis enim specubus atque omnibus urbis partibus exclusis quae ab ipso tenebantur, aquae magnam vim ex mari rotis ac machinationibus exprimere contendit: hanc locis superioribus fundere in partem Caesaris non intermittebat. Quam ob causam salsior paulo praeter consuetudinem aqua trahebatur ex proximis aedificiis magnamque hominibus admirationem praebebat, quam ob rem id accidisset; nec satis sibi ipsi credebant, cum se inferiores eiusdem generis ac saporis aqua dicerent uti atque ante consuessent, vulgoque inter se conferebant et degustando quantum inter se differrent aquae cognoscebant.
[6] With this counsel approved, he undertakes a great and difficult work. For, the conduits having been partitioned and all the parts of the city that were held by himself having been shut off, he strives to express a great quantity of water from the sea by wheels and machinations: this he did not cease to pour from higher places into Caesar’s quarter. For which cause the water drawn from the nearest buildings was a little saltier than customary and offered great admiration to people, as to why this had happened; nor did they quite believe themselves, since they said that those lower down were using water of the same kind and savor as they had been accustomed before, and commonly they compared among themselves and by degustation learned how much the waters differed among themselves.
[7] Quo facto dubitatione sublata tantus incessit timor ut ad extremum [casum] periculi omnes deducti viderentur atque alii morari Caesarem dicerent quin navis conscendere iuberent, alii multo gravius extimescerent, quod neque celari Alexandrini possent in apparanda fuga, cum tam parvo spatio distarent ab ipsis, neque illis imminentibus atque insequentibus ullus in navis receptus daretur. Erat autem magna multitudo oppidanorum in parte Caesaris, quam domiciliis ipsorum non moverat, quod ea se fidelem palam nostris esse simulabat et descivisse a suis videbatur: at mihi si defendendi essent Alexandrini neque fallaces esse neque temerarii, multa oratio frustra absumeretur; cum vero uno tempore et natio eorum et natura cognoscatur, aptissimum esse hoc genus ad proditionem dubitare nemo potest.
[7] When this had been done and hesitation removed, such great fear set in that all seemed to have been brought down to the extreme crisis of danger; and some said that Caesar was delaying and urged that he be ordered to board the ships, while others were much more gravely afraid, because neither could the Alexandrines be hidden from the preparing of the escape, since they were at so small a distance from them, nor, with them threatening and pursuing, would any admission to the ships be afforded. There was, however, a great multitude of townspeople in Caesar’s sector, whom he had not moved from their homes, because that crowd was openly pretending itself faithful to our men and seemed to have defected from their own; but, for my part, if the Alexandrines had to be defended as being neither deceitful nor rash, much speech would be spent in vain; since at one and the same time both their nation and their nature are known, no one can doubt that this race is most apt for treachery.
[8] Caesar suorum timorem consolatione et ratione minuebat. Nam puteis fossis aquam dulcem reperiri posse adfirmabat: omnia enim litora naturaliter aquae dulcis venas habere. Quod si alia esset litoris Aegypti natura atque omnium reliquorum, tamen, quoniam mare libere tenerent, neque hostes classem haberent, prohiberi sese non posse quo minus cotidie navibus aquam peterent vel a sinistra parte a Paraetonio vel a dextra ab insula, quae diversae navigationes numquam uno tempore adversis ventis praecluderentur.
[8] Caesar was diminishing the fear of his men by consolation and by reason. For he affirmed that, with wells dug, fresh water could be found; for all shores naturally have veins of fresh water. But even if the nature of the shore of Egypt were different from that of all the rest, nevertheless, since they held the sea freely and the enemies had no fleet, he said that he could not be prohibited from daily seeking water by ships either on the left side from Paraetonium or on the right from the island, which diverse sailings would never at the same time be shut off by adverse winds.
But that there was no counsel of flight, not only for those who held the foremost dignity, but not even for those who thought of nothing except life. With great trouble they could sustain from the fortifications the enemy’s assaults directed against them; if these were abandoned, they could be equal neither in position nor in number. Moreover, the embarkation into the ships had great delay and difficulty, especially from the skiffs; whereas, on the contrary, among the Alexandrians there was the utmost velocity and a knowledge of the places and buildings.
[9] Hac oratione apud suos habita atque omnium mentibus excitatis dat centurionibus negotium ut reliquis operibus intermissis ad fodiendos puteos animum conferant neve quam partem nocturni temporis intermittant. Quo suscepto negotio atque omnium animis ad laborem incitatis magna una nocte vis aquae dulcis inventa est. Ita operosis Alexandrinorum machinationibus maximisque conatibus non longi temporis labore occursum est.
[9] With this oration delivered among his own and the minds of all stirred up, he assigns a task to the centurions: that, the remaining works having been intermitted, they direct their mind to digging wells, and that they omit no portion of the night-time. When this task had been undertaken and the spirits of all roused to labor, a great supply of fresh water was found in a single night. Thus to the elaborate machinations of the Alexandrians and their very great endeavors it was opposed by labor of not long duration.
In that two‑day period the 37th legion, from surrendered Pompeian soldiers, with grain, arms, missiles, and siege engines loaded onto ships, was by Domitius Calvinus borne to the shores of Africa a little above Alexandria. These ships were prevented by the Eurus, which was blowing continuously for many days, from making the port; but there are excellent places in all that region for holding anchors. When they were detained for a long time and were hard pressed by a lack of water, they informed Caesar by a dispatch boat.
[10] Caesar, ut per se consilium caperet quid faciendum videretur, navem conscendit atque omnem classem se sequi iussit nullis nostris militibus impositis, quod, cum longius paulo discederet, munitiones nudare nolebat. Cumque ad eum locum accessissent, qui appellatur Chersonensus, aquandique causa remiges in terram euissent, non nulli ex eo numero, cum longius a navibus praedatum processissent, ab equitibus hostium sunt excepti. Ex his cognoverunt Caesarem ipsum in classe venisse nec ullos milites in navibus habere.
[10] Caesar, in order to take counsel by himself as to what seemed ought to be done, boarded a ship and ordered the whole fleet to follow him, with none of our soldiers embarked, because, as he was withdrawing a little farther, he did not wish to strip the fortifications. And when they had reached that place which is called the Chersonese, and the rowers had gone ashore for the sake of taking on water, some of their number, when they had advanced farther from the ships to plunder, were intercepted by the enemy’s cavalry. From these they learned that Caesar himself had come with the fleet and that he had no soldiers on board the ships.
When this matter was discovered, they believed that Fortune had offered to them a great faculty for the affair to be well managed. And so they equipped all the ships which they had prepared for sailing with defenders, and met Caesar returning with the fleet. He was unwilling to fight on that day for two reasons: both because he had no soldiers on the ships, and because the business was being done after hour 10 of the day; moreover, night seemed likely to bring greater confidence to those who were relying on knowledge of the places. For himself even the aid of exhorting his men would be lacking, since no exhortation would be sufficiently suitable which could mark out neither valor nor inertia.
[11] Erat una navis Rhodia in dextro Caesaris cornu longe ab reliquis collocata. Hanc conspicati hostes non tenuerunt sese, magnoque impetu IIII ad eam constratae naves et complures apertae contenderunt. Cui coactus est Caesar ferre subsidium, ne turpem in conspectu hostium contumeliam acciperet, quamquam, si quid gravius illis accidisset, merito casurum iudicabat.
[11] There was one Rhodian ship on Caesar’s right wing, stationed far from the rest. The enemy, having caught sight of this, did not restrain themselves, and with great onrush 4 decked ships and several open ones hastened toward it. To this Caesar was compelled to bring succor, lest it receive a shameful contumely in the sight of the enemy, although, if anything more serious had befallen them, he judged that it would have fallen upon them deservedly.
The battle was joined with great contention by the Rhodians; who, since in all encounters they had excelled both in skill and valor, then most of all at that time did not refuse to sustain the whole burden, lest any loss should seem to have been received through the fault of their own men. Thus the battle was most successful. One enemy quadrireme was captured, another was sunk, two were stripped of all their marines; besides, a great multitude of defenders on the remaining ships was slain.
[12] Eo detrimento adeo sunt fracti Alexandrini, cum iam non virtute propugnatorum, sed scientia classiariorum se victos viderent, +quibus et superioribus locis sublevabantur, ut ex aedificiis defendi possent+ et materiam cunctam obicerent, quod nostrae classis oppugnationem etiam ad terram verebantur. Idem, postea quam Ganymedes in concilio confirmavit sese et eas quae essent amissae restituturum et numerum adaucturum, magna spe et fiducia veteres reficere navis accuratiusque huic rei studere atque inservire instituerunt. Ac tametsi amplius CX navibus longis in portu navalibusque amiserant, non tamen reparandae classis cogitationem deposuerunt.
[12] By that loss the Alexandrians were so broken, since now they saw themselves overcome not by the valor of the defenders but by the science/skill of the mariners, +by whom they were also supported from higher positions, so that they could be defended from the buildings+; and they threw all the timber in the way, because they feared an assault of our fleet even up to the land. Likewise, after Ganymedes in council affirmed that he would both restore those which had been lost and increase the number, with great hope and confidence they set about refitting their old ships and to apply themselves more carefully to this business and devote themselves to it. And although they had lost more than 110 long ships in the harbor and the dockyards, yet they did not lay aside the plan of repairing the fleet.
For they saw that neither auxiliaries for Caesar nor supplies could be transported, if they themselves were strong in the fleet; moreover, the nautical men of the city and of the maritime region, trained from boyhood by quotidian use, were eager to take refuge in their natural and domestic good, and they perceived how much they had accomplished with very small vessels; and so, with all zeal, they bent themselves to preparing a fleet.
[13] Erant omnibus ostiis Nili custodiae exigendi portorii causa dispositae; naves veteres erant in occultis regiae navalibus, quibus multis annis ad navigandum non erant usi: has reficiebant, illas Alexandream revocabant. Deerant remi: porticus, gymnasia, publica aedificia detegebant, asseres remorum usum obtinebant; aliud naturalis sollertia, aliud urbis copia sumministrabat. Postremo non longam navigationem parabant, sed praesentis temporis necessitati serviebant et in ipso portu confligendum videbant.
[13] At all the mouths of the Nile there were guards stationed for the purpose of exacting the customs-duty; old ships were in hidden royal dockyards, which they had not used for sailing for many years: these they were refitting, those they were recalling to Alexandria. Oars were lacking: they were stripping porticoes, gymnasia, public buildings, and planks were fulfilling the use of oars; natural ingenuity supplied some things, the abundance of the city supplied others. Finally, they were not preparing for a long navigation, but were serving the necessity of the present time, and they saw that there must be fighting in the very harbor itself.
And so, in a few days, contrary to everyone’s expectation, they completed 22 quadriremes and 5 quinqueremes; to these they added several smaller and open vessels, and, having tried out in the port by the rowing-crew what each of them could accomplish, they put on board suitable soldiers and prepared themselves for conflict in all respects. Caesar had 9 Rhodian ships — for, with 10 having been sent, one on the course along the Egyptian shore had failed — , 8 Pontic, 5 +Lycian+, and 12 from Asia. Of these there were 10 quinqueremes and quadriremes; the remainder were below this magnitude and for the most part open.
[14] Postquam eo ventum est ut sibi uterque eorum confideret, Caesar Pharon classe circumvehitur adversasque navis hostibus constituit: in dextro cornu Rhodias collocat, in sinistro Ponticas. Inter has spatium CCCC passuum relinquit, quod satis esse ad explicandas navis videbatur. Post hunc ordinem reliquas navis subsidio distribuit; quae quamque earum sequatur et cui subveniat constituit atque imperat.
[14] After it had come to the point that each of them trusted himself, Caesar sails around Pharos with the fleet and positions ships opposite the enemy: on the right wing he stations the Rhodian ships, on the left the Pontic. Between these he leaves a space of 400 paces, which seemed sufficient for deploying the ships. After this order he distributes the remaining ships for succor; he determines and commands which one should follow each of them and to whom it should come to aid.
Without hesitation the Alexandrians bring out and array the fleet: in the front they place 22, the rest, as subsidiary vessels, they set in a second order. Moreover they bring out a great number of smaller craft and skiffs, with fire-darts and fires, in case the mere multitude and clamor and flame could bring some terror to our men. Between the two fleets there were shoals with a narrow passage, which pertain to the region of Africa — for thus they proclaim, that a part of Alexandria is the half called Africa — and for quite a while it was awaited among them from which side the beginning of crossing would be made, because those who had entered would seem to be more impeded both for deploying the fleet and for reception/retreat, if a harsher case should occur.
[15] Rhodiis navibus praeerat Euphranor, animi magnitudine ac virtute magis cum nostris hominibus quam cum Graecis comparandus. Hic ob notissimam scientiam atque animi magnitudinem delectus est ab Rhodiis qui imperium classis obtineret. Qui ubi +Caesaris+ animum advertit, 'Videris, mihi,' inquit, 'Caesar, vereri, si haec vada primis navibus intraris, ne prius dimicare cogaris quam reliquam classem potueris explicare.
[15] Euphranor was in command of the Rhodian ships, a man who for greatness of spirit and virtue was to be compared more with our men than with Greeks. He, on account of his most well-known science and greatness of spirit, was chosen by the Rhodians to hold the command of the fleet. When he noticed Caesar’s intention, he said, 'You seem to me, Caesar, to fear that, if you were to enter these shallows with the foremost ships, you might be forced to fight before you could deploy the rest of the fleet.'
Entrust the matter to us: we will sustain the battle — nor shall we deceive your judgment — while the rest follow after. For these men indeed to boast longer in our sight is for us a great disgrace and grief.' Caesar, having exhorted him and accompanied him with all praises, gives the signal for battle. The Alexandrians surround the 4 Rhodian ships that had advanced beyond the shoal and make an attack upon them.
They hold out and by art and skill they deploy themselves; and so much could doctrine achieve that, though the numbers were unequal, no transverse side was presented to the enemy, no one’s oars were scraped off, but they always met those coming head-on. Meanwhile the rest followed up. Then of necessity there was a departure from art because of the narrowness of the place, and the whole contest stood upon valor.
