Cicero: ORATORIA

43. Atque ut hoc ita esse perspicere possitis, exponam vobis Oppianici facinus manifesto compertum atque deprehensum; ex quo simul utrumque, et huic accusare et illi condemnari necesse fuisse, intellegetis.

43. And that you may be able to perceive this to be so, I will expose to you Oppianicus’s crime, manifestly ascertained and apprehended; from which at the same time you will understand that both were necessary: for this man to accuse, and for that man to be condemned.

XV.Martiales quidam Larini appellabantur, ministri publici Martis atque ei deo veteribus institutis religionibusque Larinatium consecrati; quorum cum satis magnus numerus esset, cumque item, ut in Sicilia permulti Venerii sunt, sic illi Larini in Martis familia numerarentur, repente Oppianicus eos omnes liberos esse civesque Romanos coepit defendere. Graviter id decuriones Larinatium cunctique municipes tulerunt; itaque ab Habito petiverunt ut eam causam susciperet publiceque defenderet. Habitus cum se ab omni eius modi negotio removisset, tamen pro loco, pro antiquitate generis sui, pro eo quod se non suis commodis sed etiam suorum municipum ceterorumque necessariorum natum esse arbitrabatur, tantae voluntati universorum Larinatium deesse noluit.

15.At Larinum certain men were called “Martiales,” public ministers of Mars and consecrated to that god by the ancient institutions and religions of the Larinates; and since their number was quite large, and likewise, as in Sicily there are very many “Venerii,” so those men at Larinum were counted in the household of Mars, suddenly Oppianicus began to maintain that they all were free and Roman citizens. The decurions of the Larinates and all the townsmen took that grievously; and so they asked Habitus to take up that cause and defend it publicly. Although Habitus had removed himself from every business of that sort, nevertheless, for the sake of his rank, for the antiquity of his stock, and because he judged that he had been born not for his own advantages but also for those of his fellow-municipals and other connections, he did not wish to be lacking to the so great will of all the Larinates.

44. Suscepta causa Romamque delata magnae cotidie contentiones inter Habitum et Oppianicum ex utriusque studio defensionis excitabantur. Erat ipse immani acerbaque natura Oppianicus: incendebat eius amentiam infesta atque inimica filio mater Habiti. Magni autem illi sua interesse arbitrabantur hunc a causa martialium removeri.

44. The case having been undertaken and brought to Rome, great daily contentions were being stirred up between Habitus and Oppianicus, arising from the zeal of defense on each side. Oppianicus himself was of a monstrous and bitter nature: his madness was inflamed by the mother of Habitus, hostile and inimical to her son. Moreover, they judged it to be greatly in their own interest that this man be removed from the cause of the Martiales.

Suberat etiam alia causa maior, quae Oppianici hominis avarissimi atque audacissimi mentem maxime commovebat. 45. Nam Habitus usque ad illius iudicii tempus nullum testamentum umquam fecerat: neque legare eius modi matri poterat animum inducere, neque testamento nomen omnino praetermittere parentis. Id cum Oppianicus sciret – neque enim erat obscurum-intellegebat Habito mortuo bona eius omnia ad matrem esse ventua, quae ab sese postea aucta pecunia maiore praemio, orbata filio minore periculo necaretur.

There was also another, greater motive underlying, which most stirred the mind of Oppianicus, a man most avaricious and most audacious. 45. For Habitus, up to the time of that judgment, had never at any time made a testament: he could not bring his mind to bequeath to such a mother, nor in a testament altogether to pass over the name of a parent. Since Oppianicus knew this – for it was not obscure-intellegebat that, with Habitus dead, all his goods would come to his mother, who, her money afterwards increased by himself, might be killed for a greater reward, and with less danger when bereft of her son.

Itaque his rebus incensus, qua ratione Habitum veneno tollere conatus sit cognoscite.

Therefore, inflamed by these things, learn by what method he tried to remove Habitus by poison.

XVI.46. C. et L. Fabricii fratres gemini fuerunt ex municipio Aletrinati, homines inter se cum forma tum moribus similes, municipum autem suorum dissimillimi, in quibus quantus splendor sit, quam prope aequabilis, quam fere omnium constans et moderata ratio vitae, nemo vestrum, ut mea fert opinio, ignorat. His Fabriciis semper est usus Oppianicus familiarissime.

CHAPTER 16. 46. C. and L. Fabricii were twin brothers from the municipium of Aletrium, men similar to each other both in form and in morals, but most dissimilar to their fellow townsmen, among whom how great splendor there is, how near to equable, how the plan of life of almost all is constant and moderate, none of you, as my opinion holds, is ignorant. With these Fabricii Oppianicus has always associated most familiarly.

Iam hoc fere scitis omnes, quantam vim habeat ad coniungendas amicitias studiorum ac naturae similitudo. Cum illi ita viverent ut nullum quaestum esse turpem arbitrarentur, cum omnis ab eis fraus, omnes insidiae circumscriptionesque adulescentium nascerentur, cumque essent vitiis atque improbitate omnibus noti, studiose, ut dixi, ad eorum se familiaritatem multis iam ante annis Oppianicus applicarat. 47. Itaque tum sic statuit, per C. Fabricium (nam Lucius erat mortuus) insidias Habito comparare.

By now you all almost know this, how great a force similarity of pursuits and of nature has for conjoining friendships. Since they lived in such a way that they judged no gain to be shameful, since from them every fraud, all ambushes and circumscriptions of young men arose, and since they were known to all for vices and improbity, Oppianicus, zealously, as I said, had attached himself to their familiarity many years before. 47. Therefore he then thus resolved, through Gaius Fabricius (for Lucius had died), to contrive a plot against Habitus.

Erat illo tempore infirma valetudine Habitus; utebatur autem medico non ignobili, spectato homine, Cleophanto, cuius servum Diogenem Fabricius ad venenum Habito dandum spe et pretio sollicitare coepit. Servus non incallidus et, ut res ipsa declaravit, frugi atque integer, sermonem Fabrici non est aspernatus: rem ad dominum detulit. Cleophantus autem cum Habito est collocutus.

At that time Habitus was in infirm health; moreover he was employing a physician not ignoble, a man of proven character, Cleophantus, whose servant Diogenes Fabricius began to solicit by hope and a price to give poison to Habitus. The servant, not unskilled and, as the matter itself declared, thrifty and upright, did not spurn Fabricius’s discourse: he reported the matter to his master. But Cleophantus conferred with Habitus.

Habitus statim cum M. Baebio senatore, familiarissimo suo, communicavit; qui qua fide, qua prudentia, qua diligentia fuerit, meminisse vos arbitror. Ei placuit ut Diogenem Habitus emeret a Cleophanto, quo facilius aut comprehenderetur res eius indicio aut falsa esse cognosceretur. Ne multa, Diogenes emitur: venenum diebus paucis comparatur: multi viri boni cum ex occulto intervenissent, pecunia obsignata, quae ob eam rem dabatur, in manibus Scamandri liberti Fabriciorum deprehenditur.

Habitus immediately communicated with M. Baebius, a senator, his most intimate friend; and with what fidelity, with what prudence, with what diligence he was endowed, I suppose you remember. It pleased him that Habitus should buy Diogenes from Cleophantus, in order that the affair might more easily either be apprehended by his testimony or be recognized as false. In short, Diogenes is purchased; poison is procured within a few days; when many worthy men had covertly intervened, the money, sealed, which was being given on account of that matter, is detected in the hands of Scamander, the freedman of the Fabricii.

48. Pro di immortales! Oppianicum quisquam his rebus cognitis circumventum esse dicet? XVII.

48. By the immortal gods! Will anyone, with these things known, say that Oppianicus was ensnared?17.

Quis umquam audacior, quis nocentior, quis apertior in iudicium adductus est? Quod ingenium, quae facultas dicendi, quae a quoquam excogitata defensio huic uni crimini potuit obsistere? Simul et illud quis est qui dubitet, quin hac re comperta manifestoque deprehensa aut obeunda mors Cluentio aut suscipienda accusatio fuerit?

Who ever has been brought into judgment more audacious, who more guilty, who more overt? What ingenuity, what faculty of speaking, what defense devised by anyone could withstand this single charge? At the same time, who is there who would doubt that, with this matter discovered and manifestly apprehended, either that death must be met by Cluentius or that the accusation must be undertaken?

49. Satis esse arbitror demonstratum, iudices, eis criminibus accusatum esse Oppianicum uti honeste absolvi nullo modo potuerit: cognoscite nunc ita reum citatum esse illum, ut re semel atque iterum praeiudicata condemnatus in iudicium venerit. Nam Cluentius, iudices, primum nomen eius detulit cuius in manibus venenum deprehenderat: is erat libertus Fabriciorum Scamander. Integrum consilium, iudicii corrupti nulla suspicio: simplex in iudicium causa, certa res, unum crimen adlatum est.

49. I judge it to have been shown enough, judges, that Oppianicus was accused by such charges that he could in no way be honorably acquitted: learn now that he was thus summoned as a defendant, that, the matter once and again prejudged, he came into the trial condemned. For Cluentius, judges, first reported the name of the man in whose hands he had detected the poison: this was Scamander, a freedman of the Fabricii. An unimpaired panel, no suspicion of a corrupted judgment: the case in court is simple, the matter sure, one accusation was adduced.

Hic tum C. Fabricius, is de quo ante dixi – qui liberto damnato sibi illud impendere periculum videret – quod mihi cum Aletrinatibus vicinitatem et cum plerisque eorum magnum usum esse sciebat, frequentes eos ad domum adduxit; qui quamquam de homine sicut necesse erat existimabant, tamen, quod erat ex eodem municipio, suae dignitatis esse arbitrabantur eum quibus rebus possent defendere; idque a me ut facerem et ut causam Scamandri susciperem petebant, in qua causa patroni omne periculum continebatur. 50. Ego, qui neque illis talibus viris ac tam amantibus mei rem possem ullam negare neque illud crimen tantum ac tam manifestum esse arbitrarer – sicut ne illi quidem ipsi qui mihi tum illam causam commendabant arbitrabantur, – pollicitus eis sum me omnia quae vellent esse facturum.

Here then Gaius Fabricius, the one of whom I spoke before—who, with the freedman condemned, saw that that peril was impending over himself—because he knew that I had a neighborhood with the Aletrinates and great familiarity with many of them, brought them in numbers to my house; who, although they judged about the man as was necessary, nevertheless, because he was from the same municipality, thought it to be of their dignity to defend him by whatever means they could; and they were asking of me that I do this and that I take up the cause of Scamander, in which cause the whole peril was contained for the advocate. 50. I, who could neither refuse anything to such men and so loving of me, nor suppose that that charge was so great and so manifest—as not even those very men who at that time were commending that case to me supposed—promised them that I would do everything they wished.

XVIII.Res agi coepta est: citatus est Scamander reus. Accusabat P. Cannutius, homo in primis ingeniosus et in dicendo exercitatus; accusabat autem ille quidem Scamandrum verbis tribus VENENUM ESSE DEPREHENSUM; omnia tela totius accusationis in Oppianicum coniciebantur, aperiebatur causa insidiarum, Fabriciorum familiaritas commemorabatur, hominis vita et audacia proferebatur, denique omnis accusatio varie graviterque tractata ad extremum manifesta veneni deprehensione conclusa est.

18.The matter began to be conducted: Scamander was summoned as the defendant. P. Cannutius was prosecuting, a man among the foremost ingenious and practiced in speaking; moreover, he indeed accused Scamander with three words, POISON WAS DETECTED; all the weapons of the whole accusation were being hurled at Oppianicus, the case of the plot was laid open, the familiarity of the Fabricii was recalled, the man’s life and audacity were brought forward; finally, the whole accusation, handled variously and gravely, was concluded in the end with the manifest detection of poison.

51. Hic ego tum ad respondendum surrexi, qua cura, di immortales! qua sollicitudine animi! quo timore!

51. Then I rose to reply, with what care, immortal gods! with what solicitude of mind! with what fear!

Semper equidem magno cum metu incipio dicere: quotienscumque dico, totiens mihi videor in iudicium venire non ingenii solum, sed etiam virtutis atque officii, ne aut id profiteri videar quod non possim [implere] quod est impudentiae, aut non id efficere quod possim, quod est aut perfidiae aut neglegentiae. Tum vero ita sum perturbatus ut omnia timerem: si nihil dixissem, ne infantissimus, si multa in eius modi causa dixissem, ne impudentissimus existimarer

Always indeed I begin to speak with great fear: as often as I speak, so often I seem to myself to come into judgment not of talent only, but also of virtue and duty, lest I seem either to profess that which I cannot [fulfill], which is impudence, or not to accomplish that which I can, which is either perfidy or negligence. Then indeed I was so disturbed that I feared everything: if I had said nothing, lest I be thought most inarticulate; if I had said many things in a cause of that kind, lest I be thought most impudent

XIX.Collegi me aliquando et ita constitui, fortiter esse agendum; illi aetati qua tum eram solere laudi dari, etiam si in minus firmis causis hominum periculis non defuissem. Itaque feci: sic puganvi, sic omni ratione contendi, sic ad omnia confugi, quantum ego adsequi potui, remedia ac perfugia causarum, ut hoc, quod timide dicam, consecutus sim, ne quis illi causae patronum defuisse arbitraretur.

19.I collected myself at some point and thus resolved that one must act bravely; for one of the age I then was it is commonly accounted a matter for praise, even if, in less firm cases, I had not failed men in peril. Accordingly I did so: thus I fought, thus I contended by every method, thus I fled for refuge to everything—the remedies and refuges of cases—as far as I could attain, so that I achieved this, which I say timidly: that no one might think that that cause had lacked a patron.

52. Sed ut quidquid ego apprehenderam, statim accusator extorquebat e manibus. Si quaesiveram quae inimicitiae Scamandro cum Habito, fatebatur nullas fuisse, sed Oppianicum, cuius ille minister fuisset, huic inimicissimum fuisse atque esse dicebat. Sin autem illud egeram, nullum ad Scamandrum morte Habiti venturum emolumentum fuisse, concedebat, sed ad uxorem Oppianici, hominis in uxoribus necandis exercitati, omnia bona Habiti ventura fuisse dicebat.

52. But whatever I had apprehended, the accuser immediately would extort out of my hands. If I had inquired what enmities Scamander had with Habitus, he admitted there had been none, but he said that Oppianicus, of whom he had been a minister, had been and was most inimical to this man. But if, however, I had urged this, that no emolument would come to Scamander from the death of Habitus, he conceded it; but he said that to the wife of Oppianicus, a man exercised in killing wives, all the goods of Habitus were going to come.

Cum illa defensione usus essem, quae in libertinorum causis honestissima semper existimata est, Scamandrum patrono esse probatum, fatebatur, sed quaerebat cui probatus esset ipse patronus. 53. Cum ego pluribus verbis in eo commoratus essem, Scamandro insidias factas esse per Diogenem constitutumque inter eos alia de re fuisse, ut medicamentum, non venenum Diogenes adferret, hoc cuivis usu venire posse, quaerebat cur in eius modi locum, tam abditum, cur solus, cur cum obsignata pecunia venisset. Denique hoc loco causa testibus, honestissimis hominibus, premebatur.

