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Dig. 42.3.0. De cessione bonorum.
42.2.0. On confessed matters.
Dig. 42.3.0. On the cession of goods.
Dig. 42.6.0. De separationibus.
42.5.0. On things to be possessed or sold by the authority of the judge.
Dig. 42.6.0. On separations.
42.8.0. That things done in fraud of creditors be restored.
Qui pro tribunali cognoscit, non semper tempus iudicati servat, sed nonnumquam artat, nonnumquam prorogat pro causae qualitate et quantitate vel personarum obsequio vel contumacia. sed perraro intra statutum tempus sententiae exsequentur, veluti si alimenta constituantur vel minori viginti quinque annis subvenitur.
He who adjudicates from the tribunal does not always observe the time of the adjudicated matter, but sometimes narrows it, sometimes prorogues it, according to the quality and quantity of the case or the compliance or the contumacy of the persons. But very rarely are sentences executed within the time set by statute, as when maintenance is established or aid is afforded to a minor under twenty-five years.
Si se non optulit procurator, iudicati actio in eum denegabitur et in dominum dabitur: si se optulit, in ipsum dabitur. optulisse autem se liti videtur non is, qui in rem suam procurator datus sit: nam hic alia ratione recusare iudicati actionem non potest, quia hic non in alienam, sed in suam rem procurator factus est.
If the procurator does not present himself, the action on the judgment (actio iudicati) will be denied against him and will be given against the principal (dominus); if he does present himself, it will be given against him. However, he is not deemed to have presented himself to the suit who has been appointed a procurator in his own interest (in rem suam); for such a man cannot otherwise refuse the action on the judgment, because he was made a procurator not for another’s matter, but for his own.
Ait praetor: " condemnatus ut pecuniam solvat". a iudicato ergo hoc exigitur, ut pecuniam solvat. quid ergo, si solvere quidem paratus non sit, satisfacere autem paratus sit, quid dicimus? et ait labeo debuisse hoc quoque adici " neque eo nomine satisfaciat": fieri enim posse, ut idoneum expromissorem habeat.
The praetor says: " that the condemned pay money." Therefore from the judgment-debtor this is exacted, that he pay money. What then, if he is not prepared to pay, but is prepared to give satisfaction—what do we say? And Labeo says that this too ought to be added: " nor under that head let him make satisfaction": for it can happen that he has a suitable expromissor (a guarantor).
Si ex conventione litigantium cautum sit post rem iudicatam ei, cui quis condemnatus est, eveniet, ut hic et retendatur, si modo novatio intercessit: ceterum si non novandi causa id factum est, manebit ordo exsecutionis. sed et si pignora accepta sint vel fideiussores in rem iudicatam, consequens erit dicere non cessare exsecutionem, quippe cum accesserit aliquid rei iudicatae, non sit a re iudicata recessum. idem observandum est in eo, cuius procurator condemnatus est.
If by the convention of the litigants it has been provided that, after res judicata, performance be made to the one to whom someone has been condemned, it will follow that execution too is to be stayed, provided that a novation has intervened; but if this was not done for the sake of novating, the order of execution will remain. But also, if pledges have been received or sureties have been taken for the res judicata, it will be consequent to say that execution does not cease, since something has been added to the res judicata, there has not been a departure from the res judicata. The same is to be observed in the case of him whose procurator has been condemned.
Si quis condemnatus sit, ut intra certos dies solvat, unde ei tempus iudicati actionis computamus, utrum ex quo sententia prolata est an vero ex eo, ex quo dies statutus praeteriit? sed si quidem minorem diem statuerit iudex tempore legitimo, repletur ex lege, quod sententiae iudicis deest: sin autem ampliorem numerum dierum sua definitione iudex amplexus est, computabitur reo et legitimum tempus et quod supra id iudex praestitit.
If someone has been condemned to pay within certain days, from what point do we compute for him the time for the action on the judgment—whether from when the sentence was pronounced, or rather from when the appointed day has passed? But if the judge has set a shorter day than the lawful term, what is lacking to the judge’s sentence is filled up by the law; whereas if the judge, by his own determination, has embraced a larger number of days, there will be counted to the defendant both the lawful time and also what beyond that the judge has granted.
Decem aut noxae dedere condemnatus iudicati in decem tenetur: facultatem enim noxae dedendae ex lege accipit. at is, qui stipulatus est decem aut noxae dedere, non potest decem petere, quia in stipulatione singula per se veniunt ea, quae singula separatim stipulari possumus: at iudicium solius noxae deditionis nullum est, sed pecuniariam condemnationem sequitur. et ideo iudicati decem agitur, his enim solis condemnatur: noxae deditio in solutione est, quae e lege tribuitur.
One condemned to pay ten or to surrender by noxal deditio is held, as iudicatus, for ten; for he receives the faculty of noxal surrender from the law. But he who has stipulated for ten or for noxal surrender cannot demand ten, because in a stipulation the several items come each by itself—namely, those things which we can stipulate for separately; yet there is no action whose sole object is noxal surrender, but rather a pecuniary condemnation ensues. And therefore the action on the iudicatus is brought for ten, for to these alone is he condemned: noxal surrender pertains to performance, which is granted by the law.
Si kalendis fieri aliquid stipulatus sum, nempe quandocumque post kalendas accepto iudicio tanti tamen aestimanda lis est, quanti interfuit mea kalendis id fieri: ex eo enim tempore quidque aestimatur, quod novissime solvi poterit.
If I have stipulated that something be done on the Kalends, then, whenever after the Kalends the action is accepted, nevertheless the suit is to be assessed at as much as it was in my interest that it be done on the Kalends: for each thing is valued from that time at which it could at the latest be paid.
Si quis ab alio decem, ab alio satisdari stipulatus est, aestimandum erit, quantum stipulatoris intersit satisdari, idque aut tantundem erit aut minus aut interdum etiam nihil: neque enim vani timoris ulla aestimatio est. verum sorte soluta nullum iam pretium aestimationis est, aut quantum ex sorte fuerit solutum, tantundem ex aestimatione decedet.
If someone has stipulated from one person ten, and from another that surety be given, it must be assessed how much it is in the stipulator’s interest that surety be given; and that will be either the same amount, or less, or sometimes even nothing: for there is no valuation of vain fear. But with the principal paid, there is now no price of the assessment, or whatever has been paid from the principal, by the same amount will be deducted from the assessment.
In venditione itaque pignorum captorum facienda ^ faciendo^ primo quidem res mobiles et animales pignori capi iubent, mox distrahi: quarum pretium si suffecerit, bene est, si non suffecerit, etiam soli pignora capi iubent et distrahi. quod si nulla moventia sint, a pignoribus soli initium faciunt: sic denique interloqui solent, si moventia non sint, ut soli quoque capiantur: nam a pignoribus soli initium faciendum non est. quod si nec quae soli sunt sufficiant vel nulla sint soli pignora, tunc pervenietur etiam ad iura.
Thus, in the sale of seized pledges to be made ^ in the making^, first indeed they order movable things and animals to be taken in pledge, then to be sold: if the price of these shall have sufficed, well; if it shall not have sufficed, they also order pledges of land to be taken and sold. But if there are no movables, they make a beginning from pledges of land: thus, finally, they are wont to issue an interlocutory order, if there are no movables, that things of the soil also be seized; for a beginning is not to be made from pledges of land. But if even those which are of the soil do not suffice, or there are no pledges of land, then recourse will also be had to rights.
Si pignora, quae capta sunt, emptorem non inveniant, rescriptum est ab imperatore nostro et divo patre eius, ut addicantur ipsi, cui quis condemnatus est, addicantur autem utique ea quantitate quae debetur. nam si creditor maluerit pignora in creditum possidere isque esse contentus, rescriptum est non posse eum quod amplius sibi debetur petere, quia velut pacto transegisse de credito videtur, qui contentus fuit pignora possidere, nec posse eum in quantitatem certam pignora tenere et superfluum petere.
If the pledges that have been seized do not find a buyer, it has been rescripted by our emperor and his deified father that they be adjudicated to the very person to whom someone has been condemned, and, to be sure, that they be adjudicated at the amount which is owed. For if the creditor should prefer to possess the pledges in satisfaction of the credit and be content with that, it has been rescripted that he cannot demand what further is owed to him, because he appears, as if by pact, to have transacted about the credit, since he was content to possess the pledges; nor can he hold the pledges for a fixed amount and seek the surplus.
Si rerum, quae pignoris iure captae sunt, controversia fiat, constitutum est ab imperatore nostro ipsos, qui rem iudicatam exsequuntur, cognoscere debere de proprietate: et si cognoverint eius fuisse qui condemnatus est, rem iudicatam exsequentur. sed sciendum est summatim eos cognoscere debere nec sententiam eorum posse debitori praeiudicare, si forte hi dimittendam eam rem putaverint, quasi eius sit, qui controversiam movit, non eius, cuius nomine capta est: nec eum, cui restituta est, statim habere per sententiam debere, si forte iure ordinario coeperit ab eo res peti. sic evenit, ut omnibus integris tantum capioni res iudicata proficiat.
If a controversy should arise concerning things which have been seized by the right of pledge, it has been constituted by our emperor that those who execute the res judicata ought themselves to inquire into ownership; and if they ascertain that it belonged to the one who has been condemned, they will carry out the res judicata. But it must be understood that they ought to cognize summarily, and that their sentence cannot prejudice the debtor, if perchance they think that that thing ought to be released, as though it belonged to the one who stirred the controversy, and not to him in whose name it was seized; nor ought he to whom it has been restored to have it immediately by their sentence, if perchance, by ordinary law, the thing begins to be claimed from him. Thus it comes about that, with all things left intact, the res judicata profits only for the purpose of the taking (capio).
Quod si res sit pignerata, quae pignori capta est, videndum est, an sic distrahi possit, ut dimisso creditore superfluum in causam iudicati convertatur. et quamquam non cogatur creditor rem, quam pignori accepit, distrahere: tamen in iudicati exsecutione servatur, ut, si emptorem invenerit res quae capta est, qui dimisso priore creditore superfluum solvere sit paratus, admittenda sit huius quoque rei distractio. nec videtur deterior condicio creditoris fieri suum consecuturi nec prius ius pignoris dimissuri, quam si ei fuerit satisfactum.
But if the thing is pledged—namely, that which has been seized in pledge—it must be considered whether it can be sold in such a way that, the creditor being discharged, the surplus is converted to the cause of the judgment. And although the creditor is not compelled to sell the thing which he accepted in pledge, nevertheless in the execution of a judgment it is observed that, if a buyer is found for the thing that has been seized who, the prior creditor being discharged, is prepared to pay the surplus, the sale of this thing too is to be admitted. Nor does the condition of the creditor appear to be made worse—since he will obtain what is his—nor will he relinquish the right of pledge before satisfaction has been made to him.
Si post addictum pignus aliqua controversia emptori moveatur, an sit cognitio eiusdem iudicis, qui sententiam exsecutus fuerit, videndum est. et cum semel emptio perfecta sit eiusque qui comparavit periculum vertatur, non puto locum esse cognitioni: certe posteaquam inductus est emptor in possessionem, nonne cessabunt partes eorundem iudicum? idemque et si ipsi, cui quis iudicatus est, res fuerit addicta.
If, after a pledge has been adjudged, some controversy is moved against the buyer, it must be seen whether the cognition is that of the same judge who has executed the sentence. And since once the sale has been perfected and the peril is turned upon him who has acquired, I do not think there is room for cognition: certainly, after the buyer has been inducted into possession, will not the functions of those same judges cease? And the same as well if the thing has been adjudged to the very person to whom someone has been judged.
Sed si emptor, cui pignora sunt addicta exsequente iudice, pretium non solvat, utrum adversus emptorem porrigere manus debeant idem iudices, qui sententiam exsequuntur, videndum est. et non puto eos ultra procedere: ceterum longe res abibit. quid enim dicemus?
But if the buyer, to whom the pledges have been adjudged with the judge executing (the sentence), does not pay the price, it must be considered whether the same judges who execute the sentence ought to lay hands upon the buyer. And I do not think they should proceed further: otherwise the matter will go far afield. For what shall we say?
will they condemn the buyer and thus execute the sentence against him, or will they at once hold it as adjudged? and what if he denies that he purchased or contends that he has paid? it will therefore be better if they do not interpose themselves, especially since the one for whom it is desired that judgment be made has no action against him.
nor will he be affected with injustice: for it is proper that things taken in pledge and put up for sale be sold for ready money, not in such a way that the money be paid after a time. surely, if they do interpose themselves, they ought to intervene only thus far: that they take the very thing adjudicated and sell it off, as though it were not yet freed from the bond of the pledge.
Sed utrum confessum nomen tantum capi possit an etiam si neget quis se debere, videamus. et magis est, ut id dumtaxat capiatur, quod confitetur: ceterum si negetur, aequissimum erit discedi a nomine, nisi forte quis exemplum secutus corporalium pignerum ultra processerit dixeritque ipsos debere iudices de nomine cognoscere, ut cognoscunt de proprietate: sed contra rescriptum est.
But let us see whether only the confessed claim can be seized, or even if someone denies that he owes. And the more correct view is that only that which he confesses is to be seized; otherwise, if it is denied, it will be most equitable to desist from the claim—unless perhaps someone, following the example of corporeal pledges, should go further and say that the judges themselves ought to take cognizance of the claim, as they take cognizance of ownership; but there is a rescript to the contrary.
Item quid dicemus? utrum ipsi iudices convenient nomen exigentque id quod debetur et in causam iudicati convertent, an vero vendent nomen, ut pignora corporalia solent? et necesse est, ut quod eis facilius videatur ad rem exsequendam, hoc faciant.
Likewise, what shall we say? Whether the judges themselves will proceed against the claim (nomen) and exact that which is owed and convert it into an action on a judgment, or rather will sell the claim, as corporeal pledges are wont? And it is necessary that they do that which seems to them easier for carrying the matter into execution.
Praeterea pecuniam quoque depositam nomine condemnati vel in arcam reclusam solent capere, ut iudicato satisfiat. hoc amplius et si pupillaris pecunia in arcam reposita sit ad praediorum comparationem, et citra permissum praetoris ab eo, qui exsequitur iudicatum, solet capi et in causam iudicati converti.
Furthermore, they are accustomed to take also money deposited in the name of the condemned, or shut up in a chest, so that the adjudged debt may be satisfied. Moreover, even if pupillary money has been placed in a chest for the acquisition of estates, even without the praetor’s permission it is wont to be taken by him who executes the judgment and to be converted to the cause of the adjudged debt.
Inter eos, quibus ex eadem causa debetur, occupantis melior condicio est nec deducitur, quod eiusdem condicionis hominibus debetur, sicuti fit in de peculio actione: nam et hic occupantis melior est causa. sed et si cum patre patronove agetur, non est deducendum aes alienum, maxime quod eiusdem condicionis personis debebitur, ut liberis libertis.
Among those to whom it is owed from the same cause, the condition of the occupant (the one who first seizes) is better, nor is there deducted what is owed to persons of the same condition, just as happens in the action de peculio: for here too the cause of the occupant is better. But also, if suit is brought with the father or the patron, the alien debt is not to be deducted, especially since it will be owed to persons of the same condition, such as to children and freedmen.
Is quoque, qui ex causa donationis convenitur, in quantum facere potest condemnatur et quidem is solus deducto aere alieno: et inter eos, quibus ex simili causa pecunia debetur, occupantis potior erit causa. immo nec totum quod habet extorquendum ei puto: sed et ipsius ratio habenda est, ne egeat.
He also who is sued on the ground of a donation is condemned to the extent that he can perform, and indeed he alone, debts being deducted; and among those to whom money is owed from a similar cause, the claim of the one who first seizes will be the stronger. Nay rather, I do not think that all he has should be extorted from him; consideration must also be had for him himself, lest he be in need.
