Dante: MONARCHIA

I.1. Omnium hominum quos ad amorem veritatis natura superior impressit hoc maxime interesse videtur: ut, quemadmodum de labore antiquorum ditati sunt, ita et ipsi posteris prolaborent, quatenus ab eis posteritas habeat quo ditetur. 2. Longe nanque ab offitio se esse non dubitet qui, publicis documentis imbutus, ad rem publicam aliquid afferre non curat; non enim est lignum, quod secus decursus aquarum fructificat in tempore suo, sed potius perniciosa vorago semper ingurgitans et nunquam ingurgitata refundens. 3. Hec igitur sepe mecum recogitans, ne de infossi talenti culpa quandoque redarguar, publice utilitati non modo turgescere, quinymo fructificare desidero, et intemptatas ab aliis estendere veritates.

I.1. Of all men upon whom the higher nature has impressed a love of truth, this seems to be of the greatest importance: that, just as they have been enriched by the labor of the ancients, so they themselves should labor for their descendants, to the extent that posterity may have from them that by which it may be enriched. 2. For let him not doubt that he is far from duty who, steeped in public documents, does not care to bring something to the commonwealth; for he is not a tree which beside the courses of waters bears fruit in its season, but rather a pernicious whirlpool, ever ingulfing and never, the things ingulfed, pouring back. 3. Therefore, often pondering these things with myself, lest I someday be reproved for the fault of the buried talent, I desire for public utility not only to burgeon, but indeed to fructify, and to extend truths unattempted by others.

4. Nam quem fructum ille qui theorema quoddam Euclidis iterum demonstraret? qui ab Aristotile felicitatem ostensam reostendere conaretur? qui senectutem a Cicerone defensam resummeret defensandam?

4. For what profit would that man have who should demonstrate anew some theorem of Euclid? who would try to re-display the felicity set forth by Aristotle? who would resume for defense old age, defended by Cicero?

Nullum quippe, sed fastidium potius illa superfluitas tediosa prestaret. 5. Cumque, inter alias veritates occultas et utiles, temporalis Monarchie notitia utilissima sit et maxime latens et, propter non se habere immediate ad lucrum, ab omnibus intemptata, in proposito est hanc de suis enucleare latibulis, tum ut utiliter mundo pervigilem, tum etiam ut palmam tanti bravii primus in meam gloriam adipiscar. 6. Arduum quidem opus et ultra vires aggredior, non tam de propria virtute confidens, quam de lumine Largitoris illius "qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat".

None indeed; rather that tedious superfluity would furnish distaste. 5. And since, among other hidden and useful truths, the knowledge of Temporal Monarchy is most useful and most latent, and, because it does not have an immediate relation to lucre, is unattempted by all, it is my purpose to enucleate this from its lurking-places, both that I may usefully keep vigil for the world, and also that I, first, may obtain to my glory the palm of so great a prize. 6. I do indeed undertake a toilsome work and beyond my powers, trusting not so much in my own virtue as in the light of that Bestower “who gives to all abundantly and does not reproach”.

II.1. Primum quidem igitur videndum quid est quod 'temporalis Monarchia' dicitur, typo ut dicam et secundum intentionem. 2. Est ergo temporalis Monarchia, quam dicunt 'Imperium', unicus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in hiis et super hiis que tempore mensurantur. 3. Maxime autem de hac tria dubitata queruntur: primo nanque dubitatur et queritur an ad bene esse mundi necessaria sit; secundo an romanus populus de iure Monarche offitium sibi asciverit; et tertio an auctoritas Monarche dependeat a Deo inmediate vel ab alio, Dei ministro seu vicario.

2.1. First, then, it must be seen what it is that is called the ‘temporal Monarchy,’ by type, so to speak, and according to intention. 2. Therefore the temporal Monarchy, which they call the ‘Empire,’ is a single principate and over all in time, both in these things and over these things which are measured by time. 3. But chiefly about this three points are doubted and inquired: first, it is doubted and asked whether it is necessary for the well-being of the world; second, whether the Roman people by right assumed to themselves the office of the Monarch; and third, whether the authority of the Monarch depends upon God immediately or upon another, a minister or vicar of God.

4. Verum, quia omnis veritas que non est principium ex veritate alicuius principii fit manifesta, necesse est in qualibet inquisitione habere notitiam de principio, in quod analetice recurratur pro certitudine omnium propositionum que inferius assummuntur. Et quia presens tractatus est inquisitio quedam, ante omnia de principio scruptandum esse videtur in cuius virtute inferiora consistant. 5. Est ergo sciendum quod quedam sunt que, nostre potestati minime subiacentia, speculari tantummodo possumus, operari autem non: velut mathematica, physica et divina; quedam vero sunt que, nostre potestati subiacentia, non solum speculari sed etiam operari possumus: et in hiis non operatio propter speculationem, sed hec propter illam assummitur, quoniam in talibus operatio finis.

4. But, since every truth which is not a principle becomes manifest from the truth of some principle, it is necessary in any inquiry to have knowledge of the principle, to which one may recur analytically for the certitude of all the propositions that are assumed below. And because the present treatise is a certain inquiry, before all things it seems that the principle must be scrutinized in whose virtue the lower things consist. 5. Therefore it must be known that there are certain things which, being in no way subject to our power, we can only contemplate, but not operate: such as the mathematical, the physical, and the divine; and there are certain things which, being subject to our power, we can not only contemplate but also operate: and in these, operation is not assumed for the sake of speculation, but this for that, since in such matters operation is the end.

6. Cum ergo materia presens politica sit, ymo fons atque principium rectarum politiarum, et omne politicum nostre potestati subiacet, manifestum est quod materia presens non ad speculationem per prius, sed ad operationem ordinatur. 7. Rursus, cum in operabilibus principium et causa omnium sit ultimus finis—movet enim primo agentem—, consequens est ut omnis ratio eorum que sunt ad finem ab ipso fine summatur. Nam alia erit ratio incidendi lignum propter domum constituendam, et alia propter navim.

6. Since therefore the present matter is political—nay, the fount and principle of right polities—and every political thing is subject to our power, it is manifest that the present matter is ordained not primarily to speculation but to operation. 7. Again, since in operable things the principle and cause of all is the ultimate end—for it is the first to move the agent—it follows that every rationale of the things that are for an end is taken from the end itself. For one rationale will be that of cutting wood for constituting a house, and another for a ship.

8. Illud igitur, siquid est, quod est finis universalis civilitatis humani generis, erit hic principium per quod omnia que inferius probanda sunt erunt manifesta sufficienter: esse autem finem huius civilitatis et illius, et non esse unum omnium finem arbitrari stultum est.

8. Therefore that thing, whatever it is, which is the end of the universal civilization of the human race, will here be the principle through which all the things that are to be proved below will be made sufficiently manifest: but to suppose that there is an end of this civilization and of that, and that there is not one end of all, is foolish.

III.1. Nunc autem videndum est quid sit finis totius humane civilitatis: quo viso, plus quam dimidium laboris erit transactum, iuxta Phylosophum ad Nicomacum. 2. Et ad evidentiam eius quod queritur advertendum quod, quemadmodum est finis aliquis ad quem natura producit pollicem, et alius ab hoc ad quem manum totam, et rursus alius ab utroque ad quem brachium, aliusque ab omnibus ad quem totum hominem; sic alius est finis ad quem singularem hominem, alius ad quem ordinat domesticam comunitatem, alius ad quem viciniam, et alius ad quem civitatem, et alius ad quem regnum, et denique optimus ad quem universaliter genus humanum Deus ecternus arte sua, que natura est, in esse producit. Et hoc queritur hic tanquam principium inquisitionis directivum.

3.1. Now, however, it must be seen what is the end of the whole human commonwealth: this once seen, more than half the labor will have been completed, according to the Philosopher to Nicomachus. 2. And for the evidence of that which is sought it must be noted that, just as there is some end to which nature produces the thumb, and another distinct from this to which the whole hand, and again another distinct from both to which the arm, and another from all to which the whole man; so one end is that to which it orders the individual man, another that to which it orders the domestic community, another that to which the neighborhood, and another that to which the city, and another that to which the kingdom, and finally the best, to which God eternal, by His art, which is nature, brings the human race universally into being. And this is sought here as a directive principle of the inquiry.

3. Propter quod sciendum primo quod Deus et natura nil otiosum facit, sed quicquid prodit in esse est ad aliquam operationem. Non enim essentia ulla creata ultimus finis est in intentione creantis, in quantum creans, sed propria essentie operatio: unde est quod non operatio propria propter essentiam, sed hec propter illam habet ut sit. 4. Est ergo aliqua propria operatio humane universitatis, ad quam ipsa universitas hominum in tanta moltitudine ordinatur; ad quam quidem operationem nec homo unus, nec domus una, nec una vicinia, nec una civitas, nec regnum particulare pertingere potest.

