Bacon: NOVUM ORGANUM

MAN, the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands only as much as he has observed of the order of nature, in reality or in mind: he neither knows more, nor can do more.

II.

Nec manus nuda, nec intellectus sibi permissus, multum valet; instrumentis et auxiliis res perficitur; quibus opus est, non minus ad intellectum, quam ad manum. Atque ut instrumenta manus motum aut cient aut regunt; ita et instrumenta mentis intellectui aut suggerunt aut cavent.

Neither the naked hand, nor the understanding left to itself, avails much; by instruments and aids the business is accomplished; which are needed no less for the understanding than for the hand. And just as the instruments of the hand either set motion in play or govern it; so too the instruments of the mind either prompt the understanding or protect it.

III.

Scientia et potentia humana in idem coincidunt, quia ignoratio causae destituit effectum. Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur: et quod in contemplatione instar causae est, id in operatione instar regulae est.

Human knowledge and power coincide in the same, because ignorance of the cause deprives the effect. For Nature is conquered only by obeying; and what in contemplation is in the likeness of a cause, that in operation is in the likeness of a rule.

IV.

Ad opera nil aliud potest homo, quam ut corpora naturalia admoveat et amoveat: reliqua natura intus transigit.

For operations a man can do nothing else than to bring natural bodies near and to remove them: the rest nature accomplishes within.

Solent se immiscere naturae (quoad opera) mechanicus, mathematicus, medicus, alchemista, et magus; sed omnes (ut nunc sunt res) conatu levi, successu tenui.

They are wont to meddle with nature (as regards works) the mechanic, the mathematician, the medic, the alchemist, and the magus; but all (as things now are) with slight endeavor, with tenuous success.

VI.

Insanum quiddam esset, et in se contrarium, existimare ea, quae adhuc nunquam facta sunt, fieri posse, nisi per modos adhuc nunquam tentatos.

It would be something insane, and contrary in itself, to suppose that things which have not yet ever been done could be done, unless by modes not yet ever attempted.

VII.

Generationes mentis et manus numerosae admodum videntur in libris et opificiis. Sed omnis ista varietas sita est in subtilitate eximia, et derivationibus paucarum rerum, quae innotuerunt; non in numero axiomatum.

Generationes of mind and of hand seem very numerous in books and in works of craftsmanship. But all that variety is situated in exquisite subtlety, and in derivations of a few things which have become known; not in the number of axioms.

VIII.

Etiam opera, quae jam inventa sunt, casui debentur et experientiae, magis quam scientiis: scientiae enim, quas nunc habemus, nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam concinnationes rerum antea inventarum; non modi inveniendi, aut designationes novorum operum.

Even the works which are already discovered are owed to chance and experience rather than to the sciences: for the sciences which we now have are nothing else than certain concinnations of things previously discovered; not modes of discovering, nor designations of new works.

IX.

Causa vero et radix fere omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est; quod dum mentis humanae vires falso miramur et extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quaeramus.

The cause and the root of almost all evils in the sciences is this one indeed; that, while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human mind, we do not seek its true aids.

10.

Subtilitas naturae subtilitatem sensus et intellectus multis partibus superat; ut pulchrae illae meditationes et speculationes humanae et causationes res malesana sint, nisi quod non adsit qui advertat.

The subtlety of nature surpasses the subtlety of sense and of intellect by many degrees; so that those beautiful human meditations, speculations, and causations are an unsound thing, save that there is no one present to take notice.

XI.

11.

Sicut scientiae, quae nunc habentur, inutiles sunt ad inventionem operum; ita et logica, quae nunc habetur, inutilis est ad inventionem scientiarum.

As the sciences which are now held are useless for the invention of works, so too the logic which is now held is useless for the invention of sciences.

XII.

12.

Logica, quae in usu est, ad errores (qui in notionibus vulgaribus fundantur) stabiliendos et figendos valet, potius quam ad inquisitionem veritatis; ut magis damnosa sit, quam utilis.

Logic, which is in use, avails for stabilizing and fixing errors (which are founded on vulgar notions) rather than for the inquisition of truth; so that it is more damaging than useful.

XIII.

13.

Syllogismus ad principia scientiarum non adhibetur, ad media axiomata frustra adhibetur, cum sit subtilitati naturae longe impar. Assensum itaque constringit, non res.

The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sciences; to the middle axioms it is applied in vain, since it is far unequal to the subtlety of nature. Thus it constrains assent, not things.

XIV.

14.

Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesserae sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsae (id quod basis rei est) confusae sint, et temere a rebus abstractae; nihil in iis, quae superstruuntur, est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est una in inductione vera.

Syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, words are the tokens of notions. And so, if the notions themselves (that which is the basis of the matter) are confused, and rashly abstracted from things, there is nothing of firmness in those things which are superstructured upon them. Therefore the one hope is in true induction.

XV.

15.

In notionibus nil sani est, nec in logicis, nec in physicis: non substantia, non qualitas, agere, pati, ipsum esse, bonae notiones sunt; multo minus grave, leve, densum, tenue, humidum, siccum , generatio, corruptio, attrahere, fugare, elementum, materia, forma, et id genus; sed omnes phantasticae et male terminatae.

In notions there is nothing sound, neither in logic nor in physics: neither substance, nor quality, to act, to suffer, being itself, are good notions; much less the heavy, the light, the dense, the tenuous, the humid, the dry , generation, corruption, to attract, to repel, element, matter, form, and the like; but all are fantastical and ill-defined.

XVI.

16.

Notiones infimarum specierum, hominis, canis, columbae, et prehensionum immediatarum sensus, calidi, frigidi, albi, nigri, non fallunt magnopere; quae tamen ipsae a fluxu materiae et commissione rerum quandoque confunduntur; reliquae omnes (quibus homines hactenus usi sunt) aberrationes sunt, nec debitis modis a rebus abstractae et excitatae.

The notions of the lowest species—man, dog, dove—and the senses of immediate prehensions—hot, cold, white, black—do not greatly deceive; yet these themselves are sometimes confounded by the flux of matter and the commixture of things; all the rest (which men have used hitherto) are aberrations, nor have they been abstracted and elicited from things by due methods.

XVII.

17.

Nec minor est libido et aberratio in constituendis axiomatibus, quam in notionibus abstrahendis; idque in ipsis principiis, quae ab inductione vulgari pendent. At multo major est in axiomatibus, et propositionibus inferioribus, quae educit syllogismus.

Nor is the lust and aberration less in constituting axioms than in abstracting notions; and this in the very principles which depend upon vulgar induction. But it is much greater in the axioms and the lower propositions which the syllogism educes.

XVIII.

18.

Quae adhuc inventa sunt in scientiis, ea hujusmodi sunt, ut notionibus vulgaribus fere subjaceant: ut vero ad interiora et remotiora naturae penetretur, necesse est ut tam notiones quam axiomata magis certa et munita via a rebus abstrahantur, atque omnino melior et certior intellectus adoperatio in usum veniat.

What has thus far been discovered in the sciences is of such a kind as to lie almost under vulgar notions; but in order to penetrate to the inner and more remote things of nature, it is necessary that both notions and axioms be abstracted from things by a more certain and fortified way, and that altogether a better and more certain operation of the intellect come into use.

XIX.

19.

Duae viae sunt, atque esse possunt, ad inquirendam et inveniendam veritatem. Altera a sensu et particularibus advolat ad axiomata maxime generalia, atque ex iis principiis eorumque immota veritate judicat et invenit axiomata media; atque haec via in usu est. Altera a sensu et particularibus excitat axiomata, ascendendo continenter et gradatim, ut ultimo loco perveniatur ad maxime generalia; quae via vera est, sed intentata.

Two ways there are, and can be, for inquiring into and finding truth. The one flies up from sense and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles and their immovable truth it judges and discovers the middle axioms; and this way is in use. The other elicits axioms from sense and particulars, ascending continuously and step by step, so that in the last place one may arrive at the most general; which way is true, but unattempted.

XX.

20.

Eandem ingreditur viam (priorem scilicet) intellectus sibi permissus, quam facit ex ordine dialecticae. Gestit enim mens exsilire ad magis generalia, ut acquiescat; et post parvam moram fastidit experientiam: sed haec mala demum aucta sunt a dialectica ob pompas disputationum.

The intellect, when left to itself, enters upon the same path (the former, namely) which is made according to the order of dialectic. For the mind is eager to leap out to more generalities, so that it may come to rest; and after a short delay it grows weary of experience: but these evils at last have been augmented by dialectic on account of the pomps of disputations.

XXI.

21.

Intellectus sibi permissus, in ingenio sobrio et patiente et gravi (praesertim si a doctrinis receptis non impediatur), tentat nonnihil illam alteram viam, quae recta est, send exiguo profectu; cum intellectus, nisi regatur et juvetur, res inaequalis sit, et omnino inhabilis ad superandam rerum obscuritatem.

The intellect, when left to itself, in a sober, patient, and grave disposition (especially if it is not impeded by received doctrines), does attempt somewhat that other path which is straight, but with scant progress; since the intellect, unless it be governed and aided, is an unequal thing, and altogether unfit for overcoming the obscurity of things.

XXII.

22.

Utraque via orditur a sensu et particularibus, et acquiescit in maxime generalibus: sed immensum quiddam discrepant; cum altera perstringat tantum experientiam et particularia cursim; altera in iis rite et ordine versetur; altera rursus jam a principio constituat generalia quaedam abstracta et inutilia; altera gradatim exsurgat ad ea quae revera naturae sunt notiora.

Both ways commence from sense and particulars, and acquiesce in the most general things: but they differ by something immense; since the one merely grazes experience and the particulars cursorily; the other deals with them duly and in order; the one again from the very beginning sets up certain generalities that are abstract and useless; the other by degrees rises to those which are in truth more known to nature.

XXIII.

23.

Non leve quiddam interest inter humanae mentis idola, et divinae mentis ideas; hoc est, inter placita quaedam inania, et veras signaturas atque impressiones factas in creaturis, prout inveniuntur.

Not a slight difference lies between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind; that is, between certain empty dogmas and the true signatures and impressions made in creatures, as they are found.

XXIV.

24.

Nullo modo fieri potest, ut axiomata per argumentationem constituta ad inventionem novorum operum valeant; quia subtilitas naturae subtilitatem argumentandi multis partibus superat. Sed axiomata, a particularibus rite et ordine abstrata, nova particularia rursus facile indicant et designant; itaque scientias reddunt activas. XXV.

It can in no way be brought about that axioms established through argumentation should avail for the invention of new works; because the subtlety of nature surpasses the subtlety of arguing by many degrees. But axioms, abstracted from particulars properly and in due order, in turn readily indicate and designate new particulars; and thus render the sciences active. 25.

Axiomata, quae in usu sunt, ex tenui et manipulari experientia, et paucis particularibus, quae ut plurimum occurrunt, fluxere; et sunt fere ad mensuram eorum facta et extensa: ut nil mirum sit, si ad nova particularia non ducant. Quod si forte instantia aliqua, non prius animadversa aut cognita, se offerat, axioma distinctione aliqua frivola salvatur, ubi emendari ipsum verius foret.

Axioms which are in use have flowed from tenuous and manipular experience, and from the few particulars which for the most part present themselves; and they are almost made and extended to the measure of those: so that it is no marvel if they do not lead to new particulars. But if perchance some instance, not previously observed or known, offers itself, the axiom is saved by some frivolous distinction, where it would be truer that it itself be emended.

XXVI.

26.

Rationem humanam, qua utimur ad naturam, anticipationes naturae (quia res temeraria est et praematura), at illam rationem quae debitis modis elicitur a rebus, interpretationem naturae, docendi gratia, vocare consuevimus.

We are accustomed, for the sake of teaching, to call the human reasoning which we employ toward nature anticipations of nature (because it is a rash and premature thing), but that reasoning which is elicited from things by due modes the interpretation of nature.

XXVII.

27.

Anticipationes satis firmae sunt ad consensum; quandoquidem, si homines etiam insanirent ad unum modum et conformiter, illi satis bene inter se congruere possent.

Anticipations are sufficiently firm for consensus; since, if men even were to be insane in one mode and conformably, they could agree among themselves well enough.

XXVIII.

28.

Quin longe validiores sunt ad subeundum assensum anticipationes, quam interpretationes; quia ex paucis collectae, iisque maxime quae familiariter occurrunt, intellectum statim perstringunt, et phantasiam implent; ubi contra, interpretationes, ex rebus admodum variis et multum distantibus sparsim collectae, intellectum subito percutere non possunt; ut necesse sit eas, quoad opiniones, duras et absonas, fere instar mysteriorum fidei videri.

Nay, anticipations are by far more powerful for inducing assent than interpretations; because, collected from a few things, and those especially which occur familiarly, they straightway strike the understanding and fill the phantasy; whereas, on the contrary, interpretations, collected here and there from things very diverse and far distant, cannot smite the understanding suddenly; so that it must needs be that they, as regards opinions, appear hard and absonant, almost after the manner of the mysteries of faith.

XXIX.

29.

In scientiis, quae in opinionibus et placitis fundatae sunt, bonus est usus anticipationum et dialecticae; quando opus est assensum subjugare, non res.

In sciences which are founded on opinions and dogmas, the use of anticipations and of dialectic is good; when the work is to subjugate assent, not things.

XXX.

30.

Non, si omnia omnium aetatum ingenia coierint, et labores contulerint et transmiserint, progressus magnus fieri poterit in scientiis per anticipationes: quia errores radicales, et in prima digestione mentis, ab excellentia functionum et remediorum sequentium non curantur.

Not, if all the wits of all ages should come together, and should contribute their labors and transmit them, could great progress be made in the sciences by anticipations: because radical errors, and in the first digestion of the mind, are not cured by the excellence of subsequent functions and remedies.

XXXI.

31.

Frustra magnum expectatur augmentum in scientiis ex superinductione et insitione novorum super vetera; sed instauratio facienda est ab imis fundamentis, nisi libeat perpetuo circumvolvi in orbem, cum exili et quasi contemnendo progressu.

In vain is a great augmentation in the sciences expected from the superinduction and grafting of new things upon old; but a restoration must be made from the deepest foundations, unless it be pleasing to revolve perpetually in a circle, with exiguous and, as it were, contemptible progress.

XXXII.

32.

Antiquis auctoribus suus constat honos, atque adeo omnibus; quia non ingeniorum aut facultatum inducitur comparatio, sed viae; nosque non judicis, sed indicis personam sustinemus.

To the ancient authors their proper honor stands, and indeed to all; because a comparison is not introduced of wits or faculties, but of the way; and we sustain not the part of a judge, but of an index, a guide.

XXXIII.

33.

Nullum (dicendum enim est aperte) recte fieri potest judicium nec de via nostra, nec de iis quae secundum eam inventa sunt, per anticipationes (rationem scilicet quae in usu est), quia non postulandum est ut ejus rei judicio stetur, quae ipsa in judicium vocatur.

No judgment (for we must speak openly) can be made rightly either concerning our way, or concerning the things that have been discovered according to it, by anticipations (to wit, the reason which is in use), because it must not be demanded that one stand by the judgment of that very thing which is itself called into judgment.

XXXIV.

34.

Neque etiam tradendi aut explicandi ea, quae adducimus, facilis est ratio; quia, quae in se nova sunt, intelligentur tamen ex analogia veterum.

Nor is the method of transmitting or explicating the things which we adduce easy; for those things which are new in themselves will nevertheless be understood by the analogy of the ancients.

XXXV.

35.

Dixit Borgia de expeditione Gallorum in Italiam, eos venisse cum creta in manibus, ut diversoria notarent, non cum armis, ut perrumperent. Itidem et nostra ratio est, ut doctrina nostra animos idoneos et capaces subintret; confutationum enim nullus est usus, ubi de principiis et ipsis notionibus, atque etiam de formis demonstrationum dissentimus.

Borgia said, about the expedition of the French into Italy, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark the inns, not with arms to break through. Likewise, such is our method: that our doctrine may insinuate itself into minds that are suitable and capable; for there is no use in confutations, where we disagree about first principles and the very notions, and even about the forms of demonstrations.

XXXVI.

36.

Restat vero nobis modus tradendi unus et simplex, ut homines ad ipsa particularia et eorum series et ordines adducamus; et ut illi rursus imperent sibi ad tempus abnegationem notionum, et cum rebus ipsis consuescere incipiant.

There truly remains to us one simple mode of teaching: that we lead men to the very particulars and to their series and orders; and that they in turn enjoin upon themselves for a time an abnegation of notions, and begin to grow accustomed to the things themselves.

XXXVII.

37.

Ratio eorum, qui acatalepsiam tenuerunt, et via nostra initiis suis quodammodo consentiunt; exitu immensum disjunguntur et opponuntur. Illi enim nihil sciri posse simpliciter asserunt; nos, non multum sciri posse in natura, ea, quae nunc in usu est, via: verum illi exinde authoritatem sensus et intellectus destruunt; nos auxilia iisdem excogitamus et subministramus.

The reasoning of those who have held acatalepsy and our way agree in their beginnings in a certain manner; in the outcome they are immensely separated and set in opposition. For they assert simply that nothing can be known; we, that not much can be known in nature by the way which is now in use: but they, from this, destroy the authority of sense and intellect; we excogitate and supply aids to these same.

XXXVIII.

38.

Idola et notiones falsae, quae intellectum humanum jam occuparunt atque in eo alte haerent, non solum mentes hominum ita obsident, ut veritati aditus difficilis pateat; sed etiam dato et concesso aditu, illa rursus in ipsa instauratione scientiarum occurrent et molesta erunt; nisi homines praemoniti adversus ea se, quantum fieri potest, muniant.

The idols and false notions which have already occupied the human intellect and stick in it deeply not only so beset the minds of men that an access for truth lies open with difficulty; but even when that access is given and granted, they will again, in the very instauration of the sciences, present themselves and be troublesome; unless men, being forewarned, fortify themselves against them as far as can be.

XXXIX.

39.

Quatuor sunt genera idolorum, quae mentes humanas obsident. Iis (docendi gratia) nomina imposuimus; ut primum genus, idola tribus; secundum, idola specus; tertium, idola fori; quartum, idola theatri, vocentur.

Four genera of idols there are, which besiege human minds. To these (for the sake of teaching) we have imposed names; so that the first genus be called idols of the tribe; the second, idols of the cave; the third, idols of the forum; the fourth, idols of the theatre.

XL.

40.

Excitatio notionum et axiomatum per inductionem veram est certe proprium remedium ad idola arcenda et summovenda; sed tamen indicatio idolorum magni est usus. Doctrina enim de idolis similiter se habet ad interpretationem naturae, sicut doctrina de sophisticis elenchis ad dialecticam vulgarem.

The elicitation of notions and axioms by true induction is assuredly the proper remedy for warding off and removing idols; yet nevertheless the indication of the idols is of great use. For the doctrine concerning idols stands in a like relation to the interpretation of nature as the doctrine concerning sophistical elenchi to vulgar dialectic.

XLI.

41.

Idola tribus sunt fundata in ipsa natura humana, atque in ipsa tribu seu gente hominum. Falso enim asseritur, sensum humanum esse mensuram rerum; quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam sensus quam mentis, sunt ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi. Estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inaequalis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturae rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet et inficit.

The Idols of the Tribe are founded in human nature itself, and in the very tribe or race of men. For it is falsely asserted that the human sense is the measure of things; on the contrary, all perceptions, both of sense and of mind, are according to the analogy of man, not according to the analogy of the universe. And the human intellect is like an uneven mirror to the rays of things, which mingles its own nature with the nature of things, and so distorts and infects it.

XLII.

42.

Idola specus sunt idola hominis individui. Habet enim unusquisque (praeter aberrationes naturae humanae in genere) specum sive cavernam quandam individuam, quae lumen naturae frangit et corrumpit: vel propter naturam cujusque propriam et singularem; vel propter educationem et conversationem cum aliis; vel propter lectionem librorum, et authoritates eorum quos quisque colit et miratur; vel propter differentias impressionum, prout occurrunt in animo praeoccupato et praedisposito, aut in animo aequo et sedato, vel ejusmodi: ut plane spiritus humanus (prout disponitur in hominibus singulis) sit res varia, et omnino perturbata, et quasi fortuita. Unde bene Heraclitus, homines scientias quaerere in minoribus mundis, et non in majore sive communi.

Idols of the cave are the idols of the individual man. For each person (besides the aberrations of human nature in general) has a certain individual cave or cavern, which refracts and corrupts the light of nature: either on account of each one’s own proper and singular nature; or on account of education and conversation with others; or on account of the reading of books, and the authorities of those whom each one cultivates and admires; or on account of differences of impressions, as they occur in a mind preoccupied and predisposed, or in an even and sedate mind, or the like: so that plainly the human spirit (as it is disposed in individual men) is a variable thing, and altogether perturbed, and as it were fortuitous. Whence Heraclitus rightly said, that men seek sciences in lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common one.

XLIII.

43.

Sunt etiam idola tanquam ex contractu et societate humani generis ad invicem, quae idola fori, propter hominum commercium et consortium, appellamus. Homines enim per sermones sociantur; at verba ex captu vulgi imponuntur. Itaque mala et inepta verborum impositio miris modis intellectum obsidet.

There are also idols, as it were, from the compact and society of the human race with one another, which we call the idols of the marketplace, on account of the commerce and consortium of men. For men are associated by discourses; but words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. Therefore the bad and inept imposition of words in wondrous ways besieges the intellect.

Neque definitiones aut explicationes, quibus homines docti se munire et vindicare in nonnullis consueverunt, rem ullo modo restituunt. Sed verba plane vim faciunt intellectui, et omnia turbant; et homines ad inanes et innumeras controversias et commenta deducunt.

Nor do definitions or explications, with which learned men have been accustomed in some matters to fortify and vindicate themselves, restore the thing in any way. Rather, words plainly do violence to the intellect, and disturb everything; and they lead men into empty and innumerable controversies and fictions.

XLIV.

44.

Sunt denique idola, quae immigrarunt in animos hominum ex diversis dogmatibus philosophiarum, ac etiam ex perversis legibus demonstrationum; quae idola theatri nominamus; quia quot philosophiae receptae aut inventae sunt, tot fabulas productas et actas censemus, quae mundos effecerunt fictitios et scenicos. Neque de his quae jam habentur, aut etiam de veteribus philosophiis et sectis tantum loquimur, cum complures aliae ejusmodi fabulae componi et concinnari possint; quandoquidem errorum prorsus diversorum causae sint nihilominus fere communes. Neque rursus de philosophiis universalibus tantum hoc intelligimus, sed etiam de principiis et axiomatibus compluribus scientiarum, quae ex traditione et fide et neglectu invaluerunt.

Finally, there are idols which have immigrated into the minds of men from the diverse dogmas of philosophies, and even from the perverse laws of demonstrations; which idols we name the idols of the theater; because as many philosophies as have been received or invented, so many fables we reckon to have been produced and acted, which have made worlds fictitious and scenic. Nor do we speak only of those which are now held, or even of the ancient philosophies and sects, since many other fables of this kind can be composed and concinnated; inasmuch as the causes of errors wholly diverse are nevertheless almost common. Nor again do we understand this only of universal philosophies, but also of the principles and axioms of many sciences, which have prevailed by tradition and belief and neglect.

Verum de singulis istis generibus idolorum, fusius et distinctius dicendum est, ut intellectui humano cautum sit.

However, concerning each of those kinds of idols, it must be set forth more fully and more distinctly, so that the human intellect may be safeguarded.

XLV.

45.

Intellectus humanus ex proprietate sua facile supponit majorem ordinem et aequalitatem in rebus, quam invenit: et cum multa sint in natura monodica, et plena imparitatis, tamen affingit parallela, et correspondentia, et relativa, quae non sunt. Hinc commenta illa, in coelestibus omnia moveri per circulos perfectos, lineis spiralibus et draconibus (nisi nomine tenus) prorsus rejectis. Hinc elementum ignis cum orbe suo introductum est ad constituendum quaternionem cum reliquis tribus, quae subjiciuntur sensui.

The human intellect, from its own property, easily supposes a greater order and equality in things than it finds; and whereas many things in nature are monadic and full of inequality, nevertheless it feigns parallels, correspondences, and relations which are not. Hence those fictions, that in the heavens all things are moved in perfect circles, spiral lines and dragons being utterly rejected (except in name only). Hence the element of fire with its orb was introduced, to constitute a quaternion with the other three which are subject to sense.

Etiam elementis (quae vocant) imponitur ad placitum decupla proportio excessus in raritate ad invicem; et hujusmodi somnia. Neque vanitas ista tantum valet in dogmatibus, verum etiam in notionibus simplicibus.

Even upon the elements (as they call them) there is imposed at pleasure a decuple proportion of excess in rarity, one to another; and dreams of this sort. Nor does that vanity prevail only in dogmas, but even in simple notions.

XLVI.

46.

Intellectus humanus in iis quae semel placuerunt (aut quia recepta sunt et credita, aut quia delectant), alia etiam omnia trahit ad suffragationem et consensum cum illis: et licet major sit instantiarum vis et copia, quae occurrunt in contrarium; tamen eas aut non observat, aut contemnit, aut distinguendo summovet et rejicit, non sine magno et pernicioso praejudicio, quo prioribus illis syllepsibus authoritas maneat inviolata. Itaque recte respondit ille, qui, cum suspensa tabula in templo ei monstraretur eorum qui vota solverant, quod naufragii periculo elapsi sint, atque interrogando premeretur, anne tum quidem Deorum numen agnosceret, quaesivit denuo, At ubi sunt illi depicti qui post vota nuncupata perierint? Eadem ratio est fere omnis superstitionis, ut in astrologicis, in somniis, ominibus, nemesibus, et hujusmodi; in quibus homines delectati hujusmodi vanitatibus advertunt eventus, ubi emplentur; ast ubi fallunt, licet multo frequentius, tamen negligunt et praetereunt.

The human intellect, in those things which have once pleased it (either because they have been received and believed, or because they delight), draws all other things as well to suffrage and consent with them; and although the force and abundance of instances which occur to the contrary be greater, yet it either does not observe them, or contemns them, or by making distinctions removes and rejects them, not without a great and pernicious prejudice, whereby authority may remain inviolate to those former conclusions. And so he answered rightly who, when a tablet hanging in a temple was shown to him of those who had paid their vows because they had escaped the danger of shipwreck, and he was pressed with questioning whether he then acknowledged the godhead, asked in turn, But where are those painted who, after vows were vowed, perished? The same reason holds almost for all superstition, as in astrological matters, in dreams, omens, nemeses, and the like; in which men, delighted by such vanities, take note of the events where they are fulfilled; but where they fail, though far more frequently, nevertheless they neglect and pass them by.

At longe subtilius serpit hoc malum in philosophiis et scientiis; in quibus quod semel placuit, reliqua (licet multo firmiora et potiora) inficit, et in ordinem redigit. Quinetiam licet abfuerit ea, quam diximus, delectatio et vanitas, is tamen humano intellectui error est proprius et perpetuus, ut magis moveatur et excitetur affirmativis, quam negativis; cum rite et ordine aequum se utrique praebere debeat; quin contra, in omni axiomate vero constituendo, major est vis instantiae negativae.

But far more subtly this evil creeps in philosophies and sciences; in which what has once pleased infects the rest (though much firmer and more excellent), and brings them into alignment. Moreover, even if that delight and vanity of which we spoke be absent, yet this error is proper and perpetual to the human intellect: that it is more moved and excited by affirmatives than by negatives; whereas, duly and in order, it ought to offer itself equally to each; nay rather, in constituting any true axiom, the force of the negative instance is greater.

XLVII.

47.

Intellectus humanus illis, quae simul et subito mentem ferire et subire possunt, maxime movetur; a quibus phantasia impleri et inflari consuevit: reliqua vero modo quodam, licet imperceptibili, ita se habere fingit et supponit, quomodo se habent pauca illa quibus mens obsidetur; ad illum vero transcursum ad instantias remotas et heterogeneas, per quas axiomata tanquam igne probantur, tardus omnino intellectus est, et inhabilis, nisi hoc illi per duras leges et violentum imperium imponatur.

The human understanding is moved most by those things which can at once and suddenly strike and enter the mind; by which the phantasy is wont to be filled and inflated: but it feigns and supposes that the rest are so disposed, in a certain manner (though imperceptible), as are those few by which the mind is besieged; whereas for that transit to remote and heterogeneous instances, by which axioms are, as it were, tested by fire, the understanding is altogether slow and unfit, unless this be imposed upon it by hard laws and a violent command.

XLVIII.

48.

Gliscit intellectus humanus, neque consistere aut acquiescere potis est, sed ulterius petit; at frustra. Itaque incogitabile est ut sit aliquid extremum aut extimum mundi, sed semper quasi necessario occurrit ut sit aliquid ulterius. Neque rursus cogitari potest quomodo aeternitas defluxerit ad hunc diem; cum distinctio illa, quae recipi consuevit, quod sit infinitum a parte ante, et a parte post, nullo modo constare possit; quia inde sequeretur, quod sit unum infinitum alio infinito majus, atque ut consumatur infinitum, et vergat ad finitum.

The human intellect swells, nor is it able to halt or to acquiesce, but seeks further; yet in vain. Therefore it is unthinkable that there be anything ultimate or outermost of the world, but it always, as if by necessity, occurs that there be something further. Nor again can it be conceived how eternity has flowed down to this day; since that distinction which is wont to be received, that it is infinite on the side before and on the side after, can in no way stand; because from this it would follow that one infinite is greater than another infinite, and that the infinite be consumed and verge toward the finite.

Similis est subtilitas de lineis semper divisibilibus, ex impotentia cogitationis. At majore cum pernicie intervenit haec impotentia mentis in inventione causarum: nam cum maxime universalia in natura positiva esse debeant, quemadmodum inveniuntur, neque sunt revera causabilia; tamen intellectus humanus, nescius acquiescere, adhuc appetit notiora. Tum vero, ad ulteriora tendens, ad proximiora recidit, videlicet ad causas finales, quae sunt plane ex natura hominis, potius quam universi: atque ex hoc fonte philosophiam miris modis corruperunt.

A like subtlety is that about lines being always divisible, arising from the impotence of cogitation. But with greater pernicious effect this impotence of mind intervenes in the invention of causes: for whereas the most universal things in nature ought to be positive, as they are discovered, nor are they in truth capable of being caused; yet the human intellect, unable to acquiesce, still craves things more known. Then indeed, while tending to what is more ulterior, it relapses to what is more proximate, namely to final causes, which are plainly from the nature of man rather than of the universe: and from this fountain they have corrupted philosophy in wondrous ways.

Est autem aeque imperiti et leviter philosophantis, in maxime universalibus causam requirere, ac in subordinatis et subalternis causam non desiderare.

It is, however, equally the mark of one unskilled and lightly philosophizing to seek a cause in the most universal things, and in subordinate and subaltern things not to desire a cause.

XLIX.

49.

Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est; sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et affectibus, id quod generat ad quod vult scientias: quod enim mavult homo verum esse, id potius credit. Rejicit itaque difficilia, ob inquirendi impatientiam; sobria, quia coarctant spem; altiora naturae, propter superstitionem; lumen experientiae, propter arrogantiam et fastum, ne videatur mens versari in vilibus et fluxis; paradoxa, propter opinionem vulgi; denique innumeris modis, iisque interdum imperceptibilibus, affectus intellectum imbuit et inficit.