Nor indeed at Alexandria was there anyone, either of our men or of the townsfolk, who, having his mind occupied either in work or in battle, did not make for the highest rooftops and, from every vantage, seize a place for the spectacle, and by prayers and vows demand victory for their own from the immortal gods.
[16] Minime autem par erat proeli certamen. Nostris enim pulsis neque terra neque mari effugium dabatur victis, omniaque victoribus erant futura in incerto; [cum] illi, si superassent navibus, omnia tenerent, si inferiores fuissent, reliquam tamen fortunam periclitarentur. Simul illud grave ac miserum videbatur, perpaucos de summa rerum ac de salute omnium decertare; quorum si qui aut animo aut virtute cessisset, reliquis etiam esset cavendum, quibus pro se pugnandi facultas non fuisset.
[16] By no means, however, was the contest of the battle equal. For, with our men routed, neither by land nor by sea was an escape given to the vanquished, and all things for the victors would be in uncertainty; [when] they, if they had prevailed with the ships, would hold everything, but if they had been inferior, nevertheless they would hazard the remaining fortune. At the same time this seemed grievous and miserable: that very few were fighting it out concerning the sum of affairs and the safety of all; of whom, if anyone had given way either in spirit or in valor, the rest too would have to beware, who had not had the faculty of fighting on their own behalf.
In the preceding days Caesar had very often set these things before his own men, that they should strive with the greater spirit, because they saw that the safety of all had been commended to him. Likewise each man, addressing his own contubernal, friend, and acquaintance, had adjured him not to disappoint his and everyone’s expectation, by whose judgment he set forth to the fight as one chosen. And so the contest was carried on with such a spirit that neither maritime and nautical skill and art brought protection, nor did superiority in the number of ships profit the multitude, nor could the men chosen for virtue out of so great a multitude equal the virtue of our men.
[17] Hoc ne sibi saepius accidere posset, omni ratione Caesar contendendum existimavit ut insulam molemque ad insulam pertinentem in suam redigeret potestatem. Perfectis enim magna ex parte munitionibus in oppido et insulam et urbem uno tempore temptari posse confidebat. Quo capto consilio cohortis X et levis armaturae electos, quosque idoneos ex equitibus Gallis arbitrabatur, in navigia minora scaphasque imponit; [in] alteram insulae partem distinendae manus causa constratis navibus aggreditur, praemiis magnis propositis qui primus insulam cepisset.
[17] That this might not befall him more often, Caesar judged that he must strive by every method to bring the island and the mole pertaining to the island into his own power. For with the fortifications in the town completed for the most part, he was confident that both the island and the city could be attempted at one time. Having adopted this plan, he puts aboard the picked men of cohort 10 and of the light-armed, and those whom he judged suitable from the Gallic cavalry, into the smaller vessels and skiffs; [in] the other part of the island, for the purpose of distracting the force, he makes an attack, the ships having been decked over, with great rewards proposed for whoever should first seize the island.
And at first they sustained the onset of our men equally: for at one and the same time they were fighting from the roofs of the buildings and, armed, were defending the shores—whereby, on account of the asperity of the place, no easy approach was afforded to our men—and with skiffs and five long-ships they nimbly and skillfully guarded the narrows of the place. But when at last, the locations being known and the shallows tried through, a few of ours stood firm on the shore, and others followed these up, and steadily made an attack upon those who had taken a stand on the level shore, all the Pharitae turned their backs. With these routed and the guard of the harbor left, they brought their ships to the shores and the village, and hurled themselves from the ships to defend the buildings.
[18] Neque vero diutius ea munitione se continere potuerunt, etsi erat non dissimile atque Alexandreae genus aedificiorum, ut minora maloribus conferantur, turresque editae et coniunctae muri locum obtinebant, neque nostri aut scalis aut cratibus aut reliquis rebus parati venerant ad oppugnandum. Sed terror hominibus mentem consiliumque eripit et membra debilitat; ut tum accidit. Qui se in aequo loco ac plano pares esse confidebant, idem perterriti fuga suorum et caede paucorum XXX pedum altitudine in aedificiis consistere ausi non sunt seque per molem in mare praecipitaverunt et DCCC passuum intervallum ad oppidum enataverunt.
[18] Nor indeed were they able to keep themselves any longer within that fortification, although the kind of buildings was not unlike that of Alexandria—so that lesser things may be compared with greater—and the raised and conjoined towers held the place of a wall; nor had our men come prepared for assault either with ladders or with hurdles or with the remaining things. But terror snatches from men mind and counsel and weakens the limbs; as then happened. Those who trusted that on level and flat ground they were a match, the same, panic‑stricken by the flight of their own and by the slaughter of a few, did not dare to take a stand in the buildings at a height of 30 feet, and hurled themselves along the mole into the sea and swam the interval of 800 paces to the town.
[19] Caesar praeda militibus concessa aedificia diripi iussit castellumque ad pontem, qui propior erat Pharo, communivit atque ibi praesidium posuit. Hunc fuga Pharitae reliquerant; artiorem illum propioremque oppido Alexandrini tuebantur. Sed eum postero die simili ratione aggreditur, quod his obtentis duobus omnem navigiorum excursum et repentina latrocinia sublatum iri videbatur.
[19] Caesar, the booty having been granted to the soldiers, ordered the buildings to be plundered and fortified the fort at the bridge which was nearer to the Pharos, and there he placed a garrison. This one the Pharitae had left in flight; the Alexandrians were defending the other, the tighter one and nearer to the town. But on the next day he attacks it in a similar manner, because, with these two obtained, it seemed that every excursion of the ships and sudden latrociny would be removed.
And already he had driven off with engines from the ships and with arrows those who were holding that place as a garrison and had forced them back into the town, and had put ashore the strength of three cohorts — for the narrowness of the place did not allow more to stand — ; the remaining forces were holding station on the ships. This done, he orders the bridge to be ramparted in front against the enemy and, where there was an egress for the ships by an arch constructed, by which the bridge was supported, to be filled up and blocked with stones. Of which works, the one having been completed, so that no skiff at all could get out, the other being set on foot, all the forces of the Alexandrians hurled themselves out of the town and took up position over against the fortifications of the bridge at a broader place, and at the same time they stationed at the mole the small craft which were accustomed to be sent through the bridge for the burning of the cargo-ships.
[20] In his rebus occupato Caesare militesque hortante remigum magnus numerus et classiariorum ex longis navibus nostris in molem se eiecit. Pars eorum studio spectandi ferebatur, pars etiam cupiditate pugnandi. Hi primum navigia hostium lapidibus ac fundis a mole repellebant ac multum proficere multitudine telorum videbantur.
[20] With Caesar occupied in these matters and encouraging the soldiers, a great number of oarsmen and marines from our long ships hurled themselves onto the mole. Part of them were borne along by eagerness to watch, part also by desire to fight. These at first were driving back the enemy’s vessels from the mole with stones and slings, and seemed to be making much progress by the multitude of their missiles.
But after a few Alexandrinians dared to go out from the ships beyond that place, from their side left open, as they had advanced without standards and fixed ranks, without any rationale, so they began rashly to take refuge back into the ships. Incited by their flight, more Alexandrinians were disembarking from the ships and were pursuing our men more sharply, thrown into confusion. At the same time those who had remained on the long ships were hurrying to snatch up the ladders and to push the ships off from the land, lest the enemy gain possession of the ships.
Disturbed by all these things, our soldiers of the three cohorts which had taken their stand on the bridge and on the foremost mole, when they heard the shouting behind them, saw their own in flight, and endured a great force of missiles from in front, fearing lest they be surrounded from the rear and, by the departure of the ships, be altogether cut off from return, abandoned the fortification established on the bridge and, spurred to great speed, hastened toward the ships. Some of them, having reached the nearest ships, saw the ships pressed down by the multitude of men and by the burden; a part, resisting and hesitating what counsel should be adopted, were slain by the Alexandrians; not a few, with a happier outcome, having caught up with the unencumbered ships at anchor, departed unharmed; a few, with shields lifted and with spirit to make the attempt, even swam to the nearest vessels.
[21] Caesar quoad potuit cohortando suos ad pontem ac munitiones continere, eodem in periculo versatus est; postquam universos cedere animadvertit, in suum navigium se recepit. Quo multitudo hominum insecuta cum irrumperet neque administrandi neque repellendi a terra facultas daretur, fore quod accidit suspicatus sese ex navigio eiecit atque ad eas quae longius constiterant navis adnatavit. Hinc suis laborantibus subsidio scaphas mittens non nullos conservavit.
[21] Caesar, so far as he could, by exhorting his men to keep to the bridge and the fortifications, was engaged in the same peril; after he observed that all were yielding, he withdrew into his own vessel. When a multitude of men, having followed it, was bursting in, and no faculty was given either of administering the ship or of repelling it from the land, suspecting that what occurred would befall, he cast himself from the vessel and swam to those ships which had taken position farther out. From there, sending skiffs as succor to his men laboring, he preserved not a few.
Indeed his vessel, weighed down by the multitude of soldiers, perished together with the men. In this battle there were lost from the number of the legionary soldiers about 400, and sailors of the fleet and oarsmen a little [beyond] that number. The Alexandrians at that spot strengthened a fort with great fortifications and many engines, and once stones had been hauled out of the sea, they afterwards made free use of the place for sending off ships.
[22] Hoc detrimento milites nostri tantum afuerunt ut perturbarentur, ut incensi atque incitati magnas accessiones fecerint in operibus hostiurn expugnandis. In proelils cotidianis, quandocumque fors obtulerat, procurrentibus et erumpentibus Alexandrinis, +manum comprehendi multum operibus+ et ardentibus studiis militum; nec divulgata Caesaris hortatio subsequi legionurn aut laborem aut pugnandi poterat cupiditatem, ut magis deterrendi et continendi a periculosissimis essent dimicationibus quam incitandi ad pugnandum.
[22] By this loss our soldiers were so far from being disturbed that, inflamed and incited, they made great accessions in the works for storming the enemies. In the daily battles, whenever chance had offered, with the Alexandrians rushing forward and breaking out, +hand-to-hand to be engaged much at the works+ and with the burning zeal of the soldiers; nor, even with Caesar’s exhortation spread abroad, could it keep up with the legions’ desire either for toil or for fighting, so that they had to be rather deterred and restrained from the most perilous contests than incited to fight.
[23] Alexandrini cum Romanos et secundis rebus confirmari et adversis incitari viderent neque ullum belli tertium casum nossent quo possent esse firmiores, ut coniectura consequi possumus, aut admoniti a regis amicis qui in Caesaris erant praesidiis, aut suo priore consilio per occultos nuntios regi probato legatos ad Caesarem miserunt, ut dimitteret regem transireque ad suos pateretur: paratam enim omnem multitudinem esse, confectam taedio puellae, fiduciario regno, dominatione crudelissima Ganymedis, facere id quod rex imperasset; quo si auctore in Caesaris fidem amicitiamque venturi essent, nullius periculi timorem multitudini fore impedimento quo minus se dederent.
[23] When the Alexandrians saw that the Romans were both confirmed by prosperous circumstances and incited by adverse ones, and knew no third condition of war by which they could be made stronger, as we can gather by conjecture, either admonished by the king’s friends who were in Caesar’s garrisons, or by their own earlier plan, approved by the king through secret messengers, they sent envoys to Caesar, that he dismiss the king and allow him to pass over to his own people: for the whole multitude was prepared, worn out by weariness of the girl, by a fiduciary (regency) kingdom, by the most cruel domination of Ganymedes, to do that which the king should have commanded; with him as author, if they were to come into Caesar’s faith and friendship, there would be no fear of any danger to be an impediment to the multitude, to prevent them from surrendering themselves.
[24] Caesar etsi fallacem gentem semperque alia cogitantem, alia simulantem bene cognitam habebat, tamen petentibus dare veniam utile esse statuit, quod, si quo pacto sentirent ea quae postularent, mansurum in fide dimissum regem credebat, sin, id quod magis illorum naturae conveniebat, ducem ad bellum gerendum regem habere vellent, splendidius atque honestius se contra regem quam contra convenarum ac fugitivorum manum bellum esse gesturum. Itaque regem cohortatus ut consuleret regno paterno, parceret praeclarissimae patriae, quae turpibus incendiis et ruinis esset deformata, civis suos primum ad sanitatem revocaret, deinde conservaret, fidem populo Romano sibique praestaret, cum ipse tantum ei crederet ut ad hostis armatos eum mitteret, dextra dextram tenens dimittere coepit adulta iam aetate puerum. At regius animus disciplinis fallacissimis eruditus, ne a gentis suae moribus degeneraret, flens orare contra Caesarem coepit ne se dimitteret: non enim sibi regnum ipsum conspectu Caesaris esse iucundius.
[24] Caesar, although he had the nation—deceptive and always thinking one thing while simulating another—well known, nevertheless decided that it was useful to grant pardon to the petitioners; because, if in any way they should experience the things that they demanded, he believed the king, once dismissed, would remain in loyalty; but if, which more suited their nature, they wished to have the king as a leader for waging war, he would wage war more splendidly and more honorably against a king than against a band of newcomers and fugitives. And so, having exhorted the king to consult for his father’s kingdom, to spare his most illustrious fatherland, which had been disfigured by base conflagrations and ruins, to recall his fellow citizens first to soundness and then to preserve them, to exhibit good faith to the Roman People and to himself—since he himself trusted him so much as to send him to armed enemies—right hand holding right hand he began to dismiss the boy now already of adult age. But the royal spirit, trained in the most deceptive disciplines, so as not to degenerate from the customs of his race, began, weeping, to beg in opposition to Caesar that he not send him away: for to him the kingdom itself was not more pleasing than the sight of Caesar.
With the boy’s tears checked, Caesar himself, moved, quickly, affirming that, if he truly felt those things, he would be with him, sent him back to his own. He, as if released from the starting-gates into free course, began to wage war so sharply against Caesar that the tears which he had cast in the colloquy seemed to have been poured out for joy. Many of Caesar’s legates, friends, centurions, and soldiers rejoiced that this had happened, because his excessive goodness had been outplayed by the boy’s fallacies.
