Dante: MONARCHIA

I.1. "Quare fremuerunt gentes, et populi meditati sunt inania? Astiterunt reges terre, et principes convenerunt in unum, adversus Dominum et adversus Cristum eius. Dirumpamus vincula eorum, et proiciamus a nobis iugum ipsorum". 2. Sicut ad faciem cause non pertingentes novum effectum comuniter admiramur, sic, cum causam cognoscimus, eos qui sunt in admiratione restantes quadam derisione despicimus.

1.1. "Why did the nations rage, and the peoples meditate vain things? The kings of the earth stood forth, and the princes gathered together as one, against the Lord and against his Christ. Let us burst their bonds, and let us cast from us their yoke". 2. Just as, not attaining to the face of the cause, we commonly admire a new effect, so, when we come to know the cause, we look down with a certain derision on those who remain in admiration.

Admirabar equidem aliquando romanum populum in orbe terrarum sine ulla resistentia fuisse prefectum, cum, tantum superficialiter intuens, illum nullo iure sed armorum tantummodo violentia obtinuisse arbitrabar. 3. Sed postquam medullitus oculos mentis infixi et per efficacissima signa divinam providentiam hoc effecisse cognovi, admiratione cedente, derisiva quedam supervenit despectio, cum gentes noverim contra romani populi preheminentiam fremuisse, cum videam populos vana meditantes, ut ipse solebam, cum insuper doleam reges et principes in hoc unico concordantes: ut adversentur Domino suo et Uncto suo, romano principi. 4. Propter quod derisive, non sine dolore quodam, cum illo clamare possum pro populo glorioso, pro Cesare, qui pro Principe celi clamabat: "Quare fremuerunt gentes, et populi meditati sunt inania?

I did indeed at one time marvel that the Roman people had been set as prefect over the orb of the lands without any resistance, since, merely looking superficially, I supposed that it had obtained this not by any right but by the violence of arms alone. 3. But after I fixed the eyes of my mind to the very marrow and through most efficacious signs came to know that divine providence accomplished this, admiration yielding place, a certain derisive disdain supervened, since I have learned that the nations raged against the preeminence of the Roman people, since I see peoples meditating vanities, as I myself used to do, since moreover I grieve that kings and princes are concordant in this one thing: that they set themselves against their Lord and his Anointed, the Roman princeps. 4. Wherefore derisively, not without a certain sorrow, I can cry out with him on behalf of the glorious people, on behalf of Caesar, who cried out for the Prince of heaven: “Why have the nations raged, and the peoples meditated vanities?”

Astiterunt reges terre, et principes convenerunt in unum, adversus Dominum et adversus Cristum eius". 5. Verum quia naturalis amor diuturnam esse derisionem non patitur, sed, ut sol estivus qui disiectis nebulis matutinis oriens luculenter irradiat, derisione omissa, lucem correctionis effundere mavult, ad dirumpendum vincula ignorantie regum atque principum talium, ad ostendendum genus humanum liberum a iugo ipsorum, cum Propheta sanctissimo me me subsequenter hortabor subsequentia subassummens: "Dirumpamus" videlicet "vincula eorum, et proiciamus a nobis iugum ipsorum". 6. Hec equidem duo fient sufficienter, si secundam partem presentis propositi prosecutus fuero, et instantis questionis veritatem ostendero. Nam per hoc quod romanum Inpenum de iure fuisse monstrabitur, non solum ab oculis regum et principum, qui gubemacula publica sibi usurpant, hoc ipsum de romano populo mendaciter extimantes, ignorantie nebula eluetur, sed mortales omnes esse se liberos a iugo sic usurpantium recognoscent. 7. Veritas autem questionis patere potest non solum lumine rationis humane, sed etiam radio divine auctoritatis: que duo cum simul ad unum concurrunt, celum et terram simul assentire necesse est.

"The kings of the earth stood forth, and the princes convened into one, against the Lord and against his Christ." 5. But because natural love does not permit derision to be long-lasting, but, like the estival sun which, the matutinal mists having been scattered, rising irradiates brightly, laying aside derision prefers to pour out the light of correction, for the bursting of the bonds of the ignorance of such kings and princes, for the showing that the human race is free from their yoke, with the most holy Prophet I will subsequently exhort myself, taking up the things that follow: "Let us burst," namely, "their bonds, and let us cast from us their yoke". 6. These two indeed will be done sufficiently, if I shall have pursued the second part of the present purpose, and shall have shown the truth of the present question. For through this, that the Roman Empire will be shown to have been by right, not only will the cloud of ignorance be washed away from the eyes of the kings and princes who usurp the public helms, falsely supposing this very thing about the Roman people, but all mortals will recognize themselves to be free from the yoke of those so usurping. 7. Moreover, the truth of the question can lie open not only by the light of human reason, but also by the ray of divine authority: which two, when together they concur unto one, heaven and earth must together assent.

8. Igitur fiducie prenotate innixus et testimonio rationis et auctoritatis prefretus, ad secundam questionem dirimendam ingredior.

8. Therefore, leaning on the pre-noted confidence and equipped with the testimony of reason and authority, I proceed to resolve the second question.

II. 1. Postquam sufficienter, secundum quod materia patitur, de veritate prime dubitationis inquisitum est, instat nunc de veritate secunde inquirere: hoc est utrum romanus populus de iure sibi asciverit Imperii dignitatem; cuius quidem inquisitionis principium est videre que sit illa veritas, in quam rationes inquisitionis presentis velut in principium proprium reducantur. 2. Sciendum est igitur quod, quemadmodum ars in triplici gradu invenitur, in mente scilicet artificis, in organo et in materia formata per artem, sic et naturam in triplici gradu possumus intueri. Est enim natura in mente primi motoris, qui Deus est; deinde in celo, tanquam in organo quo mediante similitudo bonitatis ecterne in fluitantem materiam explicatur.

2. 1. After it has been sufficiently inquired, according as the subject-matter permits, into the truth of the first doubt, it now presses to inquire into the truth of the second: that is, whether the Roman people by right has ascribed to itself the dignity of the Empire; and the principle of this inquiry is to see what that truth is, into which the reasons of the present inquiry may be reduced as into their proper principle. 2. It must therefore be known that, just as art is found in a triple grade—namely, in the mind of the artificer, in the organ, and in the matter formed by art—so too we can contemplate nature in a triple grade. For nature is in the mind of the first mover, who is God; then in heaven, as in an organ by whose mediation the likeness of eternal goodness is unfolded into the flowing matter.

3. Et quemadmodum, perfecto existente artifice atque optime organo se habente, si contingat peccatum in forma artis, materie tantum inputandum est, sic, cum Deus ultimum perfectionis actingit et instrumentum eius, quod celum est, nullum debite perfectionis patiatur defectum, ut ex hiis patet que de celo phylosophamur, restat quod quicquid in rebus inferioribus est peccatum, ex parte materie subiacentis peccatum sit et preter intentionem Dei naturantis et celi; et quod quicquid est in rebus inferioribus bonum, cum ab ipsa materia esse non possit, sola potentia esistente, per prius ab artifice Deo sit et secondario a celo, quod organum est artis divine, quam 'naturam' comuniter appellat. 4. Ex hiis iam liquet quod ius, cum sit bonum, per prius in mente Dei est; et, cum omne quod in mente Dei est sit Deus, iuxta illud "Quod factum est in ipso vita erat", et Deus maxime se ipsum velit, sequitur quod ius a Deo, prout in eo est, sit volitum. Et cum voluntas et volitum in Deo sit idem, sequitur ulterius quod divina voluntas sit ipsum ius.

3. And just as, the artisan being perfect and the organ being in an optimal condition, if a fault (peccatum) occurs in the form of the art, it must be imputed only to the matter, so, since God reaches the ultimate of perfection and His instrument, which is heaven, suffers no defect of due perfection, as is evident from those things which we philosophize concerning heaven, it remains that whatever in the lower things is a fault is a fault on the part of the underlying matter and beyond the intention of the naturing God and of heaven; and that whatever in the lower things is good—since it cannot be from matter itself, matter existing only as potency—exists primarily from the artisan God and secondarily from heaven, which is the organ (instrument) of the divine art, which one commonly calls “nature.” 4. From these things it is now clear that right (ius), since it is a good, is primarily in the mind of God; and, since everything that is in the mind of God is God, according to that saying “Quod factum est in ipso vita erat” (“What was made was life in him”), and God supremely wills Himself, it follows that right, by God, insofar as it is in Him, is willed. And since will and the willed are the same in God, it further follows that the divine will is right itself.

5. Et iterum ex hoc sequitur quod ius in rebus nichil est aliud quam similitudo divine voluntatis; unde fit quod quicquid divine voluntati non consonat, ipsum ius esse non possit, et quicquid divine voluntati est consonum, ius ipsum sit. 6. Quapropter querere utrum de iure factum sit aliquid, licet alia verba sint, nichil tamen aliud queritur quam utrum factum sit secundum quod Deus vult. Hoc ergo supponatur, quod illud quod Deus in hominum sotietate vult, illud pro vero atque sincero iure habendum sit.

5. And again from this it follows that right in things is nothing else than the similitude of the divine will; whence it comes about that whatever is not consonant with the divine will cannot be right itself, and whatever is consonant with the divine will is right itself. 6. Wherefore to inquire whether something has been done by right, though the words be different, nevertheless nothing else is asked than whether it has been done according to what God wills. Let this therefore be supposed: that what God wills in the society of men ought to be held as true and sincere right.

7. Preterea meminisse oportet quod, ut Phylosophus docet in primis ad Nicomacum, non similiter in omni materia certitudo querenda est, sed secundum quod natura rei subiecte recipit. Propter quod sufficienter argumenta sub invento principio procedent, si ex manifestis signis atque sapientum autoritatibus ius illius populi gloriosi queratur. 8. Voluntas quidem Dei per se invisibilis est; et invisibile Dei "per ea que facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur"; nam, occulto existente sigillo, cera impressa de illo quamvis occulto tradit notitiam manifestam.

7. Moreover, it ought to be remembered that, as the Philosopher teaches in the first books to Nicomachus, certitude is not to be sought similarly in every matter, but according as the nature of the subject thing receives it. Wherefore the arguments will proceed sufficiently under the principle discovered, if from manifest signs and the authorities of the wise the right of that glorious people be sought. 8. The will of God indeed is in itself invisible; and “the invisible things of God are understood, being seen, through the things that have been made”; for, the seal itself being hidden, the impressed wax conveys manifest knowledge about it, although it is hidden.

Nec mirum si divina voluntas per signa querenda est, cum etiam humana extra volentem non aliter quam per signa cernatur.

Nor is it a wonder if the divine will is to be sought through signs, since even a human will, outside the one willing, is discerned in no other way than through signs.

III.1. Dico igitur ad questionem quod romanus populus de iure, non usurpando, Monarche offitium, quod 'Imperium' dicitur, sibi super mortales omnes ascivit. 2. Quod quidem primo sic probatur: nobilissimo populo convenit omnibus aliis preferri; romanus populus fuit nobilissimus; ergo convenit ei omnibus aliis preferri. 3. Assumpta ratione probatur: nam, cum honor sit premium virtutis et omnis prelatio sit honor, omnis prelatio virtutis est premium.

3.1. Therefore I say to the question that the Roman people, by right, not by usurping, has assumed to itself over all mortals the office of Monarchy, which is called 'the Empire'. 2. This indeed is proved first thus: it befits the most noble people to be preferred before all others; the Roman people was most noble; therefore it befits it to be preferred before all others. 3. The assumed rationale is proved: for, since honor is the prize of virtue and every prelation is honor, every prelation is the prize of virtue.