Non tantum dotis nomine maritus in quantum facere possit condemnatur, sed ex aliis quoque contractibus ab uxore iudicio conventus in quantum facere potest, condemnandus est ex divi pii constitutione. quod et in persona mulieris aequa lance servari aequitatis suggerit ratio.
Not only, under the name of the dowry, is the husband condemned to the extent that he is able to perform, but also on other contracts, when sued by his wife, he must be condemned to the extent that he is able to perform, by the constitution of the deified Pius. Reason suggests that this likewise be observed, with the balance of equity held even, in the person of the woman.
Sicut autem cum marito agitur, ita et cum socero, ut non ultra facultates damnetur. an si cum socero ex promissione dotis agatur, in id quod facere potest, damnandus sit? quod et id aequum esse videtur: sed alio iure utimur, ut et neratius scribit.
Just as, moreover, suit is conducted with the husband, so also with the father-in-law, that he not be condemned beyond his means. Or if suit is brought with the father-in-law on the promise of a dowry, should he be condemned only to the extent that he can perform? Which also seems equitable: but we employ a different law, as Neratius also writes.
Sed hoc ita accipiendum est, si a socero dos ex promissione petatur soluto matrimonio: verum si manente matrimonio dos ab eo petatur, succurrendum utique est, ut ne maioris summae condemnetur, quam quantum facere potest.
But this is to be understood thus, if from the father-in-law the dowry is sought by virtue of a promise, the marriage having been dissolved: however, if, the marriage remaining, the dowry is sought from him, one must certainly come to his aid, lest he be condemned in a greater sum than the amount he is able to pay.
Quod autem de sociis dictum est, ut et hi in quantum facere possint condemnentur, causa cognita se facturum praetor edicit. causae cognitio autem in hoc erit, ut neganti se socium esse aut ex doli clausula obligato non succurratur.
But as to what has been said concerning partners, namely that they too be condemned in so far as they are able to perform, the praetor proclaims that he will do this after inquiry into the case. The inquiry into the case will be to this end: that no relief be afforded to one denying that he is a partner, or to one bound under the clause of fraud.
Praeses provinciae usuras usurarum condemnavit contra leges et sacras constitutiones ideoque lucius titius contra prolatam sententiam iniustam praesidis appellavit: quaero, cum non secundum legem titius provocasset, an exigi possit pecunia secundum condemnationem. modestinus respondit, si sententiae certa quantitas continetur, nihil proponi, cur iudicati agi non possit.
The governor of the province adjudged compound interest, contrary to the laws and the sacred constitutions; and therefore Lucius Titius appealed against the unjust sentence handed down by the governor. I ask, since Titius had not appealed in accordance with the law, whether the money can be exacted according to the condemnation. Modestinus replied that, if a definite amount is contained in the sentence, nothing is put forward why an action on the judgment cannot be brought.
Cum ex causa donationis promissa pecunia est, si dubium sit, an ea res eo usque donatoris facultates exhaurire possit, ut vix quicquam ei in bonis relictum sit, actio in id quod facere possit danda est, ita ut et ipsi donatori aliquid sufficiens relinquatur. quod maxime inter liberos et parentes observandum est.
When money has been promised on the ground of a donation, if it is doubtful whether that matter could so far exhaust the donor’s resources that scarcely anything is left to him in his goods, an action is to be granted for so much as he can perform, in such a way that something sufficient is left to the donor himself. This is to be especially observed between children and parents.
Debitoribus non tantum petentibus dies ad solvendum dandi sunt, sed et prorogandi, si res exigat: si qui tamen per contumaciam magis, quam quia non possint explicare pecuniam, differant solutionem, pignoribus captis compellendi sunt ad satisfaciendum ex forma, quam cassio proconsuli divus pius in haec verba rescripsit: " his, qui fatebuntur debere aut ex re iudicata necesse habebunt reddere, tempus ad solvendum detur, quod sufficere pro facultate cuiusque videbitur: eorum, qui intra diem vel ab initio datum vel ex ea causa postea prorogatum sibi non reddiderint, pignora capi eaque, si intra duos menses non solverint, vendantur: si quid ex pretiis supersit, reddatur ei, cuius pignora vendita erant".
Not only to debtors who petition are days to be given for paying, but also to be prorogated, if the matter requires: if any, however, out of contumacy rather than because they cannot produce the money, defer payment, they are to be compelled, with pledges seized, to satisfy, according to the form which the deified Pius rescripted to Cassius the proconsul in these words: " to those who will confess that they owe, or will be under necessity to restore by reason of a res judicata, let time be given for paying, which shall seem sufficient in proportion to each one’s means: as to those who shall not have paid within the day either originally given, or later prorogated for that reason, let pledges be taken, and let these, if they shall not pay within two months, be sold: if anything from the prices remains over, let it be returned to him whose pledges had been sold".
Cum prolatis constitutionibus contra eas pronuntiat iudex, eo quod non existimat causam, de qua iudicat, per eas iuvari, non videtur contra constitutiones sententiam dedisse. ideoque ab eiusmodi sententia appellandum est: alioquin rei iudicatae stabitur.
When, the constitutions having been produced, the judge pronounces contrary to them, because he does not consider that the case which he is judging is aided by them, he does not seem to have given a judgment against the constitutions. Therefore from such a judgment one must appeal; otherwise res judicata will stand.
Divus hadrianus, aditus per libellum a iulio tarentino et indicante eo falsis testimoniis, conspiratione adversariorum testibus pecunia corruptis, religionem iudicis circumventam esse, in integrum causam restituendam in haec verba rescripsit: " exemplum libelli dati mihi a iulio tarentino mitti tibi iussi: tu, si tibi probaverit conspiratione adversariorum et testibus pecunia corruptis oppressum se, et rem severe vindica et, si qua a iudice tam malo exemplo circumscripto iudicata sunt, in integrum restitue".
the deified hadrian, having been approached by petition by julius of tarentum and he indicating that, by false testimonies—through a conspiracy of adversaries, the witnesses corrupted by money—the scruple of the judge had been circumvented, wrote back that the case was to be restored in entirety in these words: "i ordered a copy of the petition given to me by julius of tarentum to be sent to you: you, if it shall have convinced you that he has been oppressed by a conspiracy of adversaries and by witnesses corrupted with money, both vindicate the matter severely, and, if any things have been adjudged with the judge overreached by so bad an example, restore them in entirety."
Pomponius libro trigensimo septimo ad edictum scribit, si uni ex pluribus iudicibus de liberali causa cognoscenti de re non liqueat, ceteri autem consentiant, si is iuraverit sibi non liquere, eo quiescente ceteros, qui consentiant, sententiam proferre, quia, etsi dissentiret, plurium sententia optineret.
Pomponius writes in the thirty-seventh book on the Edict, that if to one of several judges hearing a liberty case the matter is not clear, but the rest agree, if he has sworn that it is not clear to him, with him remaining quiescent the others who agree may deliver sentence, because, even if he dissented, the opinion of the majority would prevail.
Nesennius apollinaris: si te donaturum mihi delegavero creditori meo, an in solidum conveniendus sis? et si in solidum conveniendus, an diversum putes, si non creditori meo, sed ei, cui donare volebam, te delegavero? et quid de eo, qui pro muliere, cui donare volebat, marito eius dotem promiserit?
Nesennius apollinaris: if I have delegated you, who intended to donate to me, to my creditor, are you to be sued in solidum? and if you are to be sued in solidum, would you think it different if I had delegated you not to my creditor, but to him to whom I wished to donate? and what about the one who, on behalf of a woman to whom he wished to donate, has promised a dowry to her husband?
he replied: the creditor would not be removed by any exception, although the one who has been delegated to him will be able to employ it against the person in whose name he promised; to which the husband is similar, especially if he seeks while the marriage is continuing. and just as the donor’s heir is condemned in solidum, and likewise the surety (fideiussor) whom he employed in making the donation, so also the one to whom he did not give is condemned in solidum.
Fundum quis donavit: si non restituat, ut quivis possessor damnandus est: si autem fundum restituit, fructuum nomine, si non eos consumpsit, in solidum condemnandus est: potuit enim non periclitari, si statim restituisset: si dolo desiit possidere, in litem iurabitur et tanti sequetur condemnatio.
Someone donated an estate: if he does not restore it, he is to be condemned as any possessor; but if he restores the estate, for the fruits, if he has not consumed them, he is to be condemned in solidum; for he could have avoided jeopardy if he had restored it at once; if he ceased to possess through fraud, there will be an in litem oath and condemnation will follow for that amount.
Paulus responsit rescindere quidem sententiam suam praecedentem praetorem non posse, reliqua autem, quae ad consequentiam quidem iam statutorum pertinent, priori tamen sententiae desunt, circa condemnandum reum vel absolvendum debere supplere, scilicet eodem die.
Paulus answered that the praetor indeed cannot rescind his own preceding sentence; but the remaining matters, which pertain to the consequence of what has already been statuted yet are lacking to the prior sentence, ought to be supplied concerning the defendant’s being condemned or acquitted, namely on the same day.
Paulus respondit eos, qui una sententia in unam quantitatem condemnati sunt, pro portione virili ex causa iudicati conveniri, et si ex sententia adversus tres dicta titius portionem sibi competentem exsolvit, ex persona ceterorum ex eadem sententia conveniri eum non posse.
Paul answered that those who have been condemned by a single judgment to one amount are to be proceeded against, for their virile share, on the ground of the judgment; and if, from a judgment pronounced against three, Titius has paid the portion appropriate to him, he cannot be proceeded against, on account of the others, under the same judgment.
Ex contractu paterno actum est cum pupilla tutore auctore et condemnata est: postea tutores abstinuerunt eam bonis paternis et ita bona defuncti ad substitutum vel ad coheredes pervenerunt: quaeritur, an hi ex causa iudicati teneantur. rescripsit dandam in eos actionem, nisi culpa tutorum pupilla condemnata est.
From a paternal contract, suit was brought against a girl under guardianship, her tutor authorizing, and she was condemned: thereafter the tutors caused her to abstain from the paternal goods, and so the goods of the deceased passed to the substitute or to the coheirs: it is asked whether these are held liable ex causa iudicati. He replied by rescript that an action is to be granted against them, unless the girl was condemned through the fault of the tutors.
Et exheredatum vel eum, qui se paterna hereditate abstinuit, nec ex ipsius contractu nisi id quod facere potest condemnandum. quemadmodum autem facere posse credatur, videndum est, utrum deducto omni aere alieno, ut is, qui ex donatione convenitur, an ut maritus et patronus nullo deducto aere alieno. et indubitati iuris est ad similitudinem viri et patroni eum detrahendum: pinguius enim donatori succurrere debemus quam ei, qui verum debitum persolvere compellitur,
And a disinherited person, or one who has abstained from the paternal inheritance, is not to be condemned on his own contract except for that which he is able to do. But how he is to be thought able to do, it must be considered, whether with all debt deducted, as in the case of one who is sued on account of a donation, or as with a husband and a patron, with no debt deducted. And it is a matter of indubitable law that he is to be treated on the model of the husband and the patron: for we ought to succor the donor more liberally than him who is compelled to pay a true debt,
Si quis creditorem missum in possessionem rei servandae causa non admiserit, si venditor praestiterit creditori, quanti eius interfuerit, quaesitum est an debitor liberetur. et puto improbum esse eum, qui velit iterum consequi quod accepit.
If anyone has not admitted a creditor sent into possession for the purpose of preserving the thing, and if the vendor has satisfied the creditor to the amount of his interest, the question has been asked whether the debtor is released. And I think him unscrupulous who would wish to obtain again what he has received.
Quidam consulebat, an valeret sententia a minore viginti quinque annis iudice data. et aequissimum est tueri sententiam ab eo dictam, nisi minor decem et octo annis sit. certe si magistratum minor gerit, dicendum est iurisdictionem eius non improbari.
Someone consulted whether a sentence given by a judge under twenty-five years of age would be valid. And it is most equitable to uphold the sentence pronounced by him, unless he is under eighteen years. Certainly, if a minor holds a magistracy, it must be said that his jurisdiction is not disapproved.
and if by consent a minor judge has been appointed, with the knowledge of those who consented to him, it is most correct to say the judgment stands. Accordingly, if a minor praetor, or if a consul, has pronounced the law or has delivered a judgment, it will be valid: for the emperor, who gave him the magistracy, has decreed that he perform all things.
Quaesitum est, cum alter ex litigatoribus febricitans discessisset et iudex absente eo pronuntiasset, an iure videretur pronuntiasse. respondit: morbus sonticus etiam invitis litigatoribus ac iudice diem differt. sonticus autem existimandus est, qui cuiusque rei agendae impedimento est.
It was asked, when one of the litigants, feverish, had withdrawn and the judge had pronounced while he was absent, whether he seemed to have pronounced lawfully. He answered: a serious sickness postpones the day even against the will of the litigants and the judge. But he is to be considered seriously ill who is an impediment to the doing of any matter.
Further, what is more of an impediment to a litigant than an unnatural motion of the body, which they call a fever? Therefore, if at the time for judging one of the litigants had a fever, the matter does not seem adjudged. Yet it can be said that there is some difference even among fevers: for if someone otherwise healthy and robust, at the time of judging, has been seized by a very slight fever, or if someone has so old a quartan that during it he is wont to be able to attend to all business, it can be said that he does not have a disabling illness.
Saepe constitutum est res inter alios iudicatas aliis non praeiudicare. quod tamen quandam distinctionem habet: nam sententia inter alios dicta aliis quibusdam etiam scientibus obest, quibusdam vero, etiamsi contra ipsos iudicatum sit, nihil nocet. nam scientibus nihil praeiudicat, veluti si ex duobus heredibus debitoris alter condemnatur: nam alteri integra defensio est, etiamsi cum coherede suo agi scierit.
It has often been established that matters adjudged between others do not prejudice others. Which, however, has a certain distinction: for a sentence pronounced between others harms some others, even those knowing of it; to some others, however, even if judgment has been given against themselves, it does no harm. For to those who are knowing it prejudices nothing, as, for instance, if out of two heirs of a debtor one is condemned: for to the other the defense is intact, even if he knew that suit was being brought with his coheir.
Likewise, if out of two claimants one, having been defeated, has acquiesced, the petition of the other is not prejudiced; and this has been so set forth by rescript. A judgment that has been given among others harms those who knew, when someone, concerning a matter for which the action or defense belongs to himself in the first place, allows a subsequent person to bring suit, as, for example, if a creditor has allowed the debtor to try an action about the proprietorship of the pledge, or a husband [has allowed] his father-in-law or his wife to litigate about the proprietorship of a thing received in dowry, or a possessor [has allowed] the vendor to litigate about the proprietorship of a thing purchased; and these matters are to be understood thus from many constitutions. But why knowledge harms these persons, whereas it does not harm those mentioned above, the reason is this: he who knows that his coheir is bringing suit cannot prevent him from using, if he wishes, his own action or defense; but he who allows a prior owner to conduct the cause in defense is therefore, because of his knowledge, removed by the prescription of res judicata, although it was judged among others, because by his own will judgment was given concerning the right which he held deriving from the person of the actor.
for even if my freedman, with me intervening, should be adjudged the slave or the freedman of another, it prejudices me. A different case is, if Titius should claim from you an estate which I also say pertains to me, but not from the person of Titius: for although, with me knowing, it has been adjudged against Titius, nevertheless I suffer no prejudice, because I neither vindicate under that right by which Titius was defeated, nor could I intercede for Titius to prevent him from using his own right, just as we said above concerning the coheir.
