Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. In tantas dubitationes hesternâ meditatione conjectus sum, ut nequeam ampliùs earum oblivisci, nec videam tamen quâ ratione solvendae sint; sed, tanquam in profundum gurgitem ex improviso delapsus, ita turbatus sum, ut nec possim in imo pedem figere, nec enatare ad summum. Enitar tamen & tentabo rursus eandem viam quam heri fueram ingressus, removendo scilicet illud omne quod vel minimum dubitationis admittit, nihilo secius quàm si omnino falsum esse comperissem; pergamque porro donec aliquid certi, vel, si nihil aliud, saltem hoc ipsum pro certo, nihil esse certi, cognoscam. Nihil nisi punctum petebat Archimedes, quod esset firmum & immobile, ut integram terram loco dimoveret; magna quoque speranda sunt, si vel minimum quid invenero quod certum sit & inconcussum.

1. Into such great doubts by yesterday’s meditation I was cast,
that I can no longer forget them, nor yet do I see by what
method they are to be solved; but, as if unawares into a deep whirlpool
having fallen, I have been so disturbed that I can neither plant my foot at the bottom, nor swim
to the top. Yet I will strive & I will attempt again the same path which yesterday I had
entered, namely by removing everything that admits even the least of doubt,
none the less than if I had discovered it to be altogether false; and I shall go on further
until I know something certain, or, if nothing else, at least this very thing for certain, that
nothing is certain. Archimedes asked for nothing but a point which would be
firm & immobile, so that he might move the whole earth from its place; great things too are to be hoped
for, if I shall have found even the least thing that is certain & unshaken.

2. Suppono igitur omnia quae video falsa esse; credo nihil unquam extitisse eorum quae mendax memoria repraesentat; nullos plane habeo sensus; corpus, figura, extensio, motus, locusque sunt chimerae. Quid igitur erit verum? Fortassis hoc unum, nihil esse certi.

2. Therefore I suppose all the things that I see to be false; I believe that nothing ever existed of those things which a mendacious memory represents; I plainly have no senses; body, figure, extension, motion, and place are chimeras. What then will be true? Perhaps this one thing: that nothing is certain.

3. Sed unde scio nihil esse diversum ab iis omnibus quae jam jam recensui, de quo ne minima quidem occasio sit dubitandi? Nunquid est aliquis Deus, vel quocunque nomine illum vocem, qui mihi has ipsas cogitationes immittit? Quare verò hoc putem, cùm forsan ipsemet illarum author esse possim?

3. But whence do I know that there is nothing different from all those things which I have just now reviewed, about which there is not even the least occasion for doubting? Is there perhaps some God, or by whatever name I may call him, who instils into me these very cogitations? But why should I suppose this, since perhaps I myself could be the author of them?

Nunquid ergo saltem ego aliquid sum? Sed jam negavi me habere ullos sensus, & ullum corpus. Haereo tamen; nam quid

Therefore, am I at least something? But already I have denied that I have any senses, & any body. Yet I hesitate; for what

[25] inde? Sumne ita corpori sensibusque alligatus, ut sine illis esse non possim? Sed mihi persuasi nihil plane esse in mundo, nullum coelum, nullam terram, nullas mentes, nulla corpora; nonne igitur etiam me non esse?

[25] what then? Am I so bound to the body and to the senses that without them I cannot be? But I have persuaded myself that plainly nothing exists in the world, no heaven, no earth, no minds, no bodies; therefore am I not also not to be?

Imo certe ego eram, si quid mihi persuasi. Sed est deceptor nescio quis, summe potens, summe callidus, qui de industriâ me semper fallit. Haud dubie igitur ego etiam sum, si me fallit; & fallat quantum potest, nunquam tamen efficiet, ut nihil sim quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo.

Nay, certainly
I existed, if I persuaded myself of anything. But there is a deceiver, I know not who, supremely potent,
supremely cunning, who by design always deceives me. Without doubt, therefore,
I also exist, if he deceives me; and let him deceive as much as he can, nevertheless he will never
effect that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something.