[25] Cum duce assumpto Alexandrini nihilo se firmiores factos aut languidiores Romanos animadverterent eludentibusque militibus regis aetatem atque infirmitatem magnum dolorem acciperent neque se quicquam proficere viderent, rumoresque exsisterent magna Caesari praesidia terrestri itinere [ex] Syria Ciliciaque adduci, quod nondum auditum Caerari erat, commeatum, qui mari nostris supportabatur, intercipere statuerunt. Itaque expeditis navigiis locis idoneis ad Canopum in statione dispositis navibus insidiabantur nostris commeatuque. Quod ubi Caesari nuntiatum est, universam classem iubet expediri atque instrui.
[25] After a leader had been assumed, when the Alexandrians observed that they themselves were made no stronger nor the Romans more languid, and, as the soldiers mocked the king’s age and weakness, they felt great vexation, and saw that they were accomplishing nothing; and when reports arose that great reinforcements for Caesar were being brought by a land route [ex] Syria and Cilicia—a thing not yet heard by Caesar—they resolved to intercept the provisions which were being conveyed by sea to our men. And so, the light vessels having been made ready, with ships placed on station in suitable places toward Canopus, they lay in ambush for our men and for the supply. When this was reported to Caesar, he orders the whole fleet to be got ready and equipped.
He appoints Tiberius Nero over this. The Rhodian ships set out in that fleet, and among them was Euphranor, without whom no maritime engagement had ever been fought, nor had any even been concluded with too little felicity. But Fortune, who for the most part reserves those whom she has adorned with very many benefactions for a harsher calamity, was attending Euphranor in a manner unlike former times.
For when they had come to Canopus and the fleet on both sides had been arrayed and had clashed, and Euphranor, in his own customary manner, had first joined battle and had perforated and sunk a quadrireme of the enemy, pursuing the nearest one too far, since the rest followed too little swiftly, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. To bring him aid no one came, either because they thought that in himself there was sufficient safeguard by reason of his valor and felicity, or because they feared for themselves. Thus he who alone of all in that battle managed the matter well perished alone with his victorious quadrireme.
[26] Sub idem tempus Mithridates Pergamenus, magnae nobilitatis domi scientiaeque in bello et virtutis, fidei dignitatisque in amicitia Caesaris, missus in Syriam Ciliciamque initio belli Alexandrini ad auxilia arcessenda, cum magnis copiis, quas celeriter et propensissima civitatium voluntate et sua diligentia confecerat, itinere pedestri, quo coniungitur Aegyptus Syriae, Pelusium adducit: idque oppidum firmo praesidio occupatum Achillae propter opportunitatem loci — namque tota Aegyptus maritimo accessu Pharo, pedestri Pelusio velut claustris munita existimatur — , repente magnis circumdatum copiis multiplici praesidio pertinaciter propugnantibus et copiarum magnitudine, quas integras vulneratis defessisque subiciebat, et perseverantia constantiaque oppugnandi quo die est aggressus in suam redegit potestatem praesidiumque ibi suum collocavit. Inde re bene gesta Alexandream ad Caesarem contendit omnisque eas regiones per quas iter faciebat auctoritate ea quae plerumque adest victori pacarat atque in amicitiam Caesaris redegerat.
[26] About the same time Mithridates of Pergamum, a man of great nobility at home and of science in war and virtue, of faith and dignity in the friendship of Caesar, having been sent into Syria and Cilicia at the beginning of the Alexandrian war to summon auxiliaries, with great forces—which he had quickly assembled both by the most forward-leaning good will of the communities and by his own diligence—by a land route, by which Egypt is joined to Syria, brings them to Pelusium; and that town, occupied by a strong garrison of Achillas on account of the opportuneness of the place — for all Egypt is considered fortified, as if by bolts, by Pharos for maritime access, by Pelusium for pedestrian access — being suddenly surrounded with great forces, with its multiple garrisons fighting pertinaciously, both by the magnitude of his forces, which he would bring in fresh while he substituted them for the wounded and wearied, and by perseverance and constancy in attacking, on the very day he set upon it he brought it back into his own power, and he stationed his own garrison there. Thence, the affair well managed, he hastened to Alexandria to Caesar, and all those regions through which he made his march he had pacified by that authority which for the most part attends the victor, and had brought back into Caesar’s friendship.
[27] Locus est fere regionum illarum nobilissimus non ita longe ab Alexandrea, qui nominatur Delta; quod nomen a similitudine litterae cepit: nam pars quaedam fluminis Nili derivata [inter se] duobus itineribus paulatim medium inter se spatium relinquens diversissimo ad litus intervallo mari coniungitur. Cui loco cum appropinquare Mithridaten rex cognovisset et transeundum ei flumen sciret, magnas adversus eum copias misit, quibus vel superari delerique Mithridaten vel sine dubio retineri posse credebat. Quem ad modum autem optabat eum vinci, sic satis habebat interclusum a Caesare a se retineri.
[27] There is a place almost the most renowned of those regions, not so far from Alexandria, which is named the Delta; which name it took from the similarity to a letter: for a certain part of the river Nile, diverted by two courses [among themselves], gradually leaving a middle space between them, is joined to the sea along the coast at a very widely separated interval. When the king had learned that Mithridates was approaching this place and knew that the river had to be crossed by him, he sent great forces against him, by which he believed that Mithridates could either be overcome and destroyed, or without doubt be retained. And just as he desired that he be conquered, so he deemed it sufficient that, cut off from Caesar, he be held by himself.
The forces which were first able to cross the river from Delta and encounter Mithridates engaged in battle, hastening to snatch from those following the partnership in victory. Mithridates, with great prudence [and with the constancy of virtues and the imprudence of the Alexandrians], withstood their assault by our custom, with a camp fortified by a rampart; but when he saw them advancing incautiously and insolently up to the fortifications, with a sally made on all sides he slew a great number of them. And had not the rest, by knowledge of the localities, covered themselves and partly withdrawn into the ships by which they had crossed the river, they would have been utterly destroyed.
[28] Mittitur a Mithridate nuntius Caesari qui rem gestam perferret. Cognoscit ex suis eadem haec accidisse rex. Ita paene sub idem tempus et rex ad opprimendum Mithridaten proficiscitur et Caesar ad recipiendum.
[28] A messenger is sent by Mithridates to Caesar to convey the deed accomplished. The king learns from his own men that these same things had occurred. Thus, almost at the same time, both the king sets out to oppress Mithridates and Caesar to receive him back.
By a swifter navigation of the river Nile the king made use, on which he had a great and prepared fleet. Caesar did not wish to use the same route, lest he contend with ships on the river, but sailed around by that sea which is said to be a part of Africa, just as we have shown above; nevertheless he met the king’s forces before he could attack Mithridates, and he received him—Mithridates—to himself as victor with his army unscathed. The king had sat down with his forces in a place fortified by nature, which was itself higher, with a plain lying beneath on all sides; and on three of its sides it was protected by fortifications of various kind: one side was adjoining the river Nile, another was drawn along a most lofty place, so as to occupy part of the camp, the third was surrounded by a marsh.
[29] Inter castra et Caesaris iter flumen intercedebat angustum altissimis ripis, quod in Nilum influebat, aberat autem ab regis castris milia passuum circiter VII. Rex cum hoc itinere venire Caesarem comperisset, equitatum omnem expeditosque delectos pedites ad id flumen misit qui transitu Caesarem prohiberent et eminus ex ripis proelium impar inirent: nullum enim processum virtus habebat aut periculum ignavia subibat. Quae res incendit dolore milites equitesque nostros, quod tam diu pari proelio cum Alexandrinis certaretur.
[29] Between the camps and Caesar’s route there intervened a narrow river with very high banks, which flowed into the Nile; moreover, it was about 7 miles from the king’s camp. When the king had learned that Caesar was coming by this route, he sent all the cavalry and unencumbered selected infantry to that river to prohibit Caesar from a crossing and to enter an unequal battle from afar from the banks: for valor had no progress, nor did cowardice incur danger. This circumstance inflamed our soldiers and horsemen with grief, because for so long the struggle with the Alexandrians was being contested on equal terms.
Accordingly, at the same time the German horsemen, scattered and seeking the fords of the river, partly swam the river from the lower banks; and the legionaries, after cutting down great trees which by their length reached both banks, having thrown these forward [them] and, with a sudden rampart cast in, crossed the river. The enemies so feared their onset that they placed their hope of safety in flight; but this was in vain: for from that flight few fled back to the king, with almost all the remaining multitude slain.
[30] Caesar re praeclarissime gesta, cum subitum adventum suum iudicaret magnum terrorem Alexandrinis iniecturum, protinus victor ad castra regis pertendit. Haec cum et opere magno vallata et loci natura munita animadverteret confertamque armatorum multitudinem collocatam in vallo videret, lassos itinere ac proeliando milites ad oppugnanda castra succedere noluit. Itaque non magno intervallo relicto ab hoste castra posuit.
[30] Caesar, the affair having been accomplished most illustriously, since he judged that his sudden arrival would inject great terror into the Alexandrians, straightway, as victor, made for the king’s camp. When he observed that this was both enclosed with a great rampart and fortified by the nature of the place, and saw a crowded multitude of armed men stationed on the rampart, he did not wish the soldiers, weary from marching and from fighting, to advance to assault the camp. And so, leaving not a great interval from the enemy, he pitched camp.
On the next day the castellum, which the king had fortified in the nearest vicus not far from his own camp and had joined by “wings” with the works of the camp for the sake of holding the village, Caesar, having attacked with all his forces, takes by storm—not because he thought it difficult to accomplish with a smaller number of soldiers, but in order that, from that victory, with the Alexandrians terrified, he might immediately assault the king’s camp. And so, at the same pace with which the soldiers pursued the Alexandrians fleeing from the fort into the camp, they came up to the fortifications and began to do battle very fiercely at range. Entrances for assault were afforded to our men from two sides: one, which I have shown had free access; the other, which had a moderate interval between the camp and the river Nile.
The greatest and most select multitude of the Alexandrians was defending that section which had the easiest access; they were making the most progress in repelling and wounding our men, who were defending in the region of the river Nile: for our men were being struck by diverse missiles—facing from the rampart of the camp in front, and from behind from the river, in which many ships, equipped with slingers and archers, were assailing our men.
[31] Caesar cum videret milites acrius proeliari non posse nec tamen multum profici propter locorum difficultatem, cumque animum adverteret excelsissimum locum castrorum relictum esse ab Alexandrinis, quod et per se munitus esset et studio partim pugnandi partim spectandi decucurrissent in eum locum in quo pugnabatur, cohortis illo circumire castra et summum locum aggredi iussit eisque Carfulenum praefecit, et animi magnitudine et rei militaris scientia virum praestantem. Quo ut ventum est, paucis defendentibus munitionem, nostris contra militibus acerrime pugnantibus, diverso clamore et proelio perterriti Alexandrini trepidantes in omnis partis castrorum discurrere coeperunt. Quorum perturbatione nostrorum animi adeo sunt incitati ut paene eodem tempore ex omnibus partibus, primi tamen editissimum castrorum locum caperent; ex quo decurrentes magnam multitudinem hostium in castris interfecerunt.
[31] Caesar, when he saw that the soldiers could not fight more keenly, nor yet make much progress because of the difficulty of the terrain, and when he noticed that the most elevated position of the camp had been left by the Alexandrines—both because it was fortified in itself, and because, in zeal partly for fighting and partly for spectating, they had run down into that place where the fighting was going on—ordered the cohorts to go around the camp to that spot and to attack the highest ground, and he set Carfulenus over them, a man outstanding both in magnanimity and in the science of military affairs. When they came there, with few defending the fortification and our soldiers, for their part, fighting most fiercely, the Alexandrines, terrified by the shout and battle arising in a different quarter, began in panic to run about into all parts of the camp. Their disarray so incited the spirits of our men that almost at the same time from all sides—though first they seized the loftiest position of the camp—running down from it they slew a great multitude of the enemy within the camp.
At this danger, most of the Alexandrians, fleeing, hurled themselves headlong in heaps from the rampart into the part that was adjacent to the river. When the foremost of these were overwhelmed by a great collapse in the very ditch of the fortification, the rest had an easier escape. It is agreed that the king himself fled from the camp and, after being received into a ship, perished when the vessel was sunk by the multitude of those who were swimming to the nearest ships.
[32] Re felicissime celerrimeque gesta Caesar magnae victoriae fiducia proximo terrestri itinere Alexandream cum equitibus contendit atque ea parte oppidi victor introiit quae praesidio hostium tenebatur. Neque eum consilium suum fefellit quin hostes eo proelio audito nihil iam de bello essent cogitaturi. Dignum adveniens fructum virtutis et animi magnitudinis tulit: omnis enim multitudo oppidanorum armis proiectis munitionibusque suis relictis, veste ea sumpta qua supplices dominantis deprecari consuerunt, sacrisque omnibus prolatis quorum religione precari offensos iratosque animos regum erant soliti, advenienti Caesari occurrerunt seque ei dediderunt.
[32] With the affair most happily and most swiftly accomplished, Caesar, in the confidence of a great victory, pressed by the nearest overland route to Alexandria with the cavalry and, as victor, entered by that part of the town which was held by an enemy garrison. Nor did his plan fail him, since, on that battle being heard, the enemies were now going to think nothing further of war. Arriving, he received a worthy fruit of valor and magnanimity: for the whole multitude of the townspeople, their arms thrown down and their fortifications abandoned, having put on that garb with which suppliants are accustomed to entreat rulers, and having brought forth all the sacred rites by the sanctity of which they were wont to beseech the offended and angered minds of kings, went to meet the arriving Caesar and surrendered themselves to him.
[33] Caesar Aegypto atque Alexandrea potitus reges constituit quos Ptolomaeus testamento scripserat atque obtestatus erat populum Romanum ne mutarentur. Nam maiore ex duobus pueris, rege, amisso minori tradidit regnum maiorique ex duabus filiis, Cleopatrae, quae manserat in fide praesidiisque eius; minorem, Arsinoen, cuius nomine diu regnasse impotenter Ganymeden docuimus, deducere ex regno statuit, ne qua rursus nova dissensio, prius quam diuturnitate confirmarentur regibus imperia, per homines seditiosos nasceretur. Legiones ibi veterana sexta secum reducta ceteras reliquit, quo firmius esset eorum regum imperium, qui neque amorem suorum habere poterant, quod fideliter permanserant in Caesaris amicitia, neque vetustatis auctoritatem, paucis diebus reges constituti.
