Seneca: EPISTULAE MORALES AD LUCILIUM

[1] Moleste fero decessisse Flaccum, amicum tuum, plus tamen aequo dolere te nolo. Illud, ut non doleas, vix audebo exigere; et esse melius scio. Sed cui ista firmitas animi continget nisi iam multum supra fortunam elato?

[1] I take it hard that Flaccus, your friend, has departed; yet I do not wish you to grieve more than is right. That—that you not grieve—I shall scarcely dare to demand; and I know it to be better. But to whom will that firmness of spirit befall, except to one already much lifted above Fortune?

illum quoque ista res vellicabit, sed tantum vellicabit. Nobis autem ignosci potest prolapsis ad lacrimas, si non nimiae decucurrerunt, si ipsi illas repressimus. Nec sicci sint oculi amisso amico nec fluant; lacrimandum est, non plorandum.

That matter will tug at him too, but only tug at him. But we can be forgiven for having lapsed into tears, if they have not run down in excess, if we ourselves have repressed them. Nor let the eyes be dry at the loss of a friend, nor let them flow; there must be weeping, not wailing.

[2] Duram tibi legem videor ponere, cum poetarum Graecorum maximus ius flendi dederit in unum dumtaxat diem, cum dixerit etiam Niobam de cibo cogitasse? Quaeris unde sint lamentationes, unde immodici fletus? per lacrimas argumenta desiderii quaerimus et dolorem non sequimur sed ostendimus; nemo tristis sibi est.

[2] I seem to be imposing a hard law upon you, since the greatest of the Greek poets has granted the right of weeping for only one day, since he has even said that Niobe thought about food. You ask whence come lamentations, whence immoderate weeping? Through tears we seek proofs of longing, and we do not follow pain but display it; no one is sad for himself.

O infelicem stultitiam! est aliqua et doloris ambitio.

O wretched stupidity! There is also some ambition of grief.

[3] 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'obliviscar amici?' Brevem illi apud te memoriam promittis, si cum dolore mansura est: iam istam frontem ad risum quaelibet fortuita res transferet. Non differo in longius tempus quo desiderium omne mulcetur, quo etiam acerrimi luctus residunt: cum primum te observare desieris, imago ista tristitiae discedet. Nunc ipse custodis dolorem tuum; sed custodienti quoque elabitur, eoque citius quo est acrior desinit.

[3] 'What then?' you ask, 'shall I forget my friend?' You promise him a brief memory with you, if it is to endure only together with pain: already any fortuitous thing will translate that brow to a smile. I do not put off to that longer time by which every desiderium is soothed, by which even the most acrid mournings subside: as soon as you cease to observe yourself, that image of sadness will depart. Now you yourself guard your pain; but even for one guarding it, it slips away, and the keener it is, the sooner it ceases.

[4] Id agamus ut iucunda nobis amissorum fiat recordatio. Nemo libenter ad id redit quod non sine tormento cogitaturus est, sicut illud fieri necesse est, ut cum aliquo nobis morsu amissorum quos amavimus nomen occurrat; sed hic quoque morsus habet suam voluptatem.

[4] Let us bring it about that the recollection of those lost becomes pleasant to us. No one willingly returns to that which he would be going to think upon not without torment; just as it must come to pass that the name of those whom we have loved and lost occurs to us with some bite; but this bite too has its own pleasure.

[5] Nam, ut dicere solebat Attalus noster, 'sic amicorum defunctorum memoria iucunda est quomodo poma quaedam sunt suaviter aspera, quomodo in vino nimis veteri ipsa nos amaritudo delectat; cum vero intervenit spatium, omne quod angebat exstinguitur et pura ad nos voluptas venit'.

[5] For, as our Attalus used to say, 'thus the memory of deceased friends is pleasant, just as certain fruits are sweetly rough, just as in wine that is too old the bitterness itself delights us; but when an interval intervenes, everything that was distressing is extinguished and pure pleasure comes to us'.

[6] Si illi credimus, 'amicos incolumes cogitare melle ac placenta frui est: eorum qui fuerunt retractatio non sine acerbitate quadam iuvat. Quis autem negaverit haec acria quoque et habentia austeritatis aliquid stomachum excitare?'

[6] If we believe him, 'to think upon friends safe and sound is to enjoy honey and cake; the reviewing of those who have been pleases not without a certain acerbity. Who, however, would deny that these sharp things too, and those having something of austerity, rouse the stomach?'

[7] Ego non idem sentio: mihi amicorum defunctorum cogitatio dulcis ac blanda est; habui enim illos tamquam amissurus, amisi tamquam habeam.

[7] I do not feel the same: to me the thought of departed friends is sweet and soothing; for I held them as though about to lose them, I lost them as though I still have them.

Fac ergo, mi Lucili, quod aequitatem tuam decet, desine beneficium fortunae male interpretari: abstulit, sed dedit.

Do therefore, my Lucilius, what befits your equity, cease to misinterpret the benefit of Fortune: she took away, but she gave.

[8] Ideo amicis avide fruamur quia quamdiu contingere hoc possit incertum est. Cogitemus quam saepe illos reliquerimus in aliquam peregrinationem longinquam exituri, quam saepe eodem morantes loco non viderimus: intellegemus plus nos temporis in vivis perdidisse.

[8] Therefore let us enjoy friends avidly, because it is uncertain how long this may be able to occur. Let us consider how often we have left them, about to set out on some long peregrination, how often, lingering in the same place, we have not seen them: we shall understand that we have lost more time while they were among the living.

[9] Feras autem hos qui neglegentissime amicos habent, miserrime lugent, nec amant quemquam nisi perdiderunt? ideoque tunc effusius maerent quia verentur ne dubium sit an amaverint; sera indicia affectus sui quaerunt.

[9] Would you bear, however, with those who keep their friends most negligently, mourn most miserably, and love no one unless they have lost him? And therefore then they grieve more effusively because they fear lest it be doubtful whether they have loved; they seek belated indications of their affection.

[10] Si habemus alios amicos, male de iis et meremur et existimamus, qui parum valent in unius elati solacium; si non habemus, maiorem iniuriam ipsi nobis fecimus quam a fortuna accepimus: illa unum abstulit, nos quemcumque non fecimus.

[10] If we have other friends, we both do ill by them and think ill of them, as if they availed too little for the solace of one carried off; if we do not have them, we have done a greater injury to ourselves than we have received from Fortune: she took away one, we have made no others.

[11] Deinde ne unum quidem nimis amavit qui plus quam unum amare non potuit. Si quis despoliatus amissa unica tunica complorare se malit quam circumspicere quomodo frigus effugiat et aliquid inveniat quo tegat scapulas, nonne tibi videatur stultissimus? Quem amabas extulisti: quaere quem ames.

[11] Then he did not even love one too much, who was not able to love more than one. If someone, despoiled with his single tunic lost, prefers to bewail himself rather than to look around how he might escape the cold and find something with which to cover his shoulder-blades, does he not seem to you most foolish? The one you loved you have borne to burial: look for someone to love.

Satius est amicum reparare quam flere.

It is better to recover a friend than to weep.

[12] Scio pertritum iam hoc esse quod adiecturus sum, non ideo tamen praetermittam quia ab omnibus dictum est: finem dolendi etiam qui consilio non fecerat tempore invenit. Turpissimum autem est in homine prudente remedium maeroris lassitudo maerendi: malo relinquas dolorem quam ab illo relinquaris; et quam primum id facere desiste quod, etiam si voles, diu facere non poteris.

[12] I know that what I am about to add is already well-worn, yet I will not on that account pass it over because it has been said by all: even one who has not effected an end of grieving by counsel finds it, in time. Moreover, the most shameful thing in a prudent man is for the remedy of sorrow to be a lassitude of mourning: I would rather you leave grief than be left by it; and cease as soon as possible to do that which, even if you wish, you will not be able to do for long.

[13] Annum feminis ad lugendum constituere maiores, non ut tam diu lugerent, sed ne diutius: viris nullum legitimum tempus est, quia nullum honestum. Quam tamen mihi ex illis mulierculis dabis vix retractis a rogo, vix a cadavere revulsis, cui lacrimae in totum mensem duraverint? Nulla res citius in odium venit quam dolor, qui recens consolatorem invenit et aliquos ad se adducit, inveteratus vero deridetur, nec immerito; aut enim simulatus aut stultus est.

[13] The ancestors established a year for women to mourn, not that they should mourn so long, but lest they mourn longer: for men there is no legitimate time, because none is honorable. Yet which one of those womenfolk will you give me, scarcely drawn back from the pyre, scarcely torn away from the corpse, whose tears have lasted for an entire month? Nothing more quickly incurs hatred than grief, which, when fresh, finds a consoler and brings some people to itself, but, once it has become inveterate, is mocked—and not without cause; for it is either feigned or foolish.

[14] Haec tibi scribo, is qui Annaeum Serenum carissimum mihi tam immodice flevi ut, quod minime velim, inter exempla sim eorum quos dolor vicit. Hodie tamen factum meum damno et intellego maximam mihi causam sic lugendi fuisse quod numquam cogitaveram mori eum ante me posse. Hoc unum mihi occurrebat, minorem esse et multo minorem - tamquam ordinem fata servarent!

[14] I write this to you, I who wept for Annaeus Serenus, most dear to me, so immoderately that, what I would least wish, I am among the examples of those whom grief has vanquished. Today, however, I condemn my action and understand that my greatest cause for mourning thus was that I had never thought that he could die before me. This one thing occurred to me, that he was younger, and much younger - as though the fates were keeping the order!

[15] Itaque assidue cogitemus de nostra quam omnium quos diligimus mortalitate. Tunc ego debui dicere, 'minor est Serenus meus: quid ad rem pertinet? post me mori debet, sed ante me potest'. Quia non feci, imparatum subito fortuna percussit.

[15] Therefore let us assiduously reflect on the mortality of our own as well as of all those whom we love. Then I ought to have said, 'My Serenus is younger: what does it matter? he ought to die after me, but he can die before me.' Because I did not do so, Fortune suddenly struck me unprepared.

Nunc cogito omnia et mortalia esse et incerta lege mortalia; hodie fieri potest quidquid umquam potest.

Now I think that all things are mortal, and mortal by an uncertain law; today whatever can ever occur can occur.

[16] Cogitemus ergo, Lucili carissime, cito nos eo perventuros quo illum pervenisse maeremus; et fortasse, si modo vera sapientium fama est recipitque nos locus aliquis, quem putamus perisse praemissus est. Vale.

[16] Therefore let us consider, dearest Lucilius, that we will soon arrive there whither we mourn that he has arrived; and perhaps, if indeed the fame/report of the wise is true and some place receives us, he whom we think to have perished has been sent ahead. Farewell.

LXIV. SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM

64. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Fuisti here nobiscum. Potes queri, si here tantum; ideo adieci 'nobiscum'; mecum enim semper es. Intervenerant quidam amici propter quos maior fumus fieret, non hic qui erumpere ex lautorum culinis et terrere vigiles solet, sed hic modicus qui hospites venisse significet.

[1] You were with us yesterday. You may complain, if yesterday only; therefore I added “with us,” for you are always with me. Some friends had dropped in, on account of whom a greater smoke was made—not that which is wont to erupt from the kitchens of the well-to-do and to terrify the watchmen, but this moderate kind which signifies that guests have come.

[2] Varius nobis fuit sermo, ut in convivio, nullam rem usque ad exitum adducens sed aliunde alio transiliens. Lectus est deinde liber Quinti Sextii patris, magni, si quid mihi credis, viri, et licet neget Stoici.

[2] Our discourse was various, as at a banquet, bringing no matter through to an exit but leaping from elsewhere to elsewhere. Then the book of Quintus Sextius the father was read, of a great man, if you believe me, even though the Stoics deny it.

[3] Quantus in illo, di boni, vigor est, quantum animi! Hoc non in omnibus philosophis invenies: quorundam scripta clarum habentium nomen exanguia sunt. Instituunt, disputant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum quia non habent: cum legeris Sextium, dices, 'vivit, viget, liber es, supra hominem est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciae'.

[3] What vigor there is in him, good gods, what spirit! This you will not find in all philosophers: the writings of certain men having a famous name are bloodless. They institute, they dispute, they cavil; they do not create spirit because they do not have it: when you have read Sextius, you will say, 'he lives, he is vigorous, he is free, he is above man, he sends me away full of immense confidence'.