Adeo ut, omnibus satis superque pensitatis, denique statuendum sit hoc pronuntiatum, Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.

So that, with everything weighed more than enough, it must finally be established that this pronouncement, I am, I exist, whenever it is uttered by me, or conceived in the mind, is necessarily true.

4. Nondum verò satis intelligo, quisnam sim ego ille, qui jam necessario sum; deincepsque cavendum est ne forte quid aliud imprudenter assumam in locum meî, sicque aberrem etiam in eâ cognitione, quam omnium certissimam evidentissimamque esse contendo. Quare jam denuo meditabor quidnam me olim esse crediderim, priusquam in has cogitationes incidissem; ex quo deinde subducam quidquid allatis rationibus vel minimum potuit infirmari, ut ita tandem praecise remaneat illud tantùm quod certum est & inconcussum.

4. Yet indeed I do not yet sufficiently understand who I am, I who now necessarily am; and henceforth I must beware lest by chance I imprudently assume something else in place of myself, and thus stray even in that cognition which I contend to be of all the most certain and most evident. Wherefore now anew I will meditate what I once believed myself to be, before I had fallen into these cogitations; from which then I will subtract whatever could even in the least be weakened by the reasons adduced, so that in this way at last that alone may precisely remain which is certain & unshaken.

5. Quidnam igitur antehac me esse putavi? Hominem scilicet. Sed quid est homo?

5. What then did I previously think myself to be? A man, to be sure. But what is a man?

Dicamne animal rationale? Non, quia postea quaerendum foret quidnam animal sit, & quid rationale, atque ita ex unâ quaestione in plures difficilioresque delaberer; nec jam mihi tantum otii est, ut illo velim inter istiusmodi subtilitates abuti. Sed hîc potius attendam, quid sponte

Shall I say a rational animal? No, because then it would have to be asked what an animal is, and what rational is, and thus from one question I would slip into many more, and more difficult ones; nor have I now so much leisure as to wish to waste it amid subtleties of this sort. But here I will rather attend to what spontaneously

[26] & naturâ duce cogitationi meae antehac occurrebat, quoties quid essem considerabam. Nempe occurrebat primo, me habere vultum, manus, brachia, totamque hanc membrorum machinam, qualis etiam in cadavere cernitur, & quam corporis nomine designabam. Occurrebat practerea me nutriri, incedere, sentire, & cogitare: quas quidem actiones ad animam referebam.

[26] & with nature as my guide there occurred to my cogitation before now, whenever I considered what I was. Namely, there occurred first, that I have a face, hands, arms, and this whole machinery of limbs, such as is even seen in a cadaver, & which I designated by the name of “body.” It further occurred that I was nourished, that I walked, sensed, & thought: which actions indeed I referred to the soul.

Sed quid esset haec anima, vel non advertebam, vel exiguum nescio quid imaginabar, instar venti, vel ignis, vel aetheris, quod crassioribus meî partibus esset infusum. De corpore verò ne dubitabam quidem, sed distincte me nosse arbitrabar ejus naturam, quam si forte, qualem mente concipiebam, describere tentassem, sic explicuissem: per corpus intelligo illud omne quod aptum est figurâ aliquâ terminari, loco circumscribi, spatium sic replere, ut ex eo aliud omne corpus excludat; tactu, visu, auditu, gustu, vel odoratu percipi, necnon moveri pluribus modis, non quidem a seipso, sed ab alio quopiam a quo tangatur: namque habere vim seipsum movendi, item sentiendi, vel cogitandi, nullo pacto ad naturam corporis pertinere judicabam; quinimo mirabar potius tales facultates in quibusdam corporibus reperiri.