[33] Caesar, having gotten possession of Egypt and Alexandria, appointed the kings whom Ptolemy had written in his testament and had adjured the Roman People not to have altered. For, the elder of the two boys, the king, having been lost, he handed over the kingdom to the younger, and to the elder of the two daughters, Cleopatra, who had remained in loyalty and in his garrisons; the younger, Arsinoe—on whose name Ganymedes, as we have shown, had long ruled immoderately—he resolved to lead out from the kingdom, lest any fresh dissension again, before the dominions of the kings were confirmed by long duration, should arise through seditious men. The legions he left there, having led back with him the veteran Sixth, in order that the power of those kings might be the more firm, who could have neither the love of their own people, because they had remained faithfully in Caesar’s friendship, nor the authority of antiquity, having been appointed kings in a few days.
At the same time he judged that it pertained to the dignity of our imperium and to the public utility, that, if the kings should remain in loyalty, they be safe by our garrisons; if they should be ungrateful, they could be coerced by the same garrisons. Thus, with all matters completed and arranged, he himself set out [by a land journey] into Syria.
[34] Dum haec in Aegypto geruntur, rex Deiotarus ad Domitium Calvinum, cui Caesar Asiam finitimasque provincias administrandas tradiderat, venit oratum ne Armeniam minorem, regnum suum, neve Cappadociam, regnum Ariobarzanis, possideri vastarique pateretur a Pharnace; quo malo nisi liberarentur, imperata se facere pecuniamque promissam Caesari non posse persolvere. Domitius, non tantum ad explicandos sumptus rei militaris cum pecuniam necessariam esse iudicaret, sed etiam turpe populo Romano et C. Caesari victori sibique infame esse statueret regna sociorum atque amicorum ab externo rege occupari, nuntios confestim ad Pharnacem misit, Armenia Cappadociaque decederet neve occupatione belli civilis populi Romani ius maiestatemque temptaret. Hanc denuntiationem cum maiorem vim habituram existimaret, si propius eas regiones cum exercitu accessisset, ad legiones profectus unam ex tribus, XXXVI, secum ducit, duas in Aegyptum ad Caesarem mittit litteris eius evocatas; quarum altera bello Alexandrino non occurrit, quod itinere terrestri per Syriam erat missa.
[34] While these things are being done in Egypt, King Deiotarus came to Domitius Calvinus, to whom Caesar had entrusted Asia and the neighboring provinces to be administered, to beg that he not allow Armenia Minor, his kingdom, nor Cappadocia, the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, to be possessed and laid waste by Pharnaces; from which evil, unless they were freed, he could not execute the things commanded and could not pay in full the money promised to Caesar. Domitius, judging that money was necessary not only to defray the expenses of the military business, but also determining that it was disgraceful to the Roman People and to Gaius Caesar the victor, and shameful to himself, that the realms of allies and friends be occupied by a foreign king, forthwith sent messengers to Pharnaces, that he withdraw from Armenia and Cappadocia and that he not, by the preoccupation of the civil war, assay the right and majesty of the Roman People. Since he thought this denunciation would have greater force if he approached more closely to those regions with an army, he set out to the legions and takes with him one out of three, the 36th; two he sends into Egypt to Caesar, summoned by his letters; of these, one did not arrive for the Alexandrian war, because it had been sent by a land route through Syria.
Cn. Domitius adds to legion 36 two from Deiotarus, which he had for several years maintained established in our discipline and armature, and he takes 100 cavalry, and the same number from Ariobarzanes. He sends P. Sestius to C. Plaetorius, the quaestor, to bring up the legion which had been composed from tumultuary soldiers in Pontus, and Quintus Patisius into Cilicia to summon auxiliaries. All these forces quickly, by Domitius’s order, assembled at Comana.
[35] Interim legati a Pharnace responsa referunt: Cappadocia se decessisse, Armeniam minorem recepisse, quam paterno nomme iure obtinere deberet. Denique eius regni causa integra Caesari servaretur: paratum enim se facere quod is statuisset. Cn. Domitius cum animadverteret eum Cappadocia decessisse non voluntate adductum sed necessitate, quod facilius Armeniam defendere posset subiectam suo regno quam Cappadociam longius remotam, quodque omnis tris legiones adducturum Domitium putasset, ex quibus cum duas ad Caesarem missas audisset, audacius in Armenia substitisse, perseverare coepit, ut eo quoque regno decederet; neque enim aliud ius esse Cappadociae atque Armeniae, nec iuste eum postulare ut in Caesaris adventum res integra differretur; id enim esse integrum quod ita esset ut fuisset.
[35] Meanwhile legates bring back responses from Pharnaces: that he had withdrawn from Cappadocia, had recovered Lesser Armenia, which by paternal title and right he ought to hold. Finally, that the case of that kingdom should be kept entire for Caesar: for he was prepared to do what he should have determined. Gnaeus Domitius, when he observed that he had left Cappadocia not led by will but by necessity, because he could more easily defend Armenia subject to his kingdom than Cappadocia farther removed, and because he had supposed that Domitius would bring all three legions, but, when he had heard that two had been sent to Caesar, he had remained more boldly in Armenia, began to persist that he withdraw from that kingdom as well; for there is not one right for Cappadocia and another for Armenia, nor did he rightly demand that the matter entire be deferred to Caesar’s arrival; for that is entire which is as it had been.
With these responses given, with those forces which I wrote above, he set out into Armenia and resolved to make the march in the higher places: for from Pontus, from Comana, there is an elevated, wooded ridge, extending into Lesser Armenia, where Cappadocia is bounded by Armenia; of which route he saw these to be certain advantages, that in the higher places no sudden onset of the enemy could occur, and that Cappadocia, lying beneath these ridges, would furnish a great abundance of supplies.
[36] Compluris interim legationes Pharnaces ad Domitium mittit quae de pace agerent regiaque munera Domitio ferrent. Ea constanter omnia aspernabatur nec sibi quicquam fore antiquius quam dignitatem populi Romani et regna sociorum reciperare legatis respondebat. Magnis et continuis itineribus confectis cum adventaret ad Nicopolim, quod oppidum positum in Armenia minore est plano ipso loco, montibus tamen altis ab duobus lateribus obiectis satis magno intervallo ab oppido remotis, castra posuit longe a Nicopoli circiter milia passuum VII.
[36] Meanwhile Pharnaces sends several legations to Domitius to negotiate about peace and to carry royal gifts to Domitius. He steadfastly spurned them all and replied to the envoys that nothing would be of higher priority for him than to recover the dignity of the Roman people and the kingdoms of the allies. With great and continuous marches completed, when he was approaching Nicopolis, which town is situated in Lesser Armenia on level ground itself, yet with high mountains thrown up on two sides, at a rather great interval removed from the town, he pitched camp far from Nicopolis, at about 7 miles.
From these camps, since a narrow and impeded place had to be crossed, Pharnaces placed in ambush selected infantry and almost all the cavalry, and he ordered a great multitude of livestock to be scattered within those defiles, and countryfolk and townsmen to show themselves in these places, so that whether Domitius should pass those narrows as a friend, he might suspect nothing of an ambush, when he noticed both herds and people moving about in the fields as at the arrival of friends, or, if as an enemy he came into the territory of foes, the soldiers, for the sake of plundering booty, might be scattered and, once dispersed, cut down.
[37] Haec cum administraret, numquam tamen intermittebat legatos de pace atque amicitia mittere ad Domitium, cum hoc ipso crederet facilius eum decipi posse. At contra spes pacis Domitio in isdem castris morandi attulit causam. Ita Pharnaces, amissa proximi temporis occasione cum vereretur ne cognoscerentur insidiae, suos in castra revocavit.
[37] While he was administering these things, nevertheless he never ceased to send legates concerning peace and amity to Domitius, since by this very thing he believed he could more easily deceive him. But conversely, the hope of peace brought to Domitius a reason for remaining in the same camp. Thus Pharnaces, the opportunity of the latest moment having been lost, since he feared lest the ambushes be recognized, called his men back into the camp.
Domitius on the next day approached nearer to Nicopolis and moved the camp up to the town. While our men were fortifying these, Pharnaces drew up the battle line in his own manner and instituted custom. For with the front deployed in a single straight line, the wings were strengthened by triple reserves; by the same plan these reserves were placed in the middle of the line, with two intervals on the right and left, formed in single ranks.
[38] Proxima nocte Pharnaces interceptis tabellariis, qui de Alexandrinis rebus litteras ad Domitium ferebant, cognoscit Caesarem magno in periculo versari flagitarique ab Domitio ut quam primum Caesari subsidia mitteret propiusque ipse Alexandream per Syriam accederet. Qua cognita re Pharnaces victoriae loco ducebat, si trahere tempus posset, cum discedendum Domitio celeriter putaret. Itaque ab oppido, qua facillimum accessum et aequissimum ad dimicandum nostris videbat, fossas duas derectas non ita magno medio intervallo relicto IIII pedum altitudinis in eum locum deduxit quo longius constituerat suam non producere aciem.
[38] On the next night, Pharnaces, after intercepting the couriers who were carrying letters to Domitius about the Alexandrian affairs, learns that Caesar is involved in great peril and that it is being demanded of Domitius that he send aid to Caesar as soon as possible and that he himself approach nearer to Alexandria via Syria. With this matter known, Pharnaces counted it in the place of a victory, if he could protract the time, since he thought Domitius would have to depart quickly. And so from the town, where he saw for our men the most easy access and the most level ground for fighting, he drew two straight ditches, with not so great a middle interval left between, of 4 feet in depth, into that place beyond which he had determined not to extend his own battle line further.
[39] Domitius autem, cum Caesaris magis periculo quam suo commoveretur neque se tuto discessurum arbitraretur, si condiciones quas reiecerat rursus appeteret aut +sine causa+ discederet, ex propinquis castris in aciem exercitum eduxit; XXXVI legionem in dextro cornu collocavit, Ponticam in sinistro, Deiotari legiones in mediam aciem contulit, quibus tamen angustissimum intervallum frontis reliquit reliquis cohortibus in subsidiis collocatis. Sic utrimque acie instructa processum est ad dimicandum.
[39] Domitius, however, since he was moved more by Caesar’s danger than his own and did not think he would depart safely if he should again seek the terms which he had rejected or depart +without cause+, led the army out from the nearby camp into the battle line; he placed the 36 legion on the right wing, the Pontic on the left, he brought the legions of Deiotarus into the middle line, to whom, however, he left a very narrow interval of front, the remaining cohorts having been stationed in reserve. Thus, with the line of battle drawn up on both sides, an advance was made to engage.
[40] Signo sub idem tempus ab utroque dato concurritur: acriter varieque pugnatur. Nam XXXVI legio, cum extra fossam in equites regis impetum fecisset, adeo secundum proelium fecit ut moenibus oppidi succederet fossamque transiret aversosque hostis aggrederetur. At Pontica ex altera parte legio, cum paulum aversa hostibus cessisset, fossam autem circumire +acies secundo+ conata esset, ut aperto latere aggrederetur hostem, in ipso transitu fossae confixa et oppressa est.
[40] When the signal at about the same time had been given by both sides, they closed in; the fighting was sharp and varied. For the 36th legion, when outside the ditch it had made a charge against the king’s cavalry, fought with such success that it drew up to the town’s walls, crossed the ditch, and attacked the enemy as they were turned in flight. But the Pontic legion on the other side, when it had yielded a little, turning its back to the enemy, and had attempted, with its battle line seconded by fortune, to go around the ditch so as to attack the enemy on their open flank, was pinned and crushed in the very crossing of the ditch.
But the legions of Deiotarus scarcely withstood the onrush. Thus the victorious royal forces, with their right wing and their center, turned themselves toward the 36th legion. This, however, bravely withstood the victors’ attack, and, surrounded by great forces of the enemy, fighting with the most resolute spirit, withdrew in a circle to the foot of the mountains; to which place Pharnaces did not wish to pursue on account of the unfavorableness of the ground.
Thus, with the Pontic legion almost wholly lost, and a great part of Deiotarus’s soldiers slain, the 36th legion betook itself to higher places, with no more than 250 missing. In that battle there fell some splendid and illustrious men, Roman equestrians. Nevertheless, with that inconvenience received, Domitius gathered the remnants of the scattered army and by safe routes through Cappadocia withdrew into Asia.
[41] Pharnaces rebus secundis elatus, cum de Caesare ea quae optabat speraret, Pontum omnibus copiis occupavit ibique et victor et crudelissimus rex, cum sibi fortunam paternam feliciore eventu destinaret, multa oppida expugnavit, bona civium Romanorum Ponticorumque diripuit, supplicia constituit in eos qui aliquam formae atque aetatis commendationem habebant ea quae morte essent miseriora, Pontumque nullo defendente paternum regnum glorians se recepisse obtinebat.
[41] Pharnaces, exalted by favorable circumstances, when he was hoping regarding Caesar for the things he desired, occupied Pontus with all his forces, and there, both a victor and a most cruel king, since he was assigning to himself his father’s fortune with a happier outcome, he stormed many towns, despoiled the goods of Roman citizens and of the Pontic people, decreed punishments upon those who had any commendation of form and of age, such as were more pitiable than death, and, with no one defending, he held Pontus, boasting that he had recovered his paternal kingdom.
[42] Sub idem tempus in Illyrico est incommodum acceptum, quae provincia superioribus mensibus retenta non tantum sine ignominia sed etiam cum laude erat. Namque eo missus aestate cum duabus legionibus Q. Cornificius, Caesaris quaestor, pro praetore, quamquam erat provincia minime copiosa ad exercitus alendos et finitimo bello ac dissensionibus confecta et vastata, tamen prudentia ac diligentia sua. quod magnam curam suscipiebat ne quo temere progrederetur, et recepit et defendit.
