Oresmius: TRACTATUS DE ORIGINE, NATURA, IIURE ET MUTATIONIBUS MONETARUM

Quibusdam videtur quod aliquis rex aut princeps, auctoritate propria possit de iure vel privilegio libere mutare monetas in suo regno currentes, et de eis ad libitum ordinare: ac super hoc capere lucrum aut emolumentum quantum libet: aliis autem videtur oppositum. Propter quod, intendo in praesenti tractatu de hoc scribere, quid secundum philosophiam Aristotelis principaliter videtur mihi dicendum; incipiens ab origine monetarum, nihil temere asserendo, sed totum summittendo correctioni maiorum, qui forsan ex eis, quae dicturus sum, poterunt excitari ad determinandum veritatem super isto; ita, ut omni cessante scrupulo, omnes in unam possint sententiam pariter convenire, et circa hoc invenire quod principibus et subiectis, immo toti reipublicae proficiat in futurum.

To some it seems that any king or prince, by his own authority, can by right or by privilege freely change the coinages circulating in his realm, and about them ordain at his pleasure; and upon this take profit or emolument as much as he likes: but to others the opposite seems true. Wherefore, I intend in the present treatise to write about this, what, according to the philosophy of Aristotle, principally seems to me to be said; beginning from the origin of coinage, asserting nothing rashly, but submitting the whole to the correction of my elders, who perhaps, from those things which I am about to say, may be stirred to determine the truth on this; so that, with every scruple ceasing, all may be able together to agree into one judgment, and in this matter to find what may profit princes and subjects, nay the whole republic, in the future.

Capitulum I: Propter quid moneta sit inventa.

Chapter 1: For what reason coinage was invented.

Quando dividebat Altissimus gentes, quando separabat filios Adam, constituit terminos populorum. Inde multiplicati sunt homines super terram, et possessiones prout expediebat divisae sunt. Ex hoc autem contingit, quod unus habuit de una re ultra suam necessitatem; alius vero de eadem re habuit parum aut nihil, et de alia re fuit e contrario.

When the Most High was dividing the nations, when he was separating the sons of Adam, he constituted the boundaries of the peoples. Thence men were multiplied upon the earth, and possessions were divided as it was expedient. From this, however, it happens that one had of one thing beyond his need; but another of the same thing had little or nothing, and of another thing it was the contrary.

Sicut forsan quis abundavit ovibus, et pane indiguit, et agricola, e converso. Una etiam regio superabundavit in uno et deficit in alio. Coeperunt ergo homines mercari sine moneta; et dabat unus alteri ovem pro frumento, et alius de labore suo panem vel lanam, et sic de aliis rebus; quod adhuc longo tempore postea fuit in quibusdam civitatibus institutum, ut narrat Iustinus.

Just as perhaps someone was abundant in sheep but was in need of bread, and the agricola, conversely. Likewise one region superabounded in one thing and was deficient in another. Therefore men began to merchandise without money; and one would give another a sheep in exchange for grain, and another, from his own labor, bread or wool, and so with other things; which moreover for a long time thereafter was instituted in certain cities, as Justin relates.

Sed tamen in huiusmodi permutatione et transportatione rerum, multae difficultates acciderunt. Subtilitati sunt homines usum monetae invenire, quae esset instrumentum permutandi ad invicem naturales divitias, quibus de per se subvenitur naturaliter humanae necessitati. Nam ipsae pecuniae dicuntur artificiales divitiae; contingit enim, his abundantem, mori fame; sicut exemplificat Aristoteles de rege cupido, qui oravit, ut quidquid ipse tangeret, aurum esset; quod dii annuerunt; et sic fame periit, ut dicunt poetae; quoniam per pecuniam non immediate succuritur indigentiae vitae, sed est instrumentum artificialiter adinventum pro naturalibus divitiis levius permutandis.

Yet in such permutation and transportation of goods, many difficulties occurred. By their subtlety men discovered the use of coin, which would be an instrument for mutually exchanging natural riches, by which, of themselves, human necessity is naturally relieved. For monies themselves are called artificial riches; indeed it happens that one abounding in these dies of hunger; as Aristotle exemplifies with the greedy king who prayed that whatever he himself touched would be gold; which the gods granted; and so he perished of hunger, as the poets say; because by money the indigence of life is not immediately succored, but it is an instrument artificially devised for more easily exchanging natural riches.

Et absque alia probatione clare potest patere, quod numisma est valde utile bonae communitati civili, et reipublicae usibus opportunum, immo necessarium: ut probat Aristoteles V Ethicorum. Quanquam de hoc dicat Ovidius:

And without other proof it can clearly be evident that coin-money is very useful to a good civil community, and opportune—nay, necessary—for the uses of the republic: as Aristotle proves in Ethics 5. Although on this Ovid says:

Effodiuntur opes irritamenta malorum,
Iamque nocens ferrum ferroque nocentius aurum,
Prodierat, etc.

Riches are dug up, incentives of evils,
And now harmful iron, and gold more harmful than iron,
had come forth, etc.

Hoc enim facit perversa malorum cupiditas, non ipsa pecunia, quae est humano convictui multum accommodata, et cuius usus per se bonus est. Inde ait Cassiodorus: Pecuniae ipsae quamvis usu creberrimo viles esse videantur, animadvertendum est quanta tamen a veteribus ratione collectae sunt etc. Et in alio loco dicit, quod constat monetarios in usum publicum specialiter esse inventos.

For it is the perverse cupidity of the wicked that does this, not money itself, which is very well accommodated to human common life, and the use of which is good in itself. Hence Cassiodorus says: “Money itself, although by very frequent use it may seem cheap, one must observe nevertheless with what reason it was amassed by the ancients,” etc. And in another place he says that it is agreed that moneyers were specially invented for public use.

Capitulum II: De qua materia debeat esse moneta.

Chapter 2: On what material money ought to be.

Et quoniam moneta est instrumentum permutandi divitias naturales, ut patet ex capitulo praecedenti, conveniens fuit, quod ad hoc tale instrumentum esset aptum: quod fit, si sit faciliter manibus attrectabile seu palpabile, et leviter portabile, et quod pro modica ipsius portione habeantur divitiae naturales in quantitate maiori, cum aliis conditionibus quae postea videbuntur.

And since coinage is an instrument for exchanging natural riches, as is evident from the preceding chapter, it was fitting that such an instrument be apt for this: which comes about if it is easily handleable by the hands, or palpable, and lightly portable, and that, for a modest portion of it, natural riches be had in greater quantity, together with other conditions which will be seen later.

Oportuit igitur quod numisma fieret de materia preciosa et rara, cuiusmodi est aurum. Sed talis materiae competens debet esse abundantia. Propter quod ubi aurum non sufficeret, moneta fit cum hoc de argento; ubi autem ista duo metalla non sufficerent vel non haberentur, debet fieri mixtio, aut simplex moneta de alio puro metallo: sicut antiquitus fiebat ex aere, ut narrat Ovidius primo Fastorum dicens:

It was therefore fitting that the coin be made from precious and rare material, of which sort is gold. But there ought to be an adequate abundance of such material. Wherefore, where gold did not suffice, coinage is made, along with it, from silver; and where these two metals did not suffice or were not available, a mixture ought to be made, or simple coinage from another pure metal: just as in antiquity it was made from bronze, as Ovid relates in the first book of the Fasti, saying:

Aera dabant olim, melius nunc omen in auro est,
Victaque concedit prisca moneta novae.

They once gave bronze; now the omen is better in gold,
And, vanquished, the ancient coin concedes to the new.

Similem etiam mutationem promisit Dominus per Isaiam prophetam dicens: Pro aere afferam aurum, et pro ferro afferam argentum. Haec enim metalla sunt ad monetam aptissima. Et, ut Cassiodorus inquit, primi dicuntur +Eacus+ aurum, argentum +Indus+ rex Scythiae reperisse et humano usui summa laude tradidisse.

The Lord also promised a similar mutation through the prophet Isaiah, saying: For bronze I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver. For these metals are most apt for coinage. And, as Cassiodorus says, the first are said to have discovered them: +Eacus+ gold, and +Indus+, king of Scythia, silver, and to have handed them over to human use with highest praise.

Et ideo non debet permitti quod tantum ex eis in usus alios applicetur, quod residuum non sufficiat pro moneta. Quod Theodoricus rex Italiae recte advertens, aurum et argentum, quod more gentium in sepulchris mortuorum erat reconditum, iussit depromi, et usui monetae ad utilitatem publicam fecit afferri, dicens, culpae genus esse inutiliter in abditis relinquere mortuorum, unde se vita potest sustentare viventium. Rursum nec expedit politiae quod talis materia sit nimis abundans; hac enim de causa moneta aerea recessit ab usu, ut ait Ovidius.

And therefore it ought not to be permitted that so much of these metals be applied to other uses that the remainder does not suffice for coinage. Noting this rightly, Theodoric, king of Italy, ordered the gold and silver which, by the custom of the nations, had been stored in the sepulchres of the dead to be brought out, and had them conveyed for the use of coinage to the public utility, saying that it is a kind of fault to leave, uselessly, in the hidden places of the dead that from which the life of the living can sustain itself. Again, it is not expedient for the polity that such material be too abundant; for this cause bronze money withdrew from use, as Ovid says.

Forsan etiam quod ab hoc humano generi provisum est ut aurum et argentum, quae sunt ad hoc aptissima, non facile habeantur in copia; et ut non possint per alchimiam faciliter fieri, sicut aliqui tentant, quibus - ut ita dicam - iuste obviat ipsa natura, cuius opera frustra nituntur excedere.

Perhaps also it has been provided by Him for the human race that gold and silver, which are most apt for this purpose, are not easily had in abundance; and that they cannot be easily made through alchemy, as some attempt, whom - so to speak - nature herself justly opposes, whose works they strive in vain to exceed.

Capitulum III: De diversitate materiae monetarum et mixtione.

Chapter 3: On the diversity of the material of coins and mixture.

Moneta, ut dicit primum capitulum, est instrumentum mercaturae. Et quoniam communitati et cuilibet expedit mercaturam fieri aliquotiens magnam seu grossam, quandoque vero minorem, et plerumque de parvis vel parvam, inde est quod conveniens fuit habere monetam preciosam, quae facilius portaretur et numeraretur, et quae magis esset habilis ad mercaturas maiores. Expedivit etiam habere argenteam, minus scilicet preciosam, quae apta est ad recompensationes et aequiparantias faciendas, et pro emptione mercimoniorum minorum.

Money, as the first chapter says, is an instrument of commerce. And since it is expedient for the community and for each individual that commerce be done sometimes on a great or gross scale, sometimes indeed on a smaller one, and very often in small things or in a small way, hence it was fitting to have precious coin, which could be more easily carried and counted, and which would be more habilis for greater trades. It was also expedient to have a silver one, namely less precious, which is apt for making recompensations and equivalences, and for the purchase of lesser merchandises.

Et quoniam aliquotiens in una regione non satis est competenter de argento, secundum portionem divitiarum naturalium; immo portiuncula argenti, quae iuste dari deberet pro libra panis vel aliquo tali, esset minus bene palpabilis propter nimiam parvitatem, ideo facta fuit de minus bona materia cum argento; et inde habuit ortum nigra moneta, quae est congrua pro minutis mercaturis. Et sic convenientissime, ubi non abundat argentum, sunt tres materiae monetarum, prima aurea, secunda argentea, et tertia nigra mixta. Sed animadvertendum est et notandum pro regula generali, quod nunquam debet fieri mixtio, nisi tantummodo ex minus precioso metallo de quo consuevit fieri parva moneta.

And since at times in one region there is not a competent supply of silver, in proportion to the portion of natural riches; nay rather, the small portion of silver which ought justly to be given for a pound of bread or something of the sort would be hardly palpable because of its excessive smallness, therefore coin was made from less good material together with silver; and thence had its origin the black coinage, which is congruent for minute trades. And thus most suitably, where silver does not abound, there are three materials of coinage: first golden, second silver, and third black, mixed. But it must be observed and noted as a general rule, that there should never be a mixture, except only from the less precious metal out of which the small coin is accustomed to be made.

Verbi gratia, ubi haberetur moneta ex auro et argento, mixtio nunquam facienda est in moneta aurea, si tamen aurum talis naturae fuerit, quod monetari possit immixtum. Et est causa, quoniam omnis talis mixtio de se suspecta est, nec facile possunt auri substantia, et eius quantitas in mixtione cognosci. Propter quod nulla mixtio debet in monetis fieri, nisi propter necessitatem iam tactam; et tunc facienda est, ubi suspicio est minor vel deceptionis minoris, et hoc est in minus precioso metallo.

For example, where coinage is had from gold and silver, a mixture is never to be made in the gold coinage, if, however, the gold be of such a nature that it can be minted unmixed. And the reason is, that every such mixture is of itself suspect, nor can the substance of the gold and its quantity in the mixture be easily known. Wherefore no mixture ought to be made in coinage, except on account of the necessity already touched; and then it is to be made where suspicion is less, or the deception is lesser, and this is in the less precious metal.

Rursum nulla talis mixtio facienda est, nisi duntaxat pro utilitate communi, ratione cuius moneta est inventa et ad quam naturaliter ordinatur, ut patet ex prius dictis. Sed nunquam est necessitas, nec apparet communis utilitas, faciendi mixtionem in moneta aurea, ubi habetur argentea; nec videtur posse bona intentione fieri, neque unquam factum est in communitate prospere gubernata.

Again, no such mixture is to be made, except only for the common utility, on account of which coinage was invented and to which it is naturally ordered, as is evident from the things previously said. But there is never a necessity, nor does a common utility appear, for making a mixture in gold coinage where silver is available; nor does it seem able to be done with good intention, nor has it ever been done in a community prosperously governed.

Capitulum IV: De forma seu figura monetae.

Chapter 4: On the form or figure of the coinage.

Cum primum coepissent homines mercari sive comparare divitias mediante moneta, nondum erat in ea aliqua impressio vel imago; sed una portio argenti vel aeris dabatur pro potu vel cibo, quae quidem portio mensurabatur ad pondus: et quoniam taediosum erat ita crebro ad trutinam recurrere, nec bene poterat pecunia mercaturis aequiparari per pondus; cum hoc etiam, ut in pluribus, venditor non poterat cognoscere metalli substantiam sive modum mixtionis, ideo per sapientes illius temporis prudenter provisum est, quod portiones monetae fierent de certa materia et determinati ponderis, quodque in eis imprimeretur figura, quae cunctis notoria significaret qualitatem materiae numismatis et ponderis veritatem, ut amota suspicione posset valor monetae sine labore cognosci. Quod autem impressio talis instituta, sit nuntius et in signum veritatis materiae et ponderis, nobis ostendunt antiqua nomina monetarum cognoscibilium ex impressionibus vel figuris, cuiusmodi sunt libra, solidus, denarius, obulus, as, sextula, et similia quae sunt nomina ponderum appropriata monetis, ut ait Cassiodorus. Similiter siclus est nomen monetae, ut patet in Genesi (1 Mos.

When men first began to trade or to acquire riches by the mediation of money, there was not yet any impression or image upon it; but a single portion of silver or of bronze was given for a drink or for food, which portion was measured by weight: and since it was tedious thus to recur so often to the balance, nor could money be well equated to merchandises by weight; and, besides this, as in most cases, the seller could not recognize the substance of the metal or the mode of its mixture, therefore it was prudently provided by the wise of that time that portions of coin should be made of a fixed material and of determinate weight, and that a figure should be imprinted in them, which, being known to all, would signify the quality of the material of the coin and the truth of the weight, so that, suspicion removed, the value of the money might be known without labor. Moreover, that such an impression, once instituted, is a token and a sign of the truth of the material and of the weight, the ancient names of coins, knowable from the impressions or figures, show us—of which sort are libra, solidus, denarius, obulus, as, sextula, and the like, which are names of weights appropriated to coins, as Cassiodorus says. Likewise siclus is the name of a coin, as is evident in Genesis (1 Mos.