Negotiorum gestorum condemnatus appellavit et diu negotium tractum est: quaesitum est appellatione eius iniusta pronuntiata, an, quo tardius iudicatum sit, usurae pecuniae in condemnatum deductae medii temporis debeantur. respondit secundum ea quae proponentur dandam utilem actionem.
Condemned in an action for the management of affairs, he appealed, and the matter was long drawn out: it was asked, after his appeal had been pronounced unjust, whether, because judgment was given later, the interest of the money, reckoned against the condemned for the intermediate time, is owed. He responded that, according to the particulars proposed, a useful action should be granted.
Iulianus ait confessum certum se debere legatum omnimodo damnandum, etiam si in rerum natura non fuisset et si iam a natura recessit, ita tamen, ut in aestimationem eius damnetur: quia confessus pro iudicato habetur.
Julian says that one who has confessed that he owes a specific legacy must in any case be condemned, even if it had not existed in the nature of things and even if it has already withdrawn from nature; nevertheless, in such a way that he be condemned to its valuation: because one who has confessed is held as adjudged.
Sed et si fundum vindicem meum esse tuque confessus sis, perinde habeberis, atque si dominii mei fundum esse pronuntiatum esset. et si alia quacumque actione civili vel honoraria vel interdicto exhibitorio vel restitutorio vel prohibitorio dum quis convenitur, confiteatur, dici potest in his omnibus subsequi praetorem voluntatem orationis divi marci debere et omne omnino, quod quis confessus est, pro iudicato habere. dabitur igitur ex his actionibus, ex quibus dies datur ad restituendam rem, confesso tempus ad restitutionem et, si non restituatur, lis aestimabitur.
But also, if you have confessed that the estate which I vindicate is mine, you will be held just as if it had been pronounced that the estate is of my dominium. And if, in any other action whatsoever—civil or honorary—or in an interdict, whether exhibitory, restitutory, or prohibitory, while one is convened he confesses, it can be said that in all these the praetor ought to follow the intention of the oration of the deified Marcus, and to hold absolutely everything which anyone has confessed as adjudged. Therefore, from those actions in which a day is given for restoring the thing, time for restitution will be given to the confessor; and, if it is not restored, the suit will be assessed.
Si quis absente adversario confessus sit, videndum, numquid non debeat pro iudicato haberi, quia nec qui iurat de operis, obligatur nec soleat quis absenti condemnari. certe procuratorem, tutorem curatoremve praesentem esse sufficit.
If anyone has confessed with the adversary absent, it must be considered whether he ought not to be held as adjudicated, because neither is he who swears concerning the works obligated, nor is one wont to be condemned with the other absent. Certainly it suffices that a procurator, tutor, or curator be present.
Cum fideicommissum peteretur, heres confessus est debere: arbiter ad restituendum datus comperit nihil deberi: quaesitum est, an possit absolvere. respondi posse interesse, qua ex causa nihil debeatur. nam si ob id, quod nullum fideicommissum fuerit, non debere eum absolvere: si vero quia testator forte solvendo non erat aut quod heres omne solutum esse apud praetorem dixerat et, cum controversia et computatio difficilior esset, arbiter datus fuerit, salvo officio eum absoluturum: has enim partes eius esse, ut, si in computatione nihil inveniatur, possit absolvere.
When a fideicommissum was being sought, the heir confessed that he owed it: an arbiter appointed for restoring found that nothing was owed: the question was asked whether he could absolve. I answered that it could make a difference for what cause nothing is owed. For if on the ground that there was no fideicommissum, he ought not to absolve him: but if because the testator perhaps was not solvent, or because the heir had said before the praetor that everything had been paid, and, since the dispute and the computation were more difficult, an arbiter had been appointed, with his office preserved he would absolve: for these are his functions, that, if in the computation nothing is found, he can absolve.
Qui bonis suis cessit, si modicum aliquid post bona sua vendita adquisivit, iterum bona eius non veneunt. unde ergo modum hunc aestimabimus, utrum ex quantitate eius quod adquisitum est an vero ex qualitate? et putem ex quantitate id aestimandum esse eius quod quaesiit, dummodo illud sciamus, si quid misericordiae causa ei fuerit relictum, puta menstruum vel annuum alimentorum nomine, non oportere propter hoc bona eius iterato venundari: nec enim fraudandus est alimentis cottidianis.
He who has made cession of his goods, if after his goods have been sold he has acquired something small, his goods are not put up for sale again. Whence, then, shall we estimate this limit—whether from the quantity of what has been acquired or rather from the quality? And I think that it should be assessed from the quantity of what he has obtained, provided that we know this: if anything has been left to him for the sake of mercy, for instance under the name of monthly or annual aliments, his goods ought not on this account to be sold a second time; for he is not to be defrauded of his daily sustenance.
Tres fere causae sunt, ex quibus in possessionem mitti solet: rei servandae causa, item legatorum servandorum gratia et ventris nomine. damni enim infecti nomine si non caveatur, non in universorum nomine fit missio, sed rei tantum, de qua damnum timetur.
There are generally three causes on account of which one is accustomed to be sent into possession: for the purpose of preserving the thing, likewise for the sake of preserving legacies, and in the name of the womb (i.e., on behalf of the unborn child). For under the head of damage not yet done (damnum infectum), if no security is given, the sending into possession is not made over all the goods, but only into the thing with respect to which damage is feared.
Apud iulianum quaeritur, si communem rem cum titio pater pupilli habuerit et communi dividundo iudicio pupillus non defendatur nihilque erit, cuius nomine propter personam patris condemnatio fieri debeat: utrum venire bona patris oporteat an vero rei servandae causa possideantur. et ait iulianus, si quidem pater aliquos fructus percepit aut fecerit rem deteriorem, bona eius venire possunt: si vero nihil sit, propter quod patris bona veneant, pupilli possideri. Marcellus autem notat perquam iniquum esse eum, qui nihil cum pupillo contraxit, expectare eius pubertatem.
It is asked in Julian, if the father of a ward has held a common thing with Titius and, in the action communi dividundo, the ward is not defended, and there will be no one in whose name, by reason of the father’s person, a condemnatio ought to be entered: whether the father’s goods ought to be sold, or rather to be held in possession rei servandae causa. And Julian says that, if indeed the father has taken any fruits or has made the thing worse, his goods can be sold; but if there is nothing on account of which the father’s goods should be sold, possession is to be taken of the ward (i.e., of the ward’s estate). Marcellus, however, notes that it is very inequitable that one who has contracted nothing with the ward must await his puberty.
Contractum cum pupillo potest dici et si cum servo eius contractum sit: competit enim adversus eum de peculio actio. unde probandum est ex omnibus causis, ex quibus adversus pupillum actio datur, hoc idem servandum. et facilius erit hoc probandum in servo, qui in rem domini vertit aut iussu eius aut si institoria cum eo agi possit.
A contract with a ward can be said to exist even if it has been contracted with his slave: for an action de peculio lies against him. Whence it must be proved that, in all causes in which an action is given against a ward, the same is to be observed. And it will be easier to establish this in the case of a slave who has turned the matter to the master’s account, either by his order, or if the institorial action can be brought against him.
Si pupillus heres extiterit alicui exque ea causa legata debeat, videndum est, an huic edicto locus sit: magisque est, ut Marcellus scribit, etiam pupilli posse bona possideri esseque in arbitrio hereditariorum creditorum, quid potius eligant: etenim videtur impubes contrahere, cum adiit hereditatem.
If a pupillus has become heir to someone and on that account owes legacies, it must be considered whether there is room for this edict; and the more correct view, as Marcellus writes, is that even the goods of a pupillus can be possessed, and that it is in the discretion of the creditors of the inheritance what they rather choose: for an impubes is deemed to contract when he has entered upon the inheritance.
Non defendi pupillum constare debet liquereque praetori, ut sic permittat bonorum possessionem. hoc autem constare debet sic: evocandi sunt ad praetorem tutores pupilli, ut defendant: si autem non habet tutores, requirendi cognati vel adfines et si qui alii forte sunt, quos verisimile est defensionem pupilli pupillae non omissuros vel propter necessitudinem vel propter caritatem vel qua alia ratione: liberti etiam si qui sunt idonei, evocandi exquirendaque defensio. si aut negent se defendere aut non negent, sed taceant, tunc praetor possessionem dabit, tamdiu scilicet, quoad non defendatur: si defendi coeperit pupillus vel pupilla, desinet possideri.
It must be established, and be clear to the praetor, that the ward is not being defended, so that thus he may permit possession of the estate. Now this must be established thus: the ward’s tutors (guardians) are to be summoned before the praetor, so that they may defend; but if he has no tutors, cognates or affines must be sought, and, if there are perhaps any others whom it is likely would not omit the defense of the male or female ward, whether on account of kinship or affection or any other reason; freedmen too, if any are suitable, are to be summoned and a defense sought out. If they either deny that they will defend, or do not deny but keep silence, then the praetor will grant possession, namely for so long as there is no defense; if the male or female ward begins to be defended, possession will cease.
Recte defendi quid sit, videamus, utrum tantum copiam sui facere et ad suscipiendum iudicium paratum esse an vero et satisdare omnimodo. et quidem non solum ipsis se defendere volentibus hoc edictum scriptum est, sed in rem: et " recte defendetur" hoc est vel a se vel ab alio quocumque. sed si alius defendat, erit necessaria satisdatio, si ipse, non puto necessariam satisdationem.
Let us see what it is to be rightly defended, whether it is enough merely to make oneself available and to be prepared to submit to the proceeding, or indeed also to give surety in every way. And indeed this edict was written not only for those themselves who wish to defend themselves, but in rem: and " it will be rightly defended," that is, either by himself or by any other whatsoever. But if another should defend, surety will be necessary; if he himself does, I do not think surety is necessary.
Cum hoc edictum locum habeat, non sufficit latitare, sed et necesse est fraudationis causa id fieri: neque quod fraudationis causa sine latitatione fit, satis est ad possessionem et venditionem, sed oportet fraudationis causa latitare. et est frequentissima haec causa possessionis: nam in usu latitantium bona possidentur.
Since this edict has application, it does not suffice to lurk in hiding, but it is also necessary that this be done for the purpose of fraud; nor is that which is done for the purpose of fraud without hiding sufficient for possession and sale, but one must hide for the purpose of fraud. And this is a most frequent ground of possession: for in practice the goods of those in hiding are possessed.
Sed is, qui fraudationis causa latitet, non tamen propter creditores, etsi haec latitatio creditores fraudet, in ea tamen erit causa, ne hinc possideri bona eius possint, quia non hoc animo latitet, ut fraudet creditores: animus enim latitantis quaeritur, quo animo latitet, ut fraudet creditores an alia ex causa.
But he who hides for the cause of fraud, yet not on account of the creditors, even if this hiding does defraud the creditors, will nevertheless be in such a case that his goods cannot on this account be taken into possession, because he does not hide with this intention, to defraud the creditors: for the intention of the one hiding is inquired into—with what intention he hides, whether to defraud the creditors or for some other cause.
Quid ergo, si duas causas latitandi habuit vel plures, inter quas etiam fraudandi creditores? an venditio recte procedat? et puto probandum, si plures causae sint latitationis, inter quas est et fraudationis causa, nocere debere posseque hinc bona vendi.
What then, if he had two causes for lying hidden, or more, among which is also that of defrauding creditors? Should the sale proceed rightly? And I think it should be proved that, if there are multiple causes of concealment, among which is also the cause of fraud, it ought to prejudice him, and that on this ground the goods can be sold.
Quid si adversus quosdam occultare se consilium non est, adversus quosdam est, quid dicemus? et rectissime pomponius scribit non adversus omnes latitationem exigendam, sed adversus eum, quem quis decipere et fraudare latitatione destinat. utrum ergo omnes bona eius vendere possunt, quia latitat, hoc est etiam hi, adversus quos non latitat, quia verum est eum latitare, an vero is solus, adversus quem latitat?
What if to hide oneself is not the plan against some persons, but is against others—what shall we say? And most rightly Pomponius writes that latitation is not to be required against all, but against him whom someone intends to deceive and defraud by latitation. Therefore can all sell his goods because he is in hiding—that is, even those against whom he is not hiding, because it is true that he is hiding—or rather only that one against whom he is hiding?
and indeed it is true that he lies hidden, and lies hidden for the cause of fraud, even if he does not lie hidden against me; but Pomponius thinks that this must be considered—whether it is against me—and that only he, against whom the latitation is being carried on, can from this obtain the vendition.
Plane si non defendatur furiosus, curatorem ei dandum, aut bona eius ut possideantur, nominatim permittendum est. labeo autem scribit, si non inveniatur curator vel defensor furiosi, sed et si curator datus eum non defendat, tunc removendum eum et oportere praetorem dare curatorem aliquem ex creditoribus, ut non amplius, quam necesse est, ex bonis furiosi veneat: eaque servanda labeo ait, quae solent servari, cum venter in possessionem mittitur.
Plainly, if the insane person is not defended, a curator must be given to him, or it must be expressly permitted that his goods be possessed. Labeo, however, writes that, if a curator or defender of the insane is not found, and also if the curator appointed does not defend him, then he must be removed, and the praetor ought to give some curator from among the creditors, so that no more than is necessary may be sold from the goods of the insane person; and Labeo says that those things are to be observed which are wont to be observed when the womb is put into possession.
Plane interdum bona eius causa cognita vendenda erunt, si urgueat aes alienum et dilatio damnum sit allatura creditoribus, ita autem vendenda, ut quod supersit, furioso detur, quia dominis eius status et habitus a pupilli condicione non multum abhorret: quod quidem non est sine ratione.
Clearly, at times his goods, the cause having been inquired into, will have to be sold, if debt presses and delay is going to bring loss to the creditors; yet they are to be sold in such a way that what remains be given to the madman, because the owner’s status and condition do not differ much from the condition of a ward: which indeed is not without reason.
Illud sciendum est posse quem in eadem civitate esse et latitare, et in alia civitate et non latitare. etenim qui in alia civitate sit copiamque sui faciat in publico ibique pareat, an latitet, videamus. et hodie hoc iure utimur, ut sive quis eodem loci agat sive peregre agat, si tamen occursum creditoris evitet, latitare videatur.
It should be known that a person can be in the same city and be in hiding, and be in another city and not be in hiding. For indeed, as to one who is in another city and makes himself available in public and appears there, whether he is hiding, let us consider. And today we use this rule of law, that whether someone acts in the same place or is abroad, if nevertheless he avoids an encounter with the creditor, he is considered to be in hiding.
finally, the ancients also answered that even he who does business in the same forum, if he conceals himself around the columns or the stations, is considered to be in hiding; and that one can be in hiding against one person, and not against another. moreover, it is agreed that he, against whom he is in hiding, can sell his goods.
Si in diem vel sub condicione debitor latitet, antequam dies vel condicio veniat, non possunt bona eius venire: quid enim interest, debitor quis non sit an nondum conveniri possit? nam et si non sit debitor, idem dicemus. idem erit dicendum et si quis habeat quidem actionem, sed talem, quae per exceptionem repellitur.
If a debtor for a term or under a condition lies in hiding, before the day or the condition arrives, his goods cannot come up for sale: for what difference does it make whether someone is not a debtor or cannot yet be convened? For even if he is not a debtor, we shall say the same. The same must be said also if someone indeed has an action, but such a one as is repelled by an exception.
Si quis actione de peculio filii vel servi nomine conveniri possit, si latitet, eo iure utimur, ut possint bona eius possideri et venire, tametsi nihil fuerit in peculio, quia esse potest et rei iudicatae tempus spectamus, utrum sit an non sit, et quod teneat actio, etiam si nihil in peculio fuerit.
If someone can be sued by the action de peculio in the name of a son or a slave, if he is in hiding, we employ this law: that his goods can be possessed and sold, although there may have been nothing in the peculium, because it can come to be, and we look to the time of res judicata, whether it is or is not, and that the action holds even if there has been nothing in the peculium.