When I had employed that defense which in cases of freedmen has always been reckoned most honorable—that Scamander had been approved as having a patron—he admitted it, but he asked to whom the patron himself had been approved. 53. When I had dwelt at greater length on this point, that an ambush had been laid for Scamander through Diogenes, and that there had been an arrangement between them about another matter, that Diogenes should bring a medicament, not a poison, and that this can befall anyone in practice, he asked why he had come to a place of such a kind, so hidden, why alone, why with sealed money. Finally, at this point the case was pressed by witnesses, most honorable men.

M. Baebius de suo consilio Diogenem emptum, se praesente Scamandrum cum veneno pecuniaque deprehensum esse dicebat; P. Quintilius Varus, homo summa religione et summa auctoritate praeditus, de insidiis quae fierent Habito, et de sollicitatione Diogenis recenti re secum Cleophantum collucutum esse dicebat. 54. Atque in illo iudicio cum Scamandrum nos defendere videremur, verbo ille reus erat, re quidem vera et periculo tota accusatione Oppianicus. Neque id obscure ferebat nec dissimulare ullo modo poterat: aderat frequens, advocabat, omni studio gratiaque pugnabat; postremo – id quod maximo malo illi causae fuit – hoc ipso in loco, quasi reus ipse esset, sedebat.

M. Baebius said, on his own counsel, that Diogenes had been bought, that, with himself present, Scamander had been caught with poison and money; P. Quintilius Varus, a man endowed with the highest religion and the highest authority, said that Cleophantus had conferred with him about the ambushes being made against Habitus, and about the recent affair of the solicitation of Diogenes. 54. And in that trial, although we seemed to be defending Scamander, in word he was the defendant, but in reality and in danger, by the entire prosecution, was Oppianicus. Nor did he carry this obscurely nor could he in any way dissimulate it: he was constantly in attendance, he summoned advocates, he fought with every zeal and favor; finally – and this was to that case the greatest harm – in this very place, as if he himself were the defendant, he sat.

Oculi omnium iudicum non in Scamandrum, sed in Oppianicum coniciebantur; timor eius, perturbatio, suspensus incertusque vultus, crebra coloris mutatio, quae erant antea suspiciosa, haec aperta et manifesta faciebant

The eyes of all the judges were directed not at Scamander, but at Oppianicus; his fear, his perturbation, a suspenseful and uncertain countenance, the frequent change of color—things which earlier were suspicious—made the matter open and manifest

XX.55. Cum in consilium iri oporteret, quaesivit ab reo C. Iunius quaesitor, ex lege illa Cornelia quae tum erat, clam an palam de se sententiam ferri vellet: de Oppianici sententia responsum est, quod is Habiti familiarem Iunium esse dicebat, clam velle ferri. Itum est in consilium. Omnibus sententiis praeter unam, quam suam Staienus esse dicebat, Scamander prima actione condemnatus est.

20.55. When it was necessary to go into deliberation, Gaius Junius, the inquisitor, asked the defendant, under that Cornelian law which was then in force, whether he wished the vote concerning himself to be taken secretly or openly: it was answered, in accordance with Oppianicus’s opinion—since he said that Junius was a familiar of Habitus—that he wished it to be taken secretly. They went into deliberation. By all the votes except one, which Staienus said was his own, Scamander was condemned at the first action.

Quis tum erat omnium qui Scamandro condemnato non iudicium de Oppianico factum esse arbitraretur? Quid est illa damnatione iudicatum nisi venenum id, quod Habito daretur, esse quaesitum? quae porro tenuissima suspicio collata in Scamandrum est aut conferri potuit, ut is sua sponte necare voluisse Habitum putaretur?

Who then was there among all who, with Scamander condemned, would not think that a judgment had been rendered concerning Oppianicus?What was adjudged by that condemnation except that the poison which was to be given to Habitus had been procured?Moreover, what most tenuous suspicion was cast upon Scamander, or could have been cast, such that he should be thought to have wished of his own accord to kill Habitus?

56. Atque hoc tum iudicio facto et Oppianico re et existimatione iam, lege et pronuntiatione nondum condemnato, tamen Habitus Oppianicum reum statim non fecit. Voluit cognoscere utrum iudices in eos solos essent severi quos venenum habuisse ipsos comperissent, an etiam consilia conscientiasque eius modi facinorum supplicio dignas iudicarent. Itaque C. Fabricium, quem propter familiaritatem Oppianici conscium illi facinori fuisse arbitrabatur, reum statim fecit, utique ei locus primus constitueretur propter causae coniunctionem impetravit.

56. And with this judgment then rendered, and Oppianicus already condemned in fact and in estimation, though not yet by law and by pronouncement, nevertheless Habitus did not immediately make Oppianicus a defendant. He wished to learn whether the judges were severe only against those whom they had discovered to have had the poison themselves, or whether they also judged the counsels and consciences of crimes of that sort worthy of punishment. And so he immediately made Gaius Fabricius a defendant, whom, on account of his familiarity with Oppianicus, he supposed to have been privy to that crime, and in particular he obtained that first place be assigned to him because of the connection of the cause.

Hic tum Fabricius non modo ad me meos vicinos et amicos Aletrinates non adduxit, sed ipse eis neque defensioribus uti postea neque laudatoribus potuit; 57. rem enim integram hominis non alieni quamvis suspiciosam defendere humanitatis esse putabamus, iudicatam labefactare conari impudentiae. Itaque tum ille inopia et necessitate coactus in causa eius modi ad Caepasios fratres confugit, homines industrios atque eo animo ut quaecumque dicendi potestas esset data in honore atque in beneficio ponerent

Then Fabricius not only did not bring to me my neighbors and friends the Aletrinates, but he himself afterwards could not make use of them either as defenders or as laudators; 57. for we thought it an act of humanity to defend an entire case, however suspicious, of a man not alien to us, but to try to undermine a case already judged an act of impudence. And so then he, compelled by indigence and necessity, in a case of that sort fled for refuge to the Caepasii brothers, industrious men and of such a mind that whatever power of speaking was given they would place among honors and as a beneficium.

XXI.Iam hoc prope iniquissime comparatum est quod in morbis corporis, ut quisque est difficillimus, ita medicus nobilissimus atque optimus quaeritur, in periculis capitis, ut quaeque causa difficillima est, ita deterrimus obscurissimusque patronus adhibetur; nisi forte hoc causae est, quod medici nihil praeter artificium, oratores etiam auctoritatem praestare debent. 58. Citatur reus, paucis verbis accusat, ut de re iudicata, Cannutius: incipit longo et alte petito prooemio respondere maior Caepasius.

CHAPTER 21. Now this has been arranged well-nigh most unjustly: that in diseases of the body, as each is more difficult, so the most noble and best physician is sought out; in capital perils, as each case is most difficult, so the worst and most obscure patron/advocate is employed; unless perhaps this is the cause, that physicians need provide nothing beyond art/technique, whereas orators must also furnish authority. 58. The defendant is cited; Cannutius accuses in a few words, as about a res iudicata: the elder Caepasius begins to respond with a long and far-fetched proem.

Primo attente auditur eius oratio. Erigebat animum iam demissum et oppressum Oppianicus; gaudebat ipse Fabricius; non intellegebat animos iudicum non illius eloquentia, sed defensionis impudentia commoveri. Postea quam de re coepit dicere, ad ea quae erant in causa addebat etiam ipse nova quaedam vulnera, ut, quamquam sedulo faciebat, tamen interdum non defendere, sed praevaricari accusationi videretur.

At first his oration is heard attentively. Oppianicus was now raising up his spirit, downcast and oppressed; Fabricius himself rejoiced; he did not understand that the minds of the jurors were being moved not by that man’s eloquence, but by the impudence of the defense. Afterwards, when he began to speak about the matter, to those things which were in the case he himself was adding certain new wounds, so that, although he was acting diligently, nevertheless at times he seemed not to defend, but to prevaricate in aid of the accusation.

Itaque cum callidissime se dicere putaret et cum illa verba gravissima ex intimo artificio deprompsisset, 'Respicite, iudices, hominum fortunas, respicite dubios variosque casus, respicite C. Fabrici senectutem' – cum hoc 'respicite' ornandae orationis causa saepe dixisset, respexit ipse: at C. Fabricius a subselliis demisso capite discesserat. 59. Hic iudices ridere, stomachari atque acerbe ferre patronus causam sibi eripi et se cetera de illo loco 'Respicite, iudices,' non posse dicere; nec quicquam propius est factum quam ut illum persequeretur et collo obtorto ad subsellia reduceret, ut reliqua posset perorare. Ita tum Fabricius primum suo iudicio, quod est gravissimum, deinde legis vi et sententiis iudicum est condemnatus.

And so, when he thought he was speaking most cunningly and, when he had drawn forth from the innermost of his art those most weighty words, 'Have regard, judges, to the fortunes of men, have regard to the doubtful and various chances, have regard to the old age of C. Fabricius'—when for the sake of ornamenting his speech he had often said this 'have regard,' he looked back himself: but C. Fabricius had departed from the benches with his head bowed. 59. Here the judges laughed, were vexed, and took it bitterly that the patron was having the case snatched from him and that he could not say the rest from that place, 'Have regard, judges'; and nothing was nearer to being done than that he should pursue him and, with his neck twisted, lead him back to the benches, so that he could finish the remainder of the peroration. Thus then Fabricius was condemned first by his own judgment, which is most weighty, then by the force of the law and by the sentences of the judges.

XXII.Quid est quod iam de Oppianici persona causaque plura dicamus? Apud eosdem iudices reus est factus, cum his duobus praeiudiciis iam damnatus esset; ab isdem autem iudicibus qui Fabriciorum damnatione de Oppianico iudicarant, locus ei primus est constitutus; accusatus est criminibus gravissimis, et eis quae a me breviter dicta sunt, et praeterea multis quae nunc ego omnia omitto; accusatus est apud eos qui Scamandrum ministrum Oppianici, C. Fabricium conscium maleficii condemnarant.

22.What more is there that we should now say about the person and the case of Oppianicus? He was made a defendant before the same judges, when by these two prejudgments he had already been condemned; and by those same judges who, from the condemnation of the Fabricii, had formed a judgment about Oppianicus, the first place was assigned to him; he was accused on the gravest charges, both those which have been briefly spoken by me, and besides many which I now entirely omit; he was accused before those who had condemned Scamander, the minister of Oppianicus, and Gaius Fabricius, an accomplice in the crime.

60. Utrum, per deos immortales! magis est mirandum, quod is condemnatus est, an quod omnino respondere ausus est? Quid enim illi iudices facere potuerunt?

60. Which, by the immortal gods! is more to be wondered at: that he was condemned, or that he dared to make any answer at all? What, indeed, could those judges do?

qui si innocentes Fabricios condemnassent, tamen in Oppianico sibi constare et superioribus consentire iudiciis debuerunt. An vero illi sua per se ipsi iudicia rescinderent, cum ceteri soleant in iudicando ne ab aliorum iudiciis discrepent providere? et ei qui Fabrici libertum, quia minister in maleficio fuerat, patronum, quia conscius, condemnassent, ipsum principem atque architectum sceleris absolverent?

who, even if they had condemned the innocent Fabricii, nevertheless ought, in the case of Oppianicus, to be consistent with themselves and to consent to their prior judgments. Or in truth would they themselves rescind their own judgments, since others are wont, in judging, to take care not to disagree with the judgments of others? and would they who had condemned Fabricius’s freedman, because he had been a minister in the malefaction, and his patron, because privy, acquit the very prince and architect of the crime?

et qui ceteros nullo praeiudicio facto tamen ex ipsa causa condemnassent, hunc, quem bis iam condemnatum acceperant, liberarent? Tum vero illa iudicia senatoria, non falsa invidia sed vera atque insigni turpitudine notata atque operta dedecore et infamia, defensioni locum nullum reliquissent. Quid enim tandem illi iudices responderent, si qui ab eis quaereret: 'Condemnastis Scamandrum: quo crimine?' 'Nempe, quod Habitum per servum medici veneno necare voluisset.' 'Quid Habiti morte Scamander consequebatur?' 'Nihil, sed administer erat Oppianici.' 'Et condemnastis C. Fabricium: quid ita?' 'Quia, cum ipse familiarissime Oppianico usus, libertus autem eius in maleficio deprehensus esset, illum expertem eius consilii fuisse non probabatur.' Si igitur ipsum Oppianicum bis suis iudiciis condemnatum absolvissent, quis tantam turpitudinem iudiciorum, quis tantam inconstantiam rerum iudicatarum, quis tantam libidinem iudicum ferre potuisset?

and those who, with no prejudgment made, had nevertheless condemned the others from the case itself, would they free this man, whom they had already received as condemned twice? Then indeed those senatorial judgments, marked not by false envy but by true and signal turpitude and covered over with disgrace and infamy, would have left no place at all for a defense. For what, pray, would those judges have answered, if someone were to ask them: 'You condemned Scamander: on what charge?' 'Namely, that he had wished to kill Habitus with poison through the physician’s slave.' 'What was Scamander to gain by the death of Habitus?' 'Nothing, but he was an assistant of Oppianicus.' 'And you condemned C. Fabricius: why so?' 'Because, since he himself had been on the most intimate terms with Oppianicus, and his freedman had been apprehended in the malefice, it was not proven that he had been uninvolved in that plan.' If, therefore, they had acquitted Oppianicus himself, condemned twice by their own judgments, who could have borne such turpitude of the courts, such inconstancy of adjudicated matters (res judicatae), such wanton caprice of the judges?

62. Quod si hoc videtis, quod iam hac omni oratione patefactum est, illo iudicio reum condemnari, praesertim ab isdem iudicibus qui duo praeiudicia fecissent, necesse fuisse, simul illud videatis necesse est, nullam accusatori causam esse potuisse cur iudicium vellet corrumpere

62. But if you see this—that now by this whole oration has been laid open—that in that judgment it was necessary for the defendant to be condemned, especially by the same judges who had made two prejudgments, at the same time you must see this: that no cause could have existed for the accuser why he should have wished to corrupt the court.

XXIII.Quaero enim de te, T. Acci, relictis iam ceteris argumentis omnibus, num Fabricios quoque innocentes condemnatos existimes, num etiam illa iudicia pecunia corrupta esse dicas, quibus in iudiciis alter a Staieno solo absolutus est, alter etiam ipse se condemnavit. Age, si nocentes, cuius maleficii?

23.For I ask of you, Titus Accius, with all the other arguments now set aside, whether you think that the Fabricii too were innocents condemned, whether you also say that those judgments were corrupted by money—in which trials the one was acquitted by Staienus alone, the other even condemned himself. Come then, if they were guilty, of what malefaction?

num quid praeter venenum quaesitum, quo Habitus necaretur, obiectum est? num quid aliud in illis iudiciis versatum est praeter hasce insidias Habito ab Oppianico per Fabricium factas? Nihil: nihil, inquam, aliud, iudices, reperietis.

Was anything, besides a poison procured by which Habitus might be killed, alleged? Was anything else dealt with in those trials besides these very plots against Habitus, carried out by Oppianicus through Fabricius? Nothing: nothing else, I say, judges, you will find.