[4] In qua positione mentis sim cum hunc lego fatebor tibi: libet omnis casus provocare, libet exclamare, 'quid cessas, fortuna? congredere: paratum vides'. Illius animum induo qui quaerit ubi se experiatur, ubi virtutem suam ostendat,

[4] In what position of mind I am when I read this man I will confess to you: it pleases me to provoke every contingency, it pleases me to cry out, 'Why do you delay, Fortune? Come to grips: you see me prepared.' I don the spirit of that man who seeks where he may test himself, where he may display his virtue,

spumantemque dari pecora inter inertia votis
optat aprum aut fulvum descendere monte leonem.

and he wishes by his vows that a foam-flecked boar be given among inert herds
or that a fulvous lion descend from the mountain.

[5] Libet aliquid habere quod vincam, cuius patientia exercear. Nam hoc quoque egregium Sextius habet, quod et ostendet tibi beatae vitae magnitudinem et desperationem eius non faciet: scies esse illam in excelso, sed volenti penetrabilem.

[5] I take pleasure in having something I may conquer, by whose patience I may be exercised. For this too Sextius has as something egregious: that he will both show you the magnitude of the happy life and will not make you despair of it; you will know that it is on high, but penetrable to the willing.

[6] Hoc idem virtus tibi ipsa praestabit, ut illam admireris et tamen speres. Mihi certe multum auferre temporis solet contemplatio ipsa sapientiae; non aliter illam intueor obstupefactus quam ipsum interim mundum, quem saepe tamquam spectator novus video.

[6] This same thing virtue itself will furnish for you, that you may admire it and yet hope. For my part, the contemplation itself of wisdom is wont to take away much time from me; I gaze upon it, thunderstruck, no otherwise than upon the world itself meanwhile, which I often behold as though a new spectator.

[7] Veneror itaque inventa sapientiae inventoresque; adire tamquam multorum hereditatem iuvat. Mihi ista acquisita, mihi laborata sunt. Sed agamus bonum patrem familiae, faciamus ampliora quae accepimus; maior ista hereditas a me ad posteros transeat.

[7] Therefore I venerate the discoveries of wisdom and their discoverers; it delights me to enter upon them as upon the inheritance of many. For me these things have been acquired, for me they have been labored. But let us act the good paterfamilias; let us make greater the things which we have received; let that inheritance pass from me to posterity greater.

Multum adhuc restat operis multumque restabit, nec ulli nato post mille saecula praecludetur occasio aliquid adhuc adiciendi.

Much of the work still remains, and much will remain; nor will the occasion to add something further be precluded to anyone born after a thousand ages.

[8] Sed etiam si omnia a veteribus inventa sunt, hoc semper novum erit, usus et inventorum ab aliis scientia ac dispositio. Puta relicta nobis medicamenta quibus sanarentur oculi: non opus est mihi alia quaerere, sed haec tamen morbis et temporibus aptanda sunt. Hoc asperitas oculorum collevatur; hoc palpebrarum crassitudo tenuatur; hoc vis subita et umor avertitur; hoc acuetur visus: teras ista oportet et eligas tempus, adhibeas singulis modum.

[8] But even if all things have been discovered by the ancients, this will always be new: the use and the knowledge and disposition of the things discovered by others. Suppose medicaments left to us by which the eyes might be healed: there is no need for me to seek others, but these nevertheless must be fitted to diseases and to times. By this the asperity of the eyes is alleviated; by this the thickness of the eyelids is attenuated; by this sudden force and humor are averted; by this the sight is sharpened: you ought to grind these and choose the time, you should apply to each its measure.

Animi remedia inventa sunt ab antiquis; quomodo autem admoveantur aut quando nostri operis est quaerere.

Remedies of the mind have been invented by the ancients; but how they are to be applied, or when, is our work to inquire.

[9] Multum egerunt qui ante nos fuerunt, sed non peregerunt. Suspiciendi tamen sunt et ritu deorum colendi. Quidni ego magnorum virorum et imagines habeam incitamenta animi et natales celebrem?

[9] Those who were before us have done much, but they have not completed it. Nevertheless they are to be looked up to and venerated with the rite of the gods. Why should I not have the images of great men as incitements of spirit, and celebrate their natal days?

quidni ego illos honoris causa semper appellem? Quam venerationem praeceptoribus meis debeo, eandem illis praeceptoribus generis humani, a quibus tanti boni initia fluxerunt.

Why should I not always address them for honor’s sake? The veneration I owe to my own preceptors, the same I owe to those preceptors of the human race, from whom the beginnings of so great a good have flowed.

[10] Si consulem videro aut praetorem, omnia quibus honor haberi honori solet faciam: equo desiliam, caput adaperiam, semita cedam. Quid ergo? Marcum Catonem utrumque et Laelium Sapientem et Socraten cum Platone et Zenonem Cleanthenque in animum meum sine dignatione summa recipiam?

[10] If I see the consul or the praetor, I will do all the things by which honor is accustomed to be shown to an honor: I will leap down from my horse, I will uncover my head, I will yield the footpath. What then? Shall I receive both Marcus Catos and Laelius the Wise and Socrates with Plato and Zeno and Cleanthes into my mind without the highest reverence?

Ego vero illos veneror et tantis nominibus semper assurgo. Vale.

I indeed venerate them, and I always rise at such great names. Farewell.

LXV. SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM

65. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS

[1] Hesternum diem divisi cum mala valetudine: antemeridianum illa sibi vindicavit, postmeridiano mihi cessit. Itaque lectione primum temptavi animum; deinde, cum hanc recepisset, plus illi imperare ausus sum, immo permittere: aliquid scripsi et quidem intentius quam soleo, dum cum materia difficili contendo et vinci nolo, donec intervenerunt amici qui mihi vim afferrent et tamquam aegrum intemperantem coercerent.

[1] I divided yesterday with bad health: the antemeridian it claimed for itself, the postmeridian yielded to me. And so I first tried my mind with reading; then, when it had recovered this, I dared to command more of it—nay, to entrust it with more: I wrote something, and indeed more intently than I am wont, while I contend with a difficult material and am unwilling to be conquered, until friends intervened to bring force to me and to restrain me as an intemperate sick man.

[2] In locum stili sermo successit, ex quo eam partem ad te perferam quae in lite est. Te arbitrum addiximus. Plus negotii habes quam existimas: triplex causa est.

[2] In place of the stylus, discourse succeeded, from which I will carry over to you that part which is in litigation. We have assigned you as arbiter. You have more business than you suppose: the cause is threefold.

Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri duo esse in rerum natura ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. Materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet unde fiat aliquid, deinde a quo fiat: hoc causa est, illud materia.

Our Stoics say, as you know, that there are two in the nature of things from which all things come to be: cause and matter. Matter lies inert, a thing ready for everything, destined to remain idle if no one moves it; but cause, that is reason, shapes matter and turns it whichever way it wills, and from it produces various works. There must therefore be that from which something is made, and then that by which it is made: this is cause, that is matter.

[3] Omnis ars naturae imitatio est; itaque quod de universo dicebam ad haec transfer quae ab homine facienda sunt. Statua et materiam habuit quae pateretur artificem, et artificem qui materiae daret faciem; ergo in statua materia aes fuit, causa opifex. Eadem condicio rerum omnium est: ex eo constant quod fit, et ex eo quod facit.

[3] Every art is an imitation of nature; therefore transfer what I was saying about the universe to these things which are to be made by man. A statue both had material that would admit the craftsman, and a craftsman who would give a form to the material; therefore, in the statue the material was bronze, the cause the artificer. The same condition holds for all things: they consist of that from which they are made, and of that which makes.

[4] Stoicis placet unam causam esse, id quod facit. Aristoteles putat causam tribus modis dici: 'prima' inquit 'causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici; secunda opifex; tertia est forma, quae unicuique operi imponitur tamquam statuae'. Nam hanc Aristoteles 'idos' vocat. 'Quarta quoque' inquit 'his accedit, propositum totius operis.'

[4] It pleases the Stoics that there is one cause, that which makes. Aristotle thinks that 'cause' is said in three ways: 'first,' he says, 'the cause is the matter itself, without which nothing can be effected; the second, the craftsman; the third is the form, which is imposed upon each work as upon a statue'. For this Aristotle calls 'idos'. 'A fourth also,' he says, 'is added to these, the purpose of the whole work.'

[5] Quid sit hoc aperiam. Aes prima statuae causa est; numquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id ex quo funderetur ducereturve. Secunda causa artifex est; non potuisset enim aes illud in habitum statuae figurari, nisi accessissent peritae manus.

[5] I will explain what this is. Bronze is the first cause of the statue; for it would never have been made, unless there had been that from which it could be cast or drawn. The second cause is the artificer; for that bronze could not have been shaped into the figure of a statue, unless skilled hands had come to it.

Tertia causa est forma; neque enim statua ista 'doryphoros' aut 'diadumenos' vocaretur, nisi haec illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est faciendi propositum; nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset.

The third cause is the form; for that statue would not be called 'doryphoros' or 'diadumenos' unless this appearance had been impressed upon it. The fourth cause is the purpose of making; for unless this had existed, it would not have been made.

[6] Quid est propositum? quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit: vel pecunia est haec, si venditurus fabricavit, vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen, vel religio, si donum templo paravit. Ergo et haec causa est propter quam fit: an non putas inter causas facti operis esse numerandum quo remoto factum non esset?

[6] What is the purpose? that which invited the artificer, which he, following, did: either this is money, if he fabricated it intending to sell, or glory, if he labored for a name, or religion, if he prepared a gift for the temple. Therefore this too is a cause on account of which it is made: do you not think it must be numbered among the causes of the work, which, if removed, it would not have been made?

[7] His quintam Plato adicit exemplar, quam ipse 'idean' vocat; hoc est enim ad quod respiciens artifex id quod destinabat effecit. Nihil autem ad rem pertinet utrum foris habeat exemplar ad quod referat oculos an intus, quod ibi ipse concepit et posuit. Haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet numerosque universorum quae agenda sunt et modos mente complexus est; plenus his figuris est quas Plato 'ideas' appellat, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles.

[7] To these Plato adds a fifth, the exemplar, which he himself calls the 'idean'; for this is that at which, looking, the artificer effected what he had intended. And it makes nothing to the point whether he has the exemplar outside, to which he refers his eyes, or inside, which he himself conceived and set there. God holds within himself these exemplars of all things, and has embraced in mind the numbers and the modes of all the things that are to be wrought; he is full of those figures which Plato calls 'ideas'—immortal, immutable, indefatigable.

Itaque homines quidem pereunt, ipsa autem humanitas, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet, et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus, illa nihil patitur.

Therefore men indeed perish, but humanity itself, to which man is fashioned, remains, and while men labor and perish, it suffers nothing.

[8] Quinque ergo causae sunt, ut Plato dicit: id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod, id propter quod; novissime id quod ex his est. Tamquam in statua - quia de hac loqui coepimus - id ex quo aes est, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est quod imitatur is qui facit, id propter quod facientis propositum est, id quod ex istis est ipsa statua .

[8] Therefore there are five causes, as Plato says: that out of which, that by which, that in which, that to which, that on account of which; lastly, that which is from these. As in a statue—for we have begun to speak of this—the “that out of which” is bronze, the “that by which” is the artificer, the “that in which” is the form which is fitted to it, the “that to which” is the exemplar which the one who makes imitates, the “that on account of which” is the maker’s purpose, the “that which is from those” is the statue itself .

[9] Haec omnia mundus quoque, ut ait Plato, habet: facientem, hic deus est; ex quo fit, haec materia est; formam, haec est habitus et ordo mundi quem videmus; exemplar, scilicet ad quod deus hanc magnitudinem operis pulcherrimi fecit; propositum, propter quod fecit.

[9] All these things the world also, as Plato says, has: a maker, this is God; that from which it is made, this is matter; a form, this is the habitus and order of the world which we see; an exemplar, namely according to which God made this greatness of a most beautiful work; a purpose, on account of which he made it.

[10] Quaeris quod sit propositum deo? bonitas. Ita certe Plato ait: 'quae deo faciendi mundum fuit causa?

[10] You ask what the purpose is for God? goodness. Thus surely Plato says: 'what cause to God was there for making the world?

bonus est; bono nulla cuiusquam boni invidia est; fecit itaque quam optimum potuit'.

he is good; a good being has no envy of anyone’s good; therefore he made it the best he could'.