23, 15 ), et est nomen ponderis, ut patet ibidem. Alia vero monetae nomina sunt impropria, accidentalia seu denominativa: a loco, a figura, ab auctore, vel aliquo tali modo; portiones autem monetae quae dicuntur numisma, deberent esse figurae et quantitatis habilis ad contractandum et ad numerandum, et de materia numerabili, ac etiam ductibili ac receptibili impressionis sive tenaci. Et inde est quod non omnis res preciosa apta est ut fiat numisma: gemmae enim, lazuleus, piper, et talia non sunt ad hoc apta nata, sed praecipue aurum et argentum, sicut fuit supra tactum.

23:15 ), and it is a name of a weight, as is evident there likewise. But other names of coin are improper, accidental, or denominative: from a place, from a figure, from an author, or in some such way; moreover, the portions of coin which are called “numisma” ought to be of a form and quantity apt for contracting and for numbering, and of a numerable material, and also ductile and receptive of an impression, that is, tenacious. And from this it follows that not every precious thing is apt to be made a numisma: for gems, lapis lazuli, pepper, and the like are not by nature suited to this, but especially gold and silver are, as was touched upon above.

Capitulum V: Cui incumbit facere numisma.

Chapter 5: On whom it is incumbent to make coin.

Adhuc autem fuit antiquitus ordinatum, et propter deceptionem cavendam, quod non licet cuilibet facere monetam, aut huiusmodi figuram vel imaginem imprimere in suo proprio argento vel auro, sed quod moneta, vel characteris impressio fieret per unam personam publicam, seu per plures a communitate ad hoc deputatas; quia, sicut praemissum est, moneta de natura sua instituta est et inventa pro bono communitatis. Et quoniam princeps est persona magis publica, et maioris auctoritatis, conveniens est quod ipse, pro communitate, faciat fabricare monetam et eam congrua impressione signare; haec autem impressio debet esse subtilis, et ad effigiendum seu contrafaciendum difficilis. Debet etiam prohiberi sub poena, ne aliquis extraneus princeps vel alter fabricaret monetam similem in figura et minoris valoris.

Moreover, it was further ordained of old—and to guard against deception—that it is not permitted to just anyone to make coin, or to imprint such a figure or image upon his own silver or gold, but that coin, or the impression of the character, be made by one public person, or by several deputed to this by the community; because, as aforesaid, coin by its nature was instituted and invented for the good of the community. And since the prince is a more public person, and of greater authority, it is fitting that he, for the community, should have coin fabricated and mark it with an appropriate impression; moreover, this impression ought to be subtle, and difficult to reproduce as an effigy or to counterfeit. It ought also to be prohibited under penalty, lest any foreign prince or another should fabricate coin similar in figure and of lesser value.

Ita quod vulgus nesciret distinguere inter istam et illam; hoc esset malefactum, nec aliquis potest de hoc habere privilegium, quia falsitas est, et causa iuste bellandi contra talem extraneum.

Such that the common people would not know how to distinguish between this and that; this would be a misdeed, nor can anyone have a privilege in this matter, because it is falsity, and a cause for justly waging war against such a foreigner.

Capitulum VI: Cuius sit ipsa moneta.

Chapter 6: To whom the coin itself belongs.

Quamvis pro utilitate communi princeps habeat signare numisma, non tamen ipse dominus seu proprietarius est monetae currentis in suo principatu. Moneta siquidem est instrumentum aequivalens permutandi divitias naturales, ut patet ex primo capitulo. Ipsa igitur est eorum possessio quorum sunt huiusmodi divitiae.

Although for the common utility the prince has to sign/stamp the coin, nevertheless he himself is not the lord or proprietor of the money current in his principate. For money is an equivalent instrument for permuting/exchanging natural riches, as is evident from the first chapter. Therefore it is the possession of those to whom such riches belong.

Nam si quis dat panem suum, vel laborem proprii corporis pro pecunia, cum ipse eam recepit, ipsa est sua, sicut erat panis vel labor corporis, qui erat in eius potestate libera, supposito quod non sit servus. Deus enim a principio non dedit solum principibus libertatem ad dominium rerum, sed primis parentibus et toti posteritati, ut habetur in Genesi (1 Mos. 1,28-30). Moneta igitur non est solius principis.

For if someone gives his bread, or the labor of his own body, for money, once he himself has received it, that money is his, just as the bread or the labor of the body was, which was in his free power—assuming that he is not a slave. For from the beginning God did not give liberty for dominion over things to princes alone, but to the first parents and to the whole posterity, as is set forth in Genesis (Genesis 1:28–30). Therefore coinage is not the prince’s alone.

Si quis autem vellet opponere per hoc, quod Salvator noster, ostenso sibi quodam denario, interrogavit dicens: «Cuius est imago et superscriptio haec?» et cum responsum est: «Caesaris», ipse sententiavit dicens: «Reddite ergo quae sunt Caesaris, Caesari, et quae Dei sunt, Deo» (Matth. 22,17-21). Ac si diceret: Caesaris est numisma, ex quo imago Caesaris in eo est impressa. Sed inspicienti seriem Evangelii patet facile, quod non ideo dicitur Caesari deberi denarius, quia erat Caesaris imagine superscriptus, sed quoniam erat tributum.

If anyone, however, should wish to object on the basis of this, that our Savior, when a certain denarius had been shown to him, asked, saying: “Whose is this image and inscription?” and when it was answered: “Caesar’s,” he himself pronounced sentence, saying: “Render therefore the things that are Caesar’s to Caesar, and the things that are God’s to God” (Matt. 22:17–21). As if he were saying: the coin is Caesar’s, since the image of Caesar is imprinted on it. But to one inspecting the sequence of the Gospel it is easily clear that the denarius is not therefore said to be owed to Caesar because it was inscribed with Caesar’s image, but because it was a tribute.

Nam, ut ait Apostolus: «Cui tributum, tributum, et cui vectigal, vectigal« (Rom. 13,17). Christus itaque signavit, per hoc posse cognosci cui debeatur tributum: quia illi debebatur, qui pro republica militabat, et qui ratione imperii poterat fabricare monetam. Est igitur pecunia communitatis et singularium personarum: et ita dicit Aristoteles VII Politicae, et Tullius circa finem veteris Rhetoricae.

For, as the Apostle says: “to whom tribute, tribute, and to whom impost, impost” (Rom. 13,17). Christ accordingly signified that by this one can recognize to whom tribute is owed: because it was owed to him who served for the commonwealth, and who by reason of imperium could fabricate coinage. Therefore money belongs to the community and to individual persons; and so says Aristotle in the Politics 7, and Tullius near the end of the old Rhetoric.

Capitulum VII: Ad cuius expendas fabricanda sit moneta.

Chapter 7: At whose expense coinage is to be minted.

Sicut ipsa moneta est communitatis, ita facienda est ad expensas communitatis; hoc autem fit convenientissime, si huiusmodi expensae accipiantur supra totam monetam, per hunc modum quod materia monetabilis, sicut aurum, quando traditur ad monetandum, vel venditur pro moneta, detur pro minori pecunia quam possit fieri ex ea sub certo precio taxato, verbi gratia, si ex marca argenti fieri possint LXII solidi, et pro labore et nececessariis ad monetandum eam requirantur duo solidi, tunc marca argenti non monetata valebit LX solidos et alii duo erunt pro monetatione. Haec autem portio taxata debet esse tanta quod sufficiat abundanter omni tempore pro fabricatione moneta. Et si moneta possit fieri pro minori precio, satis congruum est quod residuum sit distributori vel ordinatori, scilicet principi vel magistro monetarum, et sic quasi quaedam pensio; sed tamen huiusmodi portio debet esse moderata, et sufficienter satis parva, si monetae sufficerent debito modo, ut dicetur postea; et si talis portio vel pensio esset excessiva, hoc foret in damnum et praeiudicium totius communitatis, sicut potest unicuique faciliter apparere.

Just as coinage itself belongs to the community, so it must be made at the community’s expense; this, however, is done most conveniently if such expenses are taken upon the whole coinage, in this way: that the coinable material, such as gold, when it is delivered for coining, or is sold for money, is given for a lesser sum than can be made from it under a certain fixed (taxed) price—for example, if from a mark of silver there can be made 62 shillings, and for the labor and the necessaries to coin it there are required two shillings, then an uncoined mark of silver will be worth 60 shillings and the other two will be for the minting (monetation). But this taxed portion ought to be so great as to suffice abundantly at all times for the fabrication of coin. And if coinage can be produced for a lesser price, it is quite congruent that the remainder be to the distributor or ordainer, namely the prince or the master of the mints, and thus as a kind of pension; yet this portion ought to be moderated, and sufficiently small, if the coins should suffice in due manner, as will be said afterwards; and if such a portion or pension were excessive, this would be to the damage and prejudice of the whole community, as can easily appear to anyone.

Capitulum VIII: De mutatione monetarum in generali.

Chapter 8: On the change of coinages in general.

Ante omnia sciendum est, quod nunquam sine evidenti necessitate mutandae sunt priores leges, statuta, consuetudines, seu ordinationes quaecumque tangentes communitatem. Immo, secundum Aristotelem in II Politicae. Lex antiqua positiva non est abneganda pro meliore nova, nisi sit multum notabilis differentia in bonitate earum; quoniam mutationes huiusmodi diminuunt ipsarum legum auctoritatem et reverentiam, et multo magis si frequenter fiant.

Before all things it must be known that prior laws, statutes, customs, or whatever ordinances touching the community must never be changed without evident necessity. Nay rather, according to Aristotle in the Politics, Book 2, an ancient positive law is not to be abnegated for a better new one, unless there is a very notable difference in their goodness; since mutations of this kind diminish the authority and reverence of the laws themselves, and much more so if they are made frequently.

Ex hoc enim oritur scandalum et murmur in populo, et periculum inobedientiae. Maxime autem si tales mutationes essent in peius. Nam tunc forent intolerabiles et iniustae.

For from this there arises scandal and murmuring in the people, and the danger of disobedience. Most of all, however, if such mutations were for the worse; for then they would be intolerable and unjust.

Nunc autem ita est, quod cursus et precium monetarum in regno debet esse quasi quaedam lex et quaedam ordinatio firma; cuius signum est, quod pensiones et quidam reditus annuales taxati sunt ad precium pecuniae, scilicet ad certum numerum librarum vel solidorum. Ex quo patet, quod nunquam debet fieri mutatio monetarum, nisi forte emineret necessitas, aut evidens utilitas pro tota communitate. Unde Aristoteles, V Ethicorum, loquens de numismate; verumtamen, inquit, vult manere magis.

Now, however, it is thus: that the course and the price of the coinage in the kingdom ought to be, as it were, a certain law and a certain firm ordination; a sign of which is that pensions and certain annual revenues are assessed at the price of money, namely at a fixed number of pounds or shillings. Whence it is clear that a change of the coinage should never be made, unless perhaps necessity should become manifest, or there be evident utility for the whole community. Whence Aristotle, Ethics 5, speaking about coinage; “nevertheless,” he says, “it rather wants to remain.”

Mutatio autem monetae (prout in generali possum perpendere) potest imaginari fieri multipliciter. Uno modo in forma seu figura praecise, alio modo in proportione, alio modo in precio vel appellatione, alio modo in quantitate vel pondere, et alio modo in substantia materiae. Quolibet enim istorum quinque modorum sigillatim aut pluribus simul, potest mutari moneta.

Moreover, a change of the coinage (so far as, in general, I can consider it) can be conceived to occur in multiple ways. In one way in the form or figure precisely; in another way in the proportion; in another way in the price or appellation; in another way in the quantity or weight; and in another way in the substance of the material. For by any of these five modes, taken singly or several at once, the coinage can be changed.

Bonum est igitur istos modos discurrendo declarare, et per rationem inquirere, si aliquo eorum potest iuste mutari moneta; et quando, et per quem, et qualiter, et propter quid.

It is good, therefore, to declare those modes by running through them, and to inquire by reason whether by any of them the coinage can be justly mutated; and when, and by whom, and in what manner, and for what cause.

Capitulum IX: De mutatione monetae in figura.

Chapter 9: On the change of coinage in figure.

Figura impressa seu character monetae potest dupliciter innovari. Uno modo, non prohibendo cursum monetae prioris, ut si princeps in moneta, quae sit suo tempore, inscriberet nomen suum, permittendo semper cursum praecedentis; et hoc non est proprie mutatio, nec est magna vis si hoc fiat, dum tamen non implicetur cum hoc alia mutatio. Alio modo potest innovari figura, faciendo novam monetam cum prohibitione cursus antiquae; et est proprie mutatio; et potest fieri iuste propter alteram duarum causarum; una est si aliquis princeps extraneus, vel aliqui falsarii, malitiose effigerint vel contrafecerint modulos seu cuneos monetarum, et inveniatur in regno moneta sophistica, falsa et similis bonae in colore et figura: tunc qui non posset aliter remedium apponere, expediret mutare modulos et figuram impressionis monetae.

The impressed figure or character of the coinage can be innovated in a twofold way. In one way, by not prohibiting the circulation of the prior coinage: for example, if the prince were to inscribe his name on the coinage that is of his own time, while always permitting the course of the precedent; and this is not properly a mutation, nor is it of great moment if this be done, provided, however, that no other mutation is implicated with it. In another way the figure can be innovated by making new coinage with a prohibition of the circulation of the old; and this is properly a mutation; and it can be done justly for either of two causes: one is if some foreign prince, or certain forgers, have maliciously fashioned or counterfeited the patterns or dies of the coins, and sophistical coinage is found in the realm—false and similar to the good in color and figure: then, for one who could not otherwise apply a remedy, it would be expedient to change the patterns and the figure of the coinage’s impression.

Alia causa posset esse, si forsan antiqua moneta esset vetustate nimia impeiorata, vel in pondere diminuta; tunc cursus deberet prohiberi, et in nova meliore esset facienda impressio differens, ut vulgus sciret per hoc distinguere inter istam et illam. Sed non videtur mihi, quod princeps posset inhibere cursum prioris monetae sine altera istarum causarum; alias enim talis mutatio esset praeter necessaria, scandalosa, et communitati damnosa; nec apparet quod princeps ad talem mutationem posset aliunde moveri, nisi propter alterum duorum: aut videlicet, quia vult ut in quolibet numismate inscribatur nomen suum et nullum aliud, et hoc esset facere irreverentiam praedecessoribus suis, et ambitio vana; aut quia vult plus fabricare de moneta, ut ex hoc habeat plus de lucro, iuxta illud quod tactum est supra in capitulo VII, et hoc est prava cupiditas, in praeiudicium et damnum totius communitatis.

Another cause could be, if perchance the old coin were excessively deteriorated by age, or diminished in weight; then its circulation ought to be prohibited, and on a new and better coin a differing impression should be made, so that the common people might know by this how to distinguish between this and that. But it does not seem to me that the prince could inhibit the circulation of the prior coin without one or the other of these causes; otherwise such a change would be beyond what is necessary, scandalous, and damaging to the community; nor does it appear that the prince could be moved to such a mutation from any other source, except on account of one of two: namely, either because he wants his own name to be inscribed on every coin and no other—and this would be to do irreverence to his predecessors, and vain ambition—or because he wants to fabricate more out of the coinage, so that from this he may have more profit, according to that which was touched upon above in chapter 7; and this is perverse cupidity, to the prejudice and harm of the whole community.

Capitulum X: De mutatione proportionis monetarum.

CHAPTER 10: On the mutation of the proportion of the coins.

Proportio est rei ad rem comparatio vel habitudo: sicut in proposito; monetae aureae ad monetam argenteam debet esse certa habitudo in valore et precio. Nam secundum hoc quod aurum est de natura sua preciosius et rarius argento, et ad inveniendum vel habendum difficilius; ipsum aurum aequalis ponderis debet praevalere in certa proportione; sicut forsan esset proportio XX ad unum, et sic una libra auri valeret XX libras argenti, et una marcha XX marchas, et una uncia XX uncias, et sic semper conformiter; et possibile est quod sit una alia proportio, sicut forte XXV ad tria, et quaevis alia; verumtamen ista proportio debet sequi naturalem habitudinem auri ad argentum in preciositate, et secundum quod instituenda est huiusmodi proportio, quam non licet voluntarie transmutare, nec potest iuste variari, nisi propter causam realem, et variationem ex parte ipsius materiae, quae tamen raro contingit; ut si forsan notabiliter minus inveniretur de auro, quam ante, tunc oporteret quod esset carius in comparatione ad argentum, et quod mutaretur in precio et valore. Si parum aut nihil sit mutatum in re, tunc hoc nullo modo posset licere principi.