Exstat memoria, sunt tabulae publicae: redargue me, si mentior: testium dicta recita: doce in illorum iudiciis quid praeter hoc venenum Oppianici non modo in criminis, sed in male dicti loco sit obiectum. 63. Multa dici possunt qua re ita necesse fuerit iudicari, sed ego occurram exspectationi vestrae, iudices. Nam etsi a vobis sic audior ut numquam benignius neque attentius quemquam auditum putem, tamen vocat me alio iam dudum tacita vestra exspectatio, quae mihi obloqui videtur: 'quid ergo?

There is recollection, the public records exist: refute me, if I lie: recite the sayings of the witnesses: show in those trials what, besides this poison of Oppianicus, was thrown up not only in the place of a crime, but even in the place of ill-speech. 63. Many things can be said as to why it was necessary to judge thus, but I will meet your expectation, judges. For although I am heard by you in such a way that I think no one has ever been listened to more benignly nor more attentively, nevertheless your silent expectation has long now been calling me elsewhere, which seems to me to speak against me: 'what then?

negasne illud iudicium esse corruptum?' Non nego, sed ab hoc corruptum non esse confirmo. 'A quo igitur est corruptum?' Opinor, primum, si incertum fuisset quisnam exitus illius iudicii futurus esset, veri similius tamen esset eum potius corrupisse qui metuisset ne ipse condemnaretur, quam illum qui veritus esset ne alter absolveretur; deinde cum esset non dubium quid iudicari necesse esset, eum certe potius qui sibi alia ratione diffideret, quam eum qui omni ratione confideret; postremo certe potius illum qui bis apud eos iudices offendisset, quam eum qui bis causam eis probavisset. 64. Unum quidem certe nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio qui mihi non concedat, si constet corruptum illud esse iudicium, aut ab Habito aut ab Oppianico esse corruptum: si doceo non ab Habito, vinco ab Oppianico; si ostendo ab Oppianico, purgo Habitum.

‘Do you deny that that judgment was corrupted?’ I do not deny it, but I affirm that it was not corrupted by this man. ‘By whom, then, was it corrupted?’ I opine, first, if it had been uncertain what the outcome of that judgment would be, it would nevertheless be more plausible that the man who feared lest he himself be condemned had been the one to corrupt it, rather than the one who feared lest the other be acquitted; next, since it was not in doubt what it was necessary to adjudge, certainly rather he who in other respect distrusted himself, than he who in every respect was confident; finally, assuredly rather the man who had twice offended before those judges, than the one who had twice made his cause approved by them. 64. One thing at least surely no one will be so hostile to Cluentius as not to grant me: if it be established that that judgment was corrupted, it was corrupted either by Habitus or by Oppianicus: if I teach that it was not by Habitus, I win that it was by Oppianicus; if I show it was by Oppianicus, I purge Habitus.

Qua re, etsi satis docui rationem nullam huic corrumpendi iudicii fuisse, ex quo intellegitur ab Oppianico esse corruptum, tamen de illo ipso separatim cognoscite.

Wherefore, although I have sufficiently shown that there was no rationale for this man to corrupt the judgment, whence it is understood that it was corrupted by Oppianicus, nevertheless concerning that very point do you inquire separately.

XXIV.Atque ego illa non argumentabor, quae sunt gravia vehementer, eum corrupisse qui in periculo fuerit, eum qui metuerit, eum qui spem salutis in alia ratione non habuerit, eum qui semper singulari fuerit audacia. Multa sunt eius modi; verum cum habeam rem non dubiam sed apertam atque manifestam, enumeratio singulorum argumentorum non est necessaria.

24.And I will not argue those points which are exceedingly grave, that he corrupted it who was in peril, he who was afraid, he who had no hope of safety by any other method, he who was always of singular audacity. There are many things of that kind; but since I have a matter not doubtful but open and manifest, an enumeration of the individual arguments is not necessary.

65. Dico C. Aelio Staieno iudici pecuniam grandem Statium Albium ad corrumpendum iudicium dedisse. Num quis negat? Te, Oppianice, appello, te, T. Acci, quorum alter eloquentia damnationem illam, alter tacita pietate deplorat: audete negare ab Oppianico Staieno iudici pecuniam datam, negate, inquam, in eo loco.

65. I say that Statius Albius gave to Gaius Aelius Staienus, the judge, a great sum of money to corrupt the judgment. Does anyone deny it? You, Oppianicus, I appeal to you; you, Titus Accius—of whom the one laments that condemnation by eloquence, the other by silent pietas—dare to deny that money was given by Oppianicus to the judge Staienus; deny it, I say, in that place.

Quid tacetis? an negare non potestis quod repetistis, quod confessi estis, quod abstulistis? Quo tandem igitur ore mentionem corrupti iudicii facitis, cum ab ista parte iudici pecuniam ante iudicium datam, post iudicium ereptam esse fateamini?

Why are you silent? Or can you not deny what you have sought to recover, what you have confessed, what you have taken away? With what face, then, do you make mention of a corrupted judgment, when you admit that on that side money was given to the judge before the judgment, and after the judgment was snatched away?

Quonam igitur haec modo gesta sunt? 66. Repetam paulo altius, iudices, et omnia quae in diuturna obscuritate latuerunt sic aperiam ut ea cernere oculis videamini. Vos quaeso – ut adhuc me attente audistis – item quae reliqua sunt audiatis: profecto nihil a me dicetur quod non dignum hoc conventu et silentio, dignum vestris studiis atque auribus esse videatur.

So then, in what manner were these things done? 66. I will go back a little higher, judges, and I will so open up all the things which have lain hidden in long obscurity that you may seem to discern them with your eyes. I ask you—just as you have thus far listened to me attentively—likewise to listen to what remains: assuredly nothing will be said by me that does not seem worthy of this assembly and silence, worthy of your zeal and your ears.

Nam ut primum Oppianicus ex eo quod Scamander reus erat factus quid sibi impenderet coepit suspicari, statim se ad hominis egentis, audacis, in iudiciis corrumpendis exercitati, tum autem iudicis, Staieni familiaritatem applicavit. Ac primum Scamandro reo tantum donis muneribusque perfecerat ut eo fautore uteretur cupidiore quam fides iudicis postulabat. 67. Post autem cum esset Scamander unius Staieni sententia absolutus, patronus autem Scamandri ne sua quidem sententia liberatus, acrioribus saluti suae remediis subveniendum putavit.

For as soon as Oppianicus, from the fact that Scamander had been made a defendant, began to suspect what was impending for himself, at once he attached himself to the familiarity of Staienus—a man needy, daring, practiced in the corrupting of trials, and at that time a judge. And at first, in the case of the defendant Scamander, he had accomplished so much by gifts and presents that he used him as a supporter more greedy than the good faith of a judge demanded. 67. Afterwards, however, when Scamander was acquitted by the single vote of Staienus, but Scamander’s patron was not even freed by his own vote, he thought that more vigorous remedies had to be brought to the aid of his safety.

Tum ab Staieno, sicut ab homine ad excogitandum acutissimo, ad audendum impudentissimo, ad efficiendum acerrimo – haec enim ille et aliqua ex parte habebat et maiore ex parte se habere simulabat – auxilium capiti ac fortunis suis petere coepit

Then from Staienus, as from a man most acute for contriving, most impudent for daring, most keen for effecting—for he did in some part have these qualities, and in greater part pretended to have them—he began to seek help for his life and his fortunes

XXV.Iam hoc non ignoratis, iudices, ut etiam bestiae fame monitae plerumque ad eum locum ubi pastae sint aliquando revertantur. 68. Staienus ille biennio ante, cum causam bonorum Safini Atellae recepisset, sescentis milibus nummum se iudicium corrupturum esse dixerat: quae cum accepisset a pupillo suppressit, iudicioque facto nec Safinio nec bonorum emptoribus reddidit.

25.Now you are not unaware of this, judges, that even beasts, admonished by hunger, often return to that place where they have at some time fed. 68. That Staienus, two years before, when he had undertaken at Atella the case concerning the goods of Safinius, said that he would corrupt the judgment for six hundred thousand sesterces: and when he had received this from the ward, he suppressed it, and with the trial concluded he returned it neither to Safinius nor to the purchasers of the goods.

Quam cum pecuniam profudisset et sibi nihil non modo ad cupiditates suas, sed ne ad necessitatem quidem reliquisset, statuit ad easdem esse sibi praedas ac suppressiones iudicales revertendum. Itaque cum Oppianicum iam perditum et duobus iugulatum praeiudiciis videret, promissis suis eum excitavit abiectum et simul saluti desperare vetuit: Oppianicus autem orare hominem coepit ut sibi rationem ostenderet iudicii corrumpendi. Ille autem, quem ad modum ex ipso Oppianico postea est auditum, negavit quemquam esse in civitate praeter se qui id efficere possit.

When he had squandered that money and had left himself nothing, not only for his desires but not even for necessity, he resolved that he must return to those same plunders and judicial suppressions. Accordingly, when he saw Oppianicus already ruined and strangled by two prejudgments, he roused the dejected man by his promises and at the same time forbade him to despair of safety; but Oppianicus began to entreat the man to show him the method of corrupting the judgment. He, however, as was later heard from Oppianicus himself, denied that there was anyone in the state besides himself who could effect that.

Sed primo gravari coepit, quod aedilitatem se petere cum hominibus nobilissimis et invidiam atque offensionem timere dicebat; post exoratus initio permagnam pecuniam poposcit; deinde ad id pervenit quod confici potuis, HS sescenta quadraginta milia deferri ad se domum iussit. Quae pecunia simul atque ad eum delata est, homo impurissimus statim coepit in eius modi mente et cogitatione versari, nihil esse suis rationibus utilius quam Oppianicum condemnari; illo absoluto pecuniam illam aut iudicibus dispertiendam aut ipsi esse reddundam; damnato repetiturum esse neminem. 70. Itaque rem excogitat singularem.

But at first he began to be reluctant, saying that he was a candidate for the aedileship with very noble men and that he feared envy and offense; afterward, having been entreated, at the outset he demanded a very large sum of money; then he came to that which could be effected: he ordered HS 640,000 to be brought to his house. Which money, as soon as it was delivered to him, the most impure man at once began to turn over in a mind and cogitation of this sort—that nothing was more useful to his calculations than for Oppianicus to be condemned; if that man were acquitted, that money would either have to be distributed to the judges or be returned to himself; if he were condemned, no one would reclaim it. 70. And so he devises a singular scheme.

Atque haec, iudices, quae vera dicuntur a nobis, facilius credetis si cum animis vestris longo intervallo recordari C. Staieni vitam et naturam volueritis; nam perinde ut opinio est de cuiusque moribus, ita quid ab eo factum aut non factum sit existimari potest.

And these things, judges, which are said by us to be true, you will more easily believe if you are willing, with your minds, after a long interval, to recall the life and nature of Gaius Staienus; for just as the opinion is about each man’s morals, so can it be estimated what has or has not been done by him.

XXVI.Cum esset egens, sumptuosus, audax, callidus, perfidiosus, et cum domi suae miserrimis in locis et inanissimis tantum nummorum positum videret, ad omnem malitiam et fraudem versare suam mentem coepit: 'Ego dem iudicibus? mihi ipsi igitur praeter periculum et infamiam quid quaeretur?

26.Since he was needy, extravagant, audacious, cunning, perfidious, and since in the most wretched and emptiest places of his own house he saw so much money laid up, he began to turn his mind to every malice and fraud: 'I give to the judges? for myself then, besides peril and infamy, what will be sought?

Nihil excogitem quam ob rem Oppianicum damnari necesse sit? Quid tandem, – nihil enim est quod non fieri possit, – si quis eum forte casus ex periculo eripuerit, nonne reddundum est? Praecipitantem igitur impellamus' inquit 'et perditum prosternamus.' 71. Capit hoc consilii, ut pecuniam quibusdam iudicibus levissimis polliceatur, deinde eam postea supprimat, ut, quoniam graves homines sua sponte severe iudicaturos putabat, eos qui leviores erant destitutione iratos Oppianico redderet.

Shall I devise nothing whereby Oppianicus must be condemned? What then— for there is nothing that cannot be done— if some chance should by luck snatch him from danger, must it not be given back? “Therefore let us shove the man already headlong,” he says, “and cast down the ruined one.” 71. He adopts this plan: to promise money to certain very frivolous judges, and then afterward to suppress it, so that, since he thought the weighty men would of their own accord judge severely, he might, by their being left in the lurch, render those who were lighter angry against Oppianicus.

Itaque, ut erat semper praeposterus atque perversus, initium facit a Bulbo, et eum, quod iam diu nihil quaesierat, tristem atque oscitantem leviter impellit. 'Quid tu?' inquit, ecquid me adiuvas, Bulbe, ne gratis rei publicae serviamus?' Ille vero, simul atque hoc audivit 'ne gratis,' 'Quo voles,' inquit 'sequar: sed quid adfers?' Tum ei HS quadraginta milia, si esset absolutus Oppianicus, pollicetur, et eum ut ceteros appellet quibuscum loqui consuesset rogat. 72. Atque etiam ipse conditor totius negotii Guttam aspergit huic Bulbo; itaque minime amarus eis visus est qui aliquid ex eius sermone speculae degustarant.

And so, as he was always topsy-turvy and perverse, he makes a beginning with Bulbus, and, since for a long time he had earned nothing, he lightly prods him, gloomy and yawning. 'What about you?' he says, 'will you help me at all, Bulbus, so that we not serve the commonwealth for free?' He indeed, as soon as he heard the words 'not for free,' said, 'Where you will, I will follow; but what do you bring?' Then he promises him 40,000 sesterces, if Oppianicus were acquitted, and asks him to accost the others with whom he was accustomed to speak. 72. And the founder himself of the whole business even sprinkles a drop upon this Bulbus; and so he did not seem at all bitter to those who had tasted some specimen from his talk.

Unus et alter dies intercesserat cum res parum certa videbatur: sequester et confirmator pecuniae desiderabatur. Tum appellat hilaro vultu hominem Bulbus, ut blandissime potest: 'Quid tu,' inquit 'Paete?' – hoc enim sibi Staienus cognomen ex imaginibus Aeliorum delegerat, ne, si se Ligurem fecisset, nationis magis quam generis uti cognomine videretur – 'qua de re mecum locutus es, quaerunt a me ubi sit pecunia.' Hic ille planus improbissimus, quaestu iudiciario pastus, qui illi pecuniae quam condiderat spe iam atque animo incubaret, contrahit frontem – recordamini faciem atque illos eius fictos simulatosque vultus – et, qui esset totus ex fraude et mendacio factus, quique ea vitia quae a natura habebat etiam studio atque artificio quodam malitiae condivisset, pulchre adseverat sese ab Oppianico destitutum, atque hoc addit testimonii, sua illum sententia, cum palam omnes laturi essent, condemnatum iri

A day or two had intervened, when the matter seemed rather uncertain: a sequester and confirmator of the money was being wanted. Then Bulbus, with a cheerful countenance, addresses the man as most coaxingly as he can: 'Well then,' says he, 'Paete?'—for Staienus had chosen this cognomen for himself from the images of the Aelii, lest, if he had made himself a Ligur, he might seem to use a surname of a nation rather than of a clan—'about the matter on which you spoke with me, they are asking me where the money is.' Then that most shameless pettifogger, fed on judicial profit, who was already brooding in hope and mind upon that money which he had stowed away, knits his brow—recall his face and those feigned and counterfeited expressions of his—and, being made up wholly out of fraud and mendacity, and having even by study and by a certain art of malice seasoned the vices which he had from nature, neatly asseverates that he has been deserted by Oppianicus, and he adds this as testimony: that by his own vote, since all were going to deliver openly, he would be condemned.

