Justinian•DIGESTA
Abbo Floriacensis1 work
Abelard3 works
Addison9 works
Adso Dervensis1 work
Aelredus Rievallensis1 work
Alanus de Insulis2 works
Albert of Aix1 work
HISTORIA HIEROSOLYMITANAE EXPEDITIONIS12 sections
Albertano of Brescia5 works
DE AMORE ET DILECTIONE DEI4 sections
SERMONES4 sections
Alcuin9 works
Alfonsi1 work
Ambrose4 works
Ambrosius4 works
Ammianus1 work
Ampelius1 work
Andrea da Bergamo1 work
Andreas Capellanus1 work
DE AMORE LIBRI TRES3 sections
Annales Regni Francorum1 work
Annales Vedastini1 work
Annales Xantenses1 work
Anonymus Neveleti1 work
Anonymus Valesianus2 works
Apicius1 work
DE RE COQUINARIA5 sections
Appendix Vergiliana1 work
Apuleius2 works
METAMORPHOSES12 sections
DE DOGMATE PLATONIS6 sections
Aquinas6 works
Archipoeta1 work
Arnobius1 work
ADVERSVS NATIONES LIBRI VII7 sections
Arnulf of Lisieux1 work
Asconius1 work
Asserius1 work
Augustine5 works
CONFESSIONES13 sections
DE CIVITATE DEI23 sections
DE TRINITATE15 sections
CONTRA SECUNDAM IULIANI RESPONSIONEM2 sections
Augustus1 work
RES GESTAE DIVI AVGVSTI2 sections
Aurelius Victor1 work
LIBER ET INCERTORVM LIBRI3 sections
Ausonius2 works
Avianus1 work
Avienus2 works
Bacon3 works
HISTORIA REGNI HENRICI SEPTIMI REGIS ANGLIAE11 sections
Balde2 works
Baldo1 work
Bebel1 work
Bede2 works
HISTORIAM ECCLESIASTICAM GENTIS ANGLORUM7 sections
Benedict1 work
Berengar1 work
Bernard of Clairvaux1 work
Bernard of Cluny1 work
DE CONTEMPTU MUNDI LIBRI DUO2 sections
Biblia Sacra3 works
VETUS TESTAMENTUM49 sections
NOVUM TESTAMENTUM27 sections
Bigges1 work
Boethius de Dacia2 works
Bonaventure1 work
Breve Chronicon Northmannicum1 work
Buchanan1 work
Bultelius2 works
Caecilius Balbus1 work
Caesar3 works
COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI VII DE BELLO GALLICO CUM A. HIRTI SUPPLEMENTO8 sections
COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI III DE BELLO CIVILI3 sections
LIBRI INCERTORUM AUCTORUM3 sections
Calpurnius Flaccus1 work
Calpurnius Siculus1 work
Campion8 works
Carmen Arvale1 work
Carmen de Martyrio1 work
Carmen in Victoriam1 work
Carmen Saliare1 work
Carmina Burana1 work
Cassiodorus5 works
Catullus1 work
Censorinus1 work
Christian Creeds1 work
Cicero3 works
ORATORIA33 sections
PHILOSOPHIA21 sections
EPISTULAE4 sections
Cinna Helvius1 work
Claudian4 works
Claudii Oratio1 work
Claudius Caesar1 work
Columbus1 work
Columella2 works
Commodianus3 works
Conradus Celtis2 works
Constitutum Constantini1 work
Contemporary9 works
Cotta1 work
Dante4 works
Dares the Phrygian1 work
de Ave Phoenice1 work
De Expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum1 work
Declaratio Arbroathis1 work
Decretum Gelasianum1 work
Descartes1 work
Dies Irae1 work
Disticha Catonis1 work
Egeria1 work
ITINERARIUM PEREGRINATIO2 sections
Einhard1 work
Ennius1 work
Epistolae Austrasicae1 work
Epistulae de Priapismo1 work
Erasmus7 works
Erchempert1 work
Eucherius1 work
Eugippius1 work
Eutropius1 work
BREVIARIVM HISTORIAE ROMANAE10 sections
Exurperantius1 work
Fabricius Montanus1 work
Falcandus1 work
Falcone di Benevento1 work
Ficino1 work
Fletcher1 work
Florus1 work
EPITOME DE T. LIVIO BELLORUM OMNIUM ANNORUM DCC LIBRI DUO2 sections
Foedus Aeternum1 work
Forsett2 works
Fredegarius1 work
Frodebertus & Importunus1 work
Frontinus3 works
STRATEGEMATA4 sections
DE AQUAEDUCTU URBIS ROMAE2 sections
OPUSCULA RERUM RUSTICARUM4 sections
Fulgentius3 works
MITOLOGIARUM LIBRI TRES3 sections
Gaius4 works
Galileo1 work
Garcilaso de la Vega1 work
Gaudeamus Igitur1 work
Gellius1 work
Germanicus1 work
Gesta Francorum10 works
Gesta Romanorum1 work
Gioacchino da Fiore1 work
Godfrey of Winchester2 works
Grattius1 work
Gregorii Mirabilia Urbis Romae1 work
Gregorius Magnus1 work
Gregory IX5 works
Gregory of Tours1 work
LIBRI HISTORIARUM10 sections
Gregory the Great1 work
Gregory VII1 work
Gwinne8 works
Henry of Settimello1 work
Henry VII1 work
Historia Apolloni1 work
Historia Augusta30 works
Historia Brittonum1 work
Holberg1 work
Horace3 works
SERMONES2 sections
CARMINA4 sections
EPISTULAE5 sections
Hugo of St. Victor2 works
Hydatius2 works
Hyginus3 works
Hymni1 work
Hymni et cantica1 work
Iacobus de Voragine1 work
LEGENDA AUREA24 sections
Ilias Latina1 work
Iordanes2 works
Isidore of Seville3 works
ETYMOLOGIARVM SIVE ORIGINVM LIBRI XX20 sections
SENTENTIAE LIBRI III3 sections
Iulius Obsequens1 work
Iulius Paris1 work
Ius Romanum4 works
Janus Secundus2 works
Johann H. Withof1 work
Johann P. L. Withof1 work
Johannes de Alta Silva1 work
Johannes de Plano Carpini1 work
John of Garland1 work
Jordanes2 works
Julius Obsequens1 work
Junillus1 work
Justin1 work
HISTORIARVM PHILIPPICARVM T. POMPEII TROGI LIBRI XLIV IN EPITOMEN REDACTI46 sections
Justinian3 works
INSTITVTIONES5 sections
CODEX12 sections
DIGESTA50 sections
Juvenal1 work
Kepler1 work
Landor4 works
Laurentius Corvinus2 works
Legenda Regis Stephani1 work
Leo of Naples1 work
HISTORIA DE PRELIIS ALEXANDRI MAGNI3 sections
Leo the Great1 work
SERMONES DE QUADRAGESIMA2 sections
Liber Kalilae et Dimnae1 work
Liber Pontificalis1 work
Livius Andronicus1 work
Livy1 work
AB VRBE CONDITA LIBRI37 sections
Lotichius1 work
Lucan1 work
DE BELLO CIVILI SIVE PHARSALIA10 sections
Lucretius1 work
DE RERVM NATVRA LIBRI SEX6 sections
Lupus Protospatarius Barensis1 work
Macarius of Alexandria1 work
Macarius the Great1 work
Magna Carta1 work
Maidstone1 work
Malaterra1 work
DE REBUS GESTIS ROGERII CALABRIAE ET SICILIAE COMITIS ET ROBERTI GUISCARDI DUCIS FRATRIS EIUS4 sections
Manilius1 work
ASTRONOMICON5 sections
Marbodus Redonensis1 work
Marcellinus Comes2 works
Martial1 work
Martin of Braga13 works
Marullo1 work
Marx1 work
Maximianus1 work
May1 work
SUPPLEMENTUM PHARSALIAE8 sections
Melanchthon4 works
Milton1 work
Minucius Felix1 work
Mirabilia Urbis Romae1 work
Mirandola1 work
CARMINA9 sections
Miscellanea Carminum42 works
Montanus1 work
Naevius1 work
Navagero1 work
Nemesianus1 work
ECLOGAE4 sections
Nepos3 works
LIBER DE EXCELLENTIBUS DVCIBUS EXTERARVM GENTIVM24 sections
Newton1 work
PHILOSOPHIÆ NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA4 sections
Nithardus1 work
HISTORIARUM LIBRI QUATTUOR4 sections
Notitia Dignitatum2 works
Novatian1 work
Origo gentis Langobardorum1 work
Orosius1 work
HISTORIARUM ADVERSUM PAGANOS LIBRI VII7 sections
Otto of Freising1 work
GESTA FRIDERICI IMPERATORIS5 sections
Ovid7 works
METAMORPHOSES15 sections
AMORES3 sections
HEROIDES21 sections
ARS AMATORIA3 sections
TRISTIA5 sections
EX PONTO4 sections
Owen1 work
Papal Bulls4 works
Pascoli5 works
Passerat1 work
Passio Perpetuae1 work
Patricius1 work
Tome I: Panaugia2 sections
Paulinus Nolensis1 work
Paulus Diaconus4 works
Persius1 work
Pervigilium Veneris1 work
Petronius2 works
Petrus Blesensis1 work
Petrus de Ebulo1 work
Phaedrus2 works
FABVLARVM AESOPIARVM LIBRI QVINQVE5 sections
Phineas Fletcher1 work
Planctus destructionis1 work
Plautus21 works
Pliny the Younger2 works
EPISTVLARVM LIBRI DECEM10 sections
Poggio Bracciolini1 work
Pomponius Mela1 work
DE CHOROGRAPHIA3 sections
Pontano1 work
Poree1 work
Porphyrius1 work
Precatio Terrae1 work
Priapea1 work
Professio Contra Priscillianum1 work
Propertius1 work
ELEGIAE4 sections
Prosperus3 works
Prudentius2 works
Pseudoplatonica12 works
Publilius Syrus1 work
Quintilian2 works
INSTITUTIONES12 sections
Raoul of Caen1 work
Regula ad Monachos1 work
Reposianus1 work
Ricardi de Bury1 work
Richerus1 work
HISTORIARUM LIBRI QUATUOR4 sections
Rimbaud1 work
Ritchie's Fabulae Faciles1 work
Roman Epitaphs1 work
Roman Inscriptions1 work
Ruaeus1 work
Ruaeus' Aeneid1 work
Rutilius Lupus1 work
Rutilius Namatianus1 work
Sabinus1 work
EPISTULAE TRES AD OVIDIANAS EPISTULAS RESPONSORIAE3 sections
Sallust10 works
Sannazaro2 works
Scaliger1 work
Sedulius2 works
CARMEN PASCHALE5 sections
Seneca9 works
EPISTULAE MORALES AD LUCILIUM16 sections
QUAESTIONES NATURALES7 sections
DE CONSOLATIONE3 sections
DE IRA3 sections
DE BENEFICIIS3 sections
DIALOGI7 sections
FABULAE8 sections
Septem Sapientum1 work
Sidonius Apollinaris2 works
Sigebert of Gembloux3 works
Silius Italicus1 work
Solinus2 works
DE MIRABILIBUS MUNDI Mommsen 1st edition (1864)4 sections
DE MIRABILIBUS MUNDI C.L.F. Panckoucke edition (Paris 1847)4 sections
Spinoza1 work
Statius3 works
THEBAID12 sections
ACHILLEID2 sections
Stephanus de Varda1 work
Suetonius2 works
Sulpicia1 work
Sulpicius Severus2 works
CHRONICORUM LIBRI DUO2 sections
Syrus1 work
Tacitus5 works
Terence6 works
Tertullian32 works
Testamentum Porcelli1 work
Theodolus1 work
Theodosius16 works
Theophanes1 work
Thomas à Kempis1 work
DE IMITATIONE CHRISTI4 sections
Thomas of Edessa1 work
Tibullus1 work
TIBVLLI ALIORVMQUE CARMINVM LIBRI TRES3 sections
Tünger1 work
Valerius Flaccus1 work
Valerius Maximus1 work
FACTORVM ET DICTORVM MEMORABILIVM LIBRI NOVEM9 sections
Vallauri1 work
Varro2 works
RERVM RVSTICARVM DE AGRI CVLTURA3 sections
DE LINGVA LATINA7 sections
Vegetius1 work
EPITOMA REI MILITARIS LIBRI IIII4 sections
Velleius Paterculus1 work
HISTORIAE ROMANAE2 sections
Venantius Fortunatus1 work
Vico1 work
Vida1 work
Vincent of Lérins1 work
Virgil3 works
AENEID12 sections
ECLOGUES10 sections
GEORGICON4 sections
Vita Agnetis1 work
Vita Caroli IV1 work
Vita Sancti Columbae2 works
Vitruvius1 work
DE ARCHITECTVRA10 sections
Waardenburg1 work
Waltarius3 works
Walter Mapps2 works
Walter of Châtillon1 work
William of Apulia1 work
William of Conches2 works
William of Tyre1 work
HISTORIA RERUM IN PARTIBUS TRANSMARINIS GESTARUM24 sections
Xylander1 work
Zonaras1 work
Dig. 4.3.0. De dolo malo.
4.2.0. What shall have been done by reason of fear.
Dig. 4.3.0. On malicious fraud.
Dig. 4.6.0. Ex quibus causis maiores viginti quinque annis in integrum restituuntur.
4.5.0. On those diminished in status.
Dig. 4.6.0. From what causes those over twenty-five years are restored in integrum.
Dig. 4.9.0. Nautae caupones stabularii ut recepta restituant.
4.8.0. On undertakings: those who have accepted an arbitration to pronounce a sentence.
Dig. 4.9.0. Shipmasters, innkeepers, and stablekeepers, that they restore the things received.
Non solum minoris, verum eorum quoque, qui rei publicae causa afuerunt, item omnium, qui ipsi potuerunt restitui in integrum, successores in integrum restitui possunt, et ita saepissime est constitutum. sive igitur heres sit sive is cui hereditas restituta est sive filii familias militis successor, in integrum restitui poterit. proinde et si minor in servitutem redigatur vel ancilla fiat, dominis eorum dabitur non ultra tempus statutum in integrum restitutio.
Not only of a minor, but also of those who were absent for the sake of the commonwealth, likewise the successors of all who themselves could be restored in integrum, can be restored in integrum; and so it has been most frequently established. Therefore, whether it be the heir, or the one to whom the inheritance has been restored, or the successor of a filius familias who is a soldier, he can be restored in integrum. Accordingly, even if a minor be reduced into servitude or a girl become an ancilla, in integrum restitution will be given to their masters, not beyond the time prescribed.
But also, if by chance this minor was taken captive within the inheritance which he had entered upon, Julian, in book 17 of the Digest, writes that the master can have the faculty of abstaining not only by the benefit of age, but even if age does not afford protection: because they have used the benefit of the laws not for the sake of acquiring the inheritance, but for the sake of vindication.
Divus antoninus marcio avito praetori de succurrendo ei, qui absens rem amiserat, in hanc sententiam rescripsit: " etsi nihil facile mutandum est ex sollemnibus, tamen ubi aequitas evidens poscit, subveniendum est. itaque si citatus non respondit et ob hoc more pronuntiatum est, confestim autem pro tribunali te sedente adiit: existimari potest non sua culpa sed parum exaudita voce praeconis defuisse, ideoque restitui potest. "
The deified Antoninus wrote back to Marcius Avitus, the praetor, about aiding one who, being absent, had lost the case, to this effect: " even if nothing of the solemn forms should easily be changed, nevertheless where evident equity demands, help must be given. And so, if when summoned he did not answer and for this reason judgment was pronounced by custom, but immediately thereafter, as you were sitting before the tribunal, he approached: it can be thought that he failed to appear not by his own fault but because the crier’s voice was too little heard, and therefore he can be restored. "
Nec intra has solum species consistet huius generis auxilium: etenim deceptis sine culpa sua, maxime si fraus ab adversario intervenerit, succurri oportebit, cum etiam de dolo malo actio competere soleat, et boni praetoris est potius restituere litem, ut et ratio aequitatis postulabit, quam actionem famosam constituere, ad quam tunc demum descendendum est, cum remedio locus esse non potest.
Nor will the relief of this kind stand confined within these forms alone: for to those deceived without their own fault, especially if fraud by the adversary has intervened, relief ought to be afforded, since even an action for dolus malus is wont to be available; and it is the part of a good praetor rather to restore the suit, as the principle of equity will demand, than to constitute an infaming action, to which one should only then descend when there can be no room for a remedy.
Inter minores viginti quinque annis et eos qui rei publicae causa absunt hoc interest, quod minores annis etiam qui per tutores curatoresve suos defensi sunt, nihilo minus in integrum contra rem publicam restituuntur, cognita scilicet causa: ei vero qui rei publicae causa absit, ceteris quoque qui in eadem causa habentur, si per procuratores suos defensi sunt, hactenus in integrum restitutione subveniri solet, ut appellare his permittatur.
Between minors under twenty-five years and those who are absent for the sake of the Republic, this is the difference: minors in years, even if they have been defended by their tutors or curators, are nonetheless restored in integrum even against the Republic, the cause having of course been examined; but he who is absent for the sake of the Republic, and likewise the others who are held to be in the same case, if they have been defended by their procurators, are commonly aided by restitution in integrum only to this extent, that they are permitted to appeal.
Ait praetor: " quod metus causa gestum erit, ratum non habebo " . olim ita edicebatur " quod vi metusve causa " : vis enim fiebat mentio propter necessitatem impositam contrariam voluntati: metus instantis vel futuri periculi causa mentis trepidatio. sed postea detracta est vis mentio ideo, quia quodcumque vi atroci fit, id metu quoque fieri videtur.
The praetor says: " what has been done because of fear, I will not hold as ratified ". Formerly it used to be edicted thus: " what by force or by fear’s cause ": for mention of force was made on account of a necessity imposed contrary to the will; fear is a trepidation of the mind because of an imminent or future danger. But afterward mention of force was removed for this reason, because whatever is done by atrocious force seems to be done also through fear.
Sed vim accipimus atrocem et eam, quae adversus bonos mores fiat, non eam quam magistratus recte intulit, scilicet iure licito et iure honoris quem sustinet. ceterum si per iniuriam quid fecit populi romani magistratus vel provinciae praeses, pomponius scribit hoc edictum locum habere: si forte, inquit, mortis aut verberum terrore pecuniam alicui extorserit.
But we understand “violence” as atrocious, and as that which is done against good morals, not that which a magistrate has rightly applied, namely by lawful right and by the right of the office which he sustains. Moreover, if a magistrate of the Roman people or the governor of a province has done something wrongfully, Pomponius writes that this edict has application: “if perhaps,” he says, “under the terror of death or of beatings he has extorted money from someone.”
Nec timorem infamiae hoc edicto contineri pedius dicit libro septimo, neque alicuius vexationis timorem per hoc edictum restitui. proinde si quis meticulosus rem nullam frustra timuerit, per hoc edictum non restituitur, quoniam neque vi neque metus causa factum est.
Nor, Pedius says in the seventh book, is the fear of infamy contained by this edict, nor is the fear of any vexation restored through this edict. Accordingly, if some timorous person has groundlessly feared when there was no matter, he is not restored under this edict, since the deed was done neither by force nor by reason of fear.
Proinde si quis in furto vel adulterio deprehensus vel in alio flagitio vel dedit aliquid vel se obligavit, pomponius libro vicensimo octavo recte scribit posse eum ad hoc edictum pertinere: timuit enim vel mortem vel vincula. quamquam non omnem adulterum liceat occidere, vel furem, nisi se telo defendat: sed potuerunt vel non iure occidi, et ideo iustus fuerit metus. sed et si, ne prodatur ab eo qui deprehenderit, alienaverit, succurri ei per hoc edictum videtur, quoniam si proditus esset, potuerit ea pati quae diximus.
Accordingly, if someone apprehended in theft or in adultery or in another flagitious act either gave something or bound himself, Pomponius in the twenty-eighth book rightly writes that he can pertain to this edict: for he feared either death or bonds. Although it is not permitted to kill every adulterer, or thief, unless he defends himself with a weapon; yet they could have been killed even not lawfully, and therefore the fear was just. But also if, lest he be betrayed by him who apprehended him, he has alienated (his property), he seems to be aided by this edict, since, if he had been betrayed, he could have suffered those things which we have said.
Isti quidem et in legem iuliam incidunt, quod pro comperto stupro acceperunt. praetor tamen etiam ut restituant intervenire debet: nam et gestum est malo more, et praetor non respicit, an adulter sit qui dedit, sed hoc solum, quod hic accepit metu mortis illato.
These men indeed also fall under the Julian law, because they accepted as the price for a discovered stuprum. Nevertheless the praetor ought also to intervene so that they restore it: for it was done in bad fashion, and the praetor does not regard whether the giver is an adulterer, but this alone, that he accepted it under the duress of fear of death brought upon him.
Metum autem praesentem accipere debemus, non suspicionem inferendi eius: et ita pomponius libro vicensimo octavo scribit. ait enim metum illatum accipiendum, id est si illatus est timor ab aliquo. denique tractat, si fundum meum dereliquero audito, quod quis cum armis veniret, an huic edicto locus sit?
However, we ought to take fear as present, not a suspicion of its being brought on; and so Pomponius writes in the twenty-eighth book. For he says that “inflicted fear” is to be understood, that is, if fear has been inflicted by someone. Finally, he discusses whether, if I have abandoned my estate upon hearing that someone was coming with arms, there is scope for this edict?
and he reports that Labeo judges there is no place for the edict and that the interdict “unde vi” does not apply, since I do not seem to have been cast out by force, I who did not wait to be cast out but fled. otherwise than if, after armed men had entered, I then departed: for in that case this edict would have place. he says the same, too, that if perchance, with force applied, you build on my soil by force, both the interdict “quod vi aut clam” and this edict have place—namely, because through fear I allow you to do that.
Animadvertendum autem, quod praetor hoc edicto generaliter et in rem loquitur nec adicit a quo gestum: et ideo sive singularis sit persona, quae metum intulit, vel populus vel curia vel collegium vel corpus, huic edicto locus erit. sed licet vim factam a quocumque praetor complectatur, eleganter tamen pomponius ait, si quo magis te de vi hostium vel latronum vel populi tuerer vel liberarem, aliquid a te accepero vel te obligavero, non debere me hoc edicto teneri, nisi ipse hanc tibi vim summisi: ceterum si alienus sum a vi, teneri me non debere, ego enim operae potius meae mercedem accepisse videor.
It must be noted, however, that the praetor by this edict speaks generally and in rem and does not add by whom the act was done; and therefore whether the person who brought in fear is a single individual, or the People, or a curia, or a collegium, or a corporate body, this edict will have application. But although the praetor comprehends force done by anyone whatsoever, yet Pomponius elegantly says: if, in order the more to protect you or to free you from the vis of enemies or of robbers or of the populace, I have received something from you or have bound you under obligation, I ought not to be held by this edict, unless I myself sent this force upon you; but if I am a stranger to the force, I ought not to be held, for I seem rather to have received the wage of my service.
Sed quod praetor ait ratum se non habiturum, quatenus accipiendum est videamus. et quidem aut imperfecta res est, licet metus intervenerit, ut puta stipulationem numeratio non est secuta, aut perfecta, si post stipulationem et numeratio facta est aut per metum accepto debitor liberatus est vel quid simile contigerit quod negotium perficeret. et pomponius scribit in negotiis quidem perfectis et exceptionem interdum et actionem competere, in imperfectis autem solam exceptionem.
But as to what the praetor says, that he will not hold it ratified, let us see to what extent it is to be taken. And indeed, either the matter is imperfect, although fear (duress) has intervened—for instance, the numeration (counting out/payment) has not followed the stipulation—or it is perfect, if after the stipulation even the numeration has been made, or the debtor has been released by acceptilation under duress, or something similar has occurred which would perfect the transaction. And Pomponius writes that in transactions that are indeed perfect both an exception at times and an action lie; whereas in imperfect ones, only an exception.
but from an actual case I know that, when the Campanians, fear having been brought upon a certain person, had extorted a security for a promise, there was a rescript from our emperor that he could petition the praetor for in integrum restitution, and that the praetor, with me sitting beside, gave an interlocutory ruling that, whether he wished to proceed by an action against the Campanians, an action was available, or by an exception against the claimants, an exception was not lacking. from which constitution it is gathered that, whether the matter be perfect or imperfect, both an action and an exception are granted.
Ex hoc edicto restitutio talis facienda est, id est in integrum, officio iudicis, ut, si per vim res tradita est, retradatur et de dolo sicut dictum est repromittatur, ne forte deterior res sit facta. et si acceptilatione liberatio intervenit, restituenda erit in pristinum statum obligatio, usque adeo, ut iulianus scribat libro quarto digestorum, si pecunia debita fuit, quae accepta per vim facta est, nisi vel solvatur vel restituta obligatione iudicium accipiatur, quadruplo eum condemnandum. sed et si per vim stipulanti promisero, stipulatio accepto facienda erit.
From this edict such a restitution is to be made, that is, in integrum, by the duty of the judge, such that, if a thing has been delivered by force, it shall be given back, and a promise against fraud, as has been said, shall be promised anew, lest perhaps the thing has been made worse. And if a liberation has intervened by acceptilation, the obligation must be restored to its pristine state—so far that Julian writes in the fourth book of the Digest, that, if money was owed which, having been received, was obtained by force, unless either it be paid, or, the obligation having been restored, an action be taken, he must be condemned fourfold. But also, if under force I have promised to one stipulating, the stipulatio must be undone by acceptilation.
Cum autem haec actio in rem sit scripta nec personam vim facientis coercerat, sed adversus omnes restitui velit quod metus causa factum est: non immerito iulianus a Marcello notatus est scribens, si fideiussor vim intulit, ut accepto liberetur, in reum non esse restituendam actionem, sed fideiussorem, nisi adversus reum quoque actionem restituat, debere in quadruplum condemnari. sed est verius, quod Marcellus notat: etiam adversus reum competere hanc actionem, cum in rem sit scripta.
when, moreover, this action is written in rem and does not restrain itself to the person of the one using violence, but wills that what was done by reason of fear be restored against all: not without reason was Julian noted by Marcellus for writing that, if a surety applied violence so that by acceptilation he might be freed, the action is not to be restored against the principal debtor, but the surety, unless he also restores the action against the debtor, ought to be condemned in the fourfold. but what Marcellus notes is truer: that this action also lies against the debtor, since it is written in rem.
Illud verum est, si ex facto debitoris metum adhibentis fideiussores acceptilatione liberati sunt, etiam adversus fideiussores agi posse, ut se reponant in obligationem. si metu a te coactus acceptam tibi stipulationem fecerim, arbitratu iudicis, apud quem ex hoc edicto agitur, non solum illud continetur, ut in tua persona redintegretur obligatio, sed ut fideiussores quoque vel eosdem vel alios non minus idoneos adhibeas: praeterea ut et pignora quae dederas in eandem causam restituas.
