Descartes: MEDITATIONES

[53] esse quae de rebus corporeis vere percipiantur, multoque plura de mente humanâ, multo adhuc plura de Deo cognosci, ut jam absque ullâ difficultate cogitationem a rebus imaginabilibus ad intelligibiles tantùm, atque ab omni materiâ secretas, convertam. Et sane multo magis distinctam habeo ideam mentis humanae, quatenus est res cogitans, non extensa in longum, latum, & profundum, nec aliud quid a corpore habens, quàm ideam ullius rei corporeae. Cùmque attendo me dubitare, sive esse rem incompletam & dependentem, adeo clara & distincta idea entis independentis & completi, hoc est Dei, mihi occurrit; & ex hoc uno quòd talis idea in me sit, sive quòd ego ideam illam habens existam, adeo manifeste concludo Deum etiam existere, atque ab illo singulis momentis totam existentiam meam dependere, ut nihil evidentius, nihil certius ab humano ingenio cognosci posse confidam.

[53] that there are things concerning corporeal matters that are truly perceived, and much more concerning the human mind, and far more still concerning God can be known, so that now without any difficulty I turn my thought from imaginable things to intelligible only, and separated from all matter. And truly I have a much more distinct idea of the human mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, not extended in length, breadth, & depth, nor having anything else from body than the idea of any corporeal thing. And when I attend that I doubt, or that I am an incomplete & dependent thing, a so clear & distinct idea of an independent & complete being, that is, of God, occurs to me; and from this alone, that such an idea is in me, or that I exist having that idea, I conclude so manifestly that God also exists, and that upon him at each moment my whole existence depends, that I am confident nothing more evident, nothing more certain can be known by the human intellect.

Jamque videre videor aliquam viam per quam ab istâ contemplatione veri Dei, in quo nempe sunt omnes thesauri scientiarum & sapientiae absconditi, ad caeterarum rerum cognitionem deveniatur.

And now I seem to see some way by which, from that contemplation of the true God, in whom indeed all the treasures of sciences and of wisdom are hidden, one may come to the cognition of the other things.

2. In primis enim agnosco fieri non posse ut ille me unquam fallat; in omni enim fallaciâ vel deceptione aliquid imperfectionis reperitur; & quamvis posse fallere, nonnullum esse videatur acuminis aut potentiae argumentum, proculdubio velle fallere, vel malitiam vel imbecillitatem testatur, nec proinde in Deum cadit.

2. For, in the first place, I acknowledge that it cannot come to pass that he should ever deceive me; for in every fallacy or deception something of imperfection is found; & although to be able to deceive may seem to be some argument of acumen or of power, beyond doubt to will to deceive bears witness either to malice or to imbecility, and consequently does not befit God.

3. Deinde experior quandam in me esse judicandi facultatem, quam certe, ut & reliqua omnia quae in me

3. Then I experience that there is in me a certain faculty of judging, which certainly, as & the rest of all the things that are in me

[54] sunt, a Deo accepi; cùmque ille nolit me fallere, talem profecto non dedit, ut, dum eâ recte utor, possim unquam errare.

[54] are, I have received from God; and since he is unwilling to deceive me, he surely did not give such a one, that, while I use it rightly, I could ever err.

4. Nec ullum de hac re dubium superesset, nisi inde sequi videretur, me igitur errare nunquam posse; nam si quodcunque in me est, a Deo habeo, nec ullam ille mihi dederit errandi facultatem, non videor posse unquam errare. Atque ita prorsus, quamdiu de Deo tantùm cogito, totusque in eum me converto, nullam erroris aut falsitatis causam deprehendo; sed, postmodum ad me reversus, experior me tamen innumeris erroribus esse obnoxium, quorum causam inquirens animadverto non tantùm Dei, sive entis summè perfecti, realem & positivam, sed etiam, ut ita loquar, nihili, sive ejus quod ab omni perfectione summè abest, negativam quandam ideam mihi obversari, & me tanquam medium quid inter Deum & nihil, sive inter summum ens & non ens ita esse constitutum, ut, quatenus a summo ente sum creatus, nihil quidem in me sit, per quod fallar aut in errorem inducar, sed quatenus etiam quodammodo de nihilo, sive de non ente, participo, hoc est quatenus non sum ipse summum ens, desuntque mihi quam plurima, non adeo mirum esse quòd fallar. Atque ita certe intelligo errorem, quatenus error est, non esse quid reale quod a Deo dependeat, sed tantummodo esse defectum; nec proinde ad errandum mihi opus esse aliquâ facultate in hunc finem a Deo tributâ, sed contingere ut errem, ex eo quòd facultas verum judicandi, quam ab illo habeo, non sit in me infinita.