Proportion is a comparison or habitude of thing to thing: as in the matter at hand, there ought to be a certain habitude in value and price of gold coinage to silver coinage. For inasmuch as gold by its nature is more precious and rarer than silver, and harder to find or to have, the same gold of equal weight ought to prevail in a certain proportion; as perhaps the proportion would be 20 to 1, and so one pound of gold would be worth 20 pounds of silver, and one mark 20 marks, and one ounce 20 ounces, and thus always correspondingly; and it is possible that there be another proportion, as perhaps 25 to 3, and any other; nevertheless that proportion ought to follow the natural habitude of gold to silver in preciousness, and according as such a proportion is to be established, which it is not permitted to transmute at will, nor can it be justly varied, except for a real cause and a variation on the part of the material itself, which, however, rarely occurs; as if perhaps notably less gold were found than before, then it would have to be dearer in comparison to silver, and the price and value would have to be changed. If little or nothing has been changed in the thing, then this could in no way be permitted to the prince.

Nam si huiusmodi proportionem ad libitum immutaret, ipse per hoc posset attrahere sibi indebite pecunias subditorum, ut si taxaret aurum ad parvum precium, et illud emeret pro argento, et inde augmentato precio, rursum venderet aurum suum vel monetam auream, vel conformiter de argento; illud esset simile, sicut si poneret precium in toto frumento regni sui, et emeret et postea venderet pro maiori precio. Quisque certe potest clare videre, quod ista esset iniusta exactio, et vera tyrannis, immo videretur violentior et peior quam illa fuerit quam fecit Pharao in Aegypto. De qua Cassiodorus inquit: Ioseph legimus contra famem funestam, emendi tritici dedisse licentiam, sed tale posuisse precium, ut suae subiectionis avidus populus se venderet, potius alimoniam mercaturus; quale fuit rogo tunc miserum vivere, quibus acerba subventio libertatem suam videbatur adimere, ubi non minus ingemit liberatus quam potuit scire captivus?

For if he were to change such a proportion at will, he could by this unduly draw to himself the monies of his subjects, as if he were to fix gold at a small price, and buy it for silver, and then, the price having been increased, sell again his gold or gold coin, or similarly with silver; that would be like his setting the price on all the grain of his kingdom, and buying and afterwards selling for a higher price. Everyone surely can clearly see that this would be an unjust exaction, and true tyranny; nay, it would seem more violent and worse than that which Pharaoh did in Egypt. Concerning which Cassiodorus says: We read that Joseph, against a deadly famine, granted license to buy wheat, but set such a price that the people, eager for their own subjection, sold themselves, rather to purchase sustenance; what wretched living was it then, I ask, for those to whom a bitter succor seemed to take away their liberty, where the one set free groans no less than the captive was able to feel?

Credo virum sanctum hac necessitate constrictum, ut et avaro principi satis faceret, et periclitanti populo subveniret; haec ille.

I believe the holy man was constrained by this necessity, so that he might both satisfy the avaricious prince and come to the aid of the people in peril; so much for him.

Istud autem monopolium monetarum adhuc esset verius tyrannicum, eo quod foret magis involuntarium et communitati non necessarium, sed praecise damnosum. Si quis autem dicat quod non est simile de frumento, quia aliqua spectant specialiter ad principem, in quibus potest statuere precium prout placet, sicut dicunt aliqui de sale, et fortiori ratione de moneta. Istud autem monopolium seu gabella salis, aut cuiuscumque rei necessariae communitati, iniusta est.

But that monopoly of coinage would be yet more truly tyrannical, for the reason that it would be more involuntary and for the community not necessary, but precisely harmful. If, however, someone should say that it is not similar in the case of grain, because certain things pertain specially to the prince, in which he can set the price as it pleases him, as some say about salt, and, a fortiori, about coinage: this monopoly or gabelle of salt, or of any thing necessary to the community, is unjust.

Et si qui principes statuerint leges hoc eis concedentes, ipsi sunt de quibus Dominus per Isaiam prophetam dicit, «Vae qui condunt leges iniquas et scribentes iniustitias scripserunt, etc.» (Isai. 10,1). Rursum ex primo et sexto capitulis satis patet, quod pecunia est ipsius communitatis. Ideoque, et ne princeps possit maliciose fingere causam mutationis proportionis monetarum in praesenti capitulo assignatam, ipsi soli communitati spectat discernere, si et quando et qualiter et usquequo immutanda est huiusmodi proportio, nec princeps hoc debet sibi quomodolibet usurpare.

And if any princes have established laws granting them this, they are the very ones of whom the Lord says through the prophet Isaiah, «Woe to those who frame iniquitous laws, and the writers who have written injustices, etc.» (Isa. 10:1). Again, from the first and sixth chapters it is clear enough that money belongs to the community itself. And therefore, lest the prince be able maliciously to feign a cause for changing the ratio of the coinage as assigned in the present chapter, it pertains to the community alone to discern whether, and when, and in what manner, and how far this ratio is to be altered; nor ought the prince in any way to usurp this to himself.

Capitulum XI: De mutatione appellationis monetae.

Chapter 11: On the change of the appellation of the coinage.

Sicut fuit dictum in capitulo IV, quaedam sunt appellationes seu nomina accidentalia monetarum, denominativa ab auctore, vel a loco, et ista quasi nihil vel modicum faciunt ad propositum. Sed alia sunt magis essentialia et appropriata numismati, sicut denarius, solidus, libra, et similia, quae denotant precium, sive pondus, et quae fuerunt alia consideratione et magno mysterio ab antiquis imposita. Unde Cassiodorus, «Animadvertendum est», inquit, «quanta ratione ipsae pecuniae a veteribus collectae sunt.

As was said in chapter 4, certain are appellations or accidental names of coins, denominative from the author or from the place, and these contribute almost nothing or only a little to the proposed matter. But others are more essential and appropriate to the coin, such as denarius, solidus, libra, and the like, which denote price, or weight, and which were imposed by the ancients with another consideration and with great mystery. Whence Cassiodorus says, «It must be observed,» he says, «with what reasoning the monies themselves were collected by the ancients.»

Sex millia denariorum solidum esse volebant, scilicet ut radiantis metalli formata rotunditas aetatem mundi, quasi sol aureus, convenienter includeret. Denarium vero - quem non immerito perfectum antiquitas docta definivit - unciae, qui mensurae primus gradus est, appellatione significavit, quam duodecies similitudine mensium computatam, in librae plenitudinem ab anni curricula collegerunt». O inventa prudentium! O provisa maiorum!

They wished the solidus to be six thousand denarii, namely, so that the fashioned roundness of the radiant metal might fittingly enclose the age of the world, as a golden sun. But the denarius—which learned antiquity not undeservedly defined as perfect—learned antiquity signified by the appellation of the uncia, which is the first step of measure; which, computed twelve times in the likeness of the months, they gathered into the fullness of the libra from the courses of the year. O inventions of the prudent! O forethoughts of the ancestors!

Exquisita res est, quae et usui humano necessaria distingueret, et tot arcana naturae figuraliter contineret; merito igitur dicitur libra, quae tanta rerum est consideratione trutinata; haec ille. Si autem alio modo utamur pro nunc istis nominibus et nummis, nunquam tamen immutanda sunt frustra. Sint igitur, gratia exempli, tres modi numismatis: primum valeat unum denarium, secundum unum solidum, et tertium unam libram.

It is an exquisite thing, which would both distinguish what is necessary for human use and would figuratively contain so many arcana of nature; deservedly, therefore, it is called a libra, which has been weighed with so great a consideration of things; so he. If, however, for now we use these names and coins in another way, nevertheless they are never to be changed without cause. Let there be, therefore, for the sake of example, three kinds of coin: let the first be worth one denarius, the second one solidus, and the third one libra.

Si ergo appellatio unius immutetur, et non alterius, iam variabitur proportio. Sicut qui vocaret vel faceret valere primum numisma duos denarios, aliis non mutatis, proportio esset variata; quod non licet fieri - ut patet ex capitulo praecedenti - nisi forte rarissime, et hoc ad praesens non curo. Oportet igitur si proportio remaneat immutata, et unum numisma mutet appellationem, quod aliud etiam proportionabiliter immutetur, ut, si primum vocetur duo denarii, secundum vocetur duo solidi, et tertium duae librae.

If, therefore, the appellation of one be changed, and not of another, the proportion will already be varied. Just as if someone were to call or make the first coin worth two denarii, with the others not changed, the proportion would be altered; which it is not permitted to do—as is evident from the preceding chapter—unless perhaps very rarely, and this I do not care about at present. It is necessary, therefore, if the proportion is to remain unchanged, and one coin changes its appellation, that another also be changed proportionally, so that, if the first be called two denarii, the second be called two solidi, and the third two pounds.

Si autem non fieret alia mutatio, oporteret mercimonia ad maius precium comparare proportionabiliter seu appellare. Sed talis mutatio nominum fieret frustra, et non est facienda, quia scandalosa esset, et appellatio falsa. Illud enim vocaretur libra, quod in veritate non esset libra; quod est inconveniens, ut nunc dictum est; verumtamen nullum aliud inconveniens sequeretur, ubi non essent pensiones vel aliqui reditus ad pecuniae numerum assignati; ubi vero essent, statim patet, quod cum inconvenientibus praedictis huiusmodi reditus ex tali mutatione proportionaliter minuerentur, aut crescerent irrationabiliter et iniuste, ac etiam in praeiudicium multorum; nam ubi pensiones vel reditus aliquorum essent nimis parvi, deberent per alium modum specialem augeri, et non isto modo praeiudiciabili et damnoso.

But if no other change were made, it would be necessary to acquire merchandise at a greater price proportionally, or to denominate it so. But such a change of names would be done in vain, and is not to be done, because it would be scandalous and a false appellation. For that would be called a pound which in truth would not be a pound; which is inconvenient, as has just been said; nevertheless no other inconvenience would follow where there were no payments or any revenues assigned to a sum of money; but where there were, it is immediately evident that, together with the aforesaid inconveniences, such revenues from such a change would be proportionally diminished, or would increase irrationally and unjustly, and also to the prejudice of many; for where the pensions or revenues of some were too small, they ought to be increased by another special method, and not by this prejudicial and damaging way.

Haec ergo appellationis mutatio praecisa nunquam est facienda, et maxime princeps in nullo casu debet hoc attentare.

Therefore this outright change of appellation must never be done, and above all the prince ought in no case to attempt this.

Capitulum XII: De mutatione ponderis monetarum.

Chapter 12: On the change of the weight of coins.

Si pondus numismatis mutaretur, et cum hoc variaretur proportionabiliter precium, et appellatio cum figura, hoc esset facere aliud genus monetae; sicut qui faceret de uno denario duos obulos, vel aliquid tale, sine perditione vel lucro; et istud posset licite aliquotiens fieri proper aliquam transmutationem realem in materia monetabili, quae non potest nisi rarissime contingere, sicut de quadam alia mutatione dictum est cap. X. Nunc autem volo dicere de praecisa mutatione ponderis seu quantitatis monetae, quae fieret appellatione et precio non mutatis. Et videtur mihi quod talis mutatio est simpliciter illicita, potissime principi qui nullo modo potest hoc facere, nisi turpiter et iniuste.

If the weight of the coin were changed, and with this the price were varied proportionally, and the appellation together with the design, this would be to make another kind of coin; as one who would make from one denarius two obols, or something of the sort, without loss or gain; and this could lawfully at times be done on account of some real transmutation in the monetizable material, which can occur only very rarely, as was said about a certain other change in chapter 10. Now, however, I wish to speak of a sheer change of the weight or quantity of the coin, which would be made with the appellation and the price not changed. And it seems to me that such a change is simply illicit, most especially for the prince, who in no way can do this except basely and unjustly.

Primo namque, quoniam imago seu superscriptio in numismate per principem ponitur ad designandam certitudinem ponderis, et materiae qualitatem, sicut fuit ostensum supra cap. IV. Ergo si non responderet veritas in pondere, patet statim, quod esset falsitas vilissima et deceptio fraudulenta; saepe enim mensurae bladi et vini et aliae signatae sunt publico signo regis, et si quis in istis fraudem committat, reputatur falsarius. Omnino autem consimiliter suscriptio numismatis significat mensuram ponderis et materiae veritatem.

First, indeed, since the image or superscription on a coin is set by the prince to designate the certainty of the weight and the quality of the material, as was shown above, CHAPTER 4. Therefore, if the truth did not correspond in the weight, it is immediately clear that there would be the vilest falsity and fraudulent deception; for often the measures of grain and of wine and others are marked with the public sign of the king, and if anyone commits fraud in these, he is reckoned a counterfeiter. Altogether, however, similarly, the superscription of the coin signifies the measure of the weight and the truth of the material.

Quam igitur sit iniquum, quam detestabile, praecipue in principe, sub eodem signo pondus minuere, quis sufficeret explicare? De hoc enim ad istud propositum Cassiodorus lib. V Variarum sic inquit: «Quid enim tam nefarium, quam ut praescriptionibus liceat etiam in ipsa trutinae qualitate peccare, ut quod est iustitiae proprium datum, hoc per fraudes noscatur esse corruptum». [Idemque lib.

How iniquitous, then, how detestable—especially in a prince—to diminish the weight under the same sign, who would suffice to explain? For on this matter, to this very purpose, Cassiodorus in book 5 of the Variae thus says: «For what is so nefarious as that by prescriptions it be permitted even to sin in the very quality of the balance, so that what is given as the proper due of justice is known through frauds to be corrupted». [And the same, book

I, cap. X: «Talia igitur secreta violare, sic certissima velle confundere, nonne veritatis ipsius videtur esse crudelis ac foeda laceratio? Exerceantur negociatores in mercibus; emantur late quae vendantur angustius.

1, chapter 10: «Such secrets, therefore, to violate—thus to wish to confound things most certain—does it not seem to be a cruel and foul laceration of truth itself? Let merchants be exercised in merchandise; let things be bought broadly which are sold more narrowly.

Constet populis pondus ac mensura probabilis: quia cuncta turbantur, si integritas cum fraudis misceatur. Da certe solidum, et aufer inde, si praevales. Trade libram, et aliquid inde, si potes, imminue.

Let there stand for the peoples a reputable weight and measure: because all things are thrown into turmoil, if integrity be mixed with fraud. Do at least give a solidus, and take something from it, if you prevail. Hand over the pound, and lessen something from it, if you can.

Cuncta ista, nominibus ipsis constat esse provisum, aut integra tribuis, aut non ipsa quae dicuntur, exsolvis. Non potestis omnino, non potestis nomina integritatum dare, et scelestas imminutiones efficere»]. Adhuc autem princeps per hunc modum sibi posset adquirere pecuniam alienam, nec aliunde potest moveri ad mutationem huiusmodo faciendam; reciperet enim numismata boni ponderis, et ex eis fabricaret et traderet numismata tempore mutilato pondere. Et hoc non est aliud quod in multis locis sacrae Scripturae prohibetur a Deo: «Vide» ait sapiens, «pondus et pondus, mensura et mensura, utrumque abominabile apud Deum» (Prov.

All these things, as it is evident from the very names, are provided thus: either you bestow them entire, or you pay out not the very things that they are called. You cannot at all—you cannot give the names of integrities and effect wicked diminutions»]. Moreover, a prince could by this method acquire for himself another’s money, nor can he be moved from elsewhere to make a change of this sort; for he would receive numismata of good weight, and from them would fashion and hand out numismata with the weight mutilated. And this is nothing other than what in many places of Sacred Scripture is forbidden by God: «See,» says the wise man, «weight and weight, measure and measure—both abominable before God» (Prov.