That is true: if, by the act of the debtor applying fear, the sureties were released by acceptilation, it is possible also to proceed against the sureties, so that they be replaced in the obligation. If, compelled by fear by you, I have made to you an acceptilation of the stipulation, then, at the arbitrament of the judge before whom action is brought under this edict, not only is this included—that the obligation be renewed in your person—but also that you furnish sureties as well, either the same or others no less suitable; moreover, that you restore likewise the pledges which you had given for the same cause.
Quaeri poterit, an etiam ei qui vim fecerat passo vim restitui praetor velit per hoc edictum ea quae alienavit. et pomponius scribit libro vicensimo octavo non oportere ei praetorem opem ferre: nam cum liceat, inquit, vim vi repellere, quod fecit passus est. quare si metu te coegerit sibi promittere, mox ego eum coegero metu te accepto liberare, nihil esse quod ei restituatur.
It can be asked whether, even for one who had used force, when he has suffered force, the praetor would wish by this edict that there be restored the things which he alienated. And Pomponius writes in the twenty-eighth book that the praetor ought not to bring aid to him: for since it is permitted, he says, to repel force with force, what he did he has suffered. Wherefore, if he compelled you through fear to promise to him, and soon I compelled him through fear to release you by acceptilation, there is nothing that should be restored to him.
Exstat enim decretum divi marci in haec verba: " optimum est, ut, si quas putas te habere petitiones, actionibus experiaris. cum marcianus diceret: vim nullam feci, caesar dixit: tu vim putas esse solum, si homines vulnerentur ? vis est et tunc, quotiens quis id, quod deberi sibi putat, non per iudicem reposcit. quisquis igitur probatus mihi fuerit rem ullam debitoris vel pecuniam debitam non ab ipso sibi sponte datam sine ullo iudice temere possidere vel accepisse, isque sibi ius in eam rem dixisse: ius crediti non habebit " .
For there exists indeed a decree of the deified Marcus in these words: " it is best that, if you think you have any petitions, you should try them by actions. when marcianus was saying: I used no force, caesar said: do you think force is only if men are wounded ? force exists also then, whenever someone reclaims, not through a judge, that which he thinks is owed to him. therefore whoever shall have been proved before me to possess or to have received rashly, without any judge, any thing of a debtor or money owed, not given to him by the debtor himself voluntarily, and to have asserted a right to that thing for himself: he shall not have the right of credit " .
Si quis non restituat, in quadruplum in eum iudicium pollicetur: quadruplabitur autem omne quodcumque restitui oportuit. satis clementer cum reo praetor egit, ut daret ei restituendi facultatem, si vult poenam evitare. post annum vero in simplum actionem pollicetur, sed non semper, sed causa cognita.
If anyone does not restore, an action for fourfold is promised against him: moreover, whatever ought to have been restored will be quadrupled. The praetor acted quite clemently with the defendant, in that he gave him the faculty of restoring, if he wishes to evade the penalty. After a year, however, he promises an action for the simple amount, but not always, rather with the case having been cognized.
In causae autem cognitione versatur, ut, si alia actio non sit, tunc haec detur: et sane cum per metum facta iniuria anno et quidem utili exoleverit, idonea esse causa debet, ut post annum actio haec dari debeat. alia autem actio esse sic potest: si is cui vis admissa est decesserit, heres eius habet hereditatis petitionem, quoniam pro possessore qui vim intulit possidet: propter quod heredi non erit metus causa actio, quamvis, si annus largiretur, etiam heres in quadruplum experiri possit. ideo autem successoribus datur, quoniam et rei habet persecutionem.
In the examination of the cause the matter turns on this: that, if there is no other action, then this one is given; and indeed, since an injury done through fear lapses by a year—and indeed a “useful” one—there ought to be an adequate cause for this action to be granted after a year. Another action, however, can exist thus: if the person against whom force was employed has died, his heir has the petition of the inheritance, since the one who inflicted the force is in possession as possessor; for which reason the heir will not have the action on account of fear, although, if the year were granted, even the heir could proceed for the fourfold. And it is for this reason that it is given to successors, since it also has pursuit of the thing.
In hac actione non quaeritur, utrum is qui convenitur an alius metum fecit: sufficit enim hoc docere metum sibi illatum vel vim, et ex hac re eum qui convenitur, etsi crimine caret, lucrum tamen sensisse. nam cum metus habeat in se ignorantiam, merito quis non adstringitur ut designet, quis ei metum vel vim adhibuit: et ideo ad hoc tantum actor adstringitur, ut doceat metum in causa fuisse, ut alicui acceptam pecuniam faceret vel rem traderet vel quid aliud faceret. nec cuiquam iniquum videtur ex alieno facto alium in quadruplum condemnari, quia non statim quadrupli est actio, sed si res non restituatur.
In this action it is not inquired whether the one who is sued or someone else produced the fear: for it is sufficient to demonstrate this—that fear was brought upon him, or force; and from this that the one who is sued, although he is free of crime, has nevertheless derived profit. For since fear carries ignorance in itself, with good reason one is not constrained to designate who applied the fear or the force to him; and therefore the plaintiff is constrained only to this, to show that fear was the cause, so that he credited someone with money as received, or delivered a thing, or did something else. Nor does it seem unjust to anyone that one be condemned in the quadruple on account of another’s act, because the action is not immediately for the quadruple, but only if the thing is not restored.
Aliquando tamen et si metus adhibitus proponatur, arbitrium absolutionem adfert. quid enim si metum quidem titius adhibuit me non conscio, res autem ad me pervenit, et haec in rebus humanis non est sine dolo malo meo: nonne iudicis officio absolvar? aut si servus in fuga est, aeque, si cavero iudicis officio me, si in meam potestatem pervenerit, restituturum, absolvi debebo.
Sometimes, however, even if it is alleged that fear was employed, the arbitrium affords absolution. For what if indeed Titius employed fear without my being aware, yet the thing came to me, and this, in human affairs, is not attended by any dolus malus on my part: shall I not be absolved by the judge’s office? Or if the slave is in flight, likewise, if I shall give security by the judge’s office that, if he comes into my power, I will restore him, I ought to be absolved.
whence some think that a good‑faith purchaser buying from him who used force is not held liable, nor he who received by gift or to whom the thing has been bequeathed. but most correctly it seems to Vivianus that even these are held, lest the fear (duress) which I suffered be a snare to me. Pedius likewise, in Book 8, writes that the discretion of the judge in restoring the thing is of this sort: that he should order him who admitted the violence to restore, even if the thing has come to another; and also the one to whom it has come, even if another caused the fear (duress): for another’s fear ought not to be converted into someone else’s reward.
Sed et si quis per vim stipulatus, cum acceptum non faceret, fuerit in quadruplum condemnatus, ex stipulatu eum agentem adversus exceptionem replicatione adiuvari iulianus putat, cum in quadruplo et simplum sit reus consecutus. labeo autem etiam post quadrupli actionem nihilo minus exceptione summovendum eum, qui vim intulit, dicebat: quod cum durum videbatur, ita temperandum est, ut tam tripli condemnatione plectatur, quam acceptilationem omnimodo facere compellatur.
But also, if someone, having stipulated by force, and, since he did not grant an acquittance, has been condemned in fourfold, Julianus thinks that, when he sues on the stipulation, he is aided by a replication against the exception, since in the fourfold the defendant has obtained even the simple amount. Labeo, however, said that even after the fourfold action he who employed force should nonetheless be removed by the exception; which, since it seemed harsh, must be tempered thus: that he be punished both by a condemnation in triple, and be compelled in every way to make the acceptilation.
Quid si homo sine dolo malo et culpa eius, qui vim intulit et condemnatus est, periit? in hoc casu a rei condemnatione ideo relaxabitur, si intra tempora iudicati actionis moriatur, quia tripli poena propter facinus satisfacere cogitur. pro eo autem, qui in fuga esse dicitur, cautio ab eo extorquenda est, quatenus et persequatur et omnimodo eum restituat: et nihilominus in rem vel ad exhibendum vel si qua alia ei competit actio ad eum recipiendum integra ei qui vim passus est servabitur, ita ut, si dominus eum quoquo modo receperit, is qui ex stipulatione convenitur exceptione tutus fiat.
What if the man has perished without guileful intent (dolus malus) or fault on the part of him who inflicted the force and has been condemned? In this case he will for that reason be released from condemnation as defendant, if the man dies within the time for the actio iudicati, because he is compelled to satisfy the triple penalty on account of the crime (facinus). But for one who is said to be in flight, a security (cautio) must be exacted from him, to the extent that he both pursue him and in every way restore him; and nonetheless the real action (in rem) or the action for production (ad exhibendum), or if any other action is competent to him for receiving him back, will be kept intact for him who has suffered the violence, with the result that, if the master shall in any way have received him, the one who is sued on the stipulation becomes safe by a defense (exceptio).
these things if after condemnation: but if before judgment a man, without fraud or fault, has died, he will be liable, and this is effected by these words of the edict: " neque ea res at the arbitrament of the judge will be restored". therefore, if a slave be in flight without fraud or fault of him against whom action is brought, security must be exacted by the judge, that, having pursued that slave, he return him. but also, if the absence was not through the fault of him against whom action is brought, nevertheless, if the thing would not have perished had he not applied fear, the defendant will be liable: as is observed in the interdict “whence by force” or “because by force or secretly.” accordingly, the price of a dead man is sometimes recovered by him who would have sold him, if he had not suffered violence.
Secundum haec si plures metum adhibuerint et unus fuerit conventus, si quidem sponte rem ante sententiam restituerit, omnes liberati sunt: sed et si id non fecerit, sed ex sententia quadruplum restituerit, verius est etiam sic peremi adversus ceteros metus causa actionem.
Accordingly, if several have employed fear and one has been convened, if indeed he has voluntarily restored the thing before judgment, all are freed; but even if he has not done that, but has restored the quadruple by judgment, the truer view is that even so the action on account of fear is extinguished against the others.
Sed si servi metum adhibuerint, noxalis quidem actio ipsorum nomine erit, poterit autem quis dominum ad quem res pervenerit convenire: qui conventus sive rem sive secundum quod iam dictum est quadruplum praestiterit, proderit et servis. si vero noxali conventus maluerit noxae dedere, nihilo minus ipse poterit conveniri, si ad eum res pervenit.
But if slaves have employed fear, a noxal action indeed will be in their name; however, one may proceed against the master to whom the thing has come: and the one sued, whether he has rendered the thing or, as has already been said, the quadruple, it will also be to the slaves’ benefit. But if, when sued noxally, he has preferred to surrender them for the wrong (to deliver them in noxa), nonetheless he himself can be proceeded against, if the thing has come to him.
Haec actio heredi ceterisque successoribus datur, quoniam rei habet persecutionem. in heredem autem et ceteros in id, quod pervenit ad eos, datur non immerito: licet enim poena ad heredem non transeat, attamen quod turpiter vel scelere quaesitum est, ut est et rescriptum, ad compendium heredis non debet pertinere.
This action is given to the heir and the other successors, since it has the pursuit of the thing. But against the heir and the others it is given to the extent that there has come to them, not without reason: for although the penalty does not pass to the heir, nevertheless what has been acquired disgracefully or by crime, as is also set out in a rescript, ought not to pertain to the heir’s profit.
Videamus ergo, si heres, ad quem aliquid pervenerit, consumpserit id quod pervenit, an desinat teneri, an vero sufficit semel pervenisse? et, si consumpto eo decesserit, utrum adversus heredem eius omnimodo competit actio, quoniam hereditariam suscepit obligationem, an non sit danda, quoniam ad secundum heredem nihil pervenit? et melius est omnimodo competere in heredem heredis actionem: sufficit enim semel pervenisse ad proximum heredem, et perpetua actio esse coepit: alioquin dicendum erit nec ipsum, qui consumpsit quod ad eum pervenit, teneri.
Let us see therefore, if an heir, to whom something has come, has consumed that which has come, whether he ceases to be held, or indeed whether it suffices that it has once come? and, if after consuming it he has deceased, whether the action lies in every way against his heir, since he assumed a hereditary obligation, or should not be given, since nothing has come to the second heir? and it is better that in every way the action lie against the heir of the heir: for it suffices that it has once come to the next heir, and the action has begun to be perpetual; otherwise it will have to be said that not even he himself, who consumed what came to him, is held.
Si ipsa res, quae ad alium pervenit, interiit, non esse locupletiorem dicemus: sin vero in pecuniam aliamve rem conversa sit, nihil amplius quaerendum est, quis exitus sit, sed omnimodo locuples factus videtur, licet postea deperdat. nam et imperator titus antoninus claudio frontino de pretiis rerum hereditarium rescripsit ob id ipsum peti ab eo hereditatem posse, quia licet res quae in hereditate fuerant apud eum non sint, tamen pretium earum quo, locupletem eum vel saepius mutata specie faciendo, perinde obligat, ac si corpora ipsa in eadem specie mansissent.
If the very thing which came to another has perished, we will say that he is not more enriched; but if it has been converted into money or into some other thing, nothing further needs to be asked as to what the outcome is, but in every way he is considered to have been made enriched, even if he later loses it. For the Emperor Titus Antoninus also wrote back to Claudius Frontinus concerning the prices/values of things of an inheritance that on that very ground the inheritance can be claimed from him, because although the things which had been in the inheritance are not with him, nevertheless their price, which, making him enriched—even with the form repeatedly changed—obligates him to the same effect as if the very bodies had remained in the same form.
Quantum autem ad heredem pervenerit, litis contestatae tempore spectabitur, si modo certum sit aliquid pervenisse. idem et si ipsius qui vim intulit sic in corpus patrimonii pervenit aliquid, ut certum sit ad heredem perventurum, id est si debitor liberatus est.
But as to how much has come to the heir, it will be examined at the time of the litis contestatio, provided only that it is certain that something has come. The same [holds] also if something has thus come into the corpus of the patrimony of the very person who employed force, such that it is certain it will come to the heir—that is, if a debtor has been released.
Si mulier contra patronum suum ingrata facta sciens se ingratam, cum de suo statu periclitabatur, aliquid patrono dederit vel promiserit, ne in servitutem redigatur: cessat edictum, quia hunc sibi metum ipsa infert.
If a woman, having made herself ungrateful against her patron, knowing herself to be ungrateful, when she was in peril concerning her status, has given or promised something to the patron so that she not be reduced into servitude: the edict does not operate, because she herself brings this fear upon herself.
Qui possessionem non sui fundi tradidit, non quanti fundus, sed quanti possessio est, eius quadruplum vel simplum cum fructibus consequetur: aestimatur enim quod restitui oportet, id est quod abest: abest autem nuda possessio cum suis fructibus. quod et pomponius.
He who has delivered possession of an estate not his own—there will be recovered not the value of the estate, but the value of the possession, fourfold or single, together with the fruits: for what must be restored is assessed, that is, what is lacking; what is lacking, however, is the bare possession with its fruits. Which Pomponius also.
Si metu coactus sim ab emptione locatione discedere, videndum est, an nihil sit acti et antiqua obligatio remaneat, an hoc simile sit acceptilationi, quia nulla ex bonae fidei obligatione possimus niti, cum finita sit dum amittitur: et magis est ut similis species acceptilationis sit, et ideo praetoria actio nascitur.
If I have been compelled by fear to withdraw from a purchase or a lease, it must be considered whether nothing has been effected and the prior obligation remains, or whether this is similar to an acceptilation, because we can rely on no obligation of good faith, since it is terminated when it is relinquished: and the more correct view is that it is a kind similar to an acceptilation, and therefore a praetorian action arises.
Non est verisimile compulsum in urbe inique indebitum solvisse eum, qui claram dignitatem se habere praetendebat, cum potuerit ius publicum invocare et adire aliquem potestate praeditum, qui utique vim eum pati prohibuisset: sed huiusmodi praesumptioni debet apertissimas probationes violentiae opponere.
It is not plausible that one who professed that he possessed illustrious dignity, having been compelled within the city, unjustly paid what was not owed, since he could have invoked the public law and approached someone endowed with authority, who would certainly have prevented him from suffering violence: but to a presumption of this kind he ought to oppose the most manifest proofs of violence.
Si quis, quod adversario non debebat, delegante eo per vim, apparitione praesidis interveniente, sine notione iudicis, coactus est dare, iudex inciviliter extorta restitui ab eo, qui rei damnum praestiterit, iubeat. quod si debitis satisfecit simplici iussione et non cognitione habita, quamvis non extra ordinem exactionem fieri, sed civiliter oportuit, tamen quae solutioni debitarum ab eo quantitatium profecerunt, revocare incivile est.
If anyone, for what he did not owe to his adversary, was compelled to give—at that man’s delegation, by force, with the governor’s apparitors intervening—without the judge’s cognizance, the judge should order that what was extorted contrary to civil procedure be restored by the one who has inflicted damage upon the defendant. But if he satisfied debts by a simple order and not after a hearing, although the exaction ought not to have been made extra ordinem but by civil process, nevertheless it is contrary to civil procedure to revoke those things which have gone toward the payment of the amounts owed by him.
Dolum malum servius quidem ita definiit machinationem quandam alterius decipiendi causa, cum aliud simulatur et aliud agitur. labeo autem posse et sine simulatione id agi, ut quis circumveniatur: posse et sine dolo malo aliud agi, aliud simulari, sicuti faciunt, qui per eiusmodi dissimulationem deserviant et tuentur vel sua vel aliena: itaque ipse sic definiit dolum malum esse omnem calliditatem fallaciam machinationem ad circumveniendum fallendum decipiendum alterum adhibitam. labeonis definitio vera est.
Malicious deceit servius indeed thus defined as a certain machination for the purpose of deceiving another, when one thing is simulated and another is done. labeo, however, says that it can also be done without simulation, that someone be circumvented; and that, without malicious deceit, one thing can be done, another simulated, just as those do who by such dissimulation render service and protect either their own or another’s. And so he himself thus defined malicious deceit to be every cleverness, fallacy, machination applied to circumventing, misleading, deceiving another. labeo’s definition is true.
Ait praetor: " si de his rebus alia actio non erit. " merito praetor ita demum hanc actionem pollicetur, si alia non sit, quoniam famosa actio non temere debuit a praetore decerni, si sit civilis vel honoraria, qua possit experiri: usque adeo, ut et pedius libro octavo scribit, etiam si interdictum sit quo quis experiri, vel exceptio qua se tueri possit, cessare hoc edictum. idem et pomponius libro vicensimo octavo: et adicit, et si stipulatione tutus sit quis, eum actionem de dolo habere non posse, ut puta si de dolo stipulatum sit.
The praetor says: “if concerning these matters there will be no other action.” With good reason the praetor promises this action only if there is no other, since an infaming action ought not lightly to be decreed by the praetor, if there is a civil or honorary one by which a person can proceed: indeed, as Pedius writes in book 8, even if there is an interdict by which someone may proceed, or an exception by which he can protect himself, this edict falls away. The same also from Pomponius in book 28; and he adds that, if someone is secure by a stipulation, he cannot have an action for dolus, for instance if one has stipulated concerning dolus.
Idem pomponius ait et si actionem in nos dari non oporteat, veluti si stipulatio tam turpis dolo malo facta sit, ut nemo daturus sit ex ea actionem, non debere laborare, ut habeam de dolo malo actionem, cum nemo sit adversus me daturus actionem.
The same Pomponius says that even if an action ought not to be granted against us—for example, if a stipulation has been made so disgraceful by malicious fraud that no one would grant an action on it—we ought not to labor to have an action for malicious fraud, since no one is going to grant an action against me.
Idem pomponius refert labeonem existimare, etiam si quis in integrum restitui possit, non debere ei hanc actionem competere: et si alia actio tempore finita sit, hanc competere non debere, sibi imputaturo eo qui agere supersedit: nisi in hoc quoque dolus malus admissus sit ut tempus exiret.
The same Pomponius reports that Labeo thinks that, even if someone can be restored in integrum, this action ought not to lie for him; and if another action has been ended by time, this one ought not to lie, for the one who refrained from suing must impute it to himself—unless in this too dolus malus was admitted so that the time might run out.
Ideoque si quis pupillus a titio, tutore auctore colludente, circumscriptus sit, non debere eum de dolo actionem adversus titium habere, cum habeat tutelae actionem, per quam consequatur quod sua intersit. plane si tutor solvendo non sit, dicendum erit de dolo actionem dari ei.
And therefore, if any ward has been overreached by Titius, his tutor giving authorization and colluding, he ought not to have an action for fraud against Titius, since he has the action on guardianship, through which he may recover what is to his interest. Clearly, if the tutor is not solvent, it must be said that an action for fraud is granted to him.
Et eleganter pomponius haec verba " si alia actio non sit" sic excipit, quasi res alio modo ei ad quem ea res pertinet salva esse non poterit. nec videtur huic sententiae adversari, quod iulianus libro quarto scribit, si minor annis viginti quinque consilio servi circumscriptus eum vendidit cum peculio emptorque eum manumisit, dandam in manumissum de dolo actionem ( hoc enim sic accipimus carere dolo emptorem, ut ex empto teneri non possit) aut nullam esse venditionem, si in hoc ipso ut venderet circumscriptus est. et quod minor proponitur, non inducit in integrum restitutionem: nam adversus manumissum nulla in integrum restitutio potest locum habere.
and elegantly pomponius takes up these words " if there is no other action" thus, as if the thing could not otherwise be kept safe for him to whom that thing pertains. nor does what iulianus writes in the fourth book seem to be opposed to this opinion: if a person under twenty-five years, overreached by the counsel of a slave, sold him with his peculium and the purchaser manumitted him, a de dolo action is to be given against the manumitted ( for we thus understand it that the purchaser is free from fraud, so that he cannot be held ex empto) or that the sale is null, if in this very point—that he should sell—he was overreached. and the fact that a minor is put forward does not induce in integrum restitution: for against one manumitted no in integrum restitution can have place.
Non solum autem si alia actio non sit, sed et si dubitetur an alia sit, putat labeo de dolo dandam actionem et adfert talem speciem. qui servum mihi debebat vel ex venditione vel ex stipulatu, venenum ei dedit et sic eum tradidit: vel fundum, et dum tradit, imposuit ei servitutem vel aedificia diruit, arbores excidit vel extirpavit: ait labeo, sive cavit de dolo sive non, dandam in eum de dolo actionem, quoniam si cavit, dubium est, an competat ex stipulatu actio. sed est verius, si quidem de dolo cautum est, cessare actionem de dolo, quoniam est ex stipulatu actio: si non est cautum, in ex empto quidem actione cessat de dolo actio, quoniam est ex empto, in ex stipulatu de dolo actio necessaria est.
Not only, moreover, if there is no other action, but even if it is doubtful whether there is another, Labeo thinks an action for fraud (actio de dolo) should be given, and he adduces such a pattern: someone who owed me a slave either from a sale or from a stipulation gave him poison and so delivered him; or he owed me a farm, and while delivering it he imposed a servitude upon it, or tore down the buildings, or cut down or extirpated the trees. Labeo says that, whether he gave a guaranty against fraud or not, an action for fraud should be given against him, since, if he did give it, it is doubtful whether an action from stipulation (ex stipulatu) is available. But the truer view is this: if provision regarding fraud has indeed been made, the action for fraud ceases, since there is an action from stipulation; if no provision has been made, then in the action on purchase (ex empto) the action for fraud does cease, since there is an action ex empto, but in an action from stipulation the action for fraud is necessary.
Item si servum legatum heres ante aditam hereditatem occiderit, quoniam priusquam factus sit legatarii, interemptus est, cessat legis aquiliae actio: de dolo autem actio, quocumque tempore eum occiderit, cessat, quia ex testamento actio competit.
Likewise, if the heir kills a slave that has been bequeathed before the inheritance is entered upon, since he was slain before he became the legatee’s, the action of the Lex Aquilia does not lie; but the action for dolus, at whatever time he killed him, likewise does not lie, because an action ex testamento is available.
Si quadrupes tua dolo alterius damnum mihi dederit, quaeritur, an de dolo habeam adversus eum actionem. et placuit mihi, quod labeo scribit, si dominus quadrupedis non sit solvendo, dari debere de dolo, quamvis, si noxae deditio sit secuta, non puto dandam nec in id quod excedit.
If your quadruped, by another’s fraud, has caused me damage, the question is raised whether I have an action for fraud against him. And I approve what Labeo writes: if the owner of the quadruped is not solvent, an action for fraud ought to be given; although, if a noxal surrender has followed, I do not think it should be given, not even for what exceeds.
Idem labeo quaerit, si compeditum servum meum ut fugeret solveris, an de dolo actio danda sit? et ait quintus apud eum notans: si non misericordia ductus fecisti, furti teneris: si misericordia, in factum actionem dari debere.
The same Labeo asks whether, if you released my slave who was in fetters so that he might flee, an action on deceit ought to be granted? And Quintus, noting this in his work on him, says: if you did it not led by mercy, you are liable for theft; if led by mercy, an in factum action ought to be granted.
Servus pactionis pro libertate reum domino dedit ea condicione, ut post libertatem transferatur in eum obligatio: manumissus non patitur in se obligationem transferri. pomponius scribit locum habere de dolo actionem. sed si per patronum stabit, quo minus obligatio transferatur, dicendum ait patronum exceptione a reo summovendum.
A slave, by a pact for liberty, delivered a defendant to his master on this condition: that after liberty the obligation be transferred onto himself; once manumitted, he does not allow the obligation to be transferred onto himself. Pomponius writes that an action on account of dolus (fraud) lies. But if it is owing to the patron that the obligation is not transferred, he says the patron is to be removed by an exception raised by the defendant.
I am moved: how will an action for fraud be given, since there is another action? Unless perhaps someone should say that, since the patron can be removed by an exception if he brings suit against the defendant, it ought to be said that, as though there were no action that is repelled by an exception, a de dolo action should be decreed; but indeed the patron is then removed if he is unwilling to accept the expromissor, namely the manumitted man himself. Clearly, a de dolo action ought to be given to the expromissor against the manumitted man; or, if the expromissor is not solvent, it will be given to the master.
Si dolo malo procurator passus sit vincere adversarium meum, ut absolveretur, an de dolo mihi actio adversus eum qui vicit competat, potest quaeri. et puto non competere, si paratus sit reus transferre iudicium sub exceptione hac " si collusum est": alioquin de dolo actio erit danda, scilicet si cum procuratore agi non possit, quia non esset solvendo.
If by malicious fraud the procurator has allowed my adversary to win, so that he might be acquitted, it can be asked whether an action on fraud lies for me against the one who won. And I think it does not lie, if the defendant is prepared to transfer the case under this exception, " si collusum est": otherwise an action on fraud is to be granted, namely if one cannot proceed against the procurator, because he would not be solvent.