XXVII.73. Manarat sermo in consilio pecuniae quandam mentionem inter iudices esse versatam: res neque tam fuerat occulta quam erat occultanda, neque tam erat aperta quam rei publicae causa aperienda. In ea obscuritate ac dubitatione omnium Cannutio, perito homini, qui quodam odore suspicionis Staienum corruptum esse sensisset neque dum rem perfectam arbitraretur, placuit repente pronuntiari DIXERUNT. Hic tum Oppianicus non magno opere pertimuit; rem a Staieno perfectam esse arbitrabatur.

27.73. Talk had spread in the council that some mention of money had been bandied about among the judges: the matter had neither been so hidden as it ought to have been hidden, nor so open as, for the sake of the commonwealth, it ought to have been opened. In that obscurity and hesitation of everyone, to Cannutius, an experienced man—who by a certain odor of suspicion had sensed that Staienus had been corrupted and did not yet suppose the business completed—it seemed good that THEY HAVE VOTED be suddenly pronounced. Then Oppianicus was not greatly afraid; he supposed the affair had been completed by Staienus.

74. In consilium erant ituri iudices XXXII; sententiis XVI absolutio confici poterat; quadragena milia nummum in singulos iudices distributa eum numerum sententiarum conficere debebant, ut ad cumulum spe maiorum praemiorum ipsius Staieni sententia septima decima accederet. Atque etiam casu tum, quod illud repente erat factum, Staienus ipse non aderat; causam nescio quam apud iudicem defendebat. Facile hoc Habitus patiebatur, facile Cannutius, at non Oppianicus neque patronus eius L. Quinctius; qui cum esset illo tempore tribunus plebis, convicium C. Iunio iudici quaestionis maximum fecit ut ne sine illo in consilium iretur; cumque id ei per viatores consulto neglegentius agi videretur, ipse e publico iudicio ad privatum Staieni iudicium profectus est et illud pro potestate dimitti iussit; Staienum ipse ad subsellia adduxit.

74. The judges, 32 in number, were about to go into deliberation; with 16 votes an acquittal could be effected; forty thousand coins, distributed to each judge, ought to make up that number of votes, so that, for good measure, with the hope of greater rewards, the vote of Staienus himself, the seventeenth, would be added. And also by chance then, because that had come about suddenly, Staienus himself was not present; he was defending some case before a judge. Habitus put up with this easily, Cannutius easily, but not Oppianicus nor his patron L. Quinctius; who, since he was at that time tribune of the plebs, raised the greatest outcry against C. Junius, the judge of the court of inquiry, to the effect that they should not go into deliberation without him; and since it seemed to him that this was being handled deliberately more negligently by the attendants, he himself set out from the public court to the private case of Staienus and, by authority of his office, ordered that to be dismissed; he himself led Staienus to the benches.

75. Consurgitur in consilium, cum sententias Oppianicus, quae tum erat potestas, palam ferri velle dixisset, ut Staienus scire posset quid cuique deberetur. Varia iudicum genera: nummarii pauci, sed omnes irati. Ut qui accipere in campo consuerunt eis candidatis quorum nummos suppressos esse putant inimicissimi solent esse, sic eius modi iudices infesti tum reo venerant; ceteri nocentissimum esse arbitrabantur, sed exspectabant sententias eorum quos corruptos esse putabant, ut ex eis constituerent a quo iudicium corruptum videretur

75. They rise to go into council, when Oppianicus had said that he wished the votes, which at that time it was in his power, to be cast openly, so that Staienus might know what was owed to each. Various kinds of judges: money-men few, but all angry. Just as those who are accustomed to receive on the Campus are wont to be most inimical to those candidates whose coins they think have been withheld, so judges of that sort had then come hostile to the defendant; the rest thought him most guilty, but were awaiting the votes of those whom they believed to have been corrupted, so that from them they might determine by whom the court seemed to have been corrupted

XVIII.Ecce tibi eius modi sortitio ut in primis Bulbo et Staieno et Guttae esset iudicandum! Summa omnium exspectatio quidnam sententiae ferrent leves ac nummarii iudices.

18.Behold for you a sortition of such a kind that, among the first, it had to be judged by Bulbus and Staienus and Gutta! The highest expectation of all was what votes the flighty and nummary judges would cast.

Atque illi omnes sine ulla dubitatione condemnant. 76. Hic tum iniectus est hominibus scrupulus et quaedam dubitatio quidnam esset actum. Deinde homines sapientes et ex vetere illa disciplina iudiciorum, qui neque absolvere hominem nocentissimum possent, neque eum de quo esset orta suspicio pecunia oppugnatum, re illa incognita, primo condemnare vellent, non liquere dixerunt.

And those men all condemn without any hesitation. 76. Then a scruple and a certain doubt were cast into people as to what had been done. Then men wise and from that old discipline of the courts, who could neither acquit a most guilty man, nor, with that matter unknown, at first wish to condemn the one about whom suspicion had arisen that he had been assailed with money, said that it was not clear.

Non nulli autem severi homines – qui hoc statuerunt, quo quisque animo quid faceret spectari oportere – etsi alii pecunia accepta verum iudicabant, tamen nihilo minus se superioribus suis iudiciis constare putabant oportere; itaque damnarunt. Quinque omnino fuerunt qui illum vestrum innocentem Oppianicum sive imprudentia sive misericordia sive aliqua suspicione sive ambitione adducti absolverunt.

But some strict men — who had established this principle, that one ought to look at with what spirit each person did something — although others, even with money received, were delivering a true judgment, nevertheless thought that they ought to be consistent with their former judgments; and so they condemned. There were in all five who acquitted that innocent of yours, Oppianicus, whether led by imprudence or by mercy or by some suspicion or by ambition.

77. Condemnato Oppianico statim L. Quinctius, homo maxime popularis, qui omnes rumorum et contionum ventos colligere consuesset, oblatam sibi facultatem putavit ut ex invidia senatoria posset crescere, quod eius ordinis iudicia minus iam probari populo arbitrabatur. Habetur una atque altera contio vehemens et gravis: accepisse pecuniam iudices ut innocentem reum condemnarent, tribunus plebis clamitabat; agi fortunas omnium dicebat; nulla esse iudicia; qui pecuniosum inimicum haberet, incolumem esse neminem posse. Homines totius ignari negotii, qui Oppianicum numquam vidissent, virum optimum et hominem pudentissimum pecunia oppressum esse arbitrarentur, incensi suspicione rem in medium vocare coeperunt et causam illam totam deposcere.

77. With Oppianicus condemned, immediately L. Quinctius, a man most popular, who was accustomed to gather all the winds of rumors and of public assemblies, thought that an opportunity had been offered to him to be able to grow from senatorial odium, because he judged that the judgments of that order were now less approved by the people. One and then another mass-meeting is held, vehement and grave: that the jurors had received money to condemn an innocent defendant, the tribune of the plebs kept shouting; he said the fortunes of all were being dealt with; that there were no courts; that whoever had a wealthy enemy, no one could be safe. Men wholly ignorant of the affair, who had never seen Oppianicus, supposed that a most excellent man and a most modest man had been crushed by money; inflamed by suspicion they began to call the matter into the open and to demand that whole case.

78. Atque illo ipso tempore in aedes T. Anni, hominis honestissimi, necessarii et amici mei, noctu Staienus arcessitus ab Oppianico venit. Iam cetera nota sunt omnibus: ut cum illo Oppianicus egerit de pecunia, ut ille se redditurum esse dixerit, ut eum sermonem audierint omnem viri boni qui tum consulto propter in occulto stetissent, ut res patefacta et in forum prolata et pecunia omnis Staieno extorta atque erepta sit

78. And at that very time into the house of T. Annius, a most honorable man, my close associate and friend, by night Staienus, summoned by Oppianicus, came. Now the rest is known to everyone: how Oppianicus dealt with him about the money, how he said that he would render it back, how all good men, who then had purposely stood close by in hiding, heard the whole conversation, how the matter was laid open and brought into the forum and all the money was extorted and snatched from Staienus.

XXIX.Huius Staieni persona populo iam nota atque perspecta ab nulla turpi suspicione abhorrebat. Suppressam esse ab eo pecuniam quam pro reo pronuntiasset, qui erant in contione non intellegebant, (neque enim docebantur); versatam esse in iudicio mentionem pecuniae sentiebant; innocentem reum condemnatum audiebant; Staieni sententia condemnatum videbant; non gratis id ab eo factum esse, quod hominem norant, iudicabant.

29.The persona of this Staienus, already known and examined by the people, shrank from no base suspicion. That the money which he had pronounced for the defendant had been suppressed by him, those who were in the assembly did not understand (for they were not being instructed); they perceived that mention of money had been bandied about in the judgment; they heard that an innocent defendant had been condemned; they saw that he had been condemned by Staienus’s sentence; they judged, since they knew the man, that this had not been done by him for nothing.

Similis in Bulbo, in Gutta, in aliis non nullis suspicio consistebat. 79. Itaque confiteor – licet enim iam impune, hoc praesertim in loco, confiteri – quod Oppianici non modo vita, sed etiam nomen ante illud tempus populo ignotum fuisset, indignissimum porro videretur circumventum esse innocentem pecunia, hanc deinde suspicionem augeret Staieni improbitas et non nullorum eius similium iudicum turpitudo, causam autem ageret L. Quinctius, homo cum summa potestate praeditus, tum ad inflammandos animos multitudinis accommodatus, summam illi iudicio invidiam infamiamque esse conflatam; atque in hanc flammam recentem tum C. Iunium, qui illi quaestioni praefuerat, iniectum esse memini, et illum hominem aedilicium iam praetorem opinionibus omnium constitutum, non disceptatione dicendi, sed clamore hominum de foro atque adeo de civitate esse sublatum.

80. Neque me paenitet hoc tempore potius quam illo causam A. Cluenti defendere. Causa enim manet eadem, quae mutari nullo modo potest: temporis iniquitas atque invidia recessit, ut quod in tempore mali fuit nihil obsit, quod in causa boni fuit prosit. Itaque nunc quem ad modum audiar sentio, non modo ab eis quorum iudicium ac potestas est, sed etiam ab illis quorum tantum est existimatio; at tum si dicerem, non audirer, non quod alia res esset, immo eadem, sed tempus aliud

80. Nor do I regret defending the case of A. Cluentius at this time rather than at that one. For the cause remains the same, which can in no way be changed: the iniquity of the time and the ill-will have receded, so that what was evil in the timing hinders nothing, and what was good in the cause profits. Accordingly now I perceive in what manner I am listened to, not only by those whose judgment and power it is, but also by those whose concern is only estimation; but then, if I were to speak, I would not be heard, not because the matter was other—nay, the same—but the time different

XXX.Id adeo sic cognoscite. Quis tum auderet dicere nocentem condemnatum esse Oppianicum?

30.Know this, accordingly, thus. Who then would have dared to say that Oppianicus was condemned as guilty?

quis nunc audet negare? Quis tum posset arguere ab Oppianico temptatum esse iudicium pecunia? quis id hoc tempore infitiari potest?

who now dares to deny? Who then could argue that the court had been tampered with by Oppianicus with money? who at this time can deny it?

Cui tum liceret docere Oppianicum reum factum esse tum denique cum duobus proximis praeiudiciis condemnatus esset? quis est qui id hoc tempore infirmare conetur? 81. Qua re invidia remota, quam dies mitigavit, oratio mea deprecata est, vestra fides atque aequitas a veritatis disceptatione reiecit, quid est praeterea quod in causa relinquatur?

To whom at that time would it have been permitted to show that Oppianicus had been made a defendant then at last, when he had been condemned by two most recent prejudgments? who is there who at this time tries to invalidate that? 81. Wherefore, prejudice removed, which the day has mitigated, my oration has deprecated it, your fidelity and equity have rejected it from the disputation of the truth—what, moreover, is there that is left in the case?

Versatam esse in iudicio pecuniam constat: ea quaeritur unde profecta sit, ab accusatore an ab reo. Dicit accusator haec: 'Primum gravissimis criminibus accusabam, ut nihil opus esset pecunia; deinde condemnatum adducebam, ut ne eripi quidem pecunia posset; postremo, etiam si absolutus fuisset, mearum tamen omnium fortunarum status incolumis maneret.' Quid contra reus? 'Primum ipsam multitudinem criminum et atrocitatem pertimescebam; deinde Fabriciis propter conscientiam mei sceleris condemnatis me esse condemnatum sentiebam; postremo in eum casum veneram ut omnis mearum fortunarum status unius iudicii periculo contineretur.'

It is agreed that money was in play in the trial: the question is from where it proceeded—from the accuser or from the defendant. The accuser says this: 'First, I was accusing on most grave crimes, so that there was no need of money; then I was presenting him as already condemned, so that he could not even be snatched away by money; finally, even if he had been acquitted, nevertheless the condition of all my fortunes would remain unimpaired.' What, on the other hand, does the defendant [say]? 'First, I was thoroughly afraid of the very multitude of charges and their atrocity; then, with the Fabricii condemned on account of their consciousness of my crime, I felt that I myself was condemned; lastly, I had come into such a plight that the entire state of my fortunes was contained in the peril of one judgment.'

82. Age, quoniam corrumpendi iudicii causas ille multas et graves habuit, hic nullam, profectio ipsius pecuniae requiratur. Confecit tabulas diligentissime Cluentius; haec autem res habet hoc certe, ut nihil possit neque additum neque detractum de re familiari latere. Anni sunt octo cum ista causa in ista meditatione versatur, cum omnia quae ad eam rem pertinent et ex huius et ex aliorum tabulis agitatis, tractatis, inquiritis: cum interea Cluentianae pecuniae vestigium nullum invenitis.

82. Come now, since that man had many and grave causes for corrupting the trial, this one none, let the provenance of the money itself be sought. Cluentius compiled his account-books most diligently; moreover this matter has this sure feature, that nothing either added to or subtracted from the estate can lie hidden. It is eight years that that case has been turned over in this preparation, since all things which pertain to that matter, from this man’s and from others’ account-books, you have agitated, handled, investigated: while in the meantime you find no vestige of Cluentius’s money.

Quid? Albiana pecunia vestigiisne nobis odoranda est an ad ipsum cubile vobis ducibus venire possumus? Tenentur uno in loco HS DCXL milia; tenentur apud hominem audacissimum; tenentur apud iudicem.

What? Must the Albian money be sniffed out by tracks, or can we, with you as guides, come to the very lair? They are held in one place—HS 640 thousand; they are held with a most audacious man; they are held with a judge.

83. Quid vultis amplius? At enim Staienus non fuit ab Oppianico, sed a Cluentio ad iudicium corrumpendum constitutus. Cur eum, cum in consilium iretur, Cluentius et Cannutius abesse patiebantur?

83. What more do you want? But indeed Staienus was not constituted by Oppianicus, but by Cluentius for corrupting the judgment. Why did Cluentius and Cannutius allow him to be absent when they were going into deliberation?