The human intellect is not a dry light; but it receives an infusion from the will and the affections, which generates sciences according to what it desires: for what a man prefers to be true, that he rather believes. Accordingly it rejects difficult things, out of impatience of inquiry; the sober things, because they constrain hope; things higher than nature, on account of superstition; the light of experience, on account of arrogance and ostentation, lest the mind seem to be conversant with base and fleeting things; paradoxes, on account of the opinion of the crowd; finally, in innumerable ways, and these sometimes imperceptible, the affections imbue and infect the intellect.

50.

At longe maximum impedimentum et aberratio intellectus humani provenit a stupore et incompetentia et fallaciis sensuum; ut ea, quae sensum feriunt, illis, quae sensum immediate non feriunt, licet potioribus, praeponderent. Itaque contemplatio fere desinit cum aspectu; adeo ut rerum invisibilium exigua aut nulla sit observatio. Itaque omnis operatio spirituum in corporibus tangibilibus inclusorum latet, et homines fugit.

But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human intellect arises from the stupor, incompetence, and fallacies of the senses; so that the things which strike the sense preponderate over those which do not strike the sense immediately, although the latter are the more excellent. Therefore contemplation almost ends with sight; to such a degree that there is little or no observation of invisible things. Therefore the whole operation of spirits enclosed in tangible bodies lies hidden, and escapes men.

Omnis etiam subtilior meta schematismus in partibus rerum crassiorum (quem vulgo alterationem vocant, cum sit revera latio per minima) latet similiter: et tamen nisi duo ista, quae diximus, explorata fuerint et in lucem producta, nihil magni fieri potest in natura quoad opera. Rursus ipsa natura aeris communis et corporum omnium, quae aerem tenuitate superant (quae plurima sunt), fere incognita est. Sensus enim per se res infirma est, et aberrans: neque organa ad amplificandos sensus aut acuendos multum valent; sed omnis verior interpretatio naturae conficitur per instantias, et experimenta idonea et apposita; ubi sensus de experimento tantum, experimentum de natura et re ipsa judicat.

Every more subtle metaschematism in the parts of grosser things (which the vulgar call alteration, whereas it is in truth a carrying-through by minima) likewise lies hidden: and yet, unless these two things which we have spoken of be explored and brought into the light, nothing great can be done in nature as regards works. Again, the very nature of common air and of all bodies which surpass air in tenuity (which are very many) is almost unknown. For sense in itself is a feeble and errant thing; nor do organs for amplifying or sharpening the senses avail much; but every truer interpretation of nature is wrought by instances, and by experiments fit and apposite; wherein the sense judges only of the experiment, but the experiment judges of nature and of the thing itself.

LI.

51.

Intellectus humanus fertur ad abstracta propter naturam propriam; atque ea, quae fluxa sunt, fingit esse constantia. Melius autem est naturam secare, quam abstrahere; id quod Democriti schola fecit, quae magis penetravit in naturam, quam reliquae. Materia potius considerari debet, et ejus schematismi, et meta-schematismi, atque actus purus, et lex actus sive motus; formae enim commenta animi humani sunt, nisi libeat leges illas actus formas appellare.

Intellect is carried toward abstracts by its own nature; and it fashions the things that are in flux to be constants. But it is better to cut nature than to abstract; which the school of Democritus did, and it penetrated more into nature than the rest. Matter rather ought to be considered, and its schematisms and meta-schematisms, and pure act, and the law of act or of motion; for “forms” are constructs of the human mind, unless it please one to call those laws of act “forms.”

LII.

52.

Hujusmodi itaque sunt idola, quae vocamus idola tribus; quae ortum habent aut ex aequalitate substantiae spiritus humani; aut ex praeoccupatione ejus; aut ab angustiis ejus; aut ab inquieto motu ejus; aut ab infusione affectuum; aut ab incompetentia sensuum; aut ab impressionis modo.

Such therefore are the idols which we call the idols of the tribe; which have their origin either from the uniformity of the substance of the human spirit; or from its preoccupation; or from its narrowness; or from its restless motion; or from the infusion of affections; or from the incompetence of the senses; or from the mode of impression.

LIII.

53.

Idola specus ortum habent ex propria cujusque natura et animi et corporis; atque etiam ex educatione, et consuetudine, et fortuitis. Quod genus, licet sit varium et mulitplex, tamen ea proponemus, in quibus maxima cautio est, quaeque plurimum valent ad polluendum intellectum, ne sit purus.

Idols of the cave take their origin from each person’s own nature both of mind and of body; and also from education, and custom, and fortuitous occurrences. This kind, although it is various and multiplex, yet we shall set forth those in which the greatest caution is needed, and which most avail to pollute the intellect, that it be not pure.

LIV.

54.

Adamant homines scientias et contemplationes particulares; aut quia authores et inventores se earum credunt; aut quia plurimum in illis operae posuerunt, iisque maxime assueverunt. Hujusmodi vero homines, si ad philosophiam et contemplationes universales se contulerint, illas ex prioribus phantasiis detorquent, et corrumpunt; id quod maxime conspicuum cernitur in Aristotele, qui naturalem suam philosophiam logicae suae prorsus mancipavit, ut eam fere inutilem et contentiosam reddiderit. Chemicorum autem genus, ex paucis experimentis fornacis, philosophiam constituerunt phantasticam, et ad pauca spectantem: quinetiam Gilbertus, postquam in contemplationibus magnetis se laboriosissime exercuisset, confinxit statim philosophiam consentaneam rei apud ipsum praepollenti.

Men are enamored of particular sciences and contemplations; either because they believe themselves the authors and inventors of them; or because they have bestowed very much labor upon them and have especially accustomed themselves to them. But men of this sort, if they betake themselves to philosophy and universal contemplations, distort and corrupt those from their prior fantasies; a thing most conspicuously seen in Aristotle, who wholly enslaved his natural philosophy to his logic, so that he rendered it almost useless and contentious. Moreover, the tribe of the chemists, from a few furnace experiments, have constituted a fantastic philosophy, looking only to a few things; and even Gilbert, after he had most laboriously exercised himself in contemplations of the magnet, straightway fabricated a philosophy consentaneous to the matter that with him prevailed.

LV.

55.

Maximum et velut radicale discrimen ingeniorum, quoad philosophiam et scientias, illud est; quod alia ingenia sint fortiora et aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias; alia, ad notandas rerum similitudines. Ingenia enim constantia et acuta figere contemplationes, et morari, et haerere in omni subtilitate differentiarum possunt: ingenia autem sublimia et discursiva etiam tenuissimas et catholicas rerum similitudines et agnoscunt et componunt: utrumque autem ingenium facile labitur in excessum, prensando aut gradus rerum, aut umbras.

The greatest and, as it were, radical distinction of wits, with regard to philosophy and the sciences, is this: that some wits are stronger and more apt for noting the differences of things; others, for noting the similarities of things. For steadfast and acute wits can fix contemplations, and linger, and stick fast in every subtlety of differences: whereas lofty and discursive wits both recognize and compose even the most tenuous and catholic (i.e., universal) similarities of things: yet each kind of wit easily slips into excess, grasping either the gradations of things, or the shadows.

LVI.

56.

Reperiuntur ingenia alia in admirationem antiquitatis, alia in amorem et amplexum novitatis effusa; pauca vero ejus temperamenti sunt, ut modum tenere possint, quin aut quae recte posita sunt ab antiquis convellant, aut ea contemnant quae recte afferuntur a novis. Hoc vero magno scientiarum et philosophiae detrimento fit, quum studia potius sint antiquitatis et novitatis, quam judicia: veritas autem non a felicitate temporis alicujus, quae res varia est; sed a lumine naturae et experientiae, quod aeternum est, petenda est. Itaque abneganda sunt ista studia; et videndum, ne intellectus ab illis ad consensum abripiatur.

There are found some wits poured out into admiration of antiquity, others into love and embrace of novelty; but few are of such a temperament as to be able to keep the mean, without either convulsing what has been rightly established by the ancients, or contemning what is rightly brought forward by the moderns. This indeed happens to the great detriment of the sciences and of philosophy, when the pursuits are rather for antiquity and novelty than judgments: but truth is to be sought not from the felicity of some time, which is a variable thing, but from the light of nature and of experience, which is eternal. Therefore those pursuits are to be abnegated; and it must be seen to, lest the intellect be snatched away by them into assent.

LVII.

57.

Contemplationes naturae et corporum in simplicitate sua intellectum frangunt et comminuunt; contemplationes vero naturae et corporum in compositione et configuratione sua intellectum stupefaciunt et solvunt. Id optime cernitur in schola Leucippi et Democriti, collata cum reliquis philosophiis. Illa enim ita versatur in particulis rerum, ut fabricas fere negligat; reliquae autem ita fabricas intuentur attonitae, ut ad simplicitatem naturae non penetrent: itaque alternandae sunt contemplationes istae, et vicissim sumendae; ut intellectus reddatur simul penetrans et capax; et evitentur ea, quae diximus, incommoda, atque idola ex iis provenientia.

Contemplations of nature and bodies in their simplicity break and crumble the intellect; but contemplations of nature and bodies in their composition and configuration stupefy and dissolve the intellect. This is seen most excellently in the school of Leucippus and Democritus, compared with the remaining philosophies. For that school is so engaged upon the particles of things that it well-nigh neglects the fabrics; whereas the rest gaze at the fabrics in such astonishment that they do not penetrate to the simplicity of nature: therefore these contemplations must be alternated and taken in turn, so that the intellect may be rendered at once penetrating and capacious; and the inconveniences we have mentioned, and the idols arising therefrom, may be avoided.

LVIII.

58.

Talis itaque esto prudentia contemplativa in arcendis et summovendis idolis specus; quae aut ex praedominantia, aut ex excessu compositionis et divisionis, aut ex studiis erga tempora, aut ex objectis largis et minutis, maxime ortum habent. Generaliter autem pro suspecto habendum unicuique rerum naturam contemplanti quicquid intellectum suum potissimum capit et detinet; tantoque major adhibenda in hujusmodi placitis est cautio, ut intellectus servetur aequus et purus.

Such, therefore, let contemplative prudence be in warding off and removing the idols of the cave; which have their origin chiefly either from predominance, or from an excess of composition and division, or from predilections toward times, or from objects large and minute. Generally, however, whatever most seizes and detains his intellect is to be held suspect by anyone contemplating the nature of things; and so much the greater caution is to be applied in positions of this kind, that the intellect may be kept even and pure.

LIX.

59.

At idola fori omnium molestissima sunt; quae ex foedere verborum et nominum se insinuarunt in intellectum. Credunt enim homines, rationem suam verbis imperare. Sed fit etiam ut verba vim suam super intellectum retorqueant et reflectant; quod philosophiam et scientias reddidit sophisticas et inactivas.

But the idols of the forum are the most troublesome of all; which, from the compact of words and names, have insinuated themselves into the intellect. For men believe that their reason commands words. Yet it also happens that words turn back and reflect their force upon the intellect; which has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive.

Verba autem plerunque ex captu vulgi induntur, atque per lineas vulgari intellectui maxime conspicuas res secant. Quum autem intellectus acutior, aut observatio diligentior, eas lineas transferre velit, ut illae sint magis secundum naturam; verba obstrepunt. Unde fit, ut magnae et solennes disputationes hominum doctorum saepe in controversias circa verba et nomina desinant; a quibus (ex more et prudentia mathematicorum) incipere consultius foret, easque per definitiones in ordinem redigere.

But words for the most part are imposed according to the grasp of the vulgar, and they cut things along the lines most conspicuous to vulgar understanding. But when a keener intellect, or a more diligent observation, wishes to transfer those lines so that they may be more according to nature, the words grow obstreperous. Whence it comes about that the great and solemn disputations of learned men often end in controversies about words and names; from which (after the custom and prudence of the mathematicians) it would be more advisable to begin, and to reduce them into order by definitions.

Quae tamen definitiones, in naturalibus et materiatis, huic malo mederi non possunt; quoniam et ipsae definitiones ex verbis constant, et verba gignunt verba: adeo ut necesse sit ad instantias particulares, earumque series et ordines recurrere; ut mox dicemus, quum ad modum et rationem constituendi notiones et axiomata deventum fuerit.

Which definitions, however, in things natural and material, cannot remedy this evil; since the definitions themselves consist of words, and words beget words: so that it is necessary to recur to particular instances, and to their series and orders; as we shall presently say, when it shall have come to the method and rationale of constituting notions and axioms.

LX.

60.

Idola, quae per verba intellectui imponuntur, duorum generum sunt; aut enim sunt rerum nomina, quae non sunt (quemadmodum enim sunt res, quae nomine carent per inobservationem; ita sunt et nomina, quae carent rebus, per suppositionem phantasticam), aut sunt nomina rerum, quae sunt, sed confusa et male terminata, et temere et inaequaliter a rebus abstracta. Prioris generis sunt, fortuna, primum mobile, planetarum orbes, elementum ignis, et hujusmodi commenta, quae a vanis et falsis theoriis ortum habent. Atque hoc genus idolorum facilius ejicitur, quia per constantem abnegationem et antiquationem theoriarum exterminari possunt.

Idols, which by words are imposed upon the intellect, are of two genera; for they are either names of things which are not (for just as there are things which lack a name through inobservation, so also there are names which lack things, through phantastic supposition), or they are names of things which are, but confused and badly terminated, and rashly and unequally abstracted from things. Of the former genus are fortune, primum mobile, the orbs of the planets, the element of fire, and fictions of this kind, which have their origin from vain and false theories. And this genus of idols is more easily ejected, because by the constant abnegation and antiquation of theories they can be exterminated.

At alterum genus perplexum est, et alte haerens; quod ex mala et imperita abstractione excitatur. Exempli gratia, accipiatur aliquod verbum (humidum, si placet), et videamus quomodo sibi constent quae per hoc verbum significantur: et invenietur verbum istud, humidum, nihil aliud quam nota confusa diversarum actionum, quae nullam constantiam aut reductionem patiuntur. Significat enim et quod circa aliud corpus facile se circumfundit; et quod in se est indeterminabile, nec consistere potest; et quod facile cedit undique; et quod facile se dividit et dispergit; et quod facile se unit et colligit; et quod facile fluit et in motu ponitur; et quod alteri corpori facile adhaeret, idque madefacit; et quod facile reducitur in liquidum, sive colliquatur, cum antea consisteret.

But the other kind is perplexed and sticking deep; which is aroused from bad and unskilled abstraction. For example, let some word be taken (humid, if you please), and let us see how those things which are signified by this word cohere with themselves: and it will be found that this word, humid, is nothing other than a confused mark of diverse actions, which admit of no constancy or reduction. For it signifies both that which easily pours or diffuses itself around another body; and that which in itself is indeterminable, nor can take a stand; and that which easily yields on every side; and that which easily divides and scatters itself; and that which easily unites and gathers itself; and that which easily flows and is put into motion; and that which easily adheres to another body and makes it wet; and that which is easily reduced back into a liquid, or is liquefied, when previously it had stood firm.

Itaque quum ad hujus nominis praedicationem et impositionem ventum sit; si alia accipias, flamma humida est; si alia accipias, aer humidus non est; si alia, pulvis minutus humidus est; si alia, vitrum humidum est: ut facile appareat istam notionem ex aqua tantum et communibus et vulgaribus liquoribus, absque ulla debita verificatione, temere abstractam esse.

I accordingly, when it comes to the predication and imposition of this name; if you take one set of considerations, flame is humid; if you take another, air is not humid; if another, fine dust is humid; if another, glass is humid: so that it may easily appear that that notion, drawn rashly from water alone and from the common and vulgar liquids, without any due verification, has been abstracted.

In verbis autem gradus sunt quidam pravitatis et erroris. Minus vitiosum genus est nominum substantiae alicujus, praesertim specierum infirmarum, et bene deductarum (nam notio cretae, luti, bona; terrae, mala): vitiosius genus est actionum, ut generare, corrumpere, alterare: vitiosissimum qualitatum (exceptis objectis sensus immediatis), ut gravis, levis, tenuis, densi, etc.; et tamen in omnibus istis fieri non potest, quin sint aliae notiones aliis paulo meliores, prout in sensum humanum incidit rerum copia.

But in words there are certain degrees of pravity and error. A less vicious kind is that of names of some substance, especially of weaker species and well deduced (for the notion of chalk, of mud, is good; of earth, bad): a more vicious kind is that of actions, as to generate, to corrupt, to alter: the most vicious is that of qualities (the immediate objects of sense excepted), as heavy, light, thin, dense, etc.; and yet in all these it cannot but happen that some notions are a little better than others, according as the abundance of things falls upon human sense.

LXI.

61.

At idola theatri innata non sunt, nec occulto insinuata in intellectum; sed ex fabulis theoriarum, et perversis legibus demonstrationum, plane indita et recepta. In his autem confutationes tentare et suscipere consentaneum prorsus non est illis, quae a nobis dicta sunt. Quum enim nec de principiis consentiamus, nec de demonstrationibus, tollitur omnis argumentatio.

But the idols of the theatre are not inborn, nor insinuated secretly into the intellect; rather, from the fables of theories and the perverse laws of demonstrations they are plainly instilled and received. But in regard to these, to attempt and undertake confutations is by no means consistent with what has been said by us. For since we agree neither about the principles nor about the demonstrations, all argumentation is removed.

Id vero bono fit fato, ut antiquis suus constet honos. Nihil enim illis detrahitur, quum de via omnino quaestio sit. Claudus enim (ut dicitur) in via antevertit cursorem extra viam.

This indeed happens by good fate, that the ancients’ proper honor stands firm. For nothing is detracted from them, since the question is altogether about the way. For the lame man (as it is said) on the way outstrips the runner off the way.

Etiam illud manifesto liquet, currenti extra viam, quo habilior sit et velocior, eo majorem contingere aberrationem.

It is also manifestly clear that, for one running off the road, the more able and the swifter he is, the greater an aberration befalls him.

Nostra vero inveniendi scientias ea est ratio, ut non multum ingeniorum acumini et robori relinquatur; sed quae ingenia et intellectus fere exaequet. Quemadmodum enim ad hoc ut linea recta fiat, aut circulus perfectus describatur, multum est in constantia et exercitatione manus, si fiat ex vi manus propria, sin autem adhibeatur regula, aut circinus, parum aut nihil; omnino similis est nostra ratio. Licet autem confutationum particularium nullus sit usus; de sectis tamen et generibus hujusmodi theoriarum nonnihil dicendum est; atque etiam paulo post de signis exterioribus, quod se male habeant; et postremo de causis tantae infelicitatis et tam diuturni et generalis in errore consensus; ut ad vera minus difficilis sit aditus, et intellectus humanus volentius expurgetur et idola dimittat.

But our method of discovering the sciences is of such a kind that not much is left to the acumen and strength of wits, but rather is one which almost equalizes wits and intellects. For just as, for this—namely that a straight line be made or a perfect circle be described—much depends on the constancy and exercise of the hand if it be done by the force of the hand itself; but if a ruler or a compass be employed, little or nothing: altogether similar is our method. Although there is no use in particular confutations, yet something must be said about the sects and genera of theories of this sort; and also, a little later, about the exterior signs, that they are in bad case; and finally about the causes of so great ill-fortune and of so long-continued and general a consensus in error; so that the access to truths may be less difficult, and the human intellect may more willingly be purged and dismiss its idols.

LXII.

62.

Idola theatri, sive theoriarum, multa sunt, et multo plura esse possunt, et aliquando fortasse erunt. Nisi enim per multa jam saecula hominum ingenia circa religionem et theologiam occupata fuissent; atque etiam politiae civiles (praesertim monarchiae) ab istiusmodi novitatibus, etiam in contemplationibus, essent aversae; ut cum periculo et detrimento fortunarum suarum in illas homines incumbant, non solum praemio destituti, sed etiam contemptui et invidiae expositi; complures aliae proculdubio philosophiarum et theoriarum sectae, similes illis, quae magna varietate olim apud Graecos floruerunt introductae fuissent. Quemadmodum enim super phaenomena aetheris plura themata coeli confingi possunt; similiter, et multo magis, super phaenomena philosophiae fundari possunt et constitui varia dogmata.

Idols of the theater, or of theories, are many, and could be many more, and perhaps sometime will be. For unless through many ages already men’s wits had been occupied about religion and theology; and also civil polities (especially monarchies) had been averse to novelties of this kind, even in contemplations; so that men engage in them with peril and detriment to their fortunes, not only destitute of reward, but also exposed to contempt and envy; many other sects of philosophies and theories, without doubt, similar to those which with great variety once flourished among the Greeks, would have been introduced. For just as upon the phenomena of the aether many schemes of the heavens can be contrived; so likewise, and much more, upon the phenomena of philosophy various dogmas can be founded and established.

Atque hujusmodi theatri fabulae habent etiam illud, quod in theatro poetarum usu venit; ut narrationes fictae ad scenam narrationibus ex historia veris concinniores sint et elegantiores, et quales quis magis vellet.

And the plays of the theater of this kind have also this, which occurs in practice in the theater of the poets; that fictitious narrations for the stage are more concinnous and more elegant than narrations true from history, and such as one would more wish.

In genere autem, in materiam philosophiae sumitur aut multum ex paucis, aut parum ex multis; ut utrinque philosophia super experientiae et naturalis historiae nimis angustam basin fundata sit, atque ex paucioribus, quam par est, pronunciet. Rationale enim genus philosophantium ex experientia arripiunt varia et vulgaria, eaque neque certo comperta, nec diligenter examinata et pensitata; reliqua in meditatione atque ingenii agitatione ponunt.

In general, however, as the material of philosophy there is taken either much from few, or little from many; so that on both sides philosophy is founded upon too narrow a basis of experience and natural history, and pronounces from fewer things than is fitting. For the rational kind of those philosophizing snatch from experience things various and vulgar (common), and these neither surely ascertained nor diligently examined and weighed; the rest they place in meditation and in the agitation of ingenuity.

Est et aliud genus philosophantium, qui in paucis experimentis sedulo et accurate elaborarunt, atque inde philosophias educere et confingere ausi sunt; reliqua miris modis ad ea detorquentes.

There is also another kind of philosophers, who have elaborated sedulously and accurately upon a few experiments, and from them have dared to educe and fabricate philosophies; twisting the rest in wondrous ways to accommodate them.

Est et tertium genus eorum, qui theologiam et traditiones ex fide et veneratione immiscent; inter quos vanitas nonnullorum ad petendas et derivandas scientias a spiritibus scilicet et geniis deflexit; ita ut stirps errorum et philosophia falsa genere triplex sit: sophistica, empirica, et superstitiosa.

There is also a third kind of those who intermingle theology and traditions from faith and veneration; among whom the vanity of some has turned aside to seek and derive sciences from spirits—specifically, from spirits and genii; so that the stock of errors and false philosophy is threefold in kind: sophistic, empiric, and superstitious.

LXIII.

63.

Primi generis exemplum in Aristotele maxime conspicuum est, qui philosophiam naturalem dialectica sua corrupit: quum mundum ex categoriis effecerit; animae humanae, nobilissimae substantiae, genus ex vocibus secundae intentionis tribuerit; negotium densi et rari, per quod corpora subeunt majores et minores dimensiones sive spatia, per frigidam distinctionem actus et potentiae transegerit; motum singulis corporibus unicum et proprium, et, si participent ex alio motu, id aliunde moveri, asseruerit: et innumera alia, pro arbitrio suo, naturae rerum imposuerit: magis ubique sollicitus quomodo quis respondendo se explicet, et aliquid reddatur in verbis positivum, quam de interna rerum veritate; quod etiam optime se ostendit in comparatione philosophiae ejus ad alias philosophias quae apud Graecos celebrabantur. Habent enim homoiomera Anaxagorae, atomi Leucippi et Democriti, coelum et terra Parmenidis, lis et amicitia Empedoclis, resolutio corporum in adiaphoram naturam ignis et replicatio eorundem ad densum Heracliti, aliquid ex philosopho naturali; et rerum naturam, et experientiam, et corpora sapiunt; ubi Aristotelis physica nihil aliud quam dialecticae voces plerunque sonet: quam etiam in metaphysicis sub solenniore nomine, et ut magis scilicet realis, non nominalis, retractavit. Neque illud quenquam moveat, quod in libris ejus De animalibus, et in Problematibus, et in aliis suis tractatibus, versatio frequens sit in experimentis.

An example of the first kind is most conspicuous in Aristotle, who corrupted natural philosophy by his dialectic: since he made the world out of the categories; assigned to the human soul, the most noble substance, its genus from words of second intention; transacted the business of the dense and the rare, by which bodies undergo greater and lesser dimensions or spaces, by the chilly distinction of act and potency; asserted for single bodies a single and proper motion, and that, if they partake of some other motion, that is moved from elsewhere: and imposed upon the nature of things innumerable other matters, at his own arbitrament: being everywhere more solicitous how one, by answering, may extricate himself, and something be rendered positive in words, than about the internal truth of things; which also shows itself very well in the comparison of his philosophy to the other philosophies which were celebrated among the Greeks. For the homoeomera of Anaxagoras, the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus, the heaven and the earth of Parmenides, the strife and friendship of Empedocles, the resolution of bodies into the adiaphorous nature of fire and the folding-back of the same to the dense in Heraclitus, have something from a natural philosopher; and they savor of the nature of things, and of experience, and of bodies; whereas the physics of Aristotle for the most part sounds nothing else than the words of dialectic: which he even rehandled in his metaphysics under a more solemn name, and as more, to wit, real, not nominal. Nor let it move anyone, that in his books On Animals, and in the Problems, and in his other treatises, there is frequent conversancy in experiments.

Ille enim prius decreverat, neque experientiam ad constituenda decreta et axiomata rite consuluit; sed postquam pro arbitrio suo decrevisset, experientiam ad sua placita tortam circumducit et captivam; ut hoc etiam nomine magis accusandus sit, quam sectatores ejus moderni (scholasticorum philosophorum genus) qui experientiam omnino deseruerunt.

For he had first decreed, nor did he duly consult experience for the constituting of decrees and axioms; but after he had decreed by his own arbitrament, he leads experience, twisted to his placets and captive, round about; so that even on this ground he is to be accused more than his modern followers (the kind of scholastic philosophers), who have altogether deserted experience.

LXIV.

64.

At philosophiae genus empiricum placita magis deformia et monstrosa educit, quam sophisticum aut rationale genus; quia non in luce notionum vulgarium (quae licet tenuis sit et superficialis, tamen est quodammodo universalis, et ad multa pertinens) sed in paucorum experimentorum angustiis et obscuritate fundatum est. Itaque talis philosophia illis, qui in hujusmodi experimentis quotidie versantur atque ex ipsis phantasiam contaminarunt, probabilis videtur et quasi certa; caeteris, incredibilis et vana. Cujus exemplum notabile est in chemicis, eorumque dogmatibus; alibi autem vix hoc tempore invenitur, nisi forte in philosophia Gilberti.

But the empirical kind of philosophy brings forth tenets more misshapen and monstrous than the sophistic or rational kind; because it is not founded in the light of vulgar notions (which, although thin and superficial, are yet in a certain manner universal and pertaining to many), but in the straits and obscurity of a few experiments. Therefore such a philosophy seems to those who are daily conversant with experiments of this sort, and have from them contaminated their phantasy, plausible and as it were certain; to the rest, unbelievable and vain. A notable example of this is in the chemists, and their dogmas; elsewhere, however, it is scarcely at this time found, unless perhaps in the philosophy of Gilbert.

Sed tamen circa hujusmodi philosophias cautio nullo modo praetermittenda erat; quia mente jam praevidemus et auguramur, si quando homines, nostris monitis excitati, ad experientiam se serio contulerint (valere jussis doctrinis sophisticis), tum demum, propter praematuram et praeproperam intellectus festinationem, et saltum sive volatum ad generalia et rerum principia, fore ut magnum ab hujusmodi philosophiis periculum immineat; cui malo etiam nunc obviam ire debemus.

But yet, concerning philosophies of this kind, caution was by no means to be omitted; because we already foresee in mind and augur that, if ever men, stirred by our admonitions, shall betake themselves in earnest to experience (the sophistic doctrines being ordered to stand down), then at last, on account of the premature and over-hasty hastening of the intellect, and the leap or flight to generals and to the principles of things, there will be great danger impending from philosophies of this sort; which evil we ought even now to obviate.

LXV.

65.

At corruptio philosophiae ex superstitione, et theologia admista, latius omnino patet, et plurimum mali infert, aut in philosophias integras, aut in earum partes. Humanus enim intellectus non minus impressionibus phantasiae est obnoxius, quam impressionibus vulgarium notionum. Pugnax enim genus philosophiae et sophisticum illaqueat intellectum: at illud alterum phantasticum, et tumidum, et quasi poeticum, magis blanditur intellectui.

But the corruption of philosophy from superstition and theology admixed extends altogether more widely, and brings very great harm, either upon entire philosophies or upon their parts. For the human intellect is no less liable to the impressions of phantasy than to the impressions of vulgar notions. For the pugnacious and sophistic kind of philosophy ensnares the intellect: but that other kind, phantastic and tumid and as it were poetic, flatters the intellect more.

Inest enim homini quaedam intellectus ambitio, non minor quam voluntatis; praesertim in ingeniis altis et elevatis.

For in man there is a certain ambition of the intellect, no less than of the will; especially in minds that are lofty and elevated.

Hujus autem generis exemplum inter Graecos illucescit, praecipue in Pythagora, sed cum superstitione magis crassa et onerosa conjunctum; at periculosius et subtilius in Platone atque ejus schola. Invenitur etiam hoc genus mali in partibus philosophiarum reliquarum, introducendo formas abstractas, et causas finales, et causas primas; omittendo saepissime medias, et hujusmodi. Huic autem rei summa adhibenda est cautio.

An example of this kind shines forth among the Greeks, especially in Pythagoras, but conjoined with a more gross and onerous superstition; yet more perilous and subtler in Plato and his school. This kind of evil is also found in parts of the remaining philosophies, by introducing abstract forms, and final causes, and first causes; very often omitting the middle ones, and suchlike. To this matter, however, the utmost caution is to be applied.

Pessima enim res est errorum apotheosis, et pro peste intellectus habenda est, si vanis accedat veneratio. Huic autem vanitati nonnulli ex modernis summa levitate ita indulserunt, ut in primo capitulo Geneseos, et in libro Job, et aliis Scripturis sacris, philosophiam naturalem fundare conati sint; inter viva quaerentes mortua. Tantoque magis haec vanitas inhibenda venit, et coercenda, quia ex divinorum et humanorum malesana admistione non solum educitur philosophia phantasica, sed etiam religio haeretica.

For the apotheosis of errors is a most evil thing, and is to be accounted a pest of the intellect, if veneration accedes to vanities. But to this vanity some among the moderns have, with utmost levity, so indulged that in the first chapter of Genesis, and in the book of Job, and in other sacred Scriptures, they have tried to found natural philosophy; seeking the dead among the living. And by so much the more must this vanity be inhibited and coerced, because from an unsound admixture of things divine and human there is brought forth not only phantastic philosophy, but also heretical religion.

Itaque salutare admodum est, si mente sobria fidei tantum dentur quae fidei sunt.

Therefore it is very salutary that, with a sober mind, there be given to faith only the things that are of faith.

LXVI.

66.

Et de malis authoritatibus philosophiarum, quae aut in vulgaribus notionibus, aut in paucis experimentis, aut in superstitione fundatae sunt, jam dictum est. Dicendum porro est et de vitiosa materia contemplationum, praesertim in philosophia naturali. Inficitur autem intellectus humanus ex intuitu eorum quae in artibus mechanicis fiunt, in quibus corpora per compositiones aut separationes ut plurimum alterantur; ut cogitet simile quiddam etiam in natura rerum universali fieri.