Sed constat quod merito virtutis nobilitantur homines, virtutis videlicet proprie vel maiorum. 4. Est enim nobilitas virtus et divitie antique, iuxta Phylosophum in Politicis; et iuxta luvenalem: nobilitas animi sola est atque unica virtus. Que due sententie ad duas nobilitates dantur: propriam scilicet et maiorum.

But it is agreed that by the merit of virtue men are ennobled, namely by virtue either their own or of their ancestors. 4. For nobility is virtue and ancient riches, according to the Philosopher in the Politics; and according to Juvenal: nobility of mind is the sole and unique virtue. And these two sentences are given to the two nobilities: one’s own, namely, and that of one’s ancestors.

Ergo nobilibus ratione cause premium prelationis conveniens est. 5. Et cum premia sint meritis mensuranda iuxta illud evangelicum "Eadem mensura qua mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis", maxime nobili maxime preesse convenit. 6. Subassumptam vero testimonia veterum persuadent; nam divinus poeta noster Virgilius per totam Eneydem gloriosissimum regem Eneam patrem romani populi fuisse testatur in memoriam sempiternam; quod Titus Livius, gestorum romanorum scriba egregius, in prima parte sui voluminis, que a capta Troya summit exordium, contestatur.

Therefore to nobles, by reason of the cause, the reward of prelation is fitting. 5. And since rewards ought to be measured by merits, according to that evangelical saying, "With the same measure with which you have measured, it will be measured back to you," it is most fitting that the most noble be most preeminent. 6. But the subassumption is persuaded by the testimonies of the ancients; for our divine poet Virgil, throughout the whole Aeneid, bears witness, for everlasting memory, that the most glorious king Aeneas was the father of the Roman people; which Titus Livius, the distinguished scribe of Roman deeds, attests in the first part of his volume, which takes its exordium from the capture of Troy.

7. Qui quidem invictissimus atque piissimus pater quante nobilitatis vir fuerit, non solum sua considerata virtute sed progenitorum suorum atque uxorum, quorum utrorunque nobilitas hereditario iure in ipsum confluxit, esplicare nequirem: sed "summa sequar vestigia rerum". 8. Quantum ergo ad propriam eius nobilitatem audiendus est Poeta noster introducens in primo Ilioneum orantem sic:

7. This indeed most unconquered and most pious father—of how great nobility a man he was, I could not explicate, not only considering his own virtue but that of his progenitors and of his wives, the nobility of both of whom by hereditary right flowed together into him; but, "I shall follow the chief vestiges of the matters." 8. Therefore, as to his proper nobility, our Poet is to be listened to, introducing in the first book Ilioneus praying thus:

Rex erat Eneas nobis, quo iustior alter
nec pietate fuit nec bello maior et armis.

Aeneas was our king, than whom no other was more just,
nor superior in piety, nor greater in war and in arms.

9 Audiendus est idem in sexto, qui, cum de Miseno mortuo loqueretur qui fuerat Hectoris minister in bello et post mortem Hectoris Enee ministrum se dederat, dicit ipsum Misenum "non inferiora secutum", comparationem faciens de Enea ad Hectorem, quem pre omnibus Homerus glorificat, ut refert Phylosophus in hiis que de moribus fugiendis ad Nicomacum. 10. Quantum vero ad hereditariam, quelibet pars tripartiti orbis tam avis quam coniugibus illum nobilitasse invenitur. Nam Asya propinquioribus avis, ut Assaraco et aliis qui Frigiam regnaverunt, Asye regionem; unde Poeta noster in tertio:

9 The same is to be heeded in the sixth, who, when he was speaking about Misenus dead—who had been Hector’s minister in war, and after Hector’s death had given himself as minister to Aeneas—says that this same Misenus had “not pursued inferior things,” making a comparison of Aeneas to Hector, whom above all Homer glorifies, as the Philosopher relates in those writings on morals to be shunned, to Nicomachus.
10. But as to the hereditary [nobility], each part of the tripartite world is found to have ennobled him both by ancestors and by spouses. For Asia by his nearer ancestors, such as Assaracus and others who ruled Phrygia, a region of Asia; whence our Poet in the third:

Postquam res Asye Priamique evertere gentem
inmeritam visum superis.

After the fortunes of Asia and of Priam to overthrow the undeserving nation
seemed to the gods above.

11. Europa vero avo antiquissimo, scilicet Dardano: Affrica quoque avia vetustissima, Electra scilicet, nata magni nominis regis Athlantis; ut de ambobus testimonium reddit Poeta noster in octavo, ubi Eneas ad Evandrum sic ait:

11. Europe indeed by a most ancient grandsire, namely Dardanus: Africa also by a most ancient grandmother, namely Electra, born of the king of great name, Atlas; as concerning both our Poet renders testimony in the eighth, where Aeneas thus says to Evander:

Dardanus yliace primus pater urbis et auctor,
Electra, ut Grai perhibent, Athlantide cretus,
advehitur Teucros: Electram maximus Athlas
edidit, ethereos humero qui sustinet orbes.

Dardanus, first father and author of the Iliac city,
born of Electra, as the Greeks aver, the Atlantid,
is borne to the Teucrians: Electra the greatest Atlas
begot, he who on his shoulder sustains the ethereal orbs.

12. Quod autem Dardanus ab Europa originem duxerit, noster Vates in tertio cantat dicens:

12. That, moreover, Dardanus drew his origin from Europa, our Vates sings in the third, saying:

Est locus, Hesperiam Grai cognomine dicunt,
terra antiqua, potens armis atque ubere glebe.
Oenotri coluere viri; nunc fama minores
Ytaliam dixisse ducis de nomine gentem:
hee nobis proprie sedes, hinc Dardanus ortus.

There is a place, which the Greeks by cognomen call Hesperia,
an ancient land, powerful in arms and in the richness of the glebe.
Oenotrian men cultivated it; now the report is that the descendants
have called the nation Italy from their leader’s name:
these are for us our proper seats; from here Dardanus was sprung.

13 Quod vero Athlas de Affrica fuerit, mons in illa suo nomine dictus est testis, quem esse in Affrica dicit Orosius in sua mundi descriptione sie: "Ultimus autem finis eius est mons Athlas et insule quas Fortunatas vocant"; 'eius', idest Affrice, quia de ipsa loquebatur. 14 Similiter etiam coniugio nobilitatum fuisse reperio. Prima nanque coniunx Creusa, Priami regis filia, de Asya fuit, ut superius haberi potest per ea que dicta sunt. Et quod fuerit coniunx testimonium perhibet noster Poeta in tertio, ubi Andromache de Ascanio filio Eneam genitorem interrogat sic:

13 That Atlas was from Africa, a mountain in that land called by his name is witness, which Orosius in his description of the world says to be in Africa thus: "But its utmost boundary is Mount Atlas and the islands which they call the Fortunate"; "its," that is, of Africa, because he was speaking about it. 14 Likewise I find that he was ennobled also by marriage. For his first consort, Creusa, daughter of King Priam, was from Asia, as can be seen above from the things that have been said. And that she was his consort our Poet bears witness in Book 3, where Andromache about Ascanius asks Aeneas the begetter thus:

Quid puer Ascanius? superatne et vescitur aura,
quem tibi iam Troya peperit fumante Creusa?

What of the boy Ascanius? Does he survive and feed on the air,
whom to you Creusa bore, with Troy already smoking?

15 Secunda Dido fuit, regina et mater Cartaginensium in Affrica; et quod fuerit coniunx, Idem noster vaticinatur in quarto; inquit enim de Didone:

15 The second was Dido, queen and mother of the Carthaginians in Africa; and that she was a consort, the same our Poet vaticinates in the 4th; for he says about Dido:

Nec iam furtivum Dido meditatur amorem:
coniugium vocat; hoc pretexit nomine culpam.

Nor now does Dido meditate a furtive love:
she calls it marriage; with this name she veils the guilt.

16 Tertia Lavinia fuit, Albanorum Romanorumque mater, regis Latini filia pariter et heres, si verum est testimonium nostri Poete in ultimo, ubi Turnum victum introducit orantem suppliciter ad Eneam sic:

16 Third was Lavinia, mother of the Albans and the Romans, daughter equally and heir of King Latinus, if the testimony of our Poet in the last book is true, where he introduces Turnus, conquered, praying suppliantly to Aeneas thus:

Vicisti, et victum tendere palmas
Ausonii videre: tua est Lavinia coniunx.

You have conquered, and the Ausonians have seen the vanquished stretch forth his palms:
Lavinia is your consort.

17 Que ultima uxor de Ytalia fuit, Europe regione nobilissima. Hiis itaque ad evidentiam subassumpte prenotatis cui non satis persuasum est romani populi patrem, et per consequens ipsum populum, nobilissimum fuisse sub celo? Aut quem in illo duplici concursu sanguinis a qualibet mundi parte in unum virum predestinatio divina latebit?

17 Who was the last wife, from Italy, the most noble region of Europe. These things, then, taken up and pre-noted for evidentness, to whom is it not sufficiently persuaded that the father of the Roman people, and consequently the people itself, was the most noble under heaven? Or from whom, in that double concourse of blood from whatever part of the world into one man, will divine predestination lie hidden?

IV.1. Illud quoque quod ad sui perfectionem miraculorum suffragio iuvatur, est a Deo volitum; et per consequens de iure fit. Et quod ista sit vera patet quia, sicut dicit Thomas in tertio suo contra Gentiles, miraculum est quod preter ordinem in rebus comuniter institutum divinitus fit. 2. Unde ipse probat soli Deo competere miracula operari: quod autoritate Moysi roboratur ubi, cum ventum est ad sciniphes, magi Pharaonis naturalibus principiis artificiose utentes et ibi deficientes dixerunt: "Digitus Dei est hic". 3. Si ergo miraculum est immediata operatio Primi absque cooperatione secundorum agentium—ut ipse Thomas in preallegato libro probat sufficienter—cum in favorem alicuius portenditur, nefas est dicere illud, cui sic favetur, non esse a Deo tanquam beneplacitum sibi provisum.

4.1. That also which, for its own perfection, is aided by the suffrage of miracles, is willed by God; and, consequently, is done by right. And that this is true is evident because, as Thomas says in his third Contra Gentiles, a miracle is that which, beyond the order commonly instituted in things, is done divinely. 2. Whence he himself proves that it belongs to God alone to work miracles: which is strengthened by the authority of Moses, where, when it came to the gnats, Pharaoh’s magi, using natural principles artfully and there failing, said: “The finger of God is here.” 3. If therefore a miracle is the immediate operation of the First without the co-operation of secondary agents—as the same Thomas in the pre-alleged book proves sufficiently—when it is portended in favor of someone, it is nefas to say that the one who is thus favored is not, by God, provided for according to His good pleasure.

4. Qua re suum contradictorium concedere sanctum est: romanum Imperium ad sui perfectionem miraculorum suffragio est adiutum; ergo a Deo volitum; et per consequens de iure fuit et est. 5. Quod autem pro romano Imperio perficiendo miracula Deus portenderit, illustrium autorum testimoniis comprobatur. Nam sub Numa Pompilio, secundo Romanorum rege, ritu Gentilium sacrificante, ancile de celo in urbem Deo electam delapsum fuisse Livius in prima parte testatur.