3. Wherefore it must be known first that God and nature make nothing idle, but whatever comes forth into being is for some operation. For no created essence is the ultimate end in the intention of the creator, insofar as creating, but rather the proper operation of the essence; whence it is that it is not the proper operation for the sake of the essence, but this [essence] has to be for the sake of that [operation]. 4. Therefore there is some proper operation of the human universality, to which the universality of men in so great a multitude is ordered; to which operation neither a single man, nor a single household, nor a single neighborhood, nor a single city, nor a particular kingdom can attain.

Que autem sit illa, manifestum fiet si ultimum de potentia totius humanitatis appareat. 5. Dico ergo quod nulla vis a pluribus spetie diversis partecipata ultimum est de potentia alicuius illorum; quia, cum illud quod est ultimum tale sit constitutivum spetiei, sequeretur quod una essentia pluribus spetiebus esset specificata: quod est inpossibile. 6. Non est ergo vis ultima in homine ipsum esse simpliciter sumptum, quia etiam sic sumptum ab elementis participatur; nec esse complexionatum, quia hoc reperitur in mineralibus; nec esse animatum, quia sic etiam in plantis; nec esse apprehensivum, quia sic etiam participatur a brutis; sed esse apprehensivum per intellectum possibilem: quod quidem esse nulli ab homine alii competit vel supra vel infra.

What, however, that is, will become manifest if the ultimate in the potency of the whole of humanity becomes apparent. 5. I say, therefore, that no power participated by many diverse in species is the ultimate of the potency of any of them; because, since that which is ultimate is of such a sort as to be constitutive of the species, it would follow that one essence would be specified by many species: which is impossible. 6. Therefore the ultimate power in man is not sheer being taken simply, because even so taken it is participated by the elements; nor being as complexioned (composite), because this is found in minerals; nor animated being, because thus also in plants; nor apprehensive being, because thus also it is participated by the brutes; but being apprehensive through the possible intellect: and this being appertains to none other than man, neither above nor below.

7. Nam, etsi alie sunt essentie intellectum participantes, non tamen intellectus earum est possibilis ut hominis, quia essentie tales speties quedam sunt intellectuales et non aliud, et earum esse nichil est aliud quam intelligere quod est quod sunt; quod est sine interpolatione, aliter sempiterne non essent. Patet igitur quod ultimum de potentia ipsius humanitatis est potentia sive virtus intellectiva. 8. Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per aliquam particularium comunitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum reduci non potest, necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere, per quam quidem tota potentia hec actuetur; sicut necesse est multitudinem rerum generabilium ut potentia tota materie prime semper sub actu sit: aliter esset dare potentiam separatam, quod est inpossibile.

7. For although there are other essences participating in intellect, nevertheless their intellect is not possible as man’s is, because such essences are certain intellectual species and nothing else, and their being is nothing other than to understand—which is what they are; and this is without interruption, otherwise they would not be sempiternal. It is plain, therefore, that the ultimate of the potency of humanity itself is the intellectual potency or virtue. 8. And because this potency cannot be brought wholly at once into act through one man or through any one of the particular communities distinguished above, it is necessary that there be a multitude in the human race, through which indeed this whole potency may be actualized; just as a multitude of generable things is necessary so that the whole potency of prime matter may always be under act: otherwise one would have to posit a separate potency, which is impossible.

9. Et huic sententie concordat Averrois in comento super hiis que De anima. Potentia etiam intellectiva, de qua loquor, non solum est ad formas universales aut speties, sed etiam per quandam extensionem ad particulares: unde solet dici quod intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus, cuius finis est agere atque facere. 10. Quod dico propter agibilia, que politica prudentia regulantur, et propter factibilia, que regulantur arte: que omnia speculationi ancillantur tanquam optimo ad quod humanum genus Prima Bonitas in esse produxit; ex quo iam innotescit illud Politice: intellectu, scilicet, vigentes aliis naturaliter principari.

9. And with this opinion Averroes agrees in the commentary upon those things which are in De Anima. The intellectual power, moreover, of which I speak, is directed not only to universal forms or species, but also, by a certain extension, to particulars: whence it is wont to be said that the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical, whose end is to act and to make. 10. Which I say on account of the things-to-be-done (agibilia), which are regulated by political prudence, and on account of the things-to-be-made (factibilia), which are regulated by art: all of which are handmaids to speculation as to the best, for the sake of which the human race the First Goodness brought into being; whence now that saying of the Politics becomes evident: namely, that those flourishing in intellect naturally rule over others.

IV.1. Satis igitur declaratum est quod proprium opus humani generis totaliter accepti est actuare semper totam potentiam intellectus possibilis, per prius ad speculandum et secondario propter hoc ad operandum per suam extensionem. 2. Et quia quemadmodum est in parte sic est in toto, et in homine particulari contingit quod sedendo et quiescendo prudentia et sapientia ipse perficitur, patet quod genus humanum in quiete sive tranquillitate pacis ad proprium suum opus, quod fere divinum est iuxta illud "Minuisti eum paulominus ab angelis", liberrime atque facillime se habet. Unde manifestum est quod pax universalis est optimum eorum que ad nostram beatitudinem ordinantur.

4.1. It has been sufficiently declared, therefore, that the proper work of the human race taken totally is to actualize always the whole potency of the possible intellect, primarily for speculating and secondarily, on account of this, for operating by its extension. 2. And because as it is in the part, so it is in the whole, and in the particular man it happens that by sitting and being at rest he himself is perfected in prudence and wisdom, it is clear that the human race in the quiet or tranquility of peace disposes itself most freely and most easily to its proper work, which is almost divine, according to that: “You have made him a little less than the angels”; whence it is manifest that universal peace is the best of those things which are ordered toward our beatitude.

3. Hinc est quod pastoribus de sursum sonuit non divitie, non voluptates, non honores, non longitudo vite, non sanitas, non robur, non pulcritudo, sed pax; inquit enim celestis militia: "Gloria in altissimis Deo, et in terra pax hominibus bone voluntatis". 4. Hinc etiam "Pax vobis" Salus hominum salutabat; decebat enim summum Salvatorem summam salutationem exprimere: quem quidem morem servare voluerunt discipuli eius et Paulus in salutationibus suis, ut omnibus manifestum esse potest. 5. Ex hiis ergo que declarata sunt patet per quod melius, ymo per quod optime genus humanum pertingit ad opus proprium; et per consequens visum est propinquissimum medium per quod itur in illud ad quod, velut in ultimum finem, omnia nostra opera ordinantur, quia est pax universalis, que pro principio rationum subsequentium supponatur. 6. Quod erat necessarium, ut dictum fuit, velut signum prefixum in quod quicquid probandum est resolvatur tanquam in manifestissimam veritatem.

3. Hence it is that what sounded from above to the shepherds was not riches, not pleasures, not honors, not length of life, not health, not strength, not beauty, but peace; for the celestial host said: "Glory in the highest to God, and on earth peace to men of good will." 4. Hence also "Peace to you," the Salvation of men was saluting; for it befitted the highest Savior to express the highest salutation: which custom his disciples and Paul wished to observe in their salutations, as can be manifest to all. 5. From these things therefore which have been declared it is clear by what better—nay, by what best—the human race attains to its proper work; and consequently it has seemed that the nearest means by which one goes to that to which, as to the ultimate end, all our works are ordered, is universal peace, which is to be assumed as the principle of the reasonings that follow. 6. Which was necessary, as has been said, as a prefixed sign into which whatever is to be proved may be resolved, as into the most manifest truth.

V.1. Resummens igitur quod a principio dicebatur, tria maxime dubitantur et dubitata queruntur circa Monarchiam temporalem, que comuniori vocabulo nuncupatur 'Imperium'; et de hiis, ut predictum est, propositum est sub assignato principio inquisitionem facere secundum iam tactum ordinem. 2. Itaque prima questio sit: utrum ad bene esse mundi Monarchia temporalis necessaria sit. Hoc equidem, nulla vi rationis vel auctoritatis obstante, potissimis et patentissimis argumentis ostendi potest, quorum primum ab autoritate Phylosophi assummatur de suis Politicis.

5.1. Resuming therefore what was being said from the beginning, three things are especially doubted and, being doubted, are inquired concerning the temporal Monarchy, which by the more common vocable is named ‘Empire’; and about these, as was said before, it is proposed under the assigned principle to make an inquisition according to the order already touched. 2. And so let the first question be: whether for the well-being of the world the temporal Monarchy is necessary. This indeed, with no force of reason or authority standing in the way, can be shown by the most powerful and most patent arguments, the first of which let be assumed from the authority of the Philosopher from his Politics.