But what this soul was, either I did not notice, or I imagined some slight I-know-not-what, like wind, or fire, or ether, which was infused into the thicker parts of me. About the body indeed I did not even doubt, but I supposed that I knew distinctly its nature, which, if perchance I had tried to describe such as I conceived it in mind, I would have explained thus: by body I understand anything that is apt to be bounded by some figure, to be circumscribed by place, to fill a space in such a way that it excludes every other body from it; to be perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or smell, and also to be moved in many ways, not indeed by itself, but by some other by which it is touched: for I judged that to have the power of moving itself, likewise of sensing or thinking, in no way pertained to the nature of body; rather indeed I marveled that such faculties are found in certain bodies.

6. Quid autem nunc, ubi suppono deceptorem aliquem potentissimum, &, si fas est dicere, malignum, datâ operâ in omnibus, quantum potuit, me delusisse? Possumne affirmare me habere vel minimum quid ex iis omnibus, quae jam dixi ad naturam corporis perti

6. But what now, when I suppose some deceiver most potent, and, if it is lawful to say, malignant, with set purpose in all things, as much as he could, has deluded me? Can I affirm that I have even the least thing of all those, which I have already said pertai

[27]nere? Attendo, cogito, revolvo, nihil occurrit; fatigor eadem frustrà repetere. Quid verò ex iis quae animae tribuebam?

[27]pertain? I attend, I cogitate, I revolve [them]; nothing occurs; I grow weary of repeating the same things in vain. But what then of those things which I used to attribute to the soul?

Nutriri vel incedere? Quandoquidem jam corpus non habeo, haec quoque nihil sunt nisi figmenta. Sentire?

To be nourished or to walk? Since now I have no body,
these too are nothing but figments. To sense?

Nempe etiam hoc non fit sine corpore, & permulta sentire visus sum in somnis quae deinde animadverti me non sensisse. Cogitare? Hîc invenio: cogitatio est; hacc sola a me divelli nequit.

Surely even this
does not happen without a body, and I seemed to sense very many things in dreams which afterward
I noticed I had not sensed. To think? Here I find: there is cogitation; this alone cannot be torn from me.

Ego sum, ego existo; certum est. Quandiu autem? Nempe quandiu cogito; nam forte etiam fieri posset, si cessarem ab omni cogitatione, ut illico totus esse desinerem.

I am, I exist; it is certain. How long
however? Namely as long as I think; for perhaps it could also come about, if I were to cease from
all cogitation, that I would immediately cease to be entirely.

Nihil nunc admitto nisi quod necessario sit verum; sum igitur praecise tantùm res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio, voces mihi priùs significationis ignotae. Sum autem res vera, & vere existens; sed qualis res? Dixi, cogitans.

I now admit nothing except
what is necessarily true; I am therefore precisely only a thinking thing,
that is, a mind, or a soul, or an intellect, or reason, words to me previously
of unknown signification. I am moreover a real thing, & truly existing; but of what kind
thing? I have said, a thinking one.

7. Quid praeterea? Imaginabor: non sum compages illa membrorum, quae corpus humanum appellatur; non sum etiam tenuis aliquis aër istis membris infusus, non ventus, non ignis, non vapor, non halitus, non quidquid mihi fingo: supposui enim ista nihil esse. Manet positio: nihilominus tamen ego aliquid sum.

7. What moreover? I will imagine: I am not that framework of limbs which is called the human body; nor am I even some subtle air infused into those limbs, not wind, not fire, not vapor, not breath, not whatever I feign for myself: for I have supposed these things to be nothing. The position remains: nonetheless still I am something.

Fortassis verò contingit, ut haec ipsa, quae suppono nihil esse, quia mihi sunt ignota, tamen in rei veritate non differant ab eo me quem novi? Nescio, de hac re jam non disputo; de iis tantùm quae mihi nota sunt, judicium ferre possum. Novi me existere; quaero quis sim ego ille quem novi.

Perhaps indeed it happens that these very things which I suppose
to be nothing, because they are unknown to me, nevertheless in the verity of the matter do not differ from
that me whom I know? I do not know; about this thing I now no longer dispute; only concerning those things
which are known to me can I render judgment. I know that I exist; I inquire who
I am, that very one whom I know.