And concerning the bad authorities of the philosophies, which are founded either on vulgar notions, or on few experiments, or on superstition, it has already been said. Moreover, it must be said also concerning the vitiated matter of contemplations, especially in natural philosophy. But the human intellect is infected from its intuition of the things that are done in the mechanical arts, in which bodies for the most part are altered by compositions or separations; so that it thinks that something similar also is done in the universal nature of things.

Unde fluxit commentum illud elementorum, atque illorum concursu, ad constituenda corpora naturalia Rursus, quum homo naturae libertatem contemplatur, incidit in species rerum, animalium, plantarum, mineralium; unde facile in eam labitur cogitationem, ut existimet esse in natura quasdam formas rerum primarias, quas natura educere molitur: atque reliquam varietatem ex impedimentis et aberrationibus naturae in opere suo conficiendo, aut ex diversarum specierum conflictu, et transplantatione alterius in alteram, provenire. Atque prima cogitatio qualitates primas elementares, secunda proprietates occultas et virtutes specificas nobis peperit; quarum utraque pertinet ad inania contemplationum compendia, in quibus acquiescit animus et a solidioribus avertitur. At medici in secundis rerum qualitatibus et operationibus, attrahendi, repellendi, attenuandi, inspissandi, dilatandi, astringendi, discutiendi, maturandi, et hujusmodi, operam praestant meliorem; atque, nixi ex illis duobus (quae dixi) compendiis (qualitatibus scilicet elementaribus, et virtutibus specificis) illa altera (quae recte notata sunt) corrumperent, reducendo illa ad primas qualitates earumque mixturas subtiles et incommensurabiles, aut ea non producendo cum majore et diligentiore observatione ad qualitates tertias et quartas, sed contemplationem intempestive abrumpendo, illi multo melius profecissent.

Whence there flowed that contrivance of the elements, and of their concourse for the constituting of natural bodies. Again, when a man contemplates the liberty of nature, he falls upon kinds of things—of animals, plants, minerals; whence he easily slips into this thought, that he supposes there to be in nature certain primary forms of things, which nature strives to draw out; and that the remaining variety arises from impediments and aberrations of nature in completing its work, or from the conflict of different species, and the transplantation of one into another. And the first notion begot for us the primary elementary qualities, the second the occult properties and specific virtues; both of which belong to vain shortcuts of contemplation, in which the mind rests and is turned away from more solid matters. But physicians, in the secondary qualities and operations of things—attracting, repelling, attenuating, inspissating (thickening), dilating, astringing, discussing (dispersing), maturing, and the like—render better service; and, leaning upon those two shortcuts (which I have mentioned), namely the elementary qualities and the specific virtues, they corrupt those other matters (which have been rightly noted), by reducing them to the primary qualities and to their subtle and incommensurable mixtures, or by not carrying them forward with greater and more diligent observation to tertiary and quaternary qualities, but by prematurely breaking off the contemplation—they would have made much better progress.

Neque hujusmodi virtutes (non dico eaedem, sed similes) in humani corporis medicinis tantum exquirendae sunt; sed etiam in caeterorum corporum naturalium mutationibus.

Nor are virtues of this kind (I do not say the same, but similar) to be sought only in the medicines of the human body; but also in the mutations of the other natural bodies.

Sed multo adhuc majore cum malo fit, quod quiescentia rerum principia, ex quibus; et non moventia, per quae res fiunt, contemplentur et inquirant. Illa enim ad sermones, ista ad opera spectant. Neque enim vulgars illae differentiae motus, quae in naturali philosophia recepta notantur, generationis, corruptionis, augmentationis, diminutionis, alterationis, et lationis, ullius sunt pretii.

But it happens with a far greater evil still, that they contemplate and inquire into the quiescent principles of things, from which; and not into the moving ones, through which things are effected. For the former pertain to discourses, the latter to works. For neither are those vulgar differences of motion, which are noted as received in natural philosophy—of generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and lation—of any worth.

Quippe hoc sibi volunt; si corpus, alias non mutatum, loco tamen moveatur, hoc lationem esse; si, manente et loco et specie, qualitate mutetur, hoc alterationem esse; si vero ex illa mutatione moles ipsa et quantitas corporis non eadem maneat, hoc augmentationis et diminutionis motum esse; si eatenus mutentur, ut speciem ipsam et substantiam mutent, et in alia migrent, hoc generationem et corruptionem esse. At ista mere popularia sunt, et nullo modo in naturam penetrant; suntque mensurae et periodi tantum, non species motus. Innuunt enim illud, hucusque, et non quomodo, vel ex quo fonte.

For this is what they mean: if a body, otherwise not changed, is nevertheless moved with respect to place, this is lation; if, with both place and appearance remaining, it is changed in quality, this is alteration; but if from that change the mass itself and the quantity of the body do not remain the same, this is the motion of augmentation and diminution; if they are changed to such an extent as to change the very species and substance, and migrate into another, this is generation and corruption. But these are merely popular notions, and in no way penetrate into nature; and they are measures and periods only, not species of motion. For they intimate this—“thus far,” and not the “how,” or from what source.

Neque enim de corporum appetitu, aut de partium eorum processu, aliquid significant; sed tantum quum motus ille rem aliter ac prius, crasso modo, sensui exhibeat, inde divisionem suam auspicantur. Etiam quum de causis motuum aliquid significare volunt, atque divisionem ex illis instituere, differentiam motus naturalis et violenti, maxima cum socordia, introducunt; quae et ipsa omnino ex notione vulgari est; cum omnis motus violentus etiam naturalis revera sit, scilicet cum externum efficiens naturam alio modo in opere ponet quam quo prius.

Nor indeed do they signify anything about the appetite of bodies, or about the process of their parts; but only when that motion, in a coarse manner, presents the thing to sense otherwise than before, from that they begin their division. Even when they wish to signify something about the causes of motions, and to institute a division from them, they introduce, with the utmost sluggishness, the difference between natural and violent motion; which also itself is entirely from a vulgar notion; since every violent motion is in truth also natural, namely when an external efficient sets nature in operation in another way than before.

At hisce omissis; si quis (exempli gratia) observaverit, inesse corporibus appetitum contactus ad invicem, ut non patiantur unitatem naturae prorsus dirimi aut abscindi, ut vacuum detur: aut si quis dicat, inesse corporibus appetitum se recipiendi in naturalem suam dimensionem vel tensuram, ut, si ultra eam aut citra eam comprimantur aut distrahantur, statim in veterem sphaeram et exporrectionem suam se recuperare et remittere moliantur: aut si quis dicat, inesse corporibus appetitum congregationis ad massas connaturalium suorum, densorum videlicet versus orbem terrae, tenuiorum et rariorum versus ambitum coeli: haec et hujusmodi vere physica sunt genera motuum. At illa altera plane logica sunt et scholastica, ut ex hac collatione eorum manifesto liquet.

But leaving these aside; if someone (for example) should observe that there is in bodies an appetite of contact with one another, so that they do not allow the unity of nature to be altogether sundered or cut off, so that a vacuum be given: or if someone should say that there is in bodies an appetite of taking themselves back into their natural dimension or tension, so that, if beyond it or short of it they are compressed or drawn out, they immediately endeavor to recover and relax themselves into their former sphere and extension: or if someone should say that there is in bodies an appetite of congregation toward the masses of their connaturals, namely of the denser toward the orb of the earth, of the thinner and rarer toward the ambit of heaven: these and things of this sort are truly physical kinds of motions. But those other ones are plainly logical and scholastic, as from this comparison of them it is manifestly clear.

Neque minus etiam malum est, quod in philosophiis et contemplationibus suis, in principiis rerum atque ultimatibus naturae investigandis et tractandis, opera insumatur; cum omnis utilitas et facultas operandi in mediis consistat. Hinc fit, ut abstrahere naturam homines non desinant, donec ad materiam potentialem et informem ventum fuerit; nec rursus secare naturam desinant, donec perventum fuerit ad atomum; quae, etiamsi vera essent, tamen ad juvandas hominum fortunas parum possunt.

Nor is it a lesser evil, moreover, that in their philosophies and contemplations effort is expended upon investigating and handling the principles of things and the ultimates of nature; since all utility and the faculty of operating consists in the middles. Hence it comes to pass that men do not cease to abstract nature until it has been arrived at potential and formless matter; nor, in turn, to dissect nature until it has been arrived at the atom; which things, even if they were true, nevertheless can do little to aid the fortunes of men.

LXVII.

67.

Danda est etiam cautio intellectui de intemperantiis philosophiarum, quoad assensum praebendum aut cohibendum; quia hujusmodi intemperantiae videntur idola figere, et quodammodo perpetuare, ne detur aditus ad ea summovenda.

A caution is also to be given to the intellect concerning the intemperances of philosophies, as to the assent to be given or restrained; because intemperances of this kind seem to fix idols and, in a certain manner, perpetuate them, so that access for removing them is not granted.

Duplex autem est excessus: alter eorum, qui facile pronunciant, et scientias reddunt positivas et magistrales; alter eorum, qui acatalepsiam introduxerunt, et inquisitionem vagam sine termino; quorum primus intellectum deprimit, alter enervat. Nam Aristotelis philosophia, postquam caeteras philosophias (more Ottomanorum erga fratres suos) pugnacibus confutationibus contrucidasset, de singulis pronunciavit; et ipse rursus quaestiones ex arbitrio suo subornat, deinde conficit; ut omnia certa sint et decreta: quod etiam apud successiones suas valet et in usu est.

But the excess is twofold: one of those who pronounce readily, and render the sciences positive and magisterial; the other of those who introduced acatalepsy, and a wandering inquiry without terminus; of which the former depresses the intellect, the latter enervates it. For the philosophy of Aristotle, after it had, by pugnacious confutations, butchered the other philosophies (after the manner of the Ottomans toward their brothers), pronounced upon each point; and he in turn frames questions from his own arbitrament, then dispatches them, so that all things may be certain and decreed: which also prevails among his successions and is in use.

At Platonis schola acatalepsiam introduxit, primo tanquam per jocum et ironiam, in odium veterum sophistarum, Protagorae, Hippiae, et reliquorum, qui nihil tam verebantur, quam ne dubitare de re aliqua viderentur. At nova academia acatalepsiam dogmatizavit, et ex professo tenuit: quae licet honestior ratio sit, quam pronunciandi licentia, quum ipsi pro se dicant se minime confundere inquisitionem, ut Pyrrho fecit et Ephectici, sed habere quod sequantur ut probabile, licet non habeant quod teneant ut verum; tamen postquam animus humanus de veritate invenienda semel desperaverit, omnino omnia fiunt languidiora: ex quo fit, ut deflectant homines potius ad amoenas disputationes et discursus, et rerum quasdam peragrationes, quam in severitate inquisitionis se sustineant. Verum, quod a principio diximus et perpetuo agimus, sensui et intellectui humano eorumque infirmitati authoritas non est deroganda, sed auxilia praebenda.

But Plato’s school introduced acatalepsy, at first as if by jest and irony, in hatred of the ancient sophists—Protagoras, Hippias, and the rest—who feared nothing so much as to seem to doubt about any matter. But the New Academy dogmatized acatalepsy, and maintained it professedly: which, although it is a more honorable course than the license of pronouncing, since they plead on their own behalf that they by no means confound inquiry, as Pyrrho and the Ephectics did, but have what they may follow as probable, though they do not have what they may hold as true; nevertheless, after the human mind has once despaired of finding truth, altogether all things grow more languid; whence it comes to pass that men deflect rather to pleasant disputations and discourses, and certain peragrations of things, than sustain themselves in the rigor of inquiry. But, what we said from the beginning and urge continually, authority is not to be derogated from sense and the human intellect and their infirmity, but aids are to be supplied.

LXVIII.

68.

Atque de idolorum singulis generibus, eorumque apparatu jam diximus; quae onmia constanti et solenni decreto sunt abneganda et renuncianda, et intellectus ab iis omnino liberandus est et expurgandus; ut non alius fere sit aditus ad regnum hominis, quod fundatur in scientiis, quam ad regnum coelorum, in quod, nisi sub persona infantis, intrare non datur.

Moreover, concerning the several genera of idols and their apparatus we have already spoken; all which things are to be denied and renounced by a constant and solemn decree, and the intellect is to be wholly freed and expurgated from them; so that there is scarcely any other access to the kingdom of man, which is founded upon the sciences, than to the kingdom of heaven, into which, unless under the persona of an infant, it is not granted to enter.

LXIX.

69.

At pravae demonstrationes, idolorum veluti munitiones quaedam sunt et praesidia; eaeque, quas in dialecticis habemus, id fere agunt, ut mundum plane cogitationibus humanis, cogitationes autem verbis addicant et mancipent. Demonstrationes vero potentia quadam philosophiae ipsae sunt et scientiae. Quales enim eae sunt, ac prout rite aut male institutae, tales sequuntur philosophiae et contemplationes.

But perverse demonstrations are, as it were, certain fortifications and defenses of idols; and those which we have in dialectics accomplish for the most part this, that they adjudge and enslave the world outright to human cogitations, and cogitations to words. Demonstrations indeed are themselves, by a certain potency, philosophy and science. For such as they are, and according as they are instituted rightly or ill, such in turn are the philosophies and contemplations that follow.

Fallunt autem et incompetentes sunt eae quibus utimur in universo illo processu, qui a sensu et rebus ducit ad axiomata et conclusiones. Qui quidem processus quadruplex est, et vitia ejus totidem. Primo, impressiones sensus ipsius vitiosae sunt; sensus enim et destituit et fallit.

But deceptive and incompetent are those which we employ in that whole process which leads from sense and things to axioms and conclusions. Now this process is quadruple, and its defects are as many. First, the impressions of sense itself are vitiated; for sense both fails and deceives.

At destitutionibus substitutiones, fallaciis rectificationes debentur. Secundo, notiones ab impressionibus sensuum male abstrahuntur, et interminatae et confusae sunt, quas terminatas et bene finitas esse oportuit. Tertio, inductio mala est, quae per enumerationem simplicem principia concludit scientiarum, non adhibitis exclusionibus et solutionibus, sive separationibus naturae debitis.

But for destitutions, substitutions; for fallacies, rectifications are due. Secondly, notions are ill abstracted from the impressions of the senses, and are indeterminate and confused, whereas they ought to be determinate and well defined. Thirdly, induction is bad, which by simple enumeration concludes the principles of the sciences, the due exclusions and solutions, or separations of nature, not being applied.

Postremo, modus ille inveniendi et probandi, ut primo principia maxime generalia constituantur, deinde media axiomata ad ea applicentur et probentur, errorum mater est, et scientiarum omnium calamitas. Verum de istis, quae jam obiter perstringimus, fusius dicemus, quum veram interpretandae naturae viam, absolutis istis expiationibus et expurgationibus mentis, proponemus.

Finally, that method of discovering and proving, whereby first the most general principles are established, then the middle axioms are applied to them and proved, is the mother of errors and the calamity of all the sciences. But concerning these things, which we now merely touch upon in passing, we shall speak more fully, when we shall propose the true way of interpreting nature, once those expiations and expurgations of the mind have been completed.

LXX.

70.

Sed demonstratio longe optima est experientia; modo haereat in ipso experimento. Nam si traducatur ad alia quae similia existimantur, nisi rite et ordine fiat illa traductio, res fallax est. At modus experiendi, quo homines nunc utuntur, caecus est et stupidus.

But the demonstration by far the best is experience; provided only that it stick to the experiment itself. For if it be translated to other things which are thought similar, unless that traduction be made rightly and in due order, the matter is deceptive. But the mode of experimenting which men now use is blind and stupid.

Itaque cum errant et vagantur nulla via certa, sed ex occursu rerum tantum consilium capiunt, circumferuntur ad multa, sed parum promovent; et quandoque gestiunt, quandoque distrahuntur; et semper inveniunt quod ulterius quaerant. Fere autem ita fit, ut homines leviter et tanquam per ludum experiantur, variando paululum experimenta jam cognita; et, si res non succedat, fastidiendo et conatum deserendo. Quod si magis serio et constanter ac laboriose ad experimenta se accingant, tamen in uno aliquo experimento eruendo operam collocant; quemadmodum Gilbertus in magnete, Chymici in auro.

Therefore, since they err and wander with no certain way, but take counsel only from the occurrence of things, they are carried about to many pursuits, yet they advance little; and now they exult, now they are distracted; and they always find something further to seek. Generally, moreover, it thus happens, that men experiment lightly and as if in play, by varying a little the experiments already known; and, if the thing does not succeed, by becoming fastidious and deserting the attempt. But if they gird themselves to experiments more seriously and constantly and laboriously, yet they bestow their effort on extracting some single experiment; just as Gilbert on the magnet, the Chymists on gold.

Hoc autem faciunt homines instituto non minus imperito quam tenui. Nemo enim alicujus rei naturam in ipsa re feliciter perscrutatur; sed amplianda est inquisitio ad magis communia.

But men do this by a method no less unlearned than meager. For no one successfully scrutinizes the nature of any thing in the thing itself; rather, the inquisition must be amplified to more common things.

Quod si etiam scientiam quandam et dogmata ex experimentis moliantur; tamen semper fere studio praepropero et intempestivo deflectunt ad praxin: non tantum propter usum et fructum ejusmodi praxeos, sed ut in opere aliquo novo veluti pignus sibi arripiant, se non inutiliter in reliquis versaturos: atque etiam aliis se venditent, ad existimationem meliorem comparandam de iis in quibus occupati sunt. Ita fit ut, more Atalantae, de via decedant ad tollendum aureum pomum; interim vero cursum interrumpant, et victoriam emittant e manibus. Verum in experientiae vero curriculo eoque ad nova opera producendo, Divina Sapientia omnino et ordo pro exemplari sumenda sunt.

But if they even strive to fashion a certain science and dogmas out of experiments; yet almost always, with over-hasty and untimely zeal, they deflect toward praxis: not only for the use and fruit of such praxis, but so that in some new work they may, as it were, snatch a pledge for themselves that in the rest they will not be engaged to no purpose; and also that they may vend themselves to others, to procure a better estimation concerning the matters in which they are occupied. Thus it comes to pass that, in the manner of Atalanta, they step off the road to pick up the golden apple; meanwhile they interrupt their course, and let victory slip out of their hands. But in the true course of experience, and in producing new works thereby, Divine Wisdom and order are altogether to be taken as the exemplar.

Deus autem primo die creationis lucem tantum creavit, eique operi diem integrum attribuit; nec aliquid materiati operis eo die creavit. Similiter et ex omnimoda experientia, primum inventio causarum et axiomatum verorum elicienda est: et lucifera experimenta, non fructifera quaerenda. Axiomata autem recte inventa et constituta praxin non strictim sed confertim instruunt; et operum agmina ac turmas post se trahunt.

God, moreover, on the first day of creation created light only, and to that work he assigned a whole day; nor on that day did he create anything of material work. Likewise, from experience of every kind, first the discovery of causes and of true axioms must be elicited; and experiments of light, not of fruit, are to be sought. But axioms rightly discovered and established instruct praxis not narrowly but copiously; and they draw after them ranks and companies of works.

Verum de experiendi viis, quae non minus quam viae judicandi obsessae sunt et interclusae, postea dicemus; impraesentiarum de experientia vulgari, tanquam de mala demonstratione, tantum loquuti. Jam vero postulat ordo rerum, ut de iis quorum paulo ante mentionem fecimus, signis, quod philosophiae et contemplationes in usu male se habeant, et de causis rei primo intuitu tam mirabilis et incredibilis, quaedam subjungamus. Signorum enim notio praeparat assensum: causarum vero explicatio tollit miraculum.

But concerning the ways of experimenting, which are besieged and shut off no less than the ways of judging, we shall speak later; for the present we have spoken only of vulgar (common) experience, as of a bad demonstration. Now, however, the order of things requires that we subjoin certain points about the signs—of which we made mention a little before—that philosophies and contemplations behave ill in use, and about the causes of a matter at first glance so marvelous and incredible. For the notion of the signs prepares assent; but the explication of the causes removes the miracle.

Quae duo ad extirpationem idolorum ex intellectu faciliorem et clementiorem multum juvant.

These two greatly aid the extirpation of idols from the intellect, making it easier and more clement.

LXXI.

71.

Scientiae, quas habemus, fere a Graecis fluxerunt. Quae enim scriptores Romani, aut Arabes, aut recentiores addiderunt, non multa aut magni momenti sunt: et qualiacunque sint, fundata sunt super basin eorum quae inventa sunt a Graecis. Erat autem sapientia Graecorum professoria, et in disputationes effusa: quod genus inquisitioni veritatis adversissimum est.

The sciences which we possess have for the most part flowed from the Greeks. For what the Roman, or Arab, or more recent writers have added is neither many nor of great moment; and whatever they may be, they are founded upon the basis of those things which were discovered by the Greeks. But the wisdom of the Greeks was professorial, and poured out into disputations: a kind most adverse to the inquisition of truth.

Itaque nomen illud sophistarum, quod per contemptum ab iis, qui se philosophos haberi voluerunt, in antiquos rhetores rejectum et traductum est, Gorgiam, Protagoram, Hippiam, Polum, etiam universo generi competit, Platoni, Aristoteli, Zenoni, Epicuro, Theophrasto, et eorum successoribus, Chrysippo, Carneadi, reliquis. Hoc tantum intererat: quod prius genus vagum fuerit et mercenarium, civitates circumcursando, et sapientiam suam ostentando, et mercedem exigendo; alterum vero solennius et generosius, quippe eorum qui sedes fixas habuerunt, et scholas aperuerunt, et gratis philosophati sunt. Sed tamen utrumque genus (licet caetera dispar) professorium erat, et ad disputationes rem deducebat, et sectas quasdam atque haereses philosophiae instituebat et propugnabat: ut essent fere doctrinae eorum (quod non male cavillatus est Dionysius in Platonem) Verba otiosorum senum ad imperitos juvenes.

Therefore that name of sophists, which in contempt by those who wished to be accounted philosophers was cast upon and transferred to the ancient rhetors—Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Polus—does also befit the whole genus, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Theophrastus, and their successors, Chrysippus, Carneades, and the rest. This only made a difference: that the former kind was wandering and mercenary, running about cities, ostentating their wisdom, and exacting a fee; but the latter more solemn and more generous, namely of those who had fixed seats, opened schools, and philosophized gratis. Yet both kinds (though in other respects unlike) were professorial, and brought the matter down to disputations, and instituted and championed certain sects and heresies of philosophy: so that their doctrines were for the most part (as Dionysius not ill scoffed at Plato) “the words of idle old men to unskilled youths.”

At antiquiores illi ex Graecis, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Philolaus, reliqui (nam Pythagoram, ut superstitiosum, omittimus), scholas (quod novimus) non aperuerunt: sed majore silentio, et severius, et simplicius, id est, minore cum affectatione et ostentatione, ad inquisitionem veritatis se contulerunt. Itaque et melius, ut arbitramur, se gesserunt; nisi quod opera eorum a levioribus istis, qui vulgari captui et affectui magis respondent ac placent, tractu temporis extincta sint: tempore (ut fluvio) leviora et magis inflata ad nos devehente, graviora et solida mergente. Neque tamen isti a nationis vitio prorsus immunes erant: sed in ambitionem et vanitatem sectae condendae et aurae popularis captandae nimium propendebant.

But those more ancient among the Greeks—Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Philolaus, the rest (for Pythagoras, as superstitious, we omit)—did not, so far as we know, open schools; but with greater silence, and more severely and more simply, that is, with less affectation and ostentation, they betook themselves to the inquisition of truth. And so they carried themselves, as we deem, the better; except that their works, in the tract of time, have been extinguished by those lighter spirits who more respond to and please the vulgar capacity and affect: time (as a river) conveying down to us the lighter and more inflated, submerging the weightier and the solid. Nor yet were these wholly immune from the vice of their nation; but they too inclined excessively toward the ambition and vanity of founding a sect and of catching the popular breeze.

Pro desperata autem habenda est veritatis inquisitio, cum ad hujusmodi inania deflectat. Etiam non omittendum videtur judicium illud, sive vaticinium potius, sacerdotis Aegyptii de Graecis: Quod semper pueri essent; neque haberent antiquitatem scientiae, aut scientiam antiquitatis. Et certe habent id quod puerorum est; ut ad garriendum prompti sint, generare autem non possint: nam verbosa videtur sapientia eorum, et operum sterilis.

But the inquiry of truth is to be held as desperate, when it turns aside to such inanities. Also that judgment—rather, vaticination—of the Egyptian priest about the Greeks seems not to be omitted: that they were always boys; nor did they have the antiquity of knowledge, or the knowledge of antiquity. And certainly they have that which belongs to boys: that they are prompt for chattering, but cannot beget; for their wisdom seems verbose and sterile of works.

Itaque ex ortu et gente philosophiae quae in usu est, quae capiuntur signa bona non sunt.

Therefore, from the origin and race of the philosophy that is in use, the signs that are taken are not good.

LXXII.

72.

Neque multo meliora sunt signa quae ex natura temporis et aetatis capi possunt, quam quae ex natura loci et nationis. Angusta enim erat et tenuis notitia per illam aetatem vel temporis vel orbis: quod longe pessimum est, praesertim iis qui mnia in experientia ponunt. Neque enim mille annorum historiam, quae digna erat nomine historiae, habebant; sed fabulas et rumores antiquitatis.

Nor are the signs that can be taken from the nature of time and of age much better than those from the nature of place and of nation. For the knowledge in that age was narrow and thin, whether of time or of the orb; which is by far the worst, especially for those who place everything in experience. For they did not have a history of one thousand years that was worthy of the name “history,” but rather fables and rumors of antiquity.

Regionum vero tractuumque mundi exiguam partem noverant: cum omnes hyperboreos, Scythas, omnes occidentales, Celtas indistincte appellarent; nil in Africa ultra citimam Aethiopiae partem, nil in Asia ultra Gangem, multo minus novi orbis provincias, ne per auditum sane aut famam aliquam certam et constantem, nossent; imo et plurima climata et zonae, in quibus populi infiniti spirant et degunt, tanquam inhabitabiles ab illis pronuntiata sint; quinetiam peregrinationes Democriti, Platonis, Pythagorae, non longinquae profecto, sed potius suburbanae, ut magnum aliquid celebrarentur. Nostris autem temporibus, et novi orbis partes complures et veteris orbis extrema undique innotescunt; et in infinitum experimentorum cumulus excrevit. Quare si ex nativitatis aut geniturae tempore (astrologorum more) signa capienda sint, nil magni de istis philosophiis significari videtur.

But of the regions and tracts of the world they knew a scant portion: since they called all the Hyperboreans, the Scythians, all the Westerners, the Celts, without distinction; they knew nothing in Africa beyond the nearest part of Ethiopia, nothing in Asia beyond the Ganges, much less the provinces of the New World—nor indeed even by report or by any certain and constant fame; nay, even very many climates and zones, in which infinite peoples breathe and dwell, were by them pronounced uninhabitable; and moreover the peregrinations of Democritus, Plato, and Pythagoras—by no means long-distance, but rather suburban—were celebrated as something great. But in our own times, both several parts of the New World and the extremities of the Old World on all sides are becoming known; and the cumulus of experiments has grown to infinity. Wherefore, if signs are to be taken from the time of birth or geniture (in the manner of astrologers), nothing of great moment seems to be signified about those philosophies.

LXXIII.

73.

Inter signa, nullum magis certum aut nobile est, quam quod ex fructibus. Fructus enim et opera inventa pro veritate philosophiarum velut sponsores et fidejussores sunt. Atque ex philosophiis istis Graecorum, et derivationibus earum per particulares scientias, jam per tot annorum spatia, vix unum experimentum adduci potest, quod ad hominum statum levandum et juvandum spectet, et philosophiae speculationibus ac dogmatibus vere acceptum referri possit.

Among signs, none is more certain or noble than that which is from fruits. For fruits and works/inventions found are, for the truth of philosophies, as sponsors and sureties. And from those philosophies of the Greeks, and their derivations through particular sciences, now through so many spaces of years, scarcely a single experiment can be adduced which regards the lifting up and aiding of the condition of men, and can be truly credited to the speculations and dogmas of philosophy.

Idque Celsus ingenue ac prudenter fatetur; nimirum, experimenta medicinae primo inventa fuisse, ac postea homines circa ea philosophatos esse et causas indagasse et assignasse; non ordine inverso evenisse, ut ex philosophia et causarum cognitione ipsa experimenta inventa aut deprompta essent. Itaque mirum non erat, apud Aegyptios (qui rerum inventoribus divinitatem et consecrationem attribuerunt) plures fuisse brutorum animalium imagines quam hominum: quia bruta animalia, per instinctus naturales, multa inventa perpererunt; ubi homines, ex sermonibus et conclusionibus rationalibus, pauca aut nulla exhibuerint.

And this Celsus candidly and prudently admits: namely, that the experiments of medicine were first discovered, and afterwards men philosophized about them and searched out and assigned causes; it did not happen in the inverse order, that from philosophy and the cognition of causes the experiments themselves were invented or drawn forth. And so it was not a wonder, among the Egyptians (who attributed divinity and consecration to the inventors of things), that there were more images of brute animals than of men: because brute animals, by natural instincts, brought forth many inventions; whereas men, from discourses and rational conclusions, have exhibited few or none.

At Chymicorum industria nonnulla peperit; sed tanquam fortuito et obiter, aut per experimentorum quandam variationem (ut mechanici solent), non ex arte aut theoria aliqua; nam ea, quam confinxerunt, experimenta magis perturbat, quam juvat. Eorum etiam, qui in magia (quam vocant) naturali versati sunt, pauca reperiuntur inventa; eaque levia, et imposturae propiora. Quocirca, quemadmodum in religione cavetur, ut fides ex operibus monstretur; idem etiam ad philosophiam optime traducitur, ut ex fructibus judicetur et vana habeatur quae sterilis sit: atque eo magis si, loco fructuum uvae et olivae, producat disputationum et contentionum carduos et spinas.

As for the industry of the Chymists, it has brought forth some things; but as it were fortuitously and by the way, or through a certain variation of experiments (as mechanics are wont), not from any art or theory; for that theory which they have concocted confounds experiments rather than helps them. Even among those who have been conversant in so‑called natural magic, few inventions are found; and those are slight, and nearer to imposture. Wherefore, just as in religion provision is made that faith be shown by works, the same is most aptly transferred to philosophy—that it be judged from its fruits, and that what is sterile be held vain: and all the more, if, in place of the fruits of the grape and the olive, it produces the thistles and thorns of disputations and contentions.

LXXIV.

74.

Capienda etiam sunt signa ex incrementis et progressibus philosophiarum et scientiarum. Quae enim in natura fundata sunt, crescunt et augentur: quae autem in opinione, variantur, non augentur. Itaque si istae doctrinae plane instar plantae a stirpibus suis revulsae non essent, sed utero naturae adhaererent atque ab eadem alerentur, id minime eventurum fuisset, quod per annos bis mille jam fieri videmus: nempe, ut scientiae suis haereant vestigiis, et in eodem fere statu maneant, neque augmentum aliquod memorabile sumpserint; quin potius in primo authore maxime floruerint, et deinceps declinaverint.

Signs too must be taken from the increments and progresses of philosophies and sciences. For those things which are founded in nature grow and are augmented; but those in opinion are varied, not augmented. Therefore, if these doctrines had not plainly been torn up, like a plant, from their own roots, but adhered to the womb of nature and were nourished by the same, that would by no means have come to pass which we now see happening for two thousand years: namely, that the sciences cling to their own tracks, and remain in almost the same state, nor have taken any memorable augmentation; nay rather that they flourished most in their first author, and thereafter declined.