[42] About the same time, in Illyricum a setback was sustained, which province in the previous months had been retained not only without ignominy but even with praise. For to that place in the summer, with two legions, Q. Cornificius, Caesar’s quaestor, as propraetor, was sent; and although the province was very ill-provided for sustaining armies and had been worn out and laid waste by a neighboring war and dissensions, nevertheless by his prudence and diligence—because he took great care not to advance rashly anywhere—he both recovered it and defended it.
For he both stormed several forts set in elevated places, whose advantageous position was impelling the castellans to make sorties and to bring war, and he gave the soldiers their booty; and although this was slight, nevertheless in so great a desperation of the province it was welcome, especially since it had been acquired by valor. And when Octavius, from the rout of the Pharsalic battle, had betaken himself with a great fleet into that bay, with a few ships of the Iadertini—whose singular service for the commonwealth had always stood fast—after Octavius’s ships were scattered he had gotten possession, so that he could even contend by fleet, with the captive ships of the allies added. While Caesar as victor was pursuing Gnaeus Pompey in a very far-distant part of the world, and heard that several adversaries, on account of the nearness of Macedonia, had betaken themselves into Illyricum with remnants gathered from the flight, he sends letters to Gabinius, that he should set out with the legions of recruits, which had recently been levied, into Illyricum, and, the forces having been joined with Q. Cornificius, if any danger were brought upon the province, he should drive it off; but if it could not be kept safe with small forces, he should lead the legions into Macedonia. For he believed that that whole part and region, with Gnaeus Pompey alive, would renew war.
[43] Gabinius ut in Illyricum venit hiberno tempore anni ac difficili sive copiosiorem provinciam existimans sive multum fortunae victoris Caesaris tribuens sive virtute et scientia sua confisus, qua saepe in bellis periclitatus magnas res et secundas ductu ausuque suo gesserat, neque provinciae facultatibus sublevabatur, quae partim erat exinanita partim infidelis, neque navibus intercluso mari tempestatibus commeatus supportari poterat; magnisque difficultatibus coactus non ut volebat sed ut necesse erat bellum gerebat. Ita cum durissimis tempestatibus propter inopiam castella aut oppida expugnare cogeretur, crebro incommoda accipiebat adeoque est a barbaris contemptus ut Salonam se recipiens in oppidum maritimum, quod cives Romani fortissimi fidelissimique incolebant, in agmine dimicare sit coactus. Quo proelio duobus milibus militum amplius amissis, centurionibus XXXVIII, tribunis IIII, cum reliquis copiis Salonam se recepit summaque ibi dificultate rerum omnium pressus paucis mensibus morbo periit.
[43] When Gabinius came into Illyricum in the winter season of the year, whether supposing the province to be rather more copious, or attributing much to the fortune of the victorious Caesar, or trusting in his own virtue and knowledge—by which, often tested in wars, he had carried through great and favorable affairs by his leadership and daring—he was not supported by the resources of the province, which was partly emptied and partly disloyal, nor could supplies be brought up by ships, the sea being shut off by storms; and, constrained by great difficulties, he waged war not as he wished but as was necessary. Thus, as by the harshest weather, on account of want, he was compelled to storm forts or towns, he frequently suffered reverses, and he was so despised by the barbarians that, retiring to Salona, a maritime town which the bravest and most faithful Roman citizens inhabited, he was forced to fight while in marching column. In which battle, with more than two thousand soldiers lost, with 38 centurions and 4 tribunes, he withdrew to Salona with the remaining forces, and there, pressed by the utmost difficulty of all things, within a few months he perished of disease.
[44] Vatinius Brundisi cum esset, cognitis rebus quae gestae erant in Illyrico, cum crebris litteris Cornifici ad auxilium provinciae ferendum evocaretur et M. Octavium audiret cum barbaris foedera percussisse compluribusque locis nostrorum militum oppugnare praesidia partim classe per se partim pedestribus copiis per barbaros, etsi gravi valetudine adfectus vix corporis viribus animum sequebatur, tamen virtute vicit incommodum naturae difficultatesque et hiemis et subitae praeparationis. Nam cum ipse paucas in portu navis longas haberet, litteras in Achaiam ad Q. Calenum misit, uti sibi classem mitteret. Quod cum tardius fieret quam periculum nostrorum flagitabat, qui sustinere impetum Octavi non poterant, navibus actuariis, quarum numerus erat satis magnus, magnitudo nequaquam satis iusta ad proeliandum, rostra imposuit.
[44] When Vatinius was at Brundisium, having learned the matters which had been done in Illyricum, since by frequent letters of Cornificius he was being called out to bring aid to the province, and he heard that M. Octavius had struck treaties with the barbarians and in several places was attacking the garrisons of our soldiers, partly with a fleet on his own account, partly with infantry forces through the barbarians, although afflicted by severe ill-health he could scarcely, with the strength of his body, keep up with his spirit; nevertheless by virtue he overcame the disadvantage of nature and the difficulties both of winter and of sudden preparation. For since he himself had few long ships in the harbor, he sent letters into Achaia to Q. Calenus, that he should send a fleet to him. And when this was being done more slowly than the peril of our men demanded, who could not withstand the attack of Octavius, upon the actuariae (swift transports)—the number of which was quite great, their size by no means sufficient for fighting—he placed rostra (rams).
With these ships added to the long-ships and the number of the fleet increased, with veteran soldiers embarked—of whom he had a great supply from all the legions, men who, counted among the sick, had been left at Brundisium when the army was transported into Greece—he set out for Illyricum; and certain maritime cities that had defected and surrendered themselves to Octavius he was partly reclaiming, partly, as they remained in their own plan, he was sailing past, and he laid upon himself no delay or necessity of any matter that would prevent his pursuing Octavius himself as swiftly as possible. Finding him assaulting Epidaurum by land and sea, where our garrison was, by his arrival he forced him to withdraw from the assault and recovered our garrison.
[45] Octavius cum Vatinium classem magna ex parte confectam ex naviculis actuariis habere cognosset, confisus sua classe substitit ad insulam Tauridem; qua regione Vatinius insequens navigabat, non quo Octavium ibi restitisse sciret, sed quod eum longius progressum insequi decreverat. Cum propius Tauridem accessisset distensis suis navibus, quod et tempestas erat turbulenta et nulla suspicio hostis, repente adversam ad se venientem navem antemnis ad medium malum demissis instructam propugnatoribus animum advertit. Quod ubi conspexit, celeriter vela subduci demittique antemnas iubet et milites armari et vexillo sublato, quo pugnandi dabat signum, quae primae naves subsequebantur idem ut facerent significabat.
[45] When Octavius had learned that Vatinius had a fleet composed for the most part out of oared dispatch-boats, trusting in his own fleet he halted at the island Tauris; in which region Vatinius, pursuing, was sailing—not because he knew that Octavius had come to a stop there, but because he had resolved to pursue him as he advanced farther. When he had drawn nearer to Tauris, his own ships spread out, since the weather was turbulent and there was no suspicion of an enemy, suddenly he noticed a ship coming toward him on the opposite course, with its yardarms lowered to the middle of the mast and fitted out with fighting-men. When he saw this, he quickly orders the sails to be taken in and the yards to be lowered, and the soldiers to arm; and with the standard raised, by which he gave the signal for fighting, he signaled that the leading ships which were following should do the same.
[46] Vatinius cum animum adverteret neque navium se magnitudine neque numero parem esse fortuitae dimicationi, fortunae rem committere maluit. Itaque primus sua quinqueremi in quadriremem ipsius Octavi impetum fecit. Celerrime fortissimeque contra illo remigante naves adversae rostris concurrerunt adeo vehementer ut navis Octaviana rostro discusso ligno contineretur.
[46] When Vatinius noticed that he was not a match for a fortuitous skirmish either in the magnitude of his ships or in their number, he preferred to commit the matter to Fortune. And so he was the first to make an attack with his own quinquereme against Octavius’s own quadrireme. With him rowing in response most swiftly and most bravely, the opposing ships ran together with their rostra so violently that the Octavian ship, its beak having shattered the timber, was held fast.
Battle is fiercely joined in the remaining places, and there is a rushing together especially about the leaders: for as each man brought aid to his own, a great battle at close quarters was made in the narrow sea. And the more an opportunity of clashing was afforded with the ships more closely conjoined, by so much the Vatinian side were superior; who, with admirable valor, did not hesitate to leap from their own ships onto the enemy’s ships, and, the struggle being made equal, far superior in prowess they managed the affair successfully. The quadrireme of Octavian himself is sunk; many besides are taken or, pierced by rams, are submerged; Octavian’s defenders are partly slaughtered on the ships, partly hurled headlong into the sea.
Octavius himself betakes himself into a skiff; as more were taking refuge into it, the skiff, having been swamped, he, wounded, nevertheless swims to his own myoparon. Received there, since night was severing the battle, he fled under sail in a great storm. Several of his own ships follow him, which chance had vindicated from that peril.
[47] At Vatinius re bene gesta receptui cecinit suisque omnibus incolumibus in eum se portum victor recepit, quo ex portu classis Octavi ad dimicandum processerat. Capit ex eo prcelio penterem unam, triremis duas, dicrotas VIII complurisque remiges Octavianos posteroque ibi die, dum suas captivasque navis reficeret, consumpto post diem tertium contendit in insulam Issam, quod eo se recepisse ex fuga credebat Octavium. +Erat in eum+ nobilissimum regionum earum oppidum coniunctissimumque Octavio.
[47] But Vatinius, with the matter well managed, sounded the retreat and, with all his men unharmed, as victor withdrew into that harbor, from which harbor the fleet of Octavius had advanced to fight. From that battle he captures one penteres, two triremes, 8 biremes (dicrotae), and several rowers of Octavius; and with the next day there consumed while he was refitting his own and the captured ships, after the third day he hastened to the island Issa, because he believed that Octavius had taken refuge there in flight. +There was in it+ a most noble town of those regions and most closely connected to Octavius.
When he came there, the townsmen, as suppliants, surrendered themselves to Vatinius, and he learned that Octavius himself with a few small ships, with a favorable wind, had made for the region of Greece, from there to take Sicily, then Africa. Thus, with the affair accomplished most splendidly in a short span, the province recovered and returned to Cornificius, and the adversaries’ fleet expelled from that whole gulf, as victor he withdrew to Brundisium with his army and fleet unharmed.
[48] Eis autem temporibus quibus Caesar ad Dyrrachium Pompeium obsidebat et Palaepharsali rem feliciter gerebat Alexandreaeque cum periculo magno tum etiam maiore periculi fama dimicabat, Q. Cassius Longinus, in Hispania pro praetore provinciae ulterioris obtinendae causa relictus, sive consuetudine naturae suae sive odio quod in illam provinciam susceperat quaestor ex insidiis ibi vulneratus, magnas odi sui fecerat accessiones, quod vel ex conscientia sua, cum de se mutuo sentire provinciam crederet, vel multis signis et testimoniis eorum qui difficulter odia dissimulabant animum advertere poterat, et compensare offensionem provinciae exercitus amore cupiebat. Itaque, cum primum in unum locum exercitum conduxit, sestertios centenos militibus est pollicitus, nec multo post, cum in Lusitania Medobregam oppidum montemque Herminium expugnasset, quo Medobregenses confugerant, ibique imperator esset appellatus, sestertiis centenis milites donavit. Multa praeterea et magna praemia singulis concedebat; quae speciosum reddebant praesentem exercitus amorem, paulatim tamen et occulte militarem disciplinam severitatemque minuebant.
[48] But at the times when Caesar was besieging Pompey at Dyrrachium, was conducting the affair successfully at Palaepharsalus, and at Alexandria was fighting both with great peril and with an even greater rumor of peril, Q. Cassius Longinus, left in Spain as acting praetor for the sake of holding the Farther Province, whether by the habit of his own nature or by the hatred which he had conceived against that province—he as quaestor having there been wounded by ambush—had made great additions to their hatred of him; for either from his own conscience, since he believed the province felt mutually about him, or from the many signs and testimonies of those who with difficulty concealed their hatreds, he could take notice, and he desired to compensate the province’s offense with the love of the army. And so, as soon as he had brought the army together into one place, he promised the soldiers 100 sesterces each; and not long after, when in Lusitania he had stormed the town of Medobriga and Mount Herminius, to which the Medobrigans had fled, and there had been hailed imperator, he gave the soldiers 100 sesterces each. Besides these, he was granting to individuals many and great rewards; which made the army’s present affection look splendid, yet little by little and covertly were diminishing military discipline and strictness.
[49] Cassius legionibus in hiberna dispositis ad ius dicendum Cordubam se recepit contractumque in ea aes alienum gravissimis oneribus provinciae constituit exsolvere; et ut largitionis postulat consuetudo, per causam liberalitatis speciosam plura largitori quaerebantur. Pecuniae locupletibus imperabantur, quas Longinus sibi expensas ferri non tantum patiebatur sed etiam cogebat, in gregem locupletium simultatium causa tenues coiciebantur, neque ullum genus quaestus aut magni et evidentis aut minimi et sordidi praetermittebatur quo domus et tribunal imperatoris vacaret. Nemo erat, qui modo aliquam iacturam facere posset, quin aut vadimonio teneretur aut in reos referretur.
[49] Cassius, with the legions posted in winter quarters, withdrew to Corduba to pronounce law, and he set himself to discharge in that city the debt contracted, by imposing most heavy burdens upon the province; and, as the custom of largess demands, under the specious pretext of liberality more things were being sought for the largitor. Sums of money were imposed upon the wealthy, which Longinus not only permitted to be entered as expenses to himself but even compelled; the poor were thrown into the herd of the rich for the sake of feuds; nor was any kind of gain, whether great and evident or petty and sordid, left untried, whereby the house and the tribunal of the commander might stand empty. There was no one who, provided he could suffer any loss at all, was not either held to a bail recognizance or entered among the accused.