Cur, cum in consilium mittebant, Staienum iudicem cui, quod tu dicis, pecuniam dederant non requirebant; Oppianicus querebatur; Quinctius flagitabat; sine Staieno ne in consilium iretur, tribunicia potestate effectum est? At condemnavit. Hanc enim condemnationem dederat obsidem Bulbo et ceteris, ut destitutus ab Oppianico videretur.

Why, when they were sending into the council, did they not call for Staienus the judge, to whom, as you say, they had given money? Oppianicus was complaining; Quinctius was demanding; was it not effected by tribunician power that they should not go into the council without Staienus? But he condemned. For he had given this condemnation as a hostage to Bulbus and the others, so that he might seem to have been deserted by Oppianicus.

Qua re si istinc causa corrumpendi iudicii, si istinc pecunia, istinc Staienus, istinc denique omnis fraus et audacia est, hinc pudor, honesta vita, nulla suspicio pecuniae, nulla corrumpendi iudicii causa, patimini veritate patefacta atque omni errore sublato eo transire illius turpitudinis infamiam ubi cetera maleficia consistunt: ab eo invidiam discedere aliquando ad quem numquam accesisse culpam videtis.

Wherefore, if from that side is the cause of corrupting the judgment, if from that side the money, from that side Staienus, from that side, finally, all fraud and audacity; from this side modesty, an honorable life, no suspicion of money, no cause of corrupting the judgment—allow, with the truth laid open and every error removed, the infamy of that turpitude to pass over thither where the rest of the malefactions consist; let the odium at last depart from him to whom you see that culpability has never acceded.

XXXI.84. At enim pecuniam Staieno dedit Oppianicus non ad corrumpendum iudicium, sed ad conciliationem gratiae. Tene hoc, Acci, dicere, tali prudentia, etiam usu atque exercitatione praeditum!

31.84. But indeed Oppianicus gave money to Staienus not for corrupting the judgment, but for the conciliation of favor. Are you, Accius, saying this—endowed with such prudence, even with experience and training!

Sapientissimum esse dicunt eum cui quod opus sit ipsi veniat in mentem; proxime accedere illum qui alterius bene inventis obtemperet. In stultitia contra est: minus enim stultus est is cui nihil in mentem venit, quam ille qui quod stulte alteri venit in mentem comprobat. Istam conciliationem gratiae Staienus tum recenti re, cum faucibus premeretur, excogitavit; sive, ut homines tum loquebantur, a P. Cethego admonitus, istam dedit 'conciliationis' et 'gratiae' fabulam.

They say that he is most sapient to whom what is needed comes into his own mind; he comes nearest who obeys another’s well-invented findings. In stupidity it is the contrary: for he is less stupid to whom nothing comes into mind, than he who approves what has stupidly come into another’s mind. That conciliation of “grace” Staienus then, with the affair still fresh, when he was being pressed at the throat, devised; or, as men then used to say, having been admonished by P. Cethegus, he put forth that tale of ‘conciliation’ and ‘grace’.

85. Nam fuisse hunc tum hominum sermonem recordari potestis: Cethegum, quod hominem odisset et quod eius improbitatem versari in re publica nollet et quod videret eum qui se ab reo pecuniam, cum iudex esset, clam atque extra ordinem accepisse confessus esset, salvum esse non posse, minus ei fidele consilium dedisse. In hoc si improbus Cethegus fuit, videtur mihi adversarium removere voluisse; sin erat eius modi causa ut Staienus nummos se accepisse negare non posset, nihil autem erat periculosius nec turpius quam ad quam rem accepisset confiteri, non est consilium Cethegi reprehendendum. 86. Verum alia causa tum Staieni fuit, alia nunc, Acci, tua est.

85. For you can recall that at that time this was the talk of men: that Cethegus, because he hated the man and because he did not wish his improbity to be engaged in the republic, and because he saw that one who had confessed that, when he was a judge, he had received money from the defendant, secretly and out of order, could not be safe, gave him counsel less faithful to him. In this, if Cethegus was unscrupulous, he seems to me to have wished to remove an adversary; but if the case was of such a kind that Staienus could not deny that he had received the coins, while nothing was more dangerous nor more base than to confess for what purpose he had received them, the counsel of Cethegus is not to be reprehended.86. But the case of Staienus was one thing then; another now, Accius, is yours.

Ille, cum re premeretur, quodcumque diceret, honestius diceret quam si quod erat factum fateretur; te vero illud idem, quod tum explosum et eiectum est, nunc rettulisse demiror. Qui enim poterat tum in gratiam redire cum Oppianico Cluentius? Haerebat in tabulis publicis reus et accusator: condemnati erant Fabricii: nec elabi alio accusatore poterat Albius nec sine ignominia calumniae relinquere accusationem Cluentius.

He, when he was pressed by the matter, whatever he might say, would speak more honorably than if he were to confess what had been done; but I am astonished that you have now brought back that same thing which then was exploded and cast out. For how could Cluentius then return into favor—be reconciled—with Oppianicus? In the public tablets both defendant and accuser were fixed; the Fabricii had been condemned; nor could Albius slip away to another accuser, nor could Cluentius, without the ignominy of calumny, relinquish the accusation.

XXXII.87. An ut praevaricaretur? Iam id quoque ad corrumpendum iudicium pertinet.

32.87. Or, that he should prevaricate? Now that too pertains to the corruption of the court.

Sed quid opus erat ad eam rem iudice sequestre? et omnino quam ob rem tota ista res per Staienum potius, hominem ab utroque alienissimum, sordidissimum, turpissimum, quam per bonum aliquem virum ageretur et amicum necessariumque communem? Sed quid ego haec pluribus quasi de re obscura disputo, cum ipsa pecunia quae Staieno data est numero ac summa sua non modo quanta fuerit, sed etiam ad quam rem fuerit ostendat?

But what need was there, for that matter, of a judge as sequester? and, in general, for what reason was that whole business conducted through Staienus rather, a man most alien from both sides, most sordid and most disgraceful, than through some good man and a mutual friend and intimate? But why do I argue these things at greater length as if about an obscure matter, when the money itself that was given to Staienus, by its number and its sum, shows not only how much it was, but even for what matter it was?

Sedecim dico iudices, ut Oppianicus absolveretur, corrumpendos fuisse: ad Staienum sescenta quadraginta milia nummum esse delata. Si, ut tu dicis, gratiae conciliandae causa, quadraginta istorum accessio milium quid valet? si, ut nos dicimus, ut quadragena milia sedecim iudicibus darentur, non Archimedes melius potuit discribere.

I say that sixteen jurors had to be bribed, in order that Oppianicus be acquitted: to Staienus 640,000 coins were delivered. If, as you say, for the sake of conciliating favor, what is the worth of the addition of those 40,000? If, as we say, so that 40,000 might be given to sixteen jurors, not even Archimedes could have distributed it better.

88. At enim iudicia facta permulta sunt a Cluentio iudicium esse corruptum. Immo vero ante hoc tempus omnino ista ipsa res suo nomine in iudicium numquam est vocata. Ita multum agitata, ita diu iactata ista res est, ut hodierno die primum causa illa defensa sit, hodierno die primum veritas vocem contra invidiam his iudicibus freta miserit.

88. But indeed, very many judgments have been made that the judgment was corrupted by Cluentius. Nay rather, before this time this very matter has never been called into judgment under its own name. So much has that matter been agitated, so long bandied about, that on this day for the first time that cause has been defended, on this day for the first time Truth, relying on these judges, has sent forth her voice against ill-will.

Verum tamen ista multa iudicia quae sunt? Ego enim me ad omnia confirmavi et sic paravi ut docerem quae facta postea iudicia de illo iudicio dicerentur partim ruinae similiora aut tempestati quam iudicio et disceptationi fuisse, partim nihil contra Habitum valere, partim etiam pro hoc esse, partim esse eius modi ut neque appellata umquam iudicia sint neque existimata. 89. Hic ego magis ut consuetudinem servem, quam quod vos non vestra hoc sponte faciatis, petam a vobis ut me, dum de his singulis disputo iudiciis, attente audiatis.

But still, what are those many judgments? For I have braced myself for all of them and so prepared that I might show that the judgments made afterward about that judgment were partly more like a ruin or a tempest than like a judgment and disceptation, partly had no force against Habitus, partly even were for this man, partly were of such a kind that they have neither ever been called judgments nor considered as such. 89. Here I, rather to keep the custom than because you would not do this of your own accord, will ask of you that, while I argue about these judgments one by one, you listen to me attentively.

XXXIII.Condemnatus est C. Iunius, qui ei quaestioni praefuerat. Adde etiam illud, si placet: tum est condemnatus cum esset iudex quaestionis.

33.Gaius Junius was condemned, who had presided over that inquiry. Add this too, if it pleases: he was then condemned when he was the judge of the inquiry.

Non modo causae, sed ne legi quidem quicquam per tribunum plebis laxamenti datum est: quo tempore illum a quaestione ad nullum aliud rei publicae munus abduci licebat, eo tempore ad quaestionem ipse abreptus est. At ad quam quaestionem? vultus enim vestri, iudices, me invitant ut quae reticenda putaram libeat iam libere dicere.

Not only to the case, but not even to the law, was any relaxation granted by the tribune of the plebs: at the very time when it was not lawful to draw him away from the court of inquiry to any other duty of the commonwealth, at that time he himself was snatched to the court of inquiry. But to what court? For your faces, judges, invite me to take pleasure now in speaking freely what I had thought ought to be kept back.

90. Quid? illa tandem quaestio aut disceptatio aut iudicium fuit? Putabo fuisse.

90. What? was that at last a question or a disceptation or a judgment? I will suppose it was.

Dicat qui vult hodie de illo populo concitato, cui tum populo mos gestus est, qua de re Iunius causam dixerit: quemcumque rogaveris, hoc respondebit, quod pecuniam acceperit, quod innocentem circumvenerit. Est haec opinio. At, si ita esset, hac lege accusatum oportuit qua accusatur Habitus.

Let whoever wishes today speak about that incited people, to which people at that time deference was shown, about what matter Junius pleaded his case: whomever you ask, this he will answer—that he accepted money, that he circumvented an innocent man. This is the opinion. But, if it were so, he ought to have been accused by this law under which Habitus is accused.

At ipse ea lege quaerebat. Paucos dies exspectasset Quinctius. At neque privatus accusare nec sedata iam invidia volebat.

But he himself was prosecuting under that statute. Quinctius should have waited a few days. But he wished neither to accuse as a private person nor when the ill-will was now settled.

Videtis igitur non in causa, sed in tempore ac potestate spem omnem accusatoris fuisse. 91. Multam petivit. Qua lege?

You see, therefore, that the accuser’s whole hope was not in the case, but in the timing and in power. 91. He demanded a mulct. By what law?

Quod in legem non iurasset, quae res nemini umquam fraudi fuit, et quod C. Verres, praetor urbanus, homo sanctus et diligens, subsortitionem eius in eo codice non haberet qui tum interlitus proferebatur. His de causis C. Iunius condemnatus est, iudices, levissimis et infirmissimis, quas omnino in iudicium adferri non oportuit; itaque oppressus est non causa, sed tempore

Because he had not sworn in accordance with the statute, a thing which has never been to anyone ever a prejudice, and because C. Verres, the urban praetor, a upright and diligent man, did not have his subsortition in that codex which at that time, smeared over, was being produced. For these causes C. Iunius was condemned, judges, causes most slight and most feeble, which ought not at all to have been brought into judgment; and thus he was overwhelmed not by the case, but by the timing

XXXIV.92. Hoc vos Cluentio iudicium putatis obesse oportere? Quam ob causam?

34.92. Do you think that this judgment ought to harm Cluentius? For what reason?

Si ex lege subsortitus non erat Iunius aut si in aliquam legem aliquando non iuraverat, idcirco illius damnatione aliquid de Cluentio iudicabatur? 'Non,' inquit, 'sed ille idcirco illis legibus condemnatus est, quod contra aliam legem commiserat.' Qui hoc confitentur possunt idem illud iudicium fuisse defendere? 'Ergo' inquit 'idcirco infestus tum populus Romanus fuit C. Iunio, quod illud iudicium corruptum per eum putabatur.' Num igitur hoc tempore causa mutata est?

If by law Junius had not been assigned by lot, or if at some time he had not sworn to some law, was anything therefore judged about Cluentius by his condemnation? 'No,' he says, 'but he was therefore condemned under those laws, because he had committed something against another law.' Those who confess this—can they defend that that same judgment was sound? 'Therefore,' he says, 'for that reason the Roman People was then hostile to Gaius Junius, because that judgment was thought to have been corrupted through him.' Has the ground, then, been changed at this time?

num alia res, alia ratio illius iudicii, alia natura totius negotii nunc est ac tum fuit? Non opinor ex eis rebus quae gestae sunt rem ullam potuisse mutari. 93. Quid ergo est causae quod nunc nostra defensio audiatur tanto silentio, tum Iunio defendendi sui potestas erepta sit?

Is the matter one thing, the rationale of that judgment another, the nature of the whole business another now than it was then? I do not think that, from those things which were transacted, any matter could have been altered. 93. What, then, is the reason that now our defense is listened to with such silence, while then to Iunius the power of defending himself was snatched away?

Quia tum in causa nihil erat praeter invidiam, errorem, suspicionem, contiones cotidianas seditiose ac populariter concitatas. Accusabat tribunus plebis idem in contionibus, idem ad subsellia; ad iudicium non modo de contione, sed etiam cum ipsa contione veniebat; gradus illi Aurelii tum novi quasi pro theatro illi iudicio aedificati videbantur, quos ubi accusator concitatis hominibus complerat, non modo dicendi ab reo, sed ne surgendi quidem potestas erat. 94. Nuper apud C. Orchivium, collegam meum, locus ab iudicibus Fausto Sullae de pecuniis residuis non est constitutus, non quo illi aut exlegem esse Sullam aut causam pecuniae publicae contemptam atque abiectam putarent, sed quod accusante tribuno plebis condicione aequa disceptari posse non putarunt.

Because then in the case there was nothing besides envy, error, suspicion, daily assemblies stirred up seditiously and demagogically. The tribune of the plebs was accusing the same in the assemblies and the same at the benches; he would come to the trial not only from the assembly, but even with the assembly itself; those new steps of Aurelius then seemed to have been built as if for a theater for that trial, which, when the accuser had filled with men incited, there was power not only not for the defendant to speak, but not even to rise. 94. Recently before Gaius Orchivius, my colleague, no place was assigned by the judges to Faustus Sulla concerning the remaining monies, not because they thought either that Sulla was exlex or that the cause of the public money was despised and cast aside, but because, with a tribune of the plebs as accuser, they did not think it could be argued on equal terms.

Quid? conferam Sullamne cum Iunio? an hunc tribunum plebis cum Quinctio?