Celsus autem sexto respondit, si fundum, quem petere volo, titius possideat neque absens defendatur, commodius se existimare in fundi possessionem mittendum quam bona eius possideri. hoc adnotandum est celsum consultum non de latitante, sed de absente.
Celsus, however, in the sixth, responded that, if Titius possesses the estate which I wish to claim and, being absent, is not defended, he considers it more convenient that one be sent into possession of the estate rather than that his goods be possessed. This is to be noted: that Celsus gave counsel not about one lurking in hiding, but about one absent.
Idem celsus existimat, si is, a quo hereditatem petere velim, latitat, commodissime fieri posse, ut in possessionem mittar rerum, quas pro herede vel pro possessore possidet: sed si dolo fecit, quo minus possideret, bona eius possidenda et vendenda sunt.
The same Celsus thinks that, if the person from whom I wish to claim the inheritance is in hiding, it can most conveniently be done that I be sent into possession of the things which he possesses as heir or as possessor; but if he acted by fraud, whereby he might not possess, his goods are to be possessed and sold.
Divus quoque pius in persona eius, qui hereditatem possidens copiam sui non faciebat, rescripsit in possessionem rerum hereditariarum adversarium inducendum: in quo rescripto et fructum percipere iussit eum, qui per nimiam contumaciam possessoris hereditatis, ut lucro eius cedat, in possessionem inductus est rerum hereditariarum.
The deified Pius also, in the person of one who, while possessing the inheritance, did not make himself available, rescripted that the adversary be put into possession of the hereditary things; and in that rescript he also ordered that he who, through the excessive contumacy of the possessor of the inheritance, has been inducted into possession of the hereditary property, should take the fruits, so that they may accrue to his profit.
Si alter ex heredibus intra tempora sibi praestituta deliberet adire hereditatem, alter vero neget se aditurum, videndum est, quid creditoribus agendum sit. et placet interim eos in possessionem mittendos custodiae causa, donec appareat, is qui deliberat utrum adgnoscat partem suam an non adgnoscat.
If one of the heirs, within the time prescribed to him, deliberates about entering upon the inheritance, but the other declares that he will not enter, it must be considered what is to be done by the creditors. And it is held that, meanwhile, they are to be put into possession for the sake of custody, until it appears whether the one who is deliberating recognizes his share or does not recognize it.
Cum legatorum vel fideicommissi servandi causa, vel quia damni infecti nobis non caveatur, bona possidere praetor permittit, vel ventris nomine in possessionem nos mittit, non possidemus, sed magis custodiam rerum et observationem nobis concedit.
When, for the purpose of preserving legacies or a fideicommissum, the praetor permits us to possess the goods, or because security is not furnished to us for damnum infectum, or he sends us into possession in the name of the womb, we are not possessors, but rather he grants to us the custody of the things and their oversight.
Ad cognitionem imperatorum a praeside provinciae remissus etsi in ceteris litibus romae defendere se non cogitur, tamen in provincia defendendus est: nam et exilio temporario puniti, si defensor non existat, bona veneunt.
Having been remitted to the cognizance of the emperors by the governor of the province, although in other lawsuits he is not compelled to defend himself at Rome, nevertheless in the province he must be defended: for even those punished with temporary exile, if a defender does not exist, their goods are put up for sale.
Si servus sub condicione heres institutus sit aut dubium sit, an is heres liberque futurus sit, non est iniquum postulantibus creditoribus ita decerni, ut, si ante certum tempus is heres non extiterit, perinde omnia observentur, ac si is heres ita institutus non esset: quod plerumque accideret, si sub condicione dandae alicui pecuniae heres institutus sit nec dies adpositus sit. sed hoc quantum ad bona ita observandum: ceterum libertas ei quandoque competet et a praetore conservanda est, etiamsi certum sit neque heredem neque bonorum possessorem futurum. si quis tamen heredem se spondendo vel actiones patiendo defunctum defendat, bona defuncti venire non poterunt.
If a slave has been instituted heir under a condition, or it is doubtful whether he will be going to be heir and free, it is not inequitable, at the petition of the creditors, for it to be decreed thus: that, if before a fixed time he has not come forth as heir, all things are to be observed as if he had not been instituted heir: which would for the most part occur if an heir has been instituted under the condition of giving money to someone and no day has been appointed. But this is to be observed thus so far as concerns the estate; moreover, liberty will at some time accrue to him and is to be conserved by the praetor, even if it is certain that he will be neither heir nor possessor of the estate. If, however, someone defends the deceased by promising himself as heir or by allowing actions, the goods of the deceased cannot be put up for sale.
Si minor viginti quinque annis, qui habet curatores, a curatoribus non defendatur nec alium defensorem inveniat, bonorum venditionem patitur, etsi non latitet, licet non fraudationis causa latitare videtur, qui sui non est idoneus defensor.
If a minor under twenty-five years, who has curators, is not defended by his curators nor finds another defender, he undergoes a vendition of his goods, even if he does not lie hidden; for he who is not a suitable defender of himself is deemed to lie hidden, although he does not seem to be hiding for the purpose of fraud.
Quid ergo, si quibusdam creditoribus solvit, deinde bona venierint? si quaeritur, an repetitio sit, ex causa id statuendum iulianus ait, ne alterius aut neglegentia aut cupiditas huic, qui diligens fuit, noceat. quod si utroque instante tibi gratificatus tutor solvit, aequum esse aut prius eandem portionem mihi quaeri aut communicandum quod accepisti: et hoc iulianus ait.
What then, if he has paid certain creditors, and thereafter the assets have been sold at auction? If the question is whether there is a recovery, Julian says it must be determined from the cause, lest another’s negligence or greed harm the one who was diligent. But if, with both pressing, the tutor, to gratify you, paid, it is equitable either that first the same portion be demanded of me, or that what you received be shared; and this too Julian says.
Our Scaevola says that, if there is anything in the assets, the full amount is to be deducted from the inheritance, by the example of him who has managed another’s business; but if there is nothing in the assets, it is not inequitable that repetition (recovery) be granted against the creditor, as though for an undue payment.
Si quis fructus ex praedio debitoris capi poterit, hunc creditor, qui in possessionem praedii missus est, vendere vel locare debet: sed hoc ita demum, si ante neque venierit neque locatus erit. nam si iam a debitore vel locatus erat vel venierat, servabit praetor venditionem et locationem a debitore factam, etsi minoris distractum est vel locatum, nisi si in fraudem creditorum hoc fiat: tunc enim praetor arbitrium dat creditoribus, ut ex integro locationem vel venditionem faciant.
If any fruits can be taken from the debtor’s estate, the creditor who has been sent into possession of the estate ought to sell or to lease them: but only then, if previously it has neither been sold nor leased. For if it had already been either leased or sold by the debtor, the praetor will preserve the sale and the lease made by the debtor, even if it has been sold for less or leased for less, unless this is done in fraud of the creditors: for then the praetor gives to the creditors the choice to make the lease or the sale anew.
De tempore locationis nihil praetor locutus est et ideo liberum arbitrium creditoribus datum videtur, quanto tempore locent, quemadmodum illud est in arbitrio eorum, vendant vel locent, scilicet sine dolo malo: ex culpa autem rei non fiunt.
As to the time of the leasing the praetor said nothing, and therefore free discretion seems to be given to the creditors as to for how long they may lease, just as it is in their discretion whether they sell or lease, namely without dolus malus; however, they do not become liable on account of the fault (culpa) of the thing.
Si unus sit, qui possideat bona, expeditum erit de locatione: quod si non unus, sed plures sint, quis eorum debeat locare vel vendere, quaeritur. et si quidem convenit inter eos, expeditissimum est: nam et omnes possunt locare et uni hoc negotium dare: si vero non convenit, tunc dicendum est praetorem causa cognita eligere debere, qui locet vel vendat.
If there is a single person who possesses the goods, the matter of the leasing will be straightforward; but if there are not one, but several, the question arises which of them ought to lease or to sell. And if indeed it is agreed among them, it is most expeditious: for they can all lease, and they can entrust this business to one; but if there is no agreement, then it must be said that the praetor, the case having been heard, ought to choose who shall lease or sell.
Praetor ait: " si quis, cum in possessione bonorum esset, quod eo nomine fructus ceperit, ei, ad quem ea res pertinet, non restituat: sive, quod impensae sine dolo malo fecerit, ei non praestabitur: sive dolo malo eius deterior causa possessionis facta esse dicetur, de ea re iudicium in factum dabo".
The praetor says: " if anyone, while in possession of the goods, does not restore to him to whom that thing pertains the fruits which he has taken by reason thereof: or, if reimbursement is not afforded to him for the expenses which he has made without fraud: or if it shall be said that by his fraud the condition of the possession has been made worse, on that matter I will grant an action in factum".
Quod de fructibus ait, etiam de ceteris, quaecumque ex re debitoris pervenerunt, intellegendum est. et sane debuit hoc ita esse: quid enim, si ex compromisso vel alio casu poenam consecutus est? nam eam poenam, quam consecutus est, praestare debet.
What he says about fruits is to be understood also about the rest, whatever have accrued from the debtor’s property (res). And indeed it ought to be thus: for what if from a compromise (compromissum) or some other contingency he has obtained a penalty? For he must render that penalty which he has obtained.
Quod ait praetor " sive quod impensae nomine sine dolo fecit, ei non praestabitur", hoc eo spectat, ut, si quid ipse erogavit creditor, si modo sine dolo malo erogavit, hoc ei praestetur: sufficit igitur sine dolo erogasse, etiamsi nihil profuit erogatio eius rei debitori.
What the praetor says, "or whatever he has done under the name of expenses without fraud, it will not be allowed to him," looks to this: that, if the creditor himself disbursed anything, provided only that he disbursed it without malicious fraud, this be allowed to him: it is sufficient, therefore, to have disbursed without fraud, even if his disbursement profited the debtor in that matter nothing.
His verbis " ad quem ea res pertinet" etiam curator bonis distrahendis datus continebitur et ipse debitor, si contigerit, ne bona eius veneant. et ipsi itaque creditori adversus hos dabitur actio, quos enumeravimus, sive quid in fructibus percipiendis erogavit sive in familia alenda curandave praediis fulciendis vel reficiendis vel damno infecto promittendo vel servo noxali iudicio defenso, si modo non magis eum expedit dedere quam retinere: quod si dedere expedit, consequens erit repetere eum non debere.
By these words "to whom that matter pertains" there will also be included a curator appointed for goods to be sold, and the debtor himself, if it should happen, in order that his goods not be sold. And thus to the creditor himself an action will be given against those whom we have enumerated, whether he has expended anything in perceiving the fruits, or in nourishing or caring for the household, or in shoring up or repairing the estates, or in promising for damnum infectum, or in defending a slave in a noxal suit—provided only that it is not more expedient to surrender him than to retain him; but if surrendering is expedient, it will follow that he ought not to demand him back.
Generaliter etiam dicendum est, quidquid impendit in rem, si modo sine dolo malo impendit, repetere eum posse: nam negotiorum gestorum agere non magis potest quam si socius commune aedificium fulsit, quia hic quoque creditor commune, non alienum negotium gessisse videtur.
Generally it must also be said that whatever he expends upon the thing, provided only that he expends it without malicious fraud, he can recover: for he can no more bring the action of management of affairs than if a partner had propped up a common building, because here too he is credited with having managed a common, not another’s, affair.
Est praeterea quaesitum, si deteriora praedia facta fuerint sine dolo malo creditoris vel iura eorum amissa vel aedificia diruta vel exusta, item familiae pecorumque acta cura non sit aut possessio alii tradita, sine dolo tamen malo, an teneatur. et apparet eum non teneri, quia dolo malo caret, eritque melior eius condicio quam in pignore creditoris, qui non tantum dolum malum, verum culpam quoque debet. eadem causa est curatoris bonorum: nam et is tenetur ut creditores.
It has moreover been asked whether, if the lands have been made worse without the malicious deceit (dolus malus) of the creditor, or their rights have been lost, or buildings torn down or burned, likewise if care of the household and of the herds has not been administered, or possession has been delivered to another, nevertheless without malicious deceit, he is held liable. And it appears that he is not held, because he is free of malicious deceit, and his condition will be better than in the case of a creditor with a pledge, who must answer not only for malicious deceit, but for fault (culpa) as well. The same cause applies to the curator of the goods: for he too is liable as creditors are.
In eum quoque, qui neque locavit fructum praedii neque vendidit, in factum actionem dat praetor et in hoc condemnabitur, quanto minus propter hoc perceptum est, quia neque vendidit neque locavit. ceterum si tantum perceptum est, quantum perciperetur, si locatus vel distractus fructus esset, nihil ei imputabitur. praestat autem per id tantum temporis, quo in possessionem fuit vel ipse vel iussu eius alius, quoad inde de possessione discessum est: nam neque hoc imputatur creditori, cur in possessionem non venerit, neque illud, cur de possessione decesserit, cum voluntarium et suum potius negotium creditor gerat.
Against him also who neither leased the fruits of the estate nor sold them, the praetor grants an action in factum, and he will be condemned in the amount by which less was received on account of this, because he neither sold nor leased. Otherwise, if as much was received as would have been received if the fruits had been leased or sold off, nothing will be charged to him. He is answerable, however, only for that period of time during which he himself, or another by his order, was in possession, until departure from that possession took place: for neither is this imputed to the creditor, why he did not come into possession, nor that, why he departed from possession, since the creditor conducts a voluntary matter and rather his own business.
Si possessionis causa deterior facta esse dicetur dolo eius, qui in possessionem missus sit, actio in eum ex dolo datur, quae neque post annum neque in heredes ceterosque successores dabitur, cum ex delicto oriatur poenaeque nomine concipiatur,
If it is said that the condition of the possession has been made worse by the fraud of him who has been put into possession, an action on account of fraud is given against him, which will neither be given after one year nor against the heirs and the other successors, since it arises from a delict and is conceived in the name of penalty.
Cum unus ex creditoribus postulat in bona debitoris se mitti, quaeritur, utrum solus is qui petit possidere potest, an, cum unus petit et praetor permisit, omnibus creditoribus aditus sit. et commodius dicitur, cum praetor permiserit, non tam personae solius petentis, quam creditoribus et in rem permissum videri: quod et labeo putat. nec videbitur libera persona adquirere alii, quia nec sibi quicquam adquirit, cui praetor permittit, sed aliquid ex ordine facit: et ideo ceteris quoque prodest.
When one of the creditors requests to be sent into the goods of the debtor, the question is raised whether only he who petitions can possess, or whether, when one petitions and the praetor has permitted, access is open to all the creditors. And it is more convenient to say that, when the praetor has permitted, it is seen to have been permitted not so much to the person of the single petitioner as to the creditors and in rem; which Labeo also thinks. Nor will a free person seem to acquire for another, because he to whom the praetor permits acquires nothing for himself, but does something according to the order; and therefore it profits the others as well.
Plainly, if one who is not a creditor has petitioned, it must by no means be said that even he who is a creditor can possess, because such a petition has accomplished nothing: otherwise than if a creditor, to whom it has been permitted to possess, afterwards recovered his debt; for the others will be able to carry through the vendition of the goods.
Datur in creditorem actio, qui in possessionem missus est, de eo quod ex bonis debitoris ad eum pervenit: si nondum sit aliquid consecutus, actiones suas praestabit. datur autem in factum actio adversus eum et omne, quod in actionem negotiorum gestorum veniret, si posset agi, restituendum a creditore.
An action is given against the creditor who has been sent into possession, concerning that which from the goods of the debtor has come to him: if he has not yet obtained anything, he shall furnish his actions. Moreover, an action in factum is given against him, and everything that would fall under the action of negotiorum gestorum, if suit could be brought, must be restored by the creditor.