Certissimum est hujus sic praecise sumpti notitiam non pendere ab iis quae exi

It is most certain that the knowledge of this, taken thus precisely, does not depend on those things which exi

[28]stere nondum novi; non igitur ab iis ullis, quae ima[gi]natione effingo. Atque hoc verbum, effingo, admonet me erroris mei: nam fingerem reverà, si quid me esse imaginarer, quia nihil aliud est imaginari quàm rei corporeae figuram, seu imaginem, contemplari. Jam autem certò scio me esse, simulque fieri posse ut omnes istae imagines, & generaliter quaecunque ad corporis naturam referuntur, nihil sint praeter insomnia.

[28]to exist I do not yet know; therefore not from any of those which I fashion by ima[gi]nation. And this word, “I fashion,” warns me of my error: for I would indeed be fashioning, if I imagined myself to be anything, because to imagine is nothing other than to contemplate the figure, or image, of a corporeal thing. Now, however, I know for certain that I am, and at the same time that it can happen that all those images, & generally whatever things are referred to the nature of body, are nothing but dreams.

Quibus animadversis, non minus ineptire videor, dicendo: imaginabor, ut distinctius agnoscam quisnam sim, quàm si dicerem: jam quidem sum experrectus, videoque nonnihil veri, sed quia nondum video satis evidenter, datâ operâ obdormiam, ut hoc ipsum mihi somnia verius evidentiusque repraesentent. Itaque cognosco nihil eorum quae possum imaginationis ope comprehendere, ad hanc quam de me habeo notitiam pertinere, mentemque ab illis diligentissime esse avocandam, ut suam ipsa naturam quàm distinctissime percipiat.

Having noticed these things, I seem no less to be playing the fool, in saying:
I will imagine, so that I may more distinctly recognize who I am, than if I were to say:
already indeed I am awake, and I see something of the true, but because I do not yet see
sufficiently evidently, I will deliberately fall asleep, so that dreams may represent this very thing to me
more truly and more evidently. And so I recognize that none of those things which I can
comprehend by the aid of imagination pertains to this knowledge which I have about myself,
and that the mind must be most diligently called away from them, so that it may perceive its own nature as
distinctly as possible.

8. Sed quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est hoc?

8. But what then am I? A thinking thing. What is this?

Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque, & sentiens.

Namely doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, unwilling, imagining also, & sensing.

9. Non pauca sanè haec sunt, si cuncta ad me pertineant. Sed quidni pertinerent? Nonne ego ipse sum qui jam dubito ferè de omnibus, qui nonnihil tamen intelligo, qui hoc unum verum esse affirmo, nego caetera, cupio plura nosse, nolo decipi, multa vel invitus imaginor, multa etiam tanquam a sensibus venientia animadverto?

9. These are assuredly not few, if all pertain to me. But why should they not pertain? Am I not myself the one who now doubts about nearly
everything, who nevertheless understands something, who affirm that this one thing is true, deny the rest, desire to know more, do not wish to be deceived, imagine many things even unwillingly, and also observe many things as though coming from the senses?

Quid est horum, quamvis semper dor

What of these is there, although I always dor

[29] miam, quamvis etiam is qui me creavit, quantum in se est, me deludat, quod non aeque verum sit ac me esse? Quid est quod a meâ cogitatione distinguatur? Quid est quod a me ipso separatum dici possit?

[29] sleep, even if also he who created me, so far as it lies in him, should delude me, what is there that is not just as true as that I exist? What is there that is distinguished from my thought? What is there that can be said to be separate from myself?