20,10). Et in Deuteronomio dicitur, quod Dominus abominatur eum qui facit hoc (5 Mos. 25,15). Et ideo divitiae taliter congregatae in malum domini sui, consumuntur in brevi, quia, sicut ait Tullius, male parta male dilabuntur.

20,10). And in Deuteronomy it is said that the Lord abominates him who does this (5 Mos. 25,15). And therefore riches gathered in such a way, to the harm of their own master, are consumed in a short time, because, as Tullius says, ill-gotten gains dissolve ill.

Capitulum XIII: De mutatione materiae monetarum.

Chapter 13: On the change of the material of the coins.

Aut materia numismatis est simplex, aut mixta, ut patuit ex capitulo tertio. Si simplex, ipsa potest propter defectum dimitti: ut si nihil aut modicum auri possit inveniri, oportet ipsum desinere monetari; et si de novo reperiretur sufficiens abundantia eius, incipiendum esset facere monetam ex ipso, sicut aliquotiens fuit factum. Rursus aliqua materia deberet dimitti monetari propter abundantiam excessivam; propter hoc enim aerea moneta olim recessit ab usu, ut dictum fuit in eodem capitulo tertio.

Either the material of the coin is simple, or mixed, as was evident from chapter 3. If simple, it can itself be left off on account of deficiency: as, if no gold or only a little could be found, it is necessary that it cease to be minted; and if anew a sufficient abundance of it were discovered, one would have to begin to make coin from it, as has been done on several occasions. Conversely, some material ought to be left off from minting on account of excessive abundance; for on this account bronze coin once receded from use, as was said in the same chapter 3.

Sed huiusmodi causae eveniunt rarissime, et in nullo alio reliquenda est vel assumenda noviter pura sive simplex materia monetarum. Si autem in tali materia sit mixtio, ipsa debet fieri solum in minus precioso metallo per se monetabili, ut probatum fuit in eodem capitulo tertio, et in nigra moneta, ut cognoscatur purum a mixto; haec autem mixtio debet esse secundum certam proportionem, sicut decem de argento contra unum, vel contra tria de alio metallo, vel alio modo, sicut expedit, secundum prius dicta in capitulo tertio; et ista proportio potest mutari propter aliquam proportionem seu variationem realem in natura materiae vel aequivalentis, et dupliciter: aut propter defectum materiae, sicut qui non haberet argentum, nisi multum notabiliter minus quam ante, tunc potest diminui proportio argenti ad reliquum metallum in nigra moneta; aut si haberetur de argento abundanter plus quam ante, tunc plus de eo deberet poni in ista mixtione. Sed, sicut praedictum est, istae causae valde raro contingunt, et si forsan talis casus aliquotiens evenerit, adhuc huiusmodi proportionis sive mixtionis mutatio facienda est per communitatem ad maiorem securitatem habendam, et deceptionis maliciam evitandam; sicut de mutatione proportionis monetarum dictum est in capitulo X. In nullo vero alio casu debet mutari mixtio talis sive proportio mixtionis, potissime nunquam potest hoc licere principi, propter rationes factas in capitulo praecedenti, quae de directo faciunt ad istud propositum, quoniam impressio monetae est signum veritatis materiae et huiusmodi mixtionis; hanc igitur mutare, esset monetam falsificare.

But causes of this kind occur very rarely, and in no other case is a pure or simple material of coinage to be left aside or newly assumed. If, however, in such material there is a mixture, it ought to be made only in a less precious metal monetizable in itself, as was proved in the same chapter 3, and in black coin, so that the pure may be known from the mixed; moreover this mixture ought to be according to a certain proportion, as ten of silver against one, or against three of another metal, or in some other way, as is expedient, according to what was said before in chapter 3; and this proportion can be changed on account of some real proportion or variation in the nature of the material or of what is equivalent, and this in a twofold way: either on account of defect of material—such as one who would have silver only very notably less than before—then the proportion of silver to the remaining metal in black coin can be diminished; or if one had silver more abundantly than before, then more of it ought to be put into this mixture. But, as aforesaid, these causes occur very rarely; and if perchance such a case should happen at some time, even then a change of such a proportion or mixture is to be made by the community, in order to have greater security and to avoid the malice of deception; just as about the change of the proportion of the coinages was said in chapter 10. In no other case, however, ought such a mixture or the proportion of the mixture to be changed; most of all this can never be permitted to the prince, for the reasons made in the preceding chapter, which directly bear on this thesis, since the stamp of the coin is a sign of the truth of the material and of such a mixture; to change this, therefore, would be to falsify the coin.

Praeterea in quibusdam nummis inscribitur nomen Dei, vel alicuius sancti, et signum crucis; quod fuit inventum et antiquitus institutum in testimonium veritatis monetae in materia et pondere. Si igitur princeps sub ista inscriptione immutet materiam sive pondus, ipse videtur tacite mendacium et periurium committere, et falsum testimonium perhibere, ac etiam praevaricator fieri illius praecepti legalis quo dicitur: Non assumes nomen Dei tui in vanum. Etiam ipse abutitur hoc vocando monetam; nam, secundum Hugutionem, moneta dicitur a moneo, quia monet ne fraus in metallo vel pondere sit.

Moreover, on some coins the name of God, or of some saint, and the sign of the cross are inscribed; which was invented and instituted of old as testimony to the truth of the coin in material and in weight. If, therefore, the prince under this inscription alters the material or the weight, he seems silently to commit falsehood and perjury, and to bear false witness, and even to become a prevaricator of that legal precept wherein it is said: You shall not take the name of your God in vain. He also abuses this by calling it “coin”; for, according to Hugution, moneta is said from moneo, because it warns that there be no fraud in the metal or in the weight.

Rursum princeps per hunc modum ad se posset trahere populis substantiam indebite, sicut fuit dictum de mutatione ponderis in priori capitulo, et multa alia inconvenientia sequerentur. Immo pro certo ista falsitas esset peior quam in mutatione ponderis: quia magis est sophistica, et minus perceptibilis, et magis potest nocere et plus laedere communitatem; et propter hoc, ubi fit talis mixtio vel nigra moneta, communitas debet custodire penes se, in loco vel locis publicis, exemplar istius proportionis et qualitatem mixtionis, pro vitandis periculis; ne videlicet princeps (quod absit) vel monetarii mixtionem huiusmodi occulte falsificarent. Sicut etiam apud communitatem servantur quandoque aliarum mensurarum exemplaria.

Again, by this method the prince could draw to himself the substance of the peoples improperly, as was said about the change of weight in the prior chapter, and many other inconveniences would follow. Nay rather, for certain this falsity would be worse than in the change of weight: because it is more sophistical, and less perceptible, and it can harm more and wound the community more; and on account of this, where such a mixture or black money is made, the community ought to keep with itself, in a public place or places, an exemplar of that proportion and the quality of the mixture, for the avoiding of dangers; lest, namely, the prince (far be it) or the moneyers should secretly falsify a mixture of this kind. Just as also exemplars of other measures are sometimes kept by the community.

Capitulum XIV: De mutatione composita monetarum.

Chapter 14: On the composite mutation of coins.

Mutatio monetae composita est, quando plures mutationes simplices implicantur in unam, sicut qui mutaret simul proportionem monetae vel mixtionem materiae, vel cum hoc etiam pondus. Et sic multipliciter fierent combinationes possibiles quandoque mutationum simplicium superius positarum. Et quoniam nulla mutatio simplex debet fieri, nisi propter reales et naturales causas iam dictas, quae rarissime accidunt, sciendum quod adhuc rarius, immo forte nunquam, contingit vera occasio faciendi mutationem monetae compositam.

A composite mutation of the coinage is when several simple mutations are implicated in one, as when someone would at the same time alter the proportion of the coinage or the mixture of the material, or along with this even the weight. And thus in multiple ways there would sometimes be possible combinations of the simple mutations set above. And since no simple mutation ought to be made, except on account of the real and natural causes already mentioned, which very rarely occur, it should be known that even more rarely—indeed perhaps never—does a true occasion arise for making a composite mutation of the coinage.

Sed si forsan contingeret, adhuc fortiori ratione quam de simplici, talis mutatio composita nunquam debet per principem fieri, propter pericula et inconvenientia prius tractata, sed per ipsam communitatem; nam si ex mutationibus simplicibus indebite factis tot abusiones sequuntur, sicut dictum est ante; multo maiores et peiores sequerentur ex mutatione composita. Moneta namque debet esse vera et iusta in substantia et pondere, quod nobis signatum est in sacra Scriptura, ubi de Abraham dicitur, quod ipse emit agrum, pro quo dedit CCCC siclos argenti probatae monetae publicae. Si igitur ipsa foret bona, et non mutaretur indebite (1 Mos.

But if perchance it should happen, then, by a yet stronger reasoning than in the case of a simple one, such a composite mutation ought never to be made by the prince, on account of the dangers and inconveniences previously treated, but by the community itself; for if from simple mutations made unduly so many abuses follow, as was said before, much greater and worse would follow from a composite mutation. For coinage ought to be true and just in substance and in weight, which is signified to us in Sacred Scripture, where it is said of Abraham that he himself bought a field, for which he gave 400 shekels of silver of approved public coinage. If therefore it itself were good, and were not unduly changed (Genesis 1

23,16); cum ipsa sit longo tempore durabilis, non oporteret de ea multum fabricare, nec plures monetarios ad expensas communitatis habere. Et in hoc esset utilitas communis, sicut tactum fuit capitulo VII. Universaliter igitur ex praemissis concludendum est, quod nulla mutatio monetae, sive simplex, sive composita, est sola principis auctoritate facienda; et maxime ubi hoc vellet facere propter emolumentum et lucrum ex tali mutatione sumendum.

(Genesis 23:16); since it is durable for a long time, there would be no need to fabricate much of it, nor to have more moneyers at the expenses of the community. And in this there would be common utility, as was touched upon in chapter 7. Therefore, universally, from the foregoing it is to be concluded that no mutation of the coinage, whether simple or composite, is to be made by the authority of the prince alone; and especially where he would wish to do this for the emolument and profit to be taken from such a mutation.

Capitulum XV: Quod lucrum quod provenit principi ex mutatione monetae sit iniustum.

Chapter 15: That the profit which accrues to the prince from the change of the coinage is unjust.

Videtur mihi, quod principalis et finalis causa, propter quam princeps vult sibi assumere potestatem mutandi monetas, est emolumentum vel lucrum, quod potest inde habere: aliter enim frustra faceret tot et tantas mutationes. Volo ergo adhuc plenius ostendere, quod talis acquisitio est iniusta; omnis enim mutatio monetae, praeterquam in rarissimis casibus prius dictis, falsitatem et deceptionem includit, et non potest principi pertinere, sicut probatum est ante. Ex quo ergo princeps hanc rem de se iniustam usurpat iniuste, impossibile est quod ibi capiat emolumentum iuste.

It seems to me that the principal and final cause for which the prince wishes to assume for himself the power of changing the coinage is the emolument or profit that he can have from it; otherwise he would do so many and such great mutations in vain. I wish therefore to show yet more fully that such an acquisition is unjust; for every mutation of the coinage, except in the very rare cases said before, includes falsity and deception, and cannot pertain to the prince, as was proved above. Since therefore the prince unjustly usurps this matter, which is unjust in itself, it is impossible that he should take emolument there justly.

Praeterea, quantum princeps capit ibi de lucro, tantum necesse est ipsam communitatem habere de damno. Quidquid autem princeps fecit in damnum communitatis iniustitia est et factum tyrannicum, non regale, ut ait Aristoteles. Et si ipse diceret, sicut solent mentiri tyranni, quod ipse tale lucrum convertit in publicam utilitatem, non est concedendum sibi, quia pari ratione posset mihi tunicam amovere et dicere quod ipse indigeret ea pro communi commodo.

Moreover, as much as the prince takes there in profit, by so much it is necessary that the community itself have in loss. Whatever the prince has done to the damage of the community is injustice and a tyrannical deed, not royal, as Aristotle says. And if he should say—just as tyrants are wont to lie—that he converts such profit into public utility, this is not to be conceded to him, because by the same reasoning he could remove my tunic and say that he needed it for the common good.

Etiam secundum apostolum non sunt facienda mala ut eveniant bona. Nihil ergo debet turpiter extorqueri ut postea in pravos usus fingatur expendi. Rursum, si princeps de iure potest facere unam simplicem mutationem monete et sibi capere aliquod lucrum, pari ratione potest facere maiorem mutationem et capere maius lucrum, et mutare pluries et adhuc plus habere de lucro et facere mutationem vel mutationes compositas, et semper augere lucrum secundum modos prius tactos; et verisimile est quod ita procederet ipse vel successores sui, aut proprio motu aut per consillarios, ex quo istud liceret, quia natura humana inclinatur et prona est ad augendum sibi divitias quando hoc potest leviter facere, et sic tandem princeps potest sibi attrahere quasi totam pecuniam sive divitias subditorum et eos in servitutem redigere, quod esset directe tyrannisare, immo vera et perfecta tyrannis, sicut patet per philosophos et per historias antiquorum.

Even according to the Apostle, evils are not to be done that goods may come about. Therefore nothing ought to be shamefully extorted, so that afterward it may be feigned to be expended upon perverse uses. Again, if the prince by right can make one simple change of the coinage and take some profit for himself, by the same reasoning he can make a greater change and take a greater profit, and change it many times and have still more profit, and make a change or composite changes, and always augment the profit according to the modes touched on before; and it is plausible that thus he himself or his successors would proceed, either of their own motion or through counselors, once this were permitted, because human nature is inclined and prone to augment riches for itself when it can do this easily; and thus at length the prince can draw to himself as it were all the money or wealth of his subjects and reduce them to servitude, which would be to tyrannize directly—nay, true and perfect tyranny—as is evident from the philosophers and from the histories of the ancients.

Capitulum XVI: Quod lucrum in mutatione monetae est innaturale.

Chapter 16: That lucre in the mutation of coinage is unnatural.

Quamvis omnis iniustitia sit quodam modo contra naturam, verumtamen accipere lucrum ex mutatione monetae est quodam speciali modo iniustum in naturale. Naturale enim est quibusdam naturalibus divitiis se multiplicare, sicut cerealia grana quae sata cum multo fenore reddit ager, ut ait Ovidius, sed monstruosum est et contra naturam quod res infecunda pariat, quod res sterilis a tota specie fructificet vel multiplicetur ex se, cuiusmodi est pecunia. Cum igitur ipsa pecunia affert lucrum non exponendo eam in mercatione naturalium divitiarum ac in usum proprium ac sibi naturale, sed eam transmutando in semetipsam, sicut mutando unam in aliam vel tradendo unam pro alia, tale lucrum vile est et praeter naturam.

Although every injustice is in a certain way against nature, nevertheless to take profit from the exchange of coin is in a certain special way unjust against the natural. For it is natural to multiply oneself by means of certain natural riches, as cereal grains which, when sown, the field pays back with much interest, as Ovid says; but it is monstrous and against nature that an unfruitful thing should bring forth, that a sterile thing should, from its whole kind, fructify or be multiplied from itself—such as money is. Therefore, when money itself brings profit not by exposing it in the commerce of natural riches and to its own proper and natural use, but by transmuting it into itself, as by changing one coin into another or handing over one for another, such profit is vile and contrary to nature.

Per hanc enim rationem probatur Aristoteles primo Politicae quod usura est praeter naturam, quia naturalis usus monetae est quod ipsa sit instrumentum permutandi divitias naturales, ut saepe dictum est. Qui igitur utitur ea alio modo, ipse abutitur contra institutionem naturalem monetae; facit enim, ut ait Aristoteles, quod denarius pariat denarium, quod est contra naturam. Adhuc autem, in istis mutationibus ubi capitur lucrum, oportet vocare denarium illud quod in veritate non est denarius et libram illud quod non est libra, et ita de aliis sicut dictum fuit ante.