What? Shall I compare Sulla with Junius? or this tribune of the plebs with Quinctius?

an vero tempus cum tempore? Sulla maximis opibus, cognatis, adfinibus, necessariis, clientibus plurimis, haec autem apud Iunium parva et infirma et ipsius labore quaesita atque collecta: hic tribunus plebis modestus, prudens, non modo non seditiosus, sed etiam seditiosis adversarius, ille autem acerbus, criminosus, popularis homo ac turbulentus: tempus hoc tranquillum atque pacatum, illud omnibus invidiae tempestatibus concitatum. Quae cum ita essent, in Fausto tamen illi iudices statuerunt iniqua condicione reum causam dicere, cum adversario eius ad ius accusationis summa vis potestatis accederet

or indeed time with time? Sulla with the greatest resources, kinsmen, in-laws, intimates, and very many clients; but in Junius’s case these were small and weak and acquired and gathered by his own toil: here a tribune of the plebs modest, prudent, not only not seditious, but even an adversary to the seditious, but that one bitter, criminatory, a popularis man and turbulent: this time tranquil and pacified, that one stirred by all the storms of envy. Although these things were so, nevertheless in the case of Faustus those judges determined that the defendant should plead his cause on an unequal condition, since to his adversary, in addition to the right of accusation, the highest force of power was being added

XXXV.95. Quam quidem rationem vos, iudices, diligenter pro vestra sapientia et humanitate cogitare, et penitus perspicere debetis quid mali, quantum periculi uni cuique nostrum inferre possit vis tribunicia, conflata praesertim invidia et contionibus seditiose concitatis. Optimis hercule temporibus, tum cum homines se non iactatione populari, sed dignitate atque innocentia tuebantur, tamen nec P. Popilius neque Q. Metellus, clarissimi viri atque amplissimi, vim tribuniciam sustinere potuerunt; nedum his temporibus, his moribus, his magistratibus sine vestra sapientia ac sine iudiciorum remediis salvi esse possimus.

35.95. This reasoning, indeed, you, judges, ought diligently, in accordance with your wisdom and humanity, to consider, and to perceive thoroughly what evil, how much peril, the tribunician force can bring upon each one of us, especially with envy having been fanned and with assemblies seditiously stirred up. By Hercules, in the best times, then when men protected themselves not by popular vaunting, but by dignity and innocence, nevertheless neither P. Popilius nor Q. Metellus, most renowned and most eminent men, were able to withstand the tribunician force; much less in these times, with these morals, with these magistracies, can we be safe without your wisdom and without the remedies of the courts.

96. Non fuit illud igitur iudicium iudicii simile, iudices, non fuit, in quo non modus ullus est adhibitus, non mos consuetudoque servata, non causa defensa: vis illa fuit et, ut saepe iam dixi, ruina quaedam atque tempestas et quidvis potius quam iudicium aut disceptatio aut quaestio. Quod si quis est qui illud iudicium fuisse arbitretur et qui his rebus iudicatis standum putet, is tamen hanc causam ab illa debet seiungere; ab illo enim, sive quod in legem non iurasset sive quod e lege subsortitus iudicem non esset, multa petita esse dicitur, Cluenti autem ratio cum illis legibus quibus a Iunio multa petita est nulla potest ex parte esse coniuncta.

96. That, therefore, was no judgment like a judgment, judges, it was not—one in which no measure at all was applied, no custom and usage observed, no cause defended: it was sheer force and, as I have often already said, a kind of ruin and tempest, and anything rather than a judgment or disputation or inquiry. But if there is anyone who judges that to have been a judgment and thinks that one must stand by these matters adjudicated, he nevertheless ought to separate this case from that; for from that man, whether because he had not sworn upon the statute or because he was not, under the statute, a judge assigned by supplementary lot, many fines are said to have been sought; but Cluentius’s position can in no respect be conjoined with those statutes by which many fines were sought by Junius.

97. At enim etiam Bulbus est condemnatus. Adde maiestatis, ut intellegas hoc iudicium cum illo non esse coniunctum. At est hoc illi crimen obiectum.

97. But indeed even Bulbus has been condemned. Add a count of maiestas (treason), so that you may understand that this trial is not connected with that one. But this charge has been brought against him.

Fateor, sed etiam legionem esse ab eo sollicitatam in Illyrico C. Cosconi litteris et multorum testimoniis planum factum est, quod crimen erat proprium illius quaestionis et quae res lege maiestatis tenebatur. At hoc obfuit ei maxime. Iam ista divinatio est; qua si uti licet, vide ne mea coniectura multo sit verior.

I confess it; but also that a legion was suborned in Illyricum was made plain by the letters of Gaius Cosconius and by the testimonies of many—a charge proper to that quaestio and a matter held under the law of majesty (maiestas). But this was of the greatest disadvantage to him. Now that is divination; and if it is permitted to employ that, see lest my conjecture be much truer.

Ego enim sic arbitror, Bulbum, quod homo nequam, turpis, improbus, multis flagitiis contaminatus in iudicium sit adductus, idcirco facilius esse damnatum: tu mihi ex tota causa Bulbi quod tibi commodum est eligis, ut id esse secutos iudices dicas.

For I think thus: that Bulbus—because, being a nefarious man, turpid, depraved, contaminated with many flagitious deeds—was brought into court, on that account was more easily condemned; you, for your part, pick out from the whole case of Bulbus what is convenient for you, so that you may say that the judges followed that.

XXXVI.98. Quapropter hoc Bulbi iudicium non plus huic obesse causae debet quam illa quae commemorata sunt ab accusatore duo iudicia, P. Popili et Ti. Guttae, qui causam de ambitu dixerunt. Qui accusati sunt ab eis qui erant ipsi ambitus condemnati: quos ego non idcirco esse arbitror in integrum restitutos quod planum fecerint illos ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepisse, sed quod iudicibus probaverint, cum in eodem genere in quo ipsi offendissent alios reprehendissent, se ad praemia legis venire oportere.

36.98. Wherefore this judgment of Bulbus ought not to harm this case any more than those two judgments mentioned by the accuser, of P. Popilius and Ti. Gutta, who spoke in a cause on ambitus (electoral bribery). They were accused by those who themselves had been convicted of ambitus: whom I do not therefore think to have been restored in full because they made it clear that those men had accepted money for the matter to be judged, but because they proved to the judges that, since they had reproved others in the same category in which they themselves had offended, they ought to come to the rewards of the law.

Quapropter neminem dubitare existimo quin illa damnatio ambitus nulla ex parte cum causa Cluenti vestroque iudicio coniuncta esse possit.

Wherefore I consider that no one doubts that that condemnation for ambitus can in no respect be joined with the case of Cluentius and with your judgment.

99. Quid, quod Staienus est condemnatus? Non dico hoc tempore, iudices, id quod nescio an dici oporteat, illum maiestatis esse condemnatum. Non recito testimonia hominum honestissimorum, quae in Staienum sunt dicta ab eis qui M. Aemilio, clarissimo viro, legati et praefecti et tribuni militares fuerunt; quorum testimoniis planum factum est maxime eius opera, cum quaestor esset, in exercitu seditionem esse conflatam.

99. What of the fact that Staienus was condemned? I do not say at this time, judges—a thing which I know not whether it ought to be said—that he was condemned for maiestas (treason). I do not recite the testimonies of most honorable men, which were spoken against Staienus by those who were legates and prefects and military tribunes under Marcus Aemilius, a most illustrious man; by whose testimonies it was made plain that, chiefly by his agency, when he was quaestor, a sedition in the army had been fomented.

Ne illa quidem testimonia recito quae dicta sunt de HS DC milibus, quae ille cum accepisset nomine iudicii Safiniani, sicut in Oppianici iudicio postea, reticuit atque suppressit. 100. Omitto et haec et alia permulta quae illo iudicio in Staienum dicta sunt: hoc dico, eandem tum fuisse P. et L. Cominiis, equitibus Romanis, honestis hominibus et disertis, controversiam cum Staieno, quem accusabant, quae nunc mihi est cum Accio.

Nor do I even recite those testimonies which were spoken about HS 600 thousand, which he, when he had received in the name of the Safinianus trial, just as later in the trial of Oppianicus, kept silent about and suppressed. 100. I omit both these and very many other things which in that trial were said against Staienus: this I say, that at that time the same controversy existed for P. and L. Cominius, Roman knights, honorable and eloquent men, with Staienus, whom they were accusing, as now exists for me with Accius.

Cominii dicebant idem quod ego dico, Staienum ab Oppianico pecuniam accepisse ut iudicium corrumperet: Staienus conciliandae gratiae causa accepisse dicebat. 101. Irridebatur haec illius reconciliatio et persona viri boni suscepta, sicut in statuis inauratis quas posuit ad Iuturnae, quibus subscripsit reges a se in gratiam esse reductos; exagitabantur omnes eius fraudes atque fallaciae; tota vita in eius modi ratione versata aperiebatur; egestas domestica, quaestus forensis in medium proferebatur; nummarius interpres pacis et concordiae non probabatur.

The Cominii were saying the same thing that I say: that Staienus had received money from Oppianicus to corrupt the trial; Staienus was saying he had received it for the sake of conciliating favor. 101. This reconciliation of his and the assumed persona of a good man was being laughed at, just as with the gilded statues which he set up at Juturna’s spring, beneath which he inscribed that kings had by him been brought back into favor; all his frauds and fallacies were being driven home; his whole life passed in that sort of method was being laid open; domestic indigence, forensic profit was brought into the middle; a moneyed broker of peace and concord did not meet approval.

Itaque cum Staienus, cum idem defenderet quod Accius, condemnatus est; 102. Cominii cum hoc agerent, quod nos in tota causa egimus, probaverunt. Quam ob rem si Staieni damnatione Oppianicum iudicium corrumpere voluisse, Oppianicum iudici ad emendas sententias dedisse pecuniam iudicatum est, cum ita constitutum sit ut in illa culpa aut Cluentius sit aut Oppianicus, Cluenti nummus nullus iudici datus ullo vestigio reperietur, Oppianici pecunia post iudicium factum ab iudice ablata est, – potest esse dubium quin illa damnatio Staieni non modo non sit contra Cluentium, sed maxime nostram causam defensionemque confirmet?

And so, since Staienus, while he was defending the same thing as Accius, was condemned; 102. when the Cominii were urging that which we have urged in the whole case, they proved it. Wherefore, if by the condemnation of Staienus it has been adjudged that Oppianicus wished to corrupt the court, that Oppianicus gave money to the judge for amending the votes, since it has been established that in that guilt either Cluentius or Oppianicus is the party, no coin of Cluentius will be found by any trace to have been given to the judge, the money of Oppianicus, after the judgment was rendered, was taken away by the judge, – can there be a doubt that that condemnation of Staienus not only is not against Cluentius, but most of all confirms our cause and defense?

XXXVII.103. Ergo adhuc Iuni iudicium video esse eius modi ut incursionem potius seditionis, vim multitudinis, impetum tribunicium, quam iudicium appellandum putem.

37.103. Therefore thus far I see the trial of Junius to be of such a sort that I would think it should rather be called an incursion of sedition, the force of a multitude, a tribunitian impetus, than a trial.

Quod si quis illud iudicium appellet, tamen hoc confiteatur necesse est, nullo modo illam multam quae ab Iunio petita sit cum Cluenti causa posse coniungi. Illud igitur Iunianum per vim factum est: Bulbi et Popili et Guttae contra Cluentium non est: Staieni etiam pro Cluentio est.

But if anyone should call that a judgment, nevertheless he must confess this, that in no way can that fine which was sought by Junius be connected with Cluentius’s case. Therefore that proceeding of Junius was done by force: the one of Bulbus and Popilius and Gutta is not against Cluentius: that of Staienus is even in favor of Cluentius.

Videamus ecquid aliud iudicium, quod pro Cluentio sit, proferre possimus. Dixitne tandem causam C. Fidiculanius Falcula, qui Oppianicum condemnarat, cum praesertim, – id quod fuit in illo iudicio invidiosissimum, – paucos dies ex subsortitione sedisset? Dixit et bis quidem dixit; in summam enim L. Quinctius invidiam contionibus eum cotidianis seditiosis et turbulentis adduxerat.

Let us see whether we can bring forward any other judgment that is on behalf of Cluentius. Did G. Fidiculanius Falcula, who had condemned Oppianicus, at length plead the case, especially—what was the most odious thing in that trial—though he had sat only a few days by subsortition? He did speak, and indeed he spoke twice; for Lucius Quinctius had brought upon him extreme odium by daily seditious and turbulent public assemblies.

Uno iudicio multa est ab eo petita, sicut ab Iunio, quod non suae decuriae munere neque ex lege sedisset. Paulo sedatiore tempore est accusatus quam Iunius, sed eadem fere lege et crimine: quia nulla in iudicio seditio neque vis nec turba versata est, prima actione facillime est absolutus. Non numero hanc absolutionem; nihilo minus enim potest, ut illam multam non commiserit, accepisse tamen ob rem iudicandam [pecuniam, sicut causam pecunia] capta nusquam Staienus eadem lege dixit.

In one judgment a fine was sought from him, as from Junius, because he had sat not by the office of his own decury nor under the law. He was accused at a somewhat more sedate time than Junius, but under nearly the same statute and charge: since no sedition nor force nor crowd was stirred in the trial, at the first action he was very easily acquitted. I do not count this acquittal; for nonetheless it can be that, although he did not incur that fine, he did receive, on account of the matter to be judged, [money, just as the case by money]; that it had been taken, however, Staienus said nowhere under the same law.

Proprium crimen illud quaestionis eius non fuit. 104. Fidiculanius quid fecisse dicebatur?

That was not a charge proper to that court. 104. What was Fidiculanius said to have done?

accepisse a Cluentio HS CCCC milia. Cuius erat ordinis? senatorii.

to have received from Cluentius HS 400 thousand. Of what order was he? of the senatorial.

Qua lege in eo genere a senatore ratio repeti solet, de pecuniis repetundis, ea lege accusatus honestissime est absolutus; acta est enim causa more maiorum, sine vi, sine metu, sine periculo; dicta et exposita et demonstrata sunt omnia; adducti iudices sunt non modo potuisse honeste ab eo reum condemnari qui non perpetuo sedisset, sed, aliud si is iudex nihil scisset nisi quae praeiudicia de eo facta esse constarent, audire praeterea nihil debuisse

By what law, in that kind of case, is an account from a senator usually demanded back? By the law on monies to be recovered; under that law he was accused and was most honorably acquitted; for the case was conducted in the custom of the ancestors, without force, without fear, without danger; everything was spoken and set forth and demonstrated; the judges were brought to the point not only that a defendant could honorably have been condemned by a man who had not sat continuously, but that, moreover, if that judge had known nothing except what prejudgments were established to have been made about him, he ought to have heard nothing besides

XXXVIII.105. Tum etiam illi quinque qui, imperitorum hominum rumusculos aucupati, tum illum absolverunt, iam suam clementiam laudari magno opere nolebant.

38.105. Then even those five who, angling for the petty rumors of inexpert men, at that time acquitted him, were now very unwilling to have their own clemency greatly lauded.

A quibus si qui quaereret sedissentne iudices in C. Fabricium, sedisse se dicerent; si interrogarentur num quo crimine is esset accusatus praeterquam veneni eius quod quaesitum Habito diceretur, negarent; si deinde essent rogati quid iudicassent, condemnasse se dicerent; nemo enim absolvit. Eodem modo quaesitum si esset de Scamandro, certe idem respondissent; tametsi ille una sententia est absolutus, sed illam unam nemo tum istorum suam dici vellet. 106.

If anyone were to ask them whether they had sat as judges in the case of C. Fabricius, they would say that they had sat; if they were asked whether he had been accused on any charge other than of poison, that poison which was said to have been procured by Habito, they would deny it; if then they were asked what they had judged, they would say that they had condemned; for no one acquitted him. In the same way, if inquiry had been made about Scamander, surely they would have answered the same; although he was acquitted by a single vote, yet none of those men at that time would have wished that one to be said to be his.106.