Cum plures creditores in possessionem rerum debitoris mittantur, ne corrumpantur rationes, uni hoc negotium a creditoribus esse dandum, quem maior pars creditorum elegerit. ego puto creditoribus instrumentorum etiam anagrafyn facere, non ut describant ipsa corpora instrumentorum, sed quot sint, de qua re sint, subnotent sibi et quasi inventarium faciant: quod etiam universorum facere eis erit permittendum. praeterea nonnumquam praetor causa cognita etiam describere aliquid ex instrumentis creditoribus debebit permittere, si qua idonea causa interveniat.
When several creditors are sent into possession of the debtor’s goods, lest the accounts be corrupted, this business is to be given by the creditors to one person, whom the greater part of the creditors has chosen. I think that the creditors should also make an anagraphe (register) of the instruments, not so that they copy out the very bodies of the instruments, but so that they note for themselves how many they are and what matter they concern, and make a kind of inventory: which it will also be permitted them to do for everything. Moreover, sometimes the praetor, after the case has been examined, ought even to permit the creditors to transcribe something from the instruments, if some suitable cause should intervene.
Utrum semel an etiam saepius recognitio et dispunctio concedenda sit creditoribus, videamus. et ait labeo amplius quam semel non esse concedendam: si quis tamen, inquit, iuraverit non calumniae causa se postulare neque habere quae dispunxerit, iterum ei faciendam potestatem ait nec amplius quam bis.
Whether a recognitio and dispunctio should be granted to creditors once, or even more often, let us see. and labeo says that it should not be granted more than once: however, he says, if someone has sworn that he is not petitioning for the sake of calumny and that he does not possess what he has dispuncted (struck out), he says that power should be given to him again, and not more than twice.
Quaesitum est, utrum ita demum privilegium habet funeraria, si is cuius bona veneunt funeratus sit, an etiam si proponas alium esse funeratum. et hoc iure utimur, ut quicumque sit funeratus, id est sive is, cuius de bonis agitur, sive quid is debuit, quod reddere eum, si viveret, funeraria actione cogi oporteret, privilegio locus sit parvique referre dicamus, qua actione hic sumptus repetatur, funeraria an familiae erciscundae an qua alia, dummodo sumptus funeris causa factus sit. quacumque igitur actione ob funeris sumptum utatur, etiam funerariam ei competere.
It has been asked whether the funerary action has a privilege only if the person whose goods are being sold has himself been buried, or even if you posit that someone else has been buried. And we use this rule of law: that whoever has been buried—namely, whether it is the person whose goods are in question, or in respect of whatever he owed which, if he were alive, he ought to be compelled to pay by the funerary action—there is room for the privilege; and we say it matters little by which action this expense is recovered, whether by the funerary action, or by the family-partition action (familiae erciscundae), or by some other, provided the expense was made for the sake of the funeral. Therefore, by whatever action he proceeds for the funeral expense, the funerary action also lies for him.
Si sponsa dedit dotem et nuptiis renuntiatum est, tametsi ipsa dotem condicit, tamen aequum est hanc ad privilegium admitti, licet nullum matrimonium contractum est: idem puto dicendum etiam, si minor duodecim annis in domum quasi uxor deducta sit, licet nondum uxor sit:
If a fiancée gave a dowry and the nuptials were renounced, although she herself sues for the dowry, nevertheless it is equitable that she be admitted to the privilege, although no marriage was contracted: the same, I think, must be said even if a minor under twelve years was led into the house as if a wife, although she is not yet a wife:
Si quis, cum tutor non esset, pro tutore negotia gessit, privilegio locum esse manifestum est: nec interest, ipse debeat qui gessit sive heres eius ceterique successores. ipse autem pupillus habet privilegium, sed eius successores non habent. sed aequissimum erit ceteros quoque, quibus curatores quasi debilibus vel prodigis dantur,
If anyone, when he was not a tutor, conducted business as tutor, it is manifest that there is room for the privilege: nor does it make a difference whether he himself who conducted it is the creditor, or his heir and other successors. The ward himself, moreover, has the privilege, but his successors do not have it. But it will be most equitable that the others also, to whom curators are given, as to the weak or to prodigals,
In bonis mensularii vendundis post privilegia potiorem eorum causam esse placuit, qui pecunias apud mensam fidem publicam secuti deposuerunt. sed enim qui depositis nummis usuras a mensulariis acceperunt a ceteris creditoribus non separantur, et merito: aliud est enim credere, aliud deponere. si tamen nummi exstent, vindicari eos posse puto a depositariis et futurum eum qui vindicat ante privilegia.
In the sale of a banker’s goods, it has been decided that, next after the privileges, the claim of those who deposited monies at the counter, relying on the public faith, is the stronger. But indeed those who, having deposited coins, received interest from the bankers are not separated from the other creditors, and rightly: for to lend is one thing, to deposit another. If, however, the coins are extant, I think they can be vindicated by the depositors, and that the one who vindicates will be before the privileges.
Eorum ratio prior est creditorum, quorum pecunia ad creditores privilegiarios pervenit. pervenisse autem quemadmodum accipimus, utrum si statim profecta est ab inferioribus ad privilegiarios an vero et si per debitoris personam, hoc est si ante ei numerata sit et sic debitoris facta creditori privilegiario numerata est? quod quidem potest benigne dici, si modo non post aliquod intervallum id factum sit.
The claim of those creditors is prior, whose money has reached the privileged creditors. But how do we understand “has reached”: whether if it set out at once from the lower-ranking creditors to the privileged, or even if through the person of the debtor—that is, if it was first paid to him and thus, having become the debtor’s, it was paid to the privileged creditor? This indeed can be said benignly, provided only that it was not done after some interval.
Si magistratus fideicommissi servandi causa in possessionem miserint, dare arbitrum possunt ad ea distrahenda, quae mora deteriora futura sunt, ita ut pretium ex his redactum apud fideicommissarium in causa depositi sit, donec de fideicommisso quod ei debetur constet.
If the magistrates, for the sake of preserving a fideicommissum, have put someone into possession, they can appoint an arbiter to sell off those things which by delay would become worse, on condition that the price realized from these be held with the fideicommissary as a deposit, until it is established concerning the fideicommissum that is owed to him.
Pater familias impuberi filio, si ante pubertatem decessisset, substituit heredem: is filius paterna hereditate se abstinuit ideoque bona patris venierunt: postea filio hereditas obvenit, qua adita decessit. quaero, cum praetor in ipsum pupillum, quamvis postea hereditas obvenisset, creditoribus tamen patris actionem non daret, an in substitutum creditoribus patris danda sit actio, cum ex bonis paternis, quae scilicet ad creditores missos in bona pertinent, nihil adquirat et cum creditores nihil iuris in bonis pupilli habuerint eorumque nihil interfuerit, adiretur necne pupilli hereditas, cum ea bona omissa a substituto hereditate ad creditores non pertinebant. me illud maxime movet, quod praeceptoribus tuis placet unum esse testamentum.
A paterfamilias appointed a substitute heir for his not-yet-pubescent son, in case he should decease before puberty. That son abstained from the paternal inheritance, and therefore the father’s goods were sold; afterwards an inheritance befell the son, and, having entered upon it, he died. I inquire, since the praetor, against the ward himself, although later an inheritance had fallen to him, nevertheless would not grant an action to the father’s creditors, whether an action should be given to the father’s creditors against the substitute, since he acquires nothing from the paternal goods, which, namely, pertain to the creditors who were sent into possession of the goods, and since the creditors had no right in the ward’s goods and it made no difference to them whether the ward’s inheritance was entered upon or not, since those goods, the inheritance having been omitted by the substitute, did not pertain to the creditors. What moves me most is this: that it pleases your preceptors that there is one testament.
he answered: the indulgence which the praetor affords to a son who abstains from the paternal inheritance—namely, that, even if the father’s goods are sold, no action is granted against him, although later an inheritance has befallen him, and he does not make this over to the creditors—is not to be observed in the substituted son-heir, since consideration is shown to the son’s modesty, so that the father’s goods rather than his should be sold; and thus, as to that which later befalls him, an action is denied to the creditors, because it was acquired adventitiously and did not come to him through his father. But when the substitute has entered upon the son’s inheritance, after the ward has commingled himself with the paternal inheritance, then the inheritance of both father and son is one, and for every debt (aes alienum), whether it was the father’s or the son’s, the heir is bound even unwillingly; and just as it is not within his power, as to the obligation, to prevent his own goods from being sold if the estate is not defended, so neither will he be able to separate the debts of father and son: in which case it will result that an action ought to be given against him to the creditors. But if the substituted heir has not entered upon the inheritance, an action ought not to be given to the father’s creditors with respect to what the ward left, since neither ought the ward’s goods to be sold on account of the father’s debt, nor is that which the ward acquired among the father’s goods.
Fufidius refert statuas in publico positas bonis distractis eius, cuius in honorem positae sunt, non esse emptoris bonorum eius, sed aut publicas, si ornandi municipii causa positae sint, aut eius, cuius in honorem positae sint: et nullo modo eas detrahi posse.
Fufidius reports that statues set up in a public place, when the goods of the person in whose honor they were set up are sold off, do not belong to the purchaser of his goods, but are either public, if they were set up for the sake of adorning the municipality, or belong to the person in whose honor they were set up; and that in no way can they be removed.
Si creditores heredem suspectum putent, satisdationem exigere possunt pro suo debito reddendo. cuius rei gratia cognoscere praetorem oportet nec statim eum satisdationis necessitati subicere debet, nisi causa cognita constiterit prospici debere his, qui suspectum eum postulaverunt.
If the creditors should deem the heir suspect, they can exact satisdation (security) for the repayment of their debt. For which matter it is proper for the praetor to take cognizance, nor ought he immediately subject him to the necessity of satisdation, unless, the case having been examined, it has been established that provision ought to be made for those who have petitioned declaring him suspect.
Plane in recenti aditae hereditatis audiendi erunt, qui suspectum postulant: ceterum si probentur passi eum in hereditate morari nec quicquam possint obicere criminis quasi dolose versato eo, non debebit post multum temporis ad hanc necessitatem compelli.
Clearly, in the case of a recently accepted inheritance, those who petition to have him declared suspect are to be heard; but if they are shown to have allowed him to remain in the inheritance and can allege nothing of crime, as though he had conducted himself fraudulently, he ought not, after much time, to be compelled to this necessity.
Defendere debitorem sicut ante, quam bona eius possiderentur, licet, ita post bonorum quoque possessionem eius, sive ipse sui, sive alius defensionem eius suscipiat, debet satisdare, ut satisdatione interposita iudicium accipiatur et a possessione discedatur.
To defend a debtor, just as before his goods were taken into possession, is permitted; so also after the possession of his goods, whether he himself or another undertakes his defense, he must give surety, so that, with surety interposed, the proceeding may be received and there may be a withdrawal from the possession.
Eum, qui in possessionem missus sit eius, qui rei publicae causa afuit, si apparuerit eum dolo malo rei publicae causa abesse, iure in possessione esse placet, donec solidum solvatur: eum autem, qui rerum eius, qui sine dolo malo rei publicae causa afuit, in possessionem missus sit, pignus non contrahere et ideo discedere oportere de possessione.
The one who has been sent into possession of the property of him who was absent for the sake of the republic: if it shall appear that he is absent for the sake of the republic by malicious fraud, it is held that he is lawfully in possession until the whole is paid; but the one who has been sent into possession of the goods of him who was absent for the sake of the republic without malicious fraud does not contract a pledge, and therefore ought to depart from the possession.
Eum, qui circa columnas se occultet, ut creditorem evitet, latitare placet: nam et eum, qui recedit, hoc est qui supterfugit, ne secum aliqua actio moveatur, latitare placet: tam et qui urbe profugit, utique fraudandi causa: nec enim interest, quod attinet ad latitandum, utrum quis profugerit an vero romae agens copiam sui non facit.
He who hides himself around the columns, to evade a creditor, is held to be lurking; for also he who withdraws— that is, who slips away— lest any action be moved against him, is held to be lurking; so too he who flees from the city, assuredly for the purpose of defrauding: for it makes no difference, so far as lurking is concerned, whether one has fled, or indeed, while living at Rome, does not make himself available.
Solet autem separatio permitti creditoribus ex his causis: ut puta debitorem quis seium habuit: hic decessit: heres ei extitit titius: hic non est solvendo: patitur bonorum venditionem: creditores seii dicunt bona seii sufficere sibi, creditores titii contentos esse debere bonis titii et sic quasi duorum fieri bonorum venditionem. fieri enim potest, ut seius quidem solvendo fuerit potueritque satis creditoribus suis vel ita semel, etsi non in assem, in aliquid tamen satisfacere, admissis autem commixtisque creditoribus titii minus sint consecuturi, quia ille non est solvendo aut minus consequantur, quia plures sunt hic. est igitur aequissimum creditores seii desiderantes separationem audiri impetrareque a praetore, ut separatim quantum cuiusque creditoribus praestetur.
However, separation is wont to be permitted to creditors on these grounds: for example, someone had seius as a debtor; he died; titius emerged as his heir; this man is not solvent and undergoes a sale of goods; the creditors of seius say that the goods of seius suffice for them, and that the creditors of titius ought to be content with the goods of titius—and thus, as it were, there is a sale of the goods of two persons. For it can happen that seius was indeed solvent and could satisfy his creditors, at least thus—even if not to the as, yet to satisfy them in some part—whereas, if the creditors of titius are admitted and mingled, they would obtain less, because he is not solvent, or they obtain less because there are more here. It is therefore most equitable that the creditors of seius, desiring separation, be heard and obtain from the praetor that, separately, as much be rendered to the creditors of each as is due.
Ex contrario autem creditores titii non impetrabunt separationem: nam licet alicui adiciendo sibi creditorem creditoris sui facere deteriorem condicionem. atqui igitur adiit hereditatem debitoris mei, non faciet meam deteriorem condicionem adeundo, quia licet mihi separationem impetrare, suos vero creditores oneravit, dum adiit hereditatem quae solvendo non est, nec poterunt creditores eius separationem impetrare.
On the contrary, however, Titius’s creditors will not obtain separation: for it is permitted for someone, by adding to himself the creditor of his creditor, to make his condition worse. But then, he has accepted the inheritance of my debtor; he will not make my condition worse by accepting it, because I am allowed to obtain separation, whereas he has burdened his own creditors, since he accepted an inheritance which is not solvent, and his creditors will not be able to obtain separation.
Sciendum est autem, etiamsi obligata res esse proponatur ab herede iure pignoris vel hypothecae, attamen, si hereditaria fuit, iure separationis hypothecario creditori potiorem esse eum, qui separationem impetravit: et ita severus et antoninus rescripserunt.
It should be known, moreover, that even if it is alleged that a thing has been obligated by the heir by right of pledge or hypothec, nevertheless, if it was hereditary, by the right of separation he who has obtained separation is superior to the hypothecary creditor; and thus Severus and Antoninus rescripted.
Quaesitum est, an interdum etiam heredis creditores possunt separationem impetrare, si forte ille in fraudem ipsorum adierit hereditatem. sed nullum remedium est proditum: sibi enim imputent, qui cum tali contraxerunt: nisi si extra ordinem putamus praetorem adversus calliditatem eius subvenire, qui talem fraudem commentus est: quod non facile admissum est.
It has been asked whether sometimes even the creditors of the heir can obtain separation, if perchance he has entered upon the inheritance in fraud of them. But no remedy has been set forth: let them impute it to themselves, who contracted with such a man; unless we think that, outside the ordinary course, the praetor should come to the aid against the cleverness of him who contrived such a fraud—which is not readily admitted.