4. Wherefore it is holy to concede its contradictory: the Roman Empire, for its own perfection, was aided by the suffrage of miracles; therefore it was willed by God; and consequently it was and is de jure. 5. But that God portended miracles for the perfecting of the Roman Empire is proved by the testimonies of illustrious authors. For under Numa Pompilius, the second king of the Romans, as he was sacrificing by the rite of the Gentiles, the ancile is attested by Livy in the first part to have slipped down from heaven into the city chosen by God.

6. Cuius miraculi Lucanus in nono Farsalie meminit incredibilem vim haustri, quam Lybia patitur, ibi describens; ait enim:

6. Of which miracle Lucan in the ninth of the Pharsalia makes mention, describing there the incredible force of the south wind (Auster), which Libya suffers; for he says:

Sic illa profecto
sacrifico cecidere Nume, que lecta iuventus
patritia cervice movet; spoliaverat hauster,
aut boreas populos ancilia nostra ferentes.

Thus assuredly those fell at Numa’s sacrifice,
which the chosen youth moves upon a patrician neck; Auster had despoiled,
or Boreas, the peoples bearing our ancilia.

7. Cumque Galli, reliqua urbe iam capta, noctis tenebris confusi Capitolium furtim subirent, quod solum restabat ad ultimum interitum romani nominis, anserem ibi non ante visum cecinisse Gallos adesse atque custodes ad defensandum Capitolium excitasse Livius et multi scriptores illustres concorditer contestantur. 8. Cuius rei memor fuit Poeta noster cum clipeum Enee describeret in octavo; canit enim sic:

7. And when the Gauls, with the rest of the city now captured, confounded in the darkness of night, were surreptitiously ascending the Capitol, which alone remained to the ultimate extinction of the Roman name, Livy and many illustrious writers with one accord attest that a goose there, not previously seen, had sung that the Gauls were present and had roused the guards to defend the Capitol. 8. Of which matter our Poet was mindful when he was describing Aeneas’s shield in the eighth book; for he sings thus:

In summo custos Tarpeie Manlius arcis
stabat pro templo, et Capitolia celsa tenebat,
Romuleoque recens horrebat regia culmo.
Atque hic auratis volitans argenteus anser
porticibus Gallos in limine adesse canebat.

On the summit of the Tarpeian citadel the guardian Manlius
stood before the temple, and held the lofty Capitoline heights,
and the royal house bristled, fresh with Romulean thatch.
And here, a silver goose flitting through gilded porticoes,
sang that the Gauls were present at the threshold.

9 At cum romana nobilitas, premente Annibale, sic caderet ut ad finalem romane rei deletionem non restaret nisi Penorum insultus ad urbem, subita et intolerabili grandine perturbante victores victoriam sequi non potuisse Livius in Bello punico inter alia gesta conscribit. 10. Nonne transitus Clelie mirabilis fuit, cum mulier cumque captiva, in obsidione Porsenne, abruptis vinculis, miro Dei auxilio adiuta, transnavit Tyberim, sicut onmes fere scribe romane rei ad gloriam ipsius commemorant? 11. Sic Illum prorsus operari decebat qui cuncta sub ordinis pulcritudine ab ecterno providit, ut qui visibilis erat miracula pro invisibilibus ostensurus, idem invisibilis pro visibilibus illa ostenderet.

9 When the Roman nobility, with Hannibal pressing, was thus falling that for the final annihilation of the Roman state nothing remained except the assault of the Punics upon the city, Livy, in the Punic War, among other deeds, records that, a sudden and intolerable hailstorm throwing the victors into confusion, the victors were not able to follow up their victory. 10. Was not the crossing of Cloelia marvelous, when—though a woman and even a captive—during the siege of Porsenna, with her bonds broken, aided by the wondrous help of God, she swam across the Tiber, as almost all the writers of the Roman state commemorate to her glory? 11. Thus it altogether befitted Him to act who from eternity provided all things under the comeliness of order: that He who was visible, about to display miracles for invisible things, the same, being invisible, should show those for visible things.

V.1. Quicunque preterea bonum rei publice intendit, finem iuris intendit. Quodque ita sequatur sic ostenditur: ius est realis et personalis hominis ad hominem proportio, que servata hominum servat sotietatem, et corrupta corrumpit—nam illa Digestorum descriptio non dicit quod quid est iuris, sed describit illud per notitiam utendi illo -; 2. si ergo definitio ista bene 'quid est' et 'quare' comprehendit, et cuiuslibet sotietatis finis est comune sotiorum bonum, necesse est finem cuiusque iuris bonum comune esse; et inpossibile est ius esse, bonum comune non intendens. Propter quod bene Tullius in Prima rethorica: semper—inquit—ad utilitatem rei publice leges interpretande sunt.

5.1. Whoever, moreover, intends the good of the commonwealth, intends the end of law. And that this follows is shown thus: law is a proportion, real and personal, of man to man, which, being preserved among men, preserves society, and, being corrupted, corrupts it—for that description in the Digests does not say what the what of law is, but describes it through the knowledge of using it -; 2. if therefore this definition well comprehends the “what it is” and the “why,” and the end of any society is the common good of the associates, it is necessary that the end of each law be the common good; and it is impossible that there be law not intending the common good. Wherefore Tullius rightly, in the First Rhetoric: “always,” he says, “laws are to be interpreted toward the utility of the commonwealth.”

3. Quod si ad utilitatem eorum qui sunt sub lege leges directe non sunt, leges nomine solo sunt, re autem leges esse non possunt: leges enim oportet homines devincire ad invicem propter Comunem utilitatem. Propter quod bene Seneca de lege cum in libro De quatuor virtutibus, "legem vinculum" dicat "humane sotietatis". 4. Patet igitur quod quicunque bonum rei publice intendit finem iuris intendit. Si ergo Romani bonum rei publice intenderunt, verum erit dicere finem iuris intendisse.

3. But if laws are not directly for the utility of those who are under the law, they are laws in name only, but in reality they cannot be laws: for laws ought to bind men to one another on account of the Common utility. On which account Seneca rightly, when speaking about law in the book On the Four Virtues, calls law “the bond of human society.” 4. It is therefore evident that whoever intends the good of the commonwealth intends the end of law. If therefore the Romans intended the good of the commonwealth, it will be true to say that they intended the end of law.

5. Quod autem romanus populus bonum prefatum intenderit subiciendo sibi orbem terrarum, gesta sua declarant, in quibus, omni cupiditate summota que rei publice semper adversa est, et universali pace cum libertate dilecta, populus ille sanctus pius et gloriosus propria commoda neglexisse videtur, ut publica pro salute humani generis procuraret. Unde recte illud scriptum est: "Romanum imperium de Fonte nascitur pietatis". 6. Sed quia de intentione omnium ex electione agentium nichil manifestum est extra intendentem nisi per signa exteriora, et sermones inquirendi sunt secundum subiectam materiam—ut iam dictum est—satis in hoc loco habebimus, si de intentione populi romani signa indubitabilia tam in collegiis quam in singularibus personis ostendantur. 7. De collegiis quidem, quibus homines ad rem publicam quodammodo religati esse videntur, sufficit illa sola Ciceronis autoritas in secundis Offitiis: "Quandiu" inquit "imperium rei publice beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut pro sotiis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessaria; regum, populorum et nationum portus erat et refugium senatus; nostri autem et magistratus inperatoresque in ea re maxime laudem capere studuerunt, si provincias, si sotios equitate et fide defendissent.

5. But that the Roman people intended the aforesaid good by subjecting to themselves the orb of lands, their deeds declare: in which, with all cupidity removed—which is always adverse to the commonwealth—and with universal peace together with cherished liberty, that holy, pious, and glorious people seems to have neglected their own advantages, in order that they might procure the public things for the health/salvation of the human race. Whence rightly that sentence has been written: "The Roman empire is born from the Fount of piety." 6. But since, concerning the intention of all who act from choice, nothing is manifest outside the one intending except through exterior signs, and discourses must be investigated according to the subject matter—as has already been said—we shall have enough in this place, if indubitable signs of the intention of the Roman people are shown both in the colleges and in individual persons. 7. Concerning the colleges indeed, by which men seem to be in a certain manner bound to the commonwealth, that sole authority of Cicero in the second Offices suffices: "As long," he says, "as the imperium of the commonwealth was held by benefactions, not by injuries, wars were waged either for allies or about dominion; the outcomes of the wars were either mild or necessary; the senate was the harbor and refuge of kings, peoples, and nations; and our men and magistrates and commanders strove to take their greatest praise in this matter, if they had defended the provinces, if the allies, with equity and good faith."

Itaque illud 'patrocinium' orbis terrarum potius quam 'imperium' poterat nominari". Hec Cicero. 8. De personis autem singularibus compendiose progrediar. Nunquid non bonum comune intendisse dicendi sunt qui sudore, qui paupertate, qui exilio, qui filiorum orbatione, qui amissione membrorum, qui denique animarum oblatione bonum publicum exaugere conati sunt?

Therefore that could be called the 'patronage' of the orb of lands rather than an 'empire'. Thus Cicero. 8. As for individual persons, I shall proceed compendiously. Are they not to be said to have intended the common good, who, with sweat, with poverty, with exile, with bereavement of sons, with the loss of limbs, and finally with the oblation of their souls, have tried to augment the public good?

9. Nonne Cincinnatus ille sanctum nobis reliquit exemplum libere deponendo dignitatem in termino cum, assumptus ab aratro, dictator factus est, ut Livius refert, et post victoriam, post triumphum, sceptro inperatorio restituto consulibus, sudaturus post boves ad stivam libere reversus est? 10. Quippe in eius laudem Cicero, contra Epycurum in hiis que De fine bonorum disceptans huius beneficii memor fuit: "Itaque" inquit "et maiores nostri ab aratro duxerunt Cincinnatum illum, ut dictator esset". 11. Nonne Fabritius altum nobis dedit exemplum avaritie resistendi cum, pauper existens, pro fide qua rei publice tenebatur auri grande pondus oblatum derisit, ac derisum, verba sibi convenientia fundens, despexit et refutavit? Huius etiam memoriam confirmavit Poeta noster in sexto cum caneret:

9. Did not that Cincinnatus leave us a holy example by freely laying down the dignity at the term’s end, when, taken up from the plough, he was made dictator, as Livy reports, and after victory, after triumph, with the imperatorial sceptre restored to the consuls, he freely returned to sweat behind the oxen at the plough-handle? 10. Indeed, in his praise Cicero, against Epicurus, when disputing in those matters which are in On the End of Goods, was mindful of this benefaction: “And thus,” he says, “even our ancestors led that Cincinnatus from the plough, that he might be dictator.” 11. Did not Fabricius give us a lofty example of resisting avarice when, being poor, on account of the faith by which he was bound to the commonwealth, he mocked a great weight of gold that was offered, and, having mocked it—pouring out words suitable to himself—he looked it down upon and refused it? The memory of this, too, our Poet confirmed in the sixth, when he sang:

parvoque potentem
Fabritium.

and powerful with little
Fabritius.

12. Nunquid non preferendi leges propriis commodis memorabile nobis exemplar Camillus fuit qui, secundum Livium, dampnatus exilio, postquam patriam liberavit obsessam, spolia etiam romana Rome restituit, universo populo reclamante, ab urbe sancta discessit, nec ante reversus est quam sibi repatriandi licentia de auctoritate senatus allata est? Et hunc magnanimum Poeta commendat in sexto cum dicit:

12. Was not Camillus for us a memorable exemplar of preferring laws to one’s own advantages, who, according to Livy, condemned to exile, after he freed his fatherland, besieged, even restored the Roman spoils to Rome, and, with the whole people protesting, departed from the holy city, nor did he return before leave to repatriate, brought by the authority of the senate, was conveyed to him? And this magnanimous man the Poet commends in the sixth when he says:

referentem signa Camillum.