Nam quod ego sim qui dubitem, qui intelligam, qui velim, tam manifestum est, ut nihil occurrat per quod evidentius explicetur. Sed verò etiam ego idem sum qui imaginor; nam quamvis fortè, ut supposui, nulla prorsus res imaginata vera sit, vis tamen ipsa imaginandi revera existit, & cogitationis meae partem facit. Idem denique ego sum qui sentio, sive qui res corporeas tanquam per sensus animadverto: videlicet jam lucem video, strepitum audio, calorem sentio.

For that I exist as one who doubts, who understands, who wills, is so manifest that nothing occurs by which it might be explained more evidently. But indeed I am also the same who imagines; for although perhaps, as I have supposed, absolutely no imagined thing is true, nevertheless the very power/faculty of imagining truly exists, and makes a part of my cogitation. Finally, I am the same who senses, or who observes corporeal things as if through the senses: namely, now I see light, I hear a noise, I feel heat.

Falsa haec sunt, dormio enim. At certe videre videor, audire, calescere. Hoc falsum esse non potest; hoc est proprie quod in me sentire appellatur; atque hoc praecise sic sumptum nihil aliud est quàm cogitare.

These things are false, for I am asleep. But surely
I seem to see, to hear, to grow warm. This cannot be false; this is properly
what in me is called sensing; and this, taken precisely thus, is nothing other
than thinking.

10. Ex quibus equidem aliquanto melius incipio nosse quisnam sim; sed adhuc tamen videtur, nec possum abstinere quin putem, res corporeas, quarum imagines cogitatione formantur, & quas ipsi sensus explorant, multo distinctius agnosci quàm istud nescio quid meî, quod sub imaginationem non venit: quanquam profecto sit mirum, res quas animadverto esse dubias, ignotas, a me alienas, distinctius quàm quod verum est, quod cognitum, quàm denique me ipsum, a me comprehendi. Sed video quid sit: gaudet aberrare mens mea, necdum se patitur intra veritatis limites cohiberi. Esto igitur, & adhuc semel laxissimas habe

10. From these, indeed, I begin somewhat better to know who I am; but yet it still seems, nor can I refrain from thinking, that corporeal things, whose images are formed by cogitation, & which the senses themselves explore, are recognized much more distinctly than that I-know-not-what of myself, which does not come under imagination: although indeed it is marvelous that things which I observe to be dubious, unknown, alien to me, should be comprehended by me more distinctly than what is true, what is known, than, finally, myself. But I see what it is: my mind rejoices to stray, and does not yet allow itself to be confined within the limits of truth. Let it be so then, & yet once more let me have the loosest

[30] nas ei permittamus, ut, illis paulo post opportune reductis, facilius se regi patiatur.

[30] let us permit it, that, with those opportunely reintroduced a little later, it may more easily allow itself to be governed.

11. Consideremus res illas quae vulgo putantur omnium distinctissime comprehendi: corpora scilicet, quae tangimus, quae videmus; non quidem corpora in communi, generales enim istae perceptiones aliquantò magis confusae esse solent, sed unum in particulari. Sumamus, exempli causâ, hanc ceram: nuperrime ex favis fuit educta; nondum amisit omnem saporem sui mellis; nonnihil retinet odoris florum ex quibus collecta est; ejus color, figura, magnitudo, manifesta sunt; dura est, frigida est, facile tangitur, ac, si articulo ferias, emittet sonum; omnia denique illi adsunt quae requiri videntur, ut corpus aliquod possit quàm distinctissime cognosci. Sed ecce, dum loquor, igni admovetur: saporis reliquiae purgantur, odor expirat, color mutatur, figura tollitur, crescit magnitudo, fit liquida, fit calida, vix tangi potest, nec jam, si pulses, emittet sonum.