Sed si quis suspectam hereditatem dicens compulsus fuerit adire et restituere hereditatem, deinde non sit cui restituat, ex quibus casibus solet hoc evenire. et ipsi quidem desideranti succurri sibi adversus creditores hereditarios subveniemus: hoc et divus pius rescripsit, ut perinde testatoris bona venirent, atque si adita hereditas non fuisset, creditoribus quoque huiusmodi heredis desiderantibus hoc idem praestandum puto, licet ipse non desideravit, ut quasi separatio quaedam praestetur.
But if someone, alleging that the inheritance is suspect, has been compelled to enter upon and to restore the inheritance, and then there is no one to whom he may restore it—as is wont to occur in certain cases—then indeed, if he himself desires to be succored against the hereditary creditors, we will come to his aid: and the deified Pius also wrote in a rescript that the goods of the testator should be sold just as if the inheritance had not been entered upon; and I think that the same is to be afforded to the creditors of such an heir, if they desire it, although he himself did not desire it, so that, as it were, a certain separation be provided.
Item videamus, si quis heres parenti extiterit, cum esset impubes, deinde intra pubertatem decesserit et substituti bona veneant, qui impuberis hereditatem adiit, an patris creditores possint separationem impetrare. et puto posse: hoc amplius puto etiam impuberis creditores posse separationem adversus creditores heredis eius impetrare.
Likewise, let us see: if someone has appeared as heir to his parent while he was impubes, then has died before puberty, and the goods of the substitute—who entered upon the inheritance of the impubes—are being sold, whether the father’s creditors can obtain a separation. And I think they can: furthermore I think that even the creditors of the impubes can obtain a separation against the creditors of his heir.
Secundum haec videamus, si primus secundum heredem scripserit, secundus tertium et tertii bona veneant, qui creditores possint separationem impetrare. et putem, si quidem primi creditores petant, utique audiendos et adversus secundi et adversus tertii creditores: si vero secundi creditores petant, adversus tertii utique eos impetrare posse, adversus primi autem non posse. in summa primi quidem creditores adversus omnes impetrare possunt separationem, secundi creditores adversus primi non possunt, adversus tertii possunt.
According to these things, let us see: if the first has appointed the second as heir, the second a third, and the goods of the third are sold, which creditors can obtain separation. And I think that, if indeed the creditors of the first petition, they must certainly be heard both against the creditors of the second and against those of the third; but if the creditors of the second petition, they can certainly obtain it against those of the third, but not against those of the first. In sum, the creditors of the first can obtain separation against all; the creditors of the second cannot against those of the first, but can against those of the third.
Si filii familias bona veneant, qui castrense peculium habet, an separatio fiat inter castrenses creditores ceterosque, videamus. simul ergo admittentur, dummodo, si qui cum eo contraxerunt, antequam militaret, fortasse debeant separari: quod puto probandum. ergo qui ante contraxerunt, si bona castrensia distrahantur, non possunt venire cum castrensibus creditoribus.
If the goods of a filius familias are put up for sale, and he has a castrense peculium, let us see whether a separation should be made between the castrense creditors and the others. They will accordingly be admitted together, provided, however, that those who contracted with him before he became a soldier perhaps ought to be separated: which I think should be approved. Therefore those who contracted earlier, if the castrense goods are sold, cannot come in with the castrense creditors.
Illud sciendum est eos demum creditores posse impetrare separationem, qui non novandi animo ab herede stipulati sunt. ceterum si eum hoc animo secuti sunt, amiserunt separationis commodum ( quippe cum secuti sunt nomen heredis) nec possunt iam se ab eo separare, qui quodammodo eum elegerunt. sed et si usuras ab eo ea mente quasi eum eligendo exegerunt, idem erit probandum.
It must be known that only those creditors can obtain separation who have not stipulated from the heir with an intention of novation. But if they have followed him with this intention, they have lost the benefit of separation ( since they have followed the heir’s name) and they can no longer separate themselves from him, whom in a certain way they have chosen. But even if they have exacted interest from him with that mindset, as though choosing him, the same is to be held.
Praeterea sciendum est, posteaquam bona hereditaria bonis heredis mixta sunt, non posse impetrari separationem: confusis enim bonis et unitis separatio impetrari non poterit. quid ergo si praedia extent vel mancipia vel pecora, vel aliud quod separari potest? hic utique poterit impetrari separatio nec ferendus est, qui causatur bona contributa, cum praedia contribui non possint, nisi ita coniunctae possessiones et permixtae propriis, ut impossibilem separationem effecerint: quod quidem perraro contingere potest.
Moreover it must be known that, after the hereditary goods have been mixed with the goods of the heir, separation cannot be obtained: for when the goods have been confounded and made one, separation cannot be obtained. What then if there are estates extant, or slaves, or herds, or some other thing that can be separated? Here, to be sure, separation can be obtained, nor is he to be tolerated who alleges that the goods have been contributed, since estates cannot be contributed, unless the holdings are so conjoined and so intermixed with his own as to have made separation impossible: which indeed can very rarely happen.
Quaesitum est, si forte sint plures creditores, quidam secuti heredem, quidam non secuti, et hi, qui heredem secuti non sunt, impetraverint separationem, an eos secum admittant, qui secuti sunt. et putem nihil eis prodesse: hos enim cum creditoribus heredis numerandos.
It has been asked, if by chance there are several creditors, some having followed the heir, some not having followed, and those who did not follow the heir have obtained separation, whether they should admit along with themselves those who did follow. And I think it benefits them nothing: for these are to be numbered with the creditors of the heir.
Item sciendum est vulgo placere creditores quidem heredis, si quid superfuerit ex bonis testatoris, posse habere in suum debitum, creditores vero testatoris ex bonis heredis nihil. cuius rei ratio illa est, quod qui impetravit separationem, sibi debet imputare suam facilitatem, si, cum essent bona idonea heredis, illi maluerint bona potius defuncti sibi separari, heredis autem creditoribus hoc imputari non possit. at si creditores defuncti desiderent, ut etiam in bonis heredis substituantur, non sunt audiendi: separatio enim, quam ipsi petierunt, eos ab istis bonis separavit.
Likewise it should be known that it is the common view that the creditors of the heir, if anything has remained over from the goods of the testator, can have it for their own debt, but the creditors of the testator can have nothing from the goods of the heir. The rationale of this is the following: he who has obtained a separation ought to impute to himself his own facility, if, when the goods of the heir were adequate, they preferred rather that the goods of the deceased be separated for themselves; but this cannot be imputed to the creditors of the heir. But if the creditors of the deceased desire that they also be substituted into the goods of the heir, they are not to be heard: for the separation, which they themselves requested, separated them from those goods.
Item sciendum est necessarium heredem servum cum libertate institutum impetrare posse separationem, scilicet ut, si non attigerit bona patroni, in ea causa sit, ut ei quidquid postea adquisierit separetur: sed et si quid ei a testatore debetur.
Likewise it must be known that a necessary heir—a slave instituted together with liberty—can obtain a separation, namely that, if he has not touched the goods of the patron, he is in such a position that whatever he afterwards acquires is separated for him; and likewise if anything is owed to him by the testator.
Debitor fideiussori heres extitit eiusque bona venierunt: quamvis obligatio fideiussionis extincta sit, nihilo minus separatio impetrabitur petente eo, cui fideiussor fuerat obligatus, sive solus sit hereditarius creditor sive plures. neque enim ratio iuris, quae causam fideiussionis propter principalem obligationem, quae maior fuit, exclusit, damno debet adficere creditorem, qui sibi diligenter prospexerat.
The debtor has become heir to the surety, and his goods have been sold: although the obligation of suretyship has been extinguished, nonetheless separation will be obtained at the request of the one to whom the surety had been obligated, whether he be the sole hereditary creditor or there be several. For the legal rationale, which excluded the ground of suretyship because of the principal obligation—which was the greater—ought not to affect with loss the creditor who had diligently looked out for himself.
Quid ergo, si bonis fideiussoris separatis solidum ex hereditate stipulator consequi non possit? utrum portio cum ceteris heredis creditoribus ei quaerenda erit an contentus esse debebit bonis, quae separari maluit? sed cum stipulator iste non adita fideiussoris a reo hereditate bonis fideiussoris venditis in residuum pro misceri debitoris creditoribus potuerit, ratio non patitur eum in proposito summoveri.
What then, if, with the goods of the surety separated, the stipulator cannot obtain the whole from the inheritance? Must he seek a portion along with the other creditors of the heir, or ought he to be content with the goods which he preferred to have separated? But since this stipulator, the inheritance of the surety not having been entered upon by the defendant, after the goods of the surety have been sold, could, for the residue, be mixed in with the creditors of the debtor, reason does not allow him to be removed from the position proposed.
Sed in quolibet alio creditore, qui separationem impetravit, probari commodius est, ut, si solidum ex hereditate servari non possit, ita demum aliquid ex bonis heredis ferat, si proprii creditores heredis fuerint dimissi. quod sine dubio admittendum est circa creditores heredis dimissis hereditariis.
But in the case of any other creditor who has obtained separation, it is more convenient to approve that, if the whole (solidum) cannot be preserved from the inheritance, only then should he take something from the heir’s goods, if the heir’s own creditors have been dismissed. Which, without doubt, is to be admitted with respect to the heir’s creditors, the hereditary creditors having been dismissed.
Si creditores hereditarii separationem bonorum impetraverunt et inveniatur non idonea hereditas, heres autem idoneus: non poterunt reverti ad heredem, sed eo, quod semel postulaverunt, stare debent. sed si post impetratam separationem aliquid heres adquisierit, si quidem ex hereditate, admitti debebunt ad id quod adquisitum est illi qui separationem impetraverunt: sed si illis satisfactum fuerit, quod superest tribuetur propriis heredis creditoribus. at si ex alia causa heres adquisierit, non admittentur hereditarii creditores.
If the hereditary creditors have obtained a separation of the goods and the inheritance is found not adequate, but the heir is adequate/solvent: they will not be able to revert to the heir, but must stand by that which they once petitioned. But if, after the separation has been obtained, the heir should acquire something, then if it is from the inheritance, those who obtained the separation must be admitted to that which has been acquired; but if those have been satisfied, what remains will be assigned to the heir’s own creditors. But if the heir has acquired from another cause, the hereditary creditors will not be admitted.
But if the heir’s own (proprietary) creditors have come to the whole (been satisfied in full), some think that what remains ought to be assigned to the hereditary creditors; but this does not seem so to me: for when they sought separation, they withdrew from the person of the heir and followed the goods, and, as it were, sold the deceased’s goods, which cannot receive augmentations. And I think the same must be said even if, in the matter of the separation of goods, they were deceived and obtained less than the heir’s own creditors. But the heir’s own creditors have his own goods and his person, which can acquire so long as he lives.
Quotiens heredis bona solvendo non sunt, non solum creditores testatoris, sed etiam eos, quibus legatum fuerit, impetrare bonorum separationem aequum est, ita ut, cum in creditoribus solidum adquisitum fuerit, legatariis vel solidum vel portio quaeratur.
Whenever the heir’s goods are not solvent for payment, it is equitable that not only the testator’s creditors, but also those to whom a legacy has been left, obtain a separation of goods, such that, when as regards the creditors the full amount has been secured, for the legatees either the whole or a portion is sought.
Si liberta heres instituta bonorum possessionem secundum tabulas petisset eius, qui solvendo non erat, quaesitum est, an bona eius separari ab hereditariis debent. respondit: non est iniquum succurri patrono, ne oneraretur aere alieno, quod liberta petendo bonorum possessionem secundum tabulas contraxerit.
If a freedwoman, instituted as heir, had sought possession of the goods according to the tablets of one who was not solvent, it was asked whether her goods ought to be separated from the hereditary goods. He replied: it is not inequitable to give succor to the patron, lest he be burdened with another’s debt, which the freedwoman, by seeking possession of the goods according to the tablets, has contracted.
Quaeque per eum eosve, qui ita creatus creative essent, acta facta gestaque sunt, rata habebuntur: eisque actiones et in eos utiles competunt: et si quem curatores mitterent ad agendum vel defendendum, uti ius esset: nec ab eo satis, neque de rato neque iudicatum solvi, nomine eius cuius bona veneant exigetur, sed nomine ipsius curatoris qui eum misit.
And whatever things were done, made, and transacted through him or through those who had been so created as curators, shall be held ratified; and actions will be competent to them, and against them useful actions will lie; and if the curators should send anyone to prosecute or to defend, as the law permits, neither from him will surety be exacted, either for ratification or for payment of the judgment, in the name of the one whose goods are being sold, but in the name of the curator himself who sent him.
Quaeritur, an invitus curator fieri potest: et cassius scribit neminem invitum cogendum fieri bonorum curatorem, quod verius est. voluntarius itaque quaerendus est, nisi et magna necessitate et imperatoris arbitrio hoc procedat, ut et invitus crearetur.
It is asked whether a curator can be made against his will; and Cassius writes that no one unwilling should be compelled to become a curator of goods, which is the truer view. Therefore a volunteer is to be sought, unless both by great necessity and by the emperor’s judgment this proceeds, so that even an unwilling man would be appointed.
Si tres curatores fuerint et unus ex his nihil attigerit, an in eum, qui nihil tetigit, actio danda est? et cassius existimat modum actori non debere constitui posseque eum cum quo vult experiri. puto cassii sententiam veriorem: spectandum enim, quid redactum est, non quid ad curatorem unum pervenerit, et ita utimur, nisi invitus factus est: nam si ita est, dicendum non eum conveniendum.
If there have been three curators and one of them has touched nothing, is an action to be granted against the one who touched nothing? and cassius thinks that no limit ought to be set for the plaintiff and that he can proceed against whom he wishes. I think the opinion of cassius more true: for one must look to what has been brought in, not to what has come to a single curator; and we so practice, unless he was appointed unwillingly: for if that is so, it must be said that he is not to be proceeded against.
Si debitor foro cesserit et creditores privato consilio coierint et elegerint unum, per quem bona distrahantur et portio ipsis, quae ex redacto fieret, solveretur, mox exstiterit alius, qui se creditorem dicat: nullam quidem actionem adversus curatorem habebit, sed bona debitoris una cum curatore vendere poterit, ita ut, quae a curatore et a creditore ex bonis contrahantur, omnibus pro portione praestarentur.
If the debtor has withdrawn from the forum and the creditors have come together by private counsel and have chosen one, through whom the goods are to be sold off and the portion for them, which would arise from the proceeds, be paid, and soon thereafter another should appear who says that he is a creditor: he will indeed have no action against the curator, but he will be able to sell the debtor’s goods together with the curator, so that what is realized from the goods by the curator and by the creditor shall be furnished to all in proportion.
Ait praetor: " quae fraudationis causa gesta erunt cum eo, qui fraudem non ignoraverit, de his curatori bonorum vel ei, cui de ea re actionem dare oportebit, intra annum, quo experiundi potestas fuerit, actionem dabo. idque etiam adversus ipsum, qui fraudem fecit, servabo".
The praetor says: "Whatever shall have been transacted for the purpose of fraud with one who was not ignorant of the fraud, concerning these things I will grant an action to the curator of the goods, or to him to whom it will be proper to grant an action in that matter, within a year from the time when the power of bringing suit shall have existed. And I will observe this also against the very person who committed the fraud".
Ait ergo praetor " quae fraudationis causa gesta erunt". haec verba generalia sunt et continent in se omnem omnino in fraudem factam vel alienationem vel quemcumque contractum. quodcumque igitur fraudis causa factum est, videtur his verbis revocari, qualecumque fuerit: nam late ista verba patent. sive ergo rem alienavit sive acceptilatione vel pacto aliquem liberavit,
The praetor therefore says " which shall have been done for the purpose of defrauding". These words are general and contain within themselves absolutely every alienation or whatever contract made in fraud. Accordingly, whatever has been done for the purpose of fraud is considered to be revoked by these words, whatever it may have been: for those words extend broadly. Whether therefore he alienated a thing or released someone by acceptilation or by a pact,
Gesta fraudationis causa accipere debemus non solum ea, quae contrahens gesserit aliquis, verum etiam si forte data opera ad iudicium non adfuit vel litem mori patiatur vel a debitore non petit, ut tempore liberetur, aut usum fructum vel servitutem amittit.