Camillus bringing back the standards.

13. Nonne filios an non omnes alios postponendos patrie libertati Brutus ille primus edocuit, quem Livius dicit, consulem existentem, proprios filios cum hostibus conspirantes morti dedisse? Cuius gloria renovatur in sexto Poete nostri de ipso canentis:

13. Did not that Brutus the first teach that sons—or rather all others—are to be postponed to the fatherland’s liberty, whom Livy says, while being consul, gave his own sons, conspiring with the enemies, to death? Whose glory is renewed in the sixth of our Poet, singing about him:

natosque pater nova bella moventes
ad penam pulcra pro libertate vocavit.

and the father called his sons, setting new wars in motion,
to penalty for fair liberty.

14 Quid non audendum pro patria nobis Mutius persuasit cum incautum Porsennam invasit, cum deinde manum errantem, non alio vultu quam si hostem cruciari videret, suam adhuc, cremari aspiciebat? Quod etiam Livius admiratur testificando. 15. Accedunt nunc ille sacratissime victime Deciorum, qui pro salute publica devotas animas posuerunt, ut Livius, non quantum est dignum, sed quantum potest glorificando renarrat; accedit et illud inenarrabile sacrifitium severissimi vere libertatis tutoris Marci Catonis.

14 What is there not to be dared for the fatherland did Mucius persuade us, when he assailed Porsenna incautious, when thereafter he, his hand erring—still his own—was gazing at it being burned, with no other countenance than if he saw an enemy being tortured? Which Livy also admires by bearing witness. 15. There now come those most sacred victims of the Decii, who for the public safety laid down souls devoted, as Livy, not as much as is worthy, but as much as he can, re-narrates by glorifying; there comes also that inenarrable sacrifice of Marcus Cato, most severe, truly a guardian of liberty.

Quorum alteri pro salute patrie mortis tenebras non horruerunt; alter, ut mundo libertatis amores accenderet, quanti libertas esset ostendit dum e vita liber decedere maluit quam sine libertate manere in illa. 16. Horum omnium nomen egregium voce Tullii recalescit. In hiis que De fine bonorum inquit enim Tullius hoc de Deciis: "Publius Decius princeps in ea familia consul, cum se devoveret, et equo admisso in mediam aciem Latinorum irruebat, aliquid de voluptatibus suis cogitabat, ubi ut eam caperet aut quando, cum sciret confestim esse moriendum, eamque mortem ardentiori studio peteret quam Epycurus voluptatem petendam putat?

Of whom the one party, for the safety of the fatherland, did not shudder at the shades of death; the other, in order to ignite in the world the loves of liberty, showed how much liberty was worth, when, as a free man, he preferred to depart from life rather than remain in it without liberty. 16. The distinguished name of all these grows warm again by the voice of Tullius. Among these, namely in On the End of Goods, Tullius says this about the Decii: "Publius Decius, the chief in that family, consul, when he was devoting himself, and, his horse having been given rein, was rushing into the midst of the battle-line of the Latins, was he thinking anything about his pleasures—where he might seize it, or when—since he knew he must immediately die, and was seeking that death with a more ardent zeal than Epicurus thinks pleasure ought to be sought?"

Quod quidem eius factum, nisi esset iure laudatum, non esset ymitatus quarto consulatu suo filius, neque porro ex eo natus, cum Pyrro bellum gerens, consul eo cecidisset in prelio seque e continenti genere tertiam victimam rei publice tribuisset". 17. In hiis vero que De offitiis de Catone dicebat: "Non enim alia in causa Marcus Cato fuit, alia ceteri qui se in Affrica Cesari tradiderunt. Atque ceteris forsan vitio datum esset si se interemissent, propterea quod levior eorum vita et mores fuerunt faciliores; Catoni vero cum incredibilem natura tribuisset gravitatem, eamque perpetua constantia roborasset, semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum ei potius quam tyrampni vultus aspiciendus fuit". 18. Declarata igitur duo sunt; quorum unum est, quod quicunque bonum rei publice intendit finem iuris intendit: aliud est, quod romanus populus subiciendo sibi orbem bonum publicum intendit. 19. Nunc arguatur ad propositum sic: quicunque finem iuris intendit cum iure graditur; romanus populus subiciendo sibi orbem finem iuris intendit, ut manifeste per superiora in isto capitulo est probatum: ergo romanus populus subiciendo sibi orbem cum iure hoc fecit, et per consequens de iure sibi ascivit Imperii dignitatem.

That deed of his indeed, unless it had been by right praised, would not have been imitated by his son in his fourth consulate, nor furthermore by the one born from him, who, waging war with Pyrrhus, when as consul he had fallen in that battle, offered himself from the same continuous stock as a third victim to the Republic". 17. In those matters, moreover, which in On Duties he said about Cato: "For Marcus Cato was not in one case, and the rest who surrendered themselves in Africa to Caesar in another. And to the others perhaps it would have been imputed as a fault if they had slain themselves, because their life was lighter and their manners more easy; but to Cato, since nature had bestowed incredible gravity, and had strengthened it with perpetual constancy, and he had always remained in his purpose and the counsel he had undertaken, it was rather necessary for him to die than to look upon the countenance of the tyrant". 18. Therefore two things have been made clear; of which one is, that whoever intends the good of the Republic intends the end of Right; the other is, that the Roman people, by subjecting the world to themselves, intend the public good. 19. Now let it be argued to the purpose thus: whoever intends the end of Right proceeds with Right; the Roman people, by subjecting the world to themselves, intend the end of Right, as is manifestly proved by the foregoing in this chapter: therefore the Roman people, by subjecting the world to themselves, did this with Right, and consequently by Right assumed to themselves the dignity of the Empire.

20. Que conclusio ut ex omnibus manifestis illata sit, manifestandum est hoc quod dicitur: quod quicunque finem iuris intendit cum iure graditur. Ad cuius evidentiam advertendum quod quelibet res est propter aliquem finem; aliter esset otiosa, quod esse non potest, ut superius dicebatur. 21. Et quemadmodum omnis res est ad proprium finem, sic omnis finis propriam habet rem cuius est finis; unde inpossibile est aliqua duo per se loquendo, in quantum duo, finem eundem intendere: sequeretur enim idem inconveniens, quod alterum scilicet esset frustra.

20. That this conclusion may be inferred from all the manifest things, it must be made manifest what is said: that whoever intends the end of ius proceeds with ius. For the evidence of this, it should be noted that every thing exists for some end; otherwise it would be otiose, which cannot be, as was said above. 21. And just as every thing is for its proper end, so every end has its proper thing of which it is the end; whence it is impossible that any two, speaking per se, insofar as they are two, intend the same end: for the same inconvenience would follow, namely that one of them would be in vain.

22. Cum ergo iuris finis quidam sit—ut iam declaratum est—necesse est fine illo posito ius poni, cum sit proprius et per se iuris effectus. Et cum in omni consequentia inpossibile sit habere antecedens absque consequente, ut hominem sine animali, sicut patet construendo et destruendo, inpossibile est iuris finem querere sine iure, cum quelibet res ad proprium finem se habeat velut consequens ad antecedens: nam inpossibile est bonam valetudinem membrorum actingere sine sanitate. 23. Propter quod evidentissime patet quod finem iuris intendentem oportet cum iure intendere; nec valet instantia que de verbis Phylosophi 'eubuliam' pertractantis elici solet.

22. Since therefore the end of right is a certain thing—as has already been declared—it is necessary, that end being posited, that right be posited, since it is the proper and per se effect of right. And since in every consequence it is impossible to have the antecedent without the consequent, as (to have) a man without an animal, as is evident by constructing and destroying, it is impossible to seek the end of right without right, since every thing stands to its proper end as the consequent to the antecedent: for it is impossible to attain the good valetudine of the members without health. 23. Wherefore it is most evident that one intending the end of right must intend it with right; nor has force the objection which is wont to be elicited from the words of the Philosopher treating “eubulia.”

Dicit enim Phylosophus: "Sed et hoc falso sillogismo sortiri: quod quidem oportet sortiri; per quod autem non, sed falsum medium terminum esse". 24. Nam si ex falsis verum quodammodo concluditur, hoc est per accidens, in quantum illud verum inportatur per voces illationis; per se enim verum nunquam sequitur ex falsis, signa tamen veri bene secuntur ex signis que sunt signa falsi. 25. Sic et in operabilibus: nam licet fur de furto subveniat pauperi, non tamen elimosina dicenda est, sed est actio quedam que, si de propria substantia fieret, elimosine formam haberet. 26. Similiter est de fine iuris: quia si aliquid, ut finis ipsius iuris, absque iure obtineretur, ita esset finis iuris, hoc est comune bonum, sicut exhibitio facta de male acquisito est elimosina; et sic, cum in propositione dicatur de fine iuris existente, non tantum apparente, instantia nulla est.

Dicit enim the Philosopher: "But even this is got by a false syllogism: that which indeed ought to be got; yet not by the means by which it is got, but the middle term is false." 24. For if from false things the true is in some way concluded, this is per accidens, inasmuch as that truth is imported through the words of inference; per se, indeed, the true never follows from falsehoods, yet signs of the true do well follow from signs which are signs of the false. 25. So too in things to be done: for although a thief, from theft, comes to the aid of a poor man, nevertheless it is not to be called alms, but it is a certain action which, if it were done from one’s own substance, would have the form of alms. 26. Likewise it is with the end of right: because if something, as the end of right itself, were obtained without right, then it would be the end of right—that is, the common good—just as a bestowal made from ill-gotten goods is alms; and thus, since in the proposition it is said of the end of right as existing, not merely appearing, the objection is null.

Patet igitur quod querebatur.

It is therefore evident what was being sought.

VI.1. Et illud quod natura ordinavit, de iure servatur: natura enim in providendo non deficit ab hominis providentia, quia si deficeret, effectus superaret causam in bonitate: quod est inpossibile. 2. Sed nos videmus quod in collegiis instituendis non solum ordo collegarum ad invicem consideratur ab instituente, sed etiam facultas ad offitia exercenda: quod est considerare terminum iuris in collegio vel in ordine; non enim ius extenditur ultra posse. Ergo ab hac providentia natura non deficit in suis ordinatis.

VI.1. And that which nature has ordained is preserved by right: for nature, in providing, does not fall short of man’s providence; because if it did fall short, the effect would surpass the cause in goodness, which is impossible. 2. But we see that in instituting colleges the instituter considers not only the order of the colleagues toward one another, but also the faculty for exercising the offices: which is to consider the terminus of law in the college or in the order; for law is not extended beyond ability. Therefore, nature does not fail of this providence in its ordinances.

3. Propter quod patet quod natura ordinat res cum respectu suarum facultatum, qui respectus est fundamentum iuris in rebus a natura positum. Ex quo sequitur quod ordo naturalis in rebus absque iure servari non possit, cum inseparabiliter iuris fundamentum ordini sit annexum: necesse igitur est ordinem de iure servari. 4. Romanus populus ad imperandum ordinatus fuit a natura; et hoc sic declaratur: sicut ille deficeret ab artis perfectione qui finalem formam tantum intenderet, media vero per que ad formam pertingeret non curaret, sic natura, si solam formam universalem divine similitudinis in universo intenderet, media autem negligeret; sed natura in nulla perfectione deficit cum sit opus divine intelligentie: ergo media omnia intendit, per que ad ultimum sue intentionis devenitur.