[50] Quibus de causis accidit ut, cum Longinus imperator eadem faceret quae fecerat quaestor, similia rursus de morte eius provinciales consilia inirent. Horum odium confirmabant non nulli familiares eius qui, cum in illa societate versarentur rapinarum, nihilo minus oderant eum cuius nomine peccabant, sibique quod rapuerant acceptum referebant, quod interciderat aut erat interpellatum Cassio assignabant. Quintam legionem novam conscribit.
[50] For which causes it happened that, since Longinus as emperor was doing the same things that he had done as quaestor, the provincials again entered upon similar plans concerning his death. Their hatred was being confirmed by some of his intimates, who, although they were engaged in that partnership of rapine, nonetheless no less hated him in whose name they were committing offenses; they credited to themselves what they had seized, and what had been lost or was impeded they assigned to Cassius. He conscripts a new Fifth legion.
[51] Interim litteras accepit a Caesare, ut in Africam exercitum traiceret perque Mauretaniam ad finis Numidiae perveniret, quod magna Cn. Pompeio Iuba miserat auxilia maioraque missurus existimabatur. Quibus litteris acceptis insolenti voluptate efferebatur, quod sibi novarum provinciarum et fertilissimi regni tanta oblata esset facultas. Itaque ipse in Lusitaniam proficiscitur ad legiones arcessendas auxiliaque adducenda; certis hominibus dat negotium ut frumentum navesque C praepararentur pecuniaeque describerentur atque imperarentur, ne qua res cum redisset moraretur.
[51] Meanwhile he received letters from Caesar, to transport the army into Africa and to reach, through Mauretania, to the borders of Numidia, because Juba had sent great auxiliaries to Gnaeus Pompeius and was thought about to send greater. On receiving these letters he was carried away by an insolent delight, because to him so great an opportunity had been offered of new provinces and of a most fertile kingdom. And so he himself sets out into Lusitania to summon the legions and bring in auxiliaries; he gives certain men the charge that grain and 100 ships be prepared and that monies be assessed and levied, so that no matter might delay him when he had returned.
[52] Exercitu coacto in unum locum castris ad Cordubam positis pro contione militibus exponit quas res Caesaris iussu gerere deberet, polliceturque eis, cum in Mauretaniam traiecisset, sestertios [centenos] se daturum; quintam fore in Hispania legionem. Ex contione se Cordubam recepit eoque ipso die tempore postmeridiano, cum in basilicam iret, quidam Minucius Silo cliens L. Racili libellum, quasi aliquid ab eo postularet, ut miles ei tradit, deinde post Racilium — nam is latus Cassi tegebat — , quasi responsum peteret, celeriter dato loco cum se insinuasset, sinistra corripit aversum dextraque bis ferit pugione. Clamore sublato fit a coniuratis impetus universis.
[52] With the army gathered into one place and the camp pitched near Corduba, he explains to the soldiers before the assembly what things he ought to carry out by Caesar’s order, and he promises them that, when he had crossed over into Mauretania, he would give them sesterces [a hundred each]; that there would be a fifth legion in Spain. From the assembly he withdrew to Corduba, and on that very day in the afternoon, as he was going into the basilica, a certain Minucius Silo, a client of L. Racilius, handed to him, as a soldier, a libellus, as though he were requesting something from him; then, getting behind Racilius—for he was covering Cassius’s flank—, as if to seek a reply, when a place had been quickly given he slipped himself in, seized him from behind with the left hand and with the right struck him twice with a dagger. A shout having been raised, there was an attack by all the conspirators.
Munatius Flaccus runs through with his sword the nearest lictor; with him slain, he wounds Quintus Cassius, the legate. There Titus Vasius and Lucius Mercello, with similar confidence, aid Flaccus, their fellow townsman—for they all were Italicenses. Against Longinus himself Lucius Licinius Squillus rushes, and, as he lies prostrate, wounds him with light strokes.
[53] Concurritur ad Cassium defendendum: semper enim Berones complurisque evocatos cum telis secum habere consuerat. A quibus ceteri intercluduntur qui ad caedem faciendam subsequebantur; quo in numero fuit Calpurnius Salvianus et Manilius Tusculus. Minucius inter saxa quae iacebant in itinere fugiens opprimitur et relato domum Cassio ad eum deducitur.
[53] They run together to defend Cassius: for he had always been accustomed to have the Berones and several evocati with weapons with him. By whom the rest who were following to effect the slaughter are cut off; in which number were Calpurnius Salvianus and Manilius Tusculus. Minucius, fleeing among the rocks that were lying in the road, is overpowered, and with Cassius carried home, he is led to him.
Racilius betakes himself into the nearest house of his intimate, until he might learn for certain whether Cassius had been finished off. L. Laterensis, since he did not doubt it, runs joyfully to the camp and congratulates the vernacular soldiers and those of the second legion, to whom he knew Cassius was especially an object of hatred; he is lifted up by the multitude onto the tribunal, he is entitled praetor. For no one either born in the province, as the soldiers of the vernacular legion, or by long duration now made provincial, in which number was the second legion, had not agreed with the whole province in hatred of Cassius: for Caesar had assigned legions 30 and 21, levied in Italy within a few months, to Longinus; the fifth legion had recently been completed there.
[54] Interim nuntiatur Laterensi vivere Cassium. Quo nuntio dolore magis permotus quam animo perturbatus reficit se celeriter et ad Cassium visendum proficiscitur. Re cognita XXX legio signa Cordubam infert ad auxilium ferendum imperatori suo.
[54] Meanwhile it is announced to Laterensis that Cassius is alive. At this news, moved more by grief than shaken in spirit, he quickly collects himself and sets out to see Cassius. Once the matter was learned, the 30th legion bears its standards to Corduba to bring aid to its commander.
The 21st does this same thing. After these the 5th follows. When two legions were left in the camp, the men of the Second, fearing lest they be left alone and from that it be judged what they had felt, followed the deed of the earlier ones. The home-born legion remained in its resolve and was not cast down from its station by any fear.
[55] Cassius eos qui nominati erant conscii caedis iubet comprehendi; +legiones V in castra remittit cohortibus XXX retentis.+ Indicio Minuci cognoscit L. Racilium et L. Laterensem et Annium Scapulam, maximae dignitatis et gratiae provincialem hominem sibique tam familiarem quam Laterensem et Racilium, in eadem fuisse coniuratione, nec diu moratur dolorem suum quin eos interfici iubeat. Minucium libertis tradit excruciandum, item Calpurnium Salvianum, qui profitetur indicium coniuratorumque numerum auget, vere, ut quidam existimant, ut non nulli queruntur, coactus. Isdem cruciatibus adfectus L. Mercello . . . Squillus nominat pluris; quos Cassius interfici iubet exceptis eis qui se pecunia redemerunt.
[55] Cassius orders those who had been named as privy to the slaughter to be seized; +he sends the 5 legions back to the camp, with 30 cohorts retained.+ By the disclosure of Minucius he learns that Lucius Racilius and Lucius Laterensis and Annius Scapula, a provincial man of the highest dignity and favor, and to himself as familiar as Laterensis and Racilius, had been in the same conspiracy; nor does he long delay his grief before he orders them to be put to death. He hands Minucius over to the freedmen to be excruciated, likewise Calpurnius Salvianus, who professes information and increases the number of the conspirators, truly, as some think; as some complain, compelled. Afflicted with the same torments, Lucius Mercellus . . . Squillus names several more; whom Cassius orders to be killed, except those who ransomed themselves with money.
[56] Aliquot post diebus litteras a Caesare missas accipit, quibus cognoscit Pompeium in acie victum amissis copiis fugisse. Qua re cognita mixtam dolore voluptatem capiebat: victoriae nuntius laetitiam exprimebat, confectum bellum licentiam temporum intercludebat. Sic erat dubius animus utrum nihil timere an omnia licere mallet.
[56] After several days he received letters sent from Caesar, by which he learned that Pompey, conquered in the battle-line, had fled with his forces lost. Upon learning this he took a pleasure mixed with pain: the message of victory was expressing joy; the war, brought to completion, was shutting off the license of the times. Thus his mind was in doubt whether he preferred to fear nothing or that everything be permitted.
With the wounds healed, he summons all who had borne outlays of money for him, and orders those sums received to be paid back; and to those on whom it seemed he had imposed too little a burden, he commands a larger sum besides. Moreover, he instituted a levy of Roman equites; these, conscripted from all the assize-districts and colonies, being terrified at transmarine military service, he called to a redemption of the sacrament (oath). This was a great revenue, yet it created a greater hatred.
With these matters completed, he reviews the whole army; he sends the legions which he was about to lead into Africa, and the auxiliaries, to the crossing. He himself approaches Hispalis to inspect the fleet which he was preparing, and lingers there, because he had posted an edict throughout the whole province that those upon whom he had imposed monies and who had not contributed them should approach him. This summons greatly disturbed all.
[57] Interim L. Titius, qui eo tempore tribunus militum in legione vernacula fuerat, nuntiat eam a legione XXX, quam Q. Cassius legatus simul ducebat, cum ad oppidum Ilipam castra haberet, seditione facta centurionibus aliquot occisis qui signa tolli non patiebantur, discessisse et ad secundam legionem contendisse, quae ad fretum alio itinere ducebatur. Cognita re noctu cum V cohortibus unetvicesimanorum egreditur, mane pervenit +noctu+. Ibi eum diem, ut quid ageretur perspiceret, moratus Carmonem contendit. Hic, cum legio XXX et XXI et cohortes IIII ex V legione totusque convenisset equitatus, audit IIII cohortis a vernaculis oppressas ad Obuculam cum his ad secundam pervenisse legionem omnisque ibi se coniunxisse et T. Thorium Italicensem ducem delegisse.
[57] Meanwhile L. Titius, who at that time had been a military tribune in the homeborn legion, announces that it, from legion 30, which Q. Cassius, the legate, was leading at the same time, when it had its camp near the town Ilipa, a mutiny having occurred, after several centurions who did not allow the standards to be carried off had been slain, had departed and had hastened to the second legion, which was being led to the strait by another route. The matter having been learned, by night he goes out with 5 cohorts of the 29th, he arrives in the morning +by night+. There, having delayed that day to see what was being done, he hastened to Carmo. Here, when legion 30 and 21 and 4 cohorts from legion 5 and all the cavalry had assembled, he hears that 4 cohorts, overpowered by the homeborns, had come to Obucula, and with these had reached the second legion, and that all there had joined themselves and had chosen T. Thorius of Italica as leader.
With counsel quickly held, he sends M. Marcellus, quaestor, to Corduba, that he might keep it in his power, and Q. Cassius, legate, to Hispalis. Within a few days it is reported to him that the Corduban conventus had defected from him, and that Marcellus, brought either by will or by necessity—for this was reported variously—agrees with the Cordubans; that two cohorts of the 5th legion, which had been at Corduba in garrison, do the same. Cassius, inflamed by these matters, breaks camp and on the next day came to Segovia at the river Singilis.
[58] Interim Thorius ad Cordubam veteres legiones adducit ac, ne dissensionis initium natum seditiosa militum suaque natura videretur, simul ut contra Q. Cassium, qui Caesaris nomine maioribus viribus uti videbatur, aeque potentem opponeret dignitatem, Cn. Pompeio se provinciam reciperare velle palam dictitabat. Et forsitan etiam hoc fecerit odio Caesaris et amore Pompei, cuius nomen multum poterat apud eas legiones quas M. Varro obtinuerat. Sed id qua mente, communis erat coniectura: certe hoc prae se Thorius ferebat; milites adeo fatebantur, ut Cn. Pompei nomen in scutis inscriptum haberent.
[58] Meanwhile Thorius leads the veteran legions to Corduba, and, lest the beginning of a dissension should seem to have arisen from the seditious nature of the soldiers and his own nature, and at the same time in order that, against Q. Cassius, who seemed to be using greater forces under Caesar’s name, he might oppose an equally potent dignity, he kept saying openly that he wished to recover the province for Cn. Pompeius. And perhaps he even did this from hatred of Caesar and love of Pompeius, whose name had great power among those legions which M. Varro had held. But with what mind he did this was a matter of common conjecture: certainly this Thorius professed; the soldiers admitted it to such a degree that they had the name of Cn. Pompeius inscribed on their shields.
A crowded assembly goes out to meet the legions, and not only of men but also of matrons of households and praetextati, and they beseech that they not with a hostile advent sack Corduba: for they declare that they are in agreement against Cassius together with all; they pray that they not be compelled to act against Caesar.
[59] Tantae multitudinis precibus et lacrimis exercitus commotus cum videret ad Cassium persequendum nihil opus esse Cn. Pompei nomine et memoria tamque omnibus Caesarianis quam Pompeianis Longinum esse in odio neque se conventum neque M. Marcellum contra Caesaris causam posse perducere, nomen Pompei ex scutis detraxerunt, Marcellum, qui se Caesaris causam defensurum profitebatur, ducem asciverunt praetoremque appellarunt et conventum sibi adiunxerunt castraque ad Cordubam posuerunt. Cassius eo biduo circiter IIII milia passuum a Corduba citra flumen Baetim in oppidi conspectu loco excelso facit castra; litteras ad regem Bogudem in Mauretaniam et [ad] M. Lepidum proconsulem in Hispaniam citeriorem mittit, subsidio sibi provinciaeque Caesaris causa quam primum veniret. Ipse hostili modo Cordubensium agros vastat, aedificia incendit.
[59] Moved by the prayers and tears of so great a multitude, the army, when it saw that for pursuing Cassius there was no need of the name and memory of Gnaeus Pompey, and that Longinus was in hatred as much with all the Caesarians as with the Pompeians, and that neither the conventus nor Marcus Marcellus could be brought to act against Caesar’s cause, took the name of Pompey off their shields, enrolled Marcellus—who professed that he would defend Caesar’s cause—as leader and hailed him praetor, and they added the conventus to themselves and pitched camp by Corduba. Within that two-day span Cassius made camp about 4 miles from Corduba, on this side of the river Baetis, within sight of the town, on a lofty spot; he sent letters to King Bogud into Mauretania and to M. Lepidus, proconsul, into Hither Spain, that he should come as support to himself and to the province for Caesar’s cause as soon as possible. He himself, in hostile fashion, ravaged the fields of the people of Corduba and set buildings ablaze.