Labeo libro trigensimo septimo posteriorum scribit, si oleum tuum quasi suum defendat titius, et tu hoc oleum deposueris apud seium, ut is hoc venderet et pretium servaret, donec inter vos deiudicetur cuius oleum esset, neque titius velit iudicium accipere: quoniam neque mandati neque sequestraria seium convenire potes nondum impleta condicione depositionis, de dolo adversus titium agendum. sed pomponius libro vicensimo septimo posse cum sequestre praescriptis verbis actione agi, vel si is solvendo non sit, cum titio de dolo. quae distinctio vera esse videtur.
Labeo in the thirty-seventh book of the Later Writings writes: if Titius defends your oil as though it were his own, and you have deposited this oil with Seius, that he should sell it and keep the price until it is adjudicated between you whose oil it is, and Titius is unwilling to accept the trial: since you cannot proceed against Seius either by the action on mandate or by the sequester-action, the condition of the deposit not yet having been fulfilled, an action for fraud must be brought against Titius. But Pomponius in the twenty-seventh book says that one can proceed against the sequester by the action with prescribed words; or, if he is not solvent, then against Titius by an action for fraud. This distinction seems to be true.
Haec de dolo actio noxalis erit: ideo labeo quoque libro trigensimo praetoris peregrini scribit de dolo actionem servi nomine interdum de peculio, interdum noxalem dari. nam si ea res est, in quam dolus commissus est, ex qua de peculio daretur actio, et nunc in peculio dandam: sin vero ea sit, ex qua noxalis, hoc quoque noxale futurum.
This actio de dolo will be noxal: therefore Labeo also, in the thirtieth book On the Peregrine Praetor, writes that an action for dolus in the slave’s name is sometimes granted de peculio, sometimes as noxal. For if the matter in which the dolus was committed is one from which an action de peculio would be given, then now too it should be given de peculio; but if rather it is one from which a noxal action would be given, this too will be noxal.
Et quibusdam personis non dabitur, ut puta liberis vel libertis adversus parentes patronosve, cum sit famosa. sed nec humili adversus eum qui dignitate excellet debet dari: puta plebeio adversus consularem receptae auctoritatis, vel luxurioso atque prodigo aut alias vili adversus hominem vitae emendatioris. et ita labeo.
And to certain persons it will not be given, for instance to children or freedmen against parents or patrons, since it is an infaming action. Nor ought it be given to a humble person against one who excels in dignity: for example, to a plebeian against a consular of acknowledged authority, or to a luxurious and prodigal person or otherwise base against a man of more amended life. And so Labeo.
Item in causae cognitione versari labeo ait, ne in pupillum de dolo detur actio, nisi forte nomine hereditario conveniatur. ego arbitror et ex suo dolo conveniendum, si proximus pubertati est, maxime si locupletior ex hoc factus est.
Likewise, Labeo says that, in the cognition of the cause, an action on dolus is not to be given against a pupil (minor), unless perhaps he is sued in the name of an inheritance. I judge that he also is to be convened on account of his own dolus, if he is nearest to puberty, especially if he has been made more wealthy from this.
Sed an in municipes de dolo detur actio, dubitatur. et puto ex suo quidem dolo non posse dari: quid enim municipes dolo facere possunt? sed si quid ad eos pervenit ex dolo eorum, qui res eorum administrant, puto dandam.
But whether an action on account of dolus may be granted against the municipes is doubted. And I think that it cannot be granted for their own dolus: for what, indeed, can municipes do by dolus? But if anything has come to them from the dolus of those who administer their affairs, I think it should be granted.
Arbitrio iudicis in hac quoque actione restitutio comprehenditur: et nisi fiat restitutio, sequitur condemnatio quanti ea res est. ideo autem et hic et in metus causa actione certa quantitas non adicitur, ut possit per contumaciam suam tanti reus condemnari, quanti actor in litem iuraverit: sed officio iudicis debet in utraque actione taxatione iusiurandum refrenari.
At the discretion of the judge, in this action also restitution is comprehended: and unless restitution is made, condemnation follows for as much as the thing is worth. For this reason too, both here and in the action on account of fear, no fixed quantity is added, so that through his contumacy the defendant may be condemned in as much as the plaintiff has sworn into the suit; but by the judge’s office the oath in each action ought to be restrained by a taxation (assessment).
De eo qui sciens commodasset pondera, ut venditor emptori merces adpenderet, trebatius de dolo dabat actionem. atquin si maiora pondera commodavit, id quod amplius mercis datum est repeti condictione potest, si minora, ut reliqua merx detur ex empto agi potest: nisi si ea condictione merx venit, ut illis ponderibus traderetur, cum ille decipiendi causa adfirmasset se aequa pondera habere.
Concerning one who knowingly lent weights so that a seller might weigh out goods to a buyer, Trebatius granted an action for fraud. And yet, if he lent heavier weights, that by which more of the goods was given can be recovered by a condictio; if lighter, it can be sued for ex empto that the remaining goods be delivered—unless the goods were sold on this condition, that they be handed over by those weights, when he, for the purpose of deceiving, had affirmed that he had equal (just) weights.
Dolo cuius effectum est, ut lis temporibus legitimis transactis pereat: trebatius ait de dolo dandum iudicium, non ut arbitrio iudicis res restituatur, sed ut tantum actor consequatur, quanti eius interfuerit id non esse factum, ne aliter observantibus lex circumscribatur.
By whose dolus the effect is that a suit perishes with the lawful time-limits having elapsed: Trebatius says that an action on dolus should be granted, not so that the thing be restored at the arbitrament of the judge, but so that the plaintiff obtain only as much as it was in his interest that this not be done, lest the law be circumvented to the prejudice of those who observe it.
Servus tuus cum tibi deberet nec solvendo esset, hortatu tuo pecuniam mutuam a me accepit et tibi solvit: labeo ait de dolo malo actionem in te dandam, quia nec de peculio utilis sit, cum in peculio nihil sit, nec in rem domini versum videatur, cum ob debitum dominus acceperit.
Your slave, when he owed you and was not solvent, at your instigation received a loan of money from me and paid you: Labeo says that an action for dolus malus is to be given against you, because neither would the useful action de peculio lie, since there is nothing in the peculium, nor does it seem to have been turned to the master’s account, since the master received it on account of a debt.
Quod si deferente me iuraveris et absolutus sis, postea periurium fuerit adprobatum, labeo ait de dolo actionem in eum dandam: pomponius autem per iusiurandum transactum videri, quam sententiam et Marcellus libro octavo digestorum probat: stari enim religioni debet.
But if, upon my tendering the oath, you have sworn and have been absolved, and afterward perjury is proven, Labeo says that an action for deceit should be given against him; Pomponius, however, holds that the matter appears to have been settled by the oath, which opinion Marcellus also approves in the eighth book of the Digesta: for the sanctity of the oath ought to be adhered to.
Si legatarius, cui supra modum legis falcidiae legatum est, heredi adhuc ignoranti substantiam hereditatis ultro iurando vel quadam alia fallacia persuaserit, tamquam satis abundeque ad solida legata solvenda sufficiat hereditas, atque eo modo solida legata fuerit consecutus: datur de dolo actio.
If a legatee, to whom a legacy has been left beyond the measure of the Lex Falcidia, has persuaded the heir—still ignorant of the substance of the inheritance—by taking an oath of his own accord or by some other deceit, as though the inheritance were sufficient and more than enough to pay the legacies in full (in solidum), and in that way has obtained the legacies in full: an action for fraud (de dolo) is granted.
Si dolo acciderit eius, qui verba faciebat pro eo, qui de libertate contendebat, quo minus praesente adversario secundum libertatem pronuntietur, puto statim de dolo dandam in eum actionem, quia semel pro libertate dictam sententiam retractari non oportet.
If by the fraud of him who was speaking on behalf of the one contending for liberty it has come about that a pronouncement in favor of liberty is made without the adversary being present, I think an action for fraud should at once be given against him, because a sentence once spoken for liberty ought not to be retracted.
Cum a te pecuniam peterem eoque nomine iudicium acceptum est, falso mihi persuasisti, tamquam eam pecuniam servo meo aut procuratori solvisses, eoque modo consecutus es, ut consentiente me absolveris: quaerentibus nobis, an in te doli iudicium dari debeat, placuit de dolo actionem non dari, quia alio modo mihi succurri potest: nam ex integro agere possum et si obiciatur exceptio rei iudicatae, replicatione iure uti potero.
When I was seeking money from you and on that ground an action was taken up, you falsely persuaded me, as though you had paid that money to my slave or to my procurator, and in that way you achieved that, with my consenting, you were absolved. As we inquire whether an action for dolus ought to be granted against you, it was resolved that an action for dolus is not to be given, because I can be succored in another way: for I can sue afresh (ex integro), and if the exceptio of res judicata is objected, I will be able to use the replication in law.
Itaque si accepto lata sit tibi pecunia, omnimodo cum herede tuo agetur. at si res tibi tradita sit, si quidem mortuo te ea res extitit, agetur cum herede tuo, si minus, non agetur. sed utique in heredem perpetuo dabitur, quia non debet lucrari ex alieno damno.
Therefore, if money has been paid to you and received, in every case action will be brought against your heir. But if a thing has been delivered to you, then if, you having died, that thing still existed, action will be brought against your heir; if not, it will not be brought. But at any rate an action will be given perpetually against the heir, because he ought not to profit from another’s loss.
Filius legatum sibi servum per praeceptionem rogatus manumittere post certum tempus, posteaquam rationes ipsi et coheredibus fratribus reddidisset, ante diem et ante redditas rationes ad libertatem vindicta manumittendo perduxerat: quaesitum est, an ex fideicommisso fratribus tenetur, ut rationes eorum pro portionibus redderet. respondi, cum liberum fecisset, ex causa quidem fideicommissi non teneri: verum si ideo properasset manumittere, ne rationes fratribus redderet, posse de dolo actionem in eum exercere.
A son, having been asked to manumit a slave bequeathed to him by preemption (legatum per praeceptionem) after a fixed time—after he had rendered accounts to him and to his brothers, the coheirs—before the day and before the accounts were rendered, had led him to freedom by manumission by the vindicta. It was asked whether he is held from the fideicommissum to the brothers, to render the accounts to them according to their shares. I replied that, since he made him free, he is not held on the ground of the fideicommissum; but if he hastened to manumit for this reason, so as not to render accounts to the brothers, an action of fraud (actio de dolo) can be brought against him.
Quidam debitor epistulam quasi a titio mitti creditori suo effecit, ut ipse liberetur: hac epistula creditor deceptus aquiliana stipulatione et acceptilatione liberavit debitorem: postea epistula falsa vel inani reperta creditor maior quidem annis viginti quinque de dolo habebit actionem, minor autem in integrum restituetur.
A certain debtor contrived that a letter be sent to his creditor as if by Titius, so that he himself might be released: by this letter the creditor, deceived, by an Aquilian stipulation and acceptilation released the debtor: afterwards, the letter having been found false or void, the creditor who is over twenty-five years old will have an action for fraud (actio de dolo), but a minor will be restored in integrum.
Si te titio optuleris de ea re quam non possidebas in hoc ut alius usucapiat, et iudicatum solvi satisdederis: quamvis absolutus sis, de dolo malo tamen teneberis: et ita sabino placet.
If you have offered yourself to Titius concerning a matter which you did not possess, for the purpose that another may acquire it by usucapion, and you have furnished surety that the judgment be paid: although you have been acquitted, nevertheless you will be held liable for malicious fraud; and so it pleases Sabinus.
Hoc edictum praetor naturalem aequitatem secutus proposuit, quo tutelam minorum suscepit. nam cum inter omnes constet fragile esse et infirmum huiusmodi aetatium consilium et multis captionibus suppositum, multorum insidiis expositum: auxilium eis praetor hoc edicto pollicitus est et adversus captiones opitulationem.
This edict the praetor, following natural equity, published, whereby he undertook the guardianship of minors. For since it is agreed among all that the judgment of ages of this sort is fragile and feeble and subjected to many captious devices, exposed to the snares of many, the praetor by this edict promised them aid and assistance against such captious devices.
Si quis cum minore contraxerit et contractus inciderit in tempus quo maior efficitur: utrum initium spectamus an finem? et placet, ut est et constitutum, si quis maior factus comprobaverit, quod minor gesserat, restitutionem cessare. unde illud non ineleganter celsus epistularum libro undecimo et digestorum secundo tractat, ex facto a flavio respecto praetore consultus.
If someone has contracted with a minor, and the contract falls into the time when he becomes of full age: do we look to the beginning or to the end? And it is the accepted view, as it has also been established, that if someone, after becoming of full age, has ratified what he had transacted as a minor, restitution ceases. Whence Celsus treats that point not inelegantly in the eleventh book of his Letters and the second of his Digesta, having been consulted on a case by the praetor Flavius Respectus.
a minor under 25 years, perhaps being 24 years of age, had brought the action of guardianship against the heir of his tutor: soon it happened that (with the trial not finished, now he having become of full age at 25 years) the tutor’s heir was proposed for acquittal: restitution in integrum was desired. Celsus therefore advised Respectus not easily to restore this onetime minor in integrum, but only if it were proved to him that by the adversary’s cunning this had been contrived, namely that, he having become of full age, the adversary would be freed: for, says he, it is not only on the last day of the trial that this minor appears to have been deceived, but the whole affair was structured so that, he having become of full age, the adversary would be freed. He nevertheless admits the same, that if the suspicion be slighter that the adversary acted as though with dolus, this man ought not to be restored in integrum.
Scio etiam illud aliquando incidisse. minor viginti quinque annis miscuerat se paternae hereditati maiorque factus exegerat aliquid a debitoribus paternis, mox desiderabat restitui in integrum, quo magis abstineret paterna hereditate: contradicebatur ei, quasi maior factus comprobasset, quod minori sibi placuit: putavimus tamen restituendum in integrum initio inspecto. idem puto, et si alienam adiit hereditatem.
I also know that this too has sometimes occurred. A minor under twenty-five years had involved himself in his paternal inheritance, and, having become of full age, had exacted something from the father’s debtors; soon he desired to be restored in integrum, so that he might the more abstain from the paternal inheritance: objection was made to him, as though, having become of full age, he had confirmed what had pleased him as a minor: nevertheless we thought that he should be restored in integrum, the inception having been inspected. I think the same, even if he entered upon an alien inheritance.
Minorem autem viginti quinque annis natu videndum, an etiam die natalis sui adhuc dicimus ante horam qua natus est, ut si captus sit restituatur? et cum nondum compleverit, ita erit dicendum, ut a momento in momentum tempus spectetur. proinde et si bissexto natus est, sive priore sive posteriore die celsus scripsit nihil referre: nam id biduum pro uno die habetur et posterior dies kalendarum intercalatur.
But as to one younger by birth than twenty-five years, it must be considered whether even on his birthday we still say, before the hour at which he was born, that, if he has been overreached, he is to be restored; and since he has not yet completed it, it must be said thus, that time is to be regarded from moment to moment. Accordingly, even if he was born in a bissextile year, Celsus wrote that it makes no difference whether on the earlier or the later day: for that two-day span is held as one day, and the later day before the Kalends is the intercalated one.
Sed utrum solis patribus familiarum an etiam filiis familiarum succurri debeat, videndum. movet dubitationem, quod, si quis dixerit etiam filiis familiarum in re peculiari subveniendum, efficiet, ut per eos etiam maioribus subveniatur, id est patribus eorum: quod nequaquam fuit praetori propositum: praetor enim minoribus auxilium promisit, non maioribus. ego autem verissimam arbitror sententiam existimantium, filium familias minorem annis in integrum restitui posse ex his solis causis quae ipsius intersint, puta si sit obligatus.
But whether relief ought to be given only to patres familiarum or also to filii familiarum must be considered. A doubt is stirred because, if someone should say that even to filii familiarum relief must be afforded in a peculium matter, he will bring it about that through them relief is afforded even to the maiores, that is, to their fathers—which was by no means the praetor’s purpose: for the praetor promised aid to minors, not to maiores. I, however, judge truest the opinion of those who consider that a filius familias, a minor in years, can be restored in full only for those causes which concern himself, for instance if he is obligated.
Accordingly, if he has been bound by his father’s order, the father can of course be sued for the whole; but the son too can be sued, either while remaining under paternal power, or even, if emancipated or disinherited, to the extent that he can perform—and indeed, while in paternal power, he can be sued even against the father’s will on the basis of a judgment: he ought to obtain relief if he himself is sued. But whether this relief also benefits the father, as it sometimes is wont to benefit his surety, let us consider: and I do not think it will benefit him. Therefore, if the son is sued, let him request relief; if the creditor sues the father, the relief ceases—except in the case of the giving of a mutuum: for in this case, if by his father’s order he received money by way of mutuum, he is not helped.
accordingly also if he has contracted without the father’s order and has been taken in execution, if indeed the father is sued de peculio, the son will not be restored; if the son is sued, he can be restored. nor are we moved by this, as though it were to the son’s interest to have a peculium: for it is more to the father’s than to the son’s interest, although in some case the peculium may pertain to the son: for example, if his father’s goods have been seized by the fisc on account of a debt: for the peculium is separated for him by the constitution of Claudius.
Ergo etiam filiam familias in dote captam, dum patri consentit stipulanti dotem non statim quam dedit, vel adhibenti aliquem qui dotem stipularetur, puto restituendam, quoniam dos ipsius filiae proprium patrimonium est.
Therefore even a daughter-in-power, taken in with respect to the dowry, while she consents to her father’s stipulating for the dowry not immediately upon his having given it, or to his bringing in someone who would stipulate the dowry, I think must be restored, since the dowry is the daughter’s own patrimony.
Si quid minori fuerit filio familias legatum post mortem patris vel fideicommissum relictum et captus est, forte dum consentit patri paciscenti, ne legatum peteretur: potest dici in integrum restituendum, quoniam ipsius interest propter spem legati, quod ei post mortem patris competit. sed et si ei legatum sit aliquid quod personae eius cohaeret, puta ius militiae, dicendum est posse eum restitui in integrum: interfuit enim eius non capi, cum hanc patri non adquireret, sed ipse haberet.
If anything has been left by legacy to a minor filius familias after the death of his father or a fideicommissum has been left, and he has been taken in, perhaps while he consents to his father making a pact that the legacy should not be demanded: it can be said that he is to be restored in integrum, since it is to his interest on account of the hope of the legacy, which accrues to him after his father’s death. But also if something has been bequeathed to him which coheres to his person, for instance the right of military service (ius militiae), it must be said that he can be restored in integrum: for it was to his interest not to be taken in, since he would not acquire this for his father, but would have it himself.
Et si heres sit institutus, si a patre in diebus centum sit emancipatus: mox patrem debuerit certiorare nec fecerit cum posset: qui eum emancipasset, si cognovisset: dicendum erit posse eum restitui in integrum parato patre eum emancipare.
And if he has been instituted heir, if within one hundred days he has been emancipated by his father: he ought forthwith to have informed his father and did not do so when he could: the one who had emancipated him, if he had known: it must be said that he can obtain restitutio in integrum, with the father ready to emancipate him.
Servus autem minor annis viginti quinque nullo modo restitui poterit, quoniam domini persona spectatur, qui sibi debebit imputare, cur minori rem commisit. quare et si per impuberem contraxerit, idem erit dicendum, ut et Marcellus libro secundo digestorum scribit. et si forte libera peculii administratio minori servo sit concessa, maior dominus ex hac causa non restituetur.
However, a slave under twenty‑five years of age will in no way be able to be restored, since the person of the master is considered, who ought to impute to himself why he entrusted the matter to a minor. Wherefore even if he has contracted through an impubes, the same must be said, as Marcellus also writes in the second book of the Digest. And if by chance the free administration of a peculium has been granted to a younger slave, a master of full age will not be restored on this ground.
Etenim quodcumque servus ita gerit, voluntate domini gerere intellegendus est. et magis hoc apparebit, si aut de institoria actione quaeratur, aut si proponatur maiorem annis viginti quinque negotium aliquod gerendum minori mandasse et illum in ea re deceptum esse.
For indeed whatever a slave thus conducts, he is to be understood to conduct by the will of the master. et this will appear more clearly, if either inquiry is made concerning the institorial action, or if it be proposed that someone older than twenty-five years entrusted the managing of some business to a minor and that he was deceived in that matter.
Sed et si ei pecunia a debitore paterno soluta sit vel proprio et hanc perdidit, dicendum est ei subveniri, quasi gestum sit cum eo. et ideo si minor conveniat debitorem, adhibere debet curatores, ut ei solvatur pecunia: ceterum non ei compelletur solvere. sed hodie solet pecunia in aedem deponi, ut pomponius libro vicensimo octavo scribit, ne vel debitor ultra usuris oneretur vel creditor minor perdat pecuniam, aut curatoribus solvi, si sunt. permittitur etiam ex constitutione principum debitori compellere adulescentem ad petendos sibi curatores.
But also, if money has been paid to him by his father’s debtor or by his own debtor and he has lost it, it must be said that relief is afforded to him, as though business had been transacted with him. And therefore, if a minor proceeds against a debtor, he ought to bring in his curators, so that the money may be paid to him; otherwise the debtor will not be compelled to pay him. But nowadays money is customarily deposited in a temple, as Pomponius writes in the twenty-eighth book, lest either the debtor be burdened further with interest or the minor creditor lose the money, or else it is paid to the curators, if there are any. It is also permitted by a constitution of the emperors for the debtor to compel the youth to seek curators for himself.
What then? If the praetor decrees that money be paid to a minor without curators and it is paid, can the payer be secure? It can be doubted; however, I think that, if, alleging minority, he was compelled to make the payment, nothing should be imputed to him—unless perhaps someone would think he ought to appeal as against an injury. But I believe the praetor would not listen to this minor wishing to be restored in integrum.
Non solum autem in his ei succurritur, sed etiam in interventionibus, ut puta si fideiussorio nomine se vel rem suam obligavit. pomponius autem videtur adquiescere distinguentibus: arbiter ad fideiussores probandos constitutus eum probavit an vero ipse adversarius? mihi autem semper succurrendum videtur, si minor sit et se circumventum doceat.
Not only, moreover, is succor afforded to him in these cases, but also in intercessions, for instance if in a fideiussory capacity he bound himself or his own property. pomponius, moreover, seems to acquiesce in those who draw a distinction: was it an arbiter appointed for the approving of sureties who approved him, or rather the adversary himself? to me, however, it always seems that succor should be afforded, if he is a minor and shows that he was circumvented.
Sed et si hereditatem minor adiit minus lucrosam, succurritur ei ut se possit abstinere: nam et hic captus est. idem et in bonorum possessione vel alia successione. non solum autem filius, qui se miscuit paternae hereditati, sed et si aliquis sit ex necessariis minor annis, simili modo restitutionem impetrabit, veluti si servus sit cum libertate institutus: dicendum enim erit, si se miscuit, posse ei subveniri aetatis beneficio, ut habeat bonorum suorum separationem.
But also, if a minor has entered upon an inheritance that is less lucrative, aid is afforded him so that he may be able to abstain; for here too he has been ensnared. The same [applies] in bonorum possessio or in another succession. And not only the son who has mixed himself with the paternal inheritance, but also, if anyone of the necessary heirs is under age, he will in like manner obtain restitution, for example if a slave has been instituted heir together with liberty: for it must be said that, if he has mixed himself, he can be helped by the benefit of age, so that he may have a separation of his goods.
Pomponius quoque libro vicensimo octavo scribit et si sine dolo cuiusquam legatum repudiaverit, vel in optionis legato captus sit dum elegit deteriorem, vel si duas res promiserit illam aut illam et pretiosiorem dederit, debere subveniri: et subveniendum est.
Pomponius too, in the twenty-eighth book, writes that even if he has repudiated a legacy without anyone’s fraud, or has been caught in a legacy of option while he chose the worse, or if he has promised two things, this or that, and has given the more precious, relief ought to be afforded: and relief must be afforded.
Quaesitum est ex eo, quod in lucro quoque minoribus subveniendum dicitur, si res eius venierit et existat qui plus liceatur, an in integrum propter lucrum restituendus sit? et cottidie praetores eos restituunt, ut rursum admittatur licitatio. idem faciunt et in his rebus, quae servari eis debent.
It has been asked, on the basis that even for profit assistance is to be given to minors, if his property has been sold and there exists someone who would bid more, whether he ought to be granted restitution in integrum on account of the profit? And the praetors restore them daily, so that the licitation may be admitted again. They do the same also in those matters which ought to be preserved for them.
which will have to be done circumspectly: moreover, no one will approach the purchase of pupillary goods, not even if they are being sold in good faith. and it must be strictly proved, in things that are subject to fortuitous chances, that the minor is not to be succored against the buyer, unless either sordid dealing or evident favor of the tutors or curators is shown.
Sed quod papinianus libro secundo responsorum ait minori substitutum servum necessarium repudiante quidem hereditatem minore necessarium fore, et si fuerit restitutus minor, liberum nihilo minus remanere: si autem prius minor adiit hereditatem, mox abstentus est, substitutum pupillo servum cum libertate non posse heredem existere neque liberum esse: non per omnia verum est. nam si non est solvendo hereditas, abstinente se herede et divus pius rescripsit et imperator noster, et quidem in extraneo pupillo locum fore necessario substituto. et quod ait liberum manere, tale est, quasi non et heres maneat, cum pupillus impetrat restitutionem posteaquam abstentus est: cum enim pupillus heres non fiat, sed utiles actiones habeat, sine dubio heres manebit, qui semel extitit.
But as to what Papinian in the second book of his Responses says—that a slave substituted to a minor would be a necessary heir if the minor repudiates the inheritance, and that, if the minor is restored, he nonetheless remains free; but if the minor first entered upon the inheritance and soon after abstained, the slave substituted to the pupil cannot come to be heir with freedom nor be free—this is not true in all respects. For if the inheritance is not solvent, both the deified Pius and our emperor have written by rescript that, the heir abstaining, there is room for the necessary substitute, and indeed in the case of a pupil who is an extraneous heir. And as to his saying that he remains free, it is as though he did not also remain heir when the pupil obtains restitution after he has abstained; for since the pupil does not become heir, but has useful actions, without doubt he who once came to be heir will remain heir.
Si ex causa iudicati pignora minoris capta sint et distracta, mox restitutus sit adversus sententiam praesidis vel procuratoris caesaris, videndum, an ea revocari debeant, quae distracta sunt: nam illud certum est pecuniam ex causa iudicati solutam ei restituendam. sed interest ipsius corpora potius habere: et puto interdum permittendum, id est si grande damnum sit minoris.