3. Wherefore it is evident that nature ordains things with regard to their own faculties, which regard is the foundation of law in things posited by nature. Whence it follows that the natural order in things cannot be observed without law, since the foundation of law is inseparably annexed to order: it is necessary therefore that order be observed by law. 4. The Roman people was ordained by nature for command; and this is thus made clear: just as he would fall short of the perfection of an art who should intend only the final form, but not care for the means by which he might attain to the form, so would nature, if it intended only the sole universal form of the divine similitude in the universe, but neglected the means; but nature fails in no perfection, since it is the work of divine Intelligence: therefore it intends all the means, by which one arrives at the ultimate of its intention.

5. Cum ergo finis humani generis sit aliquod medium necessarium ad finem nature universalem, necesse est naturam ipsum intendere. Propter quod bene Phylosophus naturam semper agere propter finem in secundo De naturali auditu probat. 6. Et quia ad hunc finem natura pertingere non potest per unum hominem, cum multe sint operationes necessarie ad ipsum, que multitudinem requirunt in operantibus, necesse est naturam producere hominum multitudinem ad diversas operationes ordinatorum: ad quod multum conferunt, preter superiorem influentiam, locorum inferiorum virtutes et proprietates.

5. Since therefore the end of the human race is some means necessary to the universal end of nature, it is necessary that nature intend it. Wherefore the Philosopher well proves in the second book of On Natural Hearing that nature always acts for the sake of an end. 6. And because to this end nature cannot attain through one man, since there are many operations necessary to it, which require a multitude in the agents, it is necessary that nature produce a multitude of men ordered to diverse operations: to which there contribute much, besides the superior influence, the virtues and properties of the lower places.

7. Propter quod videmus quod quidam non solum singulares homines, quinetiam populi, apti nati sunt ad principari, quidam alii ad subici atque ministrare, ut Phylosophus astruit in hiis que De Politicis: et talibus, ut ipse dicit, non solum regi est expediens, sed etiam iustum, etiamsi ad hoc cogantur. 8. Que si ita se habent, non dubium est quin natura locum et gentem disposuerit in mundo ad universaliter principandum: aliter sibi defecisset, quod est inpossibile. Quis autem fuerit locus et que gens, per dicta superius et per dicenda inferius satis est manifestum quod fuerit Roma, et cives eius sive populus.

7. Because of which we see that certain not only individual men, but even peoples, are born apt to rule, certain others to be subjected and to minister, as the Philosopher establishes in those things which are On the Politics: and for such persons, as he himself says, it is not only expedient to be ruled, but also just, even if they are compelled to this. 8. Which things if they stand thus, there is no doubt that nature has disposed a place and a nation in the world for universal rule: otherwise it would have failed itself, which is impossible. But what place and what nation it was, from the things said above and from the things to be said below it is sufficiently manifest that it was Rome, and its citizens, or the people.

9. Quod etiam Poeta noster valde subtiliter in sexto tetigit, introducens Anchisem premonentem Eneam Romanorum patrem sic:

9. Which our Poet also touched very subtly in the sixth, introducing Anchises forewarning Aeneas, the father of the Romans, thus:

Excudent alti spirantia mollius era,
credo equidem; vivos ducent de marmore vultus,
orabunt causas melius, celique meatus
describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Hee tibi erunt artes, pacique inponere morem,
parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.

They will hammer out breathing bronzes more softly, I indeed believe;
they will draw living faces from marble;
they will plead causes better, and will describe with the rod the courses of the sky,
and will tell the rising stars: you, Roman, remember to rule peoples by command.
These will be your arts: and to impose a custom upon peace,
to spare the subjected and to debellate the superb.

10. Dispositionem vero loci subtiliter tangit in quarto, cum introducit Iovem ad Mercurium de Enea loquentem isto modo:

10. The disposition of the place, indeed, he touches subtly in the fourth, when he introduces Jupiter speaking to Mercury about Aeneas in this manner:

Non illum nobis genitrix pulcerrima talem
promisit, Graiumque ideo bis vindicat armis;
sed fore qui gravidam imperiis belloque frementem
Ytaliam regeret.

Not such a one did his most beautiful mother promise to us,
and for that reason she has twice vindicated him with arms against the Graians;
but that he would be one to rule Italy, pregnant with empires and roaring with war.

11. Propterea satis persuasum est quod romanus populus a natura ordinatus fuit ad imperandum: ergo romanus populus subiciendo sibi orbem de iure ad Imperium venit.

11. For this reason it is sufficiently established that the Roman people was by nature ordained for commanding: therefore the Roman people, by subjecting the world to itself, came by right to the Empire.

VII.1. Ad bene quoque venandum veritatem quesiti scire oportet quod divinum iudicium in rebus quandoque hominibus est manifestum, quandoque occultum. 2. Et manifestum potest esse dupliciter: ratione scilicet et fide. Nam quedam iudicia Dei sunt ad que humana ratio propriis pedibus pertingere potest, sicut ad hoc: quod homo pro salute patrie seipsum exponat; nam si pars debet se exponere pro salute totius, cum homo sit pars quedam civitatis, ut per Phylosophum patet in suis Politicis, homo pro patria debet exponere seipsum, tanquam minus bonum pro meliori.

7.1. To hunt well the truth of the question, it is also needful to know that the divine judgment in things is sometimes manifest to human beings, sometimes occult. 2. And the manifest can be in a twofold manner: namely by reason and by faith. For certain judgments of God are such as human reason can attain to on its own feet, as to this: that a man should expose himself for the safety of the fatherland; for if a part ought to expose itself for the safety of the whole, since man is a certain part of the city, as is evident through the Philosopher in his Politics, a man ought to expose himself for his fatherland, as the lesser good for the better.

3. Unde Phylosophus ad Nicomacum: "Amabile quidem enim et uni soli, melius et divinius vero genti et civitati". Et hoc iudicium Dei est; aliter humana ratio in sua rectitudine non sequeretur nature intentionem: quod est inpossibile. 4. Quedam etiam iudicia Dei sunt, ad que etsi humana ratio ex propriis pertingere nequit, elevatur tamen ad illa cum adiutorio fidei eorum que in Sacris Licteris nobis dicta sunt, sicut ad hoc: quod nemo, quantumcunque moralibus et intellectualibus virtutibus et secundum habitum et secundum operationem perfectus, absque fide salvari potest, dato quod nunquam aliquid de Cristo audiverit. 5. Nam hoc ratio humana per se iustum intueri non potest, fide tamen adiuta potest.

3. Whence the Philosopher to Nicomachus: “For the lovable indeed to one only, but better and more divine truly to a people and to a city.” And this is the judgment of God; otherwise human reason in its rectitude would not follow the intention of nature: which is impossible. 4. There are also certain judgments of God, to which, although human reason cannot attain from its own resources, nevertheless it is raised to them with the aid of the faith of those things which in the Sacred Letters have been said to us, as to this: that no one, however perfect in moral and intellectual virtues both according to habit and according to operation, can be saved without faith, given that he may never have heard anything about Christ. 5. For this the human reason by itself cannot contemplate as just, yet aided by faith it can.

Scriptum est enim ad Hebreos: "Inpossibile est sine fide placere Deo"; et in Levitico: "Homo quilibet de domo Israel, qui occiderit bovem aut ovem aut capram in castris vel extra castra et non obtulerit ad hostium tabemaculi oblationem Domino, sanguinis reus erit". 6. Hostium tabemaculi Cristum figurat, qui est hostium conclavis ecterni, ut ex evangelio elici potest: occisio animalium operationes humanas. 7. Occultum vero est iudicium Dei ad quod humana ratio nec lege nature nec lege Scripture, sed de gratia spetiali quandoque pertingit; quod fit pluribus modis: quandoque sinplici revelatione, quandoque revelatione disceptatione quadam mediante. 8. Sinplici revelatione dupliciter: aut sponte Dei, aut oratione impetrante; sponte Dei dupliciter: aut expresse, aut per signum; expresse, sicut revelatum fuit iudicium Samueli contra Saulem; per signum, sicut Pharaoni revelatum fuit per signa quod Deus iudicaverat de liberatione filiorum Israel.

For it is written to the Hebrews: "It is impossible to please God without faith"; and in Leviticus: "Any man of the house of Israel who shall have killed an ox or a sheep or a goat in the camp or outside the camp, and has not offered at the door of the tabernacle an oblation to the Lord, shall be guilty of blood." 6. The door of the tabernacle prefigures Christ, who is the door of the eternal chamber, as can be elicited from the Gospel: the slaughter of animals signifies human operations. 7. But the judgment of God is occult, to which human reason attains sometimes not by the law of nature nor by the law of Scripture, but by special grace; and this happens in several modes: sometimes by simple revelation, sometimes by revelation with a certain disceptation mediating. 8. By simple revelation in a twofold way: either by God’s free initiative, or by prayer obtaining it; by God’s free initiative in a twofold way: either expressly, or by a sign; expressly, as the judgment was revealed to Samuel against Saul; by a sign, as it was revealed to Pharaoh by signs that God had judged concerning the liberation of the sons of Israel.

Oratione inpetrante, quod sciebant qui dicebant secundo Paralipomenon: "Cum ignoramus quid agere debeamus, hoc solum habemus residui: quod oculos nostros ad Te dirigamus". 9. Disceptatione vero mediante dupliciter: aut sorte, aut certamine; 'certare' etenim ab eo quod est 'certum facere' dictum est. Sorte quidem Dei iudicium quandoque revelatur hominibus, ut patet in substitutione Mathie in Actibus Apostolorum. Certamine vero dupliciter Dei iudicium aperitur: vel ex collisione virium, sicut fit per duellum pugilum, qui duelliones etiam vocantur, vel ex contentione plurium ad aliquod signum prevalere conantium, sicut fit per pugnam athletarum currentium ad bravium.

By prayer impetrating, as those knew who said in Second Paralipomenon: "When we are ignorant what we ought to do, we have this alone remaining: that we direct our eyes to Thee". 9. With disceptation mediating, in a twofold way: either by lot, or by contest; for "to contend" (certare) is said from that which is "to make certain" (certum facere). By lot indeed the judgment of God is sometimes revealed to men, as is evident in the substitution of Matthias in the Acts of the Apostles. By contest indeed the judgment of God is opened in a twofold way: either from a collision of forces, as happens through the duel of pugilists, who are also called duelliones (duelists), or from the contention of several striving to prevail to some mark, as happens through the fight of athletes running for the prize.

10. Primus horum modorum apud Gentiles figuratus fuit in illo duello Herculis et Anthei, cuius Lucanus meminit in quarto Farsalie et Ovidius in nono De rerum transmutatione; secundus figuratur apud eosdem in Athalanta et Ypomene in decimo De rerum transmutatione. 11. Similiter et latere non debet quoniam in hiis duobus decertandi generibus ita se habet res, ut in altero sine iniuria decertantes inpedire se possint, puta duelliones, in altero vero non; non enim athlete inpedimento in alterutrum uti debent, quamvis Poeta noster aliter sensisse videtur in quinto, cum fecit remunerari Eurialum. 12. Propter quod melius Tullius in tertiis Offitiis hoc prohibuit sententiam Crisippi sequens; ait enim sic: "Scite Crisippus, ut multa: 'qui stadium' inquit 'currit, eniti et contendere debet quam maxime possit ut vincat; supplantare eum quicum certet nullo modo debet'". 13. Hiis itaque in capitulo distinctis, duas rationes efficaces ad propositum accipere possumus: scilicet a disceptatione athletarum unam, et a disceptatione pugilum alteram; quas quidem prosequar in sequentibus et inmediatis capitulis.