Fer ergo iudex sententiam et pronuntia quis tibi videatur verisimillimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat; id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas.

Therefore, as judge, deliver sentence and pronounce who seems to you to speak the most verisimilar, not who speaks the truest; for that is as far above us as truth itself.

[11] Haec quae ab Aristotele et Platone ponitur turba causarum aut nimium multa aut nimium pauca comprendit. Nam si quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam iudicant esse faciendi, pauca dixerunt. Ponant inter causas tempus: nihil sine tempore potest fieri.

[11] This throng of causes which is posited by Aristotle and Plato comprehends either too many or too few. For if they judge that to be a cause of making, the removal of which whatsoever prevents something from being effected, they have said few. Let them place time among the causes: nothing can be done without time.

Ponant locum: si non fuerit ubi fiat aliquid, ne fiet quidem. Ponant motum: nihil sine hoc nec fit nec perit; nulla sine motu ars, nulla mutatio est.

Posit place: if there is not a where in which something be done, it will not even be done. Posit motion: without this nothing either comes to be nor perishes; no art is without motion, no mutation exists.

[12] Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quaerimus causam. Haec simplex esse debet; nam et materia simplex est. Quaerimus quid sit causa?

[12] But we now seek the first and general cause. This ought to be simple; for the materia is simple as well. We ask what the cause is?

ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus; ista enim quaecumque rettulistis non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea quae facit.

reason, namely the making one, that is god; for those things, whatever you have recounted, are not many and particular causes, but depend on one, on that which makes.

[13] Formam dicis causam esse? hanc imponit artifex operi: pars causae est, non causa. Exemplar quoque non est causa, sed instrumentum causae necessarium.

[13] Do you say the form is the cause? The artificer imposes this upon the work: it is a part of the cause, not the cause. The exemplar too is not a cause, but a necessary instrument of the cause.

Sic necessarium est exemplar artifici quomodo scalprum, quomodo lima: sine his procedere ars non potest, non tamen hae partes artis aut causae sunt.

Thus an exemplar is necessary for the craftsman, just as a chisel, just as a file: without these the art cannot proceed, yet these are not parts of the art nor of the cause.

[14] 'Propositum' inquit 'artificis, propter quod ad faciendum aliquid accedit, causa est.' Ut sit causa, non est efficiens causa, sed superveniens. Hae autem innumerabiles sunt: nos de causa generali quaerimus. Illud vero non pro solita ipsis subtilitate dixerunt, totum mundum et consummatum opus causam esse; multum enim interest inter opus et causam operis.

[14] 'The purpose,' he says, 'of the artificer, on account of which he accedes to making something, is a cause.' Granted that it be a cause, it is not an efficient cause, but a supervenient one. These, moreover, are innumerable: we inquire concerning the general cause. But that they did not say with their wonted subtlety—namely, that the whole world and the consummated work is a cause; for there is a great difference between the work and the cause of the work.

[15] Aut fer sententiam aut, quod facilius in eiusmodi rebus est, nega tibi liquere et nos reverti iube. 'Quid te' inquis 'delectat tempus inter ista conterere, quae tibi nullum affectum eripiunt, nullam cupiditatem abigunt?' Ego quidem [peiora] illa ago ac tracto quibus pacatur animus, et me prius scrutor, deinde hunc mundum.

[15] Either pronounce a sentence or, which is easier in matters of this sort, deny that it is clear to you and bid us to return. 'What,' you ask, 'pleases you in grinding away time among these things, which take from you no affect, drive away no cupidity?' For my part I indeed pursue and handle those [worse] matters by which the mind is pacified, and I scrutinize myself first, then this world.

[16] Ne nunc quidem tempus, ut existimas, perdo; ista enim omnia, si non concidantur nec in hanc subtilitatem inutilem distrahantur, attollunt et levant animum, qui gravi sarcina pressus explicari cupit et reverti ad illa quorum fuit. Nam corpus hoc animi pondus ac poena est; premente illo urguetur, in vinclis est, nisi accessit philosophia et illum respirare rerum naturae spectaculo iussit et a terrenis ad divina dimisit. Haec libertas eius est, haec evagatio; subducit interim se custodiae in qua tenetur et caelo reficitur.

[16] Not even now do I waste time, as you suppose; for all these things, if they are not cut to pieces nor drawn out into this useless subtlety, raise and lift the mind, which, pressed by a heavy burden, longs to be unfolded and to return to those things to which it belonged. For this body is the mind’s weight and penalty; with it pressing, it is borne down, it is in chains, unless philosophy has come and has ordered it to breathe by the spectacle of the nature of things and has dismissed it from terrene things to the divine. This is its freedom, this its roaming; meanwhile it withdraws itself from the custody in which it is held and is refreshed by heaven.

[17] Quemadmodum artifices [ex] alicuius rei subtilioris quae intentione oculos defetigat, si malignum habent et precarium lumen, in publicum prodeunt et in aliqua regione ad populi otium dedicata oculos libera luce delectant, sic animus in hoc tristi et obscuro domicilio clusus, quotiens potest, apertum petit et in rerum naturae contemplatione requiescit.

[17] Just as artificers [ex] of some more subtle thing, which by strain wearies the eyes, if they have a scant and precarious light, go forth into public and, in some region dedicated to the people’s leisure, delight their eyes with free light, so the mind, shut up in this sad and dark domicile, whenever it can, seeks the open and comes to rest in the contemplation of the nature of things.

[18] Sapiens assectatorque sapientiae adhaeret quidem in corpore suo, sed optima sui parte abest et cogitationes suas ad sublimia intendit. Velut sacramento rogatus hoc quod vivit stipendium putat; et ita formatus est ut illi nec amor vitae nec odium sit, patiturque mortalia quamvis sciat ampliora superesse.

[18] The wise man and sectator of wisdom indeed adheres in his own body, but with the best part of himself he is absent and directs his thoughts to the sublime. As if bound by a sacrament, he reckons this fact—that he lives—a stipend; and he is so formed that for him there is neither love of life nor hatred, and he endures mortal things, although he knows that ampler things are in store.

[19] Interdicis mihi inspectione rerum naturae, a toto abductum redigis in partem? Ego non quaeram quae sint initia universorum? quis rerum formator?

[19] Do you forbid me the inspection of the nature of things, and, abducted from the whole, do you reduce me to a part? Shall I not inquire what the beginnings of all things are? who is the former of things?

quis omnia in uno mersa et materia inerti convoluta discreverit? Non quaeram quis sit istius artifex mundi? qua ratione tanta magnitudo in legem et ordinem venerit?

who has separated all things that were submerged into one and convolved in inert matter? Shall I not inquire who is the artificer of this world? by what rationale has so great a magnitude come into law and order?

quis sparsa collegerit, confusa distinxerit, in una deformitate iacentibus faciem diviserit? unde lux tanta fundatur? ignis sit, an aliquid igne lucidius?

who has collected the scattered, distinguished the confused, apportioned a face to those lying in a single deformity? whence is so great a light poured forth? is it fire, or something more lucid than fire?

[20] Ego ista non quaeram? ego nesciam unde descenderim? semel haec mihi videnda sint, an saepe nascendum?

[20] Shall I not seek these things? shall I be ignorant whence I have descended? are these things to be seen by me once, or must one be born often?

quo hinc iturus sim? quae sedes exspectet animam solutam legibus servitutis humanae? Vetas me caelo interesse, id est iubes me vivere capite demisso?

Whither am I to go hence? What seat awaits the soul loosed from the laws of human servitude? You forbid me to have a share in heaven—that is, you command me to live with my head cast down?

[21] Maior sum et ad maiora genitus quam ut mancipium sim mei corporis, quod equidem non aliter aspicio quam vinclum aliquod libertati meae circumdatum; hoc itaque oppono fortunae, in quo resistat, nec per illud ad me ullum transire vulnus sino. Quidquid in me potest iniuriam pati hoc est in hoc obnoxio domicilio animus liber habitat.

[21] I am greater, and born for greater things, than to be the chattel of my body, which indeed I regard as nothing other than some fetter cast around my liberty; this, therefore, I set against Fortune, on which she may be resisted, nor do I allow any wound to pass through it to me. Whatever in me can suffer injury is this: in this liable domicile the free mind dwells.

[22] Numquam me caro ista compellet ad metum, numquam ad indignam bono simulationem; numquam in honorem huius corpusculi mentiar. Cum visum erit, distraham cum illo societatem; et nunc tamen, dum haeremus, non erimus aequis partibus socii: animus ad se omne ius ducet. Contemptus corporis sui certa libertas est.

[22] Never shall that flesh compel me to fear, never to a dissimulation unworthy of the good; never for the honor of this little body will I lie. When it shall seem good, I will sever the partnership with it; and yet even now, while we still stick together, we shall not be partners on equal terms: the mind will draw all right and jurisdiction to itself. Contempt of one’s own body is a sure liberty.

[23] Ut ad propositum revertar, huic libertati multum conferet et illa de qua modo loquebamur inspectio; nempe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur et ducem. Potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei.

[23] To return to the proposition, much will also be conferred upon this liberty by that inspection of which I was just speaking; namely, all things consist of matter and of God. God tempers these things which, circumfused, follow a rector and a leader. But more potent and more precious is that which fashions—namely, God—than the matter patient of God (that is, receptive to God).

[24] Quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est. Serviant ergo deteriora melioribus; fortes simus adversus fortuita; non contremescamus iniurias, non vulnera, non vincula, non egestatem. Mors quid est?

[24] Whatever place god occupies in this world, the mind occupies in man; what matter is there, that in us is the body. Therefore let the worse serve the better; let us be brave against fortuitous things; let us not tremble at injuries, nor wounds, nor bonds, nor indigence. What is death?

aut finis aut transitus. Nec desinere timeo - idem est enim quod non coepisse -, nec transire, quia nusquam tam anguste ero. Vale.

either an end or a transition. Nor do I fear to cease - for it is the same as not to have begun -, nor to transition, because nowhere shall I be so narrowly. Farewell.

LXVI. SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM

66. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS

[1] Claranum condiscipulum meum vidi post multos annos: non, puto, exspectas ut adiciam senem, sed mehercules viridem animo ac vigentem et cum corpusculo suo colluctantem. Inique enim se natura gessit et talem animum male collocavit; aut fortasse voluit hoc ipsum nobis ostendere, posse ingenium fortissimum ac beatissimum sub qualibet cute latere. Vicit tamen omnia impedimenta et ad cetera contemnenda a contemptu sui venit.

[1] I saw my fellow-student Claranus after many years: you do not, I think, expect me to add “an old man,” but, by Hercules, green in spirit and vigorous, and wrestling with his little body. For Nature behaved unfairly and misplaced such a soul; or perhaps she wished to show us this very thing, that a most strong and most blessed innate character can lie hidden under any skin. Yet he has conquered all impediments and, from contempt of himself, has come to contemn the rest.

[2] Errare mihi visus est qui dixit

[2] He seemed to me to err who said

gratior et pulchro veniens e corpore virtus

more pleasing, too, is virtue coming from a beautiful body

Non enim ullo honestamento eget: ipsa magnum sui decus est et corpus suum consecrat. Aliter certe Claranum nostrum coepi intueri: formosus mihi videtur et tam rectus corpore quam est animo.

For it needs no adornment of any kind: it is itself a great glory of itself and consecrates its body. I have, to be sure, begun to look upon our Claranus differently: he seems handsome to me and as straight in body as he is in spirit.

[3] Potest ex casa vir magnus exire, potest et ex deformi humilique corpusculo formosus animus ac magnus. Quosdam itaque mihi videtur in hoc tales natura generare, ut approbet virtutem omni loco nasci. Si posset per se nudos edere animos, fecisset; nunc quod amplius est facit: quosdam enim edit corporibus impeditos, sed nihilominus perrumpentis obstantia.

[3] A great man can go forth from a cottage, and from a misshapen and humble little body there can also issue a comely and great soul. Accordingly, nature seems to me to beget certain persons of this sort for this very purpose: to approve that virtue is born in every place. If she could by herself bring forth souls naked, she would have done so; as it is, she does something further: for she brings forth some hampered by bodies, yet nonetheless breaking through the obstacles.

[4] Claranus mihi videtur in exemplar editus, ut scire possemus non deformitate corporis foedari animum, sed pulchritudine animi corpus ornari. Quamvis autem paucissimos una fecerimus dies, tamen multi nobis sermones fuerunt, quos subinde egeram et ad te permittam.