In artibus autem mechanicis, quae in natura et experientiae luce fundatae sunt, contra evenire videmus: quae (quamdiu placent) veluti spiritu quodam repletae continuo vegetant et crescunt; primo rudes, deinde commodae, postea excultae, et perpetuo auctae.

In the mechanical arts, however, which are founded in nature and in the light of experience, we see the contrary come to pass: these (so long as they please), as if replete with a certain spirit, continually thrive and grow; at first rude, then commodious, afterwards cultivated, and perpetually augmented.

LXXV.

75.

Etiam aliud signum capiendum est (si modo signi appellatio huic competat; cum potius testimonium sit, atque adeo testimoniorum omnium validissimum); hoc est, propria confessio authorum, quos homines nunc sequuntur. Nam et illi qui tanta fiducia de rebus pronuntiant, tamen per intervalla cum ad se redeunt, ad querimonias de naturae subtilitate, rerum obscuritate, humani ingenii infirmitate, se convertunt. Hoc vero si simpliciter fieret, alios fortasse, qui sunt timidiores, ab ulteriori inquisitione deterrere, alios vero, qui sunt ingenio alacriori et magis fidenti, ad ulteriorem progressum acuere et incitare possit.

Even another sign is to be taken (if only the appellation of sign befits this; since rather it is testimony, and indeed the most valid of all testimonies); namely, the proper confession of the authors whom men now follow. For even those who with such confidence pronounce on matters, yet at intervals, when they come back to themselves, turn to complaints about the subtlety of nature, the obscurity of things, the infirmity of the human wit. Now if this were done simply, it might perhaps deter some, who are more timid, from further inquisition, but others, who are of a more lively and more confident ingenium, it might sharpen and incite to further progress.

Verum non satis illis est de se confiteri, sed quicquid sibi ipsis aut magistris suis incognitum aut intactum fuerit id extra terminos possibilis ponunt, et tanquam ex arte cognitu aut factu impossiblile pronuntiant: summa superbia et invidia suorum inventorum infirmitatem in naturae ipsius calumniam et aliorum omnium desperationem vertentes. Hinc schola Academiae novae, quae acatalepsiam ex professo tenuit, et homines ad sempiternas tenebras damnavit. Hinc opinio, quod formae sive verae rerum differentiae (quae revera sunt leges actus puri) inventu impossibiles sint, et ultra hominem.

Yet it is not enough for them to confess about themselves, but whatever has been unknown or untouched by themselves or their masters they set outside the bounds of the possible, and pronounce it, as though by rule of art, impossible to know or to do: with utmost superbia and envy, turning the infirmity of their own inventions into a calumny against nature herself and into the desperation of all others. Hence the school of the New Academy, which professedly held acatalepsy, and condemned men to sempiternal darkness. Hence the opinion that forms, or the true differences of things (which in truth are the laws of pure act), are impossible to discover, and beyond man.

Hinc opiniones illae in activa et operativa parte: calorem solis et ignis toto genere differre; ne scilicet homines putent se per opera ignis aliquid simile iis quae in natura fiunt educere et formare posse. Hinc illud: compositionem tantum opus hominis, mistionem vero opus solius naturae esse; ne scilicet homines sperent aliquam ex arte corporum naturalium generationem aut transformationem. Itaque ex hoc signo homines sibi persuaderi facile patientur, ne cum dogmatibus non solum desperatis, sed etiam desperationi devotis, fortunas suas et labores misceant.

Hence those opinions in the active and operative part: that the heat of the sun and of fire differ wholly in kind; lest, to wit, men should think that by works of fire they can educe and form something similar to the things that happen in nature. Hence this: that composition is the work of man only, but mixture the work of nature alone; lest, to wit, men should hope for any generation or transformation of natural bodies from art. Therefore from this sign men will readily allow themselves to be persuaded not to mingle their fortunes and their labors with doctrines not only desperate, but even devoted to desperation.

LXXVI.

76.

Neque illud signum praetermittendum est, quod tanta fuerit inter philosophos olim dissensio et scholarum ipsarum varietas: quod satis ostendit, viam a sensu ad intellectum non bene munitam fuisse, cum eadem materia philosophiae (natura scilicet rerum) in tam vagos et multiplices errores abrepta fuerit et distracta. Atque licet hisce temporibus dissensiones et dogmatum diversitates circa principia ipsa, et philosophias integras, ut plurimum extinctae sint; tamen circa partes philosophiae innumerae manent quaestiones et controversiae; ut plane appareat, neque in philosophiis ipsis, neque in modis demonstrationum aliquid certi aut sani esse.

Nor should this sign be passed over, that once there was so great dissension among the philosophers and such variety of the schools themselves: which sufficiently shows that the road from sense to intellect was not well fortified, since the same subject-matter of philosophy (namely the nature of things) was carried off and torn into such wandering and multiple errors. And although in these times dissensions and diversities of dogmas concerning the very principles, and entire philosophies, have for the most part been extinguished; nevertheless, concerning the parts of philosophy, innumerable questions and controversies remain; so that it plainly appears that neither in the philosophies themselves, nor in the methods of demonstration, is there anything certain or sound.

LXXVII.

77.

Quod vero putant homines, in philosophia Aristotelis magnum utique consensum esse; cum post illam editam antiquorum philosophiae cessaverint et exoleverint; ast apud tempora, quae sequuta sunt, nil melius inventum fuerit; adeo ut illa tam bene posita et fundata videatur, ut utrumque tempus ad se traxerit: primo, quod de cessatione antiquarum philosophiarum post Aristotelis opera edita homines cogitant, id falsum est; diu enim postea, usque ad tempora Ciceronis et secula sequentia, manserunt opera veterum philosophorum. Sed temporibus insequentibus, ex inundatione Barbarorum in imperium Romanum, postquam doctrina humana velut naufragium perpessa esset; tum demum philosophiae Aristotelis et Platonis, tanquam tabulae ex materia leviore et minus solida, per fluctus temporum servatae sunt. Illud etiam de consensu fallit homines, si acutius rem introspiciant.

But as to what men suppose—that in Aristotle’s philosophy there is assuredly great consensus; since after it was published the philosophies of the ancients ceased and became obsolete; and that in the times which followed nothing better was discovered; so that it seems so well posited and founded as to have drawn both periods to itself: first, what men think about the cessation of the ancient philosophies after Aristotle’s works were issued, that is false; for long afterwards, down to the times of Cicero and the following centuries, the works of the old philosophers remained. But in the times ensuing, from the inundation of the Barbarians into the Roman Empire, after human learning had, as it were, suffered shipwreck; then at length the philosophies of Aristotle and of Plato, like planks of lighter and less solid material, were preserved through the waves of the times. That point also about consensus deceives men, if they look more acutely into the matter.

Verus enim consensus is est, qui ex libertate judicii (re prius explorata) in idem conveniete consistit. At numerus longe maximus eorum, qui in Aristotelis philosophiam consenserunt, ex praejudicio et authoritate aliorum se illi mancipavit: ut sequacitas sit potius et coitio, quam consensus. Quod si fuisset ille verus consensus et late patens, tantum abest ut consensus pro vera et solida authoritate haberi debeat, ut etiam violentam praesumptionem inducat in contrarium.

For true consensus is that which, from freedom of judgment (the matter first explored), consists in coming together to the same conclusion. But by far the greatest number of those who have assented to Aristotle’s philosophy mancipated themselves to it out of prejudice and the authority of others: so that it is rather sequacity and a coalition than consensus. And if that had been true and wide-ranging consensus, so far is it from being fit to be held as true and solid authority, that it should even induce a violent presumption to the contrary.

Pessimum enim omnium est augurium, quod ex consensu capitur in rebus intellectualibus: exceptis divinis et politicis, in quibus suffragiorum jus est. Nihil enim multis placet, nisi imaginationem feriat, aut intellectum vulgarium notionum nodis astringat, ut supra dictum est. Itaque optime traducitur illud Phocionis a moribus ad intellectualia: Ut statim se examinare debeant homines, quid erraverint aut peccaverint, si multitudo consentiat et complaudat.

For the worst augury of all is that which is taken from consensus in intellectual matters—excepting divine and political matters, in which there is the right of suffrage. For nothing pleases the many unless it strikes the imagination, or binds the intellect with the knots of vulgar notions, as was said above. Therefore that saying of Phocion is most aptly transferred from morals to intellectual matters: that men ought at once to examine themselves as to what they have erred or sinned, if the multitude consents and applauds.

Hoc signum igitur ex aversissimis est. Itaque quod signa veritatis et sanitatis philosophiarum et scientiarum, quae in usu sunt, male se habeant; sive capiantur ex originibus ipsarum, sive ex fructibus, sive ex progressibus, sive ex confessionibus authorum, sive ex consensu; jam dictum est.

This sign, therefore, is among the most adverse. Therefore, that the signs of the truth and soundness of the philosophies and sciences which are in use are in a bad condition; whether they be taken from their origins, or from their fruits, or from their progresses, or from the confessions of the authors, or from consensus; has already been said.

LXXVIII.

78.

Jam vero veniendum ad causas errorum, et tam diuturnae in illis per tot secula morae; quae plurimae sunt et potentissimae: ut tollatur omnis admiratio, haec quae adducimus homines hucusque latuisse et fugisse; et maneat tantum admiratio, illa nunc tandem alicui mortalium in mentem venire potuisse, aut cogitationem cujuspiam subiisse: quod etiam (ut nos existimamus) foelicitatis magis est cujusdam, quam excellentis alicujus facultatis; ut potius pro temporis partu haberi debeat, quam pro partu ingenii.

Now indeed we must come to the causes of errors, and of so long-continued a delay in them through so many ages; which are very many and most potent: so that all admiration may be removed, that these things which we adduce have thus far lain hidden and escaped notice; and only this admiration remain, that they could now at length have come into the mind of some mortal, or have entered into someone’s thought: which also (as we esteem) is rather a matter of a certain felicity than of any excellent faculty; so that it ought rather to be held as the birth of the time than as the birth of ingenuity.

Primo autem tot seculorum numerus, vere rem reputanti, ad magnas angustias recidit. Nam ex viginti quinque annorum centuriis, in quibus memoria et doctrina hominum fere versatur, vix sex centuriae seponi et excerpi possunt, quae scientiarum feraces earumve proventui utiles fuerunt. Sunt enim non minus temporum quam regionum eremi et vastitates.

First, however, the whole number of ages, to one truly reconsidering the matter, falls back into great straits. For out of the 25 centuries of years in which the memory and doctrine of men for the most part are conversant, scarcely 6 centuries can be set apart and culled which have been fertile in the sciences or useful to their growth. For there are deserts and vastitudes no less of times than of regions.

Tres enim tantum doctrinarum revolutiones et periodi recte numerari possunt: una, apud Graecos; altera, apud Romanos; ultima, apud nos, occidentales scilicet Europae nationes: quibus singulis vix duae centuriae annorum merito attribui possunt. Media mundi tempora, quoad scientiarum segetem uberem aut laetam, infelicia fuerunt. Neque enim causa est ut vel Arabum vel scholasticorum mentio fiat: qui per intermedia tempora scientias potius contriverunt numerosis tractatibus, quam pondus earum auxerunt.

For only three revolutions and periods of learning can rightly be counted: one among the Greeks; another among the Romans; the last among us, namely the western nations of Europe: to each of which scarcely two centuries of years can deservedly be attributed. The middle times of the world, so far as concerns a rich or gladsome harvest of the sciences, were ill‑starred. Nor indeed is there any cause that even mention be made either of the Arabs or of the Schoolmen: who during the intermediate times rather ground down the sciences with numerous tractates than increased their weight.

Itaque prima causa tam pusilli in scientiis profectus ad angustias temporis erga illas propitii rite et ordine refertur.

Therefore the first cause of so meager a progress in the sciences is rightly and in order referred to the narrowness of the times that have been propitious toward them.

LXXIX.

79.

At secundo loco se offert causa illa magni certe per omnia momenti: ea videlicet, quod per illas ipsas aetates, quibus hominum ingenia et literae maxime vel etiam mediocriter floruerint, naturalis philosophia minimam partem humanae operae sortita sit. Atque haec ipsa nihilominus pro magna scientiarum matre haberi debet. Omnes enim artes et scientiae, ab hac stirpe revulsae, poliuntur fortasse et in usum effinguntur; sed nil admodum crescunt.

But in the second place there presents itself that cause which is surely of great moment in all respects: namely this, that through those very ages in which the wits of men and letters have most—nay, even but moderately—flourished, natural philosophy has obtained the least share of human labor. And yet this very study ought nevertheless to be held as the great mother of the sciences. For all arts and sciences, torn from this stock, are perhaps polished and fashioned for use; but they scarcely grow at all.

At manifestum est, postquam Christiana fides recepta fuisset et adolevisset, longe maximam ingeniorum praestantissimorum praestantissimorum partem ad theologiam se contulisse; atque huic rei et amplissima praemia proposita, et omnis generis adjumenta copiosissime subministrata fuisse: atque hoc theologiae studium praecipue occupasse tertiam illam partem sive periodum temporis apud nos Europaeos occidentales; eo magis, quod sub idem fere tempus et literae florere, et controversiae circa religionem pullulare coeperint. At aevo superiori, durante periodo illa secunda apud Romanos, potissimae philosophorum meditationes et industriae in morali philosophia (quae ethnicis vice theologiae erat) occupatae et consumptae fuerunt: etiam summa ingenia illis temporibus ut plurimum ad res civiles se applicuerunt, propter magnitudinem imperii Romani, quod plurimorum hominum opera indigebat. At illa aetas, qua naturalis philosophia apud Graecos maxime florere visa est, particula fuit temporis minime diuturna; cum et antiquioribus temporibus septem illi, qui sapientes nominabantur, omnes (praeter Thaletem) ad moralem philosophiam et civilia se applicuerint; et posterioribus temporibus postquam Socrates philosophiam de coelo in terras deduxisset, adhuc magis invaluerit moralis philosophia, et ingenia hominum a naturali averterit.

But it is manifest that, after the Christian faith had been received and had grown up, by far the greatest portion of the most outstanding minds betook themselves to theology; and for this pursuit both very ample rewards were set forth, and aids of every kind were most copiously supplied: and this study of theology especially occupied that third part or period of time among us Western Europeans; all the more, because at nearly the same time both letters began to flourish, and controversies around religion to sprout. But in the earlier age, while that second period among the Romans endured, the chief meditations and industries of the philosophers were occupied and spent in moral philosophy (which for the pagans was in place of theology): even the highest geniuses in those times, for the most part, applied themselves to civil affairs, on account of the magnitude of the Roman empire, which required the labor of many men. But that age in which natural philosophy among the Greeks seemed to flourish most was a portion of time by no means long; since both in earlier times those seven who were called wise men, all (except Thales) applied themselves to moral philosophy and civil affairs; and in later times, after Socrates had brought philosophy down from heaven to earth, moral philosophy gained yet more strength and turned men’s talents away from the natural.

At ipsissima illa periodus temporis, in qua inquisitiones de natura viguerunt, contradictionibus et novorum placitorum ambitione corrupta est, et inutilis reddita. Itaque quandoquidem per tres istas periodos naturalis philosophia majorem in modum neglecta aut impedita fuerit, nil mirum si homines parum in ea re profecerint, cum omnino aliud egerint.

But that very period of time, in which inquiries into nature flourished, was corrupted by contradictions and by the ambition for new doctrines, and rendered useless. Therefore, since through those three periods natural philosophy has been in the greatest measure neglected or impeded, it is no wonder if men have made little progress in that matter, since they have altogether busied themselves with something else.

LXXX.

80.

Accedit et illud, quod naturalis philosophia in iis ipsis viris, qui ei incubuerint, vacantem et integrum hominem, praesertim his recentioribus temporibus, vix nacta sit; nisi forte quis monachi alicujus in cellula, aut nobilis in villula lucubrantis, exemplum adduxerit: sed facta est demum naturalis philosophia instar transitus cujusdam et pontisternii ad alia.

Add also this: that natural philosophy, with those very men who have applied themselves to it, has scarcely found a man free and entire, especially in these more recent times; unless perhaps someone should bring forward as an example some monk in his little cell, or a nobleman in his little villa, lucubrating; but at length natural philosophy has become in the likeness of a certain passage and bridgework to other things.

Atque magna ista scientiarum mater mira indignitate ad officia ancillae detrusa est; quae medicinae aut mathematices operibus ministret, et rursus quae adolescentium immatura ingenia lavet et imbuat velut tinctura quadam prima, ut aliam postea foelicius et commodius excipiant. Interim nemo expectet magnum progressum in scientiis (praesertim in parte earum operativa), nisi philosophia naturalis ad scientias particulares producta fuerit, et scientiae particulares rursus ad naturalem philosophiam reductae. Hinc enim fit, ut astronomia, optica, musica, plurimae artes mechanicae, atque ipsa medicina, atque (quod quis magis miretur) philosophia moralis et civilis, et scientiae logicae, nil fere habeant altitudinis in profundo: sed per superficiem et varietatem rerum tantum labantur: quia, postquam particulares istae scientiae dispertitae et constitutae fuerint, a philosophia naturali non amplius aluntur; quae ex fontibus et veris contemplationibus motuum, radiorum, sonorum, texturae, et schematismi corporum, affectuum, et prehensionum intellectualium, novas vires et augmenta illis impertiri potuerit.

And that great mother of the sciences has, with a wondrous indignity, been thrust down to the offices of a handmaid; to minister to the works of medicine or mathematics, and again to wash and imbue the immature wits of adolescents as with a certain first dye, so that they may afterward more happily and more conveniently receive another. Meanwhile let no one expect great progress in the sciences (especially in their operative part), unless natural philosophy shall have been brought forward to the particular sciences, and the particular sciences in turn brought back to natural philosophy. For hence it comes about that astronomy, optics, music, very many mechanical arts, and medicine itself, and (what one may the more marvel at) moral and civil philosophy, and the logical sciences, have scarcely any depth in the profound; but merely slip along the surface and variety of things: because, after these particular sciences have been partitioned and established, they are no longer nourished from natural philosophy; which, from the fountains and true contemplations of motions, rays, sounds, the texture and schematism of bodies, affections, and intellectual apprehensions, could impart to them new forces and augmentations.

Itaque minime mirum est si scientiae non crescant, cum a radicibus suis sint separatae.

Therefore it is by no means a marvel if the sciences do not grow, since they have been separated from their roots.

LXXXI.

81.

Rursus se ostendit alia causa potens et magna, cur scientiae parum promoverint. Ea vero haec est; quod fieri non possit, ut recte procedatur in curriculo, ubi ipsa meta non recte posita sit et defixa. Meta autem scientiarum vera et legitima non alia est quam ut dotetur vita humana novis inventis et copiis.

Again there presents itself another potent and great cause why the sciences have advanced too little. This in truth is it: that it cannot come to pass that one proceeds rightly on the race-course, where the very goal-post is not rightly set and fixed. But the true and legitimate goal of the sciences is no other than that human life be endowed with new inventions and resources.

At turba longe maxima nihil ex hoc sapit, sed meritoria plane est et professoria; nisi forte quandoque eveniat, ut artifex aliquis acrioris ingenii, et gloriae cupidus, novo alicui invento det operam; quod fere fit cum facultatum dispendio. At apud plerosque tantum abest ut homines id sibi proponant, ut scientiarum et artium massa augmentum obtineat, ut ex ea, quae praesto est, massa nil amplius sumant aut quaerant, quam quantum ad usum professorium aut lucrum aut existimationem aut hujusmodi compendia convertere possint. Quod si quis ex tanta multitudine scientiam affectu ingenuo et propter se expetat; invenietur tamen ille ipse potius contemplationum et doctrinarum varietatem, quam veritatis severam et rigidam inquisitionem sequi.

But the far greatest crowd savors nothing of this; it is plainly mercenary and professorial—unless perhaps it should sometime occur that some artificer of keener ingenium, and desirous of glory, applies himself to some new invention; which almost always is done with a dispendium of resources. Yet with the majority it is so far from being their aim that the mass of the sciences and arts should obtain augment, that from the mass which is at hand they take or seek nothing more than so much as they can convert to professorial use, or to profit, or to estimation, or to compendia of the like sort. But if anyone out of so great a multitude should seek knowledge with an ingenuous affection and for its own sake, he will nevertheless be found to follow rather a variety of contemplations and doctrines than a severe and rigid inquisition of truth.

Rursus, si alius quispiam fortasse veritatis inquisitor sit severior; tamen et ille ipse talem sibi proponet veritatis conditionem, quae menti et intellectui satisfaciat in redditione causarum rerum quae jampridem sunt cognitae; non eam, quae nova operum pignora, et novam axiomatum lucem assequatur. Itaque, si finis scientiarum a nemine adhuc bene positus sit, non mirum est si in iis, quae sunt subordinata ad finem, sequatur aberatio.

Again, if perchance some other inquirer into truth be more severe; yet that very man also will set before himself such a condition of truth as may satisfy the mind and intellect in the rendering of the causes of things long since known, not that which attains new pledges of works and a new light of axioms. Therefore, if the end of the sciences has by no one as yet been well set, it is no wonder if in those things which are subordinate to the end there follows an aberration.

LXXXII.

82.

Quemadmodum autem finis et meta scientiarum male posita sunt apud homines; ita rursus etiamsi illa recte posita fuissent, viam tamen sibi delegerunt omnino erroneam et imperviam. Quod stupore quodam animum rite rem reputanti perculserit; non ulli mortalium curae aut cordi fuisse, ut intellectui humano ab ipso sensu et experientia ordinata et bene condita via aperiretur et muniretur; sed omnia vel traditionum caligini, vel argumentorum vertigini et turbini, vel casus et experientiae vagae et inconditae undis et ambagibus permissa esse. Atque cogitet quis sobrie et diligenter, qualis sit ea via, quam in inquisitione et inventione alicujus rei homines adhibere consueverunt.

Just as the end and boundary of the sciences have been ill set among men; so again, even if those had been rightly set, nevertheless they chose for themselves a way altogether erroneous and impassable. Which has smitten with a kind of astonishment anyone who rightly reckons the matter in his mind; that it has been neither a care nor at heart to any of mortals to have a way opened and fortified for the human intellect, from sense itself and experience, ordered and well-founded; but that all things have been handed over either to the murk of traditions, or to the vertigo and whirlwind of arguments, or to the waves and windings of chance and of wandering and ill-constituted experience. And let one think soberly and diligently what sort of way it is which men are wont to employ in the inquisition and invention of anything.

Et primo notabit proculdubio inveniendi modum simplicem et inartificiosum, qui hominibus maxime est familiaris. Hic autem non alius est, quam ut is, qui se ad inveniendum aliquid comparat et accingit, primo quae ab aliis circa illa dicta sint inquirat et evolvat; deinde propriam meditationem addat, atque per mentis multam agitationem spiritum suum proprium sollicitet, et quasi invocet, ut sibi oracula pandat: quae res omnino sine fundamento est, et in opinionibus tantum volvitur.

And first he will note, without a doubt, the simple and inartificial mode of discovery, which is most familiar to men. This is none other than that he who prepares and girds himself to discover something should first inquire into and peruse what has been said by others concerning those matters; then add his own meditation, and through much agitation of mind solicit his own spirit, and as it were invoke it, that it may lay open oracles to him: a proceeding which is altogether without foundation, and revolves only in opinions.

At alius quispiam dialecticam ad inveniendum advocet, quae nomine tenus tantum ad id quod agitur pertinet. Inventio enim dialecticae non est principiorum et axiomatum praecipuorum, ex quibus artes constant, sed eorum tantum quae illis consentanea videntur. Dialectica enim magis curiosos et importunos, et sibi negotium facessentes, eamque interpellantes de probationibus et inventionibus principiorum, sive axiomatum primorum, ad fidem, et veluti sacramentum cuilibet arti praestandum, notissimo responso rejicit.

But someone else will summon dialectic to aid in invention, which pertains to the matter in hand only in name. For the invention of dialectic is not of principles and chief axioms, from which the arts consist, but only of those things which seem consonant with them. For dialectic rather rejects, with the most well-known reply, the curious and the importunate—those who make trouble for themselves and interrupt her about the proofs and the discoveries of principles, or of first axioms—namely, that to each art faith must be given, and, as it were, a sacrament pledged.

Restat experientia mera: quae, si occurrat, casus; si quaesita sit, experimentum nominatur. Hoc autem experientiae genus nihil aliud est, quam (quod aiunt) scopae dissolutae, et mera palpatio, quali homines noctu utuntur, omnia pertentando, si forte in rectam viam incidere detur; quibus multo satius et consultius foret diem praestolari, aut lumen accendere, et deinceps viam inire. At contra, verus experientiae ordo primo lumen accendit, deinde per lumen iter demonstrat, incipiendo ab experientia ordinata et digesta, et minime praepostera aut erratica, atque ex ea educendo axiomata, atque ex axiomatibus constitutis rursus experimenta nova; quum nec verbum divinum in rerum massam absque ordine operatum sit.

There remains mere experience: which, if it occurs, is called chance; if it is sought, it is called experiment. But this kind of experience is nothing else than (as they say) an unbound broom, and mere groping, such as men use at night, trying everything, if perchance it may be granted to stumble upon the right road; for whom it would be much better and more advised to await day, or to light a lamp, and thereafter to enter upon the way. By contrast, the true order of experience first lights a light, then by the light demonstrates the path, beginning from experience that is ordered and digested, and by no means preposterous or erratic, and from it drawing out axioms, and from the axioms established in turn new experiments; since not even the divine Word worked upon the mass of things without order.

Itaque desinant homines mirari si spatium scientiarum non confectum sit, cum a via omnino aberraverint; relicta prorsus et deserta experientia, aut in ipsa (tanquam in labyrintho) se intricando, et circumcursando; cum rite institutus ordo per experientiae sylvas ad aperta axiomatum tramite constanti ducat.

Therefore let men cease to marvel if the course of the sciences has not been completed, since they have altogether strayed from the path; experience having been entirely left and abandoned, or by entangling themselves in it (as in a labyrinth) and running around; whereas a duly instituted order leads through the forests of experience to the open fields of axioms by a constant track.

LXXXIII.

83.

Excrevit autem mirum in modum istud malum ex opinione quadam, sive aestimatione inveterata, verum tumida et damnosa; minui nempe mentis humanae majestatem, si experimentis, et rebus particularibus sensui subjectis et in materia detriminatis, diu ac multum versetur: praesertim quum hujusmodi res ad inquirendum laboriosae, ad meditandum ignobiles, ad dicendum asperae, ad practicam illiberales, numero infinitae, et subtilitate tenues esse soleant. Itaque jam tandem huc res rediit, ut via vera non tantum deserta, sed etiam interclusa et obstructa sit; fastidita experientia, nedum relicta, aut male administrata.

But this evil has grown in a wondrous manner from a certain opinion, or inveterate estimation—indeed swollen and baneful—that the majesty of the human mind is diminished, if it long and much busies itself with experiments and with particular things subject to sense and determined in matter; especially since things of this kind are wont to be laborious for inquiry, ignoble for meditation, harsh for speech, illiberal for practice, infinite in number, and slight in subtlety. Therefore now at last the matter has come to this: that the true way is not only deserted, but even shut off and obstructed; experience being scorned, not to say abandoned, or ill-administered.

LXXXIV.

84.

Rursus vero homines a progressu in scientiis detinuit et fere incantavit reverentia antiquitatis, et virorum, qui in philosophia magni habiti sunt, authoritas, atque deinde consensus. Atque de consensu superius dictum est.

Again, indeed, reverence for antiquity, and the authority of men who have been held great in philosophy, and then consensus, has detained men from progress in the sciences and has almost enchanted them. And about consensus it was said above.

De antiquitate autem opinio, quam homines de ipsa fovent, negligens omnino est, etvix verbo ipsi congrua. Mundi enim senium et gradaevitas pro antiquitate vere habenda sunt; quae temporibus nostris tribui debent, non juniori aetati mundi, qualis apud antiquos fuit. Illa enim aetas, respectu nostri, antiqua et major; respectu mundi ipsius, nova et minor fuit.

Concerning antiquity, however, the opinion which men foster about it is altogether careless, and scarcely congruent with the word itself. For the senescence and great age of the world are what ought truly to be accounted antiquity; which ought to be attributed to our times, not to the younger age of the world such as it was among the ancients. For that age, in respect to us, was ancient and greater; in respect to the world itself, it was new and lesser.

Atque revera quemadmodum majorem rerum humanarum notitiam et maturius judicium ab homine sene expectamus quam a juvene, propter experientiam et rerum, quas vidit, et audivit, et cogitavit, varietatem et copiam; eodem modo et a nostra aetate (si vires suas nosset, et experiri et intendere vellet) majora multo quam a priscis temporibus expectari par est; utpote aetate mundi grandiore, et infinitis experimentis et observationibus aucta et cumulata.

And indeed, just as we expect from an old man rather than from a young man a greater knowledge of human affairs and a more mature judgment, because of experience and the variety and abundance of things he has seen and heard and thought; in the same way also from our own age (if it knew its own powers, and were willing to try and to apply itself) far greater things than from former times ought rightly to be expected; inasmuch as it is an older age of the world, augmented and heaped up by infinite experiments and observations.

Neque pro nihilo aestimandum, quod per longinquas navigationes et peregrinationes (quae seculis nostris increbuerunt) plurima in natura patuerint, et reperta sint, quae novam philosophiae lucem immittere possint. Quin et turpe hominibus foret, si globi materialis tractus, terrarum videlicet, marium, astrorum, nostris temporibus immensum aperti et illustrati sint; globi autem intellectualis finis inter veterum inventa et angustias cohibeantur.

Nor is it to be reckoned as nothing, that through long voyages and peregrinations (which in our ages have increased) very many things in nature have stood open and have been found, which can send in a new light of philosophy. Nay, it would even be disgraceful for men, if the tracts of the material globe, namely of lands, seas, and stars, in our times have been immensely opened and illuminated; but the boundary of the intellectual globe should be confined within the inventions and straits of the ancients.

Authores vero quod attinet, summae pusillanimitatis est authoribus infinita tribuere, authori autem authorum, atque adeo omnis authoritatis, Tempori, jus suum denegare. Recte enim Veritas Temporis filia dicitur, non Authoritatis. Itaque mirum non est, si fascina ista antiquitatis et authorum et consensus, hominum virtutem ita ligaverint, ut cum rebus ipsis consuescere (tanquam maleficiati) non potuerint.

As for the Authors, it is of the greatest pusillanimity to attribute infinite things to Authors, but to deny to the Author of authors, and indeed of all Authority, Time, its right. For Truth is rightly called the daughter of Time, not of Authority. Therefore it is no marvel, if these fascinations of antiquity and of authors and of consensus have so bound the virtue of men that they have not been able to grow accustomed to the things themselves (as if bewitched).

LXXXV.

85.