10. The first of these modes was prefigured among the Gentiles in that duel of Hercules and Antaeus, of which Lucan makes mention in the fourth of the Pharsalia and Ovid in the ninth of On the Transformation of Things; the second is prefigured among those same in Atalanta and Hippomenes in the tenth of On the Transformation of Things. 11. Likewise it ought not to lie hidden that in these two kinds of contending the matter stands thus: that in the one the contestants can impede one another without injustice, for instance the duellists, but in the other not; for athletes ought not to use impediment one against the other, although our Poet seems to have thought otherwise in the fifth, when he caused Euryalus to be remunerated. 12. Wherefore more rightly did Tullius in the third On Duties prohibit this, following the sententia of Chrysippus; for he speaks thus: “Cleverly does Chrysippus, as in many things, say: ‘He who runs in the stadium ought to strive and contend as much as he can so that he may conquer; he must by no means supplant (trip up) him with whom he contends.’” 13. These things therefore having been distinguished in this chapter, we can take two efficacious reasons for the proposal: namely one from the disceptation of athletes, and another from the disceptation of pugilists; which indeed I shall pursue in the following and immediately subsequent chapters.

VIII.1. Ille igitur populus qui cunctis athletizantibus pro imperio mundi prevaluit, de divino iudicio prevaluit. Nam, cum diremptio universalis litigii magis Deo sit cure quam diremptio particularis, et in particularibus litigiis quibusdam per athletas divinum iudicium postulamus iuxta iam tritum proverbium "Cui Deus concedit, benedicat et Petrus", nullum dubium est quin prevalentia in athletis pro imperio mundi certantibus Dei iudicium sit secuta. 2. Romanus populus cunctis athletizantibus pro imperio mundi prevaluit: quod erit manifestum—si considerantur athlete—si consideretur et bravium sive meta.

8.1. Therefore the people who prevailed over all athletes contending for the empire of the world, prevailed by divine judgment. For, since the diremption of the universal litigation is more a care to God than the diremption of a particular, and since in certain particular litigations we demand divine judgment through athletes, according to the already well-worn proverb, “To whom God grants, let Peter also bless,” there is no doubt that the prevalence among athletes contending for the empire of the world followed God’s judgment. 2. The Roman people prevailed over all athletes competing for the empire of the world: which will be manifest—if the athletes are considered—and if the prize or the turning-post is considered.

Bravium sive meta fuit omnibus preesse mortalibus: hoc enim 'Imperium' dicimus. Sed hoc nulli contigit nisi romano populo; hic non modo primus, quin etiam solus actigit metam certaminis, ut statim patebit. 3. Primus nanque in mortalibus, qui ad hoc bravium anelavit, Ninus fuit Assiriorum rex: qui quamvis cum consorte thori Semiramide per nonaginta et plures annos, ut Orosius refert, imperium mundi armis temptaverit et Asyam totam sibi subegerit, non tamen occidentales mundi partes eis unquam subiecte fuerunt.

the bravium or meta was to be over all mortals: this, indeed, we call “Imperium.” But this befell no one except the Roman people; this people not only first, but even alone, touched the goal of the contest, as will straightway be plain. 3. For first among mortals who panted toward this bravium was Ninus, king of the Assyrians: who, although with his consort of the bed, Semiramis, for ninety and more years, as Orosius reports, he tried by arms the empire of the world and subdued all Asia to himself, nevertheless the occidental parts of the world were never subject to them.

4. Horum amborum Ovidius memoriam fecit in quarto, ubi dicit in Piramo: Coctilibus muris cinxisse Semiramis urbem et infra:

4. Of these two Ovid made mention in the fourth, where he says in Pyramus: Semiramis encircled the city with baked-brick walls and below:

Conveniant ad busta Nini lateantque sub umbra.

Let them convene at Ninus’s tomb and lie hidden beneath the shade.

5. Secundus Vesoges, rex Egipti, ad hoc bravium spiravit; et quamvis meridiem atque septentrionem in Asya exagitaverit, ut Orosius memorat, nunquam tamen dimidiam partem orbis obtinuit; quin ymo a Scithis inter quasi athlotetas et terminum ab incepto suo temerario est aversus. 6. Deinde Cirus, rex Persarum, temptavit hoc: qui, Babilone destructa imperioque Babilonis ad Persas translato, nec adhuc partes occidentales expertus, sub Tamiride regina Scitharum vitam simul et intentionem deposuit. 7. Post hos vero Xerxes, Darii filius et rex in Persis, cum tanta gentiam moltitudine mundum invasit, cum tanta potentia, ut transitum maris Asyam ab Europa dirimentis inter Sexton et Abidon ponte superaverit.

5. Second, Vesoges, king of Egypt, aspired to this prize; and although he harried the meridian and the septentrion in Asia, as Orosius records, nevertheless he never obtained half the orb; nay rather, by the Scythians, as it were between the athlothetae and the terminus, he was turned back from his rash undertaking. 6. Then Cyrus, king of the Persians, attempted this: who, Babylon having been destroyed and the empire of Babylon transferred to the Persians, and not yet having tested the western parts, under Tomyris, queen of the Scythians, laid down life and intention alike. 7. After these indeed Xerxes, son of Darius and king among the Persians, with such a multitude of nations he invaded the world, with such power, that he overbridged the passage of the sea dividing Asia from Europe between Sestos and Abydos with a bridge.

Cuius operis admirabilis Lucanus in secundo Farsalie memor fuit; canit enim ibi sic:

Of which admirable work Lucan, in the second of the Pharsalia, was mindful; for he sings there thus:

Talis fama canit tumidum super equora Xerxem
construxisse vias.

Such report sings that the puffed-up Xerxes
constructed roads over the seas.

Et tandem, miserabiliter ab incepto repulsus, ad bravium pervenire non potuit. 8. Preter istos et post, Alexander rex Macedo maxime omnium ad palmam Monarchie propinquans, dum per legatos ad deditionem Romanos premoneret, apud Egiptum ante Romanorum responsionem, ut Livius narrat, in medio quasi cursu collapsus est. 9. De cuius etiam sepultura ibidem existente Lucanus in octavo, invehens in Ptolomeum regem Egipti, testimonium reddit dicens:

And at length, miserably driven back from the undertaking, he was not able to arrive at the prize. 8. Besides these and thereafter, Alexander the Macedonian king, coming nearest of all to the palm of Monarchy, while through legates he was fore-notifying the Romans to a surrender, in Egypt, before the Romans’ response, as Livy relates, collapsed as it were in mid-course. 9. Concerning whose sepulture also being there, Lucan in Book 8, inveighing against Ptolemy, king of Egypt, gives testimony, saying:

Ultima Lagee stirpis perituraque proles
degener, inceste sceptris cessure sororis,
cum tibi sacrato Macedo servetur in antro.

The last of the Lagid stock and a doomed progeny,
degenerate, incestuous, about to yield the scepters to his sister,
while for you the Macedonian is kept in a sacred cave.

10. "O altitudo divitiarum et scientie et sapientie Dei", quis hic te non obstupescere poterit? Nam conantem Alexandrum prepedire in cursu coathletam romanum tu, ne sua temeritas prodiret ulterius, de certamine rapuisti. 11. Sed quod Roma palmam tanti bravii sit adepta, multis comprobatur testimoniis.

10. "O depth of the riches and of the knowledge and wisdom of God," who here will not be astounded at you? For the Roman co-athlete, attempting to hinder Alexander in his course, you snatched from the contest, lest his rashness should go forth further. 11. But that Rome has obtained the palm of so great a prize is corroborated by many testimonies.

Ait enim Poeta noster in primo:

For our Poet says in the first:

Certe hinc Romanos olim volventibus armis
hinc fore ductores, revocato a sanguine Teucri,
qui mare, qui terras omni ditione tenerent.

Surely from here the Romans one day, with wars rolling on,
from here would be leaders, with the Teucrian blood recalled,
who would hold the sea and the lands in all dominion.

12. Et Lucanus in primo:

12. And Lucan in the first:

Dividitur ferro regnum populique potentis
que mare, que terras, que totum possidet orbem non cepit Fortuna duos.

The realm of a mighty people is divided by iron—
who holds the sea, who the lands, who possesses the whole orb—
Fortune did not contain two.

13. Et Boetius in secundo, cum de Romanorum principe loqueretur, sic inquit:

13. And Boethius in the second, when he was speaking about the prince of the Romans, thus says:

Hic tamen sceptro populos regebat,
quos videt condens radios sub undas
Phebus extremo veniens ab ortu,
quos premunt septem gelidi triones,
quos nothus sicco violentas estu
torret, ardentes recoquens arenas.

Here, however, he ruled peoples with the sceptre,
whom Phoebus, coming from the farthest East, sees while burying his rays beneath the waves,
whom the seven icy Triones press,
whom Notus with dry, violent heat
scorches, re-cooking the burning sands.

14 Hoc etiam testimonium perhibet scriba Cristi Lucas, qui omnia vera dicit, in illa parte sui eloquii: "Exivit edictum a Cesare Augusto, ut describeretur universus orbis"; in quibus verbis universalem mundi iurisdictionem tunc Romanorum fuisse aperte intelligere possumus. 15. Ex quibus omnibus manifestum est quod romanus populus cunctis athletizantibus pro imperio mundi prevaluit: ergo de divino iudicio prevaluit, et per consequens de divino iudicio obtinuit; quod est de iure obtinuisse.

14 This testimony also is borne by Luke, the scribe of Christ, who says all things true, in that part of his discourse: "An edict went out from Caesar Augustus, that the whole world should be enrolled"; in which words we can openly understand that the universal jurisdiction of the world was then that of the Romans. 15. From all these things it is manifest that the Roman people prevailed over all who were contending for the empire of the world: therefore by divine judgment it prevailed, and consequently by divine judgment it obtained; which is to have obtained by right.

IX.1. Et quod per duellum acquiritur, de iure acquiritur. Nam ubicunque humanum iudicium deficit, vel ignorantie tenebris involutum vel propter presidium iudicis non habere, ne iustitia derelicta remaneat recurrendum est ad Illum qui tantum eam dilexit ut, quod ipsa exigebat, de proprio sanguine ipse moriendo supplevit; unde psalmus: "Iustus Dominus et iustitias dilexit". 2. Hoc autem fit cum de libero assensu partium, non odio, non amore, sed solo zelo iustitie, per virium tam animi quam corporis mutuam collisionem divinum iudicium postulatur: quam quidem collisionem, quia primitus unius ad unum fuit ipsa inventa, 'duellum' appellamus. 3. Sed semper cavendum est ut, quemadmodum in rebus bellicis prius omnia temptanda sunt per disceptationem quandam et ultimum per prelium dimicandum est, ut Tullius et Vegetius concorditer precipiunt, hic in Re militari, ille vero in Offitiis; et quemadmodum in cura medicinali ante ferrum et ignem omnia experienda sunt et ad hoc ultimo recurrendum; sic,—omnibus viis prius investigatis pro iudicio de lite habendo, ad hoc remedium ultimo quadam iustitie necessitate coacti recurramus.

