Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. Quaestiones de Deo & mente humanâ jam ante paucis attigi inDissertatione de Methodo recte regendae rationis &veritatis in scientiis investigandae, gallice editâ anno 1637, non quidem ut ipsas ibi accurate tractarem, sed tantùm ut delibarem, & ex lectorum judiciis addiscerem quâ ratione postea essent tractandae. Tanti enim momenti mihi visae sunt, ut plus unâ vice de ipsis agendum esse judicarem; viamque sequor ad eas explicandas tam parum tritam, atque ab usu communi tam remotam, ut non utile putarim ipsam in gallico & passim ab omnibus legendo scripto fusiùs docere, ne debiliora etiam ingenia credere possent eam sibi esse ingrediendam.

1. Questions about God & the human mind I had already touched on a little before in theDiscourse on the Method of rightly governing reason &veritatis to be investigated in the sciences, published in French in the year 1637, not indeed so that I might treat them there accurately, but only so that I might sample them, & from the readers’ judgments learn in what manner they should afterwards be treated. For they seemed to me of such great moment that I judged it necessary to deal with them more than once; and I follow a road to explain them so little-trodden, and so far removed from common use, that I did not think it useful to teach it more diffusely in French & in a writing to be read everywhere by everyone, lest even weaker talents might believe that they ought to set out upon it for themselves.

2. Cùm autem ibi rogassem omnes quibus aliquid in meis scriptis reprehensione dignum occurreret, ut ejus me monere dignarentur, nulla in ea quae de his quaestionibus attigeram notatu digna objecta sunt, praeter duo, ad quae hîc paucis, priusquam earumdem accuratiorem explicationem aggrediar, respondebo.

2. Since, however, there I had asked all to whom anything in my writings worthy of reprehension should occur, to deign to admonish me of it, nothing in those things which I had touched upon concerning these questions was objected as worthy of note, except two, to which I shall here, in a few words, before a more accurate explanation of the same, reply.

3. Primum est, ex eo quod mens humana in se con

3. The first is, from the fact that the human mind in itself con

[8]versa non percipiat aliud se esse quàm rem cogitantem, non sequi ejus naturam siveessentiam in eo tantùm consistere, quod sit res cogitans, ita ut vox tantùm caetera omnia excludat quae forte etiam dici possent ad animae naturam pertinere. Cui objectioni respondeo me etiam ibi noluisse illa excludere in ordine ad ipsam rei veritatem (de quâ scilicet tunc non agebam), sed dumtaxat in ordine ad meam perceptionem, adeo ut sensus esset me nihil plane cognoscere quod ad essentiam meam scirem pertinere, praeterquam quod essem res cogitans, sive res habens in se facultatem cogitandi. In sequentibus autem ostendam quo pacto, ex eo quod nihil aliud ad essentiam meam pertinere cognoscam, sequatur nihil etiam aliud revera ad illam pertinere.

[8]from the fact that, when turned upon itself, the human mind does not perceive itself to be anything other than a thinking thing, it does not follow that its nature oressence consists in this only , namely that it is a thinking thing, in such a way that the word “only” excludes all the rest which perhaps might also be said to pertain to the nature of the soul. To which objection I reply that even there I did not wish to exclude those things in relation to the truth of the matter itself (of which, to be sure, I was not then treating), but only in relation to my perception, so that the sense was that I plainly recognized nothing which I knew to pertain to my essence, except that I was a thinking thing, that is, a thing having in itself the faculty of thinking. In what follows, however, I shall show in what manner, from the fact that I know nothing else to pertain to my essence, it follows that in reality nothing else also pertains to it.

4. Alterum est, ex eo quod ideam rei me perfectioris in me habeam, non sequi ipsam ideam esse me perfectiorem, & multo minùs illud quod per istam ideam repraesentatur existere. Sed respondeo hîc subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectûs, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentatâ, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae. Quomodo verò, ex hoc solo quod rei me perfectioris idea in me sit, sequatur illam rem revera existere, fuse in sequentibus exponetur.

4. The second point is that, from the fact that I have in me the idea of a thing more perfect than me, it does not follow that the idea itself is more perfect than me, and much less that that which is represented through that idea exists. But I reply that here there is an equivocation in the word idea: for it can be taken either materially, for the operation of the intellect, in which sense it cannot be said to be more perfect than me; or objectively, for the thing represented by that operation, which thing, even if it is not supposed to exist outside the intellect, can nevertheless be more perfect than me by reason of its essence. But how, from this alone that the idea of a thing more perfect than me is in me, it follows that that thing really exists, will be set forth at length in what follows.