11. Let us consider those things which are commonly thought to be of all the most distinctly apprehended: namely bodies, which we touch, which we see; not indeed bodies in common (for those general perceptions are wont to be somewhat more confused), but one in particular. Let us take, for example, this wax: most recently it was led out from the honeycombs; it has not yet lost all the savor of its honey; it retains somewhat of the odor of the flowers from which it was collected; its color, figure, magnitude are manifest; it is hard, it is cold, it is easily touched, and, if you strike it with a knuckle, it will emit a sound; finally, all the things are present to it which seem to be required, so that some body can be known as distinctly as possible. But behold, while I speak, it is brought near the fire: the remnants of taste are purged, the odor breathes out, the color is changed, the figure is taken away, the magnitude increases, it becomes liquid, it becomes hot, it can scarcely be touched, nor now, if you should tap it, will it emit a sound.

Remanetne adhuc eadem cera? Remanere fatendum est; nemo negat, nemo aliter putat. Quid erat igitur in eâ quod tam distincte comprehendebatur?

Does the same wax still remain? It must be admitted that it remains; no one denies it, no one thinks otherwise. What, then, was there in it that was so distinctly comprehended?

Certe nihil eorum quae sensibus attingebam; nam quaecunque sub gustum, vel odoratum, vel visum, vel tactum, vel auditum veniebant, mutata jam sunt: remanet cera.

Certainly nothing of those things that by the senses
I was apprehending; for whatever came under taste, or smell, or sight, or touch,
or hearing, have now been changed: the wax remains.

12. Fortassis illud erat quod nunc cogito: nempe ceram ipsam non quidem fuisse istam dulcedinem mellis, nec florum fragrantiam, nec istam albedinem, nec figuram, nec sonum, sed corpus quod mihi apparebat paulo ante modis istis conspicuum, nunc diversis. Quid est autem hoc praecise quod sic imaginor? Attenda

12. Perhaps it was what I now think: namely, that the wax itself was not, to be sure, that sweetness of honey, nor the fragrance of flowers, nor that whiteness, nor the figure, nor the sound, but a body that a little before appeared to me perceptible in those modes, now in different ones. But what precisely is this that I thus imagine? Pay attention.

[31] mus, &, remotis iis quae ad ceram non pertinent, videamus quid supersit: nempe nihil aliud quàm extensum quid, flexibile, mutabile. Quid verò est hoc flexibile, mutabile? An quod imaginor, hanc ceram ex figurâ rotundâ in quadratam, vel ex hac in triangularem verti posse?

[31] and, with those things removed which do not pertain to the wax, let us see what remains: namely nothing other than something extended, flexible, mutable. But what in truth is this flexible, mutable thing? Is it what I imagine, that this wax can be turned from a round figure into a square, or from this into a triangular one?

Nullo modo; nam innumerabilium ejusmodi mutationum capacem eam esse comprehendo, nec possum tamen innumerabiles imaginando percurrere; nec igitur comprehensio hacc ab imaginandi facultate perficitur. Quid extensum? Nunquid etiam ipsa ejus extensio est ignota?

In no way; for I comprehend that it is capable of innumerable mutations of this sort, yet I cannot, by imagining, run through the innumerable ones; and therefore this comprehension is not accomplished by the faculty of imagining. What of extension? Is even its very extension unknown?

Nam in cerâ liquescente fit major, major in ferventi, majorque rursus, si calor augeatur; nec recte judicarem quid sit cera, nisi putarem hanc etiam plures secundùm extensionem varietates admittere, quàm fuerim unquam imaginando complexus. Superest igitur ut concedam, me nequidem imaginari quid sit haec cera, sed solâ mente percipere; dico hanc in particulari, de cerâ enim in communi clarius est. Quaenam verò est haec cera, quae non nisi mente percipitur?

For in the wax as it is liquefying it becomes greater, greater in the boiling, and greater again if the heat be increased; nor would I judge rightly what wax is, unless I supposed that it also admits more varieties according to extension than I have ever encompassed by imagining. It remains, therefore, that I concede that I do not even imagine what this wax is, but perceive it by mind alone; I say this of this wax in particular, for of wax in common it is clearer. What then is this wax, which is perceived only by the mind?