For by this reasoning Aristotle proves in the first book of the Politics that usury is against nature, because the natural use of money is that it be an instrument for exchanging natural riches, as has often been said. Therefore whoever uses it in another way abuses it contrary to the natural institution of money; for he makes, as Aristotle says, that a denarius beget a denarius, which is against nature. Moreover, in those exchanges where profit is taken, one must call a denarius that which in truth is not a denarius, and a pound that which is not a pound, and so of others as was said before.

Constat autem quod hoc non est aliud nisi naturae et rationis ordinem perturbare; unde Cassiodorus ait: Da certe solidum et aufer inde si praevales; trade libram et aliquid si potes minue, cuncta ista nominibus ipsis constat esse provisum aut integrum tribuis aut non ipsa quae dicuntur exsolvis non potestis omnino nomina integritatum dare et scelestas imminutiones efficere. Talia ergo naturae secreta violare, sic certissima velle confundere nonne veritatis ipsius videtur crudelis ac foeda laceratio? Constat prius pondus ac mensura probabilis quia cuncta turbantur si intergitas cum fraudibus misceatur.

It is clear, moreover, that this is nothing other than to perturb the order of nature and reason; whence Cassiodorus says: Give, to be sure, a solidus, and take something away from it if you prevail; hand over a pound, and, if you can, diminish something—by the very names themselves it is evident that all these things are provided: either you render it whole, or you do not pay the very things that are spoken of; you cannot at all give the names of integrities and effect wicked diminutions. Therefore to violate such secrets of nature, thus to wish to confound things most certain—does it not seem a cruel and foul laceration of truth itself? It is clear that weight and a reliable measure come first, because all things are thrown into confusion if integrity is mixed with frauds.

Rursum in libro Sapientiae dicitur quod omnia Deus deposuit mensura, pondere et numero, sed in mutatione monetae lucrum non capitur nisi fraus in istis rebus certissimis committatur, sicut prius declaravi. Ergo Deo et naturae derogat qui sibi ex huiusmodi mutationibus lucrum captat.

Again, in the Book of Wisdom it is said that God has set all things by measure, weight, and number; but in the change of coin no profit is taken unless fraud is committed in these most certain matters, as I have declared before. Therefore he derogates from God and from nature who snatches profit for himself from mutations of this kind.

Capitulum XVII: Quod lucrum in mutatione monetae peius est quam usura.

Chapter 17: That profit from the alteration of the coinage is worse than usury.

Tres sunt modi, prout mihi videtur, quibus aliquis potest in moneta lucrari, absque hoc quod exponat eam in usu suo naturali: unus per artem campsoriam, custodiam vel mercantiam monetarum; alius est usura; tertius monetae mutatio. Primus modus vilis est, secundus malus, et tertius peior. De primis duobus fecit Aristoteles mentionem et non de tertio, quia tempore suo talis malitia nondum fuerat adinventa.

There are three modes, as it seems to me, by which someone can profit in coin, without exposing it to its natural use: one through the art of campsory, the custody or commerce of coins; another is usury; the third is the mutation of the coinage. The first mode is base, the second evil, and the third worse. Of the first two Aristotle made mention, and not of the third, because in his time such malice had not yet been invented.

Quod autem primus sit vilis et vituperabilis hoc probat Aristoteles per rationem iam tactam in praecedenti capitulo; hoc enim est quodam modo facere pecuniam parere. Artem etiam campsoriam vocat abolostaticam, quod vulgariter solet dici pictavinagium; propter quod sanctus Matheus apostolus qui fuerat campsor, non est reversus ad priorem operam post resurrectionem dominicam, sicut fecit Petrus qui fuerat piscator; et in assignando causam huiusmodi, dicit Beatus Gregorius quod aliud est victum per piscationem quaerere aliud thelonei lucris pecunias augere. Sunt enim, inquit, pleraque negotia quae sine peccatis aut vix aut nullatenus exerceri possunt, etc.

That the first is base and blameworthy, Aristotle proves by the reasoning already touched in the preceding chapter; for this is in a certain way to make money beget money. He also calls the money‑changer’s art abolostatic, which in the vulgar tongue is commonly called pictavinage; wherefore Saint Matthew the Apostle, who had been a money‑changer, did not return to his former work after the Lord’s resurrection, as Peter, who had been a fisherman, did; and in assigning the cause of this, Blessed Gregory says that it is one thing to seek a living by fishing, another to augment moneys by the profits of the teloneum (toll‑office). For, says he, there are many businesses which can be exercised without sins either scarcely or not at all, etc.

Nam sunt quaedam artes banausae quae maculant corpus, sicut est cloacaria, et aliae maculant animam sicut est ista. De usura vero certum est quod est mala, detestabilis et iniqua, et ista habentur ex sacra Scriptura; sed nunc restat ostendere quod lucrum sumere in mutatione monetae est adhuc peius quam usura. Usurarius veri tradidit pecuniam suam ei qui recipit eam voluntarie et qui postea potest ex ea se iuvare ac inde suae necessitati succurrere, et illud quod dat alteri ultra sortem est ex contractu voluntario inter partes, sed princeps in indebita mutatione monetae accipit simpliciter involuntarie pecuniam subditorum, quia prohibet cursum prioris monetae, melioris, et quam quilibet plus vellet habere quam malam; deinde praeter necessitatem absque utilitate, quae ex eo potest provenire subditis, ipse reddet eis pecuniam minus bonam.

For there are certain banausic arts that maculate the body, as is cloacal work (sewer‑work), and others maculate the soul, as does this one. Concerning usury, indeed, it is certain that it is evil, detestable, and iniquitous, and these points are had from Sacred Scripture; but now it remains to show that to take profit in the alteration of the coinage is still worse than usury. The usurer, indeed, has handed over his money to one who receives it voluntarily and who thereafter can help himself by it and from it succor his necessity; and that which he gives to the other beyond the principal is from a voluntary contract between the parties. But the prince, in an undue mutation of the coinage, simply takes, involuntarily, the money of his subjects, because he forbids the circulation of the prior coin, the better one, which everyone would rather have than the bad; then, beyond necessity and without any utility that can from it accrue to the subjects, he will return to them money that is less good.

Et si faciat meliorem quam ante, hoc tamen est ut deterioretur in posterum et tribuat eis minus aequivalenter de bona quam receperat de alia. Et qualitercumque sit ipse retinet profecto partem pro se; in hoc igitur quod ipse supra pecuniam recipit incrementum, contra et praeter naturalem ipsius usum, ista acquisitio par est ipsi usurae, sed peior quam usura, eo quod est minus voluntaria vel magis contra voluntatem subditorum, et absque hoc quod possit ipsis proficere, et praeter necessitatem penitus. Et quoniam lucrum foeneratoris non tantum excedit, nec est ita praeiudiciabile generaliter multis, sicut istud quod contra et supra totam communitatem impositum, non minus tyrannice quam dolose, ita ut sit mihi dubium an potius debeat dici violenta praedatio, vel actio fraudulenta.

And even if he should make it better than before, nevertheless this is so that it may be made worse thereafter, and that he may render to them less equivalently of the good than he had received of the other. And however it be, he assuredly retains a share for himself; therefore, in that he receives an increment over the money, against and beyond its natural use, this acquisition is equal to usury itself, but worse than usury, because it is less voluntary, or more against the will of the subjects, and without any possibility of profiting them, and utterly beyond necessity. And since the profit of the usurer does not exceed so much, nor is it so prejudicial generally to many, as this which is imposed against and over the whole community, no less tyrannically than deceitfully, it is thus doubtful to me whether it ought rather to be called violent predation or a fraudulent action.

Capitulum XVIII: Quod tales mutationes monetarum, quantum est ex se, non sunt permittendae.

Chapter 18: That such alterations of the coinage, considered in themselves, are not to be permitted.

Aliquotiens ne peius eveniat, et pro scandalo evitando, permittuntur in communitate aliqua inhonesta et mala, sicut lupanaria publica. Aliquando etiam pro aliqua necessitate vel oportunitate permittitur aliqua negociatio vilis, sicut est ars campsoris, vel etiam prava, sicut est usura. Sed de tali mutatione monetae pro lucro accipiendo, non apparet aliqua causa mundi, quare tantum lucrum debeat an possit admitti; quoniam per istud non evitatur scandalum, sed potius generatur, ut satis patet ex octavo capitulo, et multa inconvenientia inde sequuntur, quorum aliqua iam tacta sunt, et adhuc aliqua postea videbuntur, nec est aliqua necessitas sive oportunitas hoc faciendi, neque potest reipublicae expedire; cuius rei manifestum signum est, quod mutationes huiusmodi sunt noviter adinventae, sicut iam tactum est in capitulo praecedenti.

Sometimes, lest something worse happen and for avoiding scandal, certain dishonorable and evil things are permitted in some community, such as public brothels. Sometimes also, for some necessity or opportunity, some base negotiation is permitted, as is the art of the money‑changer, or even a depraved one, as is usury. But concerning such a change of the coinage for receiving profit, there does not appear any clean cause why so great a gain ought or can be admitted; since by this scandal is not avoided, but rather generated, as is quite clear from the eighth chapter, and many inconveniences follow from it, some of which have already been touched, and some others will be seen afterward; nor is there any necessity or opportunity for doing this, nor can it be expedient for the commonwealth; of which thing a manifest sign is that changes of this kind are newly devised, as has already been touched in the preceding chapter.

Nunquam enim sic factum est in civitatibus aut regnis olim prospere gubernatis, nec unquam reperi historiam quae de hoc faceret mentionem, hoc excepto quod in quadam epistola Cassiodori scripta nomine Theodorici regis Italiae, una parva mutatio in pondere facta, durissime reprehenditur, et multum efficaciter reprobatur, quam quidem efficacius fecerat pro quibusdam stipendariis persolvendis. Unde praedictus rex Boëtio de hoc scribens, inter caetera dicit: Quapropter prudentia vestra lectionibus erudita dogmaticis scelestam falsitatem a consortio veritatis eiiciat, ne cui sit appetibile aliquid de illa integritate subducere. Et quibusdam interpositis rursum inquit: Mutilari certe non debet, quod laborantibus datur, sed a quo actus fidelis exigitur, compensatio minuta praestetur etc.

For never was it done thus in cities or kingdoms once prosperously governed, nor have I ever found a history that made mention of this, except that in a certain letter of Cassiodorus written in the name of Theoderic, king of Italy, one small change in weight, having been most harshly reprehended and very efficaciously reprobated, is recorded—one which indeed he had contrived, as it were “more efficaciously,” for the paying of certain stipendiaries. Whence the aforesaid king, writing to Boethius about this, among other things says: Wherefore let your prudence, schooled by dogmatic readings, cast wicked falsity out from the consortium of truth, lest it be appetible to anyone to withdraw anything from that integrity. And after some matters interposed he says again: Surely that which is given to laborers ought not to be mutilated, but from him of whom a faithful act is required, let a minute compensation be rendered, etc.

Si vero Italici seu Romani tales mutationes finaliter fecerunt, sicut videtur ex quadam prava moneta veteri quae quandoque reperitur in campis, hoc fuit forte una de causis quare eorum nobile dominium devenit ad nihilum. Sic igitur patet quod istae mutationes tam malae sunt quod de natura sua non sunt aliquatenus permittendae.

If indeed the Italians or Romans ultimately made such mutations, as seems from a certain depraved old coin which is sometimes found in the fields, this was perhaps one of the causes why their noble dominion came to nothing. Thus, therefore, it is clear that these mutations are so evil that by their very nature they are not to be permitted in any way.

Capitulum XIX: De quibus inconvenientibus tangentibus principem, quae sequuntur ex mutationibus monetarum.

Chapter 19: On which inconveniences touching the prince, which follow from mutations of the coinage.

Multa et magna inconvenientia oriuntur ex taliter mutando monetas, quorum aliqua principalius respiciunt principem, alia totam communitatem, et alia magis partes ipsius communitatis. Unde brevi tempore nuper transacto quam plurima talia in regno Franciae visa sunt evenire, aliqua etiam iam tacta sunt ante, quae tamen expedit recitare. Primo namque nimis detestabile et nimis turpe est principi fraudem committere, monetam falsificare, aurum vocare quod non est aurum, et libram quod non est libra, et sic de talibus prius positis XII et XIII capitulis.

Many and great inconveniences arise from thus altering the coins, some of which more principally concern the prince, others the whole community, and others more the parts of that community. Whence, in a short time lately past, very many such things have been seen to occur in the kingdom of France; some also have already been touched on before, which, however, it is expedient to recite. For first, it is too detestable and too disgraceful for the prince to commit fraud, to falsify the coinage, to call gold what is not gold, and a pound what is not a pound; and so concerning such matters previously set forth in chapters 12 and 13.

Praeterea sibi incumbit falsos monetarios condemnare. Quomodo igitur satis potest erubescere, si reperiatur in eo, quod in alio deberet turpissima morte punire! Rursum, magnum scandalum est sicut dicebatur VIII.

Furthermore, it falls upon him to condemn false moneyers (counterfeiters). How, then, can he blush enough, if he be found in that very thing which in another he ought to punish with a most disgraceful death! Again, it is a great scandal, as was said in 8.

capitulo et vile principi, quod moneta regni sui nunquam in eodem statu permanet, sed de die in diem variatur; et quandoque in uno loco plus valet quam in alio pro eodem tempore. Item, saepissime ignoratur his durantibus temporibus vel mutationibus, quantum valeat hoc numisma vel illud, et oportet mercari seu emere vel vendere monetam, seu altercari de precio, quod est contra eius naturam; et sic rei quae debet esse certissima nulla est certitudo, sed potius incerta et inordinata confusio in vituperium principantis. Item, absurdum est et penitus alienum a regia nobilitate, prohibere cursum verae et bonae monetae regni, et ex cupiditate praecipere, immo cogere subditos ad utendum minus bona moneta, quasi velit dicere quod bona est mala, et e converso; cum tamen talibus dictum est a Domino per prophetam, «Vae vobis qui bonum dicitis malum, et malum bonum« (Isai.

chapter, and it is vile for a prince, that the coinage of his realm never remains in the same state, but from day to day is varied; and sometimes in one place it is worth more than in another at the same time. Likewise, most often during these seasons or mutations it is unknown how much this numism or that is worth, and one must traffic, that is, buy or sell money, or wrangle over the price, which is against its nature; and thus for a thing which ought to be most certain there is no certainty, but rather uncertain and inordinate confusion to the reproach of the ruler. Likewise, it is absurd and utterly alien from royal nobility to prohibit the course of the true and good coinage of the realm, and out of cupidity to order, nay even to compel, the subjects to use a less good coin, as if he wished to say that the good is bad, and conversely; whereas yet to such men it has been said by the Lord through the prophet, «Woe to you who call good evil, and evil good« (Isai.

5,20). Et iterum, dedecus est principi, irrevereri praedecessores suos, nam quisque tenetur ex dominico praecepto honorare parentes; ipse autem progenitorum videtur detrahere honori, quando bonam monetam eorum abrogat, et facit eam cum eorum imagine scindere: et loco monetae aureae, quam ipsi fabricaverunt, facit monetam aeneam in parte. Quod videtur fuisse figuratum in III. Regum, ubi legitur quod rex Roboam abstulit scuta aurea, quae fecerat pater eius Salomon, pro quibus fecit scuta aenea.

5,20). And again, it is a disgrace to the prince to be irreverent toward his predecessors, for each person is bound by the Lord’s precept to honor parents; he, however, seems to detract from the honor of his progenitors when he abrogates their good coinage, and causes it, with their image, to be cut; and in place of the gold coinage which they themselves fashioned, he makes bronze coinage in part. Which seems to have been prefigured in 3 Kings, where it is read that King Rehoboam took away the golden shields which his father Solomon had made, and in their place he made bronze shields.

Idem quoque Roboam perdidit quinque partes populi sui, pro eo quod ipse voluit in principio nimis gravare subditos. Adhuc autem rex debet nimis abhorrere tyrannica facta, cuiusmodi est mutatio talis, ut praedictum est saepe; quae etiam est praeiudiciabilis et periculosa pro tota posteritate regali, sicut in sequentibus diffusius ostendetur.