Neque solum admiratio antiquitatis, authoritatis, et consensus, hominum industriam in iis, quae jam inventa sunt, acquiescere compulit; verum etiam operum ipsorum admiratio, quorum copia jampridem facta est humano generi. Etenim quum quis rerum varietatem, et pulcherrimum apparatum qui per artes mechanicas ad cultum humanum congestus et introductus est, oculis subjecerit, eo certe inclinabit, ut potius ad opulentiae humanae admirationem, quam ad inopiae sensum accedat; minime advertens primitivas hominis observationes atque naturae operationes (quae ad omnem illam varietatem instar animae sunt, et primi motus) nec multas, nec alte petitas esse; caetera ad patientiam hominum tantum, et subtilem et ordinatum manus vel intrumentorum motum, pertinere. Res enim (exempli gratia) subtilis est certe et accurata confectio horologiorum, talis scilicet, quae coelestia in rotis, pulsum animalium in motu successivo et ordinato, videatur imitari; quae tamen res ex uno aut altero naturae axiomate pendet.

Not only has the admiration of antiquity, authority, and consensus compelled human industry to acquiesce in those things which are already discovered; but also the admiration of the works themselves, the abundance of which has long since been furnished to the human race. For when one sets before his eyes the variety of things and the most beautiful apparatus which through the mechanical arts has been heaped up and introduced for human culture, he will certainly incline rather to an admiration of human opulence than to an awareness of want; by no means noticing that man’s primitive observations and nature’s operations (which, for all that variety, are as it were the soul and the first motions) are neither numerous nor sought from deep sources; the rest pertains only to the patience of men, and to the subtle and orderly motion of the hand or of instruments. For the fabrication of clocks, for example, is certainly a subtle and accurate thing—one, namely, that seems to imitate the heavens in its wheels and the pulse of animals in successive and ordered movement—yet this matter depends upon one or two axioms of nature.

Quod si quis rursus subtilitatem illam intueatur quae ad artes liberales pertinet; aut etiam eam quae ad corporum naturalium praeparationem per artes mechanicas spectat, et hujusmodi res suspiciat; veluti inventionem motuum coelestium in astronomia, concentuum in musica, literarum alphabeti (quae etiam adhuc in regno Sinarum in usu non sunt) in grammatica; aut rursus in mechanicis, factorum Bacchi et Cereris, hoc est, praeparationum vini et cervisiae, panificiorum, aut etiam mensae delitiarum, et distillationum, et similium: ille quoque, si secum cogitet, et animum advertat, per quantos temporum circuitus (cum haec omnia, praeter distillationes, antiqua fuerint) haec ad eam, quam nunc habemus, culturam perducta sint, et (ut jam de horologiis dictum est) quam parum habeant ex observationibus et axiomatibus naturae, atque quam facile, et tanquam per occasiones obvias et contemplationes incurrentes, ista inveniri potuerint: ille (inquam) ab omni admiratione se facile liberabit, et potius humanae conditionis miserebitur, quod per tot secula tanta fuerit rerum et inventorum penuria et sterilitas. Atque haec ipsa tamen, quorum nunc mentionem fecimus, inventa, philosophia et artibus intellectus antiquiora fuerunt: adeo ut(si verum dicendum sit) cum hujusmodi scientiae rationales et dogmaticae inceperint, inventio operum utilium desierit.

But if someone again contemplate that subtlety which pertains to the liberal arts; or even that which looks to the preparation of natural bodies by the mechanical arts, and admire matters of this kind; as, for example, the discovery of celestial motions in astronomy, of harmonies in music, of the letters of the alphabet (which even now are not in use in the Kingdom of China) in grammar; or again in mechanics, the works of Bacchus and Ceres, that is, the preparations of wine and beer, panifications (bread-making), or even delicacies of the table, and distillations, and the like: he also, if he reflect with himself and give heed, through how many circuits of times (since all these things, except distillations, were ancient) these have been brought to that culture which we now have, and (as has already been said about clocks) how little they have from observations and axioms of nature, and how easily, and as it were through obvious occasions and contemplations occurring incidentally, those things could have been discovered: he, I say, will easily free himself from all admiration, and will rather pity the condition of man, because through so many ages there has been so great a penury and sterility of things and inventions. And yet these very discoveries, of which we have now made mention, were more ancient than philosophy and the arts of the intellect: so that(if the truth must be spoken) when such rational and dogmatic sciences began, the invention of useful works ceased.

Quod si quis ab officinis ad bibliothecas se converterit, et immensam, quam videmus, librorum varietatem in admiratione habuerit, is, examinatis et diligentius introspectis ipsorum librorum materiis et contentis, obstupescet certe in contrarium; et postquam nullum dari finem repetitionibus observaverit, quamque homines eadem agant et loquantur, ab admiratione varietatis transibit ad miraculum indigentiae et paucitatis earum rerum quae hominum mentes adhuc tenuerunt et occuparunt.

But if someone should turn himself from the workshops to the libraries, and should hold in admiration the immense variety of books which we see, he—once the materials and contents of the books themselves have been examined and more diligently inspected—will surely be stupefied to the contrary; and after he has observed that no end is given to repetitions, and how men do and say the same things, he will pass from admiration of variety to a marvel at the indigence and paucity of those things which have thus far held and occupied the minds of men.

Quod si quis ad intuendum ea, quae magis curiosa habentur quam sana, animum submiserit, et alchymistarum aut magorum opera penitius introspexerit, is dubitabit forsitan utrum risu an lachrymis potius illa digna sint. Alchymista enim spem alit aeternam, atque ubi res non succedit errores proprios reos substituit; secum accusatorie reputando, se aut artis aut authorum vocabula non satis intellexisse, unde ad traditiones et auriculares susurros animum applicat; aut in practicae suae scrupulis et momentis aliquid titubatum esse, unde experimenta in infinitum repetit: ac interim quum inter experimentorum sortes in quaedam incidit aut ipsa facie nova aut utilitate non contemnenda; hujusmodi pignoribus animum pascit, eaque in majus ostentat et celebrat: reliqua spe sustentat. Neque tamen negandum est, alchymistas non pauca invenisse, et inventis utilibus homines donasse.

If anyone should lower his mind to contemplate those things which are held to be more curious than sound, and should look more deeply into the works of the alchemists or the magi, he will perhaps doubt whether they are rather worthy of laughter or of tears. For the alchemist nourishes eternal hope, and whenever the matter does not succeed he substitutes his own errors as the guilty parties; reckoning with himself accusatorily that he has not sufficiently understood the terms of the art or of the authors, whence he applies his mind to traditions and auricular whispers; or that there has been some stumbling in the scruples and moments of his practice, whence he repeats experiments into infinity: and meanwhile, when among the chances of experiments he falls upon certain things either new in their very face or not to be despised for their utility, with pledges of this kind he feeds his mind, and he ostentates and celebrates them into something greater; the rest he sustains by hope. Nor, however, is it to be denied that the alchemists have discovered not a few things, and have endowed men with useful inventions.

Verum fabula illa non male in illos quadrat de sene, qui filiis aurum in vinea defossum (sed locum se nescire simulans) legaverit; unde illi vineae fodiendae diligenter incubuerunt, et aurum quidem nullum repertum, sed vindemia ex ea cultura facta est uberior.

But that fable fits them not badly about the old man who bequeathed to his sons gold buried in the vineyard (while feigning that he did not know the place); whence they diligently applied themselves to digging the vineyard, and indeed no gold was found, but the vintage, from that cultivation, was more abundant.

At naturalis magiae cultores, qui per rerum sympathias et antipathias omnia expediunt, ex conjecturis otiosis et supinissimis, rebus virtutes et operationes admirabiles affinxerunt; atque si quando opera exhibuerint, ea illius sunt generis, ut ad admirationem et novitatem, non ad fructum et utilitatem, accommodata sint.

But the cultivators of natural magic, who through the sympathies and antipathies of things resolve everything, from idle and most supine conjectures have affixed to things admirable virtues and operations; and if ever they have exhibited works, they are of such a kind as to be accommodated to admiration and novelty, not to fruit and utility.

In superstitiosa autem magia (si et de hac dicendum sit) illud inprimis animadvertendum est, esse tantummodo certi cujusdam et definiti generis subjecta, in quibus artes curiosae et superstitiosae, per omnes nationes atque aetates atque etiam religiones, aliquid potuerint aut luserint. Itaque ista missa faciamus. Interim nil mirum est, si opinio copiae causam inopiae dederit.

In superstitious magic (if even about this we should speak), this first of all is to be observed: that there are only subjects of a certain and definite kind, in which curious and superstitious arts, through all nations and ages and even religions, have been able to effect something or to play their games. Therefore let us dismiss those matters. Meanwhile, it is no wonder if the opinion of abundance has given rise to want.

LXXXVI.

86.

Atque hominum admirationi, quoad doctrinas et artes, per se satis simplici et prope puerili, incrementum accessit ab eorum astu et artificio qui scientias tractaverunt et tradiderunt. Illi enim ea ambitione et affectatione eas proponunt, atque in eum modum efformatas ac veluti personatas in hominum conspectum producunt, ac si illae omni ex parte perfectae essent et ad exitum perductae. Si enim methodum aspicias et partitiones, illae prorsus omnia complecti et concludere videntur, quae in illud subjectum cadere possunt.

And to the admiration of men, with regard to doctrines and arts—of itself quite simple and almost puerile—there came an increment from the cunning and artifice of those who have handled and handed down the sciences. For they present them with such ambition and affectation, and bring them forth into the view of men as fashioned in that way and, as it were, personated, as if they were in every respect perfect and brought to a consummation. For if you look to the method and the partitions, they seem altogether to comprehend and to conclude everything that can fall under that subject.

Atque licet membra illa male impleta et veluti capsulae inanes sint; tamen apud intellectum vulgarem scientiae formam et rationem integrae prae se ferunt.

And although those members are ill-filled and, as it were, empty capsules; yet to the vulgar intellect they display the form and rationale of an entire science.

At primi et antiquissimi veritatis inquisitores, meliore fide et fato, cognitionem illam, quam ex rerum contemplatione decerpere, et in usum recondere statuebant, in aphorismos, sive breves easdemque sparsas nec methodo revinctas sententias, conjicere solebant; neque se artem universam complecti simulabant aut profitebantur. At eo quo nunc res agitur modo, minime mirum est, si homines in iis ulteriora non quaerant, quae pro perfectis et numeris suis jampridem absolutis traduntur.

But the first and most ancient inquisitors of truth, with better faith and fortune, were wont to cast that knowledge which they resolved to pluck from the contemplation of things and lay up for use into aphorisms, that is, brief sentences, likewise scattered and not bound by method; nor did they pretend or profess to embrace the whole art. But in the way in which the matter is now managed, it is by no means a marvel if men do not seek further in those things which are handed down as perfect and long since completed to their full measure.

LXXXVII.

87.

Etaim antiqua magnum existimationis et fidei incrementum acceperunt ex eorum vanitate et levitate, qui nova proposuerunt; praesertim in philosophiae naturalis parte activa et operativa. Neque enim defuerunt homines vaniloqui et phantastici, qui partim ex credulitate, partim ex impostura, genus humanum promissis onerarunt: vitae prolongationem, senectutis retardationem, dolorum levationem, naturalium defectuum reparationem, sensuum deceptiones, affectuum ligationes et incitationes, intellectualium facultatum illuminationes et exaltationes, substantiarum transmutationes, et motuum ad libitum roborationes et multiplicationes, aeris impressiones et alterationes, coelestium influentiarum deductiones et procurationes, rerum futurarum divinationes, remotarum repraesentationes, occultarum revelationes, et alia complura pollicitando et ostentando. Verum de istis largitoribus non multum aberraverit, qui istiusmodi judicium fecerit, tantum nimirum in doctrinis philosophiae inter horum vanitates et veras artes interesse, quantum inter res gestas Julii Caesaris, aut Alexandri Magni, et res gestas Amadicii ex Gallia, aut Arthuri ex Britannia, in historiae narrationibus intersit.

Even the ancient things received a great increment of estimation and faith from the vanity and levity of those who proposed novelties; especially in the active and operative part of natural philosophy. For there have not been lacking vainglorious and fantastical men who, partly out of credulity, partly out of imposture, have burdened the human race with promises: the prolongation of life, the retardation of old age, the alleviation of pains, the reparation of natural defects, deceptions of the senses, ligations and incitations of the affections, illuminations and exaltations of the intellectual faculties, transmutations of substances, and strengthenings and multiplications of motions at will, impressions and alterations of the air, drawings-down and procurations of celestial influences, divinations of future things, representations of remote things, revelations of occult things, and many other things, by promising and ostentating. But concerning these lavish promisers, he will not have much erred who shall have made such a judgment: that just so much, in the doctrines of philosophy, there is between the vanities of these men and the true arts, as there is, in the narrations of history, between the deeds of Julius Caesar or Alexander the Great and the deeds of Amadis of Gaul or Arthur of Britain.

Inveniuntur enim clarissimi illi imperatores revera majora gessisse, quam umbratiles isti heroes etiam fecisse fingantur; sed modis et viis scilicet actionum minime fabulosis et prodigiosis. Neque propterea aequum est verae memoriae fidem derogari, quod a fabulis illa quandoque laesa sit et violata. Sed interim minime mirum est, si propositionibus novis (praesertim cum mentione operum) magnum sit factum praejudicium per istos impostores, qui similia tentaverunt; cum vanitatis excessus et fastidium etiam nunc omnem in ejusmodi conatibus magnanimitatem destruxerit.

For those most illustrious commanders are found in truth to have accomplished greater things than those shadowy heroes are even feigned to have done; yet by modes and ways of action by no means fabulous and prodigious. Nor on that account is it equitable that credit be derogated from true memory, because it has at times been injured and violated by fables. But meanwhile it is by no means a wonder if, upon new propositions (especially with mention of works), great prejudice has been wrought by those impostors who attempted similar things; since an excess of vanity and a distaste have even now destroyed every magnanimity in endeavors of that kind.

LXXXVIII.

88.

At longe majora a pusillanimitate, et pensorum, quae humana industria sibi proposuit, parvitate et tenuitate, detrimenta in scientias invecta sunt. Et tamen (quod pessimum est) pusillanimitas ista non sine arrogantia et fastidio se offert.

But far greater detriments have been brought into the sciences by pusillanimity, and by the smallness and tenuity of the tasks which human industry has proposed to itself. And yet (what is worst) this pusillanimity presents itself not without arrogance and disdain.

Primum enim, omnium artium illa reperitur cautela jam facta familiaris, ut in qualibet arte authores artis suae infirmitatem in naturae calumniam vertant; et quod ars ipsorum non assequitur, id ex eadem arte impossibile in natura pronunciant. Neque certe damnari potest ars, si ipsa judicet. Etiam philosophia, quae nunc in manibus est, in sinu suo posita quaedam fovet, aut placita, quibus (si diligentius inquiratur) hoc hominibus omnino persuaderi volunt; nil ab arte, vel hominis opere, arduum, aut in naturam imperiosum et validum, expectari debere; ut de heterogenia caloris astri et ignis, et mistione, superius dictum est.

First, indeed, that precaution is found to have already become familiar to all the arts: namely, that in any art the authors turn the infirmity of their own art into a calumny against nature; and what their art does not attain, that they pronounce, from that same art, to be impossible in nature. Nor, assuredly, can an art be condemned, if it itself is judge. Even philosophy, which is now in our hands, fosters within its own bosom certain positions, or placita, by which (if one inquire more diligently) they wish altogether to persuade men of this: that nothing arduous, or imperious and strong over nature, ought to be expected from art, or from the work of man; as concerning the heterogeneity of the heat of a star and of fire, and of mixture, was said above.

Quae si notentur accuratius, omnino pertinent ad humanae potestatis circumscriptionem malitiosam, et ad quaesitam et artificiosam desperationem, quae non solum spei auguria turbet, sed etiam omnes industriae stimulos et nervos incidat, atque ipsius experientiae aleas abjiciat; dum de hoc tantum solliciti sint, ut ars eorum perfecta censeatur; gloriae vanissimae et perditissimae dantes operam, scilicet ut quicquid adhuc inventum et comprehensum non sit, id omnino nec inveniri, nec comprehendi posse in futurum credatur. At si quis rebus addere se et novum aliquid reperire conetur, ille tamen omnino sibi proponet et destinabit unum aliquod inventum (nec ultra) perscrutari et eruere; ut magnetis naturam, maris fluxum et refluxum, thema coeli, et hujusmodi, quae secreti aliquid habere videntur, et hactenus parum feliciter tractata sint: quum summae sit imperitiae, rei alicujus naturam in se ipsa perscrutari; quandoquidem eadem natura, quae in aliis videtur latens et occulta, in aliis manifesta sit et quasi palpabilis, atque in illis admirationem, in his ne attentionem quidem moveat; ut fit in natura consistentiae, quae in ligno vel lapide non notatur, sed solidi appellatione transmittitur, neque amplius de fuga separationis aut solutionis continuitatis inquiritur; at in aquarum bullis eadem res videtur subtilis et ingeniosa; quae bullae se conjiciunt in pelliculas quasdam, in hemisphaerii formam curiose effictas, ut ad momentum temporis evitetur solutio continuitatis.

Which things, if they be noted more accurately, altogether pertain to a malicious circumscription of human power, and to a sought-out and artificial desperation, which not only disturbs the auguries of hope, but also cuts the goads and sinews of all industry, and throws away the hazards of experience; while they are anxious only about this, that their art be judged perfect; giving their effort to a most vain and most ruinous glory, namely that whatever has not yet been invented and comprehended be believed altogether neither able to be discovered nor to be comprehended in the future. But if anyone tries to add himself to affairs and to find something new, yet he will altogether set before himself and determine to scrutinize and unearth some one invention (and not beyond), as the nature of the magnet, the sea’s flood and ebb, the turning of the heaven, and things of this kind, which seem to have something of secret in them and have hitherto been handled with little felicity: whereas it is of the utmost unskilfulness to investigate the nature of any thing in itself; since the same nature which seems latent and occult in some things is in others manifest and as it were palpable, and in those moves admiration, in these not even attention; as happens in the nature of consistency, which in wood or stone is not noted, but is passed over with the appellation of “solid,” nor is there further inquiry about the flight from separation or the solution of continuity; but in the bubbles of waters the same matter seems subtle and ingenious; which bubbles cast themselves into certain little skins, curiously fashioned in the form of a hemisphere, so that for a moment of time the solution of continuity may be avoided.

Atque prorsus illa ipsa, quae habentur pro secretis, in aliis habent naturam manifestam et communem; quae nunquam se dabit conspiciendam, si hominum experimenta aut contemplationes in illis ipsis tantum versentur. Generaliter autem et vulgo, in operibus mechanicis habentur pro novis inventis, si quis jampridem inventa subtilius poliat, vel ornet elegantius, vel simul uniat et componat, vel cum usu commodius copulet, aut opus majore, aut etiam minore, quam fieri consuevit, mole vel volumine exhibeat, et similia.

And altogether those very things which are held as secrets have in other cases a manifest and common nature; which will never offer itself to be seen, if the experiments or contemplations of men are occupied only in those very things. Generally, however, and commonly, in mechanical works things are accounted as new inventions, if someone more subtly polishes things long since invented, or adorns them more elegantly, or at the same time unites and composes them, or couples them more conveniently with use, or exhibits the work in a greater, or even a lesser, mass or volume than is wont to be done, and the like.

Itaque minime mirum est, si nobila et genere humano digna inventa in lucem extracta non sint, quum homines hujusmodi exiguis pensis et puerilibus contenti et delectati fuerint; quinetiam in iisdem se magnum aliquod sequutos, aut assequutos putaverint.

Therefore it is by no means a wonder, if inventions noble and worthy of the human race have not been brought to light, since men have been content and delighted with such petty and puerile tasks; nay even have supposed that in these very things they were following after, or had attained, something great.

LXXXIX.

89.

Neque illud praetermittendum est, quod nacta sit philosophia naturalis per omnes aetates adversarium molestum et difficilem; superstitionem nimirum, et zelum religionis caecum et immoderatum. Etenim videre est apud Graecos, eos, qui primum causas naturales fulminis et tempestatum insuetis adhuc hominum auribus proposuerunt, impietatis in deos eo nomine damnatos: nec multo melius a nonnullis antiquorum patrum religionis Christianae exceptos fuisse eos, qui ex certissimis demonstrationibus (quibus nemo hodie sanus contradixerit) terram rotundam esse posuerunt, atque ex consequenti antipodas esse asseruerunt.

Nor must this be passed over: that natural philosophy through all ages has encountered a troublesome and difficult adversary—namely superstition, and a blind and immoderate zeal of religion. For it is to be seen among the Greeks that those who first proposed to the as-yet-unaccustomed ears of men the natural causes of lightning and storms were on that account condemned of impiety toward the gods; nor were those who, from the most certain demonstrations (to which no sane man today would contradict), posited that the earth is round and, in consequence, asserted that there are antipodes, received much better by certain of the ancient fathers of the Christian religion.

Quinetiam, ut nunc sunt res, conditio sermonum de natura facta est durior et magis cum periculo, propter theologorum scholasticorum summas et methodos; qui cum theologiam (satis pro potestate) in ordinem redegerint, et in artis formam effinxerint, hoc insuper effecerunt, ut pugnax et spinosa Aristotelis philosophia corpori religionis, plus quam par erat, immisceretur.

Moreover, as matters now stand, the condition of discourses on nature has been made harder and more perilous, because of the Summae and methods of the scholastic theologians; who, when they had reduced theology (so far as lay in their power) into order and fashioned it into the form of an art, brought it further to pass that the pugnacious and thorny philosophy of Aristotle was intermingled with the body of religion more than was fitting.

Eodem etiam spectant (licet diverso modo) eorum commentationes, qui veritatem Christianae religionis ex principiis ex authoritatibus philosophorum deducere et confirmare haud veriti sunt; fidei et sensus conjugium tanquam legitimum multa pompa et solennitate celebrates, et grata rerum varietate animos hominum permulcentes; sed interim divina humanis, impari conditione, permiscentes. At in hujusmodi misturis theologiae cum philosophia, ea tantum, quae nunc in philosophia recepta sunt, comprehenduntur; sed nova, licet in melius mutata, tantum non summoventur et exterminantur.

Eodem etiam spectant (though in a different mode) the commentations of those who did not hesitate to deduce and confirm the truth of the Christian religion from the principles and authorities of the philosophers; celebrating the conjugium of faith and sense as legitimate with much pomp and solemnity, and with a pleasing variety of matters soothing the minds of men; but meanwhile commixing the divine with the human, on unequal terms. But in mixtures of this sort of theology with philosophy, only those things are comprehended which are now received in philosophy; while new things, although changed for the better, are all but removed and exterminated.

Denique invenias, ex quorundam theologorum imperitia, aditum alicui philosophiae, quamvis emendatae, pene interclusum esse. Alii siquidem simplicius subverentur, ne forte altior in naturam inquisitio ultra concessum sobrietatis terminum penetret; traducentes et perperam torquentes ea, quae de divinis mysteriis in Scripturis sacris adversus rimantes secreta divina dicuntur, ad occulta naturae, quae nullo interdicto prohibentur. Alii callidus conjiciunt et animo versant, si media ignorentur, singula ad manum et virgulam divinam (quod religionis, ut putant, maxime intersit) facilius posse referri: quod nihil aliud est, quam Deo per mendacium gratificari velle.

Finally, you may find that, from the inexperience of certain theologians, the access to some philosophy, although emended, has been almost blocked. For some indeed, more simply, are overawed, lest perhaps a higher inquiry into nature penetrate beyond the granted limit of sobriety; transferring and perversely twisting to the hidden things of nature—which are prohibited by no interdict—those things which, concerning the divine mysteries, are said in the Holy Scriptures against those prying into divine secrets. Others cleverly conjecture and revolve in their mind that, if the middle causes are ignored, individual things can more easily be referred to the hand and the divine rod (which, as they think, is of the greatest concern to religion): which is nothing else than to wish to gratify God by a lie.

Alii ab exemplo metuunt, ne motus et mutationes circa philosophiam in religionem incurrant ac desinant. Alii denique solliciti videntur, ne in naturae inquisitione aliquid inveniri possit, quod religionem (praesertim apud indoctos) subvertat, aut saltem labefactet. At isti duo posteriores metus nobis videntur omnino sapientiam animalem sapere; ac si homines, in mentis suae recessibus et secretis cogitationibus de firmitudine religionis, et fidei in sensum imperio diffiderent ac dubitarent; et propterea ab inquisitione veritatis in naturalibus periculum illis impendere metuerent.

Others, from precedent, fear lest motions and mutations concerning philosophy run into and terminate in religion. Others finally seem anxious lest in the inquisition of nature something could be found which might subvert religion (especially among the unlearned), or at least shake it. But these two latter fears seem to us altogether to savor of animal wisdom; as if men, in the recesses of their mind and in their secret cogitations, distrusted and doubted the firmness of religion and the empire of faith over sense; and therefore feared that peril might impend for them from the inquisition of truth in things natural.

At vere rem reputanti, philosophia naturalis, post verbum Dei, certissima superstitionis medicina est; eademque probatissimum fidei alimentum. Itaque merito religioni donatur tanquam fidissima ancilla: cum altera voluntatem Dei, altera potestatem manifestet. Neque enim erravit Ille, quit dixit; erratis, nescientes Scripturas et potestatem Dei: informationem de voluntate et meditationem de potestate nexu individuo commiscens et copulans.

But indeed, to one who truly reckons the matter, natural philosophy, after the word of God, is the surest medicine for superstition; and the same is the most approved nourishment of faith. Therefore with good reason it is bestowed upon religion as a most faithful handmaid: since the one displays the will of God, the other His power. Nor did He err who said; “You err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God”: commixing and coupling information concerning the will and meditation concerning the power with an indivisible nexus.

Interim minus mirum est, si naturalis philosophiae incrementa cohibita sint; cum religio, quae plurimum apud animos hominum pollet, per quorundam imperitiam et zelum incautum in partem contrariam transierit et abrepta fuerit.

Meanwhile it is less a marvel if the increments of natural philosophy have been restrained; since religion, which wields the most power with the minds of men, through the ignorance of certain persons and incautious zeal has passed over into the contrary side and has been swept away.

XC.

90.

Rursus in moribus et institutis scholarum, academiarum, collegiorum, et similium conventuum, quae doctorum hominum sedibus et eruditionis culturae destinata sunt, omnia progressui scientiarum adversa inveniuntur. Lectiones enim et exercitia ita sunt disposita, ut aliud a consuetis haud facile cuiquam in mentem veniat cogitare aut contemplari. Si vero unus aut alter fortasse judicii libertate uti sustinuerit, is sibi soli hanc operam imponere possit; ab aliorum autem consortio nihil capiet utilitatis.

Rursus, in the customs and institutions of schools, academies, colleges, and similar assemblies, which are destined for the seats of learned men and for the cultivation of erudition, all things are found adverse to the progress of the sciences. For the lectures and exercises are so arranged that anything other than the customary hardly comes into anyone’s mind to think or to contemplate. But if perhaps one or another has dared to use the liberty of judgment, he may be able to impose this endeavor upon himself alone; from the fellowship of others, however, he will derive nothing of utility.

Sin et hoc toleraverit, tamen in capessenda fortuna industriam hanc et magnanimitatem sibi non levi impedimento fore experietur. Studia enim hominum in ejusmodi locis in quorundam authorum scripta, veluti in carceres, conclusa sunt; a quibus si quis dissentiat, continuo ut homo turbidus et rerum novarum cupidus corripitur. At magnum certe discrimen inter res civiles et artes: non enim idem periculum a novo motu et a nova luce.

But if he has endured this too, yet in the pursuit of fortune he will find this industry and magnanimity to be for himself no light impediment. For the studies of men in places of that kind are enclosed, as if in prisons, within the writings of certain authors; and if anyone dissents from them, he is immediately seized upon as a turbulent man and a lover of novelties. But there is assuredly a great discrimination between civil affairs and the arts: for the peril is not the same from a new movement and from a new light.

Verum in rebus civilibus mutatio etiam in melius suspecta est ob perturbationem; cum civilia authoritate, consensu, fama, et opinione, non demonstratione, nitantur. In artibus autem et scientiis, tanquam in metalli fodinis, omnia novis operibus et ulterioribus progressibus circumstrepere debent. Atque secundum rectam rationem res ita se habet, sed interim non ita vivtur: sed ista, quam diximus, doctrinarum administratio et politia scientiarum augmenta durius premere consuevit.

But in civil matters, change even for the better is suspect on account of perturbation; since civil affairs rely on authority, consensus, fame, and opinion, not on demonstration. But in the arts and sciences, as in mines of metal, all things ought to resound with new works and further progresses. And according to right reason the matter stands thus, but meanwhile it is not so lived: rather that administration of doctrines, and the polity of the sciences which we mentioned, has been accustomed to press more harshly upon the augmentations of the sciences.

XCI.

91.

Atque insuper licet ista invidia cessaverit; tamen satis est ad cohibendum augmentum scientiarum, quod hujusmodi conatus et industriae praemiis careant. Non enim penes eosdem est cultura scientiarum et praemium. Scientiarum enim augmenta a magnis utique ingeniis proveniunt; at pretia et praemia scientiarum sunt penes vulgus aut principes viros, qui (nisi raro admodum) vix mediocriter docti sunt.

And moreover, even if that envy has ceased; nevertheless it is sufficient to restrain the augmentation of the sciences, that endeavors and industry of this kind lack rewards. For neither the cultivation of the sciences nor the prize is in the same hands. For the augmentations of the sciences assuredly proceed from great wits; but the prices and rewards of the sciences are in the hands of the common crowd or of leading men, who (except very rarely) are scarcely moderately learned.

Quinetiam hujusmodi progressus non solum praemiis et beneficentia hominum, verum etiam ipsa populari laude destituti sunt. Sunt enim illi supra captum maximae partis hominum, et ab opinionum vulgarium ventis facile obruuntur et extinguuntur. Itaque nil mirum, si res illa non foeliciter successerit, quae in honore non fuit.

Moreover, progress of this kind is deprived not only of the rewards and beneficence of men, but even of popular praise itself. For they are above the grasp of the greatest part of men, and are easily overwhelmed and extinguished by the winds of vulgar opinions. Therefore, no marvel if that affair has not succeeded felicitously, which was not in honor.

XCII.

92.

Sed longe maximum progressibus scientiarum, et novis pensis ac provinciis in iisdem suscipiendis, obstaculum deprehenditur in desperatione hominum, et suppositione impossibilis. Solent enim viri prudentes et severi in hujusmodi rebus plane diffidere: naturae obscuritatem, vitae brevitatem, sensuum fallacias, judicii infirmitatem, experimentorum difficultates, et similia secum reputantes. Itaque existimant, esse quosdam scientiarum, per temporum et aetatum mundi revolutiones, fluxus et refluxus; cum aliis temporibus crescant et floreant, aliis declinent et jaceant: ita tamen, ut cum ad certum quendam gradum et statum pervenerint, nil ulterius possint.

But by far the greatest obstacle to the advances of the sciences, and to the undertaking of new tasks and provinces within the same, is discovered in the despair of men and in the supposition of impossibility. For prudent and severe men are wont in matters of this kind plainly to distrust, reckoning with themselves the obscurity of nature, the brevity of life, the fallacies of the senses, the infirmity of judgment, the difficulties of experiments, and the like. Therefore they think that there are, through the revolutions of the times and ages of the world, certain fluxes and refluxes of the sciences; that at some times they grow and flourish, at others they decline and lie prostrate: yet in such wise that, when they have come to a certain degree and state, they can do nothing further.