If, on account of a judgment, the pledges of a minor have been seized and sold, and soon thereafter he has been restored against the sentence of the governor or of the procurator of Caesar, it must be considered whether those things that were sold ought to be recalled; for this is certain: money paid on account of a judgment must be restored to him. But it is in his interest to have the very things (corpora) rather; and I think it should sometimes be permitted—that is, if the minor would suffer great loss.
Nunc videndum minoribus utrum in contractibus captis dumtaxat subveniatur, an etiam delinquentibus: ut puta dolo aliquid minor fecit in re deposita vel commodata vel alias in contractu, an ei subveniatur, si nihil ad eum pervenit? et placet in delictis minoribus non subveniri. nec hic itaque subvenietur.
Now it must be seen whether relief is afforded to minors only in contracts concluded, or also to them when delinquents: for instance, if a minor did something in fraud (dolus) in a deposited thing or in a loan for use (commodatum) or otherwise in a contract, is relief afforded him, if nothing has come to him? And it is the settled view that in delicts relief is not afforded to minors. Nor, therefore, will relief be afforded here.
for even if he committed theft or gave damage unjustly, relief will not be afforded to him. but if, when he could by confessing to the wrongful damage avoid being held for the double, he preferred to deny, let him be restored only to this extent: that he be held as having confessed. therefore, also if he could have settled the loss as a thief rather than undergo an action for the double or the fourfold, relief will be afforded to him.
Verum vel de dolo vel utilis actio erit in id quod minoris interfuit non manumitti: proinde quidquid hic haberet, si non manumisisset, id ei nunc praestabitur. sed et nomine earum rerum, quas dominicas servus manumissus supprimebat, competunt adversus eum actiones ad exhibendum et furti et condictio, videlicet quoniam et manumissus eas contrectabat. ceterum ex delicto in servitutem facto domino adversus eum post libertatem actio non competit: et hoc rescripto divi severi continetur.
But there will be either an action for fraud (de dolo) or a useful action (actio utilis) for the amount by which it was of lesser interest that he not be manumitted; accordingly, whatever he would have had here if he had not manumitted, that will now be made good to him. But also, with respect to those things belonging to the master which the manumitted slave was suppressing, actions lie against him ad exhibendum and for theft, and a condictio, namely because he, even after manumission, was handling them. However, for a delict committed in servitude, an action does not lie for the master against him after freedom; and this is contained in a rescript of the deified Severus.
Quid si minor viginti quinque annis, maior viginti hac lege vendiderit, ut manumittatur? ideo proposui maiorem viginti, quoniam et scaevola scribit libro quarto decimo quaestionum et magis est, ut sententia constitutionis divi marci ad aufidium victorinum hunc, id est minorem viginti annis non complectatur. quare videndum, an maiori viginti annis subveniatur: et si quidem ante desideret, quam libertas competat, audietur: sin vero postea, non possit.
What if someone under twenty-five years, but over twenty, has sold under this term, that the slave be manumitted? I have therefore proposed “over twenty,” since both Scaevola writes in the 14th book of the Questions, and it is rather the case that the opinion of the constitution of the deified Marcus to Aufidius Victorinus does not embrace this one, that is, one under twenty years. Wherefore it must be considered whether succor is afforded to one over twenty years; and if indeed he seeks it before liberty accrues, he will be heard; but if afterward, he cannot.
Ex facto quaesitum est: adulescentes quidam acceperant curatorem salvianum quendam nomine: hic cum curam administrasset, beneficio principis urbicam procurationem erat adeptus et apud praetorem se a cura adulescentium excusaverat absentibus eis: adulescentes adierant praetorem desiderantes in integrum adversus eum restitui, quod esset contra constitutiones excusatus. cum enim susceptam tutelam non alii soleant deponere, quam qui trans mare rei publicae causa absunt vel hi qui circa principem sunt occupati, ut in consiliarii menandri arrii persona est indultum, meruisset autem salvianus excusationem, adulescentes quasi capti in integrum restitui a praetore desideraverant. aetrius severus quia dubitabat, ad imperatorem severum rettulit: ad quam consultationem successori eius venidio quieto rescripsit nullas partes esse praetoris: neque enim contractum proponi cum minore annis viginti quinque: sed principes intervenire et reducere hunc ad administrationem, qui perperam esset a praetore excusatus.
From the facts the question was raised: certain youths had received as curator a certain Salvianus by name. This man, after he had administered the care, by the benefice of the princeps had obtained a city procuration, and before the praetor had excused himself from the care of the youths, they being absent. The youths had approached the praetor, desiring to be restored in integrum against him, because he had been excused contrary to the constitutions. For indeed those who have undertaken a guardianship are not wont to lay it down except those who are across the sea for the sake of the commonwealth, or those who are occupied about the princeps, as an indult has been granted in the person of the counselor Menander Arrius; and although Salvianus had merited an excuse, the youths, as if taken at a disadvantage, had desired from the praetor to be restored in integrum. Aetrius Severus, because he doubted, referred the matter to the emperor Severus: to which consultation his successor Venidius Quietus wrote in reply that there were no parts for the praetor; for neither was a contract being proposed with one under twenty-five years; but the emperors intervene and bring back to the administration him who had been improperly excused by the praetor.
Item non restituetur, qui sobrie rem suam administrans occasione damni non inconsulte accidentis, sed fato velit restitui: nec enim eventus damni restitutionem indulget, sed inconsulta facilitas. et ita pomponius libro vicensimo octavo scripsit. unde Marcellus apud iulianum notat, si minor sibi servum necessarium comparaverit, mox decesserit, non debere eum restitui: neque enim captus est emendo sibi rem pernecessariam, licet mortalem.
Likewise, he will not be restored who, managing his property soberly, wishes to be restored on the occasion of a loss happening not through ill-advisedness, but by fate: for it is not the event of the loss that indulges restitution, but incautious facility. And thus Pomponius wrote in the twenty-eighth book. Whence Marcellus notes in Julian, that if a minor has purchased for himself a necessary slave, and he soon thereafter died, he ought not to be restored: for he was not taken in by buying for himself a very necessary thing, albeit mortal.
Si locupleti heres extitit et subito hereditas lapsa sit ( puta praedia fuerunt quae chasmate perierunt, insulae exustae sunt, servi fugerunt aut decesserunt): iulianus quidem libro quadragensimo sexto sic loquitur, quasi possit minor in integrum restitui. Marcellus autem apud iulianum notat cessare in integrum restitutionem: neque enim aetatis lubrico captus est adeundo locupletem hereditatem, et quod fato contingit, cuivis patri familias quamvis diligentissimo possit contingere. sed haec res adferre potest restitutionem minori, si adiit hereditatem, in qua res erant multae mortales vel praedia urbana, aes autem alienum grave, quod non prospexit posse evenire, ut demoriantur mancipia, praedia ruant, vel quod non cito distraxerit haec, quae multis casibus obnoxia sunt.
If an heir has come into a wealthy inheritance and suddenly the inheritance has collapsed (suppose there were estates (praedia) which perished by a chasm, apartment-blocks (insulae) have been burned, slaves fled or died): Julianus indeed in the forty-sixth book speaks as though a minor can be restored in integrum. Marcellus, however, notes in Julianus that restitution in integrum does not apply: for he was not ensnared by the slippery hazard of age in entering upon a wealthy inheritance, and what happens by fate can befall any paterfamilias, however most diligent. But this matter can bring restitution to a minor, if he entered upon an inheritance in which there were many perishable things or urban estates, yet a heavy debt (aes alienum grave), which he did not foresee could occur—that the mancipia might die, the estates might collapse—or because he did not quickly sell these things, which are liable to many mishaps.
Item quaeritur, si minor adversus minorem restitui desiderat, an sit audiendus. et pomponius simpliciter scribit non restituendum. puto autem inspiciendum a praetore, quis captus sit: proinde si ambo capti sunt, verbi gratia minor minori pecuniam dedit et ille perdidit, melior est causa secundum pomponium eius, qui accepit et vel dilapidavit vel perdidit.
Likewise it is asked, if a minor desires to be restored against a minor, whether he is to be heard. And Pomponius writes simply that there should be no restoration. I, however, think it must be examined by the praetor who has been overreached: accordingly, if both were overreached—for example, a minor gave money to a minor and that one lost it—the better cause, according to Pomponius, is that of the one who received it and either dissipated it or lost it.
Si apud minorem mulier pro alio intercesserit, non est ei actio in mulierem danda, sed perinde atque ceteri per exceptionem summoveri debet: scilicet quia communi iure in priorem debitorem ei actio restituitur. haec si solvendo sit prior debitor: alioquin mulier non utetur senatus consulti auxilio.
If, before a minor, a woman has interceded on behalf of another, an action is not to be given to him against the woman, but he ought, just as the rest, to be removed by an exception: namely because by the common law the action is restored to him against the prior debtor. this, if the prior debtor is solvent; otherwise the woman will not make use of the aid of the senatorial decree (senatus consultum).
In causae cognitione versabitur, utrum soli ei succurrendum sit, an etiam his qui pro eo obligati sunt, ut puta fideiussoribus. itaque si cum scirem minorem et ei fidem non haberem, tu fideiusseris pro eo, non est aequum fideiussori in necem meam subveniri, sed potius ipsi deneganda erit mandati actio. in summa perpendendum erit praetori, cui potius subveniat, utrum creditori an fideiussori: nam minor captus neutri tenebitur.
the inquiry of the cause will turn on whether succor should be given to him alone, or also to those who are obligated on his behalf, for instance to the sureties. accordingly, if, when I knew him to be a minor and did not give him credit, you became surety for him, it is not equitable that relief be afforded to the surety to my ruin, but rather to him the action of mandate must be denied. in sum, it will have to be weighed by the praetor to whom he should rather extend relief, whether to the creditor or to the surety: for a minor who has been overreached will be liable to neither.
It will be easier to say, in the case of the mandator, that help ought not to be given to him: for he was, as it were, the affirmator and persuader that one should contract with the minor. Whence it can be discussed whether the minor ought to implore in integrum restitution against the creditor, or also against the surety. And I think it safer against both: for, the case having been examined and the adversaries being present—or if they are absent through contumacy—the restitutions in integrum are to be weighed.
Interdum autem restitutio et in rem datur minori, id est adversus rei eius possessorem, licet cum eo non sit contractum. ut puta rem a minore emisti et alii vendidisti: potest desiderare interdum adversus possessorem restitui, ne rem suam perdat vel re sua careat, et hoc vel cognitione praetoria vel rescissa alienatione dato in rem iudicio. pomponius quoque libro vicensimo octavo scribit labeonem existimasse, si minor viginti quinque annis fundum vendidit et tradidit, si emptor rursus eum alienavit, si quidem emptor sequens scit rem ita gestam, restitutionem adversus eum faciendam: si ignoravit et prior emptor solvendo esset, non esse faciendam: sin vero non esset solvendo, aequius esse minori succurri etiam adversus ignorantem, quamvis bona fide emptor est.
Sometimes, however, restitution is also given in rem to a minor, that is, against the possessor of his property, although no contract has been concluded with him. For instance, you bought a thing from a minor and sold it to another: he can sometimes seek to be restored against the possessor, lest he lose his property or be without his property; and this either by praetorian cognition, or, the alienation having been rescinded, with an action in rem granted. Pomponius also, in his twenty-eighth book, writes that Labeo thought that, if a minor under twenty-five years sold and delivered an estate, and the buyer in turn alienated it, then, if indeed the subsequent buyer knows the matter was so conducted, restitution should be made against him; if he was ignorant and the prior buyer was solvent, it should not be made; but if in truth he was not solvent, it is more equitable for the minor to be succored even against the ignorant party, although he is a good‑faith buyer.
In causae cognitione etiam hoc versabitur, num forte alia actio possit competere citra in integrum restitutionem. nam si communi auxilio et mero iure munitus sit, non debet ei tribui extraordinarium auxilium: ut puta cum pupillo contractum est sine tutoris auctoritate nec locupletior factus est.
In the cognition of the cause this also will be considered: whether perhaps another action can be competent without resort to restitution in integrum. For if he is fortified by common aid and by mere law, no extraordinary aid ought to be granted to him: for example, when a contract has been made with a pupil without the authority of his tutor and he has not been made wealthier.
Item relatum est apud labeonem, si minor circumscriptus societatem coierit vel etiam donationis causa, nullam esse societatem nec inter maiores quidem et ideo cessare partes praetoris: idem et ofilius respondit: satis enim ipso iure munitus est.
Likewise it is related in Labeo that, if a minor, having been overreached, has entered into a partnership, or even for the sake of a donation, there is no partnership—not even among those of full age—and therefore the praetor’s part ceases: Ofilius also replied the same; for he is sufficiently fortified by the law itself.
Pomponius quoque refert libro vicensimo octavo, cum quidam heres rogatus esset fratris filiae complures res dare ea condicione, ut, si sine liberis decessisset, restitueret eas heredi et haec defuncto herede heredi eius cavisset se restituturam, aristonem putasse in integrum restituendam. sed et illud pomponius adicit, quod potuit incerti condici haec cautio etiam a maiore: non enim ipso iure, sed per condictionem munitus est.
Pomponius also reports in the twenty-eighth book that, when a certain heir had been asked to give several things to his brother’s daughter on this condition, that, if she should die without children, she would restore them to the heir, and that, when the heir died, she had given security to his heir that she would restore them, Aristo thought that she ought to be granted restitutio in integrum. But Pomponius also adds this: that this cautio could be pursued by a condictio incerti even by the elder; for it was not protected by the law itself, but by a condictio.
Praefecti etiam praetorio ex sua sententia in integrum possunt restituere, quamvis appellari ab his non possit. haec idcirco tam varie. quia appellatio quidem iniquitatis sententiae querellam, in integrum vero restitutio erroris proprii veniae petitionem vel adversarii circumventionis allegationem continet.
Even the Praetorian Prefects can grant restitutio in integrum on their own judgment, although one cannot appeal from them. For this reason these things are thus varied: because an appeal contains a complaint of the injustice of the sentence, whereas restitutio in integrum contains a petition for pardon of one’s own error or an allegation of the adversary’s circumvention.
Si autem princeps sententiam dixit, perraro solet permittere restitutionem et induci in auditorium suum eum, qui per infirmitatem aetatis captum se dicat, dum ea, quae pro causa sunt, dicta non allegat vel ab advocatis proditum queratur. denique glabrionem acilium divus severus et imperator antoninus non audierunt incolorate restitui desiderantem adversus fratrem post speciem in auditorio eorum finitam.
If, however, the princeps has pronounced sentence, he very rarely is accustomed to permit restitution and to admit into his auditorium one who says that he was overreached through the weakness of age, when he does not cite the statements that are for his case, or complains that he was betrayed by his advocates. Finally, the deified Severus and Emperor Antoninus did not hear Acilius Glabrio, who desired plainly to be restored against his brother after the proceeding in their auditorium had been concluded.
Interdum tamen successori plus quam annum dabimus, ut est edicto expressum, si forte aetas ipsius subveniat: nam post annum vicensimum quintum habebit legitimum tempus. hoc enim ipso deceptus videtur, quod, cum posset restitui intra tempus statutum ex persona defuncti, hoc non fecit. plane si defunctus ad in integrum restitutionem modicum tempus ex anno utili habuit, huic heredi minori post annum vicensimum quintum completum non totum statutum tempus dabimus ad in integrum restitutionem, sed id dumtaxat tempus, quod habuit is cui heres extitit.
Sometimes, however, we will grant to the successor more than a year, as is expressed in the edict, if perchance his age comes to his aid: for after the twenty-fifth year he will have the legitimate time. For he seems to have been deceived in this very respect, that, although he could have been restored within the time fixed, reckoned from the person of the deceased, he did not do this. Clearly, if the deceased had a small span from the useful year for in-integrum restitution, to this minor heir, after the twenty-fifth year has been completed, we shall not grant the whole time prescribed for in-integrum restitution, but only that time which the one of whom he became heir had.
Papinianus libro secundo responsorum ait exuli reverso non debere prorogari tempus in integrum restitutionis statutum, quia afuit, cum potuerit adire praetorem per procuratorem, nec dixit, vel praesidem ubi erat. sed quod idem dicit et indignum esse propter irrogatam poenam, non recte: quid enim commune habet delictum cum venia aetatis?
Papinian, in the second book of the Responses, says that, for an exile who has returned, the time appointed for restitution in integrum ought not to be prorogued, because he was absent, since he could have approached the praetor through a procurator, nor did he even petition the governor where he was. But where the same man also says that it is unworthy on account of the penalty imposed, this is not correct: for what has a delict in common with the leniency of age?
In integrum vero restitutione postulata adversus aditionem a minore factam, si quid legatis expensum est, vel pretia eorum qui ad libertatem aditione eius pervenerunt, a minore refundenda non sunt. quemadmodum per contrarium cum minor restituitur ad adeundam hereditatem, quae antea gesta erant per curatorem bonorum decreto praetoris ad distrahenda bona secundum iuris formam constitutum, rata esse habenda calpurnio flacco severus et antoninus rescripserunt.
But when an in integrum restitution is sought against an adition made by a minor, if anything has been expended to legates, or the prices of those who attained liberty by his adition, these are not to be refunded by the minor. Conversely, when the minor is restored for the purpose of entering upon the inheritance, the acts which had previously been done by a curator of the goods, constituted by decree of the praetor for distraining/selling the goods according to the form of the law, must be held ratified—Severus and Antoninus rescripted to Calpurnius Flaccus to this effect.
Cum mandatu patris filius familias res administraret, non habet beneficium restitutionis: nam et si alius ei mandasset, non succurreretur, cum eo modo maiori potius consuleretur, cuius damno res sit cessura. sed si eventu damnum minor passurus sit, quia quod praestiterit servare ab eo cuius negotia gessit non potest, quia is non erit solvendo, sine dubio praetor interveniet. si autem ipse dominus minor sit, procurator vero maioris aetatis, non potest facile dominus audiri, nisi si mandatu eius gestum erit nec a procuratore servari res possit.
When, under a mandate of his father, a filius familias was administering affairs, he does not have the benefit of restitution; for even if someone else had given him a mandate, no relief would be afforded, since in that way consideration would rather be given to the principal, to whose loss the matter would be destined to come. But if, in the event, the minor is going to suffer damage, because he cannot preserve what he has rendered by recourse against the one whose business he transacted, since that person will not be solvent, without doubt the praetor will intervene. If, however, the owner himself is a minor, while the procurator is of greater age, the owner cannot readily be heard, unless it was done by his mandate and the matter cannot be preserved from the procurator.
Quod si minor sua sponte negotiis maioris intervenerit, restituendus erit, ne maiori damnum accidat. quod si hoc facere recusaverit, tunc si conventus fuerit negotiorum gestorum, adversus hanc actionem non restituitur: sed compellendus est sic ei cedere auxilio in integrum restitutionis, ut procuratorem eum in rem suam faciat, ut possit per hunc modum damnum sibi propter minorem contingens resarcire.
But if a minor of his own accord has intervened in the business of a major, he must be restored, lest damage occur to the major. But if he refuses to do this, then, if he is sued by the action of negotiorum gestorum (management of affairs), he is not restored against this action; rather, he is to be compelled so to cede to him the aid of in‑integrum restitution as to make him his procurator in his own interest (in rem suam), so that by this means he may be able to repair the loss befalling himself on account of the minor.
Non semper autem ea, quae cum minoribus geruntur, rescindenda sunt, sed ad bonum et aequum redigenda sunt. ne magno incommodo huius aetatis homines adficiantur nemine cum his contrahente et quodammodo commercio eis interdicetur. itaque nisi aut manifesta circumscriptio sit aut tam neglegenter in ea causa versati sunt, praetor interponere se non debet.
However, not always are the things transacted with minors to be rescinded, but they are to be brought back to the good and the equitable, lest people of that age be afflicted with great inconvenience, with no one contracting with them and, as it were, commerce being interdicted to them. Therefore, unless either there is manifest circumvention or they have conducted themselves so negligently in that matter, the praetor ought not to interpose himself.
Scaevola noster aiebat, si quis iuvenili levitate ductus omiserit vel repudiaverit hereditatem vel bonorum possessionem, si quidem omnia in integro sint, omnimodo audiendus est: si vero iam distracta hereditate et negotiis finitis ad paratam pecuniam laboribus substituti veniat, repellendus est: multoque parcius ex hac causa heredem minoris restituendum esse.
Our Scaevola used to say, if someone, led by youthful levity, has omitted or repudiated an inheritance or the possession of the estate, then, if indeed everything is intact, he must by all means be heard: but if, the inheritance having already been liquidated and the dealings concluded, he comes for the ready money produced by the labors of a substitute, he must be repelled: and for this reason the heir of a minor is to be restored much more sparingly.
Si servus vel filius familias minorem circumscripserit, pater dominusve quod ad eum pervenerit restituere iubendus est, quod non pervenerit ex peculio eorum praestare: si ex neutro satisfiet et dolus servi intervenerit, aut verberibus castigandus aut noxae dedendus erit. sed et si filius familias hoc fecit, ob dolum suum condemnabitur.
If a slave or a filius familias has defrauded a minor, the father or the master is to be ordered to restore what has come to him; what has not come to him he must provide from their peculium. If from neither source satisfaction is made, and the slave’s fraud has intervened, he shall either be chastised with beatings or be surrendered in noxal surrender. But even if the filius familias has done this, he will be condemned on account of his fraud.
Restitutio autem ita facienda est, ut unusquisque integrum ius suum recipiat. itaque si in vendendo fundo circumscriptus restituetur, iubeat praetor emptorem fundum cum fructibus reddere et pretium recipere, nisi si tunc dederit, cum eum perditurum non ignoraret: sicuti facit in ea pecunia, quae ei consumpturo creditur, sed parcius in venditione, quia aes alienum ei solvitur, quod facere necesse est, credere autem non est necesse. nam et si origo contractus ita constitit, ut infirmanda sit, si tamen necesse fuit pretium solvi, non omnimodo emptor damno adficiendus est.
Restitution, moreover, must be made in such a way that each person receives back his entire right intact. And so, if someone overreached in selling an estate is to be restored, let the praetor order the buyer to return the estate with its fruits and to receive back the price—unless he paid it at a time when he was not ignorant that he would lose it: just as he does in the case of money which is lent to one who will consume it, but more sparingly in a sale, because a debt is being paid for him, which must be done, whereas to lend is not necessary. For even if the origin of the contract stood in such a way that it ought to be invalidated, nevertheless, if it was necessary that the price be paid, the buyer is not to be affected with loss in every respect.
Illud nullam habet dubitationem, quin minor si non debitum solverit ex ea causa, ex qua iure civili repetitio non est, danda sit ei utilis actio ad repetendum: cum et maioribus viginti quinque annis iustis ex causis dari solet repetitio.
This admits no doubt, that if a minor has paid what was not owed, from a cause for which under the civil law there is no repetition (recovery), a useful action should be granted to him to recover: since even to those over twenty-five years of age repetition is accustomed to be granted for just causes.
Patri pro filio omnimodo praestanda restitutio est, licet filius restitui nolit, quia patris periculum agitur qui de peculio tenetur. ex quo apparet ceteros cognatos vel adfines alterius esse condicionis, nec aliter audiri oportere, quamsi ex voluntate adulescentis postulent aut eius vitae sit iste adulescens, ut merito etiam bonis ei debeat interdici.
Restitution is in every way to be afforded to a father on behalf of his son, even if the son is unwilling to be restored, because the father’s peril is at stake, he being held liable de peculio. From which it appears that other cognates or affines are in a different condition, and ought not to be heard otherwise than if they petition with the young man’s consent, or if this youth is of such a way of life that deservedly he should even be interdicted from his goods.
Si pecuniam, quam mutuam minor accepit, dissipavit, denegare debet proconsul creditori adversus eum actionem. quod si egenti minor crediderit, ulterius procedendum non est, quam ut iubeatur iuvenis actionibus suis, quas habet adversus eum cui ipse credidisset, cedere creditori suo. praedium quoque si ex ea pecunia pluris quam oporteret emit, ita temperanda res erit, ut iubeatur venditor reddito pretio reciperare praedium, ita ut sine alterius damno etiam creditor a iuvene suum consequatur.
If the money which a minor received as a loan he has dissipated, the proconsul ought to deny the creditor an action against him. But if the minor has given credit to a needy person, the proceeding is not to go further than that the youth be ordered to cede to his creditor his own actions which he has against the one to whom he himself had given credit. Also, if out of that money he has bought an estate for more than was proper, the matter shall be tempered thus: the seller shall be ordered, with the price restored, to recover back the estate, so that, without another’s loss, even the creditor may obtain from the youth what is his.
whence of course at the same time we understand what ought to be observed, if with his own money he has bought for more than is proper: namely, that both in this and in the preceding case the seller, who has returned the price, must also return the interest (usury) which he has received, or could have received, from that money, and take back the fruits by which the youth was made more wealthy. likewise, conversely, if the young man has sold for a lower price than is proper, the purchaser ought to be ordered to restore the estates together with the fruits, while the youth, however, is to give back out of the price only insofar as he has been enriched by that money.
Ex causa curationis condemnata pupilla adversus num caput sententiae restitui volebat, et quia videtur in ceteris litis speciebus relevata fuisse, actor maior aetate, qui adquievit tunc temporis sententiae, dicebat totam debere litem restaurari. herennius ^ ^ modestinus respondit, si species, in qua pupilla in integrum restitui desiderat, ceteris speciebus non cohaeret, nihil proponi, cur a tota sententia recedi actor postulans audiendus est.
Condemned on account of a curatorship, a female ward wished to be restored by restitution in integrum against one head of the judgment; and because she appears to have been relieved in the other species of the suit, the plaintiff of full age, who at that time acquiesced in the judgment, said that the whole suit ought to be restored. herennius ^ ^ modestinus responded, if the count in which the ward desires to be restored in integrum does not cohere with the other counts, nothing is put forward why the plaintiff, requesting that there be a departure from the entire judgment, should be heard.
Si hereditate patris aetatis beneficio in integrum restitutus abstinuit se nemine de creditoribus paternis praesente vel ad agendum a praeside evocato, an ea restitutio recte facta videatur, quaeritur. herennius ^ ^ modestinus respondit, cum non evocatis creditoribus in integrum restitutionis decretum interpositum proponatur, minime id creditoribus praeiudicasse.
If, with respect to his father’s inheritance, someone, having been restored in full by the benefit of age, abstained, with none of the paternal creditors present or summoned by the governor to bring an action, the question is raised whether that restitution seems to have been rightly made. Herennius ^ ^ Modestinus responded that, when the creditors have not been summoned and a decree of in‑integrum restitution is put forward as having been interposed, that by no means prejudiced the creditors.