3. Asserit enim ibi venerabilis eius autoritas quod, quando aliqua plura ordinantur ad unum, oportet unum eorum regulare seu regere, alia vero regulari seu regi; quod quidem non solum gloriosum nomen autoris facit esse credendum, sed ratio inductiva. 4. Si enim consideremus unum hominem, hoc in eo contingere videbimus, quia, cum omnes vires eius ordinentur ad felicitatem, vis ipsa intellectualis est regulatrix et rectrix omnium aliarum: aliter ad felicitatem pervenire non potest. 5. Si consideremus unam domum, cuius finis est domesticos ad bene vivere preparare, unum oportet esse qui regulet et regat, quem dicunt patremfamilias, vel eius locum tenentem, iuxta dicentem Phylosophum: "Omnis domus regitur a senissimo"; et huius, ut ait Homerus, est regulare omnes et leges imponere aliis.

3. For he there asserts—his venerable authority—that when several things are ordered to one end, it is necessary that one of them regulate or rule, and that the others be regulated or ruled; which indeed not only the glorious name of the author makes to be believed, but also inductive reason. 4. For if we consider a single man, we shall see this to occur in him: since all his powers are ordered to happiness, the intellectual power itself is the regulatrix and rectrix of all the others; otherwise he cannot arrive at happiness. 5. If we consider a single household, whose end is to prepare the household to live well, there must be one who regulates and rules, whom they call the paterfamilias, or one holding his place, according to the Philosopher who says: "Every household is ruled by the eldest"; and it is his, as Homer says, to regulate all and to impose laws upon the others.

Propter quod proverbialiter dicitur illa maledictio: "Parem habeas in domo". 6. Si consideremus vicum unum, cuius finis est commoda tam personarum quam rerum auxiliatio, unum oportet esse aliorum regulatorem, vel datum ab alio vel ex ipsis preheminentem consentientibus aliis; aliter ad illam mutuam sufficientiam non solum non pertingitur, sed aliquando, pluribus preheminere volentibus, vicinia tota destruitur. 7. Si vero unam civitatem, cuius finis est bene sufficienterque vivere, unum oportet esse regimen, et hoc non solum in recta politia, sed etiam in obliqua; quod si aliter fiat, non solum finis vite civilis amictitur, sed etiam civitas desinit esse quod erat. 8. Si denique unum regnum particolare, cuius finis est is qui civitatis cum maiori fiducia sue tranquillitatis, oportet esse regem unum qui regat atque gubernet; aliter non modo existentes in regno finem non assecuntur, sed etiam regnum in interitum labitur, iuxta illud infallibilis Veritatis: "Omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur". 9. Si ergo sic se habet in hiis et in singulis que ad unum aliquod ordinantur, verum est quod assummitur supra; nunc constat quod totum humanum genus ordinatur ad unum, ut iam preostensum fuit: ergo unum oportet esse regulans sive regens, et hoc 'Monarcha' sive 'Imperator' dici debet.

Wherefore that curse is said proverbially: "May you have an equal in the house." 6. If we consider a single village, whose end is the helpful assistance of both persons and things, there must be one regulator of the others, either given by another or preeminent from among them with the others consenting; otherwise one not only does not reach that mutual sufficiency, but sometimes, when several wish to be preeminent, the whole neighborhood is destroyed. 7. But if a single city, whose end is to live well and sufficiently, there must be one regimen, and this not only in a right polity but also in an oblique one; and if it is done otherwise, not only is the end of civil life lost, but the city also ceases to be what it was. 8. Finally, if a single particular kingdom, whose end is that which is the city's, with greater assurance of its tranquility, there must be one king to rule and to govern; otherwise not only do those existing in the kingdom not attain the end, but the kingdom also slips into ruin, according to that of infallible Truth: "Every kingdom divided against itself will be desolated." 9. If therefore it stands thus in these and in each of the things that are ordered to some one, what was assumed above is true; now it is clear that the whole human race is ordered to one, as was already shown before: therefore there must be one regulating or ruling, and he ought to be called "Monarch" or "Emperor."

10. Et sic patet quod ad bene esse mundi necesse est Monarchiam esse sive Imperium.

10. And thus it is evident that for the well-being of the world it is necessary that there be a Monarchy or Empire.

VI.1. Et sicut se habet pars ad totum, sic ordo partialis ad totalem. Pars ad totum se habet sicut ad finem et optimum: ergo et ordo in parte ad ordinem in toto, sicut ad finem et optimum. Ex quo habetur quod bonitas ordinis partialis non excedit bonitatem totalis ordinis, sed magis e converso.

VI.1. And just as the part stands to the whole, so the partial order to the total. The part stands to the whole as to an end and the optimum: therefore the order in the part likewise stands to the order in the whole as to an end and the optimum. Whence it is had that the goodness of the partial order does not exceed the goodness of the total order, but rather conversely.

2. Cum ergo duplex ordo reperiatur in rebus, ordo scilicet partium inter se, et ordo partium ad aliquod unum quod non est pars, sicut ordo partium exercitus inter se et ordo earum ad ducem, ordo partium ad unum est melior tanquam finis alterius: est enim alter propter hunc, non e converso. 3. Unde si forma huius ordinis reperitur in partibus humane multitudinis, multo magis debet reperiri in ipsa multitudine sive totalitate per vim sillogismi premissi, cum sit ordo melior sive forma ordinis; sed reperitur in omnibus partibus humane multitudinis, ut per ea que dicta sunt in capitulo precedenti satis est manifestum: ergo et in ipsa totalitate reperiri debet. 4. Et sic onmes partes prenotate infra regna et ipsa regna ordinari debent ad unum principem sive principatum, hoc est ad Monarcham sive Monarchiam.

2. Therefore since a twofold order is found in things, namely the order of the parts among themselves, and the order of the parts to some one thing which is not a part—just as the order of the parts of an army among themselves and their order to the leader—the order of the parts to the one is better as the end of the other: for the other is on account of this, not conversely. 3. Whence, if the form of this order is found in the parts of the human multitude, much more ought it to be found in the multitude itself or totality by the force of the premised syllogism, since it is the better order, that is, the form of order; but it is found in all the parts of the human multitude, as by the things which were said in the preceding chapter it is sufficiently manifest: therefore it ought also to be found in the totality itself. 4. And thus all the parts aforesaid beneath within kingdoms and the kingdoms themselves ought to be ordered to one prince or principate, that is, to a Monarch or Monarchy.

VII.1. Amplius, humana universitas est quoddam totum ad quasdam partes, et est quedam pars ad quoddam totum. Est enim quoddam totum ad regna particularia et ad gentes, ut superiora ostendunt; et est quedam pars ad totum universum. 2. Et hoc est de se manifestum.

7.1. Furthermore, the human universality is a certain whole with respect to certain parts, and is a certain part with respect to a certain whole. For it is a certain whole with respect to particular kingdoms and to peoples, as the foregoing shows; and it is a certain part with respect to the whole universe. 2. And this is manifest of itself.

Sicut ergo inferiora humane universitatis, bene respondent ad ipsam, sic ipsa 'bene' dicitur respondere ad suum totum; partes enim bene respondent ad ipsam per unum principium tantum, ut ex superioribus colligi potest de facili: ergo et ipsa ad ipsum universum sive ad eius principem, qui Deus est et Monarcha, simpliciter bene respondet per unum principium tantum, scilicet unicum principem. 3. Ex quo sequitur Monarchiam necessariam mundo ut bene sit.

Therefore, just as the lower things of the human universality correspond well to it, so it itself is said to correspond “well” to its own whole; for the parts correspond well to it through one principle only, as can easily be gathered from the foregoing: therefore it too, to the universe itself, or to its ruler, who is God and the Monarch, simply corresponds well through one principle only, namely a single ruler. 3. Whence it follows that Monarchy is necessary for the world, so that it may be well.

VIII.1. Et omne illud bene se habet et optime quod se habet secundum intentionem primi agentis, qui Deus est; et hoc est per se notum, nisi apud negantes divinam bonitatem actingere summum perfectionis. 2. De intentione Dei est ut omne causatum divinam similitudinem representet in quantum propria natura recipere potest. Propter quod dictum est: "Faciamus hominem ad ymaginem et similitudinem nostram"; quod licet 'ad ymaginem' de rebus inferioribus ab homine dici non possit, 'ad similitudinem' tamen de qualibet dici potest, cum totum universum nichil aliud sit quam vestigium quoddam divine bonitatis.