Itaque si quis majora credat aut spondeat, id putant esse cujusdam impotentis et immaturi animi; atque hujusmodi conatus initia scilicet laeta, media ardua, extrema confusa habere. Atque cum hujusmodi cogitationes eae sint, quae in viros graves et judicio praestantes facile cadant, currandum revera est, ne rei optimae et pulcherrimae amore capti severitatem judicii relaxemus, aut minuamus; et sedulo videndum, quid spei affulgeat, et ex qua parte se ostendat; atque auris levioribus spei rejectis, eae, quae plus firmitudinis habere videntur, omnino discutiendae sunt et pensitandae. Quinetiam prudentia civilis ad consilium vocanda est et adhibenda, quae ex praescripto diffidit, et de rebus humanis in deterius conjicit.

And so if anyone believes or promises greater things, they think that to be of a certain impotent and immature spirit; and that attempts of this kind have, namely, beginnings joyful, middles arduous, ends confused. And since such thoughts are those which readily befall grave men and men excelling in judgment, care must indeed be taken lest, captivated by love of the best and most beautiful thing, we relax or diminish the severity of judgment; and we must diligently see what of hope gleams forth, and from what quarter it shows itself; and, the lighter breezes of hope being rejected, those which seem to have more firmness must altogether be examined and weighed. Moreover, civil prudence must be called to counsel and employed, which by rule is distrustful, and conjectures the worse concerning human affairs.

Itaque jam et de spe dicendum est; praesertim cum nos promissores non simus, nec vim aut insidias hominum judiciis faciamus aut struamus, sed homines manu et sponte ducamus. Atque licet longe potentissimum futurum sit remedium ad spem imprimendam, quando homines ad particularia, praesertim in tabulis nostris inveniendi digesta et disposita (quae partim ad secundam, sed multo magis ad quartam Instaurationis nostrae partem pertinent), adducemus; cum hoc ipsum sit non spes tantum, sed tanquam res ipsa: tamen ut omnia clementius fiant, pergendum est in instituto nostro de praeparandis hominum mentibus; cujus praeparationis ista ostensio spei pars est non exigua. Nam absque ea, reliqua faciunt magis ad contristationem hominum (scilicet, ut deteriorem et viliorem habeant de iis, quae jam in usu sunt, opinionem, quam nunc habent, et suae conditionis infortunium plus sentiant et pernoscant), quam ad alacritatem aliquam inducendam, aut industriam experiendi acuendam.

Accordingly now we must also speak of hope; especially since we are not promisers, nor do we employ force or lay ambushes for men’s judgments, but lead men by the hand and of their own accord. And although by far the most potent remedy for impressing hope will be, when we bring men to particulars, especially in our Tables of Discovery, digested and disposed (which pertain in part to the second, but much more to the fourth part of our Instauration); since this is not hope only, but as it were the thing itself: nevertheless, that all things may be done more gently, we must proceed in our design of preparing men’s minds; of which preparation this exposition of hope is no small part. For without it, the rest make rather for the saddening of men (namely, that they should have a worse and meaner opinion of those things which are now in use than they now have, and should feel and come to know more the misfortune of their condition), than for inducing any alacrity, or for sharpening an industry of experimenting.

Itaque conjecturae nostrae, quae spem in hac re faciunt probabilem, aperiendae sunt et proponendae: sicut Columbus fecit, ante navigationem illam suam mirabilem maris Atlantici: cum rationes adduxerit, cur ipse novas terras et continentes praeter eas, quae ante cognitae fuerunt, inveniri posse confideret: quae rationes, licet primo rejectae, postea tamen experimento probatae sunt, et rerum maximarum causae et initia fuerunt.

Therefore our conjectures, which render the hope in this matter probable, must be laid open and proposed: just as Columbus did before that marvelous navigation of his over the Atlantic Sea, when he adduced reasons why he confided that new lands and continents, besides those which had previously been known, could be discovered; which reasons, although at first rejected, were afterwards proved by experiment, and were the causes and beginnings of the greatest things.

XCIII.

93.

Principium autem sumendum a Deo: hoc nimirum quod agitur, propter excellentem in ipso boni naturam, manifeste a Deo esse, qui author boni, et pater luminum est. In operationibus autem divinis, initia quaeque tenuissima exitum certo trahunt. Atque quod de spiritualibus dictum est, Regnum Dei non venit cum observatione, id etiam in omni majore opere Providentiae evenire reperitur; ut omnia sine strepitu et sonitu placide labantur, atque res plane agatur priusquam homines eam agi putent aut advertant.

But the beginning must be taken from God: namely, that which is being carried on, on account of the excellent nature of the good in Him, is manifestly from God, who is the author of good and the father of lights. In divine operations, even the most tenuous beginnings draw a sure outcome. And what has been said concerning spiritual things, The Kingdom of God does not come with observation, is found to occur also in every greater work of Providence; so that all things glide placidly without din and sound, and the matter is plainly transacted before men think it is being transacted or take notice.

Neque omittenda est prophetia Danielis de ultimis mundi temporibus; Multi pertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia: manifeste innuens et significans, esse in fatis, id est, in Providentia, ut pertransitus mundi (qui per tot longinquas navigationes impletus plane aut jam in opere esse videtur) et augmenta scientiarum in eandem aetatem incidant.

Nor should the prophecy of Daniel concerning the last times of the world be omitted: “Many shall pass through, and knowledge shall be manifold”; plainly intimating and signifying that it is in the fates, that is, in Providence, that the traversal of the world (which through so many long-distant navigations appears plainly either to have been fulfilled or already to be in the working) and the augmentations of the sciences should coincide in the same age.

XCIV.

94.

Sequitur ratio omnium maxima ad faciendam spem; nempe ex erroribus temporis praeteriti et viarum adhuc tentatarum. Optima enim est ea reprehensio, quam de statu civili haud prudenter administrato quispiam his verbis complexus est: Quod ad praeterita pessimum est, id ad futura optimum videri debet. Si enim vos omnia, quae ad officium vestrum spectant, praestitissetis, neque tamen res vestrae in meliore loco essent; ne spes quidem ulla reliqua foret, eas in melius provehi posse.

The greatest reason of all follows for creating hope; namely, from the errors of past time and of the ways hitherto attempted. For the best reprehension is that which someone, concerning a civil state not prudently administered, has embraced in these words: As to what is worst in the past, that ought to seem best for the future. For if you had performed everything which pertains to your office, and yet your affairs were in no better position, not even any hope would remain that they could be promoted into a better condition.

Sed cum rerum vestrarum status, non a vi ipsa rerum, sed ab erroribus vestris male se habeat; sperandum est, illis erroribus missis aut correctis, magnam rerum in melius mutationem fieri posse. Simili modo, si homines per tanta annorum spatia viam veram inveniendi et colendi scientias tenuissent, nec tamen ulterius progredi potuissent; audax proculdubio et temeraria foret opinio, posse rem in ulterius provehi. Quod si in via ipsa erratum sit, atque hominum opera in iis consumpta, in quibus minime oportebat; sequitur ex eo, non in rebus ipsis difficultatem oriri, quae potestatis nostrae non sunt, sed in intellectu humano ejusque usu et applicatione; quae res remedium et medicinam suscipit.

But since the condition of your affairs is in a bad way, not from the force of the things themselves, but from your errors; it is to be hoped that, those errors dismissed or corrected, a great mutation of things for the better can be made. In a similar way, if men over so great a span of years had held to the true way of finding and cultivating the sciences, and yet had not been able to advance further; it would, beyond doubt, be a bold and rash opinion that the matter could be carried further. But if there has been error in the very way, and the labors of men have been consumed on those things on which it least ought to have been; it follows from this that the difficulty arises not in the things themselves, which are not in our power, but in the human intellect and its use and application; a matter which admits remedy and medicine.

Itaque optimum fuerit illos ipsos errores proponere: quot enim fuerint errorum impedimenta in praeterito, tot sunt spei argumenta in futurum. Ea vero licet in his, quae superius dicta sunt, non intacta omnino fuerint; tamen ea etiam nunc breviter, verbis nudis ac simplicibus, repraesentare visum est.

Therefore it will be best to propose those very errors: for as many impediments of errors as there were in the past, so many are arguments of hope for the future. These matters indeed, although in what has been said above they have not been altogether left untouched; nevertheless it has seemed good even now to represent them briefly, in bare and simple words.

XCV.

95.

Qui tractaverunt scientias aut empirici aut dogmatici fuerunt. Empirici, formicae more, congerunt tantum, et utuntur: rationales, aranearum more, telas ex se conficiunt: apis vero ratio media est, quae materiam ex floribus horti et agri elicit; sed tamen eam propria facultate vertit et digerit. Neque absimile philosophiae verum opificium est; quod nec mentis viribus tantum aut praecipue nititur, neque ex historia naturali et mechanicis experimentis praebitam materiam, in memoria integram, sed in intellectu mutatam et subactam, reponit.

Those who have handled the sciences have been either empirics or dogmatics. The empirics, after the manner of ants, merely gather and use; the rationalists, after the manner of spiders, weave webs out of themselves; but the method of the bee is a middle one, which draws its material from the flowers of the garden and the field, yet by its own faculty transforms and digests it. Nor is the true workmanship of philosophy dissimilar: for it relies neither on the powers of the mind only or chiefly, nor does it store the material furnished by natural history and mechanical experiments whole in the memory, but lays it up in the intellect changed and subdued (wrought upon).

Itaque ex harum facultatum (experimentalis scilicet et rationalis) arctiore et sanctiore foedere (quod adhuc factum non est) bene sperandum est.

Therefore, from a stricter and more sacred covenant of these faculties (namely the experimental and the rational) (which has not yet been made), good hope is to be had.

XCVI.

96.

Naturalis philosophia adhuc sincera non invenitur, sed infecta et corrupta: in Aristotelis schola, per logicam, in Platonis schola, per theologiam naturalem; in secunda schola Platonis, Procli, et aliorum, per mathematicam; quae philosophiam naturalem terminare, non generare aut procreare debet. At ex philosophia naturali pura et impermista meliora speranda sunt.

Natural philosophy is not yet found sincere, but infected and corrupted: in Aristotle’s school, through logic; in Plato’s school, through natural theology; in the second school of Plato, of Proclus, and of others, through mathematics; which ought to terminate natural philosophy, not generate or procreate it. But from pure and unmixed natural philosophy better things are to be hoped.

XCVII.

97.

Nemo adhuc tanta mentis constantia et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi imposuerit theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et aequum ad particularia de integro applicare. Itaque ratio illa humana, quam habemus, ex multa fide, et multo etiam casu, nec non ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago quaedam est et congeries.

No one has yet been found of such constancy and rigor of mind as to have decreed and imposed upon himself to abolish utterly the theories and common notions, and to apply an abraded and even intellect anew to particulars. Therefore that human reason which we have, from much faith, and much also accident, and likewise from the childish notions which we first imbibed, is a certain farrago and congeries.

Quod si quis aetate matura, et sensibus integris, et mente repurgata, se ad experientiam et ad particularia de integro applicet, de eo melius sperandum est. Atque hac in parte nobis spondemus fortunam Alexandri Magni: neque quis nos vanitatis arguat, antequam exitum rei audiat, quae ad exuendam omnem vanitatem spectat.

If anyone of mature age, with senses intact and a mind purged, should apply himself anew to experience and to particulars, there is better hope to be had of him. And in this respect we pledge to ourselves the fortune of Alexander the Great; nor let anyone accuse us of vanity before he hears the outcome of the matter, which aims at stripping off all vanity.

Etenim de Alexandro et ejus rebus gestis Aeschines ita loquutus est: Nos certe vitam mortalem non vivimus; sed in hoc nati sumus, ut posteritas de nobis portenta narret et praedicet: perinde ac si Alexandri res gestas pro miraculo habuisset.

For indeed, about Alexander and his achievements Aeschines spoke thus: We certainly do not live a mortal life; but for this we were born, that posterity may relate and proclaim prodigies about us; just as if he had held Alexander’s achievements as a miracle.

At aevis sequentibus Titus Livius melius rem advertit et introspexit, atque de Alexandro hujusmodi quippiam dixit: Eum non aliud quam bene ausum vana contemnere. Atque simile etiam de nobis judicium futuris temporibus factum iri existimamus: Nos nil magni fecisse; sed tantum ea, quae pro magnis habentur, minoris fecisse. Sed interim (quod jam diximus) non est spes nisi in regeneratione scientiarum; ut eae scilicet ab experientia certo ordine excitentur et rursus condantur: quod adhuc factum esse aut cogitatum nemo (ut arbitramur) affirmaverit.

But in following ages Titus Livius adverted to the matter and looked into it better, and said something of this sort about Alexander: that he had done nothing other than dared well to contemn vanities. And we think that a similar judgment will be made also about us in future times: that we have done nothing great; but only have made of less account those things which are held as great. But meanwhile (as we have already said) there is no hope except in the regeneration of the sciences; namely that they be elicited from experience in a sure order and again be established: which as yet no one (as we suppose) will affirm to have been done or even conceived.

XCVIII.

98.

Atque experientiae fundamenta (quando ad hanc omnino deveniendum est) aut nulla, aut admodum infirma adhuc fuerunt; nec particularium sylva et materies, vel numero, vel genere, vel certitudine, informando intellectui competens, aut ullo modo sufficiens, adhuc quaesita est et congesta. Sed contra homines docti (supini sane et faciles) rumores quosdam experientiae, et quasi famas et auras ejus, ad philosophiam suam vel constituendam vel confirmandam exceperunt, atque illis nihilominus pondus legitimi testimonii attribuerunt. Ac veluti si regnum aliquod aut status non ex literis et relationibus a legatis et nuntiis fide dignis missis, sed ex urbanorum sermunculis et ex triviis consilia sua et negotia gubernaret; omnino talis in philosphiam administratio, quatenus ad experientiam, introducta est.

And the foundations of experience (since we must altogether come down to this) have thus far been either none or very feeble; nor has the forest and material of particulars, whether in number, in kind, or in certainty, suitable for informing the intellect, or in any way sufficient, as yet been sought out and heaped together. But on the contrary learned men (truly supine and facile) have caught up certain rumors of experience, as it were its reports and breezes, for the establishing or confirming of their philosophy, and nevertheless have attributed to them the weight of legitimate testimony. And as if a kingdom or a state were to govern its counsels and affairs not from letters and relations sent by legates and trustworthy messengers, but from the little street-talk of townsfolk and from the crossways; altogether such an administration into philosophy, so far as concerns experience, has been introduced.

Nil debitis modis exquisitum, nil verificatum, nil numeratum, nil appensum, nil dimensum in naturali historia reperitur. At quod in observatione indefinitum et vagum, id in informatione fallax et infidum est. Quod si cui haec mira dictu videantur, et querelae minus justae propiora, cum Aristoteles tantus ipse vir, et tanti regis opibus subnixus, tam accuratam de animalibus historiam confecerit, atque alii nonnulli majore diligentia (licet strepitu minore) multe adjecerint, et rursus alii de plantis, de metallis, et fossilibus, historias et narrationes copiosas conscripserint; is sane non satis attendere et perspicere videtur, quid agatur in praesentia.

Nothing by due modes has been exquisitely investigated, nothing verified, nothing numbered, nothing weighed, nothing measured is found in natural history. But what in observation is indefinite and vague, that in information is fallacious and untrustworthy. But if to anyone these things seem strange to say, and nearer to less just complaints, since Aristotle, so great a man himself and supported by the resources of so great a king, composed so accurate a history of animals, and certain others with greater diligence (though with less noise) have added many things, and again others concerning plants, metals, and fossils have written copious histories and narrations; he surely seems not sufficiently to attend to and to discern what is being transacted at the present.

Alia enim est ratio naturalis historiae, quae propter se confecta est; alia ejus, quae collecta est ad informandum intellectum in ordine ad condendam philosophiam. Atque hae duae historiae tum aliis rebus, tum praecipue in hoc differunt; quod prima ex illis specierum naturalium varietatem, non artium mechanicarum experimenta contineat. Quemadmodum enim in civilibus ingenium cujusque, et occultus animi affectuumque sensus, melius elicitur, cum quis in perturbatione ponitur, quam alias: simili modo, et occulta naturae magis se produnt per vexationes artium, quam cum cursu suo meant.

For the rationale is one in the case of a natural history composed for its own sake; another in that which is collected for informing the intellect with a view to founding philosophy. And these two histories differ both in other matters and chiefly in this: that the former of them contains the variety of natural species, not the experiments of the mechanical arts. For just as in civil affairs the disposition of each person, and the hidden sense of the mind and of the affections, is better elicited when someone is placed in perturbation than otherwise, in a similar manner the occult things of nature disclose themselves more through the vexations of the arts than when they go along by their own course.

Itaque tum demum bene sperandum est de naturali philosophia, postquam historia naturalis (quae ejus basis est et fundamentum) melius instructa fuerit; antea vero minime.

Therefore then at last there is good hope for natural philosophy, after natural history (which is its basis and foundation) shall have been better equipped; before that, indeed, not at all.

XCIX.

99.

Atque rursus in ipsa experimentorum mechanicorum copia, summa eorum, quae ad intellectus informationem maxime faciunt et juvant, detegitur inopia. Mechanicus enim, de veritatis inquisitione nullo modo sollicitus, non ad alia quam quae operi suo subserviunt aut animum erigit aut manum porrigit. Tum vero de scientiarum ulteriore progressu spes bene fundabitur, quum in Historiam Naturalem recipientur et aggregabuntur complura experimenta, quae in se nullius sunt usus, se ad inventionem causarum et axiomatum tantum faciunt; quae nos lucifera experimenta, ad differentiam fructiferorum, appellare consuevimus.

And again, in the very abundance of mechanical experiments, there is detected the utmost scarcity of those which most conduce to the informing of the intellect. For the mechanic, in no way solicitous about the inquiry of truth, neither lifts his mind nor stretches forth his hand to anything other than what subserves his work. Then indeed hope for the further progress of the sciences will be well founded, when into Natural History there shall be received and aggregated many experiments which in themselves are of no use, but serve only for the invention of causes and axioms; which we have been accustomed to call luciferous experiments, in distinction from fructiferous.

Illa autem miram habent in se virtutem et conditionem; hanc videlicet, quod nunquam fallant aut frustrentur. Cum enim ad hoc adhibeantur, non ut opus aliquod efficiant sed ut causam naturalem in aliquo revelent, quaquaversum cadunt, intentioni aeque satisfaciunt; cum quaestionem terminent.

Those, moreover, have within themselves a marvelous virtue and condition; namely this: that they never deceive or frustrate. For when they are applied to this, not to effect some work but to reveal the natural cause in some particular, whithersoever they fall they equally satisfy the intention; since they bring the question to a close.

100.

At non solum copia major experimentorum quaerenda est et procuranda, atque etiam alterius generis, quam adhuc factum est; sed etiam methodus plane alia et ordo et processus continuande et provehendae Experientiae introducenda. Vaga enim Experientia et se tantum sequens (ut superius dictum est) mera palpatio est, et homines potius stupefacit quam informat. At cum Experientia lege certa procedet, seriatim et continenter, de scientiis aliquid melius sperari poterit.

But not only must a greater supply of experiments be sought and procured, and also of another kind than has been done thus far; but a plainly different method and order and process for the continuing and advancing of Experience must likewise be introduced. For Wandering Experience, following only itself (as was said above), is mere groping, and amazes men rather than informs them. But when Experience shall proceed by a fixed law, in series and continuously, something better may be hoped for concerning the sciences.

CI.

101.

Postquam vero copia et materies Historiae Naturalis et Experientiae, talis qualis ad opus intellectus sive ad opus philosophicum requiritur, praesto jam sit et parata; tamen nullo modo sufficit intellectus, ut in illam materiem agat sponte et memoriter; non magis, quam si quis computationem alicujus ephemeridis memoriter se tenere et superare posse speret. Atque hactenus tamen potiores meditationis partes quam scriptionis in inveniendo fuerunt; neque adhuc Experientia literata facta est: atqui nulla nisi de scripto inventio probanda est. Illa vero in usum inveniente, ab Experientia facta demum literata melius sperandum.

But after the supply and the material of Natural History and of Experience, such as is required for the work of the intellect or for the philosophical work, is now at hand and prepared; yet in no way does the intellect suffice to act upon that material spontaneously and from memory; no more than if someone should hope to retain by memory and carry through the computation of some ephemeris. And hitherto, however, the parts of meditation have been preferred to those of writing in discovering; nor has Experience yet been made literate: and yet no invention is to be approved except on the basis of writing. But when that comes into use for the discoverer, from Experience at length made literate there is better hope.

CII.

102.

Atque insuper cum tantus sit particularium numerus et quasi exercitus, isque ita sparsus et diffusus, ut intellectum disgreget et confundat, de velitationibus et levibus motibus et transcursibus intellectus non bene sperandum est; nisi fiat instructio et coordinatio, per tabulas inveniendi idoneas et bene dispositas et tanquam vivas, eorum quae pertinent ad subjectum in quo versatur inquisitio, atque ad harum tabularum auxilia praeparata et digesta mens applicetur.

And moreover, since so great is the number of particulars, and as it were an army, and it is so scattered and diffused as to disaggregate and confound the intellect, there is no good hoping from skirmishes and light motions and rapid sallies of the intellect; unless there be made an instruction and a coordination, through tables of discovery suitable, well disposed, and as if living, of those things which pertain to the subject in which the inquiry is occupied; and the mind be applied to the aids of these tables, prepared and digested.

CIII.

103.

Verum post copiam particularium rite et ordine veluti sub oculos positorum, non statim transeundum est ad inquisitionem et inventionem novorum particularium aut operum; aut saltem, si hoc fiat, in eo non acquiescendum. Neque enim negamus, postquam omnia omnium artium experimenta collecta et digesta fuerint atque ad unius hominis notitam et judicium pervenerint, quin ex ipsa traductione experimentorum unius artis in alias multa nova inveniri possint ad humanam vitam et statum utilia, per istam Experientiam quam vocamus Literatam: sed tamen minora de ea speranda sunt; majora vero a nova luce Axiomatum ex particularibus illis certa via et regula eductorum, quae rursus nova particularia indicent et designent. Neque enim in plano via sita est, sed ascendendo et descendendo; ascendendo primo ad Axiomata, descendendo ad Opera.

However, after an abundance of particulars has been duly and in order, as it were, set beneath the eyes, one must not straightway pass to the inquiry and invention of new particulars or of works; or at least, if this be done, one must not rest in it. For we do not deny that, after all the experiments of all the arts have been collected and digested and have come to the knowledge and judgment of a single man, many new things can be discovered, useful to human life and estate, from the very transfer of experiments from one art into others, through that Experience which we call Learned: yet lesser things are to be hoped from it; but greater from a new light of Axioms, drawn from those particulars by a sure way and rule, which in turn indicate and designate new particulars. For the road does not lie on the level, but by ascending and descending: ascending first to Axioms, descending to Works.

CIV.

104.

Neque tamen permittendum est, ut intellectus a particularibus ad axiomata remota et quasi generalissima (qualia sunt principia, quae vocant, artium et rerum) saliat et volet; et ad eorum immotam veritatem axiomata media probet et expediat: quod adhuc factum est, prono ad hoc impetu naturali intellectus, atque etiam ad hoc ipsum, per demonstrationes quae fiunt per syllogismum, jampridem edocto et assuefacto. Sed de scientiis tum demum bene sperandum est, quando per scalam veram, et per gradus continuos et non intermissos aut hiulcos, a particularibus ascendetur ad axiomata minora, et deinde ad media, alia aliis superiora, et postremo demum ad generalissima. Etenim axiomata infirma non multum ab experientia nuda discrepant.

Nor, however, must it be allowed that the intellect should leap and fly from particulars to remote axioms and, as it were, the most general (such as the principles, as they call them, of the arts and of things), and on the basis of their immovable truth prove and unfold the middle axioms: which is what has been done hitherto, the intellect being by a natural impulse prone to this, and even for this very purpose long since taught and accustomed by demonstrations made through the syllogism. But of the sciences good hope is then and only then to be had, when by a true ladder, and by continuous degrees not interrupted or gaping, one shall ascend from particulars to lesser axioms, and then to middle ones, some higher than others, and only at the last to the most general. For weak axioms do not differ much from naked experience.

Suprema vero illa et generalissima (quae habentur) notionalia sunt et abstracta, et nil habent solidi. At media sunt axiomata illa vera et solida et viva, in quibus humanae res et fortunae sitae sunt; et supra haec quoque, tandem ipsa illa generalissima; talia scilicet quae non abstracta sint, sed per haec media vere limitantur.

The supreme and those most general (which are held) are notional and abstract, and have nothing solid. But the middle axioms are those true and solid and living ones, in which human affairs and fortunes are situated; and above these also, finally those very most general—namely such as are not abstract, but are truly limited through these middle ones.

Itaque hominum intellectui non plumae addendae, sed plumbum potius et pondera; ut cohibeant omnem saltum et volatum. Atque hoc adhuc factum non est; quum vero factum fuerit, melius de scientiis sperare licebit.

Therefore, to the intellect of men there must be added not plumes, but rather lead and weights; so that they may restrain every leap and flight. And this has not yet been done; but when it has been done, it will be permitted to hope better concerning the sciences.

CV.

105.

In constituendo autem axiomate, forma inductionis alia quam adhuc in usu fuit excogitanda est; eaque non ad principia tantum (quae vocant) probanda et invenienda, sed etiam ad axiomata minora et media, denique omnia. Inductio enim quae procedit per enumerationem simplicem res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantummodo quae praesto sunt, pronunciat. At inductio, quae ad inventionem et demonstrationem scientiarum et artium erit utilis, naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde, post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere; quod adhuc factum non est, nec tentatum certe, nisi tantummodo a Platone, qui ad excutiendas definitiones et ideas hac certe forma inductionis aliquatenus utitur.

In constituting an axiom, however, a form of induction other than that which has hitherto been in use must be devised; and this not only for proving and discovering the so‑called first principles, but also for the lesser and middle axioms, finally for all. For the induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is a childish thing, concludes precariously, is exposed to danger from a contradictory instance, and for the most part pronounces on fewer cases than is fitting, and only from those which are at hand. But the induction which will be useful for the discovery and demonstration of the sciences and arts ought to separate the nature, by due rejections and exclusions; and then, after negatives as many as suffice, to conclude upon affirmatives; which has not yet been done, nor certainly attempted, except only by Plato, who, for the sifting of definitions and ideas, does to some extent employ this form of induction.

Verum ad hujus inductionis, sive demonstrationis, instructionem bonam et legitimam quamplurima adhibenda sunt, quae adhuc nullius mortalium cogitationem subiere; adeo ut in ea major sit consumenda opera, quam adhuc consumpta est in syllogismo. Atque hujus inductionis auxilio, non solum ad axiomata invenienda, verum etiam ad notiones terminandas, utendum est. Atque in hac certe inductione spes maxima sita est.

But for the good and legitimate instruction of this induction, or demonstration, very many things must be employed, which have as yet entered the thought of no mortals; to such a degree that upon it more labor ought to be expended than has hitherto been spent on the syllogism. And by the aid of this induction, use is to be made not only for discovering axioms, but also for terminating notions. And in this induction, certainly, the greatest hope is set.

CVI.

106.

At in axiomatibus constituendis per hanc inductionem, examinatio et probatio etiam facienda est, utrum quod constituitur axioma aptatum sit tantum et ad mensuram factum eorum particularium ex quibus extrahitur; an vero sit amplius et latius. Quod si sit amplius aut latius, videndum an eam suam amplitudinem et latitudinem per novorum particularium designationem, quasi fide-jussione quadam, firmet; ne vel in jam notis tantum haereamus, vel laxiore fortasse complexu umbras et formas abstractas, non solida et determinata in materia, prensemus. Haec vero cum in usum venerint, solida tum demum spes merito affulserit.

But in establishing axioms by this induction, examination and proof must also be made, whether the axiom that is established is only fitted and made to the measure of those particulars from which it is extracted, or whether it is broader and wider. And if it is broader or wider, one must see whether it confirms that breadth and width by the designation of new particulars, as it were by a kind of fidejussion—a surety—lest we either stick only in things already known, or perhaps with a looser embrace seize shadows and abstract forms, not things solid and determined in matter. But when these have come into use, then at last a solid hope will deservedly shine forth.

CVII.

107.

Atque hic etiam resumendum est, quod superius dictum est de Naturali Philosophia producta et scientiis particularibus ad eam reductis, ut non fiat scissio et truncatio scientiarum; nam etiam absque hoc minus de progressu sperandum est.

And here too it must be resumed, what was said above concerning Natural Philosophy being extended and the particular sciences being reduced to it, lest there be a scission and truncation of the sciences; for, without this, even less is to be hoped for concerning progress.

CVIII.

108.

Atque de desperatione tollenda et spe facienda, ex praeteriti temporis erroribus valere jussis aut rectificatis, jam dictum est. Videndum autem et si quae alia sint quae spem faciant. Illud vero occurrit; si hominibus non quaerentibus, et aliud agentibus, multa utilia, tanquam casu quodam aut per occasionem, inventa sint; nemini dubium esse posse, quin iisdem quaerentibus et hoc agentibus, idque via et ordine, non impetu et desultorie, longe plura detegi necesse sit.

And concerning the removal of desperation and the making of hope, the errors of past time having been ordered to be void or rectified, has already been said. It must, however, be considered also whether there are other things that make hope. This, indeed, occurs: if, for men not seeking and busied about something else, many useful things have been discovered, as if by a certain chance or by occasion, no one can doubt that, for the same men seeking and attending to this—and that by way and order, not by impetuosity and desultorily—by far more must needs be detected.

Licet enim semel aut iterum accidere possit, ut quispiam in id forte fortuna incidat, quod magno conatu et de industria scrutantem antea fugit; tamen in summa rerum proculdubio contrarium invenitur. Itaque longe plura et meliora, atque per minora intervalla, a ratione et industria et directione et intentione hominum speranda sunt, quam a casu et instinctu animalium et hujusmodi, quae hactenus principium inventis dederunt.

Granted that once or twice it may occur that someone, by lucky chance, stumbles upon that which, though he had previously been scrutinizing it with great effort and by design, had escaped him; nevertheless, in the sum of things, beyond doubt the contrary is found. Therefore far more numerous and better things, and at shorter intervals, are to be hoped for from the reason and industry and direction and intention of men, than from chance and the instinct of animals and suchlike, which hitherto have given the starting-point to discoveries.

CIX.

109.

Etiam illud ad spem trahi possit, quod nonnulla ex his quae jam inventa sunt ejus sint generis ut antequam invenirentur haud facile cuiquam in mentem venisset de iis aliquid suspicari; sed plane quis illa ut impossibilia contempsisset. Solent enim homines de rebus novis ad exemplum veterum, et secundum phantasiam ex iis praeceptam et inquinatam, hariolari; quod genus opinandi fallacissimum est, quandoquidem multa ex his quae ex fontibus rerum petuntur per rivulos consuetos non fluant.

This too may be drawn to hope, that some of those things which are already discovered are of such a kind that, before they were discovered, it would hardly have come into anyone’s mind to suspect anything about them; but plainly one would have contemned them as impossible. For men are wont, about new things, after the example of the old, and according to a fantasy preconceived and contaminated from them, to vaticinate; which kind of opining is most fallacious, since many of those things which are fetched from the fountains of things do not flow along the accustomed rivulets.

Veluti si quis, ante tormentorum igneorum inventionem, rem per effectus descripsisset, atque in hunc modum dixisset: inventum quoddam detectum esse, per quod muri et munitiones quaeque maximae ex longo intervallo concuti et dejici possint; homines sane de viribus tormentorum et machinarum per pondera et rotas et hujusmodi arietationes et impulsus multiplicandis, multa et varia secum cogitaturi fuissent; de vento autem igneo, tam subito et violenter se expandente et exsufflante, vix unquam aliquid alicujus imaginationi aut phantasiae occursurum fuisset; utpote cujus exemplum in proximo non vidisset, nisi forte in terrae motu aut fulmine, quae, ut magnalia naturae et non imitabilia ab homine, homines statim rejecturi fuissent.