Nempe eadem quam video, quam tango, quam imaginor, eadem denique quam ab initio esse arbitrabar. Atqui, quod notandum est, ejus perceptio non visio, non tactio, non imaginatio est, nec unquam fuit, quamvis prius ita videretur, sed solius mentis inspectio, quae vel imperfecta esse potest & confusa, ut prius erat, vel clara & distincta, ut nunc est, prout minus vel magis ad illa ex quibus constat attendo.

Surely it is the same one that I see, that I touch, that I imagine, the same, finally, that I thought it to be from the beginning. And yet, what is to be noted, its perception is not vision, not touch, not imagination, nor ever was—although earlier it seemed so—but an inspection of mind alone, which can be either imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct, as now it is, according as I attend less or more to those things of which it consists.

13. Miror verò interim quàm prona sit mea mens in errores; nam quamvis haec apud me tacitus & sine

13. I marvel indeed meanwhile how prone my mind is to errors; for although these things with myself silently & without

[32] voce considerem, haereo tamen in verbis ipsis, & fere decipior ab ipso usu loquendi. Dicimus enim nos videre ceram ipsammet, si adsit, non ex colore vel figurâ eam adesse judicare. Unde concluderem statim: ceram ergo visione oculi, non solius mentis inspectione, cognosci; nisi jam forte respexissem ex fenestrâ homines in plateâ transeuntes, quos etiam ipsos non minus usitate quàm ceram dico me videre.

[32] when I consider in words, I nevertheless stick fast in the words themselves, & am almost deceived by the very use of speech. For we say that we see the very wax itself, if it is present, not judge it to be present from color or figure. Whence I would straightway conclude: therefore the wax is known by vision of the eye, not by inspection of mind alone; unless perchance by now I had looked out from the window at men passing in the street, whom also I say that I see no less customarily than the wax.

Quid autem video praeter pileos & vestes, sub quibus latere possent automata? Sed judico homines esse. Atque ita id quod putabam me videre oculis, solâ judicandi facultate, quae in mente meâ est, comprehendo.

But what do I see besides hats &
garments, under which automata could lie hidden? Yet I judge them to be men. And
thus that which I thought I was seeing with my eyes, by the sole faculty of judging, which
is in my mind, I comprehend.

14. Sed pudeat supra vulgus sapere cupientem, ex formis loquendi quas vulgus invenit dubitationem quaesivisse; pergamusque deinceps, attendendo utrùm ego perfectius evidentiusque percipiebam quid esset cera, cùm primùm aspexi, credidique me illam ipso sensu externo, vel saltem sensu communi, ut vocant, id est potentiâ imaginatrice, cognoscere? an verò potiùs nunc, postquam diligentiùs investigavi tum quid ea sit, tum quomodo cognoscatur? Certe hac de re dubitare esset ineptum; nam quid fuit in primâ perceptione distinctum?

14. But let one who wishes to be wise above the vulgus be ashamed to have sought a doubt from the forms of speaking which the vulgus has invented; and let us proceed henceforth, attending to whether I was perceiving more perfectly and more evidently what the wax was when first I looked upon it, and believed that I knew it by that very external sense, or at least by the common sense, as they call it, that is, by the imaginative power; or rather now, after I have investigated more carefully both what it is and how it is known? Surely to doubt about this would be foolish; for what in the first perception was distinct?

Quid quod non a quovis animali haberi posse videretur? At verò cùm ceram ab externis formis distinguo, & tanquam vestibus detractis nudam considero, sic illam revera, quamvis adhuc error in judicio meo esse possit, non possum tamen sine humanâ mente percipere.

What of the fact
that it seemed it could not be possessed by just any animal? But indeed, when I distinguish the wax
from external forms, and consider it naked as though its garments were stripped off,
thus that, in truth, although error may still be in my judgment, nevertheless I cannot, however, perceive it without a human mind.

[33]

15. Quid autem dicam de hac ipsâ mente, sive de me ipso? Nihildum enim aliud admitto in me esse praeter mentem. Quid, inquam, ego qui hanc ceram videor tam distincte percipere?