Si filius emancipatus contra tabulas non accepta possessione, post inchoatam restitutionis quaestionem, legatum ex testamento patris maior viginti quinque annis petisset, liti renuntiare videtur, cum et si bonorum possessionis tempus largiretur, electo iudicio defuncti repudiatum beneficium praetoris existimaretur.
If an emancipated son, without having accepted possession contra tabulas, after the question of restitution had been initiated, being more than twenty-five years old, had sought a legacy from his father’s testament, he is seen to renounce the suit, since even if the time for bonorum possessio were granted, by choosing the deceased’s action the praetor’s benefice would be considered repudiated.
Si mulier, postquam heres extitit, propter aetatem abstinendi causa in integrum restituta fuerit, servos hereditarios ex fideicommisso ab ea recte manumissos retinere libertatem respondit: nec erunt cogendi viginti aureos pro libertate retinenda dependere, quam iure optimo consecuti videntur. nam et si quidam ex creditoribus pecuniam suam ante restitutionem ab ea reciperassent, ceterorum querella contra eos qui acceperunt ut pecunia communicetur non admittetur.
If a woman, after she had become heir, was restored in integrum, on account of her age, for the purpose of abstaining, he answered that the hereditary slaves, rightly manumitted by her in fulfillment of a fideicommissum, retain their liberty; nor will they be compelled to pay twenty aurei for retaining their liberty, which they seem to have obtained by the best right. For also, if certain creditors had received their money from her before the restitution, the complaint of the others against those who received, that the money be shared, will not be admitted.
Minor viginti quinque annis adito praeside ex aspectu corporis falso probavit perfectam aetatem: curatores cum intellexissent esse minorem perseveraverunt in administratione: medio tempore post probatam aetatem ante impletum vicensimum quintum annum solutae sunt adulescenti pecuniae debitae easque male consumpsit. quaero cuius sit periculum: et quid si curatores quoque in eodem errore perseverassent, ut putarent maiorem esse et abstinuissent se ab administratione, curationem etiam restituissent, an periculum temporis, quod post probatam aetatem cessit, ad eos pertineat? respondi: hi qui debita exsoluerunt liberati iure ipso non debent iterum conveniri.
Under twenty-five years of age, after approaching the governor he, from the appearance of his body, falsely proved full age: the curators, when they had understood that he was a minor, persevered in the administration: in the meantime, after age had been approved but before the completion of the twenty-fifth year, monies owed were paid out to the adolescent, and he ill-consumed them. I ask whose is the risk: and what if the curators also had persisted in the same error, so that they thought him of full age and abstained from administration, and even had the curatorship restored, whether the risk of the time which elapsed after the age was approved pertains to them? I answered: those who paid off the debts, being freed by the law itself, ought not to be sued again.
plainly the curators, who, knowing him to be a minor, persevered in the same office, ought not to have allowed him to receive the moneys owed, and they must be proceeded against under this head. but if they themselves also trusted in the decree of the governor and ceased to administer or even rendered an account, they are like the other debtors, and therefore are not proceeded against.
Si minor viginti quinque annis servum suum, qui pluris, quam in testamento ei legatum sit, manumittere rogatus fuerit et legatum acceperit, non cogendum praestare libertatem, si legatum reddere paratus sit, iulianus respondit: ut quemadmodum maioribus liberum sit non accipere, si nolint manumittere, sic huic reddenti legatum necessitas manumittendi remittatur.
If someone under twenty‑five years of age has been asked to manumit his own slave, who is worth more than has been bequeathed to him in the testament, and has accepted the legacy, Julian answered that he is not to be compelled to furnish liberty, if he is prepared to return the legacy: so that just as it is free to those of full age not to accept, if they do not wish to manumit, so for this one returning the legacy the necessity of manumitting is remitted.
Si in emptionem penes se collatam minor adiectione ab alio superetur, implorans in integrum restitutionem audietur, si eius interesse emptam ab eo rem fuisse adprobetur, veluti quod maiorum eius fuisset: ita ^ ^ tamen ut id, quod ex licitatione accessit, ipse offerat venditori.
If, in a purchase placed in his hands, a minor is outdone by another by an addition, he, imploring restitution in integrum, will be heard, if it is proved that it was to his interest that the thing had been bought by him, as for example because it had belonged to his ancestors: yet ^ ^ on the condition that he himself offer to the seller that which accrued from the licitation.
Sed et in sexaginta diebus praeteritis, in quibus iure mariti sine calumnia vir accusare mulierem adulterii potest, denegatur ei in integrum restitutio: quod ius omissum si nunc repetere vult, quid aliud quam delicti veniam, id est calumniae deprecatur? et cum neque in delictis neque calumniatoribus praetorem succurrere oportere certi iuris sit, cessabit in integrum restitutio. in delictis autem minor annis viginti quinque non meretur in integrum restitutionem, utique atrocioribus, nisi quatenus interdum miseratio aetatis ad mediocrem poenam iudicem produxerit.
But also, when the sixty days have elapsed, within which by the right of a husband a man can accuse a woman of adultery without calumny, restitution in full is denied to him: if he now wishes to reclaim the right he omitted, what else is he beseeching than pardon for an offense, that is, for calumny? And since it is settled law that the praetor ought to succor neither in offenses nor calumniators, restitution in full will cease. In delicts, moreover, one under twenty-five years does not merit restitution in full, especially for more atrocious ones, except insofar as compassion for age has sometimes led the judge to a moderate penalty.
but, to come to the precepts of the Lex Iulia on restraining adulteries, assuredly there is no deprecation of the penalty for adultery if one who is a minor by years confesses himself an adulterer. I have said: nor even if he has committed any of those things which the same law punishes on account of adultery—such as, if knowingly he has taken as wife a woman condemned for adultery; or has not dismissed a wife caught in adultery; or has made profit from the adultery of his wife; or has received a price for a discovered act of debauchery; or has provided a house for debauchery or adultery to be committed upon her: and there is not to be an excuse of age against the precepts of the laws for him who, while he invokes the laws, commits acts against them.
Aemilius larianus ab ovinio fundum rutilianum lege commissoria emerat data parte pecuniae, ita ut si intra duos menses ab emptione reliqui pretii partem dimidiam non solvisset, inemptus esset, item si intra alios duos menses reliquum pretium non numerasset, similiter esset inemptus. intra priores duos menses lariano defuncto rutiliana pupillaris aetatis successerat, cuius tutores in solutione cessaverunt. venditor denuntiationibus tutoribus saepe datis post annum eandem possessionem claudio telemacho vendiderat.
aemilius larianus had bought from ovinius the rutilian farm under a commissory clause, a part of the money having been given, on condition that if within two months from the purchase he had not paid half of the remaining price, it would be unbought; likewise, if within another two months he had not counted out the remaining price, similarly it would be unbought. within the first two months, larianus having died, rutiliana of pupillary age had succeeded, whose guardians delayed in the payment. the seller, with notices often given to the guardians, after a year had sold the same possession to claudius telemachus.
the ward desired to be restored in integrum; having been defeated both before the praetor and before the prefect of the city, she had appealed. I was thinking it was well adjudged, because her father, not she herself, had contracted; but the emperor was moved, because the day for the commissory clause to take effect had fallen in the ward’s time, and this had brought it about that the law of the sale was not obeyed. I said that she could rather be restored on this ground: that the seller, by serving denuntiationes after the day on which it had been agreed that the forfeiture was to be operative, and by demanding the price, seemed to have departed from his own law (lex); I was not moved by the fact that the day had later passed, any more than if a creditor had sold the pledge after the debtor’s death, the day of payment having ended.
Intra utile tempus restitutionis apud praesidem petierunt in integrum restitutionem minores et de aetate sua probaverunt: dicta pro aetate sententia adversarii, ut impedirent cognitionem praesidis, ad imperatorem appellaverunt: praeses in eventum appellationis cetera cognitionis distulit. quaesitum est: si finita appellationis apud imperatorem cognitione et iniusta appellatione pronuntiata egressi aetatem deprehendantur, an cetera negotii implere possunt, cum per eos non steterit, quo minus res finem accipiat? respondi secundum ea quae proponuntur perinde cognosci atque si nunc intra aetatem essent.
Within the utile time for restitution, the minors sought in integrum restitution before the governor and proved their age. A judgment having been pronounced in their favor on the ground of age, the adversaries, in order to impede the governor’s hearing, appealed to the emperor. The governor, pending the outcome of the appeal, deferred the rest of the hearing. The question was raised: if, once the hearing of the appeal before the emperor has been concluded and the appeal declared unjust, they are found to have passed beyond the age (of minority), can they complete the rest of the business, since it was not through them that the matter failed to reach its end? I replied that, according to what is set forth, it is to be examined just as if they were now within the age.
Vendentibus curatoribus minoris fundum emptor extitit lucius titius et sex fere annis possedit et longe longeque rem meliorem fecit: quaero, cum sint idonei curatores, an minor adversus titium emptorem in integrum restitui possit. respondi ex omnibus quae proponerentur vix esse restituendum, nisi si maluerit omnes expensas, quas bona fide emptor fecisse adprobaverit, ei praestare, maxime cum sit ei paratum promptum auxilium curatoribus eis idoneis constitutis.
With the curators of the minor selling the estate, lucius titius turned out to be the purchaser and possessed it for nearly six years and made the property far and away better: I inquire, since the curators are suitable, whether the minor can be restored in full against titius the purchaser. I replied that, from all that was proposed, restoration should scarcely be granted, unless he should prefer to render to him all the expenses which the good‑faith purchaser shall have proved that he incurred, especially since ready and prompt aid is available to him through those curators appointed as suitable.
Minor annis viginti quinque, cui fideicommissum solvi pronuntiatum erat, caverat id se accepisse et cautionem eidem debitor quasi creditae pecuniae fecerat. in integrum restitui potest, quia partam ex causa iudicati persecutionem novo contractu ad initium alterius petitionis redegerat.
a minor under twenty-five years, for whom it had been pronounced that a fideicommissum be paid, had given a bond that he had received it, and the debtor had made to the same a security as if for money credited (loaned). he can be restored in integrum, because he had, by a new contract, reduced the enforcement acquired from the cause of a judgment to the beginning of another claim.
Praedia patris sui minor annis viginti quinque ob debita rationis tutelae aliorum, quam pater administraverat, in solutum inconsulte dedit: ad suam aequitatem per in integrum restitutionem revocanda res est, usuris pecuniae, quam constiterit ex tutela deberi, reputatis et cum quantitate fructuum perceptorum compensatis.
A person under twenty-five years, on account of debts of the account of the tutelage of others which his father had administered, imprudently gave his father’s estates in payment: the matter is to be recalled to his equity by restitution in integrum, the interest on the money which shall be established to be owed from the tutelage being reckoned, and compensated with the amount of the fruits received.
Si iudex circumvento in venditione adulescenti iussit fundum restitui eumque pretium emptori reddere, et hic nolit uti hac in integrum restitutione paenitentia acta, exceptionem utilem adversus petentem pretium quasi ex causa iudicati adulescens habere poterit, quia unicuique licet contemnere haec, quae pro se introducta sunt. nec queri poterit venditor, si restitutus fuerit in eam causam, in qua se ipse constituit et quam mutare non potuisset, si minor auxilium praetoris non implorasset.
If a judge has ordered that the estate be restored to a youth overreached in the sale, and that he repay the price to the buyer; and if he is unwilling to use this restitutio in integrum, repentance having been made, the youth will be able to have a useful exception against one seeking the price as if from a cause adjudged, because it is permitted to everyone to disdain those things which have been introduced on his behalf. Nor will the seller be able to complain, if he has been restored to that position in which he placed himself and which he could not have changed, if the minor had not implored the praetor’s aid.
Non omnia, quae minores annis viginti quinque gerunt, irrita sunt, sed ea tantum, quae causa cognita eiusmodi deprehensa sunt, vel ab aliis circumventi vel sua facilitate decepti aut quod habuerunt amiserunt, aut quod adquirere emolumentum potuerunt omiserint, aut se oneri quod non suscipere licuit obligaverunt.
Not all the things which minors under the age of twenty-five years do are void, but only those which, the cause having been examined, have been found to be of such a kind: either that they were circumvented by others or deceived by their own facility, or that they lost what they had, or omitted to acquire an emolument which they could have acquired, or that they obligated themselves to a burden which it was permitted not to undertake.
Eum, qui ex sua voluntate minorem annis in iudicio defendit et condemnatus est, ex causa iudicati posse conveniri nec eius quem defendit aetatem ad restitutionem impetrandam ei prodesse, cum causam iudicati recusare non possit. ex quo apparet nec eum, cuius nomine condemnatus est, auxilium restitutionis propter eam sententiam implorare posse.
He who, of his own will, defends in court a minor in years and is condemned can be sued on the cause of the adjudged matter; nor does the age of him whom he defended profit him for obtaining restitution, since he cannot refuse the cause of the adjudged. Whence it appears that not even the one in whose name he was condemned can implore the aid of restitution on account of that sentence.
Tutor urguentibus creditoribus rem pupillarem bona fide vendidit, denuntiante tamen matre emptoribus: quaero, cum urguentibus creditoribus distracta sit nec de sordibus tutoris merito quippiam dici potest, an pupillus in integrum restitui potest. respondi cognita causa aestimandum, nec idcirco, si iustum sit restitui, denegandum id auxilium, quod tutor delicto vacaret.
The tutor, with creditors pressing, sold the ward’s property in good faith, the mother nevertheless giving notice to the purchasers: I ask, since it was alienated under pressure from creditors and nothing can rightly be said of the tutor’s turpitude, whether the pupil can be restored in integrum. I responded that, the case having been inquired into, the matter must be assessed, and therefore, if it is just that restoration be granted, that aid is not to be denied on the ground that the tutor would be free from delict.
Curator adulescentium praedia communia sibi et his, quorum curam administrabat, vendidit: quaero, si decreto praetoris adulescentes in integrum restituti fuerint, an eatenus venditio rescindenda sit, quatenus adulescentium pro parte fundus communis fuit? respondi eatenus rescindi, nisi si emptor a toto contractu velit discedi, quod partem empturus non esset. item quaero, emptor utrum a seio et sempronio pupillis pretium cum usuris recipere deberet an vero ab herede curatoris?
The curator of the adolescents sold the common estates belonging to himself and to those whose care he was administering: I ask, if by decree of the praetor the adolescents have been restored in integrum, whether the sale should be rescinded only to the extent that the estate was common in part to the adolescents? I answered that it is to be rescinded to that extent, unless the buyer should wish to withdraw from the whole contract, because he would not have been going to buy a part. Likewise I ask whether the buyer ought to recover the price with interest from Seius and Sempronius, the wards, or rather from the heir of the curator?
Si res pupillaris vel adulescentis distracta fuerit, quam lex distrahi non prohibet, venditio quidem valet, verumtamen si grande damnum pupilli vel adulescentis versatur, etiam si collusio non intercessit, distractio per in integrum restitutionem revocatur.
If the property of a ward or an adolescent has been alienated, which the law does not prohibit to be alienated, the sale indeed is valid; nevertheless, if a great loss is at stake for the ward or the adolescent, even if no collusion has intervened, the alienation is revoked by in integrum restitution.
Iunius diophantus pomponio suo salutem. minor viginti quinque annis novandi animo intercessit pro eo, qui temporali actione tenebatur, tunc cum adhuc supererant decem dies, et postea in integrum restitutus est: utrum restitutio, quae creditori adversus priorem debitorem datur, decem dierum sit an plenior? ego didici ex tempore in integrum restitutionis tantundem temporis praestandum, quantum supererat: tu quid de eo putas velim rescribas.
Iunius Diophantus to his Pomponius, greetings. A minor under twenty-five years, with the intent of novating, interceded as surety for one who was held by a temporal action, at a time when ten days still remained, and afterwards he was restored in integrum: whether the restitution, which is given to the creditor against the prior debtor, is to be for ten days or fuller? I have learned that from the time of the in integrum restitution there must be afforded just as much time as was remaining; what you think about this I would like you to write back.
Pertinet hoc edictum ad eas capitis deminutiones, quae salva civitate contingunt. ceterum sine amissione civitatis sive libertatis amissione contingat capitis deminutio, cessabit edictum neque possunt hi penitus conveniri: dabitur plane actio in eos, ad quos bona pervenerunt eorum.
This edict pertains to those diminutions of status which occur with citizenship preserved. But if a diminution of status occurs by loss either of citizenship or of liberty, the edict will cease, and these persons cannot at all be convened; plainly, an action will be given against those to whom their goods have come.
Hi qui capite minuuntur ex his causis, quae capitis deminutionem praecesserunt, manent obligati naturaliter: ceterum si postea, imputare quis sibi debebit cur contraxerit, quantum ad verba huius edicti pertinet. sed interdum, si contrahatur cum his post capitis deminutionem, danda est actio: et quidem si adrogatus sit, nullus labor: nam perinde obligabitur ut filius familias.
Those who are reduced in civil status, from those causes which preceded the capitis deminutio, remain naturally obligated: however, if afterwards, one must impute to himself why he contracted, so far as the words of this edict are concerned. But sometimes, if one contracts with them after the capitis deminutio, an action is to be given: and indeed, if he has been adrogated, no trouble: for he will be obligated just as a filius familias.
Qui deficiunt, capite minuuntur ( deficere autem dicuntur, qui ab his, quorum sub imperio sunt, desistunt et in hostium numerum se conferunt): sed et hi, quos senatus hostes iudicavit vel lege lata: utique usque eo, ut civitatem amittant.
Those who defect are diminished in caput (now, they are said to defect who desist from those under whose command they are and transfer themselves into the number of the enemy): and likewise those whom the Senate has adjudged enemies, or by a law enacted—namely, to the extent that they lose citizenship.
Tutelas etiam non amittit capitis minutio exceptis his, quae in iure alieno personis positis deferuntur. igitur testamento dati vel ex lege vel ex senatus consulto erunt nihilo minus tutores: sed legitimae tutelae ex duodecim tabulis intervertuntur eadem ratione, qua et hereditates exinde legitimae, quia adgnatis deferuntur, qui desinunt esse familia mutati. ex novis autem legibus et hereditates et tutelae plerumque sic deferuntur, ut personae naturaliter designentur: ut ecce deferunt hereditatem senatus consulta matri et filio.
He does not even lose tutelages by diminution of status (capitis deminutio), except for those which are conferred upon persons placed in an alien right. Therefore those given by testament or by statute or by senatorial decree will nonetheless be tutors; but the legitimate guardianships from the Twelve Tables are overturned for the same reason as the legitimate inheritances from that source, because they are devolved upon agnates, who cease to be such when the family has been changed. From the newer laws, however, both inheritances and tutelages are for the most part thus devolved, that persons are designated naturally: for example, senatorial decrees confer the inheritance upon mother and son.
Si libertate adempta capitis deminutio subsecuta sit, nulli restitutioni adversus servum locus est, quia nec praetoria iurisdictione ita servus obligatur, ut cum eo actio sit: sed utilis actio adversus dominum danda est, ut iulianus scribit, et nisi in solidum defendatur, permittendum mihi est in bona quae habuit mitti.
If, with liberty taken away, a diminution of status follows, there is no place for any restitution against the slave, because not even under praetorian jurisdiction is the slave bound in such a way that there is an action against him; but a useful action is to be granted against the master, as Julian writes, and unless he be defended for the whole, it is to be permitted to me to be put into possession of the goods which he had.
Eas obligationes, quae naturalem praestationem habere intelleguntur, palam est capitis deminutione non perire, quia civilis ratio naturalia iura corrumpere non potest. itaque de dote actio, quia in bonum et aequum concepta est, nihilo minus durat etiam post capitis deminutionem,
Those obligations which are understood to have a natural prestation are plainly not extinguished by capitis deminutio, because the civil order cannot corrupt natural rights. And so the action for dowry, since it is conceived on the basis of the good and the equitable, nonetheless endures even after capitis deminutio,
Capitis deminutionis tria genera sunt, maxima media minima: tria enim sunt quae habemus, libertatem civitatem familiam. igitur cum omnia haec amittimus, hoc est libertatem et civitatem et familiam, maximam esse capitis deminutionem: cum vero amittimus civitatem, libertatem retinemus, mediam esse capitis deminutionem: cum et libertas et civitas retinetur, familia tantum mutatur, minimam esse capitis deminutionem constat.
There are three kinds of diminution of status, the greatest, the middle, the least: for there are three things which we have, liberty, citizenship, family. therefore, when we lose all these, that is, liberty and citizenship and family, the diminution of status is the greatest: but when we lose citizenship, while we retain liberty, the diminution of status is the middle: when both liberty and citizenship are retained, and only the family is changed, it is established that the diminution of status is the least.
Huius edicti causam nemo non iustissimam esse confitebitur: laesum enim ius per id tempus, quo quis rei publicae operam dabat vel adverso casu laborabat, corrigitur, nec non et adversus eos succurritur, ne vel obsit vel prosit quod evenit.
Everyone will confess the cause of this edict to be most just: for an injured right, for that time during which someone was giving service to the Republic or was laboring under an adverse mischance, is corrected; and likewise relief is afforded even against them, lest what has occurred either harm or profit.
Verba autem edicti talia sunt: " si cuius quid de bonis, cum is metus aut sine dolo malo rei publicae causa abesset, inve vinculis servitute hostiumque potestate esset: sive cuius actionis eorum cui dies exisse dicetur: item si quis quid usu suum fecisset, aut quod non utendo amisit, consecutus, actioneve qua solutus ob id, quod dies eius exierit, cum absens non defenderetur, inve vinculis esset, secumve agendi potestatem non faceret, aut cum eum invitum in ius vocari non liceret neque defenderetur: cumve magistratus de ea re appellatus esset sive cui pro magistratu ^ per magistratus^ sine dolo ipsius actio exempta esse dicetur: earum rerum actionem intra annum, quo primum de ea re experiundi potestas erit, item si qua alia mihi iusta causa esse videbitur, in integrum restituam, quod eius per leges plebis scita senatus consulta edicta decreta principum licebit. "
But the words of the edict are such: " if anyone’s something of his goods, when he was absent through fear or, without evil deceit, for the sake of the commonwealth, or was in chains, in servitude, and under the power of enemies: or if of any action of those persons for whom it will be said that their day has expired: likewise, if anyone had made something his own by usucapion, or had acquired what he lost by not using, or had been released by an action on account of this, that his day had expired, when, being absent, he was not defended, or was in chains, or did not make the power of proceeding against himself, or when it was not permitted to summon him unwilling into court and he was not defended: or when the magistrate had been appealed in that matter, or if for someone, on behalf of the magistrate ^ by magistrates^, without his own fraud, the action shall be said to have been taken away: the action concerning those matters within a year, from the time when first there will be the power of making trial in that matter, likewise, if any other just cause shall seem to me to exist, I will restore in integrum, so far as of this will be permitted through laws, plebiscites, senatorial decrees, edicts, and decrees of the emperors. "
Metus autem causa abesse videtur, qui iusto timore mortis vel cruciatus corporis conterritus abest: et hoc ex affectu eius intellegitur. sed non sufficit quolibet terrore abductum timuisse, sed huius rei disquisitio iudicis est.
But fear, moreover, seems to be a cause for being absent, when one is absent, thoroughly frightened by a just fear of death or of bodily excruciation: and this is understood from his affect. But it does not suffice that, led away by any terror whatsoever, he was afraid; rather, the disquisition of this matter is the judge’s.
Item hi, qui rei publicae causa sine dolo malo afuissent. dolum malum eo pertinere accepi, ut qui reverti potest neque reverteretur, in eo, quod per id tempus adversus eum factum est, non adiuvetur: veluti si alterius grandis commodi captandi gratia id egerit, ut rei publicae causa abesset, et revocatur ab isto privilegio,
Likewise those who had been absent for the sake of the Republic without malicious deceit. I have understood that malicious deceit pertains to this, namely, that he who is able to return and does not return is not aided as to that which has been done against him during that time: for instance, if for the sake of capturing another’s great advantage he contrived that he be absent for the sake of the Republic, he is recalled from that privilege,
Et qui data opera et sine lucro hoc affectaverit: vel qui maturius profectus est: vel litis gratia coepit rei publicae causa abesse. sed haec adiectio doli mali ad rei publicae causa absentes refertur, non etiam ad eum, qui metus causa: quoniam nullus metus est, si dolus intercedit.
And also he who by deliberate effort and without gain has aimed at this; or who set out earlier; or who, for the sake of litigation, began to be absent on account of the commonwealth. But this addition of malicious fraud is applied to those absent for the sake of the commonwealth, not also to him who is absent by reason of fear: since there is no fear, if fraud intervenes.
Succurritur etiam ei, qui in vinculis fuisset. quod non solum ad eum pertinet, qui publica custodia coercetur, sed ad eum quoque, qui a latronibus aut praedonibus vel potentiore vi oppressus vinculis coercebatur. vinculorum autem appellatio latius accipitur: nam etiam inclusos veluti lautumiis vinctorum numero haberi placet, quia nihil intersit, parietibus an compedibus teneatur.
Relief is also afforded to one who has been in bonds; and this pertains not only to him who is restrained in public custody, but also to him who, overpowered by bandits or pirates or by a more powerful force, was restrained in chains. Moreover, the appellation of “bonds” is taken more broadly: for it is held that even those shut in, as in the quarries, are to be reckoned in the number of the bound, because it makes no difference whether one is held by walls or by fetters.
Item ei succurritur, qui in hostium potestate fuit, id est ab hostibus captus. nam transfugis nullum credendum est beneficium tribui, quibus negatum est postliminium. poterant tamen, qui in hostium potestate essent, illa parte edicti contineri, qua loquitur de his qui in servitute fuerint.
Likewise, aid is afforded to one who has been in the power of enemies, that is, captured by enemies. For it is to be believed that no beneficium is granted to deserters, for whom postliminium is denied. Nevertheless, those who were in the power of enemies could be included under that part of the edict which speaks about those who have been in servitude.
Ab hostibus autem captis postliminio reversis succurritur aut ibi mortuis, quia nec procuratorem habere possunt: cum aliis supra scriptis etiam per procuratorem possit subveniri praeter eos, qui in servitute detinentur. ego autem etiam nomine eius, qui hostium potitus est, si curator ( ut plerumque) fuerit bonis constitutus, auxilium competere existimo.
But relief is afforded to those captured by enemies who have returned by postliminy, or who have died there, because they cannot have a procurator: whereas to the other persons written above aid can even be furnished through a procurator, except those who are detained in servitude. I, however, consider that even in the name of him who has come into the power of the enemy, if a curator ( as for the most part) has been appointed for his goods, a remedy is competent.