As if someone, before the invention of firearms, had described the matter by its effects and had thus said: that a certain invention had been discovered, by which walls and fortifications, however great, could be shaken and cast down from a long distance; men surely would have been about to ponder many and various things with themselves concerning the forces of engines and machines, to be multiplied by weights and wheels and batterings and impulses of this sort; but of the fiery wind, so suddenly and violently expanding itself and blowing out, scarcely ever would anything have occurred to anyone’s imagination or phantasy; since he would not have seen an example of it at hand, unless perhaps in an earthquake or a thunderbolt—things which, as magnalia of nature and not imitable by man, men would straightway have rejected.

Eodem modo si, ante fili bombycini inventionem, quispiam hujusmodi sermonem injecisset: esse quoddam fili genus inventum ad vestium et supellectilis usum, quod filum linteum aut laneum tenuitate, et nihilominus tenacitate, ac etiam splendore et mollitie, longe superaret; homines statim aut de serico aliquo vegetabili, aut de animalis alicujus pilis delicatioribus, aut de avium plumis et lanugine, aliquid opinaturi fuissent; verum de vermis pusilli textura, eaque tam copiosa et se renovante et anniversaria, nil fuissent certe commenturi. Quod si quis etiam de vermi verbum aliquod injecisset, ludibrio certe futurus fuisset, ut qui novas aranearum operas somniaret.

In the same way, if, before the invention of silk thread, someone had thrown out a discourse of this kind: that a certain kind of thread had been discovered for the use of garments and furnishings, which would far surpass linen or woolen thread in fineness, and nonetheless in tenacity, and even in splendor and softness; men straightway would have supposed something about some vegetable silk, or about the more delicate hairs of some animal, or about the feathers and down of birds; but about the weaving of a tiny worm—and that so copious, self-renewing, and annual—they would certainly have contrived nothing. And if someone had even tossed in a word about the worm, he would surely have been a laughingstock, like one dreaming up new spiders’ works.

Similiter, si ante inventionem acus nauticae quispiam hujusmodi sermonem intulisset: inventum esse quoddam instrumentum, per quod cardines et puncta coeli exacte capi et dignosci possint; homines statim de magis exquisita fabricatione instrumentorum astronomicorum ad multa et varia, per agitationem phantasiae, discursuri fuissent; quod vero aliquid inveniri possit, cujus motus cum coelestibus tam bene conveniret, atque ipsum tamen ex coelestibus non esset, sed tantum substantia lapidea aut metallica, omnino incredibile visum fuisset. Atque haec tamen et similia per tot mundi aetates homines latuerunt, nec per philosophiam aut artes rationales inventa sunt, sed casu et per occasionem; suntque illius (ut diximus) generis, ut ab iis quae antea cognita fuerunt plane heterogenea et remotissima sint, ut praenotio aliqua nihil prorsus ad illa conducere potuisset.

Similiarly, if before the invention of the nautical needle someone had introduced a discourse of this sort: that a certain instrument had been discovered, by which the quarters and points of the heaven could be exactly taken and discerned; men would straightway, by an agitation of phantasy, have gone off to a more exquisite fabrication of astronomical instruments for many and various purposes; but that something could be found whose motion agreed so well with the celestials, and yet itself was not from the celestials, but only a stony or metallic substance, would have seemed altogether incredible. And yet these and the like lay hidden from men through so many ages of the world, nor were they discovered by philosophy or the rational arts, but by chance and by occasion; and they are of that (as we said) kind, that they are plainly heterogeneous and most remote from the things that were known before, so that any prenotion could in no wise have conduced to them.

Itaque sperandum omnino est, esse adhuc in naturae sinu multa excellentis usus recondita, quae nullam cum jam inventis cognationem habent aut parallelismum, sed omnino sita sunt extra vias phantasiae; quae tamen adhuc inventa non sunt; quae proculdubio per multos saeculorum circuitus et ambages et ipsa quandoque prodibunt, sicut illa superiora prodierunt; sed per viam, quam nunc tractamus, propere et subito et simul repraesentari et anticipari possunt.

Therefore it is altogether to be hoped that there still lie hidden in the bosom of nature many things of excellent use, which have no kinship or parallelism with the things already discovered, but are altogether situated outside the ways of phantasy; which, however, have not yet been found; which without doubt, through many circuits and windings of the ages, will themselves at some time come forth, just as those aforementioned came forth; but by the path which we are now handling, they can be speedily and suddenly and at once represented and anticipated.

CX.

110.

Attamen conspiciuntur et alia inventa ejus generis, quae fidem faciant, posse genus humanum nobilia inventa, etiam ante pedes posita, praeterire et transilire. Utcunque enim pulveris tormentarii vel fili bombycini vel acus nauticae vel sacchari vel papyri vel similium inventa quibusdam rerum et naturae proprietatibus niti videantur, at certe imprimendi artificium nil habet quod non sit apertum et fere obvium. Et nihilominus homines, non advertentes literarum modulos difficilius scilicet collocari quam literae per motum manus scribantur, sed hoc interesse, quod literarum moduli semel collocati infinitis impressionibus, literae autem per manum exaratae unicae tantum scriptioni, sufficiant; aut fortasse iterum non advertentes atramentum ita inspissari posse, ut tingat, non fluat; praesertim literis resupinatis et impressione facta desuper; hoc pulcherrimo invento (quod ad doctrinarum propagationem tantum facit) per tot saecula caruerunt.

Yet there are also observed other inventions of that kind, which make credible that the human race can pass by and overleap noble inventions, even placed before their very feet. For although the inventions of gunpowder, or of silken thread, or of the nautical needle, or of sugar, or of paper, or of the like, may seem to rely on certain properties of things and of nature, yet surely the art of printing has nothing which is not open and almost obvious. And nonetheless men, not noticing that the letter-modules are indeed more difficult to be set in place than that letters be written by the motion of the hand, but that this is the difference: that the letter-modules, once set, suffice for infinite impressions, whereas letters traced by the hand suffice only for a single writing; or perhaps again not noticing that ink can be thickened to such a point that it dyes, not flows—especially with the letters turned supine and the impression made from above—were without this most beautiful invention (which does so much for the propagation of doctrines) through so many ages.

Solet autem mens humana, in hoc inventionis curriculo, tam laeva saepenumero et male composita esse, ut primo diffidat, et paulo post se contemnat; atque primo incredibile ei videatur aliquid tale inveniri posse, postquam autem inventum sit, incredibile rursus videatur id homines tamdiu fugere potuisse. Atque hoc ipsum ad spem rite trahitur; superesse nimirum adhuc magnum inventorum cumulum, qui non solum ex operationibus incognitis eruendis, sed et ex jam cognitis transferendis et componendis et applicandis, per eam quam diximus Experientiam Literatam, deduci possit.

However, the human mind is wont, in this career of invention, to be so left-handed and ill-composed so often, that at first it distrusts, and a little later it despises itself; and at first it seems to it incredible that something of the kind can be discovered, but after it has been discovered, it again seems incredible that men could have so long missed it. And this very fact is rightly drawn over to hope; namely, that there still remains a great accumulation of inventions, which can be derived not only from excavating unknown operations, but also from transferring and composing and applying things already known, through that which we have called the Literate Experience.

CXI.

111.

Neque illud omittendum ad faciendam spem: reputent (si placet) homines infinitas ingenii, temporis, facultatum expensas, quas homines in rebus et studiis longe minoris usus et pretii collocant; quorum pars quota si ad sana et solida verteretur, nulla non difficultas superari possit. Quod idcirco adjungere visum est, quia plane fatemur Historiae Naturalis et Experimentalis collectionem, qualem animo metimur et qualis esse debet, opus esse magnum, et quasi regium, et multae operae atque impensae.

Nor should this be omitted for the engendering of hope: let men consider (if it please them) the infinite expenditures of ingenuity, time, and faculties which men invest in matters and studies of far lesser use and price; of which what fraction, if it were turned to things sound and solid, could not every difficulty be overcome? For which cause it seemed good to subjoin this, because we plainly confess that the collection of Natural and Experimental History, such as we measure in mind and such as it ought to be, is a great work, as it were regal, and of much labor and expense.

CXII.

112.

Interim particularium multitudinem nemo reformidet, quin potius hoc ipsum ad spem revocet. Sunt enim artium et naturae particularia Phaenomena manipuli instar ad ingenii commenta, postquam ab evidentia rerum disjuncta et abstracta fuerint. Atque hujus viae exitus in aperto est, et fere in propinquo; alterius exitus nullus, sed implicatio infinita.

Meanwhile let no one dread the multitude of particulars; rather let him recall this very thing to hope. For the particular phenomena of the arts and of nature are, as it were, handfuls in comparison with the figments of wit, once those have been disjoined and abstracted from the evidence of things. And the outcome of this way lies in the open, and almost at hand; the other has no outcome, but an infinite entanglement.

Homines enim adhuc parvam in Experientia moram fecerunt, et eam leviter perstrinxerunt, sed in meditationibus et commentationibus ingenii infinitum tempus contriverunt. Apud nos vero si esset praesto quispiam qui de facto naturae ad interrogata responderet, paucorum annorum esset inventio causarum et scientiarum omnium.

For men, thus far, have made but a small stay in Experience, and have lightly skimmed it, but in meditations and commentations of the intellect they have squandered infinite time. But with us, if there were at hand someone who would answer the questions on the basis of the fact of nature, the discovery of the causes and of all the sciences would be a matter of a few years.

CXIII.

113.

Etiam nonnihil hominibus spei fieri posse putamus ab exemplo nostro proprio; neque jactantiae causa hoc dicimus sed quod utile dictu sit. Si qui diffidant, me videant, hominem inter homines aetatis meae civilibus negotiis occupatissimum, nec firma admodum valetudine (quod magnum habet temporis dispendium), atque in hac re plane protopirum, et vestigia nullius sequutum, neque haec ipsa cum ullo mortalium communicantem, et tamen veram viam constanter ingressum et ingenium rebus submittentem, haec ipsa aliquatenus (ut existimamus) provexisse: et deinceps videant, quid ab hominibus otio abundantibus, atque a laboribus consociatis, atque a temporum successione, post haec indicia nostra expectandum sit; praesertim in via quae non singulis solummodo pervia est (ut fit in via illa rationali), sed ubi hominum labores et operae (praesertim quantum ad experientiae collectam) optime distribui et deinde componi possint. Tum enim homines vires suas nosse incipient, cum non eadem infiniti, sed alia alii praestabunt.

We think that somewhat of hope can be afforded to men from our own proper example; nor do we say this for the sake of vaunting, but because it is useful to say. If any distrust, let them look at me—a man among the men of my age most occupied with civil affairs, and by no means of very firm health (which carries with it a great waste of time), and in this matter plainly a pioneer, and having followed the footsteps of no one, nor communicating these very things with any mortal—and yet having steadily entered upon the true way and submitting the intellect to things, to have advanced these very matters in some measure (as we suppose): and then let them see what is to be expected, after these our indications, from men abounding in leisure, and from labors in fellowship, and from the succession of times; especially in a way which is not passable only for individuals (as happens in that rational way), but where the labors and works of men (especially as regards the collection of experience) can be best distributed and then combined. For then men will begin to know their strengths, when not an infinity do the same things, but different men render different things.

CXIV.

114.

Postremo, etiamsi multo infirmior et obscurior aura spei ab ista Nova Continente spiraverit, tamen omnino experiendum esse (nisi velimus animi esse plane abjecti) statuimus. Non enim res pari periculo non tentatur, et non succedit; cum in illo ingentis boni, in hoc exiguae humanae operae, jactura vertatur. Verum ex dictis, atque etiam ex non dictis, visum est nobis spei abunde subesse, non tantum homini strenuo ad experiendum, sed etiam prudenti et sobrio ad credendum.

Finally, even if a much feebler and more obscure breeze of hope should have breathed from that New Continent, nevertheless we have determined that the thing must altogether be tried (unless we wish to be plainly abject in spirit). For the matter is not of equal peril in not being attempted and in not succeeding; since in the former the loss is of an immense good, in the latter of a slight human effort. Yet from what has been said, and even from what has not been said, it has seemed to us that there is abundantly underlying ground for hope—not only for a strenuous man to make the experiment, but also for a prudent and sober man to believe.

CXV.

115.

Atque de desperatione tollenda, quae inter causas potentissimas ad progressum scientiarum remorandum et inhibendum fuit, jam dictum est. Atque simul sermo de signis et causis errorum, et inertiae et ignorantiae quae invaluit, absolutus est; praesertim cum subtiliores causae, et quae in judicium populare aut observationem non incurrunt, ad ea quae de Idolis animi humani dicta sunt referri debeant.

And on the removal of despair, which was among the most powerful causes for delaying and inhibiting the progress of the sciences, it has already been said. And at the same time the discourse about the signs and causes of errors, and of inertia and ignorance which has prevailed, has been completed; especially since the more subtle causes, and those which do not fall under popular judgment or observation, ought to be referred to the things that have been said concerning the Idols of the human mind.

Atque hic simul pars destruens Instaurationis nostrae claudi debet, quae perficitur tribus redargutionibus: redargutione nimirum Humanae Rationis Nativae et sibi permissae; redargutione Demonstrationum; et redargutione Theoriarum, sive philosophiarum et doctrinarum quae receptae sunt. Redargutio vero earum talis fuit qualis esse potuit; videlicet per signa, et evidentiam causarum; cum confutatio alia nulla a nobis (qui et de principiis et de demonstrationibus ab aliis dissentimus) adhiberi potuerit.

And here at the same time the destroying part of our Instauration ought to be closed, which is completed by three refutations: the refutation, namely, of Native Human Reason left to itself; the refutation of Demonstrations; and the refutation of Theories, that is, of the philosophies and doctrines which are received. The refutation of these, indeed, has been such as it could be; namely by signs and the evidence of causes; since no other confutation could be applied by us (who dissent from others both about principles and about demonstrations).

Quocirca tempus est, ut ad ipsam artem et normam Interpretandi Naturam veniamus; et tamen nonnihil restat quod praevertendum est. Quum enim in hoc primo Aphorismorum libro illud nobis propositum sit, ut tam ad intelligendum quam ad recipiendum ea quae sequuntur mentes hominum praeparentur; expurgata jam et abrasa et aequata mentis area, sequitur ut mens sistatur in positione bona, et tanquam aspectu benevolo, ad ea quae proponemus. Valet enim in re nova ad praejudicium, non solum praeoccupatio fortis opinionis veteris, sed et praeceptio sive praefiguratio falsa rei quae affertur.

Therefore the time has come that we should approach the very art and norm of Interpreting Nature; and yet something still remains which must be prefaced. For since in this first book of the Aphorisms it has been our aim that the minds of men be prepared as well for understanding as for receiving the things that follow; the area of the mind, now cleared out and scraped and leveled, it follows that the mind be set in a good position, and, as it were, with a benevolent aspect, toward the things we shall propose. For in a new matter there has weight toward prejudgment not only the strong preoccupation of an old opinion, but also the false preconception or prefiguration of the thing that is brought forward.

Itaque conabimur efficere ut habeantur bonae et verae de iis quae adducimus opiniones, licet ad tempus tantummodo, et tanquam usurariae, donec res ipsa pernoscatur.

Therefore we shall endeavor to bring it about that good and true opinions be held concerning the things which we adduce, albeit only for a time, and as if on usury, until the matter itself is thoroughly known.

CXVI.

116.

Primo itaque postulandum videtur, ne existiment homines nos, more antiquorum Graecorum, aut quorundam novorum hominum, Telesii, Patricii, Severini, sectam aliquam in philosophia condere velle. Neque enim hoc agimus; neque etiam multum interesse putamus ad hominum fortunas quales quis opiniones abstractas de natura et rerum principiis habeat; neque dubium est, quin multa hujusmodi et vetera revocari et nova introduci possint; quemadmodum et complura themata coeli supponi possunt, quae cum phaenomenis sat bene conveniunt, inter se tamen dissentiunt.

First, therefore, it seems to be postulated that men should not suppose that we, after the manner of the ancient Greeks or of certain modern men—Telesius, Patricius, Severinus—wish to found some sect in philosophy. For this is not what we are doing; nor do we even think it much to concern the fortunes of men what sort of abstract opinions one may have about nature and the principles of things; nor is there any doubt that many things of this kind can both have the old recalled and the new introduced; just as also several hypotheses of the heavens can be supposed, which agree well enough with the phenomena, yet disagree among themselves.

At nos de hujusmodi rebus opinabilibus, et simul inutilibus, non laboramus. At contra nobis constitutum est experiri, an revera potentiae et amplitudinis humanae firmiora fundamenta jacere ac fines in latius proferre possimus. Atque licet sparsim, et in aliquibus subjectis specialibus, longe veriora habeamus et certiora (ut arbitramur) atque etiam magis fructuosa quam quibus homines adhuc utuntur (quae in quintam Instaurationis nostrae partem congessimus), tamen theoriam nullam universalem aut integram proponimus.

But as for us, we do not labor over matters of this kind that are opinable, and at the same time unprofitable. On the contrary, it is established with us to make trial whether indeed we can lay firmer foundations for human power and greatness and extend its boundaries more widely. And although, here and there and in certain special subjects, we have (as we judge) things far truer and more certain, and also more fruitful, than those which men have hitherto used (which we have gathered into the fifth part of our Instauration), nevertheless we propose no theory universal or entire.

Neque enim huic rei tempus adhuc adesse videtur. Quin nec spem habemus vitae producendae ad sextam. Instaurationis partem (quae philosophiae per legitimam Naturae Interpretationem inventae destinata est) absolvendam; sed satis habemus si in mediis sobrie et utiliter nos geramus, atque interim semina veritatis sincerioris in poteros spargamus, atque initiis rerum magnarum non desimus.

Nor does the time yet seem to have arrived for this matter. Nay, nor do we even have hope of prolonging life so far as to complete the Sixth Part of the Instauration (which is destined for the philosophy discovered through the legitimate Interpretation of Nature); but we are satisfied if, in intermediate matters, we conduct ourselves soberly and usefully, and meanwhile scatter the seeds of a more sincere truth among posterity, and do not fail in the beginnings of great things.

CXVII.

117.

Atque quemadmodum sectae conditores non sumus, ita nec operum particularium largitores aut promissores. Attamen possit aliquis hoc modo occurrere; quod nos, qui tam saepe operum mentionem faciamus et omnia eo trahamus, etiam operum, etiam operum aliquorum pignora exhibeamus. Verum via nostra et ratio (ut saepe perspicue diximus et adhuc dicere juvat) ea est; ut non opera ex operibus sive experimenta ex experimentis (ut empirici), sed ex operibus et experimentis causas et axiomata, atque ex causis et axiomatibus rursus nova opera et experimenta (ut legitimi Naturae Interpretes), extrahamus.

And just as we are not founders of a sect, so neither are we dispensers or promisers of particular works. Yet someone could counter in this way: that we, who so often make mention of works and draw everything thereto, should also exhibit pledges of works—indeed, pledges of certain works. But our way and method (as we have often said clearly and are still glad to say) is this: that we do not extract works from works or experiments from experiments (as the empirics), but from works and experiments we extract causes and axioms, and from causes and axioms in turn new works and experiments (as legitimate Interpreters of Nature).

Atque licet in tabulis nostris inveniendi (ex quibus quarta pars Instaurationis consistit), atque etiam exemplis particularium (quae in secunda parte adduximus), atque insuper in observationibus nostris super historiam (quae in tertia parte operis descripta est), quivis vel mediocris perspicaciae et solertiae complurium operum nobilium indicationes et designationes ubique notabit; ingenue tamen fatemur, historiam naturalem quam adhuc habemus, aut ex libris aut ex inquisitione propria, non tam copiosam esse et verificatam, ut legitimae Interpretationi satisfacere aut ministrare possit.

And although in our Tables of Invention (of which the fourth part of the Instauration consists), and also in the examples of particulars (which we adduced in the second part), and moreover in our observations upon history (which in the third part of the work is described), anyone even of mediocre perspicacity and skill will everywhere note indications and designations of many noble works; nevertheless we candidly confess that the natural history which we have thus far, whether from books or from our own inquiry, is not so copious and verified as to be able to satisfy or minister to a legitimate Interpretation.

Itaque si quis ad mechanica sit magis aptus et paratus, atque sagax ad venanda opera ex conversatione sola cum experimentis, ei permittimus et relinquimus illam industriam, ut ex historia nostra et tabulis multa tanquam in via decerpat et applicet ad opera, ac veluti foenus recipiat ad tempus, donec sors haberi possit. Nos vero, cum ad majora contendamus, moram omnem praeproperam et praematuram in istiusmodi rebus tanquam Atalantae pilas (ut saepius solemus dicere) damnamus. Neque enim aurea poma pueriliter affectamus, sed omnia in victoria cursus artis super naturam ponimus; neque muscum aut segetem herbidam demetere festinamus, sed messem tempestivam expectamus.

Therefore, if anyone be more apt and prepared for the mechanical, and sagacious for hunting out works from mere conversation with experiments, to him we permit and leave that industry, that from our history and tables he may pluck many things, as it were on the way, and apply them to works, and, as it were, receive interest for a time, until the principal can be had. But we, since we strive toward greater things, condemn every over‑hasty and premature delay in matters of this sort as Atalanta’s balls (as we are wont to say often). For we do not childishly desire golden apples, but place everything in the victory of the course of art over nature; nor do we hasten to reap moss or a grassy crop, but we await the seasonable harvest.

CXVIII.

118.

Occurret etiam alicui proculdubio, postquam ipsam historiam nostram et inventionis tabulas perlegerit, aliquid in ipsis experimentis minus certum, vel omnino falsum; atque propterea secum fortasse reputabit, fundamentis et principiis falsis et dubiis inventa nostra niti. Verum hoc nihil est; necesse enim est talia sub initiis evenire. Simile enim est ac si in scriptione aut impressione una forte litera aut altera perperam posita aut collocata sit; id enim legentem non multum impedire solet, quandoquidem errata ab ipso sensu facile corriguntur.

It will also, without doubt, occur to someone, after he has read through our history itself and the tables of invention, that there is in the experiments themselves something less certain, or altogether false; and therefore he will perhaps reckon with himself that our inventions rest upon false and doubtful foundations and principles. But this is nothing; for it is necessary that such things should happen at the beginnings. For it is like if in writing or impression one or another letter by chance be wrongly set or placed; for this is not wont to hinder the reader much, since the errata are easily corrected by the sense itself.

Ita etiam cogitent homines, multa in historia naturali experimenta falso credi et recipi posse, quae paulo post a causis et axiomatibus inventis facile expunguntur et rejiciuntur. Sed tamen verum est, si in historia naturali et experimentis magna et crebra et continua fuerint errata, illa nulla ingenii aut artis foelicitate corrigi aut emendari posse. Itaque si in historia nostra naturali, quae tanta diligentia et severitate et fere religione probata et collecta est, aliquid in particularibus quandoque subsit falsitatis aut erroris, quid tandem de naturali historia vulgari, quae prae nostra tam negligens est et facilis, dicendum erit?

Let men also think thus: that many experiments in natural history may be believed and received falsely, which a little afterwards, by the causes and axioms discovered, are easily expunged and rejected. Yet it is true that, if in natural history and in experiments the errors are great and frequent and continual, those cannot by any felicity of wit or of art be corrected or amended. Therefore, if in our natural history, which has been approved and collected with such diligence and strictness and almost with religion, something in particulars does at times have falsity or error underlying, what, then, shall be said of the vulgar natural history, which, in comparison with ours, is so negligent and facile?

aut de philosophia et scientiis super hujusmodi arenas (vel syrtes potius) aedificatis? Itaque hoc quod diximus neminem moveat.

or about philosophy and the sciences built upon sands of this kind (or rather, upon shoals)? Therefore let what we have said move no one.

CXIX.

119.

Occurrent etiam in historia nostra et experimentis plurimae res, primo leves et vulgatae, deinde viles et illiberales, postremo nimis subtiles ac mere speculativae, et quasi nullius usus: quod genus rerum hominum studia avertere et alienare possit.

There will also occur in our history and experiments very many things—first light and vulgar, then vile and illiberal, finally too subtle and merely speculative, and as if of no use: which kind of things can avert and alienate the studies of men.

Atque de istis rebus, quae videntur vulgatae, illud homines cogitent; solere sane eos adhuc nihil aliud agere, quam ut eorum quae rara sunt causas ad ea quae frequenter fiunt referant et accommodent, at ipsorum quae frequenter eveniunt nullas causas inquirant, sed ea ipsa recipiant tanquam concessa et admissa.

And concerning those matters which seem commonplace, let men consider this; they are indeed accustomed hitherto to do nothing else than to refer and accommodate the causes of things that are rare to those which occur frequently, but for the things which occur frequently themselves they inquire into no causes, and receive those very things as granted and admitted.

Itaque non ponderis, non rotationis coelestium, non caloris, non frigoris, non luminis, non duri, non mollis, non tenuis, non densi, non liquidi, non consistentis, non animati, non inanimati, non similaris, non dissimilaris, nec demum organici, causas quaerunt; sed illis, tanquam pro evidentibus et manifestis, receptis, de ceteris rebus, quae non tam frequenter et familiariter occurrunt, disputant et judicant.

Therefore, they do not seek the causes of weight, nor of the rotation of the celestial bodies, nor of heat, nor of cold, nor of light, nor of the hard, nor of the soft, nor of the tenuous, nor of the dense, nor of the liquid, nor of the consistent, nor of the animate, nor of the inanimate, nor of the similar, nor of the dissimilar, nor finally of the organic; but with these accepted as though evident and manifest, they dispute and judge concerning the other things which do not occur so frequently and familiarly.

Nos vero, qui satis scimus nullum de rebus raris aut notabilibus judicium fieri posse, multo minus res novas in lucem protrahi, absque vulgarium rerum causis et causarum causis rite examinatis et repertis, necessario ad res vulgarissimas in historiam nostram recipiendas compellimur. Quinetiam nil magis philosophiae offecisse deprehendimus quam quod res, quae familiares sunt et frequenter occurrunt, contemplationem hominum non morentur et detineant, sed recipiantur obiter, neque earum causae quaeri soleant: ut non saepius requiratur informatio de rebus ignotis, quam attentio in notis.

We, for our part, who know well enough that no judgment can be made about rare or notable things, much less that new things can be brought forth into the light, without the causes of common things and the causes of causes having been duly examined and discovered, are necessarily compelled to admit the most common things into our history. Moreover, we have found that nothing has harmed philosophy more than this: that things which are familiar and frequently occur do not delay and detain the contemplation of men, but are received cursorily, nor are their causes wont to be sought; so that inquiry is made more often about unknown things than attention is given to known.

CXX.

120.

Quod vero ad rerum vilitatem attinet, vel etiam turpitudinem, quibus (ut ait Plinius) honos praefandus est; eae res, non minus quam lautissimae et pretiosissimae, in historiam naturalem recipiendae sunt. Neque propterea polluitur naturalis historia: sol enim aeque palatia et cloacas ingreditur, neque tamen polluitur. Nos autem non Capitolium aliquod aut Pyramidem hominum superbiae dedicamus aut condimus, sed templum sanctum ad exemplar mundi in intellectu humano fundamus.

As for the cheapness of things, or even their turpitude, to which (as Pliny says) honor must be prefaced, those things, no less than the most sumptuous and most precious, are to be received into natural history. Nor is natural history thereby polluted: for the sun enters palaces and sewers alike, nor yet is it polluted. But we are not dedicating or founding some Capitol or Pyramid of human pride, but we are founding a sacred temple, after the exemplar of the world, in the human intellect.

Itaque exemplar sequimur. Nam quicquid essentia dignum est, id etiam scientia dignum, quae est essentiae imago. At vilia aeque subsistunt ac lauta.

Therefore we follow the exemplar. For whatever is worthy of essence is likewise worthy of science, which is the image of essence. But base things subsist equally with the sumptuous.

Quinetiam, ut e quibusdam putridis materiis, veluti musco et zibetho, aliquando optimi odores generantur; ita et ab instantiis vilibus et sordidis quandoque eximia lux et informatio emanat. Verum de hoc nimis multa; cum hoc genus fastidii sit plane puerile et effoeminatum.

And moreover, just as from certain putrid materials, such as musk and civet, at times the finest odors are generated; so also from base and sordid instances there sometimes emanates exceptional light and information. But enough on this; since this kind of fastidiousness is plainly puerile and effeminate.

CXXI.

121.

At de illo omnino magis accurate dispiciendum; quod plurima in historia nostra captui vulgari, aut etiam cuivis intellectui (rebus praesentibus assuefacto), videbuntur curiosae cujusdam et inutilis subtilitatis. Itaque de hoc ante omnia et dictum et dicendum est: hoc scilicet; nos jam sub initiis et ad tempus, tantum lucifera experimenta, non fructifera quaerere; ad exemplum creationis divinae, quod saepius diximus, quae primo die lucem tantum produxit, eique soli unum integrum diem attribuit, neque illo die quicquam materiati operis immiscuit.

But about that matter altogether we must look more accurately; since very many things in our history will seem to vulgar capacity, or even to any intellect (accustomed to present affairs), to be of a certain curious and useless subtlety. Therefore about this, before all things, both has been said and must be said: namely this; that we now, at the outset and for a time, seek only luciferous experiments, not fructiferous; after the example of the divine creation, as we have said more often, which on the first day produced light only, and to light alone assigned one whole day, nor on that day mingled any material work.

Itaque si quis istiusmodi res nullius esse usus putet, idem cogitat ac si nullum etiam lucis esse usum censeat, quia res scilicet solida aut materiata non sit. Atque revera dicendum est, simplicum naturarum cognitionem bene examinatam et definitam instar lucis esse; quae ad universa operum penetralia aditum praebet, atque tota agmina operum et turmas, et axiomatum nobilissimorum fontes, potestate quadam complectitur et post se trahit; in se tamen non ita magni usus est. Quin et literarum elementa per se et separatim nihil significant nec alicujus usus sunt, sed tamen ad omnis sermonis compositionem et apparatum instar materiae primae sunt.

Therefore, if anyone should think such things to be of no use, he thinks the same as if he should judge that there is no use even of light, because the thing, to wit, is not solid or furnished with matter. And indeed it must be said that the knowledge of simple natures, well examined and defined, is after the likeness of light; which affords access to all the inmost recesses of works, and with a certain power embraces and draws after itself whole battalions and troops of works, and the fountains of the most noble axioms; yet in itself is not of such great use. Nay even the elements of letters by themselves and separately signify nothing nor are of any use, yet nevertheless for the composition and apparatus of all discourse they are after the likeness of first matter.

Etiam semina rerum potestate valida, usu (nisi in processu suo) nihili sunt. Atque lucis ipsius radii dispersi, nisi coeant, beneficium suum non impertiuntur.

Even the seeds of things, strong in potency, are of no use (unless in their own process). And the rays of light itself, dispersed, do not impart their benefit unless they coalesce.