[4] Claranus seems to me to have been brought forth as an exemplar, so that we might know that the mind is not defiled by deformity of body, but that the body is adorned by the beauty of the mind. And although we spent very few days together, nevertheless we had many discourses, which I had from time to time carried on, and I will submit to you.

[5] Hoc primo die quaesitum est, quomodo possint paria bona esse, si triplex eorum condicio est. Quaedam, ut nostris videtur, prima bona sunt, tamquam gaudium, pax, salus patriae; quaedam secunda, in materia infelici expressa, tamquam tormentorum patientia et in morbo gravi temperantia. Illa bona derecto optabimus nobis, haec, si necesse erit.

[5] On this first day it was asked how goods can be equal, if their condition is threefold. Some, as it seems to us, are first goods, such as joy, peace, the safety of the fatherland; some are second, expressed in unhappy material, such as patience of torments and temperance in severe sickness. Those goods we shall directly wish for ourselves, these, if it will be necessary.

Sunt adhuc tertia, tamquam modestus incessus et compositus ac probus vultus et conveniens prudenti viro gestus.

There are still a third [kind], such as a modest gait and a composed and honest countenance and a gesture fitting for a prudent man.

[6] Quomodo ista inter se paria esse possunt, cum alia optanda sint, alia aversanda?

[6] How can these be equal among themselves, since some are to be opted for, others to be averted?

Si volumus ista distinguere, ad primum bonum revertamur et consideremus id quale sit. Animus intuens vera, peritus fugiendorum ac petendorum, non ex opinione sed ex natura pretia rebus imponens, toti se inserens mundo et in omnis eius actus contemplationem suam mittens, cogitationibus actionibusque intentus ex aequo, magnus ac vehemens, asperis blandisque pariter invictus, neutri se fortunae summittens, supra omnia quae contingunt acciduntque eminens, pulcherrimus, ordinatissimus cum decore tum viribus, sanus ac siccus, imperturbatus intrepidus, quem nulla vis frangat, quem nec attollant fortuita nec deprimant - talis animus virtus est.

If we wish to distinguish these things, let us return to the first good and consider of what sort it is. A mind beholding the true things, skilled in things to be fled and sought, imposing values upon things not from opinion but from nature, inserting itself into the whole world and sending its contemplation into all its acts, intent equally upon thoughts and actions, great and vehement, equally unconquered by harsh and pleasant things, submitting itself to neither fortune, standing eminent above all that befalls and occurs, most beautiful, most orderly both in decorum and in powers, sound and sober, unperturbed and intrepid, whom no force breaks, whom neither fortuitous things lift up nor cast down - such a mind is virtue.

[7] Haec eius est facies, si sub unum veniat aspectum et semel tota se ostendat. Ceterum multae eius species sunt, quae pro vitae varietate et pro actionibus explicantur: nec minor fit aut maior ipsa. Decrescere enim summum bonum non potest nec virtuti ire retro licet; sed in alias atque alias qualitates convertitur, ad rerum quas actura est habitum figurata.

[7] This is its face, if it should come under one aspect and show itself whole at once. Moreover, there are many species of it, which are explicated according to the variety of life and according to actions: nor does it itself become either lesser or greater. For the supreme good cannot decrease, nor is it permitted for virtue to go retrograde; but it is converted into other and yet other qualities, figured to the habit of the things which it is about to do to be done.

[8] Quidquid attigit in similitudinem sui adducit et tinguit; actiones, amicitias, interdum domos totas quas intravit disposuitque condecorat; quidquid tractavit, id amabile, conspicuum, mirabile facit. Itaque vis eius et magnitudo ultra non potest surgere, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies rectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius.

[8] Whatever it has touched, it draws into a similitude of itself and tinges; actions, friendships, sometimes whole households which it has entered and disposed it also embellishes; whatever it has handled, that it makes lovable, conspicuous, marvelous. And so its force and magnitude cannot rise further, since there is no increment to the greatest: you will find nothing more right than the right, no more true than the true, nor more temperate than the temperate.

[9] Omnis in modo est virtus; modo certa mensura est; constantia non habet quo procedat, non magis quam fiducia aut veritas aut fides. Quid accedere perfecto potest? nihil, aut perfectum non erat cui accessit; ergo ne virtuti quidem, cui si quid adici potest, defuit.

[9] Virtue is wholly in measure; and its measure is a fixed measure; constancy has nowhere to proceed, no more than confidence or truth or faith. What can be added to the perfect? Nothing—or else that to which something was added was not perfect; therefore not even to virtue, to which, if anything can be added, it was lacking.

Honestum quoque nullam accessionem recipit; honestum est enim propter ista quae rettuli. Quid porro? decorum et iustum et legitimum non eiusdem esse formae putas, certis terminis comprehensum?

That which is honorable also receives no accession; for the honorable is such on account of those things which I have recounted. What furthermore? Do you not think the decorous and the just and the legitimate to be of the same form, comprehended within fixed boundaries?

Crescere posse imperfectae rei signum est.

To be able to grow is a sign of an imperfect thing.

[10] Bonum omne in easdem cadit leges: iuncta est privata et publica utilitas, tam mehercules quam inseparabile est laudandum petendumque. Ergo virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines quibus illae contigere.

[10] Every good falls under the same laws: the private and the public utility are conjoined, as, by Hercules, inseparable are the laudable and the to-be-sought. Therefore the virtues are equal among themselves, and the works of virtue, and all men to whom those have befallen.

[11] Satorum vero animaliumque virtutes, cum mortales sint, fragiles quoque caducaeque sunt et incertae; exsiliunt residuntque et ideo non eodem pretio aestimantur. Una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula; una enim est ratio recta simplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, caelesti caelestius.

[11] But the virtues of the things sown and of animals, since they are mortal, are also fragile, caducous, and uncertain; they leap forth and subside, and therefore are not appraised at the same price. One rule is introduced for human virtues; for there is one right and simple reason. Nothing is more divine than the divine, more celestial than the celestial.

[12] Mortalia minuuntur cadunt, deteruntur crescunt, exhauriuntur implentur; itaque illis in tam incerta sorte inaequalitas est: divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa; si ratio divina est, nullum autem bonum sine ratione est, bonum omne divinum est. Nullum porro inter divina discrimen est; ergo nec inter bona.

[12] Mortal things are diminished and fall, are worn down and grow, are exhausted and filled; and so, for them in so uncertain a lot, there is inequality: of divine things there is one nature. But reason is nothing other than a part of the divine spirit immersed in the human body; if reason is divine, and no good is without reason, every good is divine. Moreover, there is no distinction among things divine; therefore neither among goods.

Paria itaque sunt et gaudium et fortis atque obstinata tormentorum perpessio; in utroque enim eadem est animi magnitudo, in altero remissa et laxa, in altero pugnat et intenta.

Therefore both joy and the strong and obstinate endurance of torments are equal; for in each the same magnanimity of spirit is present, in the one relaxed and lax, in the other it fights and is intent.

[13] Quid? tu non putas parem esse virtutem eius qui fortiter hostium moenia expugnat, et eius qui obsidionem patientissime sustinet? [et] Magnus Scipio, qui Numantiam cludit et comprimit cogitque invictas manus in exitium ipsas suum verti, magnus ille obsessorum animus, qui scit non esse clusum cui mors aperta est, et in complexu libertatis exspirat.

[13] What? Do you not think the virtue of him who bravely storms the enemy’s walls and of him who most patiently sustains a siege to be equal? [and] Great is Scipio, who shuts in and compresses Numantia and compels undefeated bands to turn themselves to their own destruction; great, too, that spirit of the besieged, who knows that he is not shut in for whom death is open, and expires in the embrace of liberty.

Aeque reliqua quoque inter se paria sunt, tranquillitas, simplicitas, liberalitas, constantia, aequanimitas, tolerantia; omnibus enim istis una virtus subest, quae animum rectum et indeclinabilem praestat.

Equally, the remaining things also are equal among themselves—tranquillity, simplicity, liberality, constancy, equanimity, tolerance; for one virtue underlies all these, which renders the mind straight and indeclinable.

[14] 'Quid ergo? nihil interest inter gaudium et dolorum inflexibilem patientiam?' Nihil, quantum ad ipsas virtutes: plurimum inter illa in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur; in altero enim naturalis est animi remissio ac laxitas, in altero contra naturam dolor. Itaque media sunt haec quae plurimum intervalli recipiunt: virtus in utroque par est.

[14] 'What then? Is there no difference between joy and the inflexible patience of pains?' Nothing, as to the virtues themselves: very much between those things in which each virtue is exhibited; for in the one there is a natural remission and laxity of the mind, in the other, pain contrary to nature. And so these are intermediate things which admit the greatest interval: virtue in each is equal.

[15] Virtutem materia non mutat: nec peiorem facit dura ac difficilis nec meliorem hilaris et laeta; necessest ergo par sit. In utraque enim quod fit aeque recte fit, aeque prudenter, aeque honeste; ergo aequalia sunt bona, ultra quae nec hic potest se melius in hoc gaudio gerere nec ille melius in illis cruciatibus; duo autem quibus nihil fieri melius potest paria sunt.

[15] The material does not change virtue: neither do hard and difficult things make it worse, nor cheerful and glad ones make it better; therefore it must be equal. For in both cases what is done is done equally rightly, equally prudently, equally honestly; therefore the goods are equal, beyond which neither can this man conduct himself better in this joy nor that man better in those torments; but two things than which nothing can be done better are equal.

[16] Nam si quae extra virtutem posita sunt aut minuere illam aut augere possunt, desinit unum bonum esse quod honestum. Si hoc concesseris, omne honestum per;t. Quare? dicam: quia nihil honestum est quod ab invito, quod a coacto fit; omne honestum voluntarium est.

[16] For if things placed outside virtue can either diminish it or augment it, that ceases to be the one good, which is the honorable. If you concede this, all the honorable perishes. Why? I will say: because nothing is honorable that is done by one unwilling, that is done under compulsion; every honorable thing is voluntary.

Admisce illi pigritiam, querelam, tergiversationem, metum: quod habet in se optimum perdidit, sibi placere. Non potest honestum esse quod non est liberum; nam quod timet servit.

Mix into it sloth, complaint, tergiversation, fear: it has lost what it has in itself as best, to be pleased with itself. What is not free cannot be honorable; for what fears serves.

[17] Honestum omne securum est, tranquillum est: si recusat aliquid, si complorat, si malum iudicat, perturbationem recepit et in magna discordia volutatur; hinc enim species recti vocat, illinc suspicio mali retrahit. Itaque qui honeste aliquid facturus est, quidquid opponitur, id etiam si incommodum putat, malum non putet, velit, libens faciat. Omne honestum iniussum incoactumque est, sincerum et nulli malo mixtum.

[17] All honest is secure, is tranquil: if it refuses anything, if it bewails, if it judges a bad, it has received perturbation and is rolled about in great discord; for from here the species of the right calls, from there the suspicion of evil draws back. And so he who is going to do something honestly, whatever is opposed, that, even if he thinks it an inconvenience, let him not think it a bad; let him will it, let him do it willingly. Every honest is unbidden uncoerced is, sincere and mixed with no evil.

[18] Scio quid mihi responderi hoc loco possit: 'hoc nobis persuadere conaris, nihil interesse utrum aliquis in gaudio sit an in eculeo iaceat ac tortorem suum lasset?'. Poteram respondere: Epicurus quoque ait sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, 'dulce est et ad me nihil pertinet'. Quid miraris si ego paria bona dico

[18] I know what could be answered to me at this point: 'are you trying to persuade us of this, that it makes no difference whether someone is in joy or is lying on the rack and is wearying his torturer?'. I could reply: Epicurus too says that the wise man, if he is seared in Phalaris’s bull, will exclaim, 'it is sweet and it pertains nothing to me.' Why do you marvel if I call equal goods

[19] Sed hoc respondeo, plurimum interesse inter gaudium et dolorem; si quaeratur electio, alterum petam, alterum vitabo: illud secundum naturam est, hoc contra. Quamdiu sic aestimantur, magno inter se dissident spatio: cum ad virtutem ventum est, utraque par est, et quae per laeta procedit et quae per tristia.

[19] But this I reply: there is a very great difference between joy and pain; if a choice be sought, I will seek the one, I will avoid the other: the former is according to nature, the latter contrary to it. So long as they are thus assessed, they differ by a great interval; when it comes to virtue, each is equal, both that which proceeds through joyful things and that which through sad things.