Uter igitur facilius suae sententiae rationem redderet: isne qui se et sibi et rei iudicatae constitisse dicit, an ille qui se in principem maleficii lenem, in adiutores eius et conscios vehementissimum esse respondet? Quorum ego de sententia non debeo disputare; neque enim dubito quin ii tales viri suspicione aliqua perculsi repentina de statu suo declinarint. Qua re eorum qui absolverunt misericordiam non reprehendo, eorum qui in iudicando superiora iudicia secuti sunt (sua sponte, non Staieni fraude) constantiam comprobo, eorum vero qui sibi non liquere dixerunt sapientiam laudo, – qui absolvere eum quem nocentissimum cognorant, et quem ipsi bis iam antea condemnarant nullo modo poterant, condemnare, cum tanta consilii infamia et tam atrocis rei suspicio esset iniecta, paulo posterius patefacta re maluerunt.

Which of the two, then, would more easily render a reason for his opinion: he who says that he stood fast both for himself and for the res judicata, or he who answers that he is lenient toward the principal of the crime, but most vehement toward his helpers and accomplices? As for whose opinion I ought not to dispute; for I do not doubt that such men, struck by some sudden suspicion, have swerved from their position. Wherefore I do not reprehend the mercy of those who acquitted, I approve the constancy of those who in judging followed the former judgments (of their own accord, not by Staienus’s fraud), and I praise the wisdom of those who said it was not clear to them—who could by no means acquit him whom they knew most guilty and whom they themselves had already twice before condemned, but preferred to condemn, since so great an infamy of the jury and such suspicion of so atrocious a matter had been cast, a little later, once the affair was laid open.

107. Ac ne ex facto solum sapientes illos iudicetis, sed etiam ex hominibus ipsis quod hi fecerunt rectissime ac sapientissime factum probetis, quis P. Octavio Balbo ingenio prudentior, iure peritior, fide, religione, officio diligentior aut sanctior commemorari potest? Non absolvit.

107. And lest you judge those men to be wise from the deed alone, but also from the men themselves approve that what these men did was done most rightly and most wisely, who can be mentioned more prudent in natural talent, more expert in law, more diligent or more holy in good faith, religion, and duty, than Publius Octavius Balbus? He did not acquit.

Quis Q. Considio constantior, quis iudiciorum atque eius dignitatis quae in iudiciis publicis versari debet peritior, quis virtute, consilio, auctoritate praestantior? Ne is quidem absolvit. Longum est de singulorum virtute ita dicere; quae cognita sunt ab omnibus verborum ornamenta non quaerunt.

Who is more constant than Q. Considius, who more expert in trials and in that dignity which ought to be engaged in public trials, who more outstanding in virtue, counsel, authority? Not even he acquitted. It is long to speak thus about the virtue of individuals; things known by all do not seek ornaments of words.

Qualis vir M. Iuventius Pedo fuit ex vetere illa iudicum disciplina, qualis L. Caulius Mergus, M. Basilus, C. Caudinus! qui omnes in iudiciis publicis iam tum florente re publica floruerunt. Ex eodem numero L. Cassius, Cn. Heius, pari et integritate et prudentia; quorum nullius sententia est Oppianicus absolutus.

What a man M. Iuventius Pedo was from that old discipline of jurors, what a man L. Caulius Mergus, M. Basilus, C. Caudinus! all of whom in public trials flourished even then, when the Republic was flourishing. From the same number L. Cassius, Cn. Heius, equal both in integrity and in prudence; by the judgment of none of whom was Oppianicus acquitted.

Atque in his omnibus natu minimus, ingenio et diligentia et religione par eis quos antea commemoravi, P. Saturius, in eadem sententia fuit. 108. O innocentiam Oppianici singularem, quo in reo qui absolvit ambitiosus, qui distulit cautus, qui condemnavit constans existimatur!

And among all these, the youngest in age, equal in ingenuity and diligence and scrupulousness to those whom I mentioned before, P. Saturius, was of the same opinion. 108. O singular innocence of Oppianicus, in whose case as defendant he who acquitted is deemed ambitious, he who deferred is deemed cautious, he who condemned is deemed constant!

XXXIX.Haec tum agente Quinctio neque in contione neque in iudicio demonstrata sunt; neque enim ipse dici patiebatur nec per multitudinem concitatam consistere cuiquam in dicendo licebat. Itaque ipse postquam Iunium pervertit, totam causam reliquit; paucis enim diebus illis et ipse privatus est factus et hominum studia defervisse intellegebat.

39.While Quintius was then managing the matter, these things were demonstrated neither in the contio nor in court; for he himself did not allow anything to be said, nor was it permitted for anyone, because of the aroused multitude, to take his stand in speaking. And so, after he had ruined Junius, he abandoned the whole case; for within those few days he himself too had been made a private citizen, and he understood that men’s enthusiasms had cooled down.

Quod si per quos dies Iunium accusavit Fidiculanium accusare voluisset, respondendi Fidiculanio potestas facta non esset. Ac primo quidem omnibus illis iudicibus qui Oppianicum condemnarant minabatur. 109.

But if, during the days on which he accused Junius, he had wished to accuse Fidiculanius, no opportunity of responding would have been afforded to Fidiculanius. And at first indeed he was threatening all those judges who had condemned Oppianicus. 109.

Iam insolentiam noratis hominis, noratis animos eius ac spiritus tribunicios. Quod erat odium, di immortales, quae superbia, quanta ignorantia sui, quam gravis atque intolerabilis arrogantia! qui illud iam ipsum acerbe tulerit, ex quo illa nata sunt omnia, non sibi ac defensioni suae condonatum esse Oppianicum: proinde quasi non satis signi esse debuerit ab omnibus eum fuisse desertum qui se ad patronum illum contulisset.

You had already known the insolence of the man; you knew his spirit and his tribunician airs. What hatred there was, immortal gods, what haughtiness, how great an ignorance of himself, how grave and intolerable arrogance! he who took ill that very point itself—from which all those things sprang—that Oppianicus had not been condoned to him and to his defense; just as if it should not have been enough of a sign that he who had betaken himself to that patron had been deserted by all.

Erat enim Romae summa copia patronorum, hominum eloquentissimorum atque amplissimorum, quorum certe aliquis defendisset equitem Romanum, in municipio suo nobilem, si honeste putaset eius modi causam posse defendi

For at Rome there was the utmost abundance of patrons, men most eloquent and most eminent, of whom surely some one would have defended a Roman equestrian, noble in his own municipality, if he had thought that a case of that mode could be defended honorably

XL. 110. Nam Quinctius quidem quam causam umquam antea dixerat, cum annos ad quinquaginta natus esset? quis eum umquam non modo in patroni, sed in laudatoris aut advocati loco viderat?

40.110. For Quinctius indeed—what case had he ever pleaded before, when he had come to about fifty years of age? Who had ever seen him, not only in the position of a patron, but even in that of a laudator or an advocate?

Qui quod rostra iam diu vacua locumque illum post adventum L. Sullae a tribunicia voce desertum oppresserat, multitudinemque desuefactam iam a contionibus ad veteris consuetudinis similitudinem revocarat, idcirco cuidam hominum generi paulisper iucundior fuit. Atque idem quanto in odio postea fuit illis ipsis per quos in altiorem locum ascenderat! 111.

He, because he had occupied the rostra, long empty, and that place which after the advent of Lucius Sulla had been deserted by the tribunician voice, and had recalled the multitude, now unaccustomed to public assemblies, to a likeness of the ancient custom, was on that account for a short time more pleasing to a certain kind of men. And the same man, how greatly afterwards was he in hatred with those very persons by whom he had ascended to a higher place! 111.

Neque iniuria; facite enim ut non solum mores eius et arrogantiam, sed etiam vultum atque amictum, atque illam usque ad talos demissam purpuram recordemini! Is, quasi non esset ullo modo ferendum se ex iudicio discessisse victum, rem a subselliis ad rostra detulit. Et iam querimur saepe hominibus novis non satis magnos in hac civitate esse fructus?

Nor without cause; for do now recall not only his manners and arrogance, but even his countenance and attire, and that purple let down to the ankles! He, as though it were in no way to be borne that he had departed from the judgment defeated, transferred the matter from the benches to the Rostra. And do we even now often complain that for new men the fruits in this commonwealth are not large enough?

Nego usquam umquam fuisse maiores, ubi si quis ignobili loco natus ita vivit ut nobilitatis dignitatem virtute tueri posse videatur, usque eo pervenit quoad eum industria cum innocentia prosecuta est; 112. si quis autem hoc uno nititur, quod sit ignobilis, procedit saepe longius quam si idem ille esset cum isdem suis vitiis nobilissimus. Ut Quinctius – nihil enim dicam de ceteris – si fuisset homo nobilis, quis eum cum illa superbia atque intolerantia ferre potuisset?

I deny that anywhere ever there have been greater rewards, where, if someone born of ignoble station so lives that he seems able by virtue to guard the dignity of nobility, he advances just so far as industry together with innocence has attended him; 112. but if someone relies on this one thing, that he is ignoble, he often proceeds farther than if that same man, with those same vices, were most noble. As for Quinctius – for I will say nothing of the others – if he had been a noble man, who could have endured him with that arrogance and intolerance?

Quod eo loco fuit, ita tulerunt ut, si quid haberet a natura boni, prodesse ei putarent oportere, superbiam autem atque arrogantiam eius deridendam magis arbitrarentur propter humilitatem hominis quam pertimescendam.

Since his position was such, they bore it thus that, if he had anything good from nature, they thought it ought to profit him; but they judged his pride and arrogance to be rather derided on account of the man's humility than to be dreaded.

XLI. Sed, ut illuc revertar, quo tempore Fidiculanius est absolutus tu, qui iudicia facta commemoras, quid tum esse existimas iudicatum? certe gratis iudicasse.

41.But, to revert thither, at the time when Fidiculanius was acquitted, you, who commemorate the judgments that were made, what do you think was then adjudged? surely, that they judged gratis.

113. At condemnarat, at causam totam non audierat, at in contionibus a L. Quinctio vehementer erat et saepe vexatus. Illa igitur omnia Quinctiana iniqua, falsa, turbulenta, popularia, seditiosa iudicia fuerunt.

113. But he had condemned, but he had not heard the whole case, but in the public assemblies he had been vehemently and often harassed by L. Quinctius. Therefore all those Quinctian judgments were iniquitous, false, turbulent, popular, seditious judgments.

Esto: potuit esse innocens Falcula. Iam ergo aliqui Oppianicum gratis condemnavit; iam non eos Iunius subsortitus est qui pecunia accepta condemnarent; iam videtur aliqui ab initio non sedisse et tamen Oppianicum gratis condemnasse. Verum, si innocens Falcula, quaero quis sit nocens?

Granted: Falcula could have been innocent. So then, someone condemned Oppianicus gratis; now Junius did not by lot assign those who would condemn with money accepted; now it seems that someone who had not sat from the beginning nevertheless condemned Oppianicus gratis. But, if Falcula is innocent, I ask who is guilty?

si hic gratis condemnavit, quis accepit? Nego rem esse ullam in quemquam illorum obiectam quae Fidiculanio non obiecta sit, aliquid fuisse in Fidiculani causa quod idem non esset in ceterorum. 114.

if this man condemned gratis, who accepted? I deny that there is any matter objected against any of those men which has not been objected to Fidiculanius, that there was anything in Fidiculanius’s case which was not the same in the case of the rest. 114.

Aut hoc iudicium reprehendas tu, cuius accusatio rebus iudicatis niti videbatur, necesse est, aut, si hoc verum esse concedis, Oppianicum gratis condemnatum esse fateare.

Either you must reprehend this judgment—you whose accusation seemed to rely on adjudicated matters—or, if you concede this to be true, you must admit that Oppianicus was condemned gratuitously.

Quamquam satis magno argumento esse debet, quod ex tam multis iudicibus absoluto Falcula nemo reus factus est. Quid enim mihi damnatos ambitus colligitis, alia lege, certis criminibus, plurimis testibus? cum primum illi ipsi debuerint potius accusari de pecuniis repetundis quam ambitus; nam si in ambitus iudiciis hoc eis obfuit, cum alia lege causam dicerent, certe, si propria lege huius peccati adducti essent, multo plus obfuisset.

Although it ought to be sufficiently strong evidence that, with Falcula acquitted, out of so many jurors no one was made a defendant. For why do you gather for me men condemned for ambitus, under a different law, on definite charges, with very many witnesses? since, in the first place, those very men ought rather to have been accused on charges of extortion (pecuniae repetundae) than of ambitus; for if in trials of ambitus this was a disadvantage to them when they were pleading their case under another law, certainly, if they had been brought under the proper law of this crime, it would have harmed them much more.

115. Deinde si tanta vis fuit istius criminis, ut, qua quisque lege ex illis iudicibus reus factus esset, tamen hac plaga periret, cur in tanta multitudine accusatorum, tantis praemiis, ceteri rei facti non sunt? Hic profertur id quod iudicium appellari non oportet, P. Septimio Scaevolae litem eo nomine esse aestimatam.

115. Then, if so great was the force of that charge, that, by whatever law each of those judges had been made a defendant, nevertheless he would perish by this blow, why, in so great a multitude of accusers, with such great rewards, were the others not made defendants? Here there is produced that which ought not to be called a judgment: that, under that head, the suit of P. Septimius Scaevola was assessed.

Cuius rei quae consuetudo sit, quoniam apud homines peritissimos dico, pluribus verbis docere non debeo; numquam enim ea diligentia quae solet adhiberi in ceteris iudiciis eadem reo damnato adhibita est. 116. In litibus aestimandis fere iudices aut, quod sibi eum quem semel condemnarunt inimicum putant esse, si quae in eum lis capitis illata est, non admittunt, aut, quod se perfunctos iam esse arbitrantur, cum de reo iudicarunt, neglegentius attendunt cetera.

As to what the customary practice of this matter is, since I am speaking among most expert men, I ought not to teach in many words; for never has the same diligence which is wont to be applied in other trials been applied to a condemned defendant. 116. In assessing suits, judges for the most part either—because they think that the man whom they have once condemned is an enemy to themselves—do not admit, if any capital action has been brought against him; or—because they suppose that they are already done when they have judged about the defendant—they attend to the rest more negligently.

Itaque et maiestatis absoluti sunt permulti, quibus damnatis de pecuniis repetundis lites maiestatis essent aestimatae, et hoc cotidie fieri videmus, ut reo damnato de pecuniis repetundis, ad quos pervenisse pecunias in litibus aestimandis statutum sit, eos idem iudices absolvant; quod cum fit, non iudicia rescinduntur, sed hoc statuitur, aestimationem litium non esse iudicium. Scaevola condemnatus est aliis criminibus, frequentissimis Apuliae testibus; omni contentione pugnatum est uti lis haec capitis aestimaretur. Quae res si rei iudicatae pondus habuisset, ille postea vel isdem vel aliis inimicis reus hac lege ipsa factus esset.