9.1. And what is acquired through a duel is acquired by right. For wherever human judgment fails, either wrapped in the shadows of ignorance or because it does not have the protection of a judge, lest justice remain abandoned we must have recourse to Him who so loved it that, what it itself demanded, he himself, by dying, supplied from his own blood; whence the psalm: "The Lord is just and he has loved justices." 2. But this happens when, by the free assent of the parties, not from hatred, not from love, but solely from zeal for justice, through the mutual collision of forces both of mind and of body the divine judgment is sought: which collision indeed, because at first it was itself invented of one against one, we call a "duel." 3. But it must always be guarded that, just as in matters of war all things must first be attempted through a certain disputation and at the last it must be fought out by battle, as Tullius and Vegetius concordantly prescribe, the former in "On Military Matters," the latter indeed in "On Duties"; and just as in medical care before iron and fire all things must be tried and only at the last must there be recourse to them; so,—with all ways first investigated for having a judgment concerning the lawsuit, let us have recourse to this remedy at the last, compelled by a certain necessity of justice.

4. Duo igitur formalia duelli apparent: unum hoc quod nunc dictum est; aliud quod superius tangebatur, scilicet ut non odio, non amore, sed solo zelo iustitie de comuni assensu agoniste seu duelliones palestram ingrediantur. Et propter hoc bene Tullius, cum de hac materia tangeret; inquiebat enim:. "Sed bella quibus Imperii corona proposita est, minus acerbe gerenda sunt". 5. Quod si formalia duelli servata sunt, aliter enim duellum non esset, iustitie necessitate de comuni assensu congregati propter zelum iustitie nonne in nomine Dei congregati sunt? Et si sic, nonne Deus in medio illorum est, cum ipse in evangelio nobis hoc promictat ? 6. Et si Deus adest, nonne nefas est arbitrari iustitiam succumbere posse, quam ipse in tantum diligit, quantum superius prenotatur?

4. Two formal elements of the duel therefore appear: one is this which has now been said; the other is that which was touched upon above, namely, that not from hatred, not from love, but from the sole zeal of justice, by common assent the agonists or duelers enter the arena. And because of this Tullius, when he touched upon this matter, spoke well; for he said:. "But wars for which the crown of the Empire has been set forth are to be waged less bitterly." 5. But if the formal elements of the duel are observed—for otherwise it would not be a duel—congregated by necessity of justice by common assent on account of zeal for justice, are they not congregated in the name of God? And if so, is not God in the midst of them, since he himself in the Gospel promises this to us ? 6. And if God is present, is it not nefarious to suppose that justice can succumb, which he loves so greatly as is noted above?

Et si iustitia in duello succumbere nequit, nonne de iure acquiritur quod per duellum acquiritur? 7. Hanc veritatem etiam Gentiles ante tubam evangelicam cognoscebant, cum iudicium a fortuna duelli querebant. 8. Unde bene Pirrus ille, tam moribus Eacidarum quam sanguine generosus, cum legati Romanorum pro redimendis captivis ad illum missi fuerunt, respondit:

And if justice cannot succumb in the duel, is not that which is acquired through the duel acquired by right? 7. This truth even the Gentiles knew before the evangelical trumpet, when they sought judgment from the fortune of the duel. 8. Whence that Pyrrhus, noble both in the manners of the Aeacidae and in blood, when envoys of the Romans were sent to him for the ransoming of captives, replied:

Nec mi aurum posco, nec mi pretium dederitis;
non cauponantes belltim, sed belligerantes,
ferro, non auro, vitam cemamus utrique.
Vosne velit an me regnare Hera, quidve ferat sors,
virtute experiamur.
Quorum virtuti belli fortuna pepercit,
eorundem me libertati parcere certum est.

Nor do I ask gold for myself, nor should you give me a price;
not huckstering war, but war-waging,
with iron, not with gold, let each of us decide life.
Whether Hera wills you or me to reign, and what lot brings,
let us test by virtue.
Those whose valor the fortune of war has spared,
of those same men it is fixed for me to spare the liberty.

Dono ducite.

Take it as a gift.

Hic Pirrus 'Heram' vocabat fortunam, quam causam melius et rectius nos 'divinam providentiam' appellamus. 9. Unde caveant pugiles ne pretium constituant sibi causam; quia non tunc duellum, sed forum sanguinis et iustitie dicendum esset; nec tunc arbiter Deus adesse credatur, sed ille antiquus Hostis qui litigii fuerat persuasor. 10. Habeant semper, si duelliones esse volunt, non sanguinis et iustitie mercatores, in hostio palestre ante oculos Pirrum, qui pro imperio decertando sic aurum despiciebat ut dictum est.

Here Pyrrhus was calling “Hera” Fortune, which cause we more fittingly and more rightly call “divine providence.” 9. Whence let the pugilists beware lest they appoint price as their cause; for then it would not be a duel, but ought to be called a forum of blood and of justice; nor then would the arbiter God be believed to be present, but that ancient Enemy who had been the persuader of the litigation. 10. Let them always have, if they wish to be duelists and not merchants of blood and justice, Pyrrhus before their eyes at the threshold of the palestra, who, when contending for imperium, thus despised gold as has been said.

11. Quod si contra veritatem ostensam de inparitate virium instetur, ut assolet, per victoriam David de Golia obtentam instantia refellatur; et si Gentiles aliud peterent, refellant ipsam per victoriam Herculis in Antheum. Stultum enim est valde vires quas Deus confortat inferiores in pugile suspicari. 12. Iam satis manifestum est quod per duellum acquiritur de iure acquiri.

11. But if, against the truth made evident concerning the disparity of forces, objection is pressed, as is wont, let that insistence be refuted by the victory of David obtained over Goliath; and if the Gentiles would seek another, let them refute that same point by the victory of Hercules over Antaeus. For it is very foolish to suspect the forces which God strengthens to be inferior in a pugilist. 12. Now it is sufficiently manifest that what is acquired through a duel is acquired by right.

Sed romanus populus per duellum acquisivit Imperium: quod fide dignis testimoniis comprobatur. In quibus manifestandis non solum hoc apparebit, sed etiam quicquid a primordialibus Imperii romani diudicandum erat per duellum esse discussum. 13. Nam de primo cum de sede patris Enee, qui primus pater huius populi fuit, verteretur litigium, Turno Rotulorum rege contra stante, de comuni amborum regum assensu ad ultimum, propter divinum beneplacitum inquirendum, inter se solum dimicatum est, ut in ultimis Eneydos canitur.

But the Roman people acquired the Empire through duel: which is attested by testimonies worthy of faith. In the manifesting of these not only will this appear, but also that whatever, from the primordial beginnings of the Roman Empire, was to be adjudicated, was examined by duel. 13. For, at the first, when litigation was turning upon the seat of father Aeneas, who was the first father of this people, with Turnus, king of the Rutulians, standing against, by the common assent of both kings at the last, in order to inquire the divine good-pleasure, it was fought out between themselves alone, as is sung in the last parts of the Aeneid.

14. In quo quidem agone tanta victoris Enee clementia fuit, ut nisi balteus, quem Turnus Pallanti a se occiso detraxerat, patuisset, victo victor simul vitam condonasset et pacem, ut ultima carmina nostri Poete testantur. 15. Cumque duo populi ex ipsa troyana radice in Ytalia germinassent, romanus videlicet et albanus, atque de signo aquile deque penatibus aliis Troyanorum atque dignitate principandi longo tempore inter se disceptatum esset, ad ultimum de comuni assensu partium, propter iustitiam cognoscendam, per tres Oratios fratres hinc et per totidem Curiatios fratres inde in conspectu regum et populorum altrinsecus expectantium decertatum est: ubi tribus pugilibus Albanorum peremptis, Romanorum duobus, palma victorie sub Hostilio rege cessit Romanis. Et hoc diligenter Livius in prima parte contexit, cuius Orosius etiam contestatur.

14. In which contest the clemency of the victor Aeneas was so great that, had not the baldric which Turnus had stripped from Pallas, whom he himself had slain, been made manifest, the victor would at once have granted to the vanquished both life and peace, as the last songs of our Poet attest. 15. And when two peoples had sprouted in Italy from that very Trojan root, namely the Roman and the Alban, and there had long been dispute between them about the sign of the eagle and about the other Penates of the Trojans and about the dignity of ruling, at last, by the common assent of the parties, in order that justice might be known, it was fought out through three Horatii brothers on this side and just as many Curiatii brothers on that side, in the sight of the kings and of the peoples on either side awaiting the outcome: where, with three pugilists of the Albans slain, and two of the Romans, the palm of victory under King Hostilius fell to the Romans. And this Livy diligently has woven in the first part, to which Orosius also bears witness.

16. Deinde cum finitimis, omni iure belli servato, cum Sabinis, cum Samnitibus, licet in multitudine decertantium, sub forma tamen duelli, de imperio decertatum fuisse Livius narrat: in quo quidem modo decertandi cum Saninitibus fere fortunam, ut dicam, incepti penituit. 17. Et hoc Lucanus in secundo ad exemplum reducit sic:

16. Then with the neighbors, with every law of war observed, with the Sabines, with the Samnites, although with a multitude of contestants, yet under the form of a duel, Livy relates that it was contested for imperium: in which mode of contending, with the Samnites, Fortune, so to say, almost repented of the enterprise begun. 17. And Lucan in Book 2 brings this back as an exemplum thus:

Aut Collina tulit stratas quot porta catervas
tunc cum pene caput mundi rerumque potestas
mutavit translata locum, romanaque Samnis
ultra Caudinas speravit vulnera furcas.

Or how many routed bands the Colline Gate bore,
then when almost the head of the world and the power of affairs,
translated, changed place, and the Samnite hoped for Roman
wounds beyond the Caudine Forks.

18. Postquam vero Ytalorum litigia sedata fuerunt, et cum Grecis cumque Penis nondum pro divino iudicio certatum esset, ad Imperium intendentibus illis et illis, Fabritio pro Romanis, Pirro pro Grecis, de imperii gloria in militie multitudine decertantibus, Roma obtinuit; Scipione vero pro Ytalis, Annibale pro Affricanis in forma duelli bellum gerentibus, Ytalis Affricani succubuerunt, sicut Livius et alii romane rei scriptores testificari conantur. 19. Quis igitur adeo mentis obtuse nunc est, qui non videat sub iure duelli gloriosum populum coronam orbis totius esse lucratum? Vere dicere potuit homo romanus quod quidem Apostolus ad Timotheum "Reposita est michi corona iustitie"; 'reposita', scilicet in Dei providentia ecterna.

18. After the litigations of the Italians were truly settled, and since with the Greeks and with the Poeni it had not yet been contended by divine judgment, while both those and these were aiming at Empire, with Fabricius for the Romans, Pyrrhus for the Greeks, contending for the glory of dominion by a multitude of soldiery, Rome prevailed; but with Scipio for the Italians, Hannibal for the Africans, waging war in the form of a duel, the Africans succumbed to the Italians, as Livy and other writers of Roman affairs strive to bear witness. 19. Who, therefore, is now so obtuse of mind as not to see that, under the law of the duel, the glorious people has won the crown of the whole orb? A Roman man could truly say what indeed the Apostle to Timothy [says]: "A crown of justice has been laid up for me"; “laid up,” namely, in the eternal providence of God.