4. Nor would any doubt on this matter remain, unless it seemed to follow therefrom that I therefore could never err; for if whatever is in me I have from God, and he has given me no faculty of erring, I do not seem able ever to err. And thus indeed, so long as I think only of God, and turn myself wholly toward him, I detect no cause of error or falsity; but, afterwards returning to myself, I experience that I am nonetheless liable to innumerable errors, the cause of which, upon inquiry, I observe that not only the real & positive idea of God, or of a being most perfect, presents itself to me, but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of nothing, or of that which is most far removed from all perfection, and that I am, as it were, constituted as a kind of middle between God & nothing, or between the highest being & non-being, such that, insofar as I am created by the highest being, there is nothing in me by which I should be deceived or led into error; but inasmuch as I also in some manner partake of nothing, or of non-being, that is, insofar as I myself am not the highest being, and very many things are lacking to me, it is not at all a wonder that I am deceived. And thus I certainly understand error, insofar as it is error, not to be anything real that depends on God, but only to be a defect; nor therefore do I need any faculty bestowed by God for this end in order to err, but it happens that I err from this, that the faculty of judging the true, which I have from him, is not infinite in me.

5. Verumtamen hoc nondum omnino satisfacit; non

5. Nevertheless, this does not yet altogether satisfy; not

[55] enim error est pura negatio, sed privatio, sive carentia cujusdam cognitionis, quae in me quodammodo esse deberet; atque attendenti ad Dei naturam non videtur fieri posse, ut ille aliquam in me posuerit facultatem, quae non sit in suo genere perfecta, sive quae aliquâ sibi debitâ perfectione sit privata. Nam si, quo peritior est artifex, eo perfectiora opera ab illo proficiscantur, quid potest a summo illo rerum omnium conditore factum esse, quod non sit omnibus numeris absolutum? Nec dubium est quin potuerit Deus me talem creare, ut nunquam fallerer; nec etiam dubium est quin velit semper id quod est optimum: anne ergo melius est me falli quàm non falli?

[55] for error is not pure negation, but a privation, or a lack of a certain cognition, which in me ought, in a certain way, to be; and to one attending to the nature of God it does not seem able to occur that he has placed in me any faculty which is not perfect in its kind, or which is deprived of some perfection due to it. For if, the more skilled the craftsman is, the more perfect works proceed from him, what could have been made by that highest creator of all things that is not complete in every respect? Nor is there any doubt that God could have created me such that I would never be deceived; nor is there any doubt that he always wills what is best: is it therefore better that I be deceived than not be deceived?

6. Dum haec perpendo attentiùs, occurrit primò non mihi esse mirandum, si quaedam a Deo fiant quorum rationes non intelligam; nec de ejus existentiâ ideo esse dubitandum, quòd forte quaedam alia esse experiar, quae quare vel quomodo ab illo facta sint non comprehendo. Cùm enim jam sciam naturam meam esse valde infirmam & limitatam, Dei autem naturam esse immensam, incomprehensibilem, infinitam, ex hoc satis etiam scio innumerabilia illum posse quorum causas ignorem; atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod a fine peti solet, in rebus Physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto posse investigare fines Dei.

6. While I weigh these things more attentively, it first occurs that it is not for me to marvel, if certain things are done by God whose reasons I do not understand; nor therefore is there to be doubting of his existence, because perhaps I experience that there are certain other things which I do not comprehend why or how they have been made by him. For since I already know that my nature is very weak & limited, but the nature of God is immense, incomprehensible, infinite, from this I also know well enough that he can do innumerable things whose causes I am ignorant of; and for this sole reason I judge that whole genus of causes, which is wont to be sought from the end, to have no use in Physical matters; for I do not think I can investigate the ends of God without temerity.