Sed quod simpliciter praetor edixit " posteave" ita accipiendum est, ut si inchoata sit bonae fidei possessoris detentatio ante absentiam, finita autem reverso, restitutionis auxilium locum habeat non quandoque, sed ita demum, si intra modicum tempus quam rediit hoc contigit, id est dum hospitium quis conducit, sarcinulas componit, quaerit advocatum: nam eum, qui differt restitutionem, non esse audiendum neratius scribit.
But as to the point that the praetor simply edicted “or thereafter,” it is to be understood thus: if the detention of a possessor in good faith was begun before the absence, but was concluded after his return, the aid of restitution has place not whenever, but only if this befell within a modest time after he came back—that is, while one hires lodging, arranges his little packs, and seeks an advocate; for Neratius writes that one who defers restitution is not to be heard.
Non enim neglegentibus subvenitur, sed necessitate rerum impeditis. totumque istud arbitrio praetoris temperabitur, id est ut ita demum restituat, si non neglegentia, sed temporis angustia non potuerunt litem contestari.
For relief is not afforded to the negligent, but to those impeded by the necessity of circumstances. and the whole of this will be tempered by the discretion of the praetor, that is, that he grant restitution only then, if it was not negligence, but the pressure of time, that prevented them from joining issue in the action.
Iulianus libro quarto scribit non solum adversus possessorem hereditatis succurrendum militi, verum adversus eos quoque, qui a possessore emerunt, ut vindicari res possint, si miles hereditatem adgnoverit: quod si non adgnoverit, ex post facto usucapionem processisse manifestatur.
Julian in book 4 writes that succor must be afforded to the soldier not only against the possessor of the inheritance, but also against those who bought from the possessor, so that the things can be vindicated, if the soldier has acknowledged the inheritance: but if he has not acknowledged it, it is manifest that usucapion has proceeded ex post facto.
Eum quoque cui sic legatum sit: " vel in annos singulos, quibus in italia esset", restituendum, ut capiat, atque si in italia fuisset, et labeo scribit et iulianus libro quarto et pomponius libro trigensimo primo probant: non enim dies actionis exit, ubi praetoris auxilium necessarium erat, sed condicio in causa est.
He too, to whom it has been bequeathed thus: "or for each single year during which he was in Italy," must be restored, in order that he may take, as if he had been in Italy; and both Labeo writes this, and Iulianus in book 4 and Pomponius in book 31 approve it: for the day for bringing the action does not run out where the praetor’s aid was necessary, but a condition is in question.
Denique si emptor, priusquam per usum sibi adquireret, ab hostibus captus sit, placet interruptam possessionem postliminio non restitui, quia haec sine possessione non constitit, possessio autem plurimum facti habet: causa vero facti non continetur postliminio.
Finally, if the buyer, before he had acquired it for himself through use (usucapion), was captured by the enemy, it is the view that the interrupted possession is not restored by postliminy, because this did not subsist without possession; possession moreover has very much of fact, but the matter of fact is not encompassed by postliminy.
" item", ait praetor," si quis usu suum fecisset, aut quod non utendo sit amissum consecutus, actioneve qua solutus ob id, quod dies eius exierit, cum absens non defenderetur. " quam clausulam praetor inseruit, ut quemadmodum succurrit supra scriptis personis, ne capiantur, ita et adversus ipsas succurrit, ne capiant.
" likewise", says the praetor," if anyone had made it his own by use, or had obtained what had been lost by not using, or had been released from an action because its day had expired, while the absent man was not being defended. " This clause the praetor inserted, so that just as he succors the persons written above, lest they be taken advantage of, so too he succors against those same persons, lest they take advantage.
Et erit notandum, quod plus praetor expressit, cum adversus eos restituit, quam cum ipsis subvenit: nam hic non certas personas enumeravit adversus quas subvenit, ut supra, sed adiecit clausulam, qua omnes qui absentes non defenduntur complexus est.
And it will be to be noted that the praetor expressed more when he grants restitution against them than when he comes to their aid themselves: for here he did not enumerate specific persons against whom he affords relief, as above, but he added a clause by which he encompassed all who, being absent, are not defended.
Haec autem restitutio locum habet, sive per se sive per subiectas sibi personas usu adquisierunt, qui absentes non defendebantur, et ita, si nemo eorum erat defensor. nam si fuit procurator, cum habueris quem convenias, non debet inquietari. ceterum si non existebat defensor, aequissimum erat subveniri, eo potius, quod eorum qui non defenduntur, si quidem latitent, praetor ex edicto pollicetur in bona eorum mittere, ut si res exegerit etiam distrahantur, si vero non latitent, licet non defendantur, in bona tantum mitti.
However, this restitutio has a place for those who, being absent and not defended, have acquired by usucapion, whether by themselves or through persons subject to them—and thus, if none of them had a defensor. For if there was a procurator, since you have someone whom you may convene, he ought not to be disturbed. But if no defensor existed, it was most equitable to grant relief, all the more because, as to those who are not defended, if indeed they are in hiding, the praetor by edict promises to send into their goods (missio in bona), so that, if the matter requires, they may even be sold off; but if they are not in hiding, although they are not defended, to be sent into their goods only.
Defendi autem non is videtur, cuius se defensor ingerit, sed qui requisitus ab actore non est defensioni defuturus, plenaque defensio accipietur, si et iudicium non detrectetur et iudicatum solvi satisdetur.
Moreover, he is not seen as defended, on whose behalf a defender thrusts himself in; rather, he is, who, when required by the plaintiff, will not be lacking to the defense; and a full defense will be accepted, if both the action is not declined and surety is given that the adjudged amount will be paid.
Ergo sciendum est non aliter hoc edictum locum habere, quam si amici eius interrogati fuerint, an defendant, aut si nemo sit, qui interrogari potest. ita enim absens defendi non videtur, si actor ultro interpellat nec quisquam defensioni se offerat: eaque testatione complecti oportet.
Therefore it must be known that this edict has effect only if his friends have been interrogated whether they will defend, or if there is no one who can be interrogated. For an absent person is not considered to be defended if the actor interpellates of his own accord and no one offers himself for the defense; and it ought to be included in that testation.
Ait praetor: " inve vinculis esset, secumve agendi potestatem non faceret". haec persona merito adiecta est: fieri enim poterat, ut quis in vinculis praesens esset, vel in publica vel in privata vincula ductus: nam eteum qui in vinculis est, si modo non sit in servitute, posse usu adquirere constat. sed et is, qui in vinculis est si defendatur, cessat restitutio.
The praetor says: " or if he were in chains, or did not afford the power of proceeding with him." this person was rightly added: for it could happen that someone, being present, was in chains, led into public or private bonds: for even one who is in chains, provided only that he is not in servitude, is understood to be able to acquire by use (usucapion). But also, if one who is in chains is defended, restitution ceases.
Item ei, qui per captivitatem fundi possessionem vel usus fructus quasi possessionem amisit, succurrendum esse papinianus ait, et fructus quoque medio tempore ab alio ex usu fructu perceptos debere captivo restitui aequum putat.
Likewise, to him who through captivity has lost the possession of a farm (fundus) or the quasi-possession of a usufruct, relief must be afforded, says Papinian; and he also deems it equitable that the fruits as well, gathered in the meantime by another from the usufruct, ought to be restored to the captive.
Hi plane, qui fuerunt in potestate captivi, usu rem adquirere possunt ex re peculiari: et aequum erit ex hac clausula praesentibus, id est qui non sunt in captivitate, subveniri, si cum non defenderentur usucaptum quid sit. sed et si dies actionis, quae adversus captivum competebat, exierit, succurretur adversus eum.
Clearly, those who were in the power of the captive can acquire ownership by usucaption of a thing from the peculium; and it will be equitable, by virtue of this clause, that aid be given to those present, that is, who are not in captivity, if, while they were not being defended, something has been usucaptured. But also, if the time for an action which lay against the captive has expired, relief will be afforded against him.
Deinde adicit praetor: " secumve agendi potestatem non faceret", ut si, dum hoc faciat, per usum adquisitio impleta vel quid ex supra scriptis contigit, restitutio concedatur: merito, nec enim sufficit semper in possessionem bonorum eius mitti, quia ea interdum species esse potest, ut in bonis latitantis mitti non possit aut non latitet: finge enim, dum advocationes postulat, diem exisse, vel dum alia mora iudicii contingit.
Then the praetor adds: " or should not make the power of proceeding in action with him," so that, if, while he does this, acquisition by use is completed or something from the above-written occurs, restitution may be granted: rightly so; for it does not always suffice to be sent into possession of his goods, because there can sometimes be a case such that one cannot be sent into the goods of one who is in hiding, or he is not in hiding: imagine, for instance, that, while he is demanding advocations (adjournments), the day has run out, or while some other delay of the trial occurs.
Ait praetor: " aut cum eum invitum in ius vocare non liceret neque defenderetur". haec clausula ad eos pertinet, quos more maiorum sine fraude in ius vocare non licet, ut consulem praetorem ceterosque, qui imperium potestatemve quam habent. sed nec ad eos pertinet hoc edictum, quos praetor prohibet sine permissu suo vocari, quoniam aditus potuit permittere: patronos puta et parentes.
The praetor says: "or when it is not permitted to summon him into court against his will, nor is he defended." This clause pertains to those whom, by the custom of the ancestors, it is not permitted to summon into court without penalty, such as the consul, the praetor, and others who have imperium or potestas. But this edict does not pertain to those whom the praetor forbids to be summoned without his permission, since he could grant access: patrons, for instance, and parents.
Ait praetor: " sive cui per magistratus sine dolo malo ipsius actio exempta esse dicetur". hoc quo? ut si per dilationes iudicis effectum sit, ut actio eximatur, fiat restitutio. sed et si magistratus copia non fuit, labeo ait restitutionem faciendam.
The praetor says: " or if anyone’s action shall be said to have been removed through the magistrates, without evil fraud on his part." To what end is this? So that, if through the judge’s adjournments it has been brought about that the action be removed, let restitution be made. But also, if there was no availability of magistrates, Labeo says restitution is to be made.
but “done through the magistrate” is to be understood thus, if he did not pronounce the law; otherwise, if, the case having been examined, he denied the action, restitution ceases; and so it seems to Servius. Likewise, it appears to be through the magistrate’s doing if, through favor or sordidness (corruption), the magistrate did not pronounce the law; and this part will have place, and likewise also the earlier “ secumve agendi potestatem non faciat”: for the litigant contrived this, that action might not be brought against himself, while he corrupts the judge.
Et adicitur: " sine dolo malo ipsius", videlicet ut, si dolus eius intervenit, ne ei succurratur: ipsis enim delinquentibus praetor non subvenit. proinde si, dum vult apud sequentem praetorem agere, tempus frustratus est, non ei subvenietur. sed et si, dum decreto praetoris non obtemperat, iurisdictionem ei denegaverit, non esse eum restituendum labeo scribit.
And it is added: " without his own fraudulent intent," namely, that, if his fraud intervened, he is not to be succored: for the praetor does not come to the aid of the delinquents themselves. Accordingly, if, while he wishes to bring an action before the succeeding praetor, he has missed the time, no aid will be afforded him. But also, if, while he does not obey the praetor’s decree, the praetor has denied him jurisdiction, Labeo writes that he is not to be restored.
Si feriae extra ordinem sint indictae, ob res puta prospere gestas vel in honorem principis, et propterea magistratus ius non dixerit, gaius cassius nominatim edicebat restituturum se, quia per praetorem videbatur factum: sollemnium enim feriarum rationem haberi non debere, quia prospicere eas potuerit et debuerit actor, ne in eas incidat. quod verius est, et ita celsus libro secundo digestorum scribit. sed cum feriae tempus eximunt, restitutio dumtaxat ipsorum dierum facienda est, non totius temporis.
If holidays have been proclaimed out of the ordinary, for instance on account of affairs, suppose, successfully accomplished, or in honor of the princeps, and for that reason the magistrate has not held court, Gaius Cassius expressly used to proclaim by edict that he would grant restitution, because it seemed to have been done through the praetor: for no account ought to be taken of the solemn holidays, because the plaintiff could and ought to have foreseen them, so as not to fall upon them. Which is the truer view, and so Celsus writes in the second book of the Digest. But since holidays remove time from the reckoning, restitution is to be made only for those days themselves, not for the whole period.
" item", inquit praetor, " si qua alia mihi iusta causa videbitur, in integrum restituam. " haec clausula edicto inserta est necessario: multi enim casus evenire potuerunt, qui deferrent restitutionis auxilium, nec singillatim enumerari potuerunt, ut, quotiens aequitas restitutionem suggerit, ad hanc clausulam erit descendendum. ut puta legatione quis pro civitate functus est: aequissimum est eum restitui, licet rei publicae causa non absit: et saepissime constitutum est adiuvari eum debere, sive habuit procuratorem sive non.
" likewise," says the praetor, " if any other just cause shall seem to me, I will grant restitution in integrum. " This clause has been necessarily inserted into the edict: for many cases could occur which would bring the aid of restitution, and they could not be enumerated one by one, so that, whenever equity suggests restitution, one must resort to this clause. For instance, someone has performed an embassy on behalf of his community: it is most equitable that he be restored, although he is not away on public business; and it has been most often established that he ought to be aided, whether he had a procurator or not.
I think the same, even if for the sake of testimony he has been summoned from whatever province either to the City or to the Princeps: for to this man too it has very often been rescripted that he be succored. But also to those who have traveled abroad for the sake of a hearing (cognitio) or of an appeal, similarly aid has been afforded. And generally, whenever someone has been absent from necessity, not from will, it ought to be said that assistance must be given to him.
Si quis saepius rei publicae causa afuit, ex novissimo reditu tempus restitutionis esse ei computandum labeo putat. sed si omnes quidem absentiae annum colligant, singulae minus anno, utrum annum ei damus ad restitutionem an vero tantum temporis, quantum novissima eius absentia occupavit, videndum: et puto annum dandum.
If anyone has been absent more often for the sake of the commonwealth, Labeo thinks that the time for restitution is to be computed for him from his most recent return. But if all the absences together make up a year, though each is less than a year, it must be considered whether we grant him a year for restitution, or rather only so much time as his most recent absence occupied: and I think a year should be given.
Si cum in provincia domicilium haberes, esses autem in urbe, an mihi annus cedat, quasi experiundi potestatem habeam? et ait labeo non cedere. ego autem puto hoc ita verum, si ius revocandi domum adversarius habuit: si minus, videri esse experiundi potestatem, quia et romae contestari litem potuit.
If, while you had your domicile in the province, you were, however, in the City, does the year accrue to me, as if I had the power of bringing an action? And Labeo says it does not accrue. I, however, think this true thus, if the adversary had the right of recalling you home; if not, it seems that there is the power of bringing an action, because he could even at Rome join issue in the suit.
Cum miles qui usucapiebat decesserit et heres impleverit usucapionem, aequum est rescindi quod postea usucaptum est, ut eadem in heredibus, qui in usucapionem succedunt, servanda sint: quia possessio defuncti quasi iniuncta descendit ad heredem et plerumque nondum hereditate adita completur.
When a soldier who was usucapting has died and the heir has completed the usucapion, it is equitable that what was afterwards usucaptured be rescinded, so that the same things be observed in heirs who succeed into the usucapion: because the possession of the deceased descends to the heir as if annexed, and for the most part is completed even before the inheritance has been entered upon.
Si is, qui rei publicae causa afuit, usucepit et post usucapionem alienaverit rem, restitutio facienda erit et licet sine dolo afuerit et usuceperit, lucro eius occurri oportet. item ex reliquis omnibus causis restitutio facienda erit, veluti si adversus eum pronuntiatum sit.
If someone who was absent for the sake of the commonwealth acquired the thing by usucapion and, after usucapion, alienated the thing, restitution will have to be made; and although he was absent without fraud and acquired by usucapion, his gain must be countered. Likewise, in all the remaining causes restitution will have to be made, as for instance if a pronouncement has been made against him.
Abesse rei publicae causa intellegitur et is, qui ab urbe profectus est, licet nondum provinciam excesserit: sed et is qui excessit, donec in urbem revertatur. et hoc ad proconsules legatosque eorum et ad eos, qui provinciis praesunt, procuratoresve principum, qui in provinciis tenentur, pertinet, et ad tribunos militum et praefectos et comites legatorum, qui ad aerarium delati aut in commentarium principis delati sunt.
One is understood to be absent on account of the commonwealth even he who has set out from the City, although he has not yet left the province; and likewise he who has left it, until he returns to the City. And this pertains to proconsuls and their legates, and to those who preside over provinces, or to the emperors’ procurators who are stationed in the provinces, and to military tribunes and prefects and the companions (comites) of legates, who have been entered in the Aerarium (treasury) or entered in the emperor’s Commentarius (record).
Item procurator caesaris, non solum cui rerum provinciae cuiusque procuratio mandata erit, sed et is, cui rerum quamvis non omnium. itaque plures sibi procuratores diversarum rerum rei publicae causa abesse intelleguntur.
Likewise the procurator of Caesar, not only the one to whom the procuration of the affairs of any province shall have been mandated, but also the one to whom the procuration of affairs—although not of all—[is committed]. And so several procurators of different affairs are understood to be absent for him for the sake of the commonwealth.
Et dum eat in castra et redeat, rei publicae causa abest, quod et eundum sit in castra militaturo et redeundum. vivianus scribit proculum respondisse militem, qui commeatu absit, dum domum vadit aut redit, rei publicae causa abesse, dum domi sit, non abesse.
And while he goes into the camp and returns, he is absent for the sake of the republic, because both going into the camp to do military service and returning must be done. Vivianus writes that Proculus replied that a soldier who is absent on furlough, while he goes home or returns, is absent for the sake of the republic; while he is at home, he is not absent.
Si cui in provincia sua princeps adsidere speciali beneficio permiserit, puto eum rei publicae causa abesse: quod si non ex permissu hoc fecerit, consequenter dicemus, cum crimen admisit, non habere eum privilegia eorum, qui rei publicae causa absunt.
If the princeps has permitted someone by a special benefice to sit as assessor in his own province, I think him to be absent for the sake of the commonwealth; but if he has done this not by permission, consequently we shall say, since he has committed a crime, that he does not have the privileges of those who are absent for the sake of the commonwealth.
Tamdiu rei publicae causa abesse quis videbitur, quamdiu officio aliquo praeest: quod si finitum fuerit officium, iam desinit abesse rei publicae causa. sed ad revertendum illi tempora computabimus statim atque desiit rei publicae causa abesse ea quibus reverti in urbem potuit: et erit moderatum tempora ei dare, quae lex revertentibus praestitit. quare si quo deflexerit suae rei causa, non dubitamus id tempus ei non proficere, habitaque dinumeratione temporis, quo reverti potuit, statim eum dicemus desisse rei publicae causa abesse.
Someone will be deemed to be absent for the sake of the Republic for as long as he presides over some office; but if the office has ended, he at once ceases to be absent for the sake of the Republic. But for his return we will reckon from the moment he ceased to be absent for the sake of the Republic the time within which he could have returned to the city; and it will be proper to grant him the periods which the law has provided for those returning. Wherefore, if he has turned aside anywhere for the sake of his own affairs, we do not doubt that that time does not accrue to his benefit; and, the reckoning having been made of the time within which he could have returned, we will say that he immediately ceased to be absent for the sake of the Republic.
Si quis titio legaverit, si mortis suae tempore in italia esset, aut in annos singulos, quod in italia esset, et ei succursum fuerit, quia ob id, quod rei publicae causa afuit, exclusus fuerit a legato: fideicommissum ab eo relictum praestare cogitur. Marcellus notat: quis enim dubitabit salva legatorum et fideicommissorum causa militi restitui hereditatem, quam ob id perdidit, quod rei publicae causa afuit?
If someone has bequeathed to Titius, on condition that at the time of his death he was in Italy, or for each single year in which he was in Italy, and succor has been afforded to him because, for the reason that he was away for the sake of the commonwealth, he had been excluded from the legacy: he is compelled to render the fideicommissum left by him. Marcellus notes: for who will doubt, with the claims of legacies and fideicommissa kept safe, that the inheritance should be restored to a soldier, which he lost for this reason, that he was away for the sake of the commonwealth?
Si quis stipulatus sit in annos singulos, quoad in italia esset vel ipse vel promissor, et alteruter rei publicae causa abesse coeperit, officium praetoris est introducere utilem actionem. eadem dicemus, et si ita concepta stipulatio fuerit: " si quinquennio proximo romae fuerit", vel ita: " si romae non fuerit, centum dare spondes?"
If someone has stipulated for each single year, so long as either he himself or the promisor was in italy, and either one begins to be absent for the sake of the commonwealth, it is the duty of the praetor to introduce a useful action. We shall say the same also if the stipulation has been framed thus: " if in the next five-year period he shall have been at rome", or thus: " if he shall not have been at rome, do you promise to give one hundred?"
Omnibus modis proconsul id agit, ne cuius deterior causa fiat ex alieno facto, et cum intellegeret iudiciorum exitum interdum duriorem nobis constitui opposito nobis alio adversario, in eam quoque rem prospexit, ut si quis alienando rem alium nobis adversarium suo loco substituerit idque data opera in fraudem nostram fecerit, tanti nobis in factum actione teneatur, quanti nostra intersit alium adversarium nos non habuisse.
In every way the proconsul strives that no one’s case become worse from another’s act; and since he understood that the outcome of judgments is sometimes made harsher for us by another adversary being opposed to us, he also provided for this: that if anyone, by alienating a thing, has substituted another adversary for us in his own place, and has done this by design in fraud of us, he be held to us by an action in factum for as much as it is our interest not to have had another adversary.
Item si locum, in quo opus feceris, cuius nomine interdicto quod vi aut clam vel actione aquae pluviae arcendae tenebaris, alienaveris, durior nostra condicio facta intellegitur, quia si tecum ageretur, tuis impensis id opus tollere deberes, nunc vero cum incipiat mihi adversus alium actio esse quam qui fecerit, compellor meis impensis id tollere, quia ab alio factum possidet, hactenus istis actionibus tenetur, ut patiatur id opus tolli.
Likewise, if you have alienated the place in which you have made the work, on account of which you were held by the interdict “quod vi aut clam” or by the action for warding off rainwater, our condition is understood to have been made harsher; for if proceedings were had against you, you would have to remove that work at your expense; but now, since the action begins to lie for me against someone other than the one who made it, I am compelled to remove it at my own expense, since he possesses a thing made by another; he is held by these actions only to this extent, that he allow that work to be removed.
Opus quoque novum si tibi nuntiaverim tuque eum locum alienaveris et emptor opus fecerit, dicitur te hoc iudicio teneri, quasi neque tecum ex operis novi nuntiatione agere possim, quia nihil feceris, neque cum eo cui id alienaveris, quia ei nuntiatum non sit.
Likewise, if I have given you notice of a new work and you have alienated that place and the purchaser has carried out the work, it is said that you are held by this action, as if I could neither proceed with you by the notice of a new work, because you have done nothing, nor with him to whom you alienated it, because notice was not given to him.
Ex quibus apparet, quod proconsul in integrum restituturum se pollicetur, ut hac actione officio tantum iudicis consequatur actor, quantum eius intersit alium adversarium non habuisse: forte si quas impensas fecerit aut si quam aliam incommoditatem passus erit alio adversario substituto.
From which it appears that the proconsul promises that he will grant in integrum restitution, so that by this action the plaintiff, from the judge’s office only, recovers as much as it is of his interest not to have had a different adversary: for example, if he has incurred any expenses or shall have suffered any other inconvenience upon another adversary being substituted.
Itemque fieri potest, ut sine dolo malo quidem possidere desierit, verum iudicii mutandi causa id fiat. sunt et alia complura talia. potest autem aliquis dolo malo desinere possidere nec tamen iudicii mutandi causa fecisse nec hoc edicto teneri: neque enim alienat, qui dumtaxat omittit possessionem.
Likewise it can happen that someone has indeed ceased to possess without fraudulent intent, but that this is done for the sake of changing the suit. There are also many other such cases. Conversely, someone can cease to possess with fraudulent intent and yet not have done so for the sake of changing the suit, and not be bound by this edict: for he does not alienate who merely omits possession.
However, the praetor does not disapprove the act of one who held it at such a price to be without the thing, lest on account of it he should litigate more often (for this modest cogitation of one who execrates lawsuits is not to be vituperated), but only that of one who, while he wishes to have the thing, transfers the lawsuit to another, so that he may thrust forward in his stead a troublesome adversary.
Si quis autem ob valetudinem aut aetatem aut occupationes necessarias litem in alium transtulerit, in ea causa non est, ut hoc edicto teneatur, cum in hoc edicto doli mali fiat mentio. ceterum erit interdictum et per procuratores litigare dominio in eos plerumque ex iusta causa translato.
If, however, someone on account of ill‑health or age or necessary occupations has transferred the lawsuit onto another, he is not in such a case as to be bound by this edict, since in this edict mention is made of dolus malus. Moreover, an interdict will lie, and one may litigate through procurators, dominion having for the most part been transferred to them on a just cause.
Cum miles postulabat suo nomine litigare de possessionibus, quas sibi donatas esse dicebat, responsum est, si iudicii mutandi causa donatio facta fuerit, priorem dominum experiri oportere, ut rem magis quam litem in militem transtulisse credatur.
When a soldier was petitioning to litigate in his own name about possessions which he said had been donated to him, it was answered that, if the donation had been made for the purpose of changing the action, the former owner ought to bring suit, so that he may be believed to have transferred the thing rather than the lawsuit to the soldier.
Si quis iudicii communi dividundo evitandi causa rem alienaverit, ex lege licinnia ei interdicitur, ne communi dividundo iudicio experiatur: verbi gratia ut potentior emptor per licitationem vilius eam accipiat et per hoc iterum ipse recipiat. sed ipse quidem qui partem alienaverit communi dividundo iudicio si agere velit, non audietur: is vero qui emit si experiri velit, ex illa parte edicti vetatur, qua cavetur, ne qua alienatio iudicii mutandi causa fiat.
If anyone has alienated a thing for the purpose of avoiding the action for dividing common property, by the Lex Licinia he is interdicted, so that he may not proceed by the action for dividing common property; for example, in order that a more powerful purchaser may take it more cheaply through licitation and through this he himself may receive it back again. But the very person who has alienated the share, if he should wish to sue by the action for dividing common property, will not be heard; while he who bought, if he should wish to proceed, is forbidden by that part of the edict which provides that no alienation be made for the sake of changing the suit.
Tametsi neminem praetor cogat arbitrium recipere, quoniam haec res libera et soluta est et extra necessitatem iurisdictionis posita, attamen ubi semel quis in se receperit arbitrium, ad curam et sollicitudinem suam hanc rem pertinere praetor putat: non tantum quod studeret lites finiri, verum quoniam non deberent decipi, qui eum quasi virum bonum disceptatorem inter se elegerunt. finge enim post causam iam semel atque iterum tractatam, post nudata utriusque intima et secreta negotii aperta, arbitrum vel gratiae dantem vel sordibus corruptum vel alia qua ex causa nolle sententiam dicere: quisquamne potest negare aequissimum fore praetorem interponere se debuisse, ut officium quod in se recepit impleret?