8.1. And every thing has itself well and optimally which comports itself according to the intention of the first agent, who is God; and this is known through itself, except among those denying that divine goodness attains the summit of perfection. 2. It is of the intention of God that every thing caused should represent the divine similitude, inasmuch as its proper nature can receive it. Wherefore it was said: "Let us make man to our image and likeness"; which, although "to the image" cannot be said of things lower than man, yet "to the likeness" can be said of any whatsoever, since the whole universe is nothing other than a certain vestige of divine goodness.

Ergo humanum genus bene se habet et optime quando, secundum quod potest, Deo assimilatur. 3. Sed genus humanum maxime Deo assimilatur quando maxime est unum: vera enim ratio unius in solo illo est; propter quod scriptum est: "Audi, Israel, Dominus Deus tuus unus est". 4. Sed tunc genus humanum maxime est unum, quando totum unitur in uno: quod esse non potest nisi quando uni principi totaliter subiacet, ut de se patet. 5. Ergo humanum genus uni principi subiacens maxime Deo assimilatur, et per consequens maxime est secundum divinam intentionem: quod est bene et optime se habere, ut in principio huius capituli est probatum.

Therefore the human race is well and in the best way when, insofar as it can, it is assimilated to God. 3. But the human race is most assimilated to God when it is most one: for the true rationale of the One is in that alone; on which account it is written: "Hear, Israel, the Lord your God is one." 4. But then the human race is most one, when the whole is united in one: which cannot be unless when it is totally subject to one ruler, as is evident of itself. 5. Therefore the human race, subject to one ruler, is most assimilated to God, and consequently is most according to the divine intention: which is to be well and in the best way, as at the beginning of this chapter has been proved.

IX.1. Item, bene et optime se habet omnis filius cum vestigia perfecti patris, in quantum propria natura permictit, ymitatur. Humanum genus filius est celi, quod est perfectissimum in omni opere suo: generat enim homo hominem et sol, iuxta secundum De naturali auditu. Ergo optime se habet humanum genus cum vestigia celi, in quantum propria natura permictit, ymitatur.

9.1. Likewise, every son is well and best disposed when he imitates, so far as his own nature permits, the vestiges of a perfect father. The human race is the son of heaven, which is most perfect in its every operation: for man generates man, and the sun as well, according to the second [book] of On Natural Hearing. Therefore the human race is best disposed when it imitates, so far as its own nature permits, the vestiges of heaven.

2. Et cum celum totum unico motu, scilicet Primi Mobilis, et ab unico motore, qui Deus est, reguletur in omnibus suis partibus, motibus et motoribus, ut phylosophando evidentissime humana ratio deprehendit, si vere sillogizatum est, humanum genus tunc optime se habet, quando ab unico principe tanquam ab unico motore, et unica lege tanquam unico motu, in suis motoribus et motibus reguletur. 3. Propter quod necessarium apparet ad bene esse mundi Monarchiam esse, sive unicum principatum qui 'Imperium' appellatur. Hanc rationem suspirabat Boetius dicens: O felix hominum genus si vestros animos amor, quo celum regitur, regat.

2. And since the whole heaven is regulated by a single motion, namely of the Primum Mobile, and by a single mover, who is God, in all its parts, motions, and movers, as human reason, by philosophizing, most evidently apprehends, if it has been truly syllogized, the human race is then best disposed when it is regulated by a single prince as by a single mover, and by a single law as by a single motion, in its movers and motions. 3. Wherefore it appears necessary for the well-being of the world that there be a Monarchy, or a single Principate which is called the ‘Empire’. Boethius sighed for this reasoning, saying:
O happy race of men
if love, by which heaven is ruled,
should rule your minds.

X.1. Et ubicunque potest esse litigium, ibi debet esse iudicium; aliter esset inperfectum sine proprio perfectivo: quod est impossibile, cum Deus et natura in necessariis non deficiat. 2. Inter omnes duos principes, quorum alter alteri minime subiectus est, potest esse litigium vel culpa ipsorum vel etiam subditorum—quod de se patet—: ergo inter tales oportet esse iudicium. 3. Et cum alter de altero cognoscere non possit ex quo alter alteri non subditur—nam par in parem non habet imperium—oportet esse tertium iurisdictionis amplioris qui ambitu sui iuris ambobus principetur.

10.1. And wherever litigation can be, there there ought to be judgment; otherwise it would be imperfect without its proper perfective: which is impossible, since God and nature do not fail in necessary things. 2. Between any two princes, of whom the one is in no way subject to the other, there can be litigation either through the fault of themselves or even of their subjects—which is evident in itself—: therefore between such there ought to be judgment. 3. And since the one cannot take cognizance concerning the other, inasmuch as the one is not subject to the other—for an equal has no imperium over an equal—it is necessary that there be a third of ampler jurisdiction who, within the ambit of his own right, should rule over both princes.

Et hic aut erit Monarcha aut non. 4. Si sic, habetur propositum; si non, iterum habebit sibi coequalem extra ambitum sue iurisdictionis: tunc iterum necessarius erit tertius alius. 5. Et sic aut erit processus in infinitum, quod esse non potest, aut oportebit devenire ad iudicem primum et summum, de cuius iudicio cuncta litigia dirimantur sive mediate sive inmediate: et hic erit Monarcha sive Imperator.

And here either there will be a Monarch or not. 4. If so, the proposition is obtained; if not, he will again have for himself a coequal outside the ambit of his jurisdiction: then again a third other will be necessary. 5. And thus either there will be a process into infinity, which cannot be, or it will be necessary to come to the first and highest Judge, by whose judgment all litigations are resolved, whether mediately or immediately: and this will be the Monarch or Emperor.

Est igitur Monarchia necessaria mundo. 6. Et hanc rationem videbat Phylosophus cum dicebat: "Entia nolunt male disponi; malum autem pluralitas principatuum: unus ergo princeps".

Therefore Monarchy is necessary for the world. 6. And this reasoning the Philosopher saw when he said: "Entities do not wish to be ill arranged; moreover, a plurality of principalities is an evil: therefore one prince."

XI.1. Preterea, mundus optime dispositus est cum iustitia in eo potissima est. Unde Virgilius commendare volens illud seculum quod suo tempore surgere videbatur, in suis Buccolicis cantabat: Iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna. 'Virgo' nanque vocabatur iustitia, quam etiam 'Astream' vocabant 'Saturnia regna' dicebant optima tempora, que etiam 'aurea' nuncupabant.

11.1. Moreover, the world is most excellently disposed when Justice is most powerful in it. Whence Virgil, wishing to commend that age which in his time seemed to be rising, sang in his Bucolics: Now the Virgin returns, the Saturnian reigns return. 'Virgo' was the name for Justice, which they also called 'Astream'; 'Saturnia regna' they called the best times, which they also denominated 'golden'.

2. Iustitia potissima est solum sub Monarcha: ergo ad optimam mundi dispositionem requiritur esse Monarchiam sive Imperium. 3. Ad evidentiam subassumpte sciendum quod iustitia, de se et in propria natura considerata, est quedam rectitudo sive regula obliquum hinc inde abiciens: et sic non recipit magis et minus, quemadmodum albedo in suo abstracto considerata. 4. Sunt enim huiusmodi forme quedam compositioni contingentes, et consistentes simplici et invariabili essentia, ut Magister Sex Principiorum recte ait.

2. Justice is paramount only under a Monarch: therefore for the best disposition of the world it is required that there be a Monarchy or Empire. 3. For the evidence of the subassumption it must be known that justice, considered of itself and in its proper nature, is a certain rectitude or rule casting off obliqueness on this side and on that; and thus it does not admit of more and less, just as whiteness considered in its abstract. 4. For forms of this sort are certain things incidental to composition, and consisting in a simple and invariable essence, as the Master of the Six Principles rightly says.

Recipiunt tamen magis et minus huiusmodi qualitates ex parte subiectorum quibus concernuntur, secundum quod magis et minus in subiectis de contrariis admiscetur. 5. Ubi ergo minimum de contrario iustitie admiscetur et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad operationem, ibi iustitia potissima est; et vere tunc potest dici de illa, ut Phylosophus inquit, "neque Hesperus neque Lucifer sic admirabilis est". Est enim tunc Phebe similis, fratrem dyametraliter intuenti de purpureo matutine serenitatis. 6. Quantum ergo ad habitum, iustitia contrarietatem habet quandoque in velle; nam ubi voluntas ab omni cupiditate sincera non est, etsi assit iustitia, non tamen omnino inest in fulgore sue puritatis: habet etòm subiectum, licet minime, aliqualiter tamen sibi resistens; propter quod bene repelluntur qui iudicem passionare conantur.