7. Occurrit etiam non unam aliquam creaturam separatim, sed omnem rerum universitatem esse spectandam, quoties an opera Dei perfecta sint inquirimus; quod enim forte non immeritò, si solum esset, valde

7. It also occurs that not any one creature separately, but the whole universe of things must be regarded, whenever we inquire whether the works of God are perfect; for what perhaps not undeservedly, if it were alone, would be greatly

[56] imperfectum videretur, ut habens in mundo rationem partis est perfectissimum; & quamvis, ex quo de omnibus volui dubitare, nihil adhuc praeter me & Deum existere certò cognovi, non possum tamen, ex quo immensam Dei potentiam animadverti, negare quin multa alia ab illo facta sint, vel saltem fieri possint, adeo ut ego rationem partis in rerum universitate obtineam.

[56] it would seem imperfect, yet as having in the world the rationale of a part it is most perfect; & although, since I wished to doubt about all things, I have thus far certainly known nothing to exist except myself & God, nevertheless I cannot, since I have observed the immense power of God, deny that many other things have been made by him, or at least can be made, so that I hold the rationale of a part in the universe of things.

8. Deinde, ad me propius accedens, & qualesnam sint errores mei (qui soli imperfectionem aliquam in me arguunt) investigans, adverto illos a duabus causis simul concurrentibus dependere, nempe a facultate cognoscendi quae in me est, & a facultate eligendi, sive ab arbitrii libertate, hoc est ab intellectu & simul a voluntate. Nam per solum intellectum percipio tantùm ideas de quibus judicium ferre possum, nec ullus error proprie dictus in eo praecise sic spectato reperitur; quamvis enim innumerae fortasse res existant, quarum ideae nullae in me sunt, non tamen proprie illis privatus, sed negative tantùm destitutus, sum dicendus, quia nempe rationem nullam possum afferre, quâ probem Deum mihi majorem quàm dederit cognoscendi facultatem dare debuisse; atque quantumvis peritum artificem esse intelligam, non tamen ideo puto illum in singulis ex suis operibus omnes perfectiones ponere debuisse, quas in aliquibus ponere potest. Nec verò etiam queri possum, quòd non satis amplam & perfectam voluntatem, sive arbitrii libertatem, a Deo acceperim; nam sane nullis illam limitibus circumscribi experior.

8. Then, drawing nearer to myself and investigating what sort of errors are mine (which alone argue some imperfection in me), I notice that they depend on two causes concurring together, namely on the faculty of knowing which is in me, and on the faculty of choosing, or the liberty of the will—that is, on the intellect and at the same time on the will. For by the intellect alone I perceive only the ideas about which I can pass judgment, and no error properly so called is found in it considered precisely thus; for although perhaps innumerable things exist of which there are no ideas in me, I am not to be said properly deprived of them, but only negatively destitute, because I can allege no reason whereby I might prove that God ought to have given me a greater faculty of knowing than he has given; and although I understand him to be a most skillful artificer, I do not therefore think that he ought to have placed in each of his works all the perfections that he can place in some. Nor indeed can I complain that I have not received from God a sufficiently ample and perfect will, or liberty of choice; for I truly experience it to be circumscribed by no limits.

Et quod valde notandum mihi videtur, nulla

And what seems to me very much to be noted, none

[57] alia in me sunt tam perfecta aut tanta, quin intelligam perfectiora sive majora adhuc esse posse. Nam si, exempli causâ, facultatem intelligendi considero, statim agnosco perexiguam illam & valde finitam in me esse, simulque alterius cujusdam multo majoris, imò maximae atque infinitae, ideam formo, illamque ex hoc ipso quòd ejus ideam formare possim, ad Dei naturam pertinere percipio. Eâdem ratione, si facultatem recordandi vel imaginandi, vel quaslibet alias examinem, nullam plane invenio, quam non in me tenuem & circumscriptam, in Deo immensam, esse intelligam.

[57] other things in me are so perfect
or so great, that I understand that still more perfect or greater ones can exist. For
if, for example, I consider the faculty of understanding, I at once acknowledge
that it is very slight & very finite in me, and at the same time I form the idea of
another much greater—indeed greatest and infinite—and I perceive that this,
from the very fact that I can form its idea, pertains to the nature of God. By the
same reasoning, if I examine the faculty of remembering or imagining, or any
others whatsoever, I plainly find none which I do not understand to be slight &
circumscribed in me, and immense in God.