Therefore very many have been acquitted of majesty (treason), though, once they were condemned on charges of extorted monies, suits of majesty had been assessed against them; and we see this happen every day, that when an accused is convicted for extorted monies, those persons to whom it has been determined, in assessing the suits, that the monies had come, those same judges acquit; when this happens, judgments are not rescinded, but this is established: that the assessment of suits is not a judgment. Scaevola was condemned on other charges, with the most numerous witnesses from Apulia; every effort was made to fight that this suit be assessed as a capital suit. If this matter had had the weight of a thing adjudged, he would afterward have been made a defendant under this very law, either by the same or by other enemies.

XLII. 117. Sequitur id quod illi iudicium appellant, maiores autem nostri numquam neque iudicium nominarunt neque proinde ut rem iudicatam observarunt, animadversionem atque auctoritatem censoriam.

42.117. What follows is that which they call a judgment; but our ancestors never named it a judgment nor observed it as if it were a res judicata: the censorial animadversion and authority.

Qua de re ante quam dicere incipio, perpauca mihi de meo officio verba faciunda sunt, ut a me cum huiusce periculi tum ceterorum quoque officiorum et amicitiarum ratio conservata esse videatur. Nam mihi cum viris fortibus qui censores proxime fuerunt ambobus est amicitia, cum altero vero, sicuti plerique vestrum sciunt, magnus usus et summa utriusque officiis constituta necessitudo. 118.

Concerning which matter, before I begin to speak, very few words must be spoken by me about my office, so that it may seem that by me both of this peril and also of the other offices and friendships the account has been preserved. For I have friendship with both the brave men who were most recently censors, but with one of them, as most of you know, there is great association and a highest necessitude constituted by the offices of us both. 118.

Qua re quicquid de subscriptionibus eorum mihi dicendum erit, eo dicam animo ut omnem orationem meam non de illorum facto, sed de ratione censoria habitam existimari velim; a Lentulo autem, familiari meo, qui a me pro eximia sua virtute summisque honoribus quos a populo Romano adeptus est honoris causa nominatur, facile hoc, iudices, impetrabo, ut, quam ipse adhibere consuevit in amicorum periculis cum fidem et diligentiam tum vim animi libertatemque dicendi, ex hac mihi concedat ut tantum mihi sumam quantum sine huius periculo praeterire non possim. A me tamen, ut aequum est, omnia caute pedetemptimque dicentur, ut neque fides huius defensionis relicta neque cuiusquam aut dignitas laesa aut amicitia violata esse videatur.

Wherefore whatever I shall have to say about their subscriptions, I shall say with this mind, that I would have my whole oration considered as delivered not about their act, but about censorial rationale; and from Lentulus, my familiar, who by me, for his exceptional virtue and the highest honors which he has obtained from the Roman people, is named as an honor, I shall easily obtain this, judges: that, as he is accustomed to employ in the dangers of friends both faith and diligence and also force of spirit and freedom of speaking, from this he grant to me that I take upon myself only so much as I cannot pass over without peril to this man. By me, however, as is equitable, all things will be said cautiously and step by step, so that neither the good faith of this defense seem left behind nor anyone’s dignity injured nor friendship violated.

119. Video igitur, iudices, animadvertisse censores in iudices quosdam illius consilii Iuniani, cum istam ipsam causam subscriberent. Hic illud primum commune proponam, numquam animadversionibus censoriis hanc civitatem ita contentam ut rebus iudicatis fuisse.

119. I see therefore, judges, that the censors have animadverted upon certain judges of that Junian council, when they were subscribing this very case. Here I will first propose this common point, that this state has never been so content with censorial animadversions as it has been with adjudicated matters.

Neque in re nota consumam tempus; exempli causa ponam unum illud, C. Getam, cum a L. Metello et Cn. Domitio censoribus ex senatu eiectus esset, censorem esse ipsum postea factum, et cuius mores erant a censoribus reprehensi, hunc postea et populi Romani et eorum qui in ipsum animadverterant moribus praefuisse. Quod si illud iudicium putaretur, ut ceteri turpi iudicio damnati in perpetuum omni honore ac dignitate privantur, sic hominibus ignominia notatis neque ad honorem aditus neque in curiam reditus esset. 120.

Nor will I consume time on a well-known matter; for the sake of example I will set down this one instance: Gaius Geta, although he had been ejected from the senate by the censors Lucius Metellus and Gnaeus Domitius, was afterward himself made censor, and he whose morals had been reproved by the censors later presided over the morals both of the Roman people and of those who had animadverted upon him. But if that were considered a judgment, so that, as others condemned by a disgraceful judgment are deprived forever of every honor and dignity, so for men marked with ignominy there would be neither access to office nor a return into the curia. 120.

Nunc si quem Cn. Lentuli aut L. Gelli libertus furti condemnarit, is omnibus ornamentis amissis numquam ullam honestatis suae partem recuperabit; quos autem ipse L. Gellius et Cn. Lentulus, duo censores, clarissimi viri sapientissimique homines, furti et captarum pecuniarum nomine notaverunt, ii non modo in senatum redierunt, sed etiam illarum ipsarum rerum iudiciis absoluti sunt

Now, if the freedman of Cn. Lentulus or of L. Gellius has condemned anyone for theft, he, having lost all his ornaments, will never recover any part of his honesty; but those whom L. Gellius and Cn. Lentulus themselves, the two censors, most illustrious men and most wise, marked with ignominy under the name of theft and of monies taken, they not only returned into the senate, but were even acquitted by the judgments concerning those very matters.

XLIII. Neminem voluerunt maiores nostri non modo de existimatione cuiusquam, sed ne pecuniaria quidem de re minima esse iudicem, nisi qui inter adversarios convenisset; quapropter in omnibus legibus quibus exceptum est de quibus causis aut magistratum capere non liceat aut iudicem legi aut alterum accusare, haec ignominiae causa praetermissa est; timoris enim causam, non vitae poenam in illa potestate esse voluerunt. 121.

43.Our ancestors wished that no one be a judge not only concerning anyone’s estimation, but not even concerning the least pecuniary matter, unless he had been agreed upon between the adversaries; wherefore in all the laws in which it is excepted for what causes it is not permitted either to take a magistracy or to be chosen as judge or to accuse another, this cause of ignominy has been passed over; for they wished there to be in that power a cause of fear, not a punishment upon life.121.

Itaque non solum illud ostendam, quod iam videtis, populi Romani suffragiis saepenumero censorias subscriptiones esse sublatas, verum etiam iudiciis eorum qui iurati statuere maiore cum religione et diligentia debuerunt. Primum iudices, senatores equitesque Romani, in compluribus iam reis quos contra leges pecunias accepisse subscriptum est, suae potius religioni quam censorum opinioni paruerunt; deinde praetores urbani, qui iurati debent optimum quemque in lectos iudices referre, numquam sibi ad eam rem censoriam ignominiam impedimento esse oportere duxerunt; 122. censores denique ipsi saepe numero superiorum censorum iudiciis, si ista iudicia appellari vultis, non steterunt.

Therefore I will show not only this, which you already see, that by the votes of the Roman people the censorial subscriptions have often been removed, but also by the judgments of those who, sworn, ought to decide with greater scruple and diligence. First, the jurors, senators and Roman equestrians, in the case of numerous defendants for whom it has been entered that they accepted monies contrary to the laws, obeyed their own conscience rather than the opinion of the censors; next, the urban praetors, who under oath ought to enroll each of the best men among the chosen jurors, never held that the censorial ignominy ought to be an impediment to them for that purpose; 122. finally, the censors themselves often did not abide by the judgments of prior censors—if you wish those to be called judgments.

Atque etiam ipsi inter se censores sua iudicia tanti esse arbitrantur ut alter alterius iudicium non modo reprehendat, sed etiam rescindat; ut alter de senatu movere velit, alter retineat et ordine amplissimo dignum existimet; ut alter in aerarios referri aut tribu moveri iubeat, alter vetet. Qua re qui vobis in mentem venit haec appellare iudicia, quae a populo rescindi, ab iuratis iudicibus repudiari, a magistratibus neglegi, ab eis qui eandem potestatem adepti sunt commutari, inter collegas discrepare videatis?

And moreover the censors themselves among themselves deem their own judgments to be of such weight that the one not only criticizes the judgment of the other, but even rescinds it; so that the one wishes to remove a man from the senate, the other retains him and judges him worthy of the most distinguished order; so that the one orders him to be entered among the aerarians or to be moved from his tribe, the other forbids it. Wherefore how did it come into your mind to call these “judgments,” which you see being rescinded by the people, repudiated by sworn judges, neglected by magistrates, changed by those who have attained the same power, at variance among colleagues?

XLIV. 123. Quae cum ita sint, videamus quid tandem censores de illo iudicio corrupto iudicasse dicantur.

44.123. Since these things are so, let us see what, then, the censors are said to have judged concerning that corrupt judgment.

Ac primum illud statuamus, utrum quia censores subscripserint ita sit, an quia ita fuerit illi subscripserint. Si quia subscripserint, videte quid agatis, ne in unum quemque nostrum censoribus in posterum potestatem regiam permittatis, ne subscriptio censoria non minus calamitatis civibus quam illa acerbissima proscriptio posset adferre, ne censorium stilum, cuius mucronem multis remediis maiores nostri rettuderunt, aeque posthac atque illum dictatorium gaudium pertimescamus. 124.

And first let us establish this: whether it is so because the censors have subscribed, or whether they subscribed because it was so. If because they subscribed, see what you are doing, lest you permit to the censors hereafter a regal power over each one of us; lest the censorial subscription be able to bring to the citizens no less calamity than that most bitter proscription; lest we henceforth dread the censorial stylus—whose point our ancestors blunted by many remedies—just as much as we dreaded that dictatorial joy. 124.

Sin autem quod subscriptum est, quia verum est, idcirco grave debet esse, hoc quaeremus, verum sit an falsum. Removeantur auctoritates censoriae; tollatur id ex causa quod in causa non est; doce quam pecuniam Cluentius dederit, unde dederit, quem ad modum dederit; unum denique aliquod a Cluentio aliquando profectae pecuniae vestigium ostende. Vince deinde bonum virum fuisse Oppianicum, hominem integrum, nihil de illo umquam secus esse existimatum, nihil denique praeiudicatum.

But if, however, that which has been subscribed ought therefore to be weighty because it is true, we shall inquire whether it is true or false. Let the censorial authorities be removed; let that be taken out of the case which is not in the case; show what money Cluentius gave, whence he gave it, in what manner he gave it; finally, display some single trace of money at any time having proceeded from Cluentius. Then prove that Oppianicus was a good man, an upright man, that nothing was ever thought otherwise about him, that nothing, finally, was prejudged.

Tum auctoritatem censoriam amplexator, tum illorum 'iudicium' coniunctum cum re esse defendito. 125. Dum vero eum fuisse Oppianicum constabit qui tabulas publicas municipii manu sua corrupisse iudicatus sit, qui testamentum interleverit, qui supposita persona falsum testamentum obsignandum curaverit, qui eum cuius nomine id obsignatum est interfecerit, qui avunculum filii sui in servitute ac vinculis necaverit, qui municipes suos proscribendos occidendosque curaverit, qui eius uxorem quem occiderat in matrimonium duxerit, qui pecuniam pro abortione dederit, qui socrum, qui uxores, qui uno tempore fratris uxorem speratosque liberos fratremque ipsum, qui denique suos liberos interfecerit, qui cum venenum privigno suo dare vellet, manifesto deprehensus sit, cuius ministris consciisque damnatis ipse adductus in iudicium pecuniam iudici dederit ad sententias iudicum corrumpendas – dum haec, inquam, de Oppianico constabunt, neque ullo argumento Cluentianeae pecuniae crimen tenebitur, quid est quod te ista censoria sive voluntas sive opinio fuit, adiuvare aut hunc innocentem opprimere posse videatur?

Then be an embracer of the censorial authority; then defend that their ‘judgment’ is conjoined with the matter. 125. Meanwhile, so long as it is established that it was that Oppianicus who has been adjudged to have corrupted with his own hand the public records of the municipality, who interlined a testament, who by a substituted person took care to have a false testament sealed, who killed the man in whose name it was sealed, who slew his son’s uncle in servitude and in chains, who procured that his fellow townsmen be proscribed and killed, who took to wife the wife of the man he had killed, who gave money for an abortion, who killed his mother-in-law, who killed his wives, who at one and the same time killed his brother’s wife and the hoped-for children and the brother himself, who, finally, killed his own children, who, when he wished to give poison to his stepson, was caught in the act, and who, his agents and accomplices having been condemned, himself, brought into court, gave money to the judge for the purpose of corrupting the sentences of the jurors—so long, I say, as these things about Oppianicus stand firm, and by no argument will the charge concerning Cluentius’s money be maintained, what is there by which that censorial will or opinion, such as it was, seems able either to aid you or to crush this innocent man?

XLV. 126. Quid igitur censores secuti sunt?

45.126. What, then, did the censors follow?

Ne ipsi quidem, ut gravissime dicam, quicquam aliud dicent praeter sermonem atque famam; nihil se testibus, nihil tabulis, nihil aliquo gravi argumento comperisse, nihil denique causa cognita statuisse dicent. Quod si ita fecissent, tamen id non ita fixum esse deberet ut convelli non liceret. Non utar exemplorum copia, quae summa est; non rem veterem, non hominem potentem aliquem aut gratiosum proferam.

Not even they themselves, to speak most gravely, will say anything other than talk and rumor; they will say that they have ascertained nothing from witnesses, nothing from records, nothing from any weighty argument, nothing, finally, that, the cause having been examined, they have decided. But even if they had done so, still it ought not to be so fixed that it is not permitted to be overturned. I will not use the abundance of examples, which is very great; I will bring forward neither an old matter nor some powerful or well‑favored man.

Nuper hominem tenuem, scribam aedilicium, D. Matrinium, cum defendissem apud M. Iunium Q. Publicium praetores et M. Plaetorium C. Flaminium aediles curules, persuasi ut scribam iurati legerent eum quem idem isti censores aerarium reliquissent; cum enim in homine nulla culpa inveniretur, quid ille meruisset, non quid de eo statutum esset, quaerendum esse duxerunt. 127. Nam haec quidem quae de iudicio corrupto subscripserunt, quis est qui ab illis satis cognita et diligenter iudicata arbitretur?

Recently, a man of modest means, an aedilician scribe, D. Matrinius—when I had defended him before M. Junius and Q. Publicius, praetors, and M. Plaetorius and C. Flaminius, curule aediles—I persuaded the sworn jurors to choose as scribe the one whom those same censors had left among the aerarians; for since no fault was found in the man, they deemed that what he had deserved ought to be inquired into, not what had been decreed about him. 127. For as to these things which they have subjoined about a corrupt judgment, who is there who would think that by those men they have been sufficiently ascertained and diligently judged?

In M'. Aquilium et in Ti. Guttam video esse subscriptum. Quid est hoc? duos esse corruptos solos pecunia dicant?

I see it entered against M'. Aquilius and against Ti. Gutta. What is this? Do they say that only two were corrupted by money?

ceteri videlicet gratis condemnarunt. Non est igitur circumventus, non est oppressus pecunia, non, ut illae Quinctianae contiones habebantur, omnes qui Oppianicum condemnarunt in culpa sunt ac suspicione ponendi. Duos solos video auctoritate censorum adfines ei turpitudini iudicari: aut illud adferant, aliquid sese, quod de his