Nevertheless, qualities of this kind receive more and less on the part of the subjects which they concern, according as more and less of contraries is admixed in the subjects. 5. Where therefore the least of what is contrary to justice is admixed, both as to habit and as to operation, there justice is most potent; and truly then it can be said of it, as the Philosopher says, “neither Hesperus nor Lucifer is so admirable.” For then it is like Phoebe, gazing diametrically at her brother, from the purple of the morning’s serenity. 6. Therefore as to habit, justice sometimes has contrariety in the willing; for where the will is not sincere from all cupidity, although justice be present, nevertheless it is not wholly present in the luster of its purity: it has, too, its subject, albeit in the least degree, yet in some manner resisting it; on account of which those who try to passion the judge are rightly repelled.

7. Quantum vero ad operationem, iustitia contrarietatem habet in posse; nam cum iustitia sit virtus ad alterum, sine potentia tribuendi cuique quod suum est quomodo quis operabitur secundum illam? Ex quo patet quod quanto iustus potentior, tanto in operatione sua iustitia erit amplior. 8. Ex hac itaque declaratione sic arguatur: iustitia potissima est in mundo quando volentissimo et potentissimo subiecto inest; huiusmodi solus Monarcha est: ergo soli Monarche insistens iustitia in mundo potissima est.

7. But as regards operation, justice has contrariety in ability; for since justice is a virtue toward another, without the power of bestowing to each what is his own, how will anyone operate according to it? Whence it is clear that the more powerful the just man, by so much the more ample will justice be in his operation. 8. From this declaration, therefore, let the argument run thus: justice is most potent in the world when it inheres in the most willing and the most powerful subject; such a one is the Monarch alone: therefore justice, abiding in the Monarch alone, is most potent in the world.

9. Iste prosillogismus currit per secundam figuram cum negatione intrinseca, et est similis huic: omne B est A; solum C est A: ergo solum C est B. Quod est: omne B est A; nullum preter C est A: ergo nullum preter C est B. 10. Et prima propositio declaratione precedente apparet; alia sic ostenditur, et primo quantum ad velle, deinde quantum ad posse. 11. Ad evidentiam primi notandum quod iustitie maxime contrariatur cupiditas, ut innuit Aristotiles in quinto ad Nicomacum. Remota cupiditate omnino, nichil iustitie restat adversum; unde sententia Phylosophi est ut que lege determinari possunt nullo modo iudici relinquantur.

9. This prosyllogism runs through the second figure with an intrinsic negation, and is similar to this: every B is A; only C is A: therefore only C is B. Which is: every B is A; none except C is A: therefore none except C is B. 10. And the first proposition appears from the preceding declaration; the other is shown thus, first as to willing, then as to being able. 11. For the elucidation of the first it must be noted that cupidity is most contrary to justice, as Aristotle intimates in the fifth to Nicomachus. With cupidity entirely removed, nothing remains adverse to justice; whence the Philosopher’s opinion is that the things which can be determined by law should in no way be left to a judge.

Et hoc metu cupiditatis fieri oportet, de facili mentes hominum detorquentis. Ubi ergo non est quod possit optari, inpossibile est ibi cupiditatem esse: destructis enim obiectis, passiones esse non possunt. 12. Sed Monarcha non habet quod possit optare: sua nanque iurisdictio terminatur Occeano solum: quod non contingit principibus aliis, quorum principatus ad alios terminantur, ut puta regis Castelle ad illum qui regis Aragonum.

And this ought to be effected by fear of cupidity, which easily turns aside the minds of men. Where therefore there is nothing that can be desired, it is impossible for cupidity to be there: for, the objects being destroyed, the passions cannot exist. 12. But the Monarch has nothing that he could desire: for indeed his jurisdiction is terminated by the Ocean alone: which does not befall other princes, whose principate is terminated by others, as, for instance, that of the king of Castile by that of the king of Aragon.

Ex quo sequitur quod Monarcha sincerissimum inter mortales iustitie possit esse subiectum. 13. Preterea, quemadmodum cupiditas habitualem iustitiam quodammodo, quantumcunque pauca, obnubilat, sic karitas seu recta dilectio illam acuit atque dilucidat. Cui ergo maxime recta dilectio inesse potest, potissimum locum in illo potest habere iustitia; huiusmodi est Monarcha: ergo, eo existente, iustitia potissima est vel esse potest.

From which it follows that the Monarch can be the most sincere subject of justice among mortals. 13. Moreover, just as cupidity clouds habitual justice in some way, however little, so charity, or right affection, sharpens and elucidates it. Therefore, in the one in whom right affection can be most present, justice can have the chief place; such is the Monarch: therefore, with him existing, justice is—or can be—most potent.

14. Quod autem recta dilectio faciat quod dictum est, hinc haberi potest: cupiditas nanque, perseitate hominum spreta, querit alia; karitas vero, spretis aliis omnibus, querit Deum et hominem, et per consequens bonum hominis. Cumque inter alia bona hominis potissimum sit in pace vivere—ut supra dicebatur—et hoc operetur maxime atque potissime iustitia, karitas maxime iustitiam vigorabit et potior potius. 15. Et quod Monarche maxime hominum recta dilectio inesse debeat, patet sic: omne diligibile tanto magis diligitur quanto propinquius est diligenti; sed homines propinquius Monarche sunt quam aliis principibus: ergo ab eo maxime diliguntur vel diligi debent.

14. But that right affection does what has been said can be gathered hence: cupidity, the perseity (very being) of men having been spurned, seeks other things; charity, however, all other things having been spurned, seeks God and man, and consequently the good of man. And since among the other goods of man the chief is to live in peace—as was said above—and this is effected most and most powerfully by justice, charity will most of all invigorate justice, and the stronger, more strongly. 15. And that in the Monarch there ought to be present above all the right affection for men is plain thus: every lovable thing is so much the more loved the nearer it is to the lover; but men are nearer to the Monarch than to other princes: therefore by him they are most loved, or ought to be loved.

Prima manifesta est, si natura passivorum et activorum consideretur; secunda per hoc apparet: quia principibus aliis homines non appropinquant nisi in parte, Monarche vero secundum totum. 16. Et rursus: principibus aliis appropinquant per Monarcham et non e converso; et sic per prius et immediate Monarche inest cura de omnibus, aliis autem principibus per Monarcham, eo quod cura ipsorum a cura illa supprema descendit. 17. Preterea, quanto causa est universalior, tanto magis habet rationem cause, quia inferior non est causa nisi per superiorem, ut patet ex hiis que De causis; et quanto causa magis est causa, tanto magis effectum diligit, cum dilectio talis assequatur causam per se. 18. Cum igitur Monarcha sit universalissima causa inter mortales ut homines bene vivant, quia principes alii per illum, ut dictum est, consequens est quod bonum hominum ab eo maxime diligatur.

The former is manifest, if the nature of passives and actives be considered; the latter appears from this: that to other princes men do not draw near except in part, but to the Monarch according to the whole. 16. And again: to other princes they draw near through the Monarch and not conversely; and thus the care for all pertains primarily and immediately to the Monarch, but to the other princes through the Monarch, for the reason that their care descends from that supreme care. 17. Moreover, the more universal a cause is, the more it has the ratio of cause, because the lower is not a cause except through the higher, as is evident from those things in the On Causes; and the more a cause is a cause, the more it loves its effect, since such dilection follows the cause per se. 18. Therefore, since the Monarch is the most universal cause among mortals that men may live well, because the other princes act through him, as has been said, it follows that the good of men is most loved by him.

19. Quod autem Monarcha potissime se habeat ad operationem iustitie, quis dubitat nisi qui vocem hanc non intelligit, cum, si Monarcha est, hostes habere non possit? 20. Satis igitur declarata subassumpta principalis, quia conclusio certa est: scilicet quod ad optimam dispositionem mundi necesse est Monarchiam esse.

19. But that the Monarch is most especially disposed toward the operation of justice, who doubts this except one who does not understand this term, since, if he is Monarch, he cannot have enemies? 20. Therefore the principal minor premise has been sufficiently declared, because the conclusion is certain: namely, that for the best disposition of the world it is necessary that there be a Monarchy.

XII.1. Et humanum genus potissime liberum optime se habet. Hoc erit manifestum, si principium pateat libertatis. 2. Propter quod sciendum quod principium primum nostre libertatis est libertas arbitrii, quam multi habent in ore, in intellectu vero pauci.

12.1. And the human race, being most free, is in the best condition. This will be manifest, if the principle of liberty be laid open. 2. Wherefore it must be known that the first principle of our liberty is the liberty of arbitrium (free choice), which many have on their lips, but in understanding, few.