[60] Cuius rei deformitate atque indignitate legiones quae Marcellum sibi ducem ceperant ad eum concurrerunt, ut in aciem educerentur orant, priusque confligendi sibi potestas fieret quam cum tanta contumelia nobilissimae carissimaeque possessiones Cordubensium in conspectu suo rapinis, ferro flammaque consumerentur. Marcellus cum confligere miserrimum putaret, quod et victoris et victi detrimentum ad eundem Caesarem esset redundaturum neque suae potestatis esset, legiones Baetim traducit aciemque instruit. Cum Cassium contra pro suis castris aciem instruxisse loco superiore videret, causa interposita, quod is in aequum non descenderet, Marcellus militibus persuadet ut se recipiant in castra.
[60] At the deformity and indignity of this affair, the legions which had taken Marcellus for themselves as leader ran together to him, begging that they be led out into the battle line, and that the power of engaging be granted to them before, with such contumely, the most noble and most dear possessions of the Cordubans, in their sight, were consumed by plunder, iron, and flame. Marcellus, since he thought it most miserable to fight, because the detriment both of victor and of vanquished would redound to the same Caesar, and it was not within his own power, led the legions across the Baetis and drew up the battle line. When he saw that Cassius, opposite, had drawn up his line before his own camp in a higher position, with a pretext interposed—that he did not descend into the level ground—Marcellus persuaded the soldiers to withdraw into the camp.
Therefore he began to lead back the forces. Cassius, strong in this advantage and knowing Marcellus to be infirm, attacked with cavalry and killed on the riverbanks many of the rearmost legionaries who were withdrawing. With this detriment, when it had been learned what defect and difficulty the transit of the river had, Marcellus transfers the camp to the Baetis, and frequently each leads the legions out into the battle-line; nor, however, is there an engagement on account of the difficulties of the terrain.
[61] Erat copiis pedestribus multo firmior Marcellus; habebat enim veteranas nultisque proeliis expertas legiones. Cassius fidei magis quam virtuti legionum confidebat. Itaque, cum castra castris collata essent et Marcellus locum idoneum castello cepisset quo prohibere aqua Cassianos posset, Longinus, veritus ne genere quodam obsidionis clauderetur in regionibus alienis sibique infestis, noctu silentio ex castris proficiscitur celerique itinere Uliam contendit, quod sibi fidele esse oppidum credebat.
[61] Marcellus was much stronger in infantry forces; for he had legions veteran and tried in many battles. Cassius trusted more in the fidelity than in the valor of the legions. And so, when camps had been set against camps and Marcellus had seized a place suitable for a small fort, by which he could cut the Cassians off from water, Longinus, fearing lest he be shut in by a kind of siege in regions alien and hostile to himself, by night in silence departs from the camp and with a swift march hastens to Ulia, a town which he believed to be faithful to him.
There he pitches his camp so joined to the walls that both by the nature of the place—for Ulia is set on a lofty mount—and by the city’s own fortification he was safe from assault on all sides. Marcellus pursues him and, as closely as he can, brings camp to camp near Ulia; and, the nature of the places having been learned, to the very point to which he most wished to draw the affair he was driven by necessity, namely that he neither engaged—if there were the opportunity for that, he could not restrain the incited soldiers—nor allowed Cassius to range more widely, lest more cities should suffer the things which the Cordubans had suffered. With forts placed in suitable places and with works continued around the circuit of the town, he shut in Ulia and Cassius with fortifications.
[62] Paucis diebus Q. Cassi litteris acceptis rex Bogus cum copiis venit adiungitque ei legioni quam secum adduxerat compluris cohortis auxiliarias Hispanorum. Namque ut in civilibus dissensionibus accidere consuevit, ita temporibus illis in Hispania non nullae civitates rebus Cassi studebant, plures Marcellum fovebant. Accedit cum copiis Bogus ad exteriores Marcelli munitiones.
[62] Within a few days, letters from Q. Cassius having been received, King Bogus came with forces and joined to that legion which he had led with him several auxiliary cohorts of Spaniards. For just as in civil dissensions it is accustomed to happen, so at that time in Spain some communities were favoring the cause of Cassius, more were fostering Marcellus. Bogus approaches with his forces to the exterior fortifications of Marcellus.
[63] Interim Lepidus ex citeriore provincia cum cohortibus legionariis XXXV magnoque numero equitum et reliquorum auxiliorum venit ea mente Uliam, ut sine ullo studio contentiones Cassi Marcellique componeret. Huic venienti sine dubitatione Marcellus se credit atque offert; Cassius contra suis se tenet praesidiis, sive eo quod plus sibi iuris deberi quam Marcello existimabat, sive eo quod ne praeoccupatus animus Lepidi esset obsequio adversarii verebatur. Ponit ad Uliam castra Lepidus neque habet a Marcello quicquam divisi.
[63] Meanwhile Lepidus from the Hither province came with 35 legionary cohorts and a great number of horsemen and the rest of the auxiliaries, to Ulia with this intention: that he might compose the contentions of Cassius and Marcellus without any partisanship. To him as he arrived Marcellus, without hesitation, entrusts and offers himself; Cassius, by contrast, keeps himself within his own defenses—either because he thought that more right was owed to himself than to Marcellus, or because he feared lest the mind of Lepidus be preoccupied by the obsequy of his adversary. Lepidus pitches camp at Ulia and has no division from Marcellus.
He forbids that there be fighting; he invites Cassius to come out and interposes his good faith in every matter. When Cassius had long hesitated what he should do and what was to be believed about Lepidus, and could find no outcome of his plan if he persisted in his opinion, he demands that the fortifications be dismantled and that a free exit be granted to him. Not only with a truce made but with [peace] now nearly established, while the works were being leveled [when] the guards of the fortifications had been withdrawn, the king’s auxiliaries against that stronghold of Marcellus which was nearest to the king’s camp, with no one expecting it — if, however, Cassius was among “all”: for there was doubt about his connivance — , made an attack and cut down quite a number of soldiers there.
[64] Cum iter Cassio patefactum esset, castra Marcellus cum Lepido coniungit. Lepidus eodem tempore Marcellusque Cordubam cum suis, Cassius proficiscitur Carmonem. Sub idem tempus Trebonius proconsul ad provinciam obtinendam venit.
[64] When the route had been laid open for Cassius, Marcellus joins his camp with Lepidus. Lepidus at the same time, and Marcellus, go with their own men to Corduba; Cassius sets out for Carmo. About the same time Trebonius, proconsul, comes to obtain the province.
When Cassius learned of his arrival, he distributed the legions he had with him and the cavalry into winter quarters; he himself, with all his belongings quickly snatched up, hastened to Malaca and there, at an adverse season for sailing, boarded a ship—so, as he himself was proclaiming, that he might not commit himself to Lepidus and Trebonius and Marcellus; as his friends kept saying, lest he make his journey through that province with lesser dignity, a great part of which had defected from him; as the rest thought, lest that money, amassed from infinite rapines, should come into anyone’s power. Having set out with a fair, so far as wintry, tempest, when he had betaken himself into the Hiberus River to avoid the night, then from there, with the weather somewhat more violent, setting out, believing he would sail none the more dangerously, as opposing waves were meeting at the mouth of the river, in the very jaws, since he could neither turn the ship because of the force of the river nor keep it, once directed, amid such great waves, with the ship submerged he perished.
[65] Cum in Syriam Caesar ex Aegypto venisset atque ab eis qui Roma venerant ad eum cognosceret litterisque urbanis animadverteret multa Romae male et inutiliter administrari neque ullam partem rei publicae satis commode geri, quod et contentionibus tribuniciis perniciosae seditiones orirentur et ambitione atque indulgentia tribunorum militum et qui legionibus praeerant multa contra morem consuetudinemque militarem fierent, quae dissolvendae disciplinae severitatisque essent, eaque omnia flagitare adventum suum videret, tamen praeferendum existimabat, quas in provincias regionesque venisset, eas ita relinquere constitutas ut domesticis dissensionibus liberarentur, iura legesque acciperent, externorum hostium metum deponerent. Haec in Syria, Cilicia, Asia celeriter se confecturum sperabat, quod hae provinciae nullo bello premebantur; in Bithynia ac Ponto plus oneris videbat sibi impendere. Non excessisse enim Ponto Pharnacen audiebat neque excessurum putabat, cum secundo proelio vehementer esset inflatus quod contra Domitium Calvinum fecerat.
[65] When Caesar had come into Syria from Egypt and learned from those who had come from Rome, and observed from letters from the City, that many things at Rome were being administered badly and uselessly, and that no part of the Republic was being conducted quite commodiously—because both from tribunician contentions pernicious seditions were arising, and through the ambition and indulgence of the tribunes of the soldiers and of those who commanded the legions many things were being done against military custom and consuetude, things that were for the dissolving of discipline and severity—and when he saw that all these were clamoring for his arrival, nevertheless he judged it preferable to leave the provinces and regions into which he had come so constituted that they might be freed from domestic dissensions, receive rights and laws, and lay down the fear of external enemies. These things in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia he hoped to bring to completion quickly, because these provinces were pressed by no war; in Bithynia and Pontus he saw more burden impending upon himself. For he heard that Pharnaces had not withdrawn from Pontus, nor did he think he would withdraw, since he had been greatly inflated by the favorable battle which he had fought against Domitius Calvinus.
Having tarried in nearly all the cities that are of greater dignity, he bestowed rewards upon the well-deserving both man-by-man and publicly; he examined and adjudicated ancient controversies. Kings, tyrants, and dynasts bordering the province—who had all converged upon him—he, once they were received into his good faith with conditions imposed for the guarding and defending of the province, dismissed as most friendly to himself and to the Roman people.
[66] Paucis diebus in ea provincia consumptis Sextum Caesarem, amicum et necessarium suum, legionibus Syriaeque praeficit; ipse eadem classe qua venerat proficiscitur in Ciliciam. Cuius provinciae civitates omnis evocat Tarsum, quod oppidum fere totius Ciliciae nobilissimum fortissimumque est. Ibi rebus omnibus provinciae et finitimarum civitatium constitutis cupiditate proficiscendi ad bellum gerendum non diutius moratur, magnisque itineribus per Cappadociam confectis biduum Mazacae commoratus Comana venit, vetustissimum et sanctissimum in Cappadocia Bellonae templum, quod tanta religione colitur ut sacerdos eius deae maiestate, imperio, potentia secundus a rege consensu gentis illius habeatur.
[66] After a few days spent in that province, he puts Sextus Caesar, his friend and kinsman, in command of the legions and of Syria; he himself sets out with the same fleet by which he had come, for Cilicia. He summons all the cities of that province to Tarsus, which town is almost the most noble and the most strong of all Cilicia. There, when all the affairs of the province and of the neighboring cities had been settled, through eagerness to set out to wage war he delays no longer, and, great marches having been completed through Cappadocia, after a two-day stay at Mazaca he comes to Comana, the most ancient and most sacred temple of Bellona in Cappadocia, which is cultivated with such religious reverence that the priest of that goddess is held by the consensus of that people as second to the king in majesty, command, and power.
He adjudicated that to the most noble man Lycomedes the Bithynian, who, sprung from the royal stock of the Cappadocians, with a right by no means doubtful, yet with that priesthood long interrupted because of the adverse fortune of his ancestors and the change of dynasty, was reclaiming it. But to Ariarathes, the brother of Ariobarzanes—since each of them had deserved well of the commonwealth—lest either the inheritance of the kingdom should entice Ariarathes or the heir of the kingdom should alarm him, +he assigned Ariarathes to Ariobarzanes, to be under his command and jurisdiction+. He himself began to complete the journey he had begun with like velocity.
[67] Cum propius Pontum finisque Gallograeciae accessisset, Deiotarus, tetrarches Gallograeciae tum quidem paene totius, quod ei neque legibus neque moribus concessum esse ceteri tetrarchae contendebant, sine dubio autem rex Armeniae minoris ab senatu appellatus, depositis regiis insignibus neque tantum privato vestitu sed etiam reorum habitu supplex ad Caesarem venit oratum ut sibi ignosceret, quod in ea parte positus terrarum quae nulla praesidia Caesaris habuisset exercitibus imperiisque [coactus] in Cn. Pompei castris fuisset: neque enim se debuisse iudicem esse controversiarum populi Romani, sed parere praesentibus imperiis.
[67] When he had drawn nearer to Pontus and the borders of Gallograecia, Deiotarus, tetrarch of Gallograecia—then indeed of almost the whole of it, which the other tetrarchs contended was not allowed to him by laws nor by customs—yet without doubt styled king of Lesser Armenia by the Senate, with his royal insignia laid aside, and not only in private dress but even in the garb of defendants, came as a suppliant to Caesar to beg that he would forgive him, because, being placed in that part of the lands which had held no garrisons of Caesar, he had been—compelled by the armies and commands—[coactus] in the camp of Gnaeus Pompeius: for he said that he ought not to have been a judge of the controversies of the Roman people, but to obey the present commands.
[68] Contra quem Caesar, cum plurima sua commemorasset officia quae consul ei decretis publicis tribuisset, cumque defensionem eius nullam posse excusationem eius imprudentiae recipere coarguisset, quod homo tantae prudentiae ac diligentiae scire potuisset quis urbem Italiamque teneret, ubi senatus populusque Romanus, ubi res publica esset, quis denique post L. Lentulum, C. Marcellum consul esset, tamen se concedere id factum superioribus suis beneficiis, veteri hospitio atque amicitiae, dignitati aetatique hominis, precibus eorum qui frequentes concurrissent hospites atque amici Deiotari ad deprecandum, de controversiis tetrarcharum postea se cogniturum esse dixit, regium vestitum ei restituit. Legionem autem eam quam ex genere civium suorum Deiotarus armatura disciplinaque nostra constitutam habebat equitatumque omnem ad bellum gerendum adducere iussit.