Sola est voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas, quam tantam in me experior, ut nullius majoris ideam apprehendam; adeo ut illa praecipue sit, ratione cujus imaginem quandam & similitudinem Dei me referre intelligo. Nam quamvis major absque comparatione in Deo quàm in me sit, tum ratione cognitionis & potentiae quae illi adjunctae sunt, redduntque ipsam magis firmam & efficacem, tum ratione objecti, quoniam ad plura se extendit, non tamen, in se formaliter & praccise spectata, major videtur; quia tantùm in eo consistit, quòd idem vel facere vel non facere (hoc est affirmare vel negare, prosequi vel fugere) possimus, vel potius in eo tantùm, quòd ad id quod nobis ab intellectu proponitur affirmandum vel negandum, sive prosequendum vel fugiendum, ita feramur, ut a nullâ vi externâ nos ad id determinari sentiamus. Neque enim opus est me in utramque partem ferri posse, ut sim liber, sed contrà, quo magis in unam propendeo, sive quia rationem

Only the will, or the freedom of choice, is that which I experience in me to be so great that I apprehend the idea of none greater; so that this is especially that, by reason of which I understand that I bear a certain image & likeness of God. For although it is incomparably greater in God than in me, both in respect of the cognition & the power which are adjoined to it and render it more firm & efficacious, and in respect of the object, since it extends to more things, yet, considered in itself formally & precisely, it does not appear greater; because it consists only in this, that we can either do or not do the same (that is, affirm or deny, pursue or shun), or rather only in this, that with respect to what is proposed to us by the intellect to be affirmed or denied, or pursued or shunned, we are borne in such a way that we feel ourselves to be determined to it by no external force. For it is not necessary that I be able to be borne toward either side, in order that I may be free, but on the contrary, the more I incline to one, whether because reason

[58] veri & boni in eâ evidenter intelligo, sive quia Deus intima cogitationis meae ita disponit, tanto liberius illam eligo; nec sane divina gratia, nec naturalis cognitio unquam imminuunt libertatem, sed potius augent & corroborant. Indifferentia autem illa, quam experior, cùm nulla me ratio in unam partem magis quàm in alteram impellit, est infimus gradus libertatis, & nullam in eâ perfectionem, sed tantummodo in cognitione defectum, sive negationem quandam, testatur; nam si semper quid verum & bonum sit clare viderem, nunquam de eo quod esset judicandum vel eligendum deliberarem; atque ita, quamvis plane liber, nunquam tamen indifferens esse possem.

[58] when I evidently understand the true & the good in it, or because God so disposes the inmost of my thinking, I choose it the more freely; nor indeed do divine grace nor natural cognition ever diminish liberty, but rather augment & corroborate it. But that indifference which I experience, when no reason impels me more to one side than to the other, is the lowest degree of freedom, and bears witness to no perfection in it, but only to a defect in cognition, or a certain negation; for if I always saw clearly what is true & good, I would never deliberate about what ought to be judged or chosen; and thus, although plainly free, I could nevertheless never be indifferent.

9. Ex his autem percipio nec vim volendi, quam a Deo habeo, per se spectatam, causam esse errorum meorum, est enim amplissima, atque in suo genere perfecta; neque etiam vim intelligendi, nam quidquid intelligo, cùm a Deo habeam ut intelligam, proculdubio recte intelligo, nec in eo fieri potest ut fallar. Unde ergo nascuntur mei errores? Nempe ex hoc uno quòd, cùm latius pateat voluntas quàm intellectus, illam non intra eosdem limites contineo, sed etiam ad illa quae non intelligo extendo; ad quae cùm sit indifferens, facile a vero & bono deflectit, atque ita & fallor & pecco.