20. Videant nunc iuriste presumptuosi quantum infra sint ab illa specula rationis unde humana mens hec principia speculatur, et sileant secundum sensum legis consilium et iudicium exhibere contenti. 21. Et iam manifestum est quod romanus populus per duellum acquisivit Imperium: ergo de iure acquisivit; quod est principale propositum in libro presenti.

20. Let presumptuous jurists now see how far beneath that watchtower of reason they are, whence the human mind contemplates these principles, and let them be silent, content to render counsel and judgment according to the sense of the law. 21. And now it is manifest that the Roman people acquired the Empire by duel; therefore they acquired it by right; which is the principal proposition in the present book.

X.1. Usque adhuc patet propositum per rationes que plurimum rationalibus principiis innituntur; sed ex nunc ex principiis fidei cristiane iterum patefaciendum est. Maxime enim fremuerunt et inania meditati sunt in romanum Principatum qui zelatores fidei cristiane se dicunt; nec miseret eos pauperum Cristi, quibus non solum defraudatio fit in ecclesiarum proventibus, quinymo patrimonio ipsa cotidie rapiuntur, et depauperatur Ecclesia dum, simulando iustitiam, executorem iustitie non admittunt. 2. Nec iam depauperatio talis absque Dei iudicio fit, cum nec pauperibus, quorum patrimonio sunt Ecclesie facultates, inde subveniatur, nec ab offerente Imperio cum gratitudine teneantur.

10.1. Up to this point the proposition is evident by arguments which very greatly rest upon rational principles; but from now it must again be laid open from the principles of the Christian faith. For those who call themselves zealots of the Christian faith have raged most and meditated vain things against the Roman Principate; nor are they moved to pity for the poor of Christ, for whom not only is there defraudation in the revenues of the churches, nay rather they themselves are daily snatched of the very patrimony, and the Church is impoverished while, by simulating justice, they do not admit the executor of justice. 2. Nor now does such impoverishment take place without God’s judgment, since neither are the poor—whose patrimony the faculties of the Church are—therefrom helped, nor do they hold themselves with gratitude toward the Empire that offers it.

3. Redeunt unde venerunt: venerunt bene, redeunt male, quia bene data, et male possessa sunt. Quid ad pastores tales? Quid si Ecclesie substantia defluit dum proprietates propinquorum suorum exaugeantur?

3. They return whence they came: they came well, they return ill, because they were well given, and ill possessed. What is that to such pastors? What if the Church’s substance flows away while the properties of their own kinsmen are augmented?

Sed forsan melius est propositum prosequi, et sub pio silentio Salvatoris nostri expectare succursum. 4. Dico ergo quod, si romanum Imperium de iure non fuit, Cristus nascendo persuasit iniustum; consequens est falsum: ergo contradictorium antecedentis est verum. Inferunt enim se contradictoria invicem a contrario sensu.

But perhaps it is better to pursue the proposed aim, and under pious silence to await the succor of our Savior. 4. I therefore say that, if the Roman Empire was not by right, Christ by being born approved the unjust; the consequent is false: therefore the contradictory of the antecedent is true. For contradictories infer one another mutually from a contrary sense.

5. Falsitatem consequentis ad fideles estendere non oportet: nam si fidelis quis est, falsum hoc esse concedit et si non concedit, fidelis non est, et si fidelis non est, ad eum ratio ista non queritur. 6. Consequentiam sic ostendo: quicunque aliquod edictum ex electione prosequitur, illud esse iustum opere persuadet et, cum opera persuadentiora sint quam sermones, ut Phylosopho placet in ultimis ad Nicomacum, magis persuadet quam si sermone approbaret. Sed Cristus, ut scriba eius Lucas testatur, sub edicto romane auctoritatis nasci voluit de Virgine Matre, ut in illa singulari generis humani descriptione filius Dei, homo factus, homo conscriberetur: quod fuit illud prosequi.

5. It is not fitting to extend the falsity of the consequent to the faithful: for if someone is faithful, he grants this to be false; and if he does not grant it, he is not faithful; and if he is not faithful, this line of reasoning is not sought for him. 6. I show the consequence thus: whoever follows through some edict by choice, by the deed persuades that it is just; and since deeds are more persuasive than words, as it pleases the Philosopher in the last books to Nicomachus, he persuades more than if he had approved it by speech. But Christ, as his scribe Luke bears witness, willed to be born of the Virgin Mother under an edict of Roman authority, so that in that singular description of the human race the Son of God, made man, might be inscribed as a man: which was to prosecute that edict.

7. Et forte sanctius est arbitrari divinitus illud exivisse per Cesarem, ut qui tanta tempora fuerat expectatus in sotietate mortalium, cum mortalibus ipse se consignaret. 8. Ergo Cristus Augusti, Romanorum auctoritate fungentis, edictum fore iustum opere persuasit. Et cum ad iuste edicere iurisdictio sequatur, necesse est ut qui iustum edictum persuasit iurisdictionem etiam persuaserit: que si de iure non erat, iniusta erat.

7. And perhaps it is more sacred to judge that it went forth divinely through Caesar, so that he who for so many ages had been expected in the society of mortals might, together with mortals, enroll himself. 8. Therefore Christ by deed persuaded that the edict of Augustus, who was exercising the authority of the Romans, would be just. And since jurisdiction follows upon edicting justly, it is necessary that he who persuaded a just edict also persuaded the jurisdiction: which, if it was not by right, was unjust.

9. Et notandum quod argumentum sumptum ad destructionem consequentis, licet de sua forma per aliquem locum teneat, tamen vim suam per secundam figuram ostendit, si reducatur sicut argumentum a positione antecedentis per primam. 10. Reducitur enim sic: omne iniustum persuadetur iniuste; Cristus non persuasit iniuste: ergo non persuasit iniustum. A positione antecedentis sic: onme iniustum persuadetur iniuste; Cristus persuasit quoddam iniustum: ergo persuasit iniuste.

9. And it should be noted that an argument taken for the destruction of the consequent, although by its own form it holds through some locus, nevertheless it shows its force through the second figure, if it be reduced, just as an argument from the positing of the antecedent through the first. 10. For it is reduced thus: every unjust thing is persuaded unjustly; Christ did not persuade unjustly: therefore he did not persuade an unjust thing. From the positing of the antecedent thus: every unjust thing is persuaded unjustly; Christ persuaded a certain unjust thing: therefore he persuaded unjustly.

XI.1. Et si romanum Imperium de iure non fuit, peccatum Ade in Cristo non fuit punitum, hoc autem est falsum: ergo contradictorium eius ex quo sequitur est verum. 2. Falsitas consequentis apparet sic: cum enim per peccatum Ade omnes peccatores essemus, dicente Apostolo "Sicut per unum hominem in hunc mundum peccatum intravit et per peccatum mors, ita in omnes homines mors, in quo omnes peccaverunt"; si de illo peccato non fuisset satisfactum per mortem Cristi, adhuc essemus filii ire natura, natura scilicet depravata. 3. Sed hoc non est, cum dicat Apostolus ad Ephesios loquens de Patre: "Qui predestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Cristum in ipsum, secundum propositum voluntatis sue, in laudem, et gloriam gratie sue, in qua gratificavit nos in dilecto Filio suo, in quo habemus redemptionem per sanguinem eius, remissionem peccatorum secundum divitias glorie sue que superhabundavit in nobis"; cum etiam Cristus ipse, in se punitionem patiens, dicat in Iohanne: "Consummatum est"; nam ubi consummatum est, nichil restat agendum.

11.1. And if the Roman Empire was not by right, the sin of Adam was not punished in Christ; but this is false: therefore the contradictory of that, from which it follows, is true. 2. The falsity of the consequent appears thus: since through the sin of Adam we all were sinners, the Apostle saying, "Just as through one man sin entered into this world and through sin death, so also death into all men, in whom all have sinned"; if for that sin satisfaction had not been made through the death of Christ, we would still be sons of wrath by nature, namely with nature depraved. 3. But this is not so, since the Apostle says to the Ephesians, speaking of the Father: "Who predestined us unto the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ unto himself, according to the purpose of his will, unto the praise and glory of his grace, in which he has graced us in his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins according to the riches of his glory which has superabounded in us"; since also Christ himself, suffering punishment in himself, says in John: "It is consummated"; for where it is consummated, nothing remains to be done.

4. Propter convenientiam sciendum quod 'punitio' non est simpliciter 'pena iniuriam inferenti', sed 'pena inflicta iniuriam inferenti ab habente iurisdictionem puniendi'; unde, nisi ab ordinario iudice pena inflicta sit, 'punitio' non est, sed potius 'iniuria' est dicenda. Unde dicebat ille Moysi: "Quis constituit te iudicem super nos?". 5. Si ergo sub ordinario iudice Cristus passus non fuisset, illa pena punitio non fuisset. Et iudex ordinarius esse non poterat nisi supra totum humanum genus iurisdictionem habens, cum totum humanum genus in carne illa Cristi portantis dolores nostros, ut ait Propheta, puniretur.

4. For congruity, it should be known that 'punition' is not simply 'a penalty to the one inflicting an injury', but 'a penalty inflicted on the one inflicting an injury by one having the jurisdiction to punish'; whence, unless the penalty be inflicted by an ordinary judge, it is not 'punition', but rather is to be called 'injury'. Whence that man said to Moses: "Who made you judge over us?". 5. If therefore under an ordinary judge Christ had not suffered, that penalty would not have been punition. And he could not be an ordinary judge unless possessing jurisdiction over the whole human race, since the whole human race was being punished in that flesh of Christ bearing our pains, as the Prophet says.

Et supra totum humanum genus Tyberius Cesar, cuius vicarius erat Pilatus, iurisdictionem non habuisset, nisi romanum Imperium de iure fuisset. 6. Hinc est quod Herodes, quamvis ignorans quid faceret, sicut et Cayphas cum verum dixit de celesti decreto, Cristum Pilato remisit ad iudicandum ut Lucas in evangelio suo tradit. Erat enim Herodes non vicem Tyberii gerens sub signo aquile vel sub signo senatus, sed rex regno singolari ordinatus ab eo et sub signo regni sibi commissi gubernans.

And over the whole human race Tiberius Caesar, whose vicar Pilate was, would not have had jurisdiction unless the Roman Empire had been de jure. 6. Hence it is that Herod, although ignorant of what he was doing—just as also Caiaphas, when he spoke truth from a celestial decree—sent Christ back to Pilate for judgment, as Luke hands down in his Gospel. For Herod was not bearing the vicariate of Tiberius under the sign of the Eagle or under the sign of the Senate, but was a king ordained to a singular (particular) kingdom by him, and governing under the sign of the kingdom committed to him.

7. Desinant igitur Imperium exprobrare romanum qui se filios Ecclesie fingunt, cum videant sponsum Cristum illud sic in utroque termino sue militie comprobasse. Et iam sufficienter manifestum esse arbitror, romanum populum sibi de iure orbis Imperium ascivisse. 8. O felicem populum, o Ausoniam te gloriosam, si vel nunquam infirmator ille Imperii tui natus fuisset, vel nunquam sua pia intentio ipsum fefellisset!

7. Let them, therefore, cease to reproach the Roman Imperium who feign themselves sons of the Church, since they see the Bridegroom Christ to have thus attested it at both termini of his warfare. And I judge it now to be sufficiently manifest that the Roman people assumed to itself by right the Imperium of the world. 8. O happy people, O Ausonia, glorious you, if either that enfeebler of your Imperium had never been born, or his pious intention had never deceived him!