[20] Nullum habet momentum vexatio et dolor et quidquid aliud incommodi est; virtute enim obruitur. Quemadmodum minuta lumina claritas solis obscurat, sic dolores, molestias, iniurias virtus magnitudine sua elidit atque opprimit; et quocumque affulsit, ibi quidquid sine illa apparet exstinguitur, nec magis ullam portionem habent incommoda, cum in virtutem inciderunt, quam in mari nimbus.

[20] Vexation and pain and whatever other disadvantage there is have no moment; for they are overwhelmed by virtue. Just as the brightness of the sun obscures tiny lights, so virtue, by its magnitude, dashes down and oppresses pains, annoyances, injuries; and wherever it has shone forth, there whatever appears without it is extinguished, and inconveniences have no more any portion, when they have fallen into virtue, than a storm-cloud has in the sea.

[21] Hoc ut scias ita esse, ad omne pulchrum vir bonus sine ulla cunctatione procurret: stet illic licet carnifex, stet tortor atque ignis, perseverabit nec quid passurus sed quid facturus sit aspiciet, et se honestae rei tamquam bono viro credet; utilem illam sibi iudicabit, tutam, prosperam. Eundem locum habebit apud illum honesta res, sed tristis atque aspera, quem vir bonus pauper aut exul ac pallidus.

[21] That you may know this to be so, toward every noble thing the good man will run forth without any hesitation: though the executioner stand there, though the torturer and fire stand, he will persevere and will look not at what he is going to suffer but at what he is going to do, and he will entrust himself to an honorable thing as a good man should; he will judge that thing useful to himself, safe, prosperous. The honorable thing, though sad and harsh, will have with him the same standing as the good man, poor or an exile and pale.

[22] Agedum pone ex alia parte virum bonum divitiis abundantem, ex altera nihil habentem, sed in se omnia: uterque aeque vir bonus erit, etiam si fortuna dispari utetur. Idem, ut dixi, in rebus iudicium est quod in hominibus: aeque laudabilis virtus est in corpore valido ac libero posita quam in morbido ac vincto.

[22] Come then, set on one side a good man abounding in riches, on the other one having nothing, but having everything in himself: each will be equally a good man, even if he employs disparate fortune. The same, as I said, is the judgment in things as in men: virtue is equally laudable when set in a strong and free body as when in a sick and fettered one.

[23] Ergo tuam quoque virtutem non magis laudabis si corpus illi tuum integrum fortuna praestiterit quam si ex aliqua parte mutilatum: alioqui hoc erit ex servorum habitu dominum aestimare. Omnia enim ista in quae dominium casus exercet serva sunt, pecunia et corpus et honores, imbecilla, fluida, mortalia, possessionis incertae: illa rursus libera et invicta opera virtutis, quae non ideo magis appetenda sunt si benignius a fortuna tractantur, nec minus si aliqua iniquitate rerum premuntur.

[23] Therefore you will not praise your virtue the more if fortune has furnished to it your body intact than if it is mutilated in some part: otherwise this will be to estimate the master from the habit of the slaves. For all those things over which chance exercises dominion are servile—money and the body and honors—infirma, fluid, mortal, of uncertain possession; while those, in turn, the works of virtue, are free and unconquered, which are not for that reason more to be appeted if they are handled more benignly by fortune, nor less if they are pressed by some iniquity of circumstances.

[24] Quod amicitia in hominibus est, hoc in rebus appetitio. Non, puto, magis amares virum bonum locupletem quam pauperem, nec robustum et lacertosum quam gracilem et languidi corporis; ergo ne rem quidem magis appetes aut amabis hilarem ac pacatam quam distractam et operosam.

[24] What friendship is among men, this in things is appetition. I suppose you would not love a good man wealthy rather than poor, nor a robust and brawny one rather than a slender man of a languid body; therefore you will not, either, more desire or love a thing that is cheerful and peaceful than one distracted and laborious.

[25] Aut si hoc est, magis diliges ex duobus aeque bonis viris nitidum et unctum quam pulverulentum et horrentem; deinde hoc usque pervenies ut magis diligas integrum omnibus membris et illaesum quam debilem aut luscum; paulatim fastidium tuum illo usque procedet ut ex duobus aeque iustis ac prudentibus comatum et crispulum malis. Ubi par in utroque virtus est, non comparet aliarum rerum inaequalitas; omnia enim alia non partes sed accessiones sunt.

[25] Or if this is so, you will love more, out of two equally good men, the sleek and anointed rather than the dusty and bristling; then you will come to this point, that you love more the one whole in all his members and unharmed than the crippled or one-eyed; little by little your fastidiousness will advance so far that, out of two equally just and prudent men, you prefer the long‑haired and curly. Where virtue is equal in both, the inequality of other things does not appear; for all the others are not parts but accessions.

[26] Num quis tam iniquam censuram inter, suos agit ut sanum filium quam aegrum magis diligat, procerumve et excelsum quam brevem aut modicum? Fetus suos non distinguunt ferae et se in alimentum pariter omnium sternunt; aves ex aequo partiuntur cibos. Ulixes ad Ithacae suae saxa sic properat quemadmodum Agamemnon ad Mycenarum nobiles muros; nemo enim patriam quia magna est amat, sed quia sua.

[26] Does anyone exercise so unjust a censure among his own as to love a sound son more than a sick one, or a tall and lofty one more than a short or moderate? Wild beasts do not distinguish their offspring and lay themselves out as nourishment equally for all; birds apportion food equally. Ulysses hastens to the rocks of his own Ithaca just as Agamemnon to the noble walls of Mycenae; for no one loves his fatherland because it is great, but because it is his own.

[27] Quorsus haec pertinent? ut scias; virtutem omnia opera velut fetus suos isdem oculis intueri, aeque indulgere omnibus, et quidem impensius laborantibus, quoniam quidem etiam parentium amor magis in ea quorum miseretur inclinat. Virtus quoque opera sua quae videt affici et premi non magis amat, sed parentium bonorum more magis complectitur ac fovet.

[27] To what do these things pertain? that you may know: virtue looks upon all its works, like its offspring, with the same eyes, indulges all equally, and indeed more lavishly those who labor the more, since indeed even the love of parents inclines more toward those for whom it feels pity. Virtue too does not love its works which it sees to be afflicted and pressed more, but after the manner of good parents it embraces and fosters them the more.

[28] Quare non est ullum bonum altero maius? quia non est quicquam apto aptius, quia plano nihil est planius. Non potes dicere hoc magis par esse alicui quam illud; ergo nec honesto honestius quicquam est.

[28] Why is no good greater than another? Because nothing is more apt than what is apt, because nothing is more plain than what is plain. You cannot say that this is more on a par with anything than that; therefore neither is anything more honorable than the honorable.

[29] Quod si par omnium virtutum natura est, tria genera bonorum in aequo sunt. Ita dico: in aequo est moderate gaudere et moderate dolere. Laetitia illa non vincit hanc animi firmitatem sub tortore gemitus devorantem: illa bona optabilia, haec mirabilia sunt, utraque nihilominus paria, quia quidquid incommodi est vi tanto maioris boni tegitur.

[29] But if the nature of all the virtues is equal, the three genera of goods are on a level. Thus I say: on a level is to rejoice moderately and to grieve moderately. That joy does not conquer this firmness of spirit that, under the torturer, devours groans: those goods are desirable, these are marvelous, yet both nonetheless are equal, because whatever incommodity there is is covered by the force of a good so much the greater.

[30] Quisquis haec imparia iudicat ab ipsis virtutibus avertit oculos et exteriora circumspicit. Bona vera idem pendent, idem patent: illa falsa multum habent vani; itaque speciosa et magna contra visentibus, cum ad pondus revocata sunt, fallunt.

[30] Whoever judges these things unequal turns his eyes away from the virtues themselves and looks around at externals. True goods hang alike, are alike patent; those false have much of vanity; and so they are specious and great to onlookers, but, when recalled to the scale, they deceive.

[31] Ita est, mi Lucili: quidquid vera ratio commendat solidum et aeternum est, firmat animum attollitque semper futurum in excelso. illa quae temere laudantur et vulgi sententia bona sunt inflant inanibus laetos; rursus ea quae timentur tamquam mala iniciunt formidinem mentibus et illas non aliter quam animalia specie periculi agitant.

[31] So it is, my Lucilius: whatever true reason commends is solid and eternal; it strengthens the mind and lifts it up, ever to be on high. Those things which are praised rashly and are goods in the crowd’s opinion inflate the glad with empty things; in turn, those things that are feared as evils cast dread into minds and drive them, no otherwise than animals, by the mere appearance of danger.

[32] Utraque ergo res sine causa animum et diffundit et mordet: nec illa gaudio nec haec metu digna est. Sola ratio immutabilis et iudicii tenax est; non enim servit sed imperat sensibus. Ratio rationi par est, sicut rectum recto; ergo et virtus virtuti; nihil enim aliud est virtus quam recta ratio.

[32] Therefore each thing, without cause, both diffuses and bites the mind: neither that is worthy of joy nor this of fear. Reason alone is immutable and tenacious of judgment; for it does not serve but commands the senses. Reason is equal to reason, just as the straight to the straight; therefore virtue to virtue as well; for virtue is nothing else than right reason.

Omnes virtutes rationes sunt; rationes sunt, si rectae sunt; si rectae sunt, et pares sunt.

All virtues are rational principles; they are rational principles, if they are right; if they are right, they are also equal.

[33] Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt; ergo omnes pares sunt; nam cum similes rationi sint, similes et inter se sunt. Pares autem actiones inter se esse dico qua honestae rectaeque sunt; ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, quae modo latior est, modo angustior, modo illustris, modo ignobilis, modo ad multos pertinens, modo ad paucos. In omnibus tamen istis id quod optimum est par est: honestae sunt.

[33] Such as reason is, such also are the actions; therefore all are equal; for since they are similar to reason, they are similar also among themselves. But I say that actions are equal among themselves in so far as they are honorable and right; otherwise they will have great differences as the material varies, which is now wider, now narrower, now illustrious, now ignoble, now pertaining to many, now to few. Yet in all these that which is best is equal: they are honorable.

[34] Tamquam viri boni omnes pares sunt qua boni sunt, sed habent differentias aetatis: alius senior est, alius iunior; habent corporis: alius formosus, alius deformis est; habent fortunae: ille dives, hic pauper est, ille gratiosus, potens, urbibus notus et populis, hic ignotus plerisque et obscurus. Sed per illud quo boni sunt pares sunt.

[34] Just as all good men are equal in that wherein they are good, yet they have differences of age: one is older, another younger; they have differences of body: one is well-formed, another deformed; they have differences of fortune: that one is rich, this one poor; that one in favor, powerful, known to cities and peoples, this one unknown to most and obscure. Yet by that whereby they are good, they are equals.

[35] De bonis ac malis sensus non iudicat; quid utile sit, quid inutile, ignorat. Non potest ferre sententiam nisi in rem praesentem perductus est; nec futuri providus est nec praeteriti memor; quid sit consequens nescit. Ex hoc autem rerum ordo seriesque contexitur et unitas vitae per rectum iturae.

[35] The sense does not judge about goods and evils; what is utile, what inutile, it is ignorant of. It cannot pronounce a judgment unless it has been brought into a present matter; nor is it provident of the future nor mindful of the past; it does not know what is consequent. From this, however, the order of things and the series is woven together, and the unity of a life that is going to proceed by the straight course.

Ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum ac malorum; aliena et externa pro vilibus habet, et ea quae neque bona sunt neque mala accessiones minimas ac levissimas iudicat; omne enim illi bonum in animo est.

Therefore Reason is the arbiter of goods and evils; it holds alien and external things as cheap, and judges those things which are neither good nor bad to be the smallest and lightest accessions; for to it every good is in the mind.

[36] Ceterum bona quaedam prima existimat, ad quae ex proposito venit, tamquam victoriam, bonos liberos, salutem patriae; quaedam secunda, quae non apparent nisi in rebus adversis, tamquam aequo animo pati morbum, ignem, exsilium; quaedam media, quae nihilo magis secundum naturam sunt quam contra naturam, tamquam prudenter ambulare, composite sedere. Non enim minus secundum naturam est sedere quam stare aut ambulare.