Veniunt nanque usque ad hoc: ut dicant liberum arbitrium esse liberum de voluntate iudicium. Et verum dicunt; sed importatum per verba longe est ab eis, quemadmodum tota die logici nostri faciunt de quibusdam propositionibus, que ad exemplum logicalibus interseruntur; puta de hac: 'triangulus habet tres duobus rectis equales'. 3. Et ideo dico quod iudicium medium est apprehensionis et appetitus: nam primo res apprehenditur, deinde apprehensa bona vel mala iudicatur, et ultimo iudicans prosequitur sive fugit. 4. Si ergo iudicium moveat omnino appetitum et nullo modo preveniatur ab eo, liberum est; si vero ab appetitu quocunque modo proveniente iudicium moveatur, liberum esse non potest, quia non a se, sed ab alio captivum trahitur.

For they come even to this: that they say free choice is a free judgment concerning the will. And they speak true; but what is imported through the words is far from them, just as all day long our logicians do with certain propositions which are inserted among logicals as examples; for instance this: 'a triangle has three equal to two right angles'. 3. And therefore I say that judgment is a mean between apprehension and appetite: for first the thing is apprehended, then the thing apprehended is judged good or bad, and finally the one judging pursues or flees. 4. If therefore judgment altogether moves appetite and is in no way forestalled by it, it is free; but if judgment is moved by appetite arising in any way, it cannot be free, because it is drawn captive not by itself but by another.

5. Et hinc est quod bruta iudicium liberum habere non possunt, quia eorum iudicia semper ab appetitu preveniuntur. Et hinc etiam patere potest quod substantie intellectuales, quarum sunt inmutabiles voluntates, necnon anime separate bene hinc abeuntes, libertatem arbitrii ob inmutabilitatem voluntatis non amictunt, sed perfectissime atque potissime hoc retinent. 6. Hoc viso, iterum manifestum esse potest quod hec libertas sive principium hoc totius nostre libertatis est maximum donum humane nature a Deo collatum—sicut in Paradiso Comedie iam dixi—quia per ipsum hic felicitamur ut homines, per ipsum alibi felicitamur ut dii.

5. And hence it is that brute animals cannot have a free judgment, because their judgments are always anticipated by appetite. And hence it can also be evident that intellectual substances, whose wills are immutable, and likewise the separated souls departing well hence, do not lose the liberty of arbitrium on account of the immutability of the will, but retain this most perfectly and most powerfully. 6. This seen, it can again be manifest that this liberty, or this principle of our whole liberty, is the greatest gift bestowed upon human nature by God—just as I have already said in the Paradiso of the Comedy—because through it we are made happy here as men, through it elsewhere we are made happy as gods.

7. Quod si ita est, quis erit qui humanum genus optime se habere non dicat, cum potissime hoc principio possit uti? 8. Sed existens sub Monarcha est potissime liberum. Propter quod sciendum quod illud est liberum quod "sui met et non alterius gratia est", ut Phylosopho placet in hiis que De simpliciter ente.

7. But if it is so, who will there be who does not say that the human race is in the best condition, since it can in the highest degree make use of this principle? 8. But existing under a Monarch it is most especially free. For which reason it should be known that that is free which is “for its own sake and not for another’s,” as it pleases the Philosopher in those matters which are On the simply-existent.

Nam illud quod est alterius gratia necessitatur ab illo cuius gratia est, sicut via necessitatur a termino. 9. Genus humanum solum imperante Monarcha sui et non alterius gratia est: tunc enim solum politie diriguntur oblique—democratie scilicet, oligarchie atque tyrampnides—que in servitutem cogunt genus humanum, ut patet discurrenti per omnes, et politizant reges, aristocratici quos optimates vocant, et populi libertatis zelatores; quia cum Monarcha maxime diligat homines, ut iam tactum est, vult omnes homines bonos fieri: quod esse non potest apud oblique politizantes. 10. Unde Phylosophus in suis Politicis ait quod in politia obliqua bonus homo est malus civis, in recta vero bonus homo et civis bonus convertuntur.

For that which is for the sake of another is necessitated by that for whose sake it is, just as a road is necessitated by the terminus. 9. The human race only, when a Monarch rules, is for its own sake and not for another’s: for then only are the polities directed obliquely—namely democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies—which drive the human race into servitude, as is clear to one running through them all; whereas kings, the aristocrats whom they call “optimates,” and peoples zealots for liberty govern as a polity; because, since the Monarch loves human beings most, as has already been touched, he wills all human beings to become good: which cannot be among those who polity-govern obliquely. 10. Whence the Philosopher in his Politics says that in an oblique polity a good man is a bad citizen, but in a right one the good man and the good citizen are convertible.

Et huiusmodi politie recte libertatem intendunt, scilicet ut homines propter se sint. 11. Non enim cives propter consules nec gens propter regem, sed e converso consules propter cives et rex propter gentem; quia quemadmodum non politia ad leges, quinymo leges ad politiam ponuntur, sic secundum legem viventes non ad legislatorem ordinantur, sed magis ille ad hos, ut etiam Phylosopho placet in hiis que de presenti materia nobis ab eo relicta sunt. 12. Hinc etiam patet quod, quamvis consul sive rex respectu vie sint domini aliorum, respectu autem termini aliorum ministri sunt, et maxime Monarcha, qui minister omnium proculdubio habendus est.

And such polities rightly intend liberty, namely that human beings exist on account of themselves. 11. For it is not the citizens for the consuls, nor the nation for the king, but conversely the consuls for the citizens and the king for the nation; because just as the polity is not for the laws, nay rather the laws are established for the polity, so those living according to the law are not ordained for the legislator, but rather he for them, as also pleases the Philosopher in those things which concerning the present matter have been left to us by him. 12. Hence it is also plain that, although the consul or the king with respect to the way are lords of others, yet with respect to the end they are ministers of others, and most of all the Monarch, who must without doubt be held the minister of all.

Hinc etiam iam innotescere potest quod Monarcha necessitatur a fine sibi prefixo in legibus ponendis. 13. Ergo genus humanum sub Monarcha existens optime se habet; ex quo sequitur quod ad bene esse mundi Monarchiam necesse est esse.

Hence also now it can become known that the Monarch is necessitated by the end prefixed to him in the setting of laws. 13. Therefore the human race, existing under a Monarch, is in the best condition; whence it follows that for the well-being of the world it is necessary that there be a Monarchy.

XIII.1. Adhuc, ille qui potest esse optime dispositus ad regendum, optime alios disponere potest: nam in omni actione principaliter intenditur ab agente, sive necessitate nature sive volontarie agat, propriam similitudinem explicare. 2. Unde fit quod omne agens, in quantum huiusmodi, delectatur; quia, cum omne quod est appetat suum esse, ac in agendo agentis esse quodammodo amplietur, sequitur de necessitate delectatio, quia delectatio rei desiderate semper annexa est. 3. Nichil igitur agit nisi tale existens quale patiens fieri debet; propter quod Phylosophus in hiis que De simpliciter ente: "Omne" inquit "quod reducitur de potentia in actum, reducitur per tale existens actu"; quod si aliter aliquid agere conetur, frustra conatur.

13.1. Moreover, he who can be most excellently disposed for governing can most excellently dispose others: for in every action it is principally intended by the agent, whether it acts by necessity of nature or voluntarily, to explicate its own similitude. 2. Whence it comes about that every agent, insofar as such, has delectation; because, since everything that is desires its own being, and in acting the agent’s being is in some way amplified, delectation follows of necessity, because delectation is always annexed to the desired thing. 3. Therefore nothing acts unless being such as the patient ought to become; wherefore the Philosopher, in those things which are On Being simply, says: "Everything," he says, "which is reduced from potency into act is reduced by such a thing existing in act"; and if it should attempt to act otherwise, it attempts in vain.

4. Et hinc destrui potest error illorum qui bona loquendo et mala operando credunt alios vita et moribus informare, non advertentes quod plus persuaserunt manus Iacob quam verba, licet ille falsum, illa verum persuaderent. Unde Phylosophus ad Nicomacum: "De hiis enim" inquit "que in passionibus et actionibus, sermones minus sunt credibiles operibus". 5. Hine etiam dicebatur de celo peccatori David: "Quare tu enarras iustitias meas?", quasi diceret: 'Frustra loqueris, cum tu sis alius ab eo quod loqueris'. Ex quibus colligitur quod optime dispositum esse oportet optime alios disponere volentem. 6. Sed Monarcha solus est ille qui potest optime esse dispositus ad regendum.

4. And hence the error of those can be destroyed who, by speaking good things and doing evil things, think they inform others in life and morals, not noticing that the hands of Jacob persuaded more than the words, although the former persuaded falsehood, the latter truth. Whence the Philosopher to Nicomachus: “For in those things which are in passions and actions, speeches are less credible than works.” 5. Hine it was also said from heaven to the sinner David: “Why do you recount my justices?”, as if it were saying: ‘You speak in vain, since you are other than that which you speak.’ From which it is gathered that he who wishes to dispose others in the best way ought himself to be disposed in the best way. 6. But the Monarch alone is he who can be most excellently disposed for governing.