9. From these things, however, I perceive that neither the power of willing, which I have from God, considered in itself, is the cause of my errors—for it is most ample, and in its own kind perfect—nor yet the power of understanding; for whatever I understand, since I have it from God that I should understand, without a doubt I understand rightly, nor can it be that I am deceived in it. Whence, then, are my errors born? Namely from this alone: that, since the will extends more widely than the intellect, I do not confine it within the same limits, but extend it also to those things which I do not understand; toward which, since it is indifferent, it easily deflects from the true & the good, and thus I both err & sin.

10. Exempli causâ, cùm examinarem hisce diebus an aliquid in mundo existeret, atque adverterem, ex hoc ipso quòd illud examinarem, evidenter sequi me existere, non potui quidem non judicare illud quod tam clare intelligebam verum esse; non quòd ab ali

10. For example, when in these days I was examining whether anything existed in the world, and observed that from this very fact that I was examining it, it evidently followed that I existed, indeed I could not but judge that what I understood so clearly was true; not because from any oth

[59]quâ vi externâ fuerim ad id coactus, sed quia ex magnâ luce in intellectu magna consequuta est propensio in voluntate, atque ita tanto magis sponte & libere illud credidi, quanto minus fui ad istud ipsum indifferens. Nunc autem, non tantùm scio me, quatenus sum res quaedam cogitans, existere, sed praeterea etiam idea quaedam naturae corporeae mihi obversatur, contingitque ut dubitem an natura cogitans quae in me est, vel potius quae ego ipse sum, alia sit ab istâ naturâ corporeâ, vel an ambae idem sint; & suppono nullam adhuc intellectui meo rationem occurrere, quae mihi unum magis quàm aliud persuadeat. Certe ex hoc ipso sum indifferens ad utrumlibet affirmandum vel negandum, vel etiam ad nihil de eâ re judicandum.

[59]by what external force I had been compelled to it, but because from a great light in the intellect there followed a great propensity in the will, and thus I believed it so much the more spontaneously & freely, the less I was indifferent to that very thing. Now, however, I not only know that I, insofar as I am a certain thinking thing, exist, but in addition a certain idea of corporeal nature presents itself to me, and it happens that I doubt whether the thinking nature which is in me, or rather which I myself am, is other than that corporeal nature, or whether both are the same; & I suppose that no reason has yet occurred to my intellect which would persuade me of the one more than of the other. Surely from this very fact I am indifferent to affirming either or denying, or even to making no judgment about that matter.

11. Quinimo etiam haec indifferentia non ad ea tantùm se extendit de quibus intellectus nihil plane cognoscit, sed generaliter ad omnia quae ab illo non satis perspicue cognoscuntur eo ipso tempore, quo de iis a voluntate deliberatur: quantumvis enim probabiles conjecturae me trahant in unam partem, sola cognitio quòd sint tantùm conjecturae, non autem certae atque indubitabiles rationes, sufficit ad assensionem meam in contrarium impellendam. Quod satis his diebus sum expertus, cùm illa omnia quae priùs ut vera quam maxime credideram, propter hoc unum quòd de iis aliquo modo posse dubitari deprehendissem, plane falsa esse supposui.

11. Nay rather, this indifference extends not only to those things about which the intellect knows plainly nothing, but generally to all things which are not sufficiently perspicuous to it at the very time when the will deliberates about them: for however probable conjectures may draw me to one side, the mere cognition that they are only conjectures, and not sure and indubitable reasons, suffices to impel my assent in the opposite direction. Which I have sufficiently experienced these days, when I supposed all those things which I had previously believed as true as possible to be plainly false for this one reason alone, that I had discovered that in some way it is possible to doubt about them.

12. Cùm autem quid verum sit non satis clare & distincte percipio, si quidem a judicio ferendo abstineam, clarum est me recte agere, & non falli. Sed si vel affirmem vel negem, tunc libertate arbitrii non recte utor; atque

12. But when I do not perceive sufficiently clearly & distinctly what is true, if indeed I abstain from passing judgment, it is clear that I act rightly, & am not deceived. But if I either affirm or deny, then I do not use the freedom of choice rightly; and

[60] si in eam partem quae falsa est me convertam, plane fallar; si verò alteram amplectar, casu quidem incidam in veritatem, sed non ideo culpâ carebo, quia lumine naturali manifestum est perceptionem intellectûs praecedere semper debere voluntatis determinationem. Atque in hoc liberi arbitrii non recto usu privatio illa inest quae formam erroris constituit: privatio, inquam, inest in ipsâ operatione, quatenus a me procedit, sed non in facultate quam a Deo accepi, nec etiam in operatione quatenus ab illo dependet.