[36] Moreover, it deems certain goods primary, to which it comes from a settled purpose, such as victory, good children, the safety of the fatherland; certain secondary, which do not appear except in adverse circumstances, such as to endure with equanimity disease, fire, exile; certain intermediate, which are no more according to nature than against nature, such as to walk prudently, to sit with composure. For it is no less according to nature to sit than to stand or to walk.

[37] Duo illa bona superiora diversa sunt: prima enim secundum naturam sunt, gaudere liberorum pietate, patriae incolumitate; secunda contra naturam sunt, fortiter obstare tormentis et sitim perpeti morbo urente praecordia.

[37] Those two higher goods are different: the first are according to nature—rejoicing in the piety of one’s children, in the incolumity of the fatherland; the second are against nature—bravely withstanding torments and enduring thirst when a disease is burning the vitals.

[38] 'Quid ergo? aliquid contra naturam bonum est?' Minime; sed id aliquando contra naturam est in quo bonum illud exsistit. Vulnerari enim et subiecto igne tabescere et adversa valetudine affligi contra naturam est, sed inter ista servare animum infatigabilem secundum naturam est.

[38] 'What then? Is something against nature good?' By no means; but that is sometimes against nature in which that good exists. For to be wounded and to waste away with fire placed beneath, and to be afflicted by adverse health, is against nature; but amid these things to preserve an indefatigable spirit is according to nature.

[39] Et ut quod volo exprimam breviter, materia boni aliquando contra naturam est bonum numquam, quoniam bonum sine ratione nullum est, sequitur autem ratio naturam. 'Quid est ergo ratio?' Naturae imitatio. 'Quod est summum hominis bonum?' Ex naturae voluntate se gerere.

[39] And, to express what I want briefly, the material of the good is sometimes against nature, the good never is, since there is no good without reason, and reason follows nature. 'What, then, is reason?' An imitation of nature. 'What is the highest good of man?' To conduct oneself according to the will of nature.

[40] 'Non est' inquit 'dubium quin felicior pax sit numquam lacessita quam multo reparata sanguine. Non est dubium' inquit 'quin felicior res sit inconcussa valetudo quam ex gravibus morbis et extrema minitantibus in tutum vi quadam et patientia educta. Eodem modo non erit dubium quin maius bonum sit gaudium quam obnixus animus ad perpetiendos cruciatus vulnerum aut ignium.'

[40] 'It is not,' he says, 'in doubt that a peace never assailed is more felicitous than one repaired with much blood. It is not in doubt,' he says, 'that an unshaken health is a more felicitous condition than one drawn out into safety from grave diseases and things threatening the extreme, by a certain force and patience. In the same way it will not be in doubt that joy is a greater good than a resolute spirit for enduring the torments of wounds or of fires.'

[41] Minime; illa enim quae fortuita sunt plurimum discriminis recipiunt; aestimantur enim utilitate sumentium. Bonorum unum propositum est consentire naturae; hoc [contingere] in omnibus par est. Cum alicuius in senatu sententiam sequimur, non potest dici: ille magis assentitur quam ille.

[41] By no means; for those things which are fortuitous admit the greatest disparity, for they are evaluated by the utility of the takers. Of good men there is one purpose: to consent with nature; this [to befall] is equal in all. When we follow someone’s opinion in the senate, it cannot be said: that man assents more than that one.

Ab omnibus in eandem sententiam itur. Idem de virtutibus dico: omnes naturae assentiuntur. Idem de bonis dico: omnia naturae assentiuntur.

All go to the same sentiment. The same I say about the virtues: all assent to nature. The same I say about the goods: all assent to nature.

[42] Alter adulescens decessit, alter senex, aliquis protinus infans, cui nihil amplius contigit quam prospicere vitam: omnes hi aeque fuere mortales, etiam si mors aliorum longius vitam passa est procedere, aliorum in medio flore praecidit, aliorum interrupit ipsa principia.

[42] One adolescent died, another an old man, someone straightway an infant, to whom nothing more befell than to catch sight of life: all these were equally mortal, even if death allowed the life of some to proceed further, cut off others in the midst of their bloom, and for others broke off the very beginnings.

[43] Alius inter cenandum solutus est; alterius continuata mors somno est; aliquem concubitus exstinxit. His oppone ferro transfossos aut exanimatos serpentium morsu aut fractos ruina aut per longam nervorum contractionem extortos minutatim. Aliquorum melior dici, aliquorum peior potest exitus: mors quidem omnium par est.

[43] Another was released while dining; another’s death was continuous with sleep; coitus extinguished someone. Set against these those pierced through by iron, or rendered lifeless by the bite of serpents, or broken by a collapse, or through a long contraction of the nerves wrenched out bit by bit. Of some the exit can be called better, of some worse: death indeed is equal for all.

Per quae veniunt diversa sunt; in [id] quod desinunt unum est. Mors nulla maior aut minor est; habet enim eundem in omnibus modum, finisse vitam.

The ways by which they come are diverse; in the [id] in which they terminate, it is one. Death is neither greater nor lesser; for it has the same mode in all, to have finished life.

[44] Idem tibi de bonis dico: hoc bonum inter meras voluptates, hoc est inter tristia et acerba; illud fortunae indulgentiam rexit, hoc violentiam domuit: utrumque aeque bonum est, quamvis illud plana et molli via ierit, hoc aspera. Idem enim finis omnium est: bona sunt, laudanda sunt, virtutem rationemque comitantur; virtus aequat inter se quidquid agnoscit.

[44] I say the same to you about goods: this good is among mere voluptuous pleasures, that one among sad and bitter things; that one steered the indulgence of Fortune, this one subdued her violence: each is equally good, although that one went by a level and soft road, this one by a rough. For the same end is common to all: they are goods, they are to be praised, they accompany virtue and reason; virtue equalizes, among themselves, whatever it recognizes.

[45] Nec est quare hoc inter nostra placita mireris: apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex quibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit, animus sine perturbatione. Haec bona non crescunt si plena sunt: quo enim crescet quod plenum est? Dolore corpus caret: quid ad hanc accedere indolentiam potest?

[45] Nor is there any reason why you should marvel at this among our tenets: with Epicurus there are two goods, from which that supreme and blessed state is composed, namely that the body be without pain and the mind without perturbation. These goods do not increase if they are full: for how will that which is full grow? The body is without pain: what can be added to this indolence (freedom from pain)?

Animus constat sibi et placidus est: quid accedere ad hanc tranquillitatem potest?

The mind is consistent with itself and placid: what can be added to this tranquillity?

[46] Quemadmodum serenitas caeli non recipit maiorem adhuc claritatem in sincerissimum nitorem repurgata, sic hominis corpus animumque curantis et bonum suum ex utroque nectentis perfectus est status, et summam voti sui invenit si nec aestus animo est nec dolor corpori. Si qua extra blandimenta contingunt, non augent summum bonum, sed, ut ita dicam, condiunt et oblectant; absolutum enim illud humanae naturae bonum corporis et animi pace contentum est.

[46] Just as the serenity of the sky, once repurged into its most sincere lustre, does not admit of any greater clarity, so for the man who cares for body and mind and weaves his good from both, the state is perfect, and he finds the sum of his desire if there is neither fever-heat in his mind nor pain in his body. If any blandishments from outside befall, they do not augment the highest good, but, so to speak, season and delight; for that absolute good of human nature is content with the peace of body and of mind.

[47] Dabo apud Epicurum tibi etiam nunc simillimam huic nostrae divisionem bonorum. Alia enim sunt apud illum quae malit contingere sibi, ut corporis quietem ab omni incommodo liberam et animi remissionem bonorum suorum contemplatione gaudentis; alia sunt quae, quamvis nolit accidere, nihilominus laudat et comprobat, tamquam illam quam paulo ante dicebam malae valetudinis et dolorum gravissimorum perpessionem, in qua Epicurus fuit illo summo ac fortunatissimo die suo. Ait enim se vesicae et exulcerati ventris tormenta tolerare ulteriorem doloris accessionem non recipientia, esse nihilominus sibi illum beatum diem.

[47] I will give you, with Epicurus, even now a division of goods most similar to this ours. For there are with him some things which he would prefer to befall himself, such as the quiet of the body free from every incommodity and a remission of the mind rejoicing in the contemplation of its goods; and there are others which, although he does not wish them to happen, nevertheless he praises and approves, such as that endurance of bad health and of the most grievous pains, which I was saying a little before, in which Epicurus was on that supreme and most fortunate day of his. For he says that he endures the torments of the bladder and of an ulcerated belly, not admitting any further accession of pain, and that nevertheless that day was blessed for him.

Beatum autem diem agere nisi qui est in summo bono non potest.

But to spend a blessed day no one can, except the one who is in the highest good.

[48] Ergo et apud Epicurum sunt haec bona, quae malles non experiri, sed, quia ita res tulit, et amplexanda et laudanda et exaequanda summis sunt. Non potest dici hoc non esse par maximis bonum quod beatae vitae clausulam imposuit, cui Epicurus extrema voce gratias egit.

[48] Therefore even with Epicurus there are these goods, which you would prefer not to experience, but, since the situation so turned out, are to be embraced and praised and equated with the highest. It cannot be said that this is not a good equal to the greatest, which set the closure upon a blessed life, for which Epicurus gave thanks with his final voice.

[49] Permitte mihi, Lucili virorum optime, aliquid audacius dicere: si ulla bona maiora esse aliis possent, haec ego quae tristia videntur mollibus illis et delicatis praetulissem, haec maiora dixissem. Maius est enim difficilia perfringere quam laeta moderari.

[49] Permit me, Lucili, best of men, to say something more audacious: if any goods could be greater than others, I would have preferred these which seem gloomy to those soft and delicate; these I would have called greater. For it is a greater thing to break through difficulties than to moderate joyous things.

[50] Eadem ratione fit, scio, ut aliquis felicitatem bene et ut calamitatem fortiter ferat. Aeque esse fortis potest qui pro vallo securus excubuit nullis hostibus castra temptantibus et qui succisis poplitibus in genua se excepit nec arma dimisit: 'macte virtute esto' sanguinulentis et ex acie redeuntibus dicitur. Itaque haec magis laudaverim bona exercitata et fortia et cum fortuna rixata.

[50] By the same reasoning it comes about, I know, that someone bears felicity well and calamity bravely. Equally strong can be the one who, secure, kept watch before the rampart with no enemies assailing the camp, and the one who, his hamstrings cut, caught himself upon his knees and did not let go his arms: “be increased in virtue!” is said to the blood-smeared and to those returning from the battle line. Therefore I would praise more highly these goods—trained, stalwart, and having wrangled with Fortune.

[51] Ego dubitem quin magis laudem truncam illam et retorridam manum Mucii quam cuiuslibet fortissimi salvam? Stetit hostium flammarumque contemptor et manum suam in hostili foculo destillantem perspectavit, donec Porsina cuius poenae favebat gloriae invidit et ignem invito eripi iussit.

[51] Should I hesitate that I would more praise that maimed and re-scorched hand of Mucius than the sound one of any most valiant man? He stood, a contemner of enemies and of flames, and beheld his own hand dripping on the enemy brazier, until Porsenna, whose glory he was favoring by this punishment, begrudged it and ordered the fire to be snatched away from the unwilling man.

[52] Hoc bonum quidni inter prima numerem tantoque maius putem quam illa secura et intemptata fortunae quanto rarius est hostem amissa manu vicisse quam armata? 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'hoc bonum tibi optabis?' Quidni? hoc enim nisi qui potest et optare, non potest facere.

[52] Why should I not number this good among the first, and think it so much greater than that secure and unassailed fortune, by how much it is rarer to have conquered an enemy with a hand lost than with an armed one? 'What then?' you ask, 'will you choose this good for yourself?' Why not? For unless one can even wish for this, he cannot do it.

[53] An potius optem ut malaxandos articulos exoletis meis porrigam? ut muliercula aut aliquis in mulierculam ex viro versus digitulos meos ducat? Quidni ego feliciorem putem Mucium, quod sic tractavit ignem quasi illam manum tractatori praestitisset?

[53] Or should I rather wish that I stretch out my joints to be kneaded to my catamites? that a little woman, or someone turned from a man into a little woman, should manipulate my little fingers? Why should I not think Mucius happier, because he handled the fire thus as if he had offered that hand to a masseur?

In integrum restituit quidquid erraverat: confecit bellum inermis ac mancus et illa manu trunca reges duos vicit. Vale.

He restored to wholeness whatever had erred: he finished the war unarmed and maimed, and with that truncated hand he conquered two kings. Farewell.