Although the praetor compels no one to receive an arbitrium, since this matter is free and unbound and placed outside the necessity of jurisdiction, nevertheless, when once someone has taken an arbitrium upon himself, the praetor thinks that this matter pertains to his care and solicitude: not only because he is eager that lawsuits be finished, but because those ought not to be deceived who chose him among themselves as, so to speak, a good man, a disceptator. Suppose, in fact, after the case has already been handled once and again, after the inmost and secret matters of each party have been laid bare and opened, the arbiter, either granting favor or corrupted by sordid bribes or for some other cause, is unwilling to pronounce sentence: can anyone deny that it would be most equitable that the praetor ought to have interposed himself, so that the office which he took upon himself might be fulfilled?
Tractemus de personis arbitrantium. et quidem arbitrum cuiuscumque dignitatis coget officio quod susceperit perfungi, etiam si sit consularis: nisi forte sit in aliquo magistratu positus vel potestate, consul forte vel praetor, quoniam in hoc imperium non habet.
Let us treat of the persons of arbitrators. And indeed an arbiter, of whatever dignity, one will compel to discharge the duty which he has undertaken, even if he be of consular rank; unless perhaps he is placed in some magistracy or power, perhaps consul or praetor, since in this he does not have imperium.
Unde iulianus ait, si in titium et servum compromissum sit, nec titium cogendum sententiam dicere, quia cum alio receperit: quamvis servi, inquit, arbiterium nullum sit. quid tamen si dixerit sententiam titius? poena non committitur, quia non, ut receperit, dixit sententiam.
Whence Julianus says: if a compromissum has been made upon Titius and a slave, Titius is not to be compelled to pronounce a judgment, because he has undertaken it with another; although, he says, a slave’s arbitration is of no effect. But what if Titius should pronounce a judgment? The penalty is not incurred, because he did not pronounce the judgment as he had undertaken.
Quod ait praetor: " pecuniam compromissam", accipere nos debere, non si utrimque poena nummaria, sed si et alia res vice poenae, si quis arbitri sententia non steterit, promissa sit: et ita pomponius scribit. quid ergo, si res apud arbitrum depositae sunt eo pacto, ut ei daret qui vicerit, vel ut eam rem daret, si non pareatur sententiae, an cogendus sit sententiam dicere? et puto cogendum.
As to what the praetor says: " money pledged in the compromise," we ought to take it not only if on both sides a pecuniary penalty, but also if some other thing, in the stead of a penalty, has been promised in case anyone does not abide by the arbitrator’s sentence: and so Pomponius writes. What then, if things have been deposited with the arbiter on this pact, that he should give them to the one who has won, or that he should give that thing if the sentence is not obeyed—whether he is to be compelled to pronounce a sentence? And I think he must be compelled.
Item iulianus scribit non cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, si alter promiserit, alter non. idem dicit, et si sub condicione fuerit poena compromissa, veluti " si navis ex asia venerit, tot milia": non enim prius arbitrum cogendum sententiam dicere, quam condicio exstiterit: ne sit inefficax deficiente condicione. et ita pomponius libro trigensimo tertio ad edictum scribit.
likewise Julianus writes that an arbiter is not to be compelled to pronounce a sentence, if the one has promised and the other not. he says the same, too, if the penalty has been compromitted under a condition, as, for example, "if a ship shall have come from asia, so many thousands": for the arbiter is not to be compelled to pronounce a sentence before the condition has arisen, lest it be inefficacious if the condition fails. and so Pomponius writes in the thirty-third book on the Edict.
Idem pomponius scribit, si de meis solis controversiis sit compromissum et de te poenam sim stipulatus, videndum ne non sit compromissum. sed cui rei moveatur, non video: nam si ideo, quia de unius controversiis solum compromissum est, nulla ratio est: licet enim et de una re compromittere: si vero ideo, quia ex altera dumtaxat parte stipulatio intervenit, est ratio. quamquam si petitor fuit qui stipulatus est, possit dici plenum esse compromissum, quia is qui convenitur tutus est veluti pacti exceptione, is qui convenit, si arbitro non pareatur, habet stipulationem.
The same Pomponius writes: if there has been a compromise concerning my controversies alone, and I have stipulated a penalty from you, it must be considered whether there is not a (valid) compromise. But by what consideration he is moved, I do not see: for if for this reason, because the compromise is only about the controversies of one person, there is no ground; for it is permitted also to compromise about one matter. But if for this reason, because a stipulation intervened from only one side, there is ground. Nevertheless, if it was the claimant who made the stipulation, it can be said that the compromise is full, because the one who is sued is safe, as it were, by an exception of pact; the one who sues, if the arbiter is not obeyed, has the stipulation.
Recepisse autem arbitrium videtur, ut pedius libro nono dicit, qui iudicis partes suscepit finemque se sua sententia controversiis impositurum pollicetur. quod si, inquit, hactenus intervenit, ut experiretur, an consilio suo vel auctoritate discuti litem paterentur, non videtur arbitrium recepisse.
However, he seems to have accepted an arbitration, as Pedius says in the ninth book, when he has undertaken the parts of a judge and promises that by his own sentence he will impose an end upon the controversies. But if, he says, he has intervened only thus far, to test whether they would allow the suit to be resolved by his counsel or authority, he does not seem to have accepted an arbitration.
Licet autem praetor destricte edicat sententiam se arbitrum dicere coacturum, attamen interdum rationem eius habere debet et excusationem recipere causa cognita: ut puta si fuerit infamatus a litigatoribus, aut si inimicitiae capitales inter eum et litigatores aut alterum ex litigatoribus intercesserint, aut si aetas aut valetudo quae postea contigit id ei munus remittat, aut occupatio negotiorum propriorum vel profectio urguens aut munus aliquod rei publicae: et ita labeo:
Although the praetor may strictly proclaim by edict that he will compel the arbiter to pronounce a sentence, nevertheless at times he ought to have regard to his rationale and to accept an excuse after the case has been inquired into: for instance, if he has been defamed by the litigators, or if capital enmities have intervened between him and the litigators or one of the litigators, or if age or a state of health which has afterward supervened releases him from that duty, or the occupation of his own affairs or an urgent departure, or some public office: and so Labeo.
Arbiter iudicii sui nomine, quod publicum aut privatum habet, excusatus esse debet a compromisso, utique si dies compromissi proferri non potest: quod si potest, quare non cogat eum, cum potest, proferre? quod sine ulla distinctione ipsius interdum futurum est. si tamen uterque velit eum sententiam dicere, an, quamvis cautum non sit de die proferenda, non alias impetret, quia iudicium habet, ne cogatur, quam si consentiat denuo in se compromitti?
An arbiter, by reason of his own judicium, whether public or private, ought to be excused from a compromissum, especially if the day of the compromissum cannot be deferred: but if it can, why not compel him, since he can, to defer it?—which will sometimes come about without any action of his. If, however, both parties wish him to pronounce sentence, then, although it has not been provided concerning deferring the day, does he not otherwise obtain, because he has a judicium, that he not be compelled, unless he consents that there be a fresh compromissum entered into with respect to himself?
Si in duos fuerit sic compromissum, ut si dissentirent, tertium adsumant, puto tale compromissum non valere: nam in adsumendo possunt dissentire. sed si ita sit, ut eis tertius adsumeretur sempronius, valet compromissum, quoniam in adsumendo dissentire non possunt.
If between two a compromise has been made thus, that, if they should dissent, they are to take a third, I think such a compromise is not valid: for in the taking they can dissent. But if it is thus, that a third be taken for them, Sempronius, the compromise is valid, since in the taking they cannot dissent.
Principaliter tamen quaeramus, si in duos arbitros sit compromissum, an cogere eos praetor debeat sententiam dicere, quia res fere sine exitu futura est propter naturalem hominum ad dissentiendum facilitatem. in inpari enim numero idcirco compromissum admittitur, non quoniam consentire omnes facile est, sed quia et si dissentiant, invenitur pars maior, cuius arbitrio stabitur. sed usitatum est etiam in duos compromitti, et debet praetor cogere arbitros, si non consentiant, tertiam certam eligere personam, cuius auctoritati pareatur.
Principally, however, let us inquire, if a compromise has been made to two arbiters, whether the praetor ought to compel them to pronounce a sentence, because the matter will be almost without an exit on account of the natural facility of men for dissenting. For a compromise is admitted to an odd number for this reason—not because it is easy for all to agree, but because even if they disagree, a greater part is found, by whose arbitration one will stand. But it is also customary to compromise to two, and the praetor ought to compel the arbiters, if they do not agree, to choose a definite third person, whose authority shall be obeyed.
Celsus libro secundo digestorum scribit, si in tres fuerit compromissum, sufficere quidem duorum consensum, sed si praesens fuerit et tertius: alioquin absente eo licet duo consentiant, arbitrium non valere, quia in plures fuit compromissum et potuit praesentia eius trahere eos in eius sententiam:
Celsus writes in the second book of the Digests, that if a compromissum has been made to three, the consent of two is indeed sufficient, but only if the third also is present: otherwise, with him absent, although two may consent, the arbitral award is not valid, because the compromissum was to several and his presence could draw them into his opinion:
Qualem autem sententiam dicat arbiter, ad praetorem non pertinere labeo ait, dummodo dicat quod ipsi videtur. et ideo si sic fuit in arbitrium compromissum, ut certam sententiam dicat, nullum esse arbitrium, nec cogendum sententiam dicere iulianus scribit libro quarto digestorum.
However, what kind of sentence the arbiter pronounces does not pertain to the praetor, Labeo says, provided that he says what seems to him. And therefore, if the submission to arbitration was thus made, that he should pronounce a definite sentence, the arbitration is null, nor is he to be compelled to pronounce a sentence, Julianus writes in book 4 of the Digests.
Dicere autem sententiam existimamus eum, qui ea mente quid pronuntiat, ut secundum id discedere eos a tota controversia velit, sed si de pluribus rebus sit arbiterium receptum, nisi omnes controversias finierit, non videtur dicta sententia, sed adhuc erit a praetore cogendus.
We consider him to have delivered the sentence, who pronounces something with this intention: that, in accordance with it, they should depart from the whole controversy; but if arbitration has been accepted concerning several matters, unless he has ended all the controversies, the sentence does not seem to have been spoken, but he will still be compelled by the praetor.
cassius well excuses his master’s opinion and says that sabinus did not have in mind that sentence which would finish the arbitration, but the preparation of the case: for instance, if he ordered the litigants to be present on the kalends, then bids them for the ides; for he can change that day. moreover, if he has condemned or acquitted, since he has ceased to be an arbiter, he cannot change the sentence,
Quid tamen si de pluribus controversiis sumptus est nihil sibi communibus et de una sententiam dixit, de aliis nondum, numquid desiit esse arbiter? videamus igitur, an in prima controversia possit mutare sententiam, de qua iam dixerat. et multum interest, de omnibus simul ut dicat sententiam compromissum est, an non: nam si de omnibus, poterit mutare ( nondum enim dixit sententiam): quod si et separatim, quasi plura sunt compromissa, et ideo quantum ad illam controversiam pertinet, arbiter esse desierat.
What, however, if he has been appointed for several controversies having nothing in common with one another, and he has pronounced sentence about one, not yet about the others—has he by any chance ceased to be an arbiter? Let us therefore see whether in the first controversy he can change the sentence which he had already stated. And it makes much difference whether in the compromissum it was provided that he should declare sentence about all at the same time, or not: for if about all, he will be able to change it ( nondum enim dixit sententiam); but if also separately, as if there are several compromissa, then, so far as that controversy is concerned, he has ceased to be an arbiter.
Papinianus libro tertio quaestionum ait, si cum dies compromissi finiretur, prolato die litigatores denuo in eum compromiserint nec secundi compromissi arbitrium receperit, non esse cogendum recipere, si ipse in mora non fuit, quo minus partibus suis fungeretur: quod si per eum factum est, aequissimum esse cogi eum a praetore sequens recipere. quae quaestio ita procedit, si nihil in priore compromisso de die proferendo caveatur: ceterum si cavebatur et ipse protulit, mansit arbiter.
Papinian, in the third book of Questions, says: if, when the day of the compromise was coming to an end, the day being extended, the litigants again entered into a compromise with him, and he did not accept the arbitrium of the second compromise, he is not to be compelled to accept it, provided that he himself was not in mora, so as to hinder him from discharging his parts (duties); but if it happened through him, it is most equitable that he be compelled by the praetor to accept the subsequent one. This question proceeds thus, if nothing was stipulated in the prior compromise about extending the day; however, if it was stipulated and he himself extended it, the arbiter remained.
Plenum compromissum appellatur, quod " de rebus controversiisve " compositum est: nam ad omnes controversias pertinet. sed si forte de una re sit disputatio, licet pleno compromisso actum sit, tamen ex ceteris causis actiones superesse: id enim venit in compromissum, de quo actum est ut veniret. sed est tutius, si quis de certa re compromissum facturus sit, de ea sola exprimere in compromisso.
A full compromise is called that which has been agreed “ de rebus controversiisve ”; for it pertains to all controversies. But if perchance the dispute is about a single matter, although the business has been conducted under a full compromise, nevertheless actions remain from the other causes: for that comes into the compromise which it has been agreed should come. But it is safer, if someone is going to make a compromise about a definite thing, to express that alone in the compromise.
Si quis ex litigatoribus ideo non adfuerit, quod valetudine vel rei publicae causa absentia impeditus sit aut magistratu aut alia iusta de causa, poenam committi proculus et atilicinus aiunt: sed si paratus sit in eundem compromittere, actionem denegari aut exceptione tutum fore. sed hoc ita demum verum erit, si arbiter recipere in se arbiterium fuerit paratus: nam invitum non esse cogendum iulianus libro quarto digestorum recte scribit: ipse autem nihilo minus poena absolvitur.
If any one of the litigants has for this reason not been present, because he is impeded by absence on account of health or of the res publica, or by magistracy, or by some other just cause, Proculus and Atilicinus say that the penalty is incurred; but if he is prepared to compromise to the same arbiter, the action is to be denied, or he will be safe by an exception. But this will be true only if the arbiter is prepared to receive the arbitrament upon himself; for Julian rightly writes in book 4 of the Digests that one who is unwilling is not to be compelled; he himself, however, is nonetheless absolved from the penalty.
Si arbiter iussit puta in provincia adesse litigatores, cum romae esset in eum compromissum, an ei impune non pareatur, quaeritur. et est verius, quod iulianus ait libro quarto, eum locum compromisso inesse, de quo actum sit ut promitteretur: impune igitur ei non parebitur, si alio loci adesse iusserit. quid ergo, si non appareat, de quo loco actum sit?
If an arbiter has ordered, say, that the litigants be present in a province, when at Rome a compromise had been made in regard to him, the question is whether he may be disobeyed with impunity. And the truer view, as Julian says in book four, is that the place is contained in the compromise, namely that about which it was agreed that it be promised: accordingly, he may be disobeyed with impunity if he has ordered attendance in another place. What then, if it does not appear about which place it was agreed?
Sed si in aliquem locum inhonestum adesse iusserit, puta in popinam vel in lupanarium, ut vivianus ait, sine dubio impune ei non parebitur: quam sententiam et celsus libro secundo digestorum probat. unde eleganter tractat, si is sit locus, in quem alter ex litigatoribus honeste venire non possit, alter possit, et is non venerit, qui sine sua turpitudine eo venire possit, is venerit, qui inhoneste venerat, an committatur poena compromissi an quasi opera non praebita. et recte putat non committi: absurdum enim esse iussum in alterius persona ratum esse, in alterius non.
But if he has ordered attendance in some dishonorable place, suppose in a tavern or in a brothel, as Vivianus says, without doubt one may with impunity not obey him: which opinion Celsus also approves in the second book of the Digest. Whence he elegantly discusses: if it is a place into which one of the litigants cannot come honorably, the other can, and the one who could come there without his own turpitude has not come, while the one has come who came dishonorably, whether the penalty of the compromis is incurred, or as though service had not been furnished. And he rightly thinks it is not incurred: for it is absurd that an order be ratified in one person’s case, and not in another’s.
Intra quantum autem temporis, nisi detur quod arbiter iusserit, committatur stipulatio, videndum est. et si quidem dies adiectus non sit, celsus scribit libro secundo digestorum inesse quoddam modicum tempus: quod ubi praeterierit, poena statim peti potest: et tamen, inquit, et si dederit ante acceptum iudicium, agi ex stipulatu non poterit:
But within what stretch of time, unless what the arbiter has ordered is given, the stipulation is to be deemed committed, must be considered. And if indeed no day has been added, Celsus writes in the second book of the Digest that there is some moderate time inherent; when this has elapsed, the penalty can at once be sought: and yet, he says, even if he gives before the action has been accepted, an action ex stipulatu cannot be brought:
Celsus ait, si arbiter intra kalendas septembres dari iusserit nec datum erit, licet postea offeratur, attamen semel commissam poenam compromissi non evanescere, quoniam semper verum est intra kalendas datum non esse: sin autem oblatum accepit, poenam petere non potest doli exceptione removendus. contra, ubi dumtaxat dare iussus est.
Celsus says that, if he has ordered an arbiter to be provided before the Kalends of September and it will not have been provided, although it is offered afterward, nevertheless the penalty of the compromissum, once incurred, does not vanish, since it is always true that it was not provided before the Kalends. But if he accepted what was offered, he cannot seek the penalty, being to be removed by the exception of dolus. The contrary holds where he was ordered merely to give.
Idem ait, si iusserit me tibi dare et valetudine sis impeditus, quo minus accipias, aut alia iusta ex causa, proculum existimare poenam non committi, nec si post kalendas te parato accipere non dem. sed ipse recte putat duo esse arbitri praecepta, unum pecuniam dari, aliud intra kalendas dari: licet igitur in poenam non committas, quod intra calendas non dederis, quoniam per te non stetit, tamen committis in eam partem, quod non das.
He likewise says: if he has ordered me to give to you and you are impeded by ill health from receiving, or by some other just cause, Proculus considers that the penalty is not incurred, nor even if, after the calends, when you are ready to receive, I do not give. But he himself rightly thinks there are two precepts of the arbiter: one, that the money be given; the other, that it be given within the calends. Therefore, although you do not incur the penalty for not having given within the calends, since it did not depend on you, nevertheless you incur it in that part, namely, insofar as you do not give at all.
Labeo ait, si arbiter, cum in compromisso cautum esset, ut eadem die de omnibus sententiam diceret et ut posset diem proferre, de quibusdam rebus dicta sententia, de quibusdam non dicta diem protulit: valere prolationem sententiaeque eius posse impune non pareri. et pomponius probat labeonis sententiam, quod et mihi videtur: quia officio in sententia functus non est.
Labeo says that, if the arbiter—when in the compromise it had been stipulated both that he should pronounce judgment on all matters on the same day and that he could defer the day—after judgment was pronounced on certain matters, with none pronounced on others, deferred the day: the postponement is valid, and his sentence may with impunity not be obeyed. And Pomponius approves Labeo’s opinion, which also seems so to me: because he did not discharge his office in the sentence.
Haec autem clausula " diem compromissi proferre" nullam aliam dat arbitro facultatem quam diem prorogandi: et ideo condicionem primi compromissi neque minuere neque immutare potest: et ideo cetera quoque discutere et pro omnibus unam sententiam ferre debebit.
But this clause, "to put off the day of the compromissum," gives the arbiter no other faculty than that of proroguing the day: and therefore he can neither diminish nor alter the condition of the first compromissum: and therefore he ought also to examine the rest and to deliver one judgment for all.
Si per fideiussorem fuerit cautum in primo compromisso, et sequens similiter proferendum labeo dicit. sed pomponius dubitat, utrum isdem an et aliis tam idoneis: quid enim, inquit, si idem fideiubere noluerint? sed puto, si noluerint fideiubere, tunc alios non absimiles adhibendos,
If provision has been made through a surety in the first compromissum, Labeo says the subsequent one is likewise to be put forward. But Pomponius is in doubt whether by the same men or by others as suitable: for what, he says, if the same should be unwilling to stand as sureties? But I think, if they are unwilling to act as sureties, then others not dissimilar must be employed,
Si heredis mentio vel ceterorum facta in compromisso non fuerit, morte solvetur compromissum: nec utimur labeonis sententia, qui existimavit, si arbiter aliquem pecuniam dare iusserit et is decesserit antequam daret, poenam committi, licet heres eius paratus sit offerre.
If mention of the heir or of the others has not been made in the compromissum, the compromissum will be dissolved by death; nor do we use Labeo’s opinion, who thought that, if an arbiter has ordered someone to give a sum of money and he has died before giving it, the penalty is incurred, although his heir is ready to tender it.
Stari autem debet sententiae arbitri, quam de ea re dixerit, sive aequa sive iniqua sit: et sibi imputet qui compromisit. nam et divi pii rescripto adicitur: " vel minus probabilem sententiam aequo animo ferre debet".
However, one ought to abide by the arbitrator’s sentence which he has pronounced on that matter, whether it be equitable or inequitable; and let him who made the compromise impute it to himself. For it is also added in the rescript of the deified Pius: "he ought to bear with an even mind even a less probable sentence."
Si plures arbitri fuerint et diversas sententias dixerint, licebit sententia eorum non stari: sed si maior pars consentiat, ea stabitur, alioquin poena committetur. inde quaeritur apud iulianum, si ex tribus arbitris unus quindecim, alius decem, tertius quinque condemnent, qua sententia stetur: et iulianus scribit quinque debere praestari, quia in hanc summam omnes consenserunt.
If there have been several arbiters and they have spoken diverse sentences, it will be permitted that their sentence not be stood by; but if the greater part consent, that will be stood by, otherwise the penalty will be incurred. Hence the question is raised by julianus: if out of three arbiters one condemns to fifteen, another to ten, the third to five, by which sentence should one stand? And julianus writes that five ought to be rendered, because to this sum all consented.
Si quis litigatorum defuerit, quia per eum factum est, quo minus arbitretur, poena committetur. proinde sententia quidem dicta non coram litigatoribus non valebit, nisi in compromissis hoc specialiter expressum sit, ut vel uno vel utroque absente sententia promatur: poenam autem is qui defuit committit, quia per eum factum est quo minus arbitretur.
If any one of the litigators has been absent, since through him it has been brought about that the arbiter should not arbitrate, the penalty will be incurred. Accordingly, a sentence pronounced not in the presence of the litigators will not be valid, unless this is specially expressed in the compromises, that with one or with both absent the sentence may be brought forth; but the one who was absent incurs the penalty, because through him it was brought about that the arbiter should not arbitrate.
Coram autem dicere sententiam videtur, qui sapientibus dicit: ceterum coram furioso vel demente non videtur dici: item coram pupillo non videri sententiam dictam, nisi tutor praesens fuit: et ita de his omnibus iulianus libro quarto digestorum scribit.
Moreover, he is deemed to pronounce judgment in presence who speaks before wise men; but it is not deemed to be said in presence before a madman or a demented person; likewise, a judgment is not deemed to have been pronounced in presence before a ward, unless his tutor was present; and thus concerning all these matters Julian writes in the fourth book of the Digests.
Si quis rem, de qua compromissum sit, in iudicium deducat, quidam dicunt praetorem non intervenire ad cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, quia iam poena non potest esse, atque si solutum est compromissum. sed si hoc optinuerit, futurum est, ut in potestate eius, quem paenitet compromisisse, sit compromissum eludere. ergo adversus eum poena committenda est lite apud iudicem suo ordine peragenda.
If anyone brings into court a matter about which there has been a compromissum (arbitration agreement), some say the praetor should not intervene to compel the arbiter to pronounce a sentence (decision), because now there cannot be a penalty, as if the compromissum had been dissolved. But if this should prevail, it will come about that it lies in the power of the one who repents of having entered into the compromissum to elude the compromissum. Therefore, the penalty must be deemed incurred against him, with the lawsuit before the judge being carried through in its proper order.
Ita demum autem committetur stipulatio, cum adversus eam quid fit, si sine dolo malo stipulantis factum est: sub hac enim condicione committitur stipulatio, ne quis doli sui praemium ferat. sed si quidem compromisso adiciatur " ut si quid dolo in ea re factum sit", ex stipulatu conveniri qui dolo fecit potest: et ideo si arbitrum quis corrupit vel pecunia vel ambitione, vel advocatum diversae partis, vel aliquem ex his, quibus causam suam commiserat, ex doli clausula poterit conveniri, vel si adversarium callide circumvenit, et omnino si in hac lite dolose versatus est, locum habebit ex stipulatu actio: et ideo si velit de dolo actionem exercere adversarius, non debebit, cum habeat ex stipulatu actionem. quod si huiusmodi clausula in compromisso adscripta non est, tunc de dolo actio vel exceptio locum habebit.
Thus only then will the stipulation be incurred, when something is done against it, if it was done without the bad deceit (dolus) of the stipulator: for under this condition the stipulation is incurred, lest anyone carry off a reward of his own deceit. But if, indeed, there is added in the compromise (compromissum) “that if anything has been done with deceit (dolus) in that matter,” the one who acted with deceit can be proceeded against ex stipulatu: and therefore, if someone has corrupted the arbitrator either with money or with canvassing/ambition, or the advocate of the opposite party, or any of those to whom he had committed his case, he can be proceeded against under the deceit-clause; or if he cleverly circumvented his adversary, and generally if in this suit he has conducted himself deceitfully, an action ex stipulatu will have place: and therefore, if the adversary should wish to bring an action de dolo, he ought not, since he has an action ex stipulatu. But if such a clause was not written into the compromise, then an action or exception de dolo will have place.
Summa rei est, ut praetor se non interponat, sive initio nullum sit compromissum: sive sit, sed pendeat, an ex eo poena exigi potest: sive postea deficiat poena compromisso soluto die morte acceptilatione iudicio pacto.
The sum of the matter is that the praetor should not interpose himself, whether at the outset there is no compromise (compromissum): or there is, but it hangs in doubt whether a penalty can be exacted from it: or afterwards the penalty fails, the compromise being dissolved by the term being discharged, by death, by acceptilation, by judgment, or by pact.
Sacerdotio obveniente videbimus an cogatur arbiter sententiam dicere: id enim non tantum honori personarum, sed et maiestati dei indulgetur, cuius sacris vacare sacerdotes oportet. ceterum si postea suscepit, iste quoque omnimodo sententiam ferre debet.
With the priesthood supervening, we shall see whether the arbiter is compelled to speak the sentence: for this is indulged not only to the honor of persons, but also to the majesty of God, whose sacred rites it is fitting that priests be free to attend. But if he undertook it afterward, this one too must by all means render the sentence.