Quod sic declaratur: unaqueque res eo facilius et perfectius ad habitum et ad operationem disponitur, quo minus in ea est de contrarietate ad talem dispositionem; unde facilius et perfectius veniunt ad habitum phylosophice veritatis qui nichil unquam audiverunt, quam qui audiverunt per tempora et falsis oppinionibus imbuti sunt. Propter quod bene Galienus inquit "tales duplici tempore indigere ad scientiam acquirendam". 7. Cum ergo Monarcha nullam cupiditatis occasionem habere possit vel saltem minimam inter mortales, ut superius est ostensum, quod ceteris principibus non contingit, et cupiditas ipsa sola sit corruptiva iudicii et iustitie prepeditiva, consequens est quod ipse vel omnino vel maxime bene dispositus ad regendum esse potest, quia inter ceteros iudicium et iustitiam potissime habere potest: que duo principalissime legis latori et legis executori conveniunt, testante rege illo sanctissimo cum convenientia regi et filio regis postulabat a Deo: "Deus" inquiebat "iudicium tuum regi da et iustitiam tuam filio regis". 8. Bene igitur dictum est cum dicitur in subassumpta quod Monarcha solus est ille, qui potest esse optime dispositus ad regendum: ergo Monarcha solus optime alios disponere potest. Ex quo sequitur quod ad optimam mundi dispositionem Monarchia sit necessaria.

This is thus made clear: each thing is the more easily and more perfectly disposed for habit and for operation, the less there is in it of contrariety to such a disposition; whence they come more easily and more perfectly to the habit of philosophic truth who have heard nothing ever, than those who have listened over time and have been imbued with false opinions. For which reason Galen rightly says “such men need double time to acquire knowledge.” 7. Since therefore the Monarch can have no occasion of cupidity, or at least the least among mortals, as has been shown above—a thing which does not befall the other princes—and since cupidity itself alone is corruptive of judgment and hindering of justice, it follows that he can be either altogether or in the highest degree well disposed to rule, because among the others he can possess judgment and justice most of all: which two most principally befit the lawgiver and the executor of the law, as that most holy king bears witness when, asking from God what is fitting for a king and for the son of a king, he said: “God, give your judgment to the king and your justice to the son of the king.” 8. Well therefore is it said in the minor subassumption that the Monarch alone is he who can be best disposed to rule: therefore the Monarch alone can best dispose others. Whence it follows that for the best disposition of the world Monarchy is necessary.

XIV.1. Et quod potest fieri per unum, melius est per unum fieri quam per plura. Quod sic declaratur: sit unum, per quod aliquid fieri potest, A, et sint plura, per que similiter illud fieri potest, A et B; si ergo illud idem quod fit per A et B potest fieri per A tantum, frustra ibi assummitur B, quia ex ipsius assumptione nichil sequitur, cum prius illud idem fiebat per A solum. 2. Et cum omnis talis assumptio sit otiosa sive superflua, et omne superfluum Deo et nature displiceat, et omne quod Deo et nature displicet sit malum, ut manifestum est de se, sequitur non solum melius esse fieri per unum, si fieri potest, quam fieri per plura, sed quod fieri per unum est bonum, per plura simpliciter malum.

14.1. And what can be done through one, it is better to be done through one than through several. Which is thus made clear: let there be a single means, A, through which something can be done, and let there be several, A and B, through which likewise that can be done; therefore, if that same thing which is done through A and B can be done through A only, there B is assumed in vain, because from its assumption nothing follows, since previously that same thing was being done through A alone. 2. And since every such assumption is idle or superfluous, and every superfluous thing displeases God and nature, and everything that displeases God and nature is evil, as is manifest of itself, it follows not only that it is better to be done through one, if it can be done, than to be done through several, but that what is done through one is good, through several is simply evil.

3. Preterea, res dicitur melior per esse propinquior optime; et finis habet rationem optimi; sed fieri per unum est propinquius fini: ergo est melius. Et quod sit propinquius patet sic: sit finis C; fieri per unum A; per plura A et B: manifestum est quod longior est via ab A per B in C, quam ab A tantum in C. 4. Sed humanum genus potest regi per unum suppremum principem, qui est Monarcha. Propter quod advertendum sane quod cum dicitur 'humanum genus potest regi per unum suppremum principem', non sic intelligendum est, ut minima iudicia cuiuscunque municipii ab illo uno immediate prodire possint: cum etiam leges municipales quandoque deficiant et opus habeant directivo, ut patet per Phylosophum in quinto ad Nicomacum epyikiam commendantem.

3. Furthermore, a thing is said to be better by being nearer to the best; and the end has the rationale of the best; but to be done through one is nearer to the end: therefore it is better. And that it is nearer is clear thus: let the end be C; to be done through one, A; through many, A and B: it is manifest that the way from A through B to C is longer than from A alone to C.
4. But the human race can be ruled by one supreme prince, who is the Monarch. For which reason it must plainly be noted that when it is said, 'the human race can be ruled by one supreme prince', it is not to be so understood that the smallest judgments of any municipality whatever can proceed immediately from that one; since even municipal laws sometimes fail and have need of a directive, as is evident from the Philosopher in the fifth to Nicomachus, commending epieikeia (equity).

5. Habent nanque nationes, regna et civitates intra se proprietates, quas legibus differentibus regulari oportet: est enim lex regula directiva vite. 6. Aliter quippe regulari oportet Scithas qui, extra septimum clima viventes et magnam dierum et noctium inequalitatem patientes, intolerabili quasi algore frigoris premuntur, et aliter Garamantes qui, sub equinoctiali habitantes et coequatam semper lucem diurnam noctis tenebris habentes, ob estus acris nimietatem vestimentis operiri non possunt. 7. Sed sic intelligendum est: ut humanum genus secundum sua comunia, que omnibus competunt, ab eo regatur et comuni regula gubernetur ad pacem.

5. For nations, realms, and cities have within themselves properties which it is necessary to regulate by differing laws: for law is a directive rule of life. 6. Indeed, it is necessary to regulate otherwise the Scythians, who, living beyond the seventh clime and enduring a great inequality of days and nights, are pressed by an almost intolerable chill of cold, and otherwise the Garamantes, who, dwelling under the equinoctial and having the daylight always equalized with the darkness of night, cannot be covered with garments on account of the excess of sharp heat. 7. But it is thus to be understood: that the human race, according to its commonalities which belong to all, be ruled by him and governed by a common rule unto peace.

Quam quidem regulam sive legem particulares principes ab eo recipere debent, tanquam intellectus practicus ad conclusionem operativam recipit maiorem propositionem ab intellectu speculativo, et sub illa particularem, que proprie sua est, assummit et particulariter ad operationem concludit. 8. Et hoc non solum possibile est uni, sed necesse est ab uno procedere, ut omnis confusio de principiis universalibus auferatur. 9. Hoc etiam factum fuisse per ipsum ipse Moyses in lege conscribit, qui, assumptis primatibus de tribubus filiorum Israel, eis inferiora iudicia relinquebat, superiora et comuniora sibi soli reservans, quibus comunioribus utebantur primates per tribus, secundum quod unicuique tribui competebat.

Which rule or law indeed the particular princes ought to receive from him, just as the practical intellect receives the major proposition for an operative conclusion from the speculative intellect, and under that it assumes the particular, which is properly its own, and in particular concludes to operation. 8. And this is not only possible for one, but it is necessary to proceed from one, so that all confusion about universal principles may be removed. 9. This also Moses himself records in the Law to have been done by himself: who, after taking the primates (chiefs) from the tribes of the sons of Israel, left to them the lower judgments, reserving to himself alone the higher and more common; and these more common matters were used by the primates through the tribes, according as was appropriate to each tribe.

10. Ergo melius est humanum genus per unum regi quam per plura, et sic per Monarcham qui unicus est princeps; et si melius, Deo acceptabilius, cum Deus semper velit quod melius est. Et cum duorum tantum inter se idem sit melius et optimum, consequens est non solum Deo esse acceptabilius hoc, inter hoc 'unum' et hoc 'plura', sed acceptabilissimum. 11. Unde sequitur humanum genus optime se habere cum ab uno regitur; et sic ad bene esse mundi necesse est Monarchiam esse.