[60] if I turn myself to that side which is false, I am plainly deceived; but if I embrace the other, I fall upon the truth by chance indeed, yet I shall not on that account be without fault, because by the natural light it is manifest that the perception of the intellect ought always to precede the determination of the will. And in this not-right use of free will that privation is present which constitutes the form of error: the privation, I say, is present in the operation itself, insofar as it proceeds from me, but not in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the operation insofar as it depends on Him.

13. Neque enim habeo causam ullam conquerendi, quòd Deus mihi non majorem vim intelligendi, sive non majus lumen naturale dederit quàm dedit, quia est de ratione intellectûs finiti ut multa non intelligat, & de ratione intellectûs creati ut sit finitus; estque quòd agam gratias illi, qui mihi nunquam quicquam debuit, pro eo quod largitus est, non autem quòd putem me ab illo iis esse privatum, sive illum mihi ea abstulisse, quae non dedit.

13. For I have no cause at all for complaining that God did not give me a greater power of understanding, or a greater natural light, than he gave, because it belongs to the nature of a finite intellect that it not understand many things, & to the nature of a created intellect that it be finite; and there is reason that I should give thanks to him, who never owed me anything, for that which he has bestowed, and not that I should think myself by him to be deprived of those things, or that he has taken from me those things, which he did not give.

14. Non habeo etiam causam conquerendi, quòd voluntatem dederit latius patentem quàm intellectum; cùm enim voluntas in unâ tantùm re, & tanquam in indivisibili consistat, non videtur ferre ejus natura ut quicquam ab illâ demi possit; & sane quo amplior est, tanto majores debeo gratias ejus datori.

14. I also have no cause for complaint that He has given the will more widely extending than the intellect; since the will
consists in only one thing, & as it were in an indivisible,
its nature does not seem to allow that anything can be taken away from it; &
indeed, the more ample it is, by that much the greater thanks I owe to its giver.

15. Nec denique etiam queri debeo, quòd Deus mecum concurrat ad eliciendos illos actus voluntatis, sive illa judicia, in quibus fallor: illi enim actus sunt omnino veri & boni, quatenus a Deo dependent, & major in me quodammodo perfectio est, quòd illos possim elicere, quàm si non possem. Privatio autem, in quâ solâ ratio

15. Nor finally ought I even to complain that God concurs with me in drawing forth those acts of will, or those judgments, in which I am deceived: for those acts are altogether true & good, insofar as they depend on God, & there is in me a greater perfection in a certain manner, that I can elicit them, than if I could not. But privation, in which alone the reason

[61] formalis falsitatis & culpae consistit, nullo Dei concursu indiget, quia non est res, neque ad illum relata ut causam privatio, sed tantummodo negatio dici debet. Nam sane nulla imperfectio in Deo est, quòd mihi libertatem dederit assentiendi vel non assentiendi quibusdam, quorum claram & distinctam perceptionem in intellectu meo non posuit; sed proculdubio in me imperfectio est, quòd istâ libertate non bene utar, & de iis, quae non recte intelligo, judicium feram. Video tamen fieri a Deo facile potuisse, ut, etiamsi manerem liber, & cognitionis finitae, nunquam tamen errarem: nempe si vel intellectui meo claram & distinctam perceptionem omnium de quibus unquam essem deliberaturus indidisset; vel tantùm si adeo firmiter memoriae impressisset, de nullâ unquam re esse judicandum quam clare & distincte non intelligerem, ut nunquam ejus possem oblivisci.

[61] in which alone the account of formal falsity & fault consists, it needs no concurrence of God, because it is not a thing, nor, when referred to Him as cause, a privation, but ought rather to be called a mere negation. For indeed there is no imperfection in God that He has given me the freedom of assenting or not assenting to certain things, of which He has not placed a clear & distinct perception in my intellect; but without doubt there is an imperfection in me, that I do not use that freedom well, & that I pass judgment concerning those things which I do not rightly understand. Yet I see that it could easily have been brought about by God that, even if I remained free & of finite cognition, nevertheless I should never err: namely, either if He had implanted in my intellect a clear & distinct perception of all the things about which I should ever be going to deliberate; or only if He had so firmly impressed upon my memory that one must never judge about anything which I did not clearly & distinctly understand, that I could never forget it.