Likewise Rehoboam lost five parts of his people, for this reason: that at the beginning he wished to overburden his subjects excessively. Moreover, the king ought exceedingly to abhor tyrannical deeds, of which sort is such a change, as has often been said; which also is prejudicial and dangerous for the whole royal posterity, as will be shown more fully in what follows.

Capitulum XX: De aliis inconvenientibus totam communitatem tangentibus.

Chapter 20: On other inconveniences touching the whole community.

Inter multa inconvenientia ex mutatione monetae venientia, quae totam communitatem respiciunt, unum est quod prius tangebatur capitulo XV principaliter, quia videlicet princeps per hoc posset ad se trahere quasi totam pecuniam communitatis, et nimis depauperare subiectos. Et quemadmodum quaedam aegritudines chronicae sunt aliis periculosiores, eo quod sunt minus sensibiles, ita talis exactio, quanto minus percipitur, tanto periculosius exercetur; non enim ita cito gravamen ipsius sentitur a populo, sicut per unam aliam collectam. Et tamen nulla fere talia potest esse gravior, nulla generalior, nulla maior.

Among the many inconveniences that come from a change of the coinage, which regard the whole community, one is that which was touched upon earlier chiefly in chapter 15, namely that by this the prince could draw to himself almost all the money of the community, and excessively impoverish his subjects. And just as certain chronic sicknesses are more perilous than others because they are less sensible, so such an exaction, the less it is perceived, the more perilously it is exercised; for its burden is not felt by the people as quickly as by some other single collection. And yet scarcely any such measure can be heavier, none more general, none greater.

Rursum aurum et argentum propter tales mutationes et impeiorationes minorantur in regno; quia non obstante custodia deferuntur ad extra, ubi carius allocantur; homines enim conantur suam monetam portare ad loca, ubi eam credunt magis valere. Ex hoc igitur sequitur diminutio monetarum materiae in regno. Item, illi de extra regnum aliquotiens contrafaciunt et afferunt similem monetam in regno, et sic attrahunt sibi lucrum, quod rex ille credit habere.

Again, gold and silver are diminished in the kingdom on account of such mutations and deteriorations; for notwithstanding the guard, they are carried abroad, where they are valued more dearly; for men try to carry their money to places where they believe it to be worth more. From this, therefore, there follows a diminution of the material of the coinage in the kingdom. Likewise, those from outside the kingdom sometimes counterfeit and bring similar coin into the kingdom, and thus draw to themselves the profit which that king believes he has.

Adhuc etiam forsitan ipsa monetae materia in parte consumitur, fundendo eam et refundendo totiens quotiens solet fieri, ubi mutationes huiusmodi exercentur. Sic ergo materia monetabilis tripliciter minuitur occasione mutationum praedictarum; igitur non possunt, ut videtur, longo tempore permanere, ubi non exuberaret materia monetabilis in mineriis vel aliunde; et sic tandem princeps non haberet unde facere posset sufficienter de bona moneta. Item, propter istas mutationes, bona mercimonia seu divitiae naturales de extraneis regnis cessant ad illud afferri, in quo moneta sic mutatur, quoniam mercatores caeteris paribus praediligunt ad ea loca transire, in quibus recipiunt monetam certam et bonam.

Moreover, perhaps even the very material of the coinage is in part consumed, by melting it and remelting it as often as is wont to be done where mutations of this kind are exercised. Thus therefore the mintable material is diminished threefold on the occasion of the aforesaid mutations; therefore, they cannot, it seems, endure for a long time, unless mintable material abounds in the mines or from elsewhere; and so at length the prince would not have whence he could make a sufficient amount of good coin. Likewise, on account of these mutations, good merchandises or natural riches from foreign kingdoms cease to be brought into that realm in which the coin is thus changed, since merchants, other things being equal, prefer to pass over to those places in which they receive coin that is certain and good.

Adhuc autem intrinsecus in tali regno negociatio mercatorum per tales mutationes perturbatur et multipliciter impeditur. Praeterea his mutationibus durantibus, reditus pecuniae, pensiones annuales, locagia, censivae, et similia, non possunt bene et iuste taxari seu appreciari, ut notum est. Item nec pecunia potest secure mutuo dari seu tradi, et sic de talibus; immo multi nolunt ista charitativa subsidia facere, propter tales mutationes.

Moreover, inwardly within such a kingdom the commerce of merchants is perturbed and in many ways impeded by such mutations. Furthermore, while these mutations endure, money revenues, annual pensions, leases (locagia), censives, and the like cannot be well and justly assessed or appraised, as is known. Likewise, neither can money be safely given in loan or handed over, and so with things of this sort; nay rather, many are unwilling to make these charitable subsidies, on account of such mutations.

Et tamen sufficientia materiae monetabilis, mercatores et omnia praedicta sunt aut necessaria, aut valde utilia naturae humanae; et opposita sunt praeiudiciabilia, et nociva toti communitati civili.

And yet the sufficiency of coinable material, the merchants, and all the aforesaid things are either necessary or very useful to human nature; and their opposites are prejudicial and harmful to the whole civil community.

Capitulum XXI: De aliis inconvenientibus quae tangunt partem communitatis.

Chapter 21: On other inconveniences which affect a part of the community.

Quaedam partes communitatis occupatae sunt in negociis honorabilibus aut utilibus toti reipublicae, ut in divitiis naturalibus, ad crescendum vel tractandum pro necessitate communitatis, cuiusmodi sunt viri ecclesiastici, iudices, milites, agricolae, mercatores, artifices, et similes. Sed alia pars auget divitias proprias vili quaestu, sicut campsores, mercatores monetae, sive billonatores: quae quidem negociatio turpis est, prout dicebatur cap. XVIII.

Certain parts of the community are occupied in businesses honorable or useful to the whole commonwealth, in natural wealth, either to increase it or to manage it for the necessity of the community, of which sort are ecclesiastical men, judges, soldiers, farmers, merchants, artisans, and the like. But another part augments its own riches by vile gain, such as money‑changers, dealers in coin, or billon‑dealers: which kind of business is indeed base, as was said in ch. 18.

Isti igitur qui sunt quasi praeternecessarii reipublicae, et quidam alii, sicut receptores et tractatores pecuniae, et tales, capiunt magnam partem emolumenti sive lucri provenientis ex mutationibus monetarum, et maliciose aut fortuito dicantur inde contra Deum et iustitiam, quoniam ipsi sunt tot divitiis immeriti et tantis bonis indigni. Alii vero depauperantur ex hoc, qui sunt optimae partes illius communitatis; ita quod princeps plures et meliores subditos suos per istud damnificat, et nimium gravat, et tamen non totum lucrum venit ad ipsum, sed magnam partem habent isti praedicti, quorum negociatio vilis est et admixta cum fraude. Rursum, quando princeps non facit praescire populo tempus et modum futurae mutationis monetae quam intendit facere, aliqui per cautelas aut amicos hoc secrete provident, et tunc emunt mercimonia pro moneta debili, et postea vendunt pro forti, et subito fiunt divites, et nimium lucrantur indebite contra naturalis mercationis legitimum cursum.

I therefore say that those who are, as it were, beyond-necessary to the republic, and certain others, such as receivers and handlers of money, and the like, take a great part of the emolument or gain arising from mutations of the coin; and, whether out of malice or by chance, they are thereby said to be against God and justice, since they are undeserving of so many riches and unworthy of such great goods. But others are impoverished by this, who are the best parts of that community; so that by this the prince harms more and better of his subjects and overburdens them excessively; and yet not all the profit comes to him, but a great part is held by those aforesaid, whose negotiation is vile and mingled with fraud. Again, when the prince does not cause the people to know beforehand the time and manner of the future mutation of the coin which he intends to make, some, by cautions or by friends, provide for this secretly, and then they buy merchandise for weak coin, and afterwards sell for strong, and suddenly become rich, and gain excessively, unduly, against the legitimate course of natural mercation.

Et videtur esse quodammodo genus monopolii, in praeiudicium et damnum totius communitatis residuae. Adhuc autem per tales mutationes necesse est reditus taxatos ad numerum pecuniae aut iniuste minui, aut iniuste saltem augeri, sicut tactum fuit ante capitulo XI de mutatione appellationis monetae. Item, princeps per tales diversificationes et sophisticationes monetarum dat malis occcasionem faciendi falsam monetam, aut, quia minus est contra conscientiam eorum, ipsam falsificare, ex quo apparet eis quod ita princeps fecit aut quia eorum falsitas non ita cito deprehenditur, et possunt facilius et plura mala his stantibus perpetrare quam si semper curreret bona moneta.

And it seems to be, in a certain way, a kind of monopoly, to the prejudice and detriment of the whole remaining community. Moreover, through such changes it is necessary that revenues assessed to a number/amount of money be either unjustly diminished, or at least unjustly increased, as was touched upon above in chapter 11 on the change of the denomination of coin. Likewise, the prince, through such diversifications and sophistications of the coinage, gives the wicked an occasion to make false coin, or—because it is less against their conscience—to falsify it, since it appears to them that thus the prince has done, or because their falsity is not so quickly detected; and they can, with things standing thus, more easily perpetrate more evils than if good coin were always in circulation.

Praeterea, istis durantibus, quam innumerabiles perplexitates, obscuritates, errores et inextricabiles difficultates accidunt in computis, demisiis et receptis. Oriuntur etiam inde materiae litigiorum, et variae quaestiones: malae persolutiones debitorum, fraudes, inordinationes, abusiones quam plurimae, et inconvenientia multa, quae nescirem explicare, forsan quibusdam enumeratis prius, maiora et deteriora; neque mirum, quia, sicut ait Aristoteles, uno inconvenienti dato multa sequuntur, et hoc non est difficile videre.

Moreover, while these endure, how innumerable perplexities, obscurities, errors, and inextricable difficulties occur in accounts, disbursements, and receipts. From these there also arise materials for litigations, and various questions: bad settlements of debts, frauds, disorders, very many abuses, and many inconveniences, which I would not know how to explicate—perhaps, if certain things were first enumerated, greater and worse; nor is it a marvel, because, as Aristotle says, once one inconvenience is posited many follow, and this is not difficult to see.

Capitulum XXII: Si communitas potest facere tales mutationes monetae.

Chapter 22: Whether the community can make
such changes of the coinage.

Cum moneta sit communitatis, ut ostensum est capitulo sexto, videtur quod ipsa communitas possit de ea ad libitum ordinare. Ergo etiam eam potest quomodolibet variare, et super hoc capere quantum placeat, et de ea facere sicut de re sua, maxime autem si pro guerra vel pro redemptione sui principis de capitivitate, vel aliquo tali casu fortuito, ipsa communitas indigeret una magna pecuniae summa. Ipsa enim tunc posset eam levare per mutationem monetae, nec esset contra naturam aut sicut usura, ex quo hoc non faceret princeps sed ipsa communitas cuius est ipsa moneta.

Since the coinage is the community’s, as was shown in chapter 6, it seems that the community itself can regulate it at will. Therefore it can also vary it in whatever way, and over this exact from it as much as it pleases, and deal with it as with its own property—especially if the community itself should be in need of a great sum of money for war or for the redemption of its prince from captivity, or some such fortuitous case. For then it could raise it by a change of the coinage, nor would this be against nature or like usury, since this would not be done by the prince but by the community itself, to whom the coinage itself belongs.

Per hoc enim cessarent nec haberent hic locum multae rationes prius factae contra mutationes monetae. Nec solum videtur quod communitas hoc facere potest, sed etiam quod hoc deberet ex quo necessaria est collecta, quoniam in tali mutatione aggregari videntur quasi omnes bonae conditiones requisitae in aliqua tallia seu collecta, nam in brevi tempore multum lucrum affert, facillima est ad colligendum et distribuendum seu assignandum sine occupatione multorum et sine fraude colligentium et cum parvis expensis. Nulla etiam potest imaginari magis aequalis seu proportionalis, quia fere qui plus potest, plus solvit, et est secundum sui quantitatem minus perceptibilis seu sensibilis, et immo magis portabilis sine periculo rebellionis et absque murmure populi.

For by this many reasons previously made against changes of the coinage would cease and would have no place here. Nor does it only seem that the community can do this, but also that it ought to do this, since a levy is necessary, because in such a mutation there seem to be aggregated, as it were, all the good conditions required in any tallage or levy; for in a short time it brings much profit, it is most easy to collect and to distribute or assign without the occupation of many and without the fraud of the collectors and with small expenses. Nor can any be imagined more equal or proportional, because almost he who can more pays more, and it is, according to its quantity, less perceptible or sensible, and indeed more bearable without danger of rebellion and without the murmuring of the people.

Est enim generalissima, quod neque clericus neque nobilis ab es se potest per privilegium vel alias eximere, sicut multi volunt ab aliis collectis, unde oriuntur invidiae, dissentiones, lites, scandala et multa alia inconvenientia quae non veniunt ex tali mutatione monetae; ergo in casu predicto ipsa potest et debet fieri per ipsam communitatem. De isto autem, salvo meliore iudicio, mihi videtur ad praesens sic posse dici quod videlicet aut illa summa pecuniae qua communitas indiget transferenda est vel exponenda in remotis partibus et inter gentes cum quibus non habetur communicatio; et etiam tanta est quod materia monetabilis diu erit ex hoc notabiliter minor in ista communitate. Et in isto casu potest fieri collecta per mutationem monetae vel in materia vel in mixtione, quia si fieret aliter, talis mutatio esset postea facienda propter causam assignatam et secundum modum positum in capitulo XII.

For it is most general, that neither cleric nor noble can exempt himself from it by privilege or otherwise, as many wish to do from other collections, whence arise envies, dissensions, lawsuits, scandals, and many other inconveniences which do not come from such a mutation of the coinage; therefore in the aforesaid case it can and ought to be done by the community itself. As to this, however, saving better judgment, it seems to me for the present that it can be said thus: namely, either the sum of money which the community needs is to be transferred or expended in remote parts and among peoples with whom there is no communication; and moreover it is so great that coinable material will for a long time on this account be notably less in this community. And in this case a collection can be made by a mutation of the coinage, either in the material or in the mixture (alloy), because if it were done otherwise, such a change would afterwards have to be made for the assigned cause and according to the manner set forth in chapter 12.

Si vero summa praedicta non sit ita magna vel si aliter exponatur, quomodocumque sit, quod ne materia monetabili non sit diu notabiliter minus in communitate propter istud, dico quod praeter inconvenientia incepta in praesenti capitulo, adhuc sequerentur plura et maiora et peiora quam superius explicata de tali mutatione monetae quam de una alia collecta; et potissime sequeretur periculum ne tandem principes vellet sibi hoc attribuere et tunc reverterentur omnia inconvenientia prius dicta; nec obstat ratio prima in qua dicebatur quod pecunia est communitatis, qui nec communitas nec aliquis iuste potest abuti re sua seu illicite uti, ea sicut faceret communitas si taliter mutaret monetas. Et si forsan communitas ipsa qualitercumque faceret talem mutationem, tunc moneta citius quam post reducenda est ad statum debitum et permanentum et cessare debet captio lucri super istam monetam.

If, however, the aforesaid sum be not so great, or if it be expended otherwise—however the case stands—provided that coinable material not be for a long time notably diminished in the community on account of this, I say that, besides the inconveniences set out in the present chapter, there would still follow more, greater, and worse ones than those explained above from such a mutation of the coinage than from another levy; and most of all there would follow the danger lest in the end the princes should wish to attribute this to themselves, and then all the previously mentioned inconveniences would return. Nor does the first argument avail, in which it was said that the money is the community’s, since neither the community nor anyone can justly abuse his own property or use it illicitly, as the community would do if it thus altered the coins. And if perhaps the community itself should in any way make such a mutation, then the coin must sooner rather than later be reduced back to its due and permanent state, and the taking of profit upon this coin ought to cease.

Capitulum XXIII: In quo arguitur quod princeps possit mutare monetas.

Chapter 23: In which it is argued that the prince can change the coins.