5. Vidi quidem praeterea duo quaedam scripta satis longa, sed quibus non tam meae his de rebus rationes quàm conclusiones argumentis ex Atheorum locis

5. I have indeed moreover seen two certain writings rather long, but in which not so much my reasonings on these matters as the conclusions with arguments from the loci (passages) of atheists

[9] communibus mutuatis impugnabantur. Et quoniam istiusmodi argumenta nullam vim habere possunt apud eos, qui rationes meas intelligent, adeoque praepostera & imbecillia sunt multorum judicia, ut magis a primum acceptis opinionibus, quantumvis falsis & a ratione alienis, persuadeantur, quàm a verâ & firmâ, sed posterius auditâ, ipsarum refutatione, nolo hîc ad illa respondere, ne mihi sint prius referenda. Tantùmque generaliter dicam ea omnia, quae vulgo jactantur ab Atheis ad existentiam Dei impugnandam, semper ex eo pendere, quod vel humani affectus Deo affingantur, vel mentibus nostris tanta vis & sapientia arrogetur, ut quidnam Deus facere possit ac debeat, determinare & comprehendere conemur; adeo ut, modò tantùm memores simus mentes nostras considerandas esse ut finitas, Deum autem ut incomprehensibilem & infinitum, nullam ista difficultatem sint nobis paritura.

[9] they were being assailed with common, borrowed ones. And since arguments of this sort can have no force with those who will understand my reasons, and the judgments of many are so preposterous & imbecile that they are persuaded more by opinions first received, however false & alien from reason, than by a true & firm one, but heard later, by their very refutation, I do not wish here to answer those, lest they must first be recounted by me. And I will only say in general that all the things which are commonly bruited by Atheists for impugning the existence of God always depend on this: that either human affections are affixed to God, or so great a power & wisdom are arrogated to our minds that we attempt to determine & comprehend what God can and ought to do; so that, provided only we are mindful that our minds are to be considered as finite, but God as incomprehensible & infinite, these will beget for us no difficulty.

6. Jam verò, postquam hominum judicia semel utcunque sum expertus, iterum hîc aggredior easdem de Deo & mente humanâ quaestiones, simulque totius primae Philosophiae initia tractare; sed ita ut nullum vulgi plausum, nullamque Lectorum frequentiam expectem: quin etiam nullis author sum ut haec legant, nisi tantùm iis qui seriò mecum meditari, mentemque a sensibus, simulque ab omnibus praejudiciis, abducere poterunt ac volent, quales non nisi admodum paucos reperiri satis scio. Quantum autem ad illos, qui, rationum mearum seriem & nexum comprehendere non curantes, in singulas tantùm clausulas, ut

6. Now indeed, after I have once in some fashion made trial of men’s judgments, I again here undertake the same questions about God & the human mind, and at the same time to treat the beginnings of the whole First Philosophy; but in such a way that I expect no applause of the crowd, and no thronging of Readers: nay, I am author for none to read these things, except only for those who will be able and willing to meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw the mind from the senses, and likewise from all prejudices, of which kind I know well that only very few are to be found. But as for those who, not caring to comprehend the series & nexus of my reasonings, fasten only upon individual clauses, as

[10] multis in more est, argutari studebunt, non magnum ex hujus scripti lectione fructum sunt percepturi; & quamvis forte in multis cavillandi occasionem inveniant, non facile tamen aliquid quod urgeat aut responsione dignum sit objicient.

[10] it is the custom of many they will strive to quibble, they will not reap great fruit from the reading of this writing; and although perhaps in many things they may find an occasion for cavilling, not easily, however, will they object anything that is urgent or worthy of an answer.

7. Quia verò nequidem etiam aliis spondeo me in omnibus primâ fronte satisfacturum, nec tantum mihi arrogo ut confidam me omnia posse praevidere quae alicui difficilia videbuntur, primo quidem in Meditationibus illas ipsas cogitationes exponam, quarum ope ad certam & evidentem cognitionem veritatis mihi videor pervenisse, ut experiar an fortè iisdem rationibus, quibus ego persuasus sum, alios etiam possim persuadere. Postea vero respondebo ad objectiones virorum aliquot ingenio & doctrinâ excellentium, ad quos hae Meditationes, antequam typis mandarentur, examinandae missae sunt. Satis enim multa & varia ab illis fuerunt objecta, ut ausim sperare non facile quicquam aliis, saltem alicujus momenti, venturum in mentem, quod ii nondum attigerint.

7. But since I do not even promise others that I shall satisfy them in all things at first blush, nor do I so far arrogate to myself as to be confident that I can foresee everything that will seem difficult to someone, first indeed in the Meditations I will set forth those very thoughts, by the aid of which I seem to myself to have come to a certain and evident cognition of truth, so that I may try whether perchance by the same reasons by which I have been persuaded I can also persuade others. Afterwards I shall answer the objections of certain men outstanding in wit and learning, to whom these Meditations, before they were consigned to the press, were sent for examination. For sufficiently many and various things were objected by them, that I dare hope that not easily will anything else, at least of any moment, occur to others’ minds which they have not already touched.

Ideoque rogo etiam atque etiam Lectores, ut non prius de Meditationibus judicium ferant, quàm objectiones istas earumque solutiones omnes perlegere dignati sint.

And therefore I beg again and again, Readers, that you not render judgment on the Meditations before you have deigned to read through all those objections and their solutions in full.