Quod si quis subtilitatibus speculativis offendatur, quid de scholasticis viris dicendum erit, qui subtilitatibus immensum indulserunt? quae tamen subtilitates in verbis, aut saltem vulgaribus notionibus (quod tantundem valet), non in rebus aut natura consumptae fuerunt, atque utilitatis expertes erant, non tantum in origine, sed etiam in consequentiis; tales autem non fuerunt, ut haberent in praesens utilitatem nullam, sed per consequens infinitam; quales sunt eae de quibus loquimur. Hoc vero sciant homines pro certo, omnem subtilitatem disputationum et discursuum mentis, si adhibeatur tantum post axiomata inventa, seram esse et praeposteram; et subtilitatis tempus verum ac proprium, aut saltem praecipuum, versari in pensitanda experientia et inde constituendis axiomatibus: nam illa altera subtilitas naturam prensat et captat, sed nunquam apprehendit aut capit.

If anyone be offended by speculative subtleties, what shall be said of the Scholastic men, who indulged immensely in subtleties? which subtleties, however, were expended in words, or at least in common notions (which amounts to the same), not in things or in nature, and were devoid of utility, not only in their origin, but also in their consequences; they were not of the sort to have for the present no use but by consequence infinite—such as are those of which we speak. Let men know this for certain: every subtlety of disputations and of the mind’s discourses, if it be applied only after axioms have been discovered, is late and preposterous; and the true and proper, or at least the principal, time for subtlety is to be spent in weighing experience and from thence establishing axioms: for that other kind of subtlety gropes at and snatches at nature, but never apprehends or seizes it.

Et verissimum certe est quod de occasione sive fortuna dici solet, si transferatur ad naturam: videlicet, eam a fronte comatam, ab occipitio calvam esse.

And most true, to be sure, is that which is wont to be said about occasion or fortune, if it be transferred to nature: namely, that she is hairy at the front, bald at the occiput.

Denique de contemptu in naturali historia rerum aut vulgarium, aut vilium, aut nimis subtilium et in originibus suis inutilium, illa vox mulierculae ad tumidum principem, qui petitionem ejus ut rem indignam et majestate sua inferiorem abjecisset, pro oraculo sit; Disne ergo rex esse: quia certissimum est, imperium in naturam, si quis hujusmodi rebus ut nimis exilibus et minutis vacare nolit, nec obtineri nec geri posse.

Finally, concerning the contempt in natural history for things either vulgar, or vile, or too subtle and in their origins useless, let that utterance of a little woman to a swollen prince, who had cast aside her petition as a matter unworthy and beneath his majesty, be for an oracle; “Cease then to be king”: because it is most certain that an empire over nature, if anyone is unwilling to devote himself to such things as too slight and minute, can neither be obtained nor carried on.

CXXII.

122.

Occurrit etiam et illud; mirabile quiddam esse et durum, quod nos omnes scientias atque omnes authores simul ac veluti uno ictu et impetu summoveamus: idque non assumpto aliquo ex antiquis in auxilium et praesidium nostrum, sed quasi viribus propriis.

It also occurs, moreover, this; that it is something marvelous and hard, that we should remove all the sciences and all the authors at once, and as it were with a single stroke and impulse: and that not by assuming any from the ancients to our aid and defense, but as if by our own forces.

Nos autem scimus, si minus sincera fide agere voluissemus, non difficile fuisse nobis, ista quae afferuntur vel ad antiqua saecula ante Graecorum tempora (cum scientiae de natura magis fortasse sed tamen majore cum silentio floruerint, neque in Graecorum tubas et fistulas adhuc incidissent), vel etiam (per partes certe) ad aliquos ex Graecis ipsis referre, atque astipulationem et honorem inde petere: more novorum hominum, qui nobilitatem sibi ex antiqua aliqua prosapia, per genealogiarum favores, astruunt et affingunt. Nos vero rerum evidentia freti, omnem commenti et imposturae conditionem rejicimus; neque ad id quod agitur plus interesse putamus, utrum quae jam invenientur antiquis olim cognita, et per rerum vicissitudines et saecula occidentia et orientia sint, quam hominibus curae esse debere, utrum Novus Orbis fuerit insula illa Atlantis et veteri mundo cognita, an nunc primum reperta. Rerum enim inventio a naturae luce petenda, non ab antiquitatis tenebris repetenda est.

We, however, know that, if we had wished to act with less sincere faith, it would not have been difficult for us to refer those things which are brought forward either to the ancient ages before the times of the Greeks (since the sciences of nature perhaps flourished more then, yet with greater silence, nor had they yet fallen into the trumpets and pipes of the Greeks), or also (at least in parts) to some of the Greeks themselves, and to seek attestation and honor thence: in the manner of upstart men, who assert and affix to themselves nobility from some ancient lineage by the favors of genealogies. But we, relying on the evidence of things, reject every guise of contrivance and imposture; nor do we think it makes more difference to the business in hand whether the things which will now be discovered were once known to the ancients and, through the vicissitudes of things and the ages, setting and rising again, than it ought to concern men whether the New World was that island of Atlantis and known to the old world, or now first found. For the discovery of things is to be sought from the light of nature, not to be fetched back from the darkness of antiquity.

Quod vero ad universalem istam reprehensionem attinet, certissimum est vere rem reputanti, eam et magis probabilem esse et magis modestam, quam si facta fuisset ex parte. Si enim in primis notionibus errores radicati non fuissent, fieri non potuisset quin nonnulla recte inventa alia perperam inventa correxissent. Sed cum errores fundamentales fuerint, atque ejusmodi, ut homines potius res neglexerint ac praeterierint, quam de illis pravum aut falsum judicium fecerint; minime mirum est, si homines id non obtinuerint quod non egerint, nec ad metam pervenerint quam non posuerint aut collocarint, neque viam emensi sint quam non ingressi sint aut tenuerint.

As to that universal reprehension, it is most certain, for one who truly reckons the matter, that it is both more probable and more modest than if it had been made in part. For if errors had not been rooted in the first notions, it could not have failed that some things rightly discovered would have corrected others wrongly discovered. But since the errors have been fundamental, and of such a sort that men have rather neglected and passed things by than rendered about them a depraved or false judgment, it is by no means a wonder if men have not obtained what they have not pursued, nor reached the goal which they have not set or positioned, nor measured out the way which they have not entered upon or held.

Atque insolentiam rei quod attinet; certe si quis manus constantia atque oculi vigore lineam magis rectam aut circulum magis perfectum se describere posse quam alium quempiam sibi assumat, inducitur scilicet facultatis comparatio: quod si quis asserat se adhibita regula aut circumducto circino lineam magis rectam aut circulum magis perfectum posse describere, quam aliquem alium vi sola oculi et manus, is certe non admodum jactator fuerit. Quin hoc, quod dicimus, non solum in hoc nostro conatu primo et incoeptivo locum habet; sed etiam pertinet ad eos qui huic rei posthac incumbent. Nostra enim via inveniendi scientias exaequat fere ingenia, et non multum excellentiae eorum relinquit: cum omnia per certissimas regulas et demonstrationes transigat.

And as regards the strangeness of the matter; surely, if someone should assume to himself that by constancy of hand and vigor of eye he can describe a straighter line or a more perfect circle than some other person, plainly a comparison of faculty is introduced: but if someone should assert that, with the rule applied or the compass carried round, he can describe a straighter line or a more perfect circle than another by the sole force of eye and hand, he certainly would not have been much of a braggart. Nay rather, what we say holds not only in this our first and inceptive endeavor; but also pertains to those who hereafter will apply themselves to this matter. For our way of finding the sciences almost equalizes wits, and leaves not much to their excellence: since it dispatches everything by the most certain rules and demonstrations.

Itaque haec nostra (ut saepe diximus) foelicitatis cujusdam sunt potius quam facultatis, et potius temporis partus quam ingenii. Est enim certe casus aliquis non minus in cogitationibus humanis, quam in operibus et factis.

Therefore these things of ours (as we have often said) are rather of a certain felicity than of faculty, and rather a birth of time than of genius. For there is certainly some chance no less in human cogitations than in works and deeds.

CXXIII.

123.

Itaque dicendum de nobis ipsis quod ille per jocum dixit, praesertim cum tam bene rem secet: fieri non potest ut idem sentiant, qui aquam et qui vinum bibant. At caeteri homines, tam veteres quam novi, liquorem biberunt crudum in scientiis, tanquam aquam vel sponte ex intellectu manantem, vel per dialecticam, tanquam per rotas ex puteo, haustam. At nos liquorem bibimus et propinamus ex infinitis confectam uvis, iisque maturis et tempestivis, et per racemos quosdam collectis ac decerptis, et subinde in torculari pressis, ac postremo in vase repurgatis et clarificatis.

Therefore we must say of ourselves what that man said in jest, especially since it cuts the matter so well: it cannot be that they think the same, who drink water and who drink wine. But the rest of men, both ancients and moderns, have drunk a crude liquor in the sciences, as water either spontaneously welling from the intellect, or drawn by dialectic, as by wheels from a well. But we drink and proffer a liquor made from innumerable grapes—grapes mature and seasonable—gathered and plucked in certain clusters, then ever and anon pressed in the wine-press, and at last in the vessel purged and clarified.

Itaque nil mirum si nobis cum aliis non conveniat.

Therefore, it is no wonder if we do not agree with others.

CXXIV.

124.

Occurret proculdubio et illud: nec metam aut scopum scientiarum a nobis ipsis (id quod in aliis reprehendimus) verum et optimum praefixum esse. Esse enim contemplationem veritatis omni operum utilitate et magnitudine digniorem et celsiorem: longam vero istam et sollicitam moram in experientia et materia et rerum particularium fluctibus mentem veluti humo affigere, vel potius in Tartarum quoddam confusionis et perturbationis dejicere; atque ab abstractae sapientiae serenitate et tranquillitate (tanquam a statu multo diviniore) arcere et summovere. Nos vero huic rationi libenter assentimur; et hoc ipsum, quod innuunt ac praeoptant, praecipue atque ante omnia agimus.

Doubtless this too will occur: that the goal or mark of the sciences has not been set as the true and the best, but has been prefixed by ourselves (a thing which we reprehend in others). For that the contemplation of truth is more worthy and more lofty than every utility and magnitude of works; whereas that long and anxious delay in experience and matter and in the billows of particular things affixes the mind, as it were, to the ground, or rather casts it down into a certain Tartarus of confusion and perturbation; and keeps it away and removes it from the serenity and tranquillity of abstract wisdom (as from a state far more divine). We, however, gladly assent to this reasoning; and this very thing which they intimate and prefer, this chiefly and before all we do.

Etenim verum exemplar mundi in intellectu humano fundamus; quale invenitur, non quale cuipiam sua propria ratio dictaverit. Hoc autem perfici non potest, nisi facta mundi dissectione atque anatomia diligentissima. Modulos vero ineptos mundorum et tanquam simiolas, quas in philosophiis phantasiae hominum extruxerunt, omnino dissipandas edicimus.

For indeed we ground the true exemplar of the world in the human intellect; such as it is found, not such as anyone’s own private reason has dictated. But this cannot be brought to completion unless a most diligent dissection and anatomy of the world be made. As for the inept models of worlds, and as it were little apes, which the fantasies of men have erected in philosophies, we decree that they must be utterly dissipated.

Sciant itaque homines (id quod superius diximus) quantum intersit inter humanae mentis idola et divinae mentis ideas. Illa enim nihil aliud sunt quam abstractiones ad placitum: hae autem sunt vera signacula Creatoris super creaturas, prout in materia per lineas veras et exquisitas imprimuntur et terminantur. Itaque ipsissimae res sunt (in hoc genere) veritas et utilitas: atque opera ipsa pluris facienda sunt, quatenus sunt veritatis pignora, quam propter vitae commoda.

Let men therefore know (as we said above) how great the difference is between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind. For the former are nothing else than abstractions at pleasure; but the latter are true signacula of the Creator upon the creatures, inasmuch as in matter they are imprinted and terminated by true and exquisite lines. Therefore, in this kind, truth and utility are the very selfsame things; and works themselves are to be valued more, insofar as they are pledges of truth, than on account of the commodities of life.

CXXV.

125.

Occurret fortasse et illud: nos tanquam actum agere, atque antiquos ipsos eandem quam nos viam tenuisse. Itaque verisimile putabit quispiam etiam nos, post tantum motum et molitionem, deventuros tandem ad aliquam ex illis philosophiis quae apud antiquos valuerunt. Nam et illos in meditationum suarum principiis vim et copiam magnam exemplorum et particularium paravisse, atque in commentarios per locos et titulos digessisse, atque inde philosophias suas et artes confecisse, et postea, re comperta, pronuntiasse, et exempla ad fidem et docendi lumen sparsim addidisse; sed particularium notas et codicillos ac commentarios suos in lucem edere supervacuum et molestum putasse: ideoque fecisse quod in aedificando fieri solet, nempe post aedificii structuram machinas et scalas a conspectu amovisse.

Perhaps this too will occur: that we are, as it were, doing what has been done, and that the ancients themselves held the same road as we. Therefore someone will deem it verisimilar that we also, after so great a movement and endeavor, will at length come down to some one of those philosophies which prevailed among the ancients. For they too, at the beginnings of their meditations, prepared a force and great abundance of examples and particulars, and digested them into commentaries by topics and titles, and from thence made up their philosophies and arts; and afterwards, the matter having been ascertained, pronounced, and added examples here and there for credibility and the light of teaching; but they thought it superfluous and troublesome to bring into the light the notes of particulars and their little notebooks and commentaries: and therefore they did what is wont to be done in building—namely, after the structure of the edifice, to remove the machines and ladders from sight.

Neque aliter factum esse credere certe oportet. Verum nisi quis omnino oblitus fuerit eorum quae superius dicta sunt, huic objectioni (aut scrupulo potius) facile respondebit. Formam enim inquirendi et inveniendi apud antiquos et ipsi profitemur, et scripta eorum prae se ferunt.

Nor, assuredly, is it proper to believe that it was done otherwise. But unless someone has altogether forgotten the things which were said above, he will easily reply to this objection (or rather scruple). For the form of inquiring and of finding among the ancients we ourselves also profess, and their writings bear it on their face.

Ea autem non alia fuit, quam ut ab exemplis quibusdam et particularibus (additis notionibus communibus, et fortasse portione nonnulla ex opinionibus receptis, quae maxime placuerunt) ad conclusiones maxime generales sive principia scientiarum advolarent, ad quorum veritatem immotam et fixam conclusiones inferiores per media educerent ac probarent; ex quibus artem constituebant. Tum demum si nova particularia et exempla mota essent et adducta quae placitis suis refragarentur, illa aut per distinctiones aut per regularum suarum explanationes in ordinem subtiliter redigebant, aut demum per exceptiones grosso modo summovebant: at rerum particularium non refragantium causas ad illa principia sua laboriose et pertinaciter accommodabant. Verum nec historia naturalis et experientia illa erat, quam fuisse oportebat (longe certe abest), et ista advolatio ad generalissima omnia perdidit.

But that method was none other than this: that from certain examples and particulars (with common notions added, and perhaps some portion from received opinions which most pleased) they would fly up to the most general conclusions, or principles of the sciences; to the unmoved and fixed verity of which they would, through middle terms, draw out and prove the lower conclusions; and from these they constituted the art. Then at last, if new particulars and examples were stirred and brought forward which ran counter to their settled tenets, they either by distinctions or by explanations of their own rules subtly reduced them into order, or finally removed them, grosso modo, by exceptions: but the causes of particular things that did not gainsay they laboriously and pertinaciously accommodated to those their principles. Yet neither were natural history and experience what they ought to have been (they are certainly far from it), and this sudden flight to the most generalities destroyed all.

CXXVI.

126.

Occurret et illud: nos, propter inhibitionem quandam pronuntiandi et principia certa ponendi donec per medios gradus ad generalissima rite perventum sit, suspensionem quandam judicii tueri, atque ad Acatalepsiam rem deducere. Nos vero non Acatalepsiam, sed Eucatalepsiam meditamur et proponimus: sensui enim non derogamus, sed ministramus; et intellectum non contemnimus, sed regimus. Atque melius est scire quantum opus sit, et tamen nos non penitus scire putare, quam penitus scire nos putare, et tamen nil eorum quae opus est scire.

That too will occur: that we, because of a certain inhibition of making pronouncements and of laying down fixed principles until through intermediate steps one has duly arrived at the most general, maintain a certain suspension of judgment, and bring the matter down to Acatalepsy. But we, in truth, do not meditate Acatalepsy, but Eucatalepsy, and we propose it: for we do not derogate from sense, but minister to it; and we do not contemn the intellect, but govern it. And it is better to know how much is needful, and yet to think that we do not know utterly, than to think that we know utterly, and yet to know nothing of those things which are needful.

CXXVII.

127.

Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam objiciet, utrum nos de Naturali tantum Philosophia, an etiam de scientiis reliquis, Logicis, Ethicis, Politicis, secundum viam nostram perficiendis loquamur. At nos certe de universis haec quae dicta sunt intelligimus: atque quemadmodum vulgaris logica, quae regit res per syllogismum, non tantum ad naturales, sed ad omnes scientias pertinet; ita et nostra, quae procedit per inductionem, omnia complectitur. Tam enim historiam et tabulas inveniendi conficimus de ira, metu, et verecundia, et similibus; ac etiam de exemplis rerum civilium: nec minus de motibus mentalibus memoriae, compositionis et divisionis, judicii, et reliquorum, quam de calido et frigido, aut luce, aut vegetatione, aut similibus.

Someone will even hesitate rather than object, whether we speak only of Natural Philosophy, or also of the remaining sciences—Logic, Ethics, Politics—to be perfected according to our method. But we certainly understand that what has been said applies to all: and just as the common logic, which rules things by syllogism, pertains not only to the natural but to all the sciences; so also our own, which proceeds by induction, embraces all things. For we likewise compose a history and tables of discovery concerning anger, fear, and modesty, and the like; and also concerning examples of civil affairs: nor less concerning the mental motions of memory, of composition and division, of judgment, and the rest, than concerning heat and cold, or light, or vegetation, or the like.

Sed tamen cum nostra ratio interpretandi, post historiam praeparatam et ordinatam, non mentis tantum motus et discursus (ut logica vulgaris), sed et rerum naturam intueatur; ita mentem regimus, ut ad rerum naturam se, aptis per omnia modis, applicare possit. Atque propterea multa et diversa in doctrina interpretationis praecipimus, quae ad subjecti, de quo inquirimus, qualitatem et conditionem, modum inveniendi nonnulla ex parte applicent.

Yet nevertheless, since our method of interpreting, after the history has been prepared and ordered, contemplates not only the motions and discourses of the mind (as the common logic does) but also the nature of things; we so govern the mind that it may be able to apply itself to the nature of things, by modes apt in all respects. And therefore we prescribe many and diverse matters in the doctrine of interpretation, which in some part accommodate the method of discovering to the quality and condition of the subject about which we inquire.

CXXVIII.

128.

At illud de nobis ne dubitare quidem fas sit; utrum nos philosophiam et artes et scientias quibus utimur destruere et demoliri cupiamus: contra enim, earum et usum et cultum et honores libenter amplectimur. Neque enim ullo modo officimus, quin istae, quae invaluerunt, et disputationes alant, et sermones ornent, et ad professoria munera ac vitae civilis compendia adhibeantur et valeant; denique, tanquam numismata quaedam, consensu inter homines recipiantur. Quinetiam significamus aperte, ea quae nos adducimus ad istas res non multum idonea futura; cum ad vulgi captum deduci omnino non possint, nisi per effecta et opera tantum.

But let it not be lawful even to doubt this about us: whether we desire to destroy and demolish the philosophy and the arts and the sciences which we employ; on the contrary, we gladly embrace their use, their cultivation, and their honors. For we in no way hinder these established disciplines from both nourishing disputations and adorning discourse, and from being applied to and proving effective for professorial duties and the compendia (advantages) of civil life; finally, that, like a certain coinage, they be received by common consent among men. Moreover, we signify openly that the things which we bring forward will not prove very apt for those matters; since they cannot at all be brought down to the grasp of the multitude, except through effects and works only.

At hoc ipsum, quod de affectu nostro et bona voluntate erga scientias receptas dicimus, quam vere profiteamur, scripta nostra in publicum edita (praesertim libri De Progressu Scientiarum) fidem faciant. Itaque id verbis amplius vincere non conabimur. Illud interim constanter et diserte monemus; his modis, qui in usu sunt, nec magnos in scientiarum doctrinis et contemplatione progressus fieri, nec illas ad amplitudinem operum deduci posse.

But as to this very point—what we say about our affection and good will toward the received sciences—let our writings published to the public (especially the books On the Progress of the Sciences) give assurance of how truly we profess it. Therefore we shall not endeavor to carry that point further by words. This meanwhile we steadily and explicitly admonish: by the methods which are in use, neither can great progresses be made in the doctrines and contemplation of the sciences, nor can they be brought to the amplitude of works.

CXXIX.

129.

Superest ut de Finis excellentia pauca dicamus. Ea si prius dicta fuissent, votis similia videri potuissent: sed spe jam facta, et iniquis praejudiciis sublatis, plus fortasse ponderis habebunt. Quod si nos omnia perfecissemus et plane absolvissemus, nec alios in partem et consortium laborum subinde vocaremus, etiam ab hujusmodi verbis abstinuissemus, ne acciperentur in praedicationem meriti nostri.

It remains that we say a few things about the excellence of Finis. If these had been said earlier, they might have seemed like wishes; but with hope now made fact, and with unjust prejudices removed, they will perhaps have more weight. But if we had brought everything to completion and plainly absolved it, and did not from time to time call others into a share and consortium of the labors, we would even have abstained from words of this kind, lest they be taken as a proclamation of our merit.

Cum vero aliorum industria acuenda sit et animi excitandi atque accendendi, consentaneum est ut quaedam hominibus in mentem redigamus.

But since the industry of others ought to be sharpened and their spirits excited and kindled, it is consistent that we recall certain things to men’s minds.

Primo itaque, videtur inventorum nobilium introductio inter actiones humanas longe primas partes tenere: id quod antiqua saecula judicaverunt. Ea enim rerum inventoribus divinos honores tribuerunt; iis autem qui in rebus civilibus merebantur (quales erant urbium et imperiorum conditores, legislatores, patriarum a diuturnis malis liberatores, tyrannidum debellatores, et his similes), heroum tantum honores decreverunt. Atque certe si quis ea recte conferat, justum hoc prisci saeculi judicium reperiet.

Primo therefore, the introduction of noble inventions seems to hold by far the foremost parts among human actions: which the ancient ages judged. For they bestowed divine honors upon the inventors of things; but to those who merited in civil affairs (such as founders of cities and empires, lawgivers, liberators of fatherlands from long-enduring evils, subduers of tyrannies, and the like), they decreed only the honors of heroes. And surely, if anyone rightly compare these things, he will find this judgment of the ancient age to be just.

Etenim inventorum beneficia ad universum genus humanum pertinere possunt, civilia ad certas tantummodo hominum sedes: haec etiam non ultra paucas aetates durant, illa quasi perpetuis temporibus. Atque status emendatio in civilibus non sine vi et perturbatione plerumque procedit: at inventa beant, et beneficium deferunt absque alicujus injuria aut tristitia.

For indeed the benefits of inventions can pertain to the universal human race, while civil benefits pertain only to certain abodes of men: these also do not endure beyond a few ages, those as it were through perpetual times. And the amendment of the state in civil matters for the most part proceeds not without force and perturbation; but inventions bless, and confer a benefit without anyone’s injury or sadness.

Etiam inventa quasi novae creationes sunt, et divinorum operum imitamenta; ut bene cecinit ille:

Even inventions are as it were new creations, and imitations of divine works; as he well sang:

'Primum frugiferos foetus mortalibus aegris
Dididerant quondam praestanti nomine Athenae;
Et RECREAVERUNT vitam, legesque rogarunt.'

'First, fruitful crops to ailing mortals
did Athens, of preeminent name, once bestow;
and REVIVED life, and enacted laws.'

Atque videtur notatu dignum in Solomone; quod cum imperio, auro, magnificentia operum, satellitio, famulitio, classe insuper, et nominis claritate, ac summa hominum admiratione floreret, tamen nihil horum delegerit sibi ad gloriam sed ita pronuntiaverit: Gloriam Dei esse, celare rem; gloriam regis, investigare rem.

And it seems worthy of note in Solomon; that although he flourished in command, in gold, in magnificence of works, in bodyguard, in retinue, in a fleet besides, and in the renown of his name, and in the highest admiration of men, nevertheless he chose none of these for himself for glory, but thus proclaimed: The glory of God is to conceal a matter; the glory of a king, to investigate a matter.

Rursus (si placet) reputet quipiam, quantum intersit inter hominum vitam in excultissima quapiam Europae provincia, et in regione aliqua Novae Indiae maxime fera et barbara: ea tantum differre existimabit, ut merito hominem homini Deum esse, non solum propter auxilium et beneficium, sed etiam per status comparationem, recte dici possit. Atque hoc non solum, non coelum, non corpora, sed artes praestant.

Again (if it please), let someone reckon how great the difference is between the life of men in some most cultivated province of Europe, and in some region of the New India most wild and barbarous: he will esteem them to differ so much that, deservedly, it can rightly be said that man is a God to man, not only on account of help and beneficence, but also by comparison of status. And this is furnished—not by heaven, not by bodies, but by the arts.

Rursus, vim et virtutem et consequentias rerum inventarum notare juvat; quae non in aliis manifestius occurrunt, quam in illis tribus quae antiquis incognitae, et quarum primordia, licet recentia, obscura et ingloria sunt: Artis nimirum Imprimendi, Pulveris Tormentarii, et Acus Nauticae. Haec enim tria rerum faciem et statum in orbe terrarum mutaverunt: primum, in re literaria; secundum, in re bellica; tertium, in navigationibus: unde innumerae rerum mutationes sequutae sunt; ut non imperium aliquod, non secta, non stella, majorem efficaciam et quasi influxum super res humanas exercuisse videatur, quam ista mechanica exercuerunt.

Again, it is pleasant to note the force and the virtue and the consequences of discovered things; which do not occur more manifestly in others than in those three which were unknown to the ancients, and whose beginnings, though recent, are obscure and inglorious: namely, the Art of Printing, Gunpowder, and the Nautical Needle. For these three have changed the face and state of things in the globe of the earth: the first, in literary affairs; the second, in military affairs; the third, in navigations: whence innumerable changes of things have followed; so that no empire, no sect, no star, seems to have exercised a greater efficacy and, as it were, influx upon human affairs, than these mechanical things have exercised.

Praeterea non abs re fuerit, tria hominum ambitionis genera et quasi gradus distinguere. Primum eorum, qui propriam potentiam in patria sua amplificare cupiunt; quod genus vulgare est et degener. Secundum eorum, qui patriae potentiam et imperium inter humanum genus amplificare nituntur; illud plus certe habet dignitatis, cupiditatis haud minus.

Moreover, it would not be out of place to distinguish three genera of human ambition and, as it were, grades. The first is of those who desire to amplify their own power in their patria; which genus is vulgar and degenerate. The second is of those who strive to amplify their patria’s power and dominion among the human race; that certainly has more dignity, but no less cupidity.

Quod si quis humani generis ipsius potentiam et imperium in rerum universitatem instaurare et amplificare conetur, ea proculdubio ambitio (si modo ita vocanda sit) reliquis et sanior est et augustior. Hominis autem imperium in res, in solis artibus et scientiis ponitur. Naturae enim non imperatur, nisi parendo.

But if anyone endeavors to restore and to amplify the very power and dominion of the human race over the universe of things, that ambition (if indeed it is to be so called) is without doubt both sounder and more august than the rest. Moreover, man’s dominion over things is set only in the arts and sciences. For Nature is not commanded, except by obeying.

Praeterea, si unius alicujus particularis inventi utilitas ita homines affecerit, ut eum qui genus humanum universum beneficio aliquo devincire potuerit homine majorem putaverint; quanto celsius videbitur tale aliquid invenire, per quod alia omnia expedite inveniri possint? Et tamen (ut verum omnino dicamus) quemadmodum luci magnam habemus gratiam, quod per eam vias inire, artes exercere, legere, nos invicem dignoscere possimus; et nihilominus ipsa visio lucis res praestantior est et pulchrior, quam multiplex ejus usus: ita certe ipsa contemplatio rerum prout sunt, sine superstitione aut impostura, errore aut confusione, in seipsa magis digna est, quam universus inventorum fructus.

Moreover, if the utility of any one particular invention has so affected men that they have thought him who could bind the whole human race by some benefaction to be more than human; how much more exalted will it seem to discover something of such a kind, by which all other things might be discovered expeditiously? And yet (to speak the whole truth) just as we owe great gratitude to light, because by it we are able to enter upon roads, to exercise the arts, to read, to distinguish one another; and nonetheless the very vision of light is a thing more excellent and more beautiful than its manifold use: so surely the very contemplation of things as they are, without superstition or imposture, error or confusion, is in itself more worthy than the whole fruit of inventions.

Postremo, siquis depravationem scientiarum et artium ad malitiam et luxuriam et similia objecerit; id neminem moveat. Illud enim de omnibus mundanis bonis dici potest, ingenio, fortitudine, viribus, forma, divitiis, luce ipsa, et reliquis. Recuperet modo genus humanum jus suum in naturam quod ei ex dotatione divina competit, et detur ei copia: usum vero recta ratio et sana religio gubernabit.

Lastly, if anyone should object that the sciences and arts are depraved into malice and luxury and the like, let that move no one. For that can be said of all mundane goods—ingenuity, fortitude, strength, form, riches, light itself, and the rest. Let only the human race recuperate its right over nature which accrues to it from divine endowment, and let abundance be given to it: the use indeed will be governed by right reason and sound religion.

CXXX.

130.

Jam vero tempus est ut artem ipsam Interpretandi Naturam proponamus: in qua licet nos utilissima et verissima praecepisse arbitremur, tamen necessitatem ei absolutam (ac si absque ea nil agi possit) aut etiam perfectionem non attribuimus. Etenim in ea opinione sumus: si justam Naturae et Experientiae Historiam praesto haberent homines, atque in ea sedulo versarentur, sibique duas res imperare possent; unam, ut receptas opiniones et notiones deponerent; alteram, ut mentem a generalissimis et proximis ab illis ad tempus cohiberent; fore ut etiam vi propria et genuina mentis, absque alia arte, in formam nostram Interpretandi incidere possent. Est enim Interpretatio verum et naturale opus mentis, demptis iis quae obstant: sed tamen omnia certe per nostra praecepta erunt magis in procinctu, et multo firmiora.

Now indeed it is time that we set forth the very art of Interpreting Nature: in which, although we judge that we have prescribed things most useful and most true, yet we attribute to it neither absolute necessity (as if without it nothing could be done) nor even perfection. For we are of this opinion: if men had at hand a just History of Nature and of Experience, and diligently busied themselves therein, and could impose upon themselves two things—one, to lay down received opinions and notions; the other, to restrain the mind for a time from the most general ones and from those nearest derived from them—then it would come to pass that even by the mind’s own proper and genuine force, without any other art, they could light upon our form of Interpreting. For Interpretation is the true and natural work of the mind, the hindrances being removed: yet certainly, through our precepts, all things will be more in readiness, and much firmer.

Neque tamen illis nihil addi posse affirmamus: sed contra, nos, qui mentem respicimus non tantum in facultate propria, sed quatenus copulatur cum rebus, Artem inveniendi cum Inventis adolescere posse, statuere debemus.

Nor yet do we affirm that nothing can be added to them; but on the contrary, we, who regard the mind not only in its proper faculty, but in so far as it is coupled with things, ought to determine that the Art of discovering can grow together with the Discoveries.