10. Therefore it is better that the human race be ruled by one rather than by many, and thus by a Monarch, who is the sole prince; and if it is better, it is more acceptable to God, since God always wills what is better. And since of two things only the same is both the better and the best, it follows that this, between this 'one' and this 'many,' is not only more acceptable to God, but most acceptable. 11. Whence it follows that the human race is in the best condition when it is ruled by one; and thus for the well-being of the world it is necessary that there be a Monarchy.

XV.1. Item dico quod ens et unum et bonum gradatim se habent secundum quintum modum dicendi 'prius'. Ens enim natura precedit unum, unum vero bonum: maxime enim ens maxime est unum, et maxime unum maxime bonum; et quanto aliquid a maxime ente elongatur, tanto et ab esse unum et per consequens ab esse bonum. 2. Propter quod in omni genere rerum illud est optimum quod est maxime unum, ut Phylosopho placet in hiis que De simpliciter ente. Unde fit quod unum esse videtur esse radix eius quod est esse bonum, et multa esse eius quod est esse malum; qua re Pictagoras in correlationibus suis ex parte boni ponebat unum, ex parte vero mali plurale, ut patet in primo eorum que De simpliciter ente.

15.1. Likewise I say that being and one and good stand by degrees according to the fifth mode of saying ‘prior’. For being by nature precedes one, and one indeed [precedes] good: for the maximal being is maximally one, and the maximally one is maximally good; and the farther something is removed from the maximal being, by so much also from being one and, consequently, from being good. 2. Wherefore in every genus of things that is best which is most one, as it pleases the Philosopher in those which are On the simply being. Whence it comes about that to be one seems to be the root of that which is to be good, and to be many of that which is to be evil; for which reason Pythagoras, in his correlations, on the side of the good posited the one, but on the side of the evil the plural, as is evident in the first of those which are On the simply being.

3. Hinc videri potest quod peccare nichil est aliud quam progredi ab uno spreto ad multa; quod quidem Psalmista videbat dicens: "A fructu frumenti, vini et olei multiplicati sunt". 4. Constat igitur quod omne quod est bonum per hoc est bonum: quod in uno consistit. Et cum concordia, in quantum huiusmodi, sit quoddam bonum, manifestum est ipsam consistere in aliquo uno tanquam in propria radice. 5. Que quidem radix apparebit, si natura vel ratio concordie summatur: est enim concordia uniformis motus plurium voluntatum; in qua quidem ratione apparet unitatem voluntatum, que per uniformem motum datur intelligi, concordie radicem esse vel ipsam concordiam.

3. Hence it can be seen that to sin is nothing else than to go forth from the One, once spurned, to the many; which indeed the Psalmist saw, saying: “From the fruit of grain, wine, and oil they have been multiplied.”
4. It is therefore evident that whatever is good is good by this: that it consists in the One. And since concord, inasmuch as such, is a certain good, it is manifest that it itself consists in some One as in its proper root.
5. And this root will appear, if the nature or ratio of concord be taken: for concord is the uniform motion of a plurality of wills; in which account it appears that the unity of wills, which is given to be understood through uniform motion, is the root of concord—or concord itself.

6. Nam, sicut plures glebas diceremus 'concordes' propter condiscendere omnes ad medium, et plures flammas propter coadscendere omnes ad circunferentiam, si volontarie hoc facerent; ita homines plures 'concordes' dicimus propter simul moveri secundum velle ad unum quod est formaliter in suis voluntatibus, sicut qualitas una formaliter in glebis, scilicet gravitas, et una in fiammis, scilicet levitas. 7. Nam virtus volitiva potentia quedam est, sed speties boni apprehensi forma est eius: que quidem forma, quemadmodum et alie, una in se, multiplicatur secundum multiplicationem materie recipientis, ut anima et numerus et alie forme compositioni contingentes. 8. Hiis premissis propter declarationem assummende propositionis ad propositum, sic arguatur: omnis concordia dependet ab unitate que est in voluntatibus; genus humanum optime se habens est quedam concordia; nam, sicut unus homo optime se habens et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus est concordia quedam, et similiter domus, civitas et regnum, sic totum genus humanum; ergo genus humanum optime se habens ab unitate que est in voluntatibus dependet.

6. For, just as we would call several clods 'concordant' on account of all descending-together to the center, and several flames on account of all ascending-together to the circumference, if they were doing this voluntarily; so we call several men 'concordant' on account of being moved together according to the willing toward one thing which is formally in their wills, just as one quality is formally in the clods, namely gravity, and one in the flames, namely levity. 7. For the volitional virtue is a certain potency, but the species of the apprehended good is its form: which form, just as also the others, one in itself, is multiplied according to the multiplication of the receiving matter, as the soul and number and other forms contingent upon composition. 8. These things premised for the sake of the clarification of the proposition to be assumed for the matter in hand, let the argument proceed thus: every concord depends upon the unity which is in wills; the human race in its best condition is a certain concord; for, just as one man in his best condition both as to soul and as to body is a certain concord, and likewise a household, a city, and a kingdom, so the whole human race; therefore the human race in its best condition depends upon the unity which is in wills.

9. Sed hoc esse non potest nisi sit voluntas una, domina et regulatrix omnium aliarum in unum, cum mortalium voluntates propter blandas adolescentie delectationes indigeant directivo, ut in ultimis ad Nicomacum docet Phylosophus. Nec ista una potest esse, nisi sit princeps unus omnium, cuius voluntas domina et regulatrix aliarum omnium esse possit. 10. Quod si omnes consequentie superiores vere sunt, quod sunt, necesse est ad optime se habere humanum genus esse in mundo Monarcham, et per consequens Monarchiam ad bene esse mundi.

9. But this cannot be, unless there be one will, mistress and regulatrix of all the others into one, since the wills of mortals, on account of the seductive delights of adolescence, need a director, as the Philosopher teaches at the end of the work to Nicomachus. Nor can there be this one, unless there be one prince of all, whose will can be the mistress and regulatrix of all the others. 10. But if all the foregoing consequences are true—which they are—it is necessary, for the human race to be optimally disposed, that there be in the world a Monarch, and consequently Monarchy for the well-being of the world.

XVI.1. Rationibus omnibus supra positis experientia memorabilis attestatur: status videlicet illius mortalium quem Dei Filius, in salutem hominis hominem assumpturus, vel expectavit vel cum voluit ipse disposuit. Nam si a lapsu primorum parentum, qui diverticulum fuit totius nostre deviationis, dispositiones hominum et tempora recolamus, non inveniemus nisi sub divo Augusto monarcha, existente Monarchia perfecta, mundum undique fuisse quietum. 2. Et quod tunc humanum genus fuerit felix in pacis universalis tranquillitate hoc ystoriographi omnes, hoc poete illustres, hoc etiam scriba mansuetudinis Cristi testari dignatus est; et denique Paulus "plenitudinem temporis" statum illum felicissimum appellavit.

16.1. To all the reasons set above a memorable experience bears witness: namely, the condition of mortals which the Son of God, about to assume man for the salvation of man, either awaited, or when he willed arranged himself. For if, from the fall of the first parents—which was the bypath of our whole deviation—we recall the dispositions of men and the times, we shall find that only under the divine Augustus as monarch, Monarchy being perfect, the world was everywhere at peace. 2. And that then the human race was happy in the tranquillity of universal peace, all historiographers attest this, illustrious poets this, and even the scribe of the meekness of Christ deigned to bear witness to this; and finally Paul called that most happy condition the “fullness of time.”

Vere tempus et temporalia queque plena fuerunt, quia nullum nostre felicitatis ministerium ministro vacavit. 3. Qualiter autem se habuerit orbis ex quo tunica ista inconsutilis cupiditatis ungue scissuram primitus passa est, et legere possumus et utinam non videre. 4. O genus humanum, quantis procellis atque iacturis quantisque naufragiis agitari te necesse est dum, bellua multorum capitum factum, in diversa conaris ! 5. Intellectu egrotas utroque, similiter et affectu: rationibus irrefragabilibus intellectum superiorem non curas, nec experientie vultu inferiorem, sed nec affectum dulcedine divine suasionis, cum per tubam Sancti Spiritus tibi effletur: "Ecce quam bonum et quam iocundum, habitare fratres in unum".

Truly both time and each temporal thing were full, because no ministration of our felicity lacked a minister. 3. But how the world has borne itself since this seamless tunic first suffered a rent by the claw of cupidity, both we can read and—would that we did not—see. 4. O human race, by how many storms and tossings and by how many shipwrecks it must needs be driven, while, made a beast of many heads, you strive in divergent directions ! 5. You are sick in both intellects, and likewise in affection: by irrefutable reasons you do not care for the higher intellect, nor for the lower by the countenance of experience, nor yet the affection by the sweetness of divine suasion, when through the trumpet of the Holy Spirit it is breathed forth to you: "Behold how good and how jocund, for brothers to dwell as one"