We ought to accept as acts done for the sake of fraud not only those which someone contracting has transacted, but also if perhaps, with set purpose, he did not appear at judgment, or allows the lawsuit to die, or does not demand from the debtor, so that by lapse of time he is released, or he loses a usufruct or a servitude.
Si servum suum heredem institutum alienavit, ut iussu emptoris adeat, si quidem in venditione nulla fraus est, sed in hereditate sit, cessat edictum, quia licuit ei etiam repudiare hereditatem: at si in ipsa servi alienatione fraus est, revocabitur, quemadmodum si eum in fraudem manumisisset.
If someone alienated his slave who had been instituted as heir, in order that at the buyer’s order he might enter upon the inheritance, then, if indeed there is no fraud in the sale but there is in the inheritance, the edict ceases, because it was permitted to him even to repudiate the inheritance; but if there is fraud in the very alienation of the slave, it will be revoked, just as if he had manumitted him in fraud.
Apud labeonem scriptum est eum, qui suum recipiat, nullam videri fraudem facere, hoc est eum, qui quod sibi debetur receperat: eum enim, quem praeses invitum solvere cogat, impune non solvere iniquum esse: totum enim hoc edictum ad contractus pertinere, in quibus se praetor non interponit, ut puta pignora venditionesque.
In Labeo it is written that he who recovers what is his own is seen to commit no fraud, that is, one who has received what is owed to him; for it is inequitable that a person whom the governor compels, though unwilling, to make payment should go unpunished for not paying; for this whole edict pertains to contracts in which the praetor does not interpose himself, for example pledges and sales.
Sciendum iulianum scribere eoque iure nos uti, ut, qui debitam pecuniam recepit ante, quam bona debitoris possideantur, quamvis sciens prudensque solvendo non esse recipiat, non timere hoc edictum: sibi enim vigilavit. qui vero post bona possessa debitum suum recepit, hunc in portionem vocandum exaequandumque ceteris creditoribus: neque enim debuit praeripere ceteris post bona possessa, cum iam par condicio omnium creditorum facta esset.
It must be known that Julian writes, and that we make use of this law: that he who has received the money owed before the debtor’s goods are taken into possession, even though, knowing and fully aware that the debtor is not solvent, he receives it, need not fear this edict; for he has kept watch for himself. But he who, after the goods have been taken into possession, has received his debt—this man is to be called into the sharing and equalized with the other creditors; for he ought not to have preempted the others after the goods were possessed, since by then an equal condition of all the creditors had been established.
Si quid cum pupillo gestum sit in fraudem creditorum, labeo ait omnimodo revocandum, si fraudati sint creditores, quia pupilli ignorantia, quae per aetatem contingit, non debet esse captiosa creditoribus et ipsi lucrosa: eoque iure utimur.
If anything has been transacted with a ward in fraud of creditors, Labeo says it must by all means be revoked, if the creditors have been defrauded, because the ward’s ignorance, which occurs by reason of age, ought not to be deceptive to the creditors and lucrative to himself: and we use this rule of law.
Simili modo dicimus et si cui donatum est, non esse quaerendum, an sciente eo, cui donatum, gestum sit, sed hoc tantum, an fraudentur creditores: nec videtur iniuria adfici is qui ignoravit, cum lucrum extorqueatur, non damnum infligatur. in hos tamen, qui ignorantes ab eo qui solvendo non sit liberalitatem acceperunt, hactenus actio erit danda, quatenus locupletiores facti sunt, ultra non.
In a similar manner we say also that, if something has been donated to someone, it is not to be inquired whether it was done with the knowledge of him to whom it was donated, but only this: whether the creditors are defrauded; nor does he who was ignorant seem to be affected with injury, since a gain is being wrested, not a loss inflicted. Against those, however, who, being unaware, received a liberality from one who is not solvent, an action will be granted only to this extent, insofar as they have been made more wealthy (enriched), not beyond.
Simili modo quaeritur, si servus ab eo, qui solvendo non sit, ignorante domino ipse sciens rem acceperit, an dominus teneretur. et ait labeo hactenus eum teneri, ut restituat quod ad se pervenit aut dumtaxat de peculio damnetur vel si quid in rem eius versum est. eadem in filio familias probanda sunt.
In a similar manner it is inquired whether, if a slave, from someone who is not solvent, the master being ignorant, he himself knowing, has received a thing, the master would be held. And Labeo says that he is held thus far: that he restitute what has come to him, or at any rate be condemned de peculio, or insofar as anything has been converted into his property. The same is to be approved in the case of a filius familias.
Si debitor in fraudem creditorum minore pretio fundum scienti emptori vendiderit, deinde hi, quibus de revocando eo actio datur, eum petant, quaesitum est, an pretium restituere debent. proculus existimat omnimodo restituendum esse fundum, etiamsi pretium non solvatur: et rescriptum est secundum proculi sententiam.
If a debtor, in fraud of his creditors, has sold an estate at a lower price to a buyer who knew, and then those to whom an action is granted for revoking it claim it, the question has been raised whether they must restore the price. Proculus considers that the estate must in any case be restored, even if the price is not paid; and a rescript has been issued in accordance with Proculus’s opinion.
Ex his colligi potest ne quidem portionem emptori reddendam ex pretio: posse tamen dici eam rem apud arbitrum ex causa animadvertendam, ut, si nummi soluti in bonis exstent, iubeat eos reddi, quia ea ratione nemo fraudetur.
From these things it can be gathered that not even a portion is to be returned to the purchaser out of the price; nevertheless it can be said that the matter is to be taken into consideration by the arbiter on due grounds, so that, if the coins paid are extant among the assets, he may order them to be restored, because in that way no one is defrauded.
Is, qui a debitore, cuius bona possessa sunt, sciens rem emit, iterum alii bona fide ementi vendidit: quaesitum est, an secundus emptor conveniri potest. sed verior est sabini sententia bona fide emptorem non teneri, quia dolus ei dumtaxat nocere debeat, qui eum admisit, quemadmodum diximus non teneri eum, si ab ipso debitore ignorans emerit: is autem, qui dolo malo emit, bona fide autem ementi vendidit, in solidum pretium rei, quod accepit, tenebitur.
He who, from a debtor whose goods have been possessed, knowingly bought a thing, and then sold it again to another buying bona fide: the question was asked whether the second buyer can be sued. But the opinion of Sabinus is truer, that the bona fide buyer is not held, because dolus ought to harm only him who admitted it, just as we have said that he is not held if he bought from the debtor himself in ignorance: but he who bought with dolus malus, and sold to one buying bona fide, will be held in solidum for the price of the thing which he received.
Ait praetor: " quae lucius titius fraudandi causa sciente te in bonis, quibus de ea re agitur, fecit: ea illis, si eo nomine, quo de agitur, actio ei ex edicto meo competere esseve oportet, ei, si non plus quam annus est, cum de ea re, qua de agitur, experiundi potestas est, restituas. interdum causa cognita et si scientia non sit, in factum actionem permittam".
The praetor says: "What Lucius Titius, for the sake of defrauding, with you being aware, did among the goods about which the matter is being litigated: those things you shall restore to them, if, under the very head under which the matter is in question, an action by my edict does or ought to be competent to him; to him you shall restore, if not more than a year has elapsed from the time when there is the power to bring suit concerning the matter in question. Sometimes, the case having been inquired into, even if there is no knowledge, I will permit an action in factum".
Ita demum revocatur, quod fraudandorum creditorum causa factum est, si eventum fraus habuit, scilicet si hi creditores, quorum fraudandorum causa fecit, bona ipsius vendiderunt. ceterum si illos dimisit, quorum fraudandorum causa fecit, et alios sortitus est, si quidem simpliciter dimissis prioribus, quos fraudare voluit, alios postea sortitus est, cessat revocatio: si autem horum pecunia, quos fraudare noluit, priores dimisit, quos fraudare voluit, Marcellus dicit revocationi locum fore. secundum hanc distinctionem et ab imperatore severo et antonino rescriptum est eoque iure utimur.
Only then is that which was done for the purpose of defrauding creditors recalled, if the fraud had an outcome, namely if those creditors, for whose defrauding he acted, sold his goods. moreover, if he dismissed those for whose defrauding he acted and incurred others, then if, the former creditors whom he wished to defraud having been simply discharged, he afterward incurred others, revocation ceases; but if with the money of those whom he did not wish to defraud he dismissed the earlier ones whom he wished to defraud, Marcellus says there is room for revocation. according to this distinction also a rescript was issued by the emperor Severus and Antoninus, and by this law we make use.
Si quis particeps quidem fraudis non fuit, verumtamen vendente debitore testato conventus est a creditoribus, ne emeret, an in factum actione teneatur, si comparaverit? et magis est, ut teneri debeat: non enim caret fraude, qui conventus testato perseverat.
If someone was not indeed a participant in the fraud, nevertheless, while the debtor was selling in an attested (witnessed) manner, he was warned by the creditors not to buy—whether he is held by an actio in factum if he has purchased? And the sounder view is that he ought to be liable: for he is not without fraud who, having been admonished with witnesses, persists.
Ait praetor " sciente te", id est eo, qui convenietur hac actione. quid ergo, si forte tutor pupilli scit, ipse pupillus ignoravit? videamus, an actioni locus sit, ut scientia tutoris noceat: idem et in curatore furiosi et adulescentis.
The praetor says " sciente te", that is, with him who will be convened by this action. What then, if perchance the tutor of the pupil knows, but the pupil himself was ignorant? Let us see whether there is room for the action, so that the knowledge of the tutor may be injurious: the same in the curator of the insane and of the adolescent.
Praeterea sciendum est posse quaeri, quod dicitur in fraudem creditorum alienatum revocari posse, si idem sint creditores: et si unus creditor sit ex illis, qui fraudati sunt, sive solus tunc fuit sive, cum ceteris satisfactum est, hic solus remansit, probandum esse adhuc actioni fore locum.
Furthermore, it must be known that it can be inquired whether what is said to have been alienated in fraud of creditors can be revoked, if the creditors are the same: and if one creditor is among those who were defrauded—whether he was the only one at the time, or, when satisfaction has been made to the others, this one alone remained—it must be proved that there will still be room for the action.
Quid ergo, si ei, quem quis scit, satisfactum est? numquid deficiat actio, quia qui supersunt, non sunt fraudati? et hoc puto probandum: non tamen si dicat aliquis: " offero, quod debetur ei, quem scio creditorem", audiendus erit, ut actionem eludat.
What then, if satisfaction has been made to him whom one knows? Does the action perhaps fail, because those who remain have not been defrauded? And this I think ought to be approved; yet not so that, if someone says: "I offer what is owed to him whom I know to be a creditor," he should be heard, in order to evade the action.
Si quid in fraudem creditorum fecerit filius, qui se poterat abstinere, et in integrum sit restitutus, quod se miscuerat, vel si quis fecit voluntarius etiam vel per aetatem vel quam aliam causam iustam in integrum meruit restitutionem, dicendum erit utilem actionem competere. idem et in servo necessario. sane cum illa distinctione hoc admittendum esse labeo scribit, ut, si quidem protinus bona vendiderunt creditores vel absentibus vel paciscentibus creditoribus se necessarius miscuit, utriusque fraus revocetur, id est testatoris et ipsius: si vero passi sunt necessarium creditores et quasi in creditum habuerunt nomen eius vel dulcitudine usurarum vel qua alia ratione secuti sunt, dicendum est nihil revocari ex his, quae testator alienavit.
If a son, who could have abstained, has done anything in fraud of the creditors and has been restored in full (in integrum) as to the fact that he had involved himself, or if anyone who acted voluntarily has, whether by reason of age or by some other just cause, merited restoration in full (in integrum), it must be said that a useful action will lie. The same applies also in the case of a slave who is a necessary heir. Indeed Labeo writes that this is to be admitted with the following distinction: namely, if the creditors at once sold the goods, or the necessary heir involved himself while the creditors were absent or making terms, the fraud of both is to be revoked, that is, of the testator and of the heir himself; but if the creditors tolerated the necessary heir and, as it were, held his name on credit—being led on by the sweetness of interest or by some other consideration—it is to be said that nothing is revoked of those things which the testator alienated.
Si, cum mulier fraudandorum creditorum consilium inisset, marito suo eidemque debitori in fraudem creditorum acceptum debitum fecerit dotis constituendae causa, locum habet haec actio et per hanc omnis pecunia, quam maritus debuerat, exigitur nec mulier de dote habet actionem: neque enim dos in fraudem creditorum constituenda est: et hoc certo certius est et saepissime constitutum. exitus autem actionis erit, ut stipulatio, quae accepta facta fuerat, ex integro interponatur.
If, when a woman had entered upon a plan of defrauding creditors, she, for the sake of establishing a dowry, made a debt that was owed by her husband, who was himself the same debtor, “accepted” in fraud of the creditors, this action lies, and by it all the money which the husband had owed is exacted, nor does the woman have an action concerning the dowry: for a dowry is not to be constituted in fraud of creditors; and this is more than certain and has been most frequently established. The outcome of the action will be that the stipulation, which had been made “accepted,” is re‑interposed afresh in its entirety.
Si debitorem meum et complurium creditorum consecutus essem fugientem secum ferentem pecuniam et abstulissem ei id quod mihi debeatur, placet iuliani sententia dicentis multum interesse, antequam in possessionem bonorum eius creditores mittantur, hoc factum sit an postea: si ante, cessare in factum actionem, si postea, huic locum fore.
If I had overtaken my debtor—and the debtor of several creditors—fleeing and carrying money with him, and had taken from him that which is owed to me, Julian’s opinion is approved, stating that it makes a great difference whether this was done before the creditors are sent into possession of his goods, or afterward: if before, the action in factum ceases; if afterward, there will be room for this action.
Et fructus, non tantum qui percepti sunt, verum etiam hi, qui percipi potuerunt a fraudatore, veniunt, sed cum aliquo modo, scilicet ut sumptus facti deducantur: nam arbitrio iudicis non prius cogendus est rem restituere, quam si impensas necessarias consequatur: idemque erit probandum et si quis alios sumptus ex voluntate fideiussorum creditorumque fecerit.
And the fruits, not only those that have been perceived, but also those that could have been perceived by the defrauder, accrue, yet with some qualification, namely that the expenses incurred are to be deducted: for, at the discretion of the judge, he is not to be compelled to restore the thing before he obtains reimbursement of the necessary expenses: and the same must be proved also if anyone has made other expenses with the consent of the sureties and the creditors.
Praeterea generaliter sciendum est ex hac actione restitutionem fieri oportere in pristinum statum, sive res fuerunt sive obligationes, ut perinde omnia revocentur, ac si liberatio facta non esset. propter quod etiam medii temporis commodum, quod quis consequeretur liberatione non facta, praestandum erit, dum usurae non praestentur, si in stipulatum deductae non fuerunt, aut si talis contractus fuit, in quo usurae deberi potuerunt etiam non deductae.
Moreover, it is generally to be known that from this action restitution ought to be made into the former state, whether they be things or obligations, so that all are recalled just as if a release had not been effected. on account of which the advantage of the intervening time, which someone would have obtained if release had not been made, must also be furnished, provided that interest is not furnished, if it was not brought into stipulation, or if there was such a contract in which interest could be owed even without being brought into stipulation.