Solet dici quod in casu necessitatis omnia sunt principis. Ipse ergo de monetis regni sui potest quantum et qualiter sibi videtur expediens accipere pro imminenti vel instanti necessitate seu pro defensione reipublicae aut principatus sui regni modus vero colligendi pecuniam per mutationem monetae est valde conveniens et idoneus ut probaretur per ea quae dicta sunt capitulo praecedenti. Adhuc autem, supposito quad princeps non potest taliter mutare monetas et tantum emolumentum super hoc sumere de iure ordinario vel communi, tamen diceretur quod hoc ipso potest alio privato iure, ut puta privilegio speciali a Papa vel ecclesia vel Imperatore Romano, vel etiam communitate, olim sibi hereditarie concesso propter bona merita sua.

It is commonly said that in a case of necessity everything is the prince’s. He therefore, from the coinage of his own realm, can take as much and in such manner as seems expedient to him for an imminent or instant necessity, or for the defense of the republic or of the principate of his kingdom. The mode, moreover, of collecting money by a mutation of the coin is very convenient and apt, as was proved by the things said in the preceding chapter. Furthermore, granted that the prince cannot thus change the coins and take so great an emolument therefrom by ordinary or common right, nevertheless it would be said that he can do this by another private right, for example by a special privilege from the Pope or the Church or the Roman Emperor, or even from the community, once upon a time granted to him hereditarily on account of his good merits.

Item, moneta est ipsius communitatis, ut patet ex capitulo VI, et ipso potest eam sic mutare sicut dictum est capitulo praecedenti; ergo ipso communitas potest aut potuit auctoritate taliter mutandi monetas principi concedere et se ipsam spoliare iure ordinationis et mutationis monetae, et partem monetae principi dare ab eo, capiendam quomodo vellet. Item si de iure communi spectat ad communitatem ordinare de monetis ut dictum est saepe, et ipsa propter discordiam multitudinis non potuit convenire in unum modum, nonne ipsa potuit in hoc condescendere quod totaliter dispositio monetae ex tunc de caetero staret in principis voluntate? Certe, sic et quod ratione huius ipse caperet emolumentum in mutatione sive ordinatione monetae.

Likewise, the coinage is the community’s own, as is clear from chapter 6, and it itself can change it thus as was said in the preceding chapter; therefore the community itself can or could grant to the prince the authority of changing the coinage in such a manner and despoil itself of the right of the ordination and mutation of the coinage, and give to the prince a portion of the coinage, to be taken by him however he would wish. Likewise, if by common right it pertains to the community to ordain concerning the coinages, as has often been said, and if it, on account of the discord of the multitude, could not agree upon one method, could it not consent in this: that the total disposition of the coinage, from then on henceforth, should stand in the will of the prince? Surely, yes; and that by reason of this he would take an emolument in the mutation or ordination of the coinage.

Item, in capitulo VII dicebatur quod certa pensio debet esse taxata pro factione monetae et quod de et super illa pensione princeps potest aut debet aliquid habere. Ergo pari ratione potest habere vel accipere super hoc plus et plus, et per consequens tantum sicut per mutationem monetae; ergo eodem modo per tales mutationes potest illud emolumentum levare. Item, oportet principem habere redditus certos et magnos super communitatem unde ipse possit tenere statum nobilem et honestum, prout decet magnificentiam principalem sive regiam maiestatem.

Likewise, in chapter 7 it was said that a certain pension ought to be assessed for the making of the coinage, and that from and upon that pension the prince can or ought to have something. Therefore by equal reason he can have or take upon this more and more, and consequently as much as by the mutation of the coinage; therefore in the same way through such mutations he can levy that emolument. Likewise, it is necessary that the prince have fixed and great revenues over the community, whence he may be able to maintain a noble and honorable estate, as befits principal magnificence or royal majesty.

Oportet etiam quod isti reditus sint de dominio principis seu de iure proprio coronae regalis. Posslbile est ergo quod una et magna pars istorum redituum olim fuerit assignata super factum monetarum taliter quod liceret principi lucrum recipere mutando monetas. Possibile est ergo quod isto dempto residui redditus nunquam sufficerent pro statu principi pertinenti.

It must also be that these revenues are from the prince’s dominion or from the proper right of the royal crown. It is possible, therefore, that a single—and indeed a great—part of those revenues was once assigned upon the affair of coinage in such wise that it was permitted to the prince to receive lucre by changing the coins. It is possible, therefore, that, with this deducted, the remaining revenues would never suffice for the status pertaining to the prince.

Velle ergo amovere sibi potestatem mutandi monetas, sed hoc est contra honorem regni attentare, principem exhaereditare, immo ipsum depauperare et statu magnificentiae destituere, non tam iniuste quam etiam vituperabiliter pro tota communitate, quam non decet habere principem, nisi excellenti statu pollentem.

To wish, therefore, to remove from him the power of changing the coinage is to make an attempt against the honor of the realm, to disinherit the prince, nay rather to impoverish him and to deprive him of the state of magnificence, not only unjustly but even blameworthily for the whole commonwealth, which it is not fitting should have a prince unless one excelling in an excellent estate.

Capitulum XXIV: Responsio ad praedicta, et conclusio principalis.

Chapter 24: Response to the aforesaid, and the principal conclusion.

Quamvis in solutione primi argumenti forsan multae difficultates possent occurere, verumtamen breviter transeundo pro nunc occurrit mihi quod ne principes fingerent talem necessitatem esse quando non est, sicut fingunt tyranni, ut dicit Aristoteles determinandum est per communitatem vel per valentiorem eius partem, expresse vel tacite, quando qualis et quanta necessitas imminet. Expresse dico, quod ad hoc debet congregari communitas, si adsit facultas; tacite vero, si fuerit tam festina necessitas, quod populus vocari non possit, et tam evidens quod postea appareat notorie? Tunc enim licet principi aliquid recipere de facultatibus subditorum non per mutationem monetae, sed per modum mutui, de quo postea facienda est restitutio plenaria.

Although in the solution of the first argument perhaps many difficulties could arise, nevertheless, passing over briefly for now, it occurs to me that, lest princes feign such a necessity to exist when it does not—just as tyrants feign, as Aristotle says—it must be determined by the community, or by its more powerful part, expressly or tacitly, when a necessity is impending, of what kind and how great. By “expressly” I mean that for this the community ought to be convened, if the faculty be present; by “tacitly,” however, if the necessity should be so urgent that the people cannot be called, and so evident that afterward it may appear notoriously? Then indeed it is permitted to the prince to receive something from the resources of the subjects not by a change of coinage, but by way of a loan, for which afterward plenary restitution is to be made.

Ad aliud cum dicitur, quod princeps potest habere privilegium mutandi monetas, primo non intromitto me de potentia Papae, sed puto quod nunquam hoc concesserit, nec concederet; quoniam sic ipse daret licentiam malefaciendi, quam nullus bene operando meretur accipere. De Imperatore autem Romano dico, quod ipse nulli principi potuit unquam privilegium dare faciendi illud quod sibimet non liceret, sicut est talis mutatio monetae, ut patet ex praedictis. De communitate etiam dictum est in capitulo secundo, quod ipsa non potest mutare monetas, nisi in certo casu, et tunc in ipsa committeret hoc principi cum limitatione rationabili, quae potest ex eodem capitulo et aliis apparere, iam hoc non faceret princeps tanquam principalis auctor, sed sicut ordinationis publicae executor.

To the other point, when it is said that the prince can have the privilege of changing the coinage, first, I do not here enter into the power of the Pope, but I think that he has never granted this, nor would he grant it; since thus he himself would give a license for malefacting, which no one, by doing well, deserves to receive. As for the Roman Emperor, I say that he could never give to any prince the privilege of doing that which would not be permitted to himself, such as such an alteration of the coinage, as is clear from the aforesaid. Concerning the community it has also been said in chapter two, that it cannot change the coinage, except in a certain case; and then within itself it would commit this to the prince with a reasonable limitation, which can appear from the same chapter and others; then the prince would not do this as the principal author, but as the executor of public ordinance.

Ad aliud autem cum dicitur quod communitas cuius est moneta, potest se spoliare suo iure, et illud totum principi tradere, et sic totum ius monetae devolveretur ad principem; primo videtur mihi quod hoc nunquam faceret communitas bene consulta; nec etiam sibi licet quomodolibet mutare monetas aut male uti re sua, ut dictum est capitulo XXII. Item, communitas civium, quae naturaliter est libera, nunquam scienter se redigeret in servitutem, aut se subiiceret iugo tyrannicae potestatis. Si igitur ipsa decepta, aut nimis territa vel coacta, concedat principi tales mutationes, non advertens inconvenientia quae sequuntur, et ex hoc serviliter se fore subiectam, ipsa potest hoc statim aut quomodolibet revocare.

As to the other point: when it is said that the community to which the coinage belongs can despoil itself of its right and hand it all over to the prince, and thus the whole right of coinage would devolve to the prince—first, it seems to me that a well-advised community would never do this; nor is it permitted to it to change the coins in any way whatsoever or to misuse its property, as was said in chapter 22. Likewise, a community of citizens, which is naturally free, would never knowingly reduce itself into servitude or subject itself to the yoke of tyrannical power. If, therefore, it—deceived, or excessively frightened or coerced—grants to the prince such changes, not noticing the inconveniences that follow and that from this it would be servilely subject, it can revoke this immediately, or in any manner whatsoever.

Item, res quae spectat alicui quasi de iure naturali, non potest ad alterum iuste transferri. Sic autem pertinet moneta ipsi liberae communitati, ut satis patet ex capitulis primo et sexto; sicut ergo communitas non potest concedere principi quod ipse habeat auctoritatem abutendi uxoribus civium quibuscumque voluerit, ita non potest ei dare tale privilegium monetarum quo ipso non posset nisi male uti, exigendo tale lucrum super mutatione earum; ut satis patet ex multis praecedentibus capitulis. Per hoc etiam patet illud, quod addebatur ulterius de communitate non concordi in ordinatione monetae, quae potest condescendere, quantum ad hoc, in principis arbitrio.

Likewise, a thing which pertains to someone as by natural right cannot be justly transferred to another. But coinage pertains to the free community itself, as is sufficiently clear from chapters one and six; therefore, just as the community cannot grant to the prince that he have authority to abuse the wives of whatever citizens he wishes, so it cannot give him such a privilege of the coinage, which he could not but use ill, by exacting such profit upon their alteration; as is sufficiently clear from many preceding chapters. By this there is also made clear that further point which was added concerning a community not in concord about the ordinance of coinage, which can, as to this, yield to the prince’s discretion.

Dico quod sic potest quantum ad aliqua et ad tempus, non sibi concedendo potestatem tanti lucri sumendi super indebitis mutationibus supradictis.

I say that yes, it can, with respect to certain things and for a time, not by granting to him the power of taking so great a profit upon the aforesaid undue changes.

Ad aliud argumentum sumptum ex capitulo septimo, de hoc quod princeps potest aliquod emolumentum habere super monetam, respondetur faciliter, quod hoc est quasi quaedam parva pensio et limitata, quae non potest quantumlibet augeri per mutationes praedictas, sed stat sine mutatione quacumque. Ad aliud conceditur, quod princeps potest habere reditus, et debet habere magnificum et honestissimum statum; sed isti reditus possunt et debent alibi assignari et aliter sumi quam per tales mutationes indebitas ex quibus tanta mala et tot inconvenientia oriuntur, sicut ostensum est ante. Posito etiam, quod aliqua pars istorum redituum est super monetam, ipsa tamen debent esse certae et determinatae quantitatis, sicut, supra quamlibet marcham quae monetaretur, duo solidi vel sic, et tunc istud esset absque quacumque mutatione sine lucri augmento irrationabili et enormi quod potest provenire ex detestabilius mutationibus saepe dictis; de quibus utiliter concedendum est quod princeps non potest eas facere aut taliter lucrum accipere nec de iure communi seu ordinario nec de privilegio sive dono concessione peracto, sive quavis alia auctoritate vel alio modo quocumque, nec potest esse de suo dominio nec sibi quomodolibet pertinere; immo illud sibi denegare, non est ipsum exhaereditare, aut maiestati regiae contrarie, sicut mentiuntur falsiloqui, adulatores, sophistici et reipublicae prodirores.

To the other argument taken from chapter 7, about this, that the prince can have some emolument upon the coinage, it is answered easily, that this is as it were a certain small and limited pension, which cannot be increased at will by the aforesaid changes, but stands without any change whatsoever. To the other it is conceded, that the prince can have revenues, and ought to have a magnificent and most honorable state; but these revenues can and ought to be assigned elsewhere and taken otherwise than by such undue changes, from which so great evils and so many inconveniences arise, as was shown above. Granted also that some part of those revenues is upon the coinage, nevertheless they ought to be of a fixed and determinate quantity, as, over each and every mark that would be minted, two solidi or the like; and then that would be without any change, without the irrational and enormous increase of profit that can arise from the most detestable changes so often mentioned; concerning which it is useful to concede that the prince cannot make them or take profit thus, neither by common or ordinary law nor by privilege or by gift or by completed grant, nor by any authority whatsoever or by any manner at all, nor can it be of his domain nor pertain to him in any way; nay rather, to deny him that is not to disinherit him, nor contrary to royal majesty, as lying tongues, flatterers, sophists, and betrayers of the commonwealth falsely assert.

Rursum, cum princeps teneatur hoc non facere, ipse non meretur habere aliquam pensionem seu dominium pro abstinendo a tali abusiva exactione; hoc enim aliud non videtur esse nisi precium redemptionis a servitute, quod nullus rex aut bonus princeps debet a subditis exigere. Item supposito et non concesso quod ipse haberet privilegium capiendi aliquid supra monetam pro faciendo eam bonam et pro tenendo eam in eodem statu. Adhuc etiam ipse deberet tale privilegium perdere in casu in quo tantum abuteretur quod ipse mutaret et falsificaret monetam pro suo lucro non minus cupide quam turpiter augendo.

Again, since the prince is bound not to do this, he does not merit to have any pension or dominion for abstaining from such an abusive exaction; for this seems to be nothing else but the price of redemption from servitude, which no king or good prince ought to exact from his subjects. Likewise, supposing and not conceding that he had the privilege of taking something over the coinage for making it good and for maintaining it in the same state. Furthermore, he ought also to lose such a privilege in the case in which he so abused it that he changed and falsified the coinage for his own profit, augmenting it no less greedily than disgracefully.

Capitulum XXV: Quod Tyrannus non potest diu durare.

CHAPTER 25: That a Tyrant cannot last long.

In istis duobus capitulis intendo probare, quod exigere pecuniam per tales mutationes monetae, est contra honorem regni, et in praeiudicium totalis regalis posteritatis. Sciendum est igitur, quod inter principatum regium et tyrannicum hoc interest, quod tyrannus plus diligit et plus quaerit proprium bonum quam commune conferens subditorum, et ad hoc nititur ut populum teneat sibi serviliter subiugatum; rex autem e contrario, utilitati privatae publicam praefert, et super omnia, post Deum et animam suam, diligit bonum et libertatem publicam subditorum. Et haec est vera utilitas et nobilitas principatus, cuius dominium tanto est nobilius, tanto melius, quanto est magis liberorum sive meliorum, ut ait Aristoteles, et eo diuturnius, quo in tali proposito intentio regis perseverat, dicente Cassiodoro, disciplina imperandi est amare quod multis expedit; quotiens enim regnum in tyrannidem vergitur, non longo tempore post custoditur; quia per hoc ad diminutionem, translationem, aut perditionem omnimodam properatur, maxime in regione temperata et remota a servili barbaria, ubi sunt homines conversatione, moribus et natura liberi, non servi, nec sub tyrannide per consuetudinem indurati, quibus servitus foret inexpediens, involuntaria, et oppressio tyrannica simpliciter violenta; ergo non diu permansura, quia, sicut ait Aristoteles, violenta citissime corrumpuntur.