[68] Against him Caesar, after he had recalled his very many services which, as consul, he had conferred upon him by public decrees, and after he had proved that his defense could admit no excusation of his imprudence—for a man of such prudence and diligence could have known who held the city and Italy, where the Senate and Roman People were, where the commonwealth was, who, finally, after L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus, was consul—yet said that he granted pardon for that deed in view of his prior benefactions, the old guest-friendship and friendship, the dignity and age of the man, and the entreaties of those who had flocked in numbers, Deiotarus’s guests and friends, to intercede; he said that afterward he would take cognizance of the controversies of the tetrarchs; he restored to him his royal attire. Moreover, he ordered him to bring for the waging of war that legion which Deiotarus had maintained, formed from the class of his own citizens with our armature and discipline, and all the cavalry.
[69] Cum in Pontum venisset copiasque omnis in unum locum coegisset, quae numero atque exercitatione bellorum mediocres erant — excepta enim legione sexta, quam secum abduxerat Alexandrea veteranam multis laboribus periculisque functam multisque militibus partim difficultate itinerum ac navigationum partim crebritate bellorum adeo deminutam, ut minus mille hominibus in ea esset, reliquae erant tres legiones, una Deiotari, duae quae in eo proelio quod Cn. Domitium fecisse cum Pharnace scripsimus fuerant — , legati a Pharnace missi Caesarem adeunt atque imprimis deprecantur ne eius adventus hostilis esset: facturum enim omnia Pharnacen quae imperata essent. Maximeque commemorabant nulla Pharnacen auxilia contra Caesarem Pompeio dare voluisse, cum Deiotarus, qui dedisset, tamen ei satisfecisset.
[69] When he had come into Pontus and had gathered all the forces into one place, which were mediocre in number and in the exercise of wars — for except the sixth legion, which he had led away with him from Alexandria, a veteran [unit] that had performed many labors and dangers and had been so reduced in many soldiers partly by the difficulty of journeys and navigations, partly by the frequency of wars, that there were less than a thousand men in it, the rest were three legions, one of Deiotarus, two which had been in that battle which we wrote that Gnaeus Domitius fought with Pharnaces — , legates sent by Pharnaces approach Caesar and especially beseech that his advent not be hostile: for Pharnaces would do all things that were commanded. And they most of all recalled that Pharnaces had been unwilling to give any auxiliaries to Pompey against Caesar, whereas Deiotarus, who had given them, had nevertheless satisfied him.
[70] Caesar respondit se fore aequissimum Pharnaci, si quae polliceretur repraesentaturus esset. Monuit autem, ut solebat, mitibus verbis legatos, ne aut Deiotarum sibi obicerent aut nimis eo gloriarentur beneficio, quod auxilia Pompeio non misissent. Nam se neque libentius facere quicquam quam supplicibus ignoscre neque provinciarum publicas iniurias condonare eis posse qui [non] fuissent in se officiosi.
[70] Caesar replied that he would be most equitable to Pharnaces, if he would immediately make good whatever he promised. Moreover, as he was wont, he admonished the legates with mild words not either to throw Deiotarus in his face or to boast too much of that benefaction, that they had not sent auxiliaries to Pompey. For he neither did anything more willingly than to pardon suppliants, nor could he condone the public injuries of the provinces for those who had [not] been dutiful toward him.
Indeed, he said that that very service which they were commemorating had been more useful to Pharnaces, who had provided beforehand so as not to be conquered, than to himself, to whom the immortal gods had granted victory. And so he conceded to Pharnaces the great and grave injuries of Roman citizens who had done business in Pontus, since he could not restore them in their entirety. For neither to those killed can lost life be restored, nor to those cut out can virility be restored; and this punishment, indeed, Roman citizens had undergone as more grievous than death.
But he should depart from Pontus forthwith, send back the companies of the publicans, and restore to the allies and to Roman citizens the other things which were in his possession. If he should do so, then already at that time he might send to him gifts and presents which, when affairs were well managed, imperators were accustomed to receive from friends. For Pharnaces had sent him a golden crown.
[71] At Pharnaces liberaliter omnia pollicitus, cum festinantem ac praecurrentem Caesarem speraret libentius etiam crediturum suis promissis quam res pateretur, quo celerius honestiusque ad res magis necessarias proficisceretur — nemini enim erat ignotum plurimis de causis ad urbem Caesarem revocar — , lentius agere, decedendi diem postulare longiorem, pactiones interponere, in summa frustrari coepit. Caesar cognita calliditate hominis, quod aliis temporibus natura facere consueverat tunc necessitate fecit adductus, ut celerius omnium opinione manum consereret.
[71] But Pharnaces, having liberally promised everything, since he hoped that a hastening and outstripping Caesar would more willingly even trust to his promises than the situation would allow, in order that he might set out the more quickly and more honorably toward the more necessary affairs — for it was unknown to no one that for very many causes Caesar was being recalled to the city —, began to act more slowly, to demand a longer day for withdrawing, to interpose pactions, in sum to frustrate. Caesar, his cunning once recognized, then did, driven by necessity, what at other times he had been accustomed by nature to do: namely, to join battle more quickly than anyone expected.
[72] Zela est oppidum in Ponto positum, ipsum ut in plano loco satis munitum: tumulus enim naturalis, velut manu factus, excelsiore undique fastigio sustinet murum. Circumpositi sunt huic oppido magni multique intercisi vallibus colles; quorum editissimus unus, qui propter victoriam Mithridatis et infelicitatem Triari detrimentumque exercitus nostri magnam in illis partibus habet nobilitatem, superioribus locis atque itineribus paene coniunctus [est] oppido nec multo longius milibus passuum III abest ab Zela. Hunc locum Pharnaces veteribus paternorum felicium castrorum refectis operibus copiis suis omnibus occupavit.
[72] Zela is a town situated in Pontus, in itself, as being on level ground, sufficiently fortified: for a natural tumulus, as if man‑made, with a more elevated pitch on every side, supports the wall. Great and many hills, cut through by valleys, are set around this town; of these, one, the most elevated—which, on account of the victory of Mithridates and the ill‑fortune of Triarius and the loss of our army, has great renown in those parts—being almost connected to the town by higher ground and approaches, is not much farther off: it is 3 miles from Zela. Pharnaces, after repairing the works of the old fortunate camp of his father, occupied this place with all his forces.
[73] Caesar cum ab hoste milia passuum V castra posuisset videretque eas vallis quibus regia castra munirentur eodem intervallo sua castra munituras, si modo ea loca hostes priores non cepissent quae multo erant propiora regis castris, aggerem comportari iubet intra munitiones. Quo celeriter collato proxima nocte vigilia quarta legionibus omnibus expeditis impedimentisque in castris relictis prima luce neque opinantibus hostibus eum ipsum locum cepit, in quo Mithridates secundum proelium adversus Triarium fecerat. Huc omnem comportatum aggerem ex castris servitia +agerentur+ iussit, ne quis ab opere miles discederet, cum spatio non amplius passuum mille intercisa vallis castra hostium divideret ab opere incepto Caesaris castrorum.
[73] When Caesar had pitched camp 5 miles from the enemy and saw that those valleys by which the royal camp was fortified would, at the same interval, serve to fortify his own camp, if only the enemy did not first seize those positions which were much nearer to the king’s camp, he orders a rampart to be brought in within the fortifications. When this had been quickly heaped up, on the next night at the 4th watch, with all the legions unencumbered and the baggage left in the camp, at first light, the enemy not expecting it, he seized that very place in which Mithridates had fought the second battle against Triarius. To this spot he ordered all the rampart-material that had been brought together to be carried from the camp by the slaves, so that no soldier might leave off from the work, since a valley cut between, at a distance of not more than 1,000 paces, separated the enemy’s camp from the work begun for Caesar’s camp.
[74] Pharnaces, cum id repente prima luce animadvertisset, copias suas omnis pro castris instruxit. Quas interposita tanta locorum iniquitate consuetudine magis pervulgata militari credebat instrui Caesar vel ad opus suum tardandum, quo plures in armis tenerentur, vel ad ostentationem regiae fiduciae, ne munitione magis quam manu defendere locum Pharnaces videretur. Itaque deterritus non est quo minus prima acie pro vallo instructa reliqua pars exercitus opus faceret.
[74] Pharnaces, when he suddenly noticed this at first light, arrayed all his forces in front of the camp. Since, with so great a disadvantage of the terrain interposed, in accordance with a more widely disseminated military custom, Caesar believed them to be drawn up either for the delaying of his work, whereby more would be held under arms, or for an ostentation of royal confidence, lest Pharnaces should seem to defend the place more by fortification than by hand. And so he was not deterred from this: with the first battle line drawn up before the rampart, the remaining part of the army should do the work.
But Pharnaces, driven either by the felicity of the ground or induced by auspices and religious observances—which we afterward heard he had obeyed—or, having discovered the paucity of our men who were under arms, since, in accordance with the manner of the daily work, he had believed that great multitude of slaves carrying the earthwork to be soldiers; or also in confidence of his veteran army, which, as his legates boasted, had fought in the battle-line twenty-two times and won, together with contempt for our army, which he knew had been routed by him when Domitius was commander, having adopted the plan of fighting, began to descend the precipitous valley. Caesar for some time mocked the empty ostentation and the constriction of the soldiers in a position into which no sane enemy would have advanced; meanwhile Pharnaces, at the same pace with which he had descended into the steep valley, with his forces drawn up began to ascend against the arduous hill.
[75] Caesar incredibili eius vel temeritate vel fiducia commotus neque opinans imparatusque oppressus eodem tempore milites ab opere revocat, arma capere iubet, legiones opponit aciemque instruit; cuius rei subita trepidatio magnum terrorem attulit nostris. Nondum ordinibus instructis falcatae regiae quadrigae permixtos milites perturbant; quae tamen celeriter multitudine telorum opprimuntur. Insequitur has acies hostium, et clamore sublato confligitur multum adiuvante natura loci, plurimum deorum immortalium benignitate; qui cum omnibus casibus bellicis intersunt, tum praecipue eis quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.
[75] Caesar, moved by his incredible temerity or confidence, and not suspecting it and caught unprepared, at the same time recalls the soldiers from the work, orders them to take up arms, sets the legions to oppose and arrays the battle-line; the sudden trepidation of which affair brought great terror to our men. The royal scythed quadrigae (four-horse chariots), before the ranks were yet arrayed, throw the intermingled soldiers into disorder; yet they are quickly overwhelmed by a multitude of missiles. After these follows the battle-line of the enemy, and, a shout having been raised, battle is joined, much aided by the nature of the place, most of all by the benignity of the immortal gods; who, though they are present to all the chances of war, yet especially to those in which nothing could be administered by reason.
[76] Magno atque acri proelio comminus facto dextro cornu, quo veterana legio sexta erat collocata, initium victoriae natum est. Ab ea parte cum in proclive detruderentur hostes, multo tardius, sed tamen isdem dis adiuvantibus sinistro cornu mediaque acie totae profligantur copiae regis. Quae quam facile subierant iniquum locum, tam celeriter gradu pulsae premebantur loci iniquitate.
[76] With a great and fierce battle fought hand-to-hand on the right wing, where the veteran Sixth Legion had been stationed, the beginning of victory arose. From that side, as the enemy were being driven down the slope, much more slowly—yet with the same gods aiding—on the left wing and in the middle of the battle-line the king’s entire forces are routed. Which, as easily as they had entered the unfavorable ground, so swiftly, driven back step by step, were pressed by the iniquity of the place.
Therefore, with many soldiers partly slain and partly crushed by the ruin of their own, those who could escape by velocity, after nevertheless casting away their arms and crossing the valley, could profit nothing from the higher ground, being unarmed. But our men, elated by victory, did not hesitate to enter the disadvantageous ground and to attack the fortifications. And though the cohorts which Pharnaces had left as a garrison were defending the camp, they quickly got possession of the enemy camp.
[77] Tali victoria totiens victor Caesar incredibili est laetitia adfectus, quod maximum bellum tanta celeritate confecerat, +quodque subiti periculi recordatione laetior quod+ victoria facilis ex difficillimis rebus acciderat. Ponto recepto praeda omni regia militibus condonata postero die cum expeditis equitibus ipse proficiscitur, legionem sextam decedere ad praemia atque honores accipiendos in Italiam iubet, auxilia Deiotari domum remittit, duas legiones cum Caelio Viniciano in Ponto relinquit.
[77] By such a victory, Caesar, so often a victor, was affected with incredible joy, because he had finished the greatest war with such speed, +and, by the recollection of the sudden danger, the more joyful, because+ an easy victory had occurred out of the most difficult circumstances. With Pontus recovered, and all the royal booty bestowed to the soldiers, on the next day he himself sets out with unencumbered cavalry; he orders the 6th legion to depart into Italy to receive rewards and honors, sends home the auxiliaries of Deiotarus, and leaves two legions with Caelius Vinicianus in Pontus.
[78] Ita per Gallograeciam Bithyniamque in Asiam iter facit omniumque earum provinciarum de controversiis cognoscit et statuit; iura in tetrarchas, reges, civitates distribuit. Mithridaten Pergamenum, a quo rem feliciter celeriterque gestam in Aegypto supra scripsimus, regio genere ortum, disciplinis etiam regiis educatum — nam eum Mithridates, rex Asiae totius, propter nobilitatem Pergamo parvulum secum asportaverat in castra multosque retinuerat annos — regem Bosphori constituit, quod sub imperio Pharnacis fuerat, provinciasque populi Romani a barbaris atque inimicis regibus interposito amicissimo rege munivit. Eidem tetrarchian [legibus] Gallograecorum iure gentis et cognationis adiudicavit occupatam et possessam paucis ante annis a Deiotaro.
[78] Thus through Gallo-Greece and Bithynia into Asia he makes his journey and of all those provinces’ controversies he takes cognizance and determines them; he distributes jurisdictions among tetrarchs, kings, and communities. Mithridates the Pergamene, sprung from royal stock, trained also in royal disciplines — for Mithridates, king of all Asia, because of his nobility had carried him off from Pergamum as a small boy with him to the camp and had kept him for many years — he appointed king of the Bosporus, which had been under the sway of Pharnaces, and he fortified the provinces of the Roman People against barbarians and hostile kings by the interposition of a most friendly king. To this same man he adjudicated the tetrarchy [by the laws] of the Gallo-Greeks, by the right of nation and of kinship, which had been seized and held a few years before by Deiotarus.