Et facile intelligo me, quatenus rationem habeo totius cujusdam, perfectiorem futurum fuisse quàm nunc sum, si talis a Deo factus essem. Sed non ideo possum negare quin major quodammodo perfectio sit in totâ rerum universitate, quòd quaedam ejus partes ab erroribus immunes non sint, aliae verò sint, quàm si omnes plane similes essent. Et nullum habeo jus conquerendi quòd eam me Deus in mundo personam sustinere voluerit, quae non est omnium praecipua & maxime perfecta.

And I easily understand that I, insofar as I have the nature of a certain whole, would have been more perfect than I now am, if I had been made such by God. But I cannot on that account deny that there is in the whole universality of things a greater perfection, that certain parts of it are not immune from errors and others are, than if all were plainly similar. And I have no right to complain that God has willed me to sustain in the world that persona which is not the most principal and most perfect of all.

16. Ac praeterea, etiam ut non possim ab erroribus abstinere priori illo modo qui pendet ab evidenti eorum omnium perceptione de quibus est deliberandum, possum tamen illo altero qui pendet ab eo tantùm,

16. And moreover, even if I cannot abstain from errors by that former way which depends on the evident perception of all those things about which there is to be deliberation, I can nevertheless by that other which depends only on that,

[62] quòd recorder, quoties de rei veritate non liquet, a judicio ferendo esse abstinendum; nam, quamvis eam in me infirmitatem esse experiar, ut non possim semper uni & eidem cognitioni defixus inhaerere, possum tamen attentâ & saepius iteratâ meditatione efficere, ut ejusdem, quoties usus exiget, recorder, atque ita habitum quemdam non errandi acquiram.

[62] that I recall that, whenever the verity of the matter is not clear, one must abstain from rendering judgment; for, although I experience that there is in me such infirmity that I cannot always, fixed, adhere to one & the same cognition, yet I can, by attentive and more often iterated meditation, bring it about that I recall the same, as often as need shall require, and thus acquire a certain habit of not erring.

17. Quâ in re cùm maxima & praecipua hominis perfectio consistat, non parum me hodiernâ meditatione lucratum esse existimo, quòd erroris & falsitatis causam investigarim. Et sane nulla alia esse potest ab eâ quam explicui; nam quoties voluntatem in judiciis ferendis ita contineo, ut ad ea tantùm se extendat quae illi clare & distincte ab intellectu exhibentur, fieri plane non potest ut errem, quia omnis clara & distincta perceptio proculdubio est aliquid, ac proinde a nihilo esse non potest, sed necessariò Deum authorem habet, Deum, inquam, illum summe perfectum, quem fallacem esse repugnat; ideoque proculdubio est vera. Nec hodie tantùm didici quid mihi sit cavendum ut nunquam fallar, sed simul etiam quid agendum ut assequar veritatem; assequar enim illam profecto, si tantùm ad omnia quae perfecte intelligo satis attendam, atque illa a reliquis, quae confusius & obscurius apprehendo, secernam.

17. In which matter, since the greatest & principal perfection of man consists, I judge that by today’s meditation I have gained not a little, in that I have investigated the cause of error & falsity. And surely there can be no other than that which I have explained; for whenever I so restrain the will in rendering judgments, that it extend itself only to those things which are presented to it clearly & distinctly by the intellect, it plainly cannot come to pass that I err, because every clear & distinct perception is without doubt something, and therefore cannot be from nothing, but necessarily has God as its author—God, I say, that supremely perfect one, whom it is repugnant to suppose deceitful; and therefore it is without doubt true. Nor have I today only learned what I must beware of so that I may never be deceived, but at the same time also what must be done that I may attain the truth; for I shall assuredly attain it, if only I pay sufficient attention to all the things that I understand perfectly, and separate those from the rest, which I apprehend more confusedly & more obscurely.

Cui rei diligenter imposterum operam dabo.

To which matter I shall henceforth diligently devote myself.