Iulianus indistincte scribit: si per errorem de famoso delicto ad arbitrum itum est, vel de ea re, de qua publicum iudicium sit constitutum, veluti de adulteriis sicariis et similibus, vetare debet praetor sententiam dicere nec dare dictae exsecutionem.
Julian writes indiscriminately: if by error a matter of a notorious (famous) offense has been brought to an arbiter, or a matter for which a public iudicium has been constituted, for example concerning adulteries, assassins (sicarii), and the like, the praetor ought to forbid a sententia to be pronounced and not to grant execution of one pronounced.
De liberali causa compromisso facto recte non compelletur arbiter sententiam dicere, quia favor libertatis est, ut maiores iudices habere debeat. eadem dicenda sunt, sive de ingenuitate sive de libertinitate quaestio sit et si ex fideicommissi causa libertas deberi dicatur. idem dicendum est in populari actione.
concerning a cause of liberty, when a compromise has been made, the arbiter is rightly not compelled to pronounce sentence, because there is a favor of liberty, namely that he ought to have greater judges. the same things are to be said, whether the question is about freeborn status or about freedman status, and if liberty is said to be owed by reason of a fideicommiss. the same is to be said in a popular action.
Si servus compromiserit, non cogendum dicere sententiam arbitrum, nec si dixerit, poenae exsecutionem dandam de peculio putat octavenus. sed an, si liber cum eo compromiserit, exsecutio adversus liberum detur, videamus: sed magis est, ut non detur.
If a slave has made a compromise (compromissum), the arbiter is not to be compelled to pronounce a sentence; nor, if he has pronounced it, does Octavenus think that execution of the penalty should be granted from the peculium. But as to whether, if a free man has made a compromise with him, execution should be given against the free man, let us consider: but the better view is that it should not be given.
Item si quis romae compromiserit, mox romam in legationem venerit: non est cogendus arbiter sententiam dicere, non magis quam cogeretur, si litem ante contestatus esset, nunc eam exercere: nec interest, tunc quoque in legatione fuerit an non. sed si nunc in legatione compromittat, puto cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, quia et si iudicium sponte accepisset, cogeretur peragere. sunt tamen qui de isto non recte dubitant: qui utique nullo modo dubitabunt, si de ea re in legatione compromisit, quam in legatione contraxit: quia et iudicium eo nomine accipere cogeretur.
Likewise, if someone has entered into a compromise at Rome, and soon thereafter has come to Rome on an embassy: the arbiter is not to be compelled to pronounce a sentence, any more than he would be compelled, if he had previously joined issue in a suit, now to prosecute it; nor does it matter whether at that time he also was on an embassy or not. But if he now, while on an embassy, should compromise, I think the arbiter must be compelled to pronounce a sentence, because even if he had accepted a judgment of his own accord, he would be compelled to carry it through. There are, however, some who not rightly doubt about this—who, at any rate, will by no means doubt, if he, while on an embassy, compromised concerning that matter which he contracted while on an embassy: because he would also be compelled to accept a judgment under that head.
that point can be discerned at first glance, namely, whether, if a legate previously made a compromise, the arbiter should be compelled to pronounce sentence if the legate himself requests it: which at first reasoning might seem inequitable, that it should lie in his own power. but this will be of the same sort as if he should wish to dictate an action, which it is permitted for him to do. but we will compare that compromise to an ordinary action, so that the one desiring that the arbiter pronounce sentence is not to be heard otherwise than if he defends himself.
Cum in plures compromissum est ea condicione, ut quilibet vel unus dixisset sententiam, eo staretur, absentibus ceteris nihilo minus qui praesens est cogetur: at si ea condicione, ut omnes dicant, vel quod de maioris partis sententia placuerit, non debet singulos separatim cogere, quia singulorum sententia ad poenam non facit.
When a compromissum has been made among several on this condition, that anyone, even a single one, should have pronounced the sentence, that shall be abided by; with the others absent, nonetheless he who is present will be compelled. But if on this condition, that all speak, or that whatever shall have been approved by the sentence of the majority, he ought not to compel individuals separately, because the sentences of individuals do not give rise to a penalty.
Cum quidam arbiter ex aliis causis inimicus manifeste apparuisset, testationibus etiam conventus, ne sententiam diceret, nihilo minus nullo cogente dicere perseverasset, libello cuiusdam id querentis imperator antoninus subscripsit posse eum uti doli mali exceptione. et idem, cum a iudice consuleretur, apud quem poena petebatur, rescripsit, etiamsi appellari non potest, doli mali exceptionem in poenae petitione obstaturam. per hanc ergo exceptionem quaedam appellandi species est, cum liceat retractare de sententia arbitri.
When a certain arbiter had manifestly appeared as an enemy from other causes, and even after being served with formal protests not to pronounce a sentence, nonetheless, with no one compelling him, he persisted in pronouncing it, Emperor Antoninus endorsed on the petition of a certain person complaining of this that he could use the exception of dolus malus. And the same emperor, when he was consulted by a judge before whom a penalty was being sought, wrote back that, even if an appeal cannot be taken, the exception of dolus malus will obstruct the demand for the penalty. Therefore, through this exception there is a certain species of appealing, since it is permitted to re-examine the sentence of the arbiter.
De officio arbitri tractantibus sciendum est omnem tractatum ex ipso compromisso sumendum: nec enim aliud illi licebit, quam quod ibi ut efficere possit cautum est: non ergo quod libet statuere arbiter poterit nec in qua re libet nisi de qua re compromissum est et quatenus compromissum est.
For those treating of the office of the arbiter, it must be known that the whole conduct is to be taken from the compromise itself: for nothing else will be permitted to him than what is there stipulated so that he may be able to effect it: therefore the arbiter will not be able to establish whatever he pleases, nor in whatever matter he pleases, except concerning the matter about which a compromise has been made, and to the extent to which a compromise has been made.
Quaesitum est de sententia dicenda, et dictum non quamlibet, licet de quibusdam variatum sit. et puto vere non committi, si dicat ad iudicem de hoc eundum vel in se vel in alium compromittendum. nam et iulianus impune non pareri, si iubeat ad alium arbitrum ire, ne finis non sit: quod si hoc modo dixerit, ut arbitrio publii maevii fundus traderetur aut satisdatio detur, parendum esse sententiae.
It has been asked about the sentence to be pronounced, and it has been said that not just any sentence is permissible, although in certain matters practice has varied. And I truly think no fault is committed if he says that one must go to a judge (iudex) about this, or that a compromise/submission (compromissum) must be made, either to himself or to another. For Julian likewise allows that one may with impunity not obey, if he orders going to another arbitrator, lest there be no end; but if he has spoken in this way—that, by the award (arbitrium) of Publius Maevius, the estate (fundus) be handed over, or that security (satisdatio) be given—the sentence must be obeyed.
the same Pedius approves: lest arbitrations be prolonged, or be transferred at times to others hostile to the litigants, he ought to impose an end to the controversy by his own decision; nor is the controversy finished when either the arbitration is deferred or transferred to another; and it is part of the decision in what manner security is to be given, and with which fideiussors (sureties), and that this cannot be delegated, unless there has been a compromise to this effect: that the arbiter should determine at whose arbitrament security is to be given.
Arbitri officio continetur et quemadmodum detur vacua possessio. an et satis ratam rem habiturum? sextus pedius putat, quod nullam rationem habet: nam si ratum non habeat dominus, committetur stipulatio.
It is contained within the arbiter’s office also in what manner vacant possession is to be given. And whether he should also take surety for “that he will have the matter ratified”? Sextus Pedius thinks that this has no rationale: for if the owner does not have it ratified, the stipulation will be committed.
Si duo rei sunt aut credendi aut debendi et unus compromiserit isque vetitus sit petere aut ne ab eo petatur: videndum est, an si alius petat vel ab alio petatur, poena committatur: idem in duobus argentariis quorum nomina simul eunt. et fortasse poterimus ita fideiussoribus coniungere, si socii sunt: alias nec a te petitur, nec ego peto, nec meo nomine petitur, licet a te petatur.
If there are two parties liable either on the creditor’s side or on the debtor’s side, and one has entered a compromise and is forbidden to sue or that suit be brought against him, it must be considered whether, if the other sues or is sued, the penalty is incurred; the same in the case of two bankers whose “names go together.” And perhaps we can in this way connect guarantors, if they are partners; otherwise, neither is it demanded by you, nor do I demand, nor is it demanded in my name, although it is demanded from you.
Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate compromiserit, non est arbiter cogendus pronuntiare, quia si contra eum pronuntietur, poena non tenetur: praeterquam si fideiussorem dederit, a quo poena peti possit. idque et iulianus sentit.
If a pupil has entered into a compromissum without the tutor’s authority, the arbiter is not to be compelled to pronounce, because if it were pronounced against him, the penalty is not binding—except if he has provided a surety (fideiussor), from whom the penalty can be sought. And Julianus thinks this as well.
Non ex omnibus causis, ex quibus arbitri paritum sententiae non est, poena ex compromisso committitur, sed ex his dumtaxat, quae ad solutionem pecuniae aut operam praebendam pertinent. idem. contumaciam litigatoris arbiter punire poterit pecuniam eum adversario dare iubendo: quo in numero haberi non oportet, si testium nomina ex sententia arbitri exhibita non sunt.
Not from all causes in which the arbitrator’s award has not been obeyed is the penalty under the compromissum incurred, but only from those which pertain to the payment of money or to the furnishing of service. the same. The arbitrator will be able to punish the litigant’s contumacy by ordering him to give money to his adversary: which ought not to be held in that number, if the names of witnesses have not been exhibited according to the arbitrator’s award.
Arbiter calendis ianuariis adesse iussit et ante eum diem decessit: alter ex litigatoribus non adfuit. procul dubio poena minime commissa est: nam et cassium audisse se dicentem aristo ait in eo arbitro, qui ipse non venisset, non esse commissam: quemadmodum servius ait, si per stipulatorem stet, quo minus accipiat, non committi poenam.
The arbiter ordered (them) to be present on the Kalends of January and before that day he died: one of the litigants did not appear. Without doubt the penalty is by no means incurred: for Aristo says that he heard Cassius saying that, in the case of an arbiter who himself had not come, it is not incurred; just as Servius says, if it depends on the stipulator that he not accept, the penalty is not incurred.
Cum lege iulia cautum sit, ne minor viginti annis iudicare cogatur, nemini licere minorem viginti annis compromissarium iudicem eligere: ideoque poena ex sententia eius nullo modo committitur. maiori tamen viginti annis, si minor viginti quinque annis sit, ex hac causa succurrendum, si temere auditorium receperit, multi dixerunt.
Since by the Julian law it is provided that one under twenty years is not to be compelled to judge, it is permitted to no one to choose as a compromissary judge a person under twenty years; and therefore the penalty on the basis of his sentence is in no way incurred. Nevertheless, for one over twenty years, if he is under twenty-five years, on this account relief should be afforded, if he has rashly undertaken the hearing, many have said.
Arbiter intra certum diem servos restitui iussit, quibus non restitutis poenae causa fisco secundum formam compromissi condemnavit: ob eam sententiam fisco nihil adquiritur, sed nihilo minus stipulationis poena committitur, quod ab arbitro statuto non sit obtemperatum.
An arbiter ordered that the slaves be restored within a fixed day; when they were not restored, he condemned to the fiscus, for the sake of a penalty, according to the form of the compromissum: by that sentence nothing is acquired to the fiscus, but nonetheless the penalty of the stipulation is incurred, because what was laid down by the appointed arbiter was not obeyed.
De rebus controversiisque omnibus compromissum in arbitrum a lucio titio et maevio sempronio factum est, sed errore quaedam species in petitionem a lucio titio deductae non sunt nec arbiter de his quicquam pronuntiavit: quaesitum est an species omissae peti possint. respondit peti posse nec poenam ex compromisso committi. quod si maligne hoc fecit, petere quidem potest, sed poenae subiugabitur.
A compromissum to an arbitrator concerning all matters and controversies was made by lucius titius and maevios sempronius, but through error certain particulars were not brought into the petition by lucius titius, nor did the arbitrator pronounce anything about these: it was asked whether the omitted particulars can be sought. He responded that they can be sought, nor is the penalty under the compromissum incurred. But if he did this in bad faith, he can indeed seek, but he will be subjected to the penalty.
Inter castellianum et seium controversia de finibus orta est et arbiter electus est, ut arbitratu eius res terminetur: ipse sententiam dixit praesentibus partibus et terminos posuit: quaesitum est, an si ex parte castelliani arbitro paritum non esset, poena ex compromisso commissa est. respondi, si arbitro paritum non esset in eo, quod utroque praesente arbitratus esset, poenam commissam.
Between castellianus and seius a controversy over boundaries arose, and an arbiter was chosen, that by his arbitrament the matter be terminated: he himself pronounced sentence with the parties present and set the boundaries: it was asked whether, if on the part of castellianus obedience were not paid to the arbiter, the penalty under the compromissum was incurred. I answered: if obedience were not paid to the arbiter in that which he had arbitrated with both present, the penalty was incurred.
Si compromissum ita factum est, ut praesente utroque aut heredibus eorum arbiter sententiam dicat et alter ex litigatoribus decesserit pupillo herede relicto, non aliter videtur sententia dicta esse, nisi tutoris auctoritas interposita fuerit.
If a compromise has been made in such a way that the arbiter shall pronounce the sentence with both present, or their heirs, and one of the litigants has died leaving a ward as heir, the sentence is not otherwise seen to have been pronounced unless the authority of the tutor (guardian) has been interposed.
Arbiter ex compromisso sumptus cum ante eum diem, qui constitutus compromisso erat, sententiam dicere non posset, diem compromissi proferri iusserat: alter ex litigatoribus dicto audiens non fuerat: consulebatur possetne ab eo pecunia ex compromisso peti. respondi non posse, ideo quod non esset arbitro permissum ut id iuberet.
An arbiter appointed under a compromissum (arbitration agreement), since before the day which had been fixed by the compromissum he could not pronounce his sentence, had ordered the day of the compromissum to be extended: one of the litigants was not obedient to the order; it was consulted whether money could be claimed from him under the compromissum. I replied that it could not, for the reason that it was not permitted to the arbiter to order that.
Maxima utilitas est huius edicti, quia necesse est plerumque eorum fidem sequi et res custodiae eorum committere. ne quisquam putet graviter hoc adversus eos constitutum: nam est in ipsorum arbitrio, ne quem recipiant, et nisi hoc esset statutum, materia daretur cum furibus adversus eos quos recipiunt coeundi, cum ne nunc quidem abstineant huiusmodi fraudibus.
There is the greatest utility in this edict, because it is for the most part necessary to follow their good faith and to commit things to their custody. Let no one think that this has been constituted harshly against them: for it is within their discretion not to receive anyone; and unless this had been established, occasion would be afforded for joining with thieves against those whom they do receive, since not even now do they refrain from frauds of this sort.
Qui sunt igitur, qui teneantur, videndum est. ait praetor " nautae". nautam accipere debemus eum qui navem exercet: quamvis nautae appellantur omnes, qui navis navigandae causa in nave sint: sed de exercitore solummodo praetor sentit. nec enim debet, inquit pomponius, per remigem aut mesonautam obligari, sed per se vel per navis magistrum: quamquam si ipse alicui e nautis committi iussit, sine dubio debeat obligari.
Who, then, are those who are to be held liable must be considered. The praetor says " sailors". We ought to take "sailor" as the one who operates a ship; although all are called sailors who are on the ship for the sake of navigating the ship, the praetor has in view only the exercitor. For he ought not, says pomponius, to be bound through a rower or a mesonaut, but by himself or through the ship’s master; although if he himself ordered that it be entrusted to someone from among the sailors, without doubt he ought to be bound.
Et sunt quidam in navibus, qui custodiae gratia navibus praeponuntur, ut naufulakes et diaetarii. si quis igitur ex his receperit, puto in exercitorem dandam actionem, quia is, qui eos huiusmodi officio praeponit, committi eis permittit, quamquam ipse navicularius vel magister id faciat, quod xeirembolon appellant. sed et si hoc non exercet, tamen de recepto navicularius tenebitur.
And there are certain persons on ships, who are set over the ships for the sake of custody, such as the naufulakes and the diaetarii. If, therefore, any one of these has received, I think an action should be given against the exercitor, because he who puts them in charge of an office of this sort allows things to be entrusted to them, although the navicularius or the magister himself does what they call the xeirembolon. But even if he does not practice this, nevertheless the navicularius will be held liable de recepto.
Ait praetor: " quod cuiusque ^ cuius^ salvum fore receperint": hoc est quamcumque rem sive mercem receperint. inde apud vivianum relatum est ad eas quoque res hoc edictum pertinere, quae mercibus accederent, veluti vestimenta quibus in navibus uterentur et cetera quae ad cottidianum usum habemus.
The praetor says: "whatever of anyone’s ^ cuius^ they have undertaken shall be kept safe": that is, whatever thing or merchandise they have received. And from this, in Vivianus it is reported that this edict also pertains to those things which accede to the merchandise, for example garments which they would use on ships, and the other things which we have for quotidian use.
Item pomponius libro trigensimo quarto scribit parvi referre, res nostras an alienas intulerimus, si tamen nostra intersit salvas esse: etenim nobis magis, quam quorum sunt, debent solvi. et ideo si pignori merces accepero ob pecuniam nauticam, mihi magis quam debitori nauta tenebitur, si ante eas suscepit.
Likewise Pomponius in the 34th book writes that it matters little whether we have brought on board our own things or another’s, provided, however, that it is our interest that they be kept safe: for the sums ought to be paid to us rather than to those to whom they belong. And therefore, if I have accepted the merchandise in pledge on account of maritime money (a maritime loan), the shipmaster will be bound to me rather than to the debtor, if he had received them beforehand.
Recipit autem salvum fore utrum si in navem res missae ei adsignatae sunt: an et si non sint adsignatae, hoc tamen ipso, quod in navem missae sunt, receptae videntur? et puto omnium eum recipere custodiam, quae in navem illatae sunt, et factum non solum nautarum praestare debere, sed et vectorum,
Does he, however, warrant that it will be safe only if the goods sent into the ship have been consigned to him? or even if they have not been consigned, nevertheless by this very fact, that they have been sent into the ship, do they seem to be received? And I think that he takes on the custody of all things which have been brought into the ship, and that he ought to answer for the act not only of the sailors but also of the passengers,
Ait praetor: " nisi restituent, in eos iudicium dabo". ex hoc edicto in factum actio proficiscitur. sed an sit necessaria, videndum, quia agi civili actione ex hac causa poterit: si quidem merces intervenerit, ex locato vel conducto: sed si tota navis locata sit, qui conduxit ex conducto etiam de rebus quae desunt agere potest: si vero res perferendas nauta conduxit, ex locato convenietur: sed si gratis res susceptae sint, ait pomponius depositi agi potuisse. miratur igitur, cur honoraria actio sit inducta, cum sint civiles: nisi forte, inquit, ideo, ut innotesceret praetor curam agere reprimendae improbitatis hoc genus hominum: et quia in locato conducto culpa, in deposito dolus dumtaxat praestatur, at hoc edicto omnimodo qui receperit tenetur, etiam si sine culpa eius res periit vel damnum datum est, nisi si quid damno fatali contingit.
The praetor says: "unless they restore, I will grant an action against them." From this edict an in factum action proceeds. But whether it is necessary must be considered, because one can proceed by a civil action in this cause: if indeed a fee has intervened, then from letting or from hiring; but if the whole ship has been let, the one who hired can also sue from hiring for the things that are missing; but if the shipmaster hired himself for carrying the goods, he will be proceeded against from letting; but if the things were undertaken gratis, Pomponius says an action of deposit could be brought. He therefore marvels why an honorary (praetorian) action was introduced, since there are civil ones—unless perhaps, he says, for this reason: that it might be made known that the praetor takes care to repress the depravity of this class of men; and because in letting and hiring negligence (culpa) is required to be made good, in deposit only fraud (dolus) is, but by this edict in every way the one who has received is held liable, even if the thing perished or damage was inflicted without his fault, unless something occurs by fatal damage.
Si filius familias aut servus receperit et voluntas patris domini intervenit, in solidum erit conveniendus. item si servus exercitoris subripuit vel damnum dedit, noxalis actio cessabit, quia ob receptum suo nomine dominus convenitur. sin vero sine voluntate exerceant, de peculio dabitur.
If a filiusfamilias or a slave has undertaken (the receptum) and the will of the father or master has intervened, he must be sued for the whole (in solidum). Likewise, if the slave of a shipowner (exercitor) has stolen or has given/caused damage, the noxal action will cease, because on account of the receptum the master is sued in his own name. But if, however, they conduct it without his will, recovery will be given from the peculium.
Novissime videndum, an eiusdem rei nomine et de recepto honoraria actione et furti agendum sit: et pomponius dubitat: sed magis est, ut vel officio iudicis vel doli exceptione alterutra esse contentus debeat.
Lastly it must be considered whether, for the same thing, one should proceed both by the honorary (praetorian) action “de recepto” and by the action of theft: and Pomponius is in doubt: but the better view is that he ought to be content with one or the other, either by the office of the judge or by the exception of fraud (exceptio doli).
Nauta et caupo et stabularius mercedem accipiunt non pro custodia, sed nauta ut traiciat vectores, caupo ut viatores manere in caupona patiatur, stabularius ut permittat iumenta apud eum stabulari: et tamen custodiae nomine tenentur. nam et fullo et sarcinator non pro custodia, sed pro arte mercedem accipiunt, et tamen custodiae nomine ex locato tenentur.
The sailor, the innkeeper, and the stable-keeper receive a fee not for custody, but the sailor so that he may ferry passengers across, the innkeeper so that he may allow travelers to remain in the inn, the stable-keeper so that he may permit beasts of burden to be stabled with him; and yet they are held under the name of custody. For both the fuller and the garment-mender receive a fee not for custody but for their art, and yet they are held under the name of custody by the action ex locato.
Si servo meo in nave vel in caupona utaris et damnum mihi det vel furtum faciat, quamquam et furti actio et damni iniuria mecum sit, haec tamen actio, quia in factum est, etiam servi mei nomine adversus te competit. idem dicetur, et si communis sit: tu tamen quod mihi praestiteris eius nomine, vel communi dividundo vel pro socio actione, aut si partem eius vel totum conduxisti, etiam ex conducto habebis me obligatum.
If you make use of my slave on a ship or in an inn and he causes me damage or commits theft, although both the action for theft and the action for wrongful damage lie with me, nevertheless this action—since it is in factum—also lies against you in my slave’s name. The same will be said if he is jointly owned: however, as to what you shall have rendered to me on his account, you will have me bound either by the communi dividundo action or the pro socio action; or, if you hired his share or the whole of him, you will also have me obligated ex conducto.
Possumus autem furti vel damni iniuriae actione uti cum nautis, ut certi hominis factum arguamus: sed una contenti esse debebimus, et si cum exercitore egerimus, praestare ei debemus actiones nostras, quamvis ex conducto actio adversus eos competat exercitori. sed si absolutus sit exercitor hac actione, deinde agatur cum nauta, exceptio dabitur, ne saepius de eiusdem hominis admisso quaeratur. et contra, si de admisso unius hominis actum sit, deinde in factum actione agatur, exceptio dabitur.
We can, moreover, employ the action for theft or for wrongful damage against sailors, in order that we may arraign the deed of a certain man: but we ought to be content with one [action]; and if we have proceeded against the ship-operator (exercitor), we ought to cede to him our actions, although an action ex conducto lies for the exercitor against them. But if the exercitor has been absolved in this action, and thereafter suit is brought against the sailor, an exception (defense) will be granted, lest inquiry be made more than once concerning the same man’s admitted wrongdoing. And conversely, if it has been sued upon concerning the admitted wrongdoing of one man, and thereafter suit is brought by an action in factum, an exception will be granted.
Debet exercitor omnium nautarum suorum, sive liberi sint sive servi, factum praestare: nec immerito factum eorum praestat, cum ipse eos suo periculo adhibuerit. sed non alias praestat, quam si in ipsa nave damnum datum sit: ceterum si extra navem licet a nautis, non praestabit. item si praedixerit, ut unusquisque vectorum res suas servet neque damnum se praestaturum, et consenserint vectores praedictioni, non convenitur.
The shipowner must make good the act of all his sailors, whether they are free or slaves; and not without reason does he make good their act, since he himself employed them at his own risk. But he is liable only if the damage was done on the ship itself; otherwise, if outside the ship, even if by the sailors, he will not be liable. Likewise, if he has given prior notice that each of the passengers should keep his own goods and that he will not make good any loss, and the passengers have consented to the notice, he is not proceeded against.
Sed si quid nautae inter se damni dederint. hoc ad exercitorem non pertinet. sed si quis sit nauta et mercator, debiti illi dari: quod si quis quos volgo nautepibatas dicunt, et huic tenebitur, sed huius factum praestat, cum sit et nauta.
But if sailors have inflicted any damage among themselves, this does not pertain to the shipowner; but if someone is both sailor and merchant, the debt is to be paid to him: and if someone is one of those whom they commonly call “nautepibatas” (supercargoes), the shipowner will be liable to him as well, and he warrants this man’s act, since he is also a sailor.
Hac autem actione suo nomine exercitor tenetur, culpae scilicet suae qui tales adhibuit: et ideo et si decesserint, non relevabitur. servorum autem suorum nomine noxali dumtaxat tenetur: nam cum alienos adhibet, explorare eum oportet, cuius fidei, cuius innocentiae sint: in suis venia dignus est, si qualesquales ad instruendam navem adhibuerit.
By this action the shipowner is held in his own name, namely for his own fault in that he employed such persons; and therefore, even if they have died, he will not be relieved. However, in respect of his own slaves he is held merely noxally: for when he employs those of another, he ought to explore of what trustworthiness, of what innocence they are; in his own he is worthy of indulgence, if he has employed whatever sort for equipping the ship.
Haec iudicia quamvis honoraria sunt, tamen perpetua sunt: in heredem autem non dabuntur. proinde et si servus navem exercuit et mortuus est, de peculio non dabitur actio in dominum nec intra annum. sed cum voluntate patris vel domini servus vel filius exercent navem vel cauponam vel stabulum, puto etiam hanc actionem in solidum eos pati debere, quasi omnia, quae ibi contingunt, in solidum receperint.
These judgments, although honorary, are nevertheless perpetual; however, they will not be granted against the heir. Accordingly, even if a slave has operated a ship and has died, an action de peculio will not be given against the master, not even within a year. But when, with the will of the father or master, a slave or a son operates a ship or an inn or a stable, I think that they also ought to be liable to this action for the whole (in solidum), as if they had undertaken for the whole (in solidum) all the things that happen there.