15. But what shall I say about this very mind, or about myself? For as yet I admit nothing else to be in me except mind. What, I say, am I, who seem to perceive this wax so distinctly?

Nunquid me ipsum non tantùm multo verius, multo certius, sed etiam multo distinctius evidentiusque, cognosco? Nam, si judico ceram existere, ex eo quod hanc videam, certe multo evidentius efficitur me ipsum etiam existere, ex eo ipso quod hanc videam. Fieri enim potest ut hoc quod video non vere sit cera; fieri potest ut ne quidem oculos habeam, quibus quidquam videatur; sed fieri plane non potest, cùm videam, sive (quod jam non distinguo) cùm cogitem me videre, ut ego ipse cogitans non aliquid sim.

Do I not know myself not only much more truly, much more certainly, but also much more distinctly and more evidently? For, if I judge the wax to exist from the fact that I see this, surely it is made much more evident that I myself also exist, from this very fact that I see this. For it can happen that this which I see is not truly wax; it can happen that I do not even have eyes, by which anything is seen; but it plainly cannot happen that, when I see, or (which I now do not distinguish) when I think that I see, that I myself, thinking, am not something.

Simili ratione, si judico ceram esse, ex eo quod hanc tangam, idem rursus efficietur, videlicet me esse. Si ex eo quod imaginer, vel quâvis aliâ ex causâ, idem plane. Sed & hoc ipsum quod de cerâ animadverto, ad reliqua omnia, quae sunt extra me posita, licet applicare.

By a similar reasoning, if I judge there to be wax
from the fact that I touch this, the same will again be effected, namely, that I exist. If from
the fact that I imagine, or from whatever other cause, the same plainly. But & this very thing which I observe about the wax may be applied to all the other things which
are set outside me.

Porro autem, si magis distincta visa sit cerae perceptio, postquam mihi, non ex solo visu vel tactu, sed pluribus ex causis innotuit, quanto distinctiùs me ipsum a me nunc cognosci fatendum est, quandoquidem nullae rationes vel ad cerae, vel ad cu juspiam alterius corporis perceptionem possint juvare, quin eaedem omnes mentis meae naturam melius probent! Sed & alia insuper tam multa sunt in ipsâ mente, ex quibus ejus notitia distinctior reddi potest, ut ea, quae ex corpore ad illam emanant, vix numeranda videantur.

Moreover, if the perception of the wax has seemed more distinct, after it became known to me not from sight or touch alone, but from several
causes, how much more distinctly must it be admitted that I now know myself by myself, since no reasons that could aid either toward the perception of the wax, or of any
other body, can avail without those same ones all the better proving the nature of my mind! But & in addition there are so many other things in the very
mind, from which its knowledge can be rendered more distinct, that those which from the body
to it emanate seem scarcely to be numbered.

16. Atque ecce tandem sponte sum reversus eò quò

16. And behold, at last, of my own accord I have returned to the point where

[34] volebam; nam cùm mihi nunc notum sit ipsamet corpora, non proprie a sensibus, vel ab imaginandi facultate, sed a solo intellectu percipi, nec ex eo percipi quòd tangantur aut videantur, sed tantùm ex eo quod intelligantur aperte cognosco nihil facilius aut evidentius meâ mente posse a me percipi. Sed quia tam cito deponi veteris opinionis consuetudo non potest, placet hîc consistere, ut altius haec nova cognitio memoriae meae diuturnitate meditationis infigatur.

[34] I wished; for since it is now known to me that the very bodies are not properly perceived by the senses, nor by the faculty of imagining, but by the intellect alone, and are not perceived from the fact that they are touched or seen, but only from the fact that they are understood, I plainly recognize that nothing can be perceived by me more easily or more evidently than my own mind. But since the habit of the old opinion cannot be laid aside so quickly, it pleases me to pause here, so that this new cognition may be fixed more deeply in my memory by the long duration of meditation.