Haec actio post annum de eo, quod ad eum pervenit, adversus quem actio movetur, competit: iniquum enim praetor putavit in lucro morari eum, qui lucrum sensit ex fraude: idcirco lucrum ei extorquendum putavit. sive igitur ipse fraudator sit, ad quem pervenit, sive alius quivis, competit actio in id quod ad eum pervenit dolove malo eius factum est, quo minus perveniret.
This action, after one year, for that which has come to him, lies against the one against whom the action is set in motion: for the praetor judged it inequitable for him to linger in profit, who perceived a profit from fraud; therefore he thought the profit must be extorted from him. Whether, then, the very fraudster is the one to whom it came, or any other whatsoever, an action lies up to that which came to him, or if by his dolus malus it has been brought about that it should not come.
Si pater filio familias liberam peculii administrationem dederit, non videtur ei et hoc concessisse, ut in fraudem creditorum alienaret: talem enim alienationem non habet. at si hoc quoque concessit filio pater, ut vel in fraudem creditorum facere possit, videbitur ipse fecisse et sufficient competentes adversus eum actiones. etenim filii creditores etiam patris sunt creditores, cum eius generis videlicet habebunt actionem, ut his de peculio praestari necesse sit.
If a father has given to a son under paternal power the free administration of the peculium, he is not thereby considered to have granted him also this, that he may alienate in fraud of creditors; for he has no such power of alienation. But if the father has also granted this to the son, that he may even act in fraud of creditors, he will be deemed to have done it himself, and sufficient appropriate actions will lie against him. For the son’s creditors are also the father’s creditors, since they will have an action of that kind, to the effect that payment must be made to them out of the peculium.
Hac in factum actione non solum dominia revocantur, verum etiam actiones restaurantur. ea propter competit haec actio et adversus eos, qui res non possident, ut restituant, et adversus eos, quibus actio competit, ut actione cedant. proinde si interposuerit quis personam titii, ut ei fraudator res tradat, actione mandati cedere debet.
By this action on the facts not only ownerships are recalled, but rights of action also are restored. For that reason this action is available both against those who do not possess the things, that they may restore them, and against those to whom an action lies, that they may cede the action. Accordingly, if someone has interposed the person of Titius, so that the defrauder may deliver the thing to him, he ought to cede by the action of mandate.
Si quis, cum haberet titium creditorem et sciret se solvendo non esse, libertates dederit testamento, deinde dimisso titio postea sempronium creditorem habere coeperit et eodem testamento manente decesserit: libertates datae ratae esse debent, etsi hereditas solvendo non sit, quia, libertates ut rescindantur, utrumque in eorumdem persona exigimus et consilium et eventum et, si quidem creditor, cuius fraudandi consilium initum erat, non fraudatur, adversus eum qui fraudatur consilium initum non est. libertates itaque ratae sunt,
If someone, when he had Titius as creditor and knew that he was not solvent, has given liberties (manumissions) by testament, then, Titius having been discharged, afterward began to have Sempronius as creditor and, with the same testament remaining in force, has died: the liberties given ought to stand, even if the inheritance is not solvent, because, in order that liberties be rescinded, we require both in the same persons the design and the event; and, if indeed the creditor with a view to defrauding whom the design had been initiated is not defrauded, the design is not initiated against him who is defrauded. Therefore the liberties are valid,
Lucius titius cum haberet creditores, libertis suis isdemque filiis naturalibus universas res suas tradidit. respondit: quamvis non proponatur consilium fraudandi habuisse, tamen qui creditores habere se scit et universa bona sua alienavit, intellegendus est fraudandorum creditorum consilium habuisse: ideoque et si filii eius ignoraverunt hanc mentem patris sui fuisse, hac actione tenentur.
Lucius Titius, when he had creditors, handed over all his property to his freedmen, who were the same persons as his natural sons. He responded: although it is not put forward that he had a plan to defraud, nevertheless he who knows that he has creditors and has alienated all his goods is to be understood to have had an intent to defraud his creditors; and therefore, even if his sons were unaware that this was their father’s intention, they are liable under this action.
Si vir uxori, cum creditores suos fraudare vellet, soluto matrimonio praesentem dotem reddidisset, quam statuto tempore reddere debuit, hac actione mulier tantum praestabit, quanti creditorum intererat dotem suo tempore reddi: nam praetor fraudem etiam in tempore fieri intellegit.
If a husband, when he wished to defraud his creditors, upon the dissolution of the marriage returned the dowry forthwith which he ought to have returned at the appointed time, then by this action the woman will be liable only for as much as it was in the creditors’ interest that the dowry be returned at its proper time; for the praetor understands that fraud can also be committed with respect to timing.
Etsi pignus vir uxori vel uxor viro remiserit, verior sententia est nullam fieri donationem existimantium. quod sine dubio, si in fraudem creditorum fiat, actione utili revocabitur. idemque est et si quivis debitor in fraudem creditorum pignus omiserit.
Even if a husband has remitted a pledge to his wife, or a wife to her husband, the truer opinion is that no donation is effected. Which, without doubt, if it is done in fraud of creditors, will be recalled by a useful action; and the same holds if any debtor, in fraud of creditors, has omitted (i.e., waived) a pledge.
Debitor in fraudem creditoris cum vicino de finibus pignori dati fundi pactus est: quaesitum, an is, qui a creditore emit, de finibus agere possit. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur non idcirco minus agere posse, quod debitor ignorante creditore pactus esset.
The debtor, in fraud of the creditor, made a pact with the neighbor about the boundaries of the fundus given in pledge: it was asked whether the one who bought from the creditor could bring an action concerning the boundaries. He responded that, under the matters proposed, he could nonetheless bring the action, not the less because the debtor had made the pact while the creditor was unaware.
Cum in vetus creditum unus creditor pignora accepisset, quaero, an in fraudem ceterorum creditorum factum nullius momenti esset. respondit creditorem non idcirco prohibendum a persecutione pignorum, quod, in vetus creditum ut obligaretur, pactus esset, nisi id in fraudem ceterorum creditorum factum sit et ea via iuris occurratur, qua creditorum fraudes rescindi solent.
Since, for an old debt, a single creditor had received pledges, I ask whether, as done in fraud of the other creditors, it would be of no effect. he answered that the creditor is not for that reason to be prohibited from the enforcement of the pledges, because he had bargained that they be obligated for an old debt, unless that was done in fraud of the other creditors and recourse is had to that path of law by which frauds upon creditors are wont to be rescinded.
Primo gradu scripti heredes cum animadverterent bona defuncti vix ad quartam partem aeris alieni sufficere, famae defuncti conservandae gratia ex consensu creditorum auctoritate praesidis provinciae secundum constitutionem ea condicione adierunt hereditatem, ut creditoribus dumtaxat partem praestarent: quaesitum est, an manumissi testamento et libertates et alimenta consequi possint. respondit libertates quidem, si in fraudem creditorum datae non essent, competere, legata vero, si solvendo hereditas non esset, non deberi.
The instituted heirs of the first rank, when they observed that the goods of the deceased scarcely sufficed for a fourth part of the debt, for the sake of preserving the reputation of the deceased, with the consent of the creditors, by the authority of the governor of the province, according to the constitution, entered upon the inheritance on this condition, that they would furnish only a part to the creditors: it was asked whether those manumitted by the testament could obtain both liberties (manumissions) and maintenance (alimenta). He responded that the liberties, indeed, if they had not been granted in fraud of the creditors, were competent; but that legacies, if the inheritance were not solvent, were not owed.
Pupillus patri heres extitit et uni creditorum solvit: mox abstinuit hereditate paterna: bona patris veneunt: an id quod accepit creditor revocandum sit, ne melioris condicionis sit quam ceteri creditores? an distinguimus, per gratificationem acceperit an non, ut, si per gratificationem tutorum, revocetur ad eandem portionem, quam ceteri creditores fuerint laturi: sin vero iuste exegerit, ceteri creditores neglexerint exactionem, interea res deterior facta sit, vel mortalitate vel subductis rebus mobilibus vel rebus soli ad irritum perductis, id quod acceperit creditor revocari nullo pacto potest, quoniam alii creditores suae neglegentiae expensum ferre debeant. quid ergo, si, cum in eo essent, ut bona debitoris mei venirent, solverit mihi pecuniam, an actione revocari ea possit a me? an distinguendum est, is optulerit mihi an ego illi extorserim invito et ^ ,ut^ si extorserim invito, revocetur, si non extorseim, non revocetur?
A ward became heir to his father and paid one of the creditors; soon he abstained from the paternal inheritance; the father’s goods are sold: is that which the creditor received to be revoked, lest he be in a better condition than the rest of the creditors? Or do we distinguish whether he received it by gratification or not, so that, if by the gratification of the tutors, it is recalled to the same portion which the other creditors were going to bear; but if he has exacted it justly, the other creditors have neglected exaction, and meanwhile the situation has become worse, either by mortality or by the movables having been removed or the things of the soil having been brought to naught, that which the creditor has received can in no way be revoked, since the other creditors ought to bear the cost of their own negligence. What then, if, when they were at the point that my debtor’s goods were going to be sold, he paid me money, can it be revoked from me by an action? Or must we distinguish whether he offered it to me or I extorted it from him unwilling, and ^ ,ut^ if I extorted it from him unwilling, let it be revoked; if I did not extort, let it not be revoked?
Si fraudator fideiussori suo scienti acceptum tulerit, si et reus non ignoraverit, uterque tenebitur, si minus, is qui scierit. si tamen ille, cui acceptum factum est, solvendo non sit, videndum est, an in reum, etiamsi ignoraverit, actio danda sit, quia ex donatione capit. contra si reo scienti acceptum latum sit, fideiussor quoque, si et ipse scierit, tenebitur: si vero ignoraverit, numquid non aeque actio in eum dari debeat, quoniam magis detrimentum non patitur, quam lucrum faciat?
If a defrauder has entered as received (acceptum) in favor of his surety, the surety knowing it, and the principal debtor also was not ignorant, each will be held; otherwise, he who knew. If, however, the one for whom the entry was made is not solvent, it must be considered whether an action should be granted against the principal, even if he was ignorant, because he takes by way of gift. Conversely, if an entry as received has been made for the debtor, he knowing it, the surety also, if he too knew, will be held; but if he was ignorant, is it not the case that an action ought not equally to be given against him, since he rather suffers no detriment than makes a profit?
Si a socero fraudatore sciens gener accepit dotem, tenebitur hac actione et, si restituerit eam, desinit dotem habere: nec quicquam emancipatae divortio facto restituturum labeo ait, quia haec actio rei restituendae gratia, non poenae nomine daretur ideoque absolvi solet reus, si restituerit. sed si priusquam creditores cum eo experirentur, reddiderit filiae dotem iudicio dotis nomine conventus, nihilo minus eum hac actione teneri labeo ait nec ullum regressum habiturum ad mulierem: sin vero sine iudice, videndum, an ulla repetitio competat ei. quod si is ignoraverit, filia autem scierit, tenebitur filia: si vero uterque scierit, uterque tenebitur. at si neuter scierit, quidam existimant nihilo minus in filiam dandam actionem, quia intellegitur quasi ex donatione aliquid ad eam pervenisse, aut certe cavere eam debere, quod consecuta fuerit se restituturam: in maritum autem, qui ignoraverit, non dandam actionem, non magis quam in creditorem, qui a fraudatore quod ei deberetur acceperit, cum is indotatam uxorem ducturus non fuerit.
If a son‑in‑law, knowing, received a dowry from a father‑in‑law who is a defrauder, he will be bound by this action; and if he restores it, he ceases to have the dowry. Nor, says Labeo, will he be going to restore anything to the emancipated woman when divorce has been effected, because this action is given for the sake of restoring the thing, not by way of penalty, and therefore the defendant is wont to be acquitted if he has restored. But if, before the creditors proceeded against him, he returned the dowry to the daughter after being sued in a dowry‑action, Labeo says that nonetheless he is held by this action, nor will he have any recourse back against the woman; but if truly he did so without a judge, it must be seen whether any repetition lies for him. And if he was ignorant, but the daughter knew, the daughter will be held; but if indeed each knew, each will be held. But if neither knew, some think that nonetheless an action should be given against the daughter, because it is understood that something reached her as if by donation, or at least that she ought to give security that what she has obtained she will restore; but against the husband who was ignorant an action is not to be given, any more than against a creditor who received from the defrauder what was owed to him, since he was not about to take a wife without dowry.
Item si extraneus filiae familiae nomine fraudandi causa dotem dederit, tenebitur maritus, si scierit: aeque mulier: nec minus et pater, si non ignoraverit, ita ut caveat, si ad se dos pervenerit, restitui eam.
Likewise, if a stranger, in the name of a daughter-in-power, for the purpose of defrauding, has given a dowry, the husband will be held liable, if he knew: equally the woman: and no less also the father, if he was not unaware, provided that he give security that, if the dowry has come to himself, it be restored.
Non solum autem ipsam rem alienatam restitui oportet, sed et fructus, qui alienationis tempore terrae cohaerent, quia in bonis fraudatoris fuerunt, item eos, qui post inchoatum iudicium recepti sint: medio autem tempore perceptos in restitutionem non venire. item partum ancillae per fraudem alienatae medio tempore editum in restitutionem non venire, quia in bonis non fuerit.
Not only must the alienated thing itself be restored, but also the fruits which at the time of the alienation cohere to the land, because they were in the goods of the defrauder; likewise those which were received after the suit was begun: but those collected in the intermediate time do not come into restitution. Likewise the offspring of a handmaid alienated by fraud, born in the meantime, does not come into restitution, because it was not in the goods.
Fructus autem fundo cohaesisse non satis intellegere se labeo ait, utrum dumtaxat qui maturi an etiam qui inmaturi fuerint, praetor significet: ceterum etiamsi de his senserit, qui maturi fuerint, nihilo magis possessionem restitui oportere. nam cum fundus alienaretur, quod ad eum fructusque eius attineret, unam quandam rem fuisse, id est fundum, cuius omnis generis alienationem fructus sequi: nec eum, qui hiberno habuerit fundum centum, si sub tempus messis vindemiaeve fructus eius vendere possit decem, idcirco duas res, id est fundum centum et fructus decem eum habere intellegendum, sed unam, id est fundum centum, sicut is quoque unam rem haberet, qui separatim solum aedium vendere possit.
But as to the fruits having coalesced with the fundus, Labeo says he does not quite understand whether the praetor signifies only those that were ripe or even those that were unripe; moreover, even if he had in view those that were ripe, nonetheless possession ought not to be restored. For when the fundus was alienated, as regards it and its fruits, there was one single thing, that is, the fundus, and the fruits follow every kind of alienation of it. Nor is he who in winter has held a fundus worth 100, if at the time of harvest or vintage he can sell its fruits for 10, for that reason to be understood to have two things, that is, a fundus 100 and fruits 10, but one, that is, a fundus 100—just as he too would have one thing who could sell separately the soil of a house.
Haec actio etiam in ipsum fraudatorem datur, licet mela non putabat in fraudatorem eam dandam, quia nulla actio in eum ex ante gesto post bonorum venditionem daretur et iniquum esset actionem dari in eum, cui bona ablata essent. si vero quaedam disperdidisset, si nulla ratione reciperari possent, nihilo minus actio in eum dabitur et praetor non tam emolumentum actionis intueri videtur in eo, qui exutus est bonis, quam poenam.
This action is also given against the very defrauder, although Mela did not think it should be given against the defrauder, because no action would be afforded against him from what was previously transacted after the sale of the goods, and it would be inequitable for an action to be given against him whose goods had been taken away. But if indeed he had squandered certain things, if they could by no means be recovered, nonetheless an action will be given against him; and the praetor seems to regard in the case of him who has been stripped of his goods not so much the emolument of the action as the penalty.