LXVII. SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM

67. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS

[1] Ut a communibus initium faciam, ver aperire se coepit, sed iam inclinatum in aestatem, quo tempore calere debebat, intepuit nec adhuc illi fides est; saepe enim in hiemem revolvitur. Vis scire quam dubium adhuc sit? nondum me committo frigidae verae, adhuc rigorem eius infringo.

[1] To make a beginning from commonplaces, spring has begun to open itself, but already inclined toward summer; at the time when it ought to be hot, it has become tepid, nor has it yet won credence; for it often revolves back into winter. Do you wish to know how doubtful it still is? I do not yet commit myself to the true cold (bath); I still break its rigor.

'Hoc est' inquis 'nec calidum nec frigidum pati.' Ita est, mi Lucili: iam aetas mea contenta est suo frigore; vix media regelatur aestate. Itaque maior pars in vestimentis degitur.

'This is,' you say, 'to endure neither hot nor cold.' So it is, my Lucilius: now my age is content with its own frigidity; scarcely is it rewarmed even in mid-summer. And so the greater part is passed in garments.

[2] Ago gratias senectuti quod me lectulo affixit: quidni gratias illi hoc nomine agam? Quidquid debebam nolle, non possum. Cum libellis mihi plurimus sermo est.

[2] I give thanks to old age because it has affixed me to my couch: why should I not give thanks to it on this account? Whatever I ought to have been unwilling to do, I am not able. With little books (libelli) I have the most conversation.

Si quando intervenerunt epistulae tuae, tecum esse mihi videor et sic afficior animo tamquam tibi non rescribam sed respondeam. Itaque et de hoc quod quaeris, quasi colloquar tecum, quale sit una scrutabimur.

If ever your letters have come in, I seem to be with you, and I am affected in mind in such a way as though I were not writing back to you but answering. Therefore, even about this which you ask, as if I were conversing with you, we will together scrutinize what sort it is.

[3] Quaeris an omne bonum optabile sit. 'Si bonum est' inquis 'fortiter torqueri et magno animo uri et patienter aegrotare, sequitur ut ista optabilia sint; nihil autem video ex istis voto dignum. Neminem certe adhuc scio eo nomine votum solvisse quod flagellis caesus esset aut podagra distortus aut eculeo longior factus.'

[3] You ask whether every good is desirable. 'If it is a good,' you say, 'to be bravely tormented, to be burned with great spirit, and to be ill patiently, it follows that these things are desirable; but I see nothing among these worthy of a vow. Certainly I know no one up to now to have paid a vow for this reason, that he had been beaten with scourges or distorted by gout or made longer by the rack.'

[4] Distingue, mi Lucili, ista, et intelleges esse in iis aliquid optandum. Tormenta abesse a me velim; sed si sustinenda fuerint, ut me in illis fortiter, honeste, animose geram optabo. Quidni ego malim non incidere bellum?

[4] Distinguish, my Lucilius, those things, and you will understand that there is in them something to be wished for. I would wish torments to be absent from me; but if they must be endured, I shall choose to conduct myself in them bravely, honorably, and with spirit. Why should I not rather prefer that war not occur?

sed si inciderit, ut vulnera, ut famem et omnia quae bellorum necessitas affert generose feram optabo. Ton sum tam demens ut aegrotare cupiam; sed si aegrotandum fuerit, ut nihil intemperanter, nihil effeminate faciam optabo. Ita non incommoda optabilia sunt, sed virtus qua perferuntur incommoda.

but if it should befall, I will choose to bear nobly wounds, hunger, and all the things which the necessity of wars brings. I am not so demented as to desire to be ill; but if there must be illness, I will choose to do nothing intemperately, nothing effeminately. Thus the incommodities are not things to be chosen, but the virtue by which the incommodities are endured.

[5] Quidam ex nostris existimant omnium istorum fortem tolerantiam non esse optabilem, sed ne abominandam quidem, quia voto purum bonum peti debet et tranquillum et extra molestiam positum. Ego dissentio. Quare?

[5] Some of our people reckon that a brave endurance of all those things is not to be desirable, nor even to be abominated, because by a vow a pure good ought to be sought—tranquil and set outside of trouble. I disagree. Why?

primum quia fieri non potest ut aliqua res bona quidem sit sed optabilis non sit; deinde si virtus optabilis est, nullum autem sine virtute bonum, et omne bonum optabile est; deinde etiam si *** tormentorum fortis patientia optabilis est.

first, because it cannot come to pass that some thing be indeed good but not desirable; then, if virtue is desirable, and there is no good without virtue, and every good is desirable; then also, if *** strong patience in torments is desirable.

[6] Etiam nunc interrogo: nempe fortitudo optabilis est? Atqui pericula contemnit et provocat; pulcherrima pars eius maximeque mirabilis illa est, non cedere ignibus, obviam ire vulneribus, interdum tela ne vitare quidem sed pectore excipere. Si fortitudo optabilis est, et tormenta patienter ferre optabile est; hoc enim fortitudinis pars est.

[6] Even now I ask: surely fortitude is desirable? And yet it contemns and provokes perils; the most beautiful part of it, and the most marvelous, is this: not to yield to fires, to go to meet wounds, sometimes not even to avoid missiles but to receive them with the breast. If fortitude is desirable, then to bear torments patiently is desirable as well; for this is a part of fortitude.

Sed separa ista, ut dixi: nihil erit quod tibi faciat errorem. Non enim pati tormenta optabile est, sed pati fortiter: illud opto 'fortiter', quod est virtus.

But separate those things, as I said: there will be nothing that causes you error. For it is not desirable to suffer torments, but to suffer bravely: that I opt for—'bravely'—which is virtue.

[7] 'Quis tamen umquam hoc sibi optavit?' Quaedam vota aperta et professa sunt, cum particulatim fiunt; quaedam latent, cum uno voto multa comprensa sunt. Tamquam opto mihi vitam honestam; vita autem honesta actionibus variis constat: in hac es Reguli arca, Catonis scissum manu sua vulnus, Rutili exsilium, calix venenatus qui Socraten transtulit e carcere in caelum. Ita cum optavi mihi vitam honestam, et haec optavi sine quibus interdum honesta non potest esse.

[7] 'Yet who has ever wished this for himself?' Certain vows are open and professed, when they are made piece by piece; certain lie hidden, when in one vow many things are comprised. As when I wish for myself an honorable life; now an honorable life consists of varied actions: in this are Regulus’s box, Cato’s wound torn open by his own hand, Rutilius’s exile, the poisoned chalice which transferred Socrates from prison to heaven. Thus when I have wished for myself an honorable life, I have wished also for these things, without which at times the honorable cannot be.

[8] O terque quaterque beati,
quis ante ora patrum Troiae sub moenibus altis
contigit oppetere!

[8] O thrice and four times blessed,
they to whom before the faces of their fathers beneath Troy’s lofty walls
it befell to meet death!

Quid interest, optes hoc alicui an optabile fuisse fatearis?

What difference is there, whether you wish this for someone or confess that it has been desirable?

[9] Decius se pro re publica devovit et in medios hostes concitato equo mortem petens irruit. Alter post hunc, paternae virtutis aemulus, conceptis sollemnibus ac iam familiaribus verbis in aciem confertissimam incucurrit, de hoc sollicitus tantum, ut litaret, optabilem rem putans bonam mortem. Dubitas ergo an optimum sit memorabilem mori et in aliquo opere virtutis?

[9] Decius devoted himself for the Republic and, his horse incited, seeking death he rushed into the midst of the enemies. Another after him, emulous of his father’s virtue, with set solemn and already familiar words ran into the most crowded battle-line, anxious only about this, that he might propitiate, thinking a good death a desirable thing. Do you then doubt whether it is best to die memorably and in some work of virtue?

[10] Cum aliquis tormenta fortiter patitur, omnibus virtutibus utitur. Fortasse una in promptu sit et maxime appareat, patientia; ceterum illic est fortitudo, cuius patientia et perpessio et tolerantia rami sunt; illic est prudentia, sine qua nullum initur consilium, quae suadet quod effugere non possis quam fortissime ferre; illic est constantia, quae deici loco non potest et propositum nulla vi extorquente dimittit; illic est individuus ille comitatus virtutum. Quidquid honeste fit una virtus facit, sed ex consilii sententia; quod autem ab omnibus virtutibus comprobatur, etiam si ab una fieri videtur, optabile est.

[10] When someone bravely suffers torments, he employs all the virtues. Perhaps one is in the forefront and most apparent—patience; but there too is fortitude, of which patience and sufferance and tolerance are branches; there is prudence, without which no counsel is entered upon, which advises that what you cannot escape you bear as stoutly as possible; there is constancy, which cannot be cast down from its position and surrenders its purpose to no force that would wrench it away; there is that indivisible retinue of virtues. Whatever is done honorably, one virtue accomplishes it, but according to the judgment of counsel; but what is approved by all the virtues, even if it seems to be done by one, is desirable.

[11] Quid? tu existimas ea tantum optabilia esse quae per voluptatem et otium veniunt, quae excipiuntur foribus ornatis? Sunt quaedam tristis vultus bona; sunt quaedam vota quae non gratulantium coetu, sed adorantium venerantiumque celebrantur.

[11] What? Do you suppose that only those things are desirable which come through pleasure and leisure, which are welcomed at ornamented doorways? There are certain good things of a sad countenance; there are certain vows which are celebrated not by a crowd of congratulators, but by adorers and venerators.

[12] Ita tu non putas Regulum optasse ut ad Poenos perveniret? Indue magni viri animum et ab opinionibus vulgi secede paulisper; cape, quantam debes, virtutis pulcherrimae ac magnificentissimae speciem, quae nobis non ture nec sertis, sed sudore ct sanguine colenda est.

[12] So do you not think that Regulus opted to reach the Punics? Put on the spirit of a great man and withdraw for a little while from the opinions of the crowd; take up, as much as you ought, the aspect of most beautiful and most magnificent Virtue, which is to be cultivated by us not with incense nor with garlands, but with sweat and blood.

[13] Aspice M. Catonem sacro illi pectori purissimas manus admoventem et vulnera parum alte demissa laxantem. Utrum tandem illi dicturus es 'vellem quae velles' et 'moleste fero' an 'feliciter quod agis'?

[13] Behold M. Cato applying his most pure hands to that sacred breast and loosening the wounds driven not deeply enough. What then will you say to him—“I wish that you had what you wish,” and “I take it grievously,” or “Good fortune in what you do”?

[14] Hoc loco mihi Demetrius noster occurrit, qui vitam securam et sine ullis fortunae incursionibus mare mortuum vocat. Nihil habere ad quod exciteris, ad quod te concites, cuius denuntiatione et incursu firmitatem animi tui temptes, sed in otio inconcusso iacere non est tranquillitas: malacia est.

[14] At this point my Demetrius comes to mind, who calls a secure life, without any incursions of fortune, a dead sea. To have nothing by which you are excited, to which you stir yourself, by whose denunciation and incursion you test the firmness of your mind, but to lie in unshaken leisure is not tranquility: it is malacia.

[15] Attalus Stoicus dicere solebat, 'malo me fortuna in castris suis quam in deliciis habeat. Torqueor, sed fortiter: bene est. Occidor, sed fortiter: bene est.' Audi Epicurum, dicet et 'dulce est'. Ego tam honestae rei ac severae numquam molle nomen imponam.

[15] Attalus the Stoic used to say, 'I prefer that Fortune have me in her camp rather than in her delights. I am tormented, but bravely: it is well. I am slain, but bravely: it is well.' Hear Epicurus; he will even say 'it is sweet.' I will never impose a soft name upon so honorable and severe a thing.

[16] Uror, sed invictus: quidni hoc optabile sit? - non quod urit me ignis, sed quod non vincit. Nihil est virtute praestantius, nihil pulchrius; et bonum est et optabile quidquid ex huius geritur imperio.

[16] I am burned, but unconquered: why should this not be desirable? - not because the fire burns me, but because it does not vanquish me. Nothing is more preeminent than virtue, nothing more beautiful; and whatever is carried out under its command is both good and desirable.

Vale.

Farewell.

LXVIII. SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM

68. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Consilio tuo accedo: absconde te in otio, sed et ipsum otium absconde. Hoc te facturum Stoicorum etiam si non praecepto, at exemplo licet scias; sed ex praecepto quoque facies: et tibi et cui voles approbaris.