In these two chapters I intend to prove that to exact money by such changes of the coinage is against the honor of the realm, and to the prejudice of the entire royal posterity. It must therefore be known that between royal and tyrannical principate this is the difference: the tyrant loves more and seeks more his own proper good than the common good of his subjects, and strives to this end, that he may hold the people servilely subjugated to himself; but the king, on the contrary, prefers the public utility to private advantage, and above all, after God and his own soul, loves the public good and the freedom of his subjects. And this is the true utility and nobility of principate, whose dominion is the nobler, the better, the more it is of freer or better men, as Aristotle says, and the more enduring, the more the king’s intention perseveres in such a purpose, Cassiodorus saying, “the discipline of ruling is to love what benefits the many”; for as often as a kingdom inclines to tyranny, it is not preserved long thereafter; because by this one hastens to diminution, transfer, or every kind of perdition, especially in a temperate region and removed from servile barbarism, where men by way of life, morals, and nature are free, not slaves, nor hardened by custom under tyranny, for whom servitude would be inexpedient, involuntary, and tyrannical oppression simply violent; therefore it will not long endure, because, as Aristotle says, violent things are most quickly corrupted.

Ideo dicit Tullius, quod nulla vis imperii tanta est, quae premente metu possit esse diuturna. Et Seneca in tragoediis inquit:

Therefore Tullius says that no force of empire is so great that, with fear pressing, it can be long-lasting. And Seneca in the tragedies says:

Violenta nemo imperia continuat diu,
Moderata durant.

No one continues violent rule for long,
Moderate rule endures.

Unde principibus destitutis improperabatur Dominus per prophetam dicens, quod imperabant subditis cum austeritate et potentia. Adhuc autem propositum aliter declaratur: ait enim Plutarchus ad Traianum Imperatorem, quod respublica est corpus quoddam, quod divini numinis instar beneficio animatur, et summae aequitatis agitur nutu, et regitur quodam moderamine rationis. Est igitur respublica sive regnum, sicut quoddam corpus humanum, et ita vult Aristoteles V Politicae.

Whence, with princes failing, the Lord was reproached through the prophet, saying that they were ruling their subjects with austerity and power. Furthermore, the proposition is otherwise explained: for Plutarch, to the Emperor Trajan, says that the commonwealth is a certain body, which, in the likeness of the divine numen, is animated by beneficence, is conducted at the nod of highest equity, and is governed by a certain moderation of reason. Therefore the commonwealth, or kingdom, is like a certain human body, and thus Aristotle holds in Politics 5.

Sicut igitur corpus male disponitur, quando humores excessive fluunt saepe ex hoc inflatur et nimium ingrossatur, reliquis exsiccatis et nimis attenuatis, tolliturque debita proportio, neque tale corpus potest diu vivere; ita conformiter est de communitate vel regno, divitiae ab una eius parte attrahuntur ultra modum. Communitas namque vel regnum, cuius principantes, in comparatione ad subditos, quantum ad divitias, potentiam et statum, enormiter crescunt, est sicut monstrum unum, sicut unus homo, cuius caput est ita magnum tam grossum, quod non potest a reliquo debili corpore sustentari. Quemadmodum igitur talis homo non potest sese iuvare, neque sic diu vivere, ita neque regnum permenere poterit cuius princeps trahit ad se divitias in excessu, sicut fit per mutationes monetae, ut patuit capitulo XX. Rursum, sicut in mixtione vocum non placet aut delectat aequalitas nimia vel indebita, quae totam consonantiam destruit et deturpat, immo requiritur proportionata inaequalitas et commensurata, qua perseverante eminent laeti blanda modulamina chori; sic etiam universaliter, quo ad omnes partes communitatis, aequalitas possessionum vel potentiae non convenit nec consonat, sed et nimia disparitas harmoniam reipublicae dissipat et corrumpit, ut patet per Aristotelem V Politicae.

Just as therefore a body is ill-disposed when the humors flow excessively—whence it often swells and becomes too gross, the remaining parts being dried out and overly attenuated, and the due proportion is taken away, nor can such a body live long—so correspondingly it is with a community or a kingdom, when riches are drawn to one of its parts beyond measure. For a community or a kingdom whose rulers, in comparison with their subjects, as to wealth, power, and state, grow enormously, is like a certain monster, like a single man whose head is so great and so gross that it cannot be sustained by the rest of the feeble body. Just as, then, such a man cannot help himself nor thus live long, so neither will a kingdom be able to endure whose prince draws riches to himself in excess, as happens through mutations of the coinage, as was evident in chapter 20. Again, just as in the mixture of voices an excessive or undue equality does not please or delight—which destroys and disfigures the whole consonance—rather a proportionate and commensurate inequality is required, with which persisting the pleasant modulations of the choir stand out joyous; so also universally, with regard to all the parts of the community, an equality of possessions or of power does not suit nor consonate, but excessive disparity too dissipates and corrupts the harmony of the republic, as is clear from Aristotle, Politics 5.

Potissime vero ipse princeps, qui est in regno veluti tenor et vox principalis in cantu, si magnitudine excedat, et a reliqua communitate discordat, regalis politiae melos tunc erit turbatum. Propter quod, secundum Aristotelem, adhuc est alia differentia inter regem et tyrannum. Tyrannus enim vult esse potentior tota communitate cui praesidet violenter, regis vero temperantia est tali moderamine temperata, quod ipse est maior atque potentior, quam aliquis eius subditus; est tamen ipsa tota communitate inferior viribus et opibus, et sic in medio constitutus.

Most of all indeed the prince himself, who is in the realm as it were the tenor and principal voice in song, if he exceeds in magnitude and is out of harmony with the rest of the community, the melody of the royal polity will then be disturbed. Wherefore, according to Aristotle, there is further another difference between the king and the tyrant. For the tyrant wishes to be more powerful than the whole community over which he presides, by violence; but the king’s temperance is tempered by such a moderation that he is greater and more powerful than any one of his subjects; yet he is inferior to the whole community itself in forces and in resources, and thus is set in the middle.

Sed quia potestas regia communiter et leviter tendit in maius, ideo maxima cautela adhibenda est et pervigil custodia, immo altissima et principalis prudentia requiritur ad eam praeservandam, ne labatur ad tyrannidem, praecipue propter adulatorum fallacias, qui semper principes ad tyranniam impulerunt, ut ait Aristoteles. Ipsi enim, ut in libro Esther legitur, aures principum simplices, et ex sua natura alios existimantes, callida fraude decipiunt, et eorum suggestionibus regum studia depravantur. Sed quoniam eos evitare aut extirpare difficile est, ipse Aristoteles dat aliam regulam, per quam regnum potest longo tempore conservari.

But because royal power commonly and readily tends toward the greater, therefore the greatest caution and an ever-vigilant guard must be applied, nay, the highest and principal prudence is required to preserve it, lest it slip into tyranny, especially on account of the deceits of flatterers, who, as Aristotle says, have always impelled princes toward tyranny. For they, as is read in the Book of Esther, deceive the simple ears of princes—who, judging others by their own nature—by cunning fraud, and by their suggestions the pursuits of kings are perverted. But since it is difficult to avoid or extirpate them, Aristotle himself gives another rule, by which a kingdom can be conserved for a long time.

Et est, quod princeps non multum amplificet dominium supra subditos, exactiones, captiones non faciat, libertates eis dimittat aut concedat, nec eos impediat, neque utatur plenitudine potestatis, sed potentia legibus et consuetudinibus limitata vel regulata. Pauca enim, ut ait Aristoteles, sunt iudicis vel principis arbitrio relinquenda. Aristoteles enim adducit exemplum de Theopompo Lacedaemoniorum rege, qui, cum multas potestates atque tributa populo remisisset ab antecessoribus imposita, ipse quidem uxori ploranti et improperanti, turpe esse regnum minoris emolumenti filiis tradere quam suscepisse a patre, respondit dicens: trado diuturnius.

And it is this: that the prince not greatly amplify dominion over his subjects, not make exactions or seizures, let or grant liberties to them, nor impede them, nor use the plenitude of power, but a power limited or regulated by laws and customs. Few things indeed, as Aristotle says, are to be left to the discretion of the judge or of the prince. For Aristotle adduces the example of Theopompus, king of the Lacedaemonians, who, when he had remitted to the people many powers and tributes imposed by his predecessors, to his wife who was weeping and reproaching him that it was shameful to hand down to their sons a kingdom of lesser emolument than he had received from his father, replied, saying: I hand down one more enduring.

O divinum oraculum! O quanti ponderis verbum, et in palatiis regiis litteris aureis depingendum. Trado, inquit, diuturnius; ac si diceret, plus auxi regum duratione temporis, quam sit diminutum moderatione potestatis.

O divine oracle! O word of what great weight, and to be painted in golden letters in royal palaces. “I hand it down,” he says, “more enduring”; as if he were saying, “I have increased more the longevity of kings in duration of time than has been diminished by the moderation of power.”

Ecce plusquam Salomon hic; nam si Roboam de quo supra memini a patre suo Salomone regnum sic compositum recepisset et tenuisset nunquam decem de XII tribubus perdidisset nec sibi improperatum fuisset. Eccles. XLVII: profanasti semen tuum inducere iracundiam ad liberos tuos et caeteris stultitiam tuam ut faceres imperium bipartitum.

Behold, more-than-Solomon is here; for if Rehoboam, of whom I made mention above, had received from his father Solomon the kingdom thus composed and had held it, he would never have lost ten of the 12 tribes of , nor would it have been reproached to him. Eccles. 47: you profaned your seed, to bring wrath upon your children, and to the rest your foolishness, so that you made the dominion bipartite.

Sic igitur ostensum est quod dominium quod ex regno in tyrannidem vertitur oportet ut celeriter finiatur.

Thus, therefore, it has been shown that the dominion which is turned from a kingdom into tyranny ought to be swiftly brought to an end.

Capitulum XXVI: Quod capere lucrum ex mutatione monetarum, praeiudicat toti regali potestati.

Chapter 26: That taking profit from the alteration of the coinage, prejudices the whole royal authority.

Declarare propono quod mutationes praedictae sunt contra honorem regis, et generi regio praeiudicant. Pro quo tria praemitto: Primo, quod illud est in rege vituperabile, et successoribus eius praeiudiciabile, per quod regnum perditioni disponitur, aut ut ad alienigenas transferatur; nec rex posset satis dolore vel flere, quam esset ita infelix ita miserabilis, qui per negligentiam suam aut per malum regimen eius aliquid faceret, unde ipse vel haeredes sui perderent regnum tot virtutibus auctum, tanto tempore gloriose servatum; necnon in periculo animae suae gloriosae foret, si ex defectu sui populus pateretur tot pestilentias, tot calamitates et tantas, quot et quantae solent accidere in dissipatione sive in translatione regnorum. Secundo, suppono quod per tyrannisationem regnum perditioni exponitur, sicut declaratum est in capitulo praecedenti.

I propose to declare that the aforesaid mutations are against the honor of the king and prejudice the royal lineage. For which I preface three things: First, that it is blameworthy in a king, and prejudicial to his successors, whatever disposes the kingdom to perdition, or to be transferred to foreigners; nor could the king grieve or weep enough at how unhappy, how wretched he would be, who through his negligence or through his bad regimen should do something whereby he or his heirs would lose the kingdom augmented by so many virtues, gloriously preserved for so long a time; and he would likewise be in peril of his glorious soul, if by his default the people should suffer so many pestilences, so many and so great calamities as are wont to happen in the dissipation or in the translation of kingdoms. Secondly, I suppose that through tyrannisation the kingdom is exposed to perdition, as was declared in the preceding chapter.

Et quoniam, sicut in Ecclesiastico (Eccl. 10,8) scribitur: «Regnum a gente in gentem transfertur propter iniustitias et iniurias et contumelias, et diversos dolos», tyrannis autem iniuriosa est et iniusta. Cum hoc etiam, ut ad specialia descendam, absit quod in tantum degeneraverint Francigenarum corda libera, quod voluntarie servi fiant; ideoque servitus eis imposita durare non potest, quoniam si magna sit tyrannorum potentia, est tamen liberis subditorum cordibus violenta, et adversus alienos invalida.

And since, as in Ecclesiasticus (Eccl. 10:8) it is written: «A kingdom is transferred from nation to nation because of injustices and injuries and contumelies, and diverse deceits», and tyranny, moreover, is injurious and unjust. Along with this also, to descend to particulars, far be it that the free hearts of the Frenchmen should have so degenerated that they voluntarily become slaves; and therefore the servitude imposed on them cannot endure, since, even if the power of tyrants be great, nevertheless it is violent to the free hearts of the subjects, and weak against outsiders.

Quicumque igitur dominos Franciae ad huiusmodi regimen tyrannicum quocumque modo traherent, ipsi regnum magno discrimini exponerent, et ad terminum praepararent. Neque enim regum Franciae generose propago tyrannisare didicit, nec serviliter subiici populus Gallicus consuevit. Ideo, si regia proles a pristina virtute degeneraret, procul dubio regnum perderet.

Whoever therefore would in any way draw the lords of France to such a tyrannical regimen, they themselves would expose the kingdom to great peril and would prepare it for its end. For the noble lineage of the kings of France has not learned to tyrannize, nor has the Gallic people been accustomed to be subjected in a servile manner. Therefore, if the royal progeny were to degenerate from its former virtue, without doubt it would lose the kingdom.

Tertio, suppono, tanquam iam probatum et saepius repetitum, quod capere vel augere lucrum super mutatione monetae, est factum dolosum, tyrannicum et iniustum, cum etiam non possit continuari in regno, quod quidem regnum non sit iam, quo ad alia multa, in tyrannidem versum. Unde non solum inconvenientia sequuntur ex isto, sed oportet quaedam mala alia esse praevia, alia concomitantia; quia hoc non potest a viris consuli qui non sunt in intentione corrupti, atque ad omnem fraudem et nequitiam tyrannicam consulendam parati, ubi viderent principem ad hoc inclinari vel posse flecti. Dico itaque recolligendo, quod res per quam regnum perditioni disponitur turpis est praeiudiciabilis regi, sed hoc est protrahi vel converti, et haeredibus suis, et hoc fuit primum suppositum, in tyrannidem, et hoc fuit secundum, et ad hoc vergitur per mutationes monetae, ut dicitur tertium.

Third, I suppose, as already proven and often repeated, that to seize or to augment profit upon the mutation of the coinage is a fraudulent, tyrannical, and unjust act, since it cannot even be continued in a kingdom, unless indeed that realm, as to many other things, is already turned into tyranny, and thus is no longer a kingdom. Whence not only inconveniences follow from this, but there must be certain other evils, some preceding, others concomitant; because this cannot be counseled by men unless they are corrupt in intention and prepared to recommend every fraud and tyrannical wickedness, whenever they should see the prince inclined to this or capable of being bent. I say, therefore, by way of gathering up, that the thing by which a realm is disposed to perdition is base and prejudicial to the king and to his heirs—and this was the first supposition; but this is to be drawn out or converted into tyranny—and this was the second; and toward this one inclines through mutations of the coinage, as is said third.

Igitur exactio quae fit per tales mutationes est contra honorem regis, et praeiudiciabilis toti posteritati regali, quod erat probandum.

Therefore the exaction which is done through such mutations is against the honor of the king, and prejudicial to the whole royal posterity, which was to be proved.

Haec igitur, ut praemisi, sine assertione dicta sint cum correctione prudentum. Nam, secundum Aristotelem, civilia negotia plerumque dubia et incerta. Si quis igitur, amore veritatis inveniendae, his dictis voluerit contradicere vel contrascribere, bene faciet; et si male locutus sum, perhibeat testimonium de malo, sed cum ratione, ne ipsa videatur gratis et voluntarie condemnare, quod non potest efficaciter impugnare.

Let these things, therefore, as I have premised, be said without assertion, subject to the correction of the prudent. For, according to Aristotle, civil affairs are for the most part doubtful and uncertain. If anyone, therefore, out of love for finding the truth, should wish to contradict or to write against these statements, he will do well; and if I have spoken ill, let him bear witness to the ill, but with reason, lest he himself seem to condemn gratuitously and voluntarily that which he cannot effectively impugn.