[1] I accede to your counsel: hide yourself in leisure, but hide leisure itself as well. This you may know you will do in the way of the Stoics, even if not by precept, yet by example; but you will do it also by precept: you will be approved both to yourself and to whom you wish.

[2] Nec ad omnem rem publicam mittimus nec semper nec sine ullo fine; praeterea, cum sapienti rem publicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rem publicam etiam si recesserit, immo fortasse relicto uno angulo in maiora atque ampliora transit et caelo impositus intellegit, cum sellam aut tribunal ascenderet, quam humili loco sederit. Depone hoc apud te, numquam plus agere sapientem quam cum in conspectum eius divina atque humana venerunt.

[2] Nor do we send him to every republic, nor always, nor without any limit; moreover, since we have given to the wise man a republic worthy of himself, that is, the world, he is not outside the republic even if he has withdrawn, nay rather, perhaps, leaving one corner behind, he passes over into greater and more ample things, and, set upon the sky, he understands, when he used to mount the chair or the tribunal, how low a place he had sat. Lay this down with yourself: the wise man never does more than when divine and human things have come into his sight.

[3] Nunc ad illud revertor quod suadere tibi coeperam, ut otium tuum ignotum sit. Non est quod inscribas tibi philosophiam ac quietem: aliud proposito tuo nomen impone, valetudinem et imbecillitatem vocato et desidiam. Gloriari otio iners ambitio est.

[3] Now I revert to that which I had begun to persuade you, that your leisure be unknown. There is no reason for you to inscribe to yourself “philosophy” and “quiet”: impose another name upon your purpose; call it ill-health and imbecility and idleness. To glory in leisure is inert ambition.

[4] Animalia quaedam, ne inveniri possint, vestigia sua circa ipsum cubile confundunt: idem tibi faciendum est, alioqui non deerunt qui persequantur. Multi aperta transeunt, condita et abstrusa rimantur; furem signata sollicitant. Vile videtur quidquid patet; aperta effractarius praeterit.

[4] Certain animals, lest they be found, confound their tracks around the very lair: the same must be done by you, otherwise there will be no lack of those who will pursue. Many pass by open things; they pry into what is hidden and abstruse; sealed things solicit the thief. Whatever lies open seems vile; the housebreaker passes by what is open.

Hos mores habet populus, hos imperitissimus quisque: in secreta irrumpere cupit.

These habits the populace has, these each most inexpert person has: he longs to break into secrets.

[5] Optimum itaque est non iactare otium suum; iactandi autem genus est nimis latere et a conspectu hominum secedere. Ille Tarentum se abdidit, ille Neapoli inclusus est, ille multis annis non transit domus suae limen: convocat turbam quisquis otio suo aliquam fabulam imposuit.

[5] Therefore it is best not to flaunt one’s leisure; and yet a kind of flaunting is to lurk too much and to withdraw from the sight of men. One has hidden himself away to Tarentum, another is shut up at Naples, another for many years does not cross the threshold of his house: whoever has imposed some fable upon his leisure summons a crowd.

[6] Cum secesseris, non est hoc agendum, ut de te homines loquantur, sed ut ipse tecum loquaris. Quid autem loqueris? quod homines de aliis libentissime faciunt, de te apud te male existima: assuesces et dicere verum et audire.

[6] When you have withdrawn, this is not to be done, that men speak about you, but that you yourself speak with yourself. And what will you speak about? What men most gladly do about others—judge yourself ill before yourself: you will become accustomed both to speak the truth and to hear it.

Id autem maxime tracta quod in te esse infirmissimum senties.

But treat most of all that which you sense to be the most infirm in you.

[7] Nota habet sui quisque corporis vitia. Itaque alius vomitu levat stomachum, alius frequenti cibo fulcit, alius interposito ieiunio corpus exhaurit et purgat; ii quorum pedes dolor repetit aut vino aut balineo abstinent: in cetera neglegentes huic a quo saepe infestantur occurrunt. Sic in animo nostro sunt quaedam quasi causariae partes quibus adhibenda curatio est.

[7] Each person has the defects of his own body known. Therefore one relieves the stomach by vomiting, another props it with frequent food, another, with a fast interposed, drains and purges the body; those whose feet the pain revisits abstain either from wine or from the bath: negligent in the rest, they counter this one thing by which they are often harassed. So in our mind there are certain, as it were, causal parts to which treatment must be applied.

[8] Quid in otio facio? ulcus meum curo. Si ostenderem tibi pedem turgidum, lividam manum, aut contracti cruris aridos nervos, permitteres mihi uno loco iacere et fovere morbum meum: maius malum est hoc, quod non possum tibi ostendere: in pectore ipso collectio et vomica est.

[8] What do I do in leisure? I tend my ulcer. If I were to show you a swollen foot, a livid hand, or the withered sinews of a contracted leg, you would permit me to lie in one place and foment my illness: this is a greater evil, which I cannot show you: in my very chest there is a collection and an abscess.

Nolo nolo laudes, nolo dicas, 'o magnum virum! contempsit omnia et damnatis humanae vitae furoribus fugit'. Nihil damnavi nisi me.

I do not want, I do not want praises, I do not want you to say, 'O great man! he contemned all things and, the frenzies of human life condemned, fled.' I condemned nothing except myself.

[9] Non est quod proficiendi causa venire ad me velis. Erras, qui hinc aliquid auxili speras: non medicus sed aeger hic habitat. Malo illa, cum discesseris, dicas: 'ego istum beatum hominem putabam et eruditum, erexeram aures: destitutus sum, nihil vidi, nihil audivi quod concupiscerem, ad quod reverterer'. Si hoc sentis, si hoc loqueris, aliquid profectum est: malo ignoscas otio meo quam invideas.

[9] There is no reason why you should wish to come to me for the sake of making progress. You err, you who hope for some aid from here: not a physician but a sick man dwells here. I would rather that, when you have departed, you say: 'I was thinking that man blessed and erudite, I had pricked up my ears: I was left in the lurch; I saw nothing, I heard nothing that I would desire, to which I would return.' If you feel this, if you say this, something has made progress: I would rather you pardon my leisure than envy it.

[10] 'Otium' inquis 'Seneca, commendas mihi? ad Epicureas voces delaberis?' Otium tibi commendo, in quo maiora agas et pulchriora quam quae reliquisti: pulsare superbas potentiorum fores, digerere in litteram senes orbos, plurimum in foro posse invidiosa potentia ac brevis est et, si verum aestimes, sordida.

[10] 'Leisure,' you say, 'Seneca, do you commend it to me? Are you sliding down into Epicurean maxims?' I commend leisure to you, in which you may do greater and more beautiful things than those you have left behind: to beat upon the proud doors of the more powerful, to arrange childless old men by the letter, to have the most power in the forum—a power that is envied and brief, and, if you esteem it truly, sordid.

[11] Ille me gratia forensi longe antecedet, ille stipendiis militaribus et quaesita per hoc dignitate, ille clientium turba. [cui in turba] Par esse non possum, plus habent gratiae: est tanti ab omnibus vinci, dum a me fortuna vincatur.

[11] That man will far outstrip me in forensic favor, that one in military stipends and the dignity acquired through this, that one in a throng of clients. [to whom in the throng] I cannot be equal, they have more favor: it is worth it to be conquered by all, provided that Fortune is conquered by me.

[12] Utinam quidem hoc propositum sequi olim fuisset animus tibi! utinam de vita beata non in conspectu mortis ageremus! Sed nunc quoque non moramur; multa enim quae supervacua esse et inimica credituri fuimus rationi, nunc experientiae credimus.

[12] Would that indeed you had once had the animus to follow this purpose! would that we were not discussing the happy life in the sight of death! But even now we do not delay; for many things which we were going to believe to be superfluous and inimical to reason, now we trust to experience.

[13] Quod facere solent qui serius exierunt et volunt tempus celeritate reparare, calcar addamus. Haec aetas optime facit ad haec studia: iam despumavit, iam vitia primo fervore adulescentiae indomita lassavit; non multum superest ut exstinguat.

[13] As those are wont to do who have set out later and wish to repair the time by celerity, let us add the spur. This age does most excellently for these studies: it has already skimmed off its froth, already has wearied the vices, untamed in the first fervor of adolescence; not much remains for it to extinguish them.

[14] 'Et quando' inquis 'tibi proderit istud quod in exitu discis, aut in quam rem?' In hanc, ut exeam melior. Non est tamen quod existimes ullam aetatem aptiorem esse ad bonam mentem quam quae se multis experimentis, longa ac frequenti rerum paenitentia domuit, quae ad salutaria mitigatis affectibus venit. Hoc est huius boni tempus: quisquis senex ad sapientiam pervenit, annis pervenit.

[14] 'And when,' you say, 'will that which you learn at the exit profit you, or to what end?' To this end: that I may go out better. Yet there is no reason for you to suppose that any age is more apt for a good mind than that which has subdued itself by many experiments, by a long and frequent repentance for things, which comes to salutary matters with its affections mitigated. This is the time of this good: whoever as an old man arrives at wisdom, arrives by years.

Vale.

Farewell.

LXIX. SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM

69. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Mutare te loca et aliunde alio transilire nolo, primum quia tam frequens migratio instabilis animi est: coalescere otio non potest nisi desit circumspicere et errare. Ut animum possis continere, primum corporis tui fugam siste.

[1] I do not want you to change places and leap from one place to another, first because such frequent migration is of an unstable mind: one cannot coalesce with leisure unless one ceases to look around and to wander. So that you may be able to contain your mind, first halt the flight of your body.

[2] Deinde plurimum remedia continuata proficiunt: interrumpenda non est quies et vitae prioris oblivio; sine dediscere oculos tuos, sine aures assuescere sanioribus verbis. Quotiens processeris, in ipso transitu aliqua quae renovent cupiditates tuas tibi occurrent.

[2] Then continued remedies profit very much: rest and the oblivion of prior life are not to be interrupted; allow your eyes to unlearn, allow your ears to become accustomed to sounder words. As often as you go forth, in the very passage some things which renew your desires will meet you.

[3] Quemadmodum ei qui amorem exuere conatur evitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis - nihil enim facilius quam amor recrudescit -, ita qui deponere vult desideria rerum omnium quarum cupiditate flagravit et oculos et aures ab iis quae reliquit avertat.

[3] Just as for one who attempts to strip off love every admonition of the beloved body is to be avoided - for nothing more easily recrudesces than love -, so he who wishes to depose the desires of all the things with whose cupidity he has blazed should avert both eyes and ears from those things which he has left behind.

[4] Cito rebellat affectus. Quocumque se verterit, pretium aliquod praesens occupationis suae aspiciet. Nullum sine auctoramento malum est: avaritia pecuniam promittit, luxuria multas ac varias voluptates, ambitio purpuram et plausum et ex hoc potentiam et quidquid potentia.

[4] The feeling quickly rebels. Wherever he turns himself, he will see some present reward of his occupation. No evil is without a bounty: avarice promises money, luxury many and various pleasures, ambition the purple and applause, and from this power, and whatever power can.

[5] Mercede te vitia sollicitant: hic tibi gratis vivendum est. Vix effici toto saeculo potest ut vitia tam longa licentia tumida subigantur et iugum accipiant, nedum si tam breve tempus intervallis discindimus; unam quamlibet rem vix ad perfectum perducit assidua vigilia et intentio.

[5] Vices solicit you with wages; here you must live gratis. Hardly can it be effected in a whole age that vices, swollen by so long a license, be subdued and take the yoke—much less if we tear apart so brief a time with intervals; assiduous vigil and intention scarcely bring any single thing to perfection.

[6] Si me quidem velis audire, hoc meditare et exerce, ut mortem et excipias et, si ita res suadebit, accersas: interest nihil, illa ad nos veniat an ad illam nos. Illud imperitissimi cuiusque verbum falsum esse tibi ipse persuade: 'bella res est mori sua morte'. Nemo moritur nisi sua morte. Illud praeterea tecum licet cogites: nemo nisi suo die moritur.

[6] If you indeed wish to hear me, meditate on this and practice it: to both meet death and, if the matter so advises, to summon it; it makes no difference whether it comes to us or we go to it. Convince yourself that the saying of every most unskilled person is false: 'it is a fine thing to die one's own death.' No one dies except his own death. Moreover, you may consider this with yourself: no one dies except on his own day.

Nihil perdis ex tuo tempore; nam quod relinquis alienum est. Vale.

You lose nothing from your own time; for what you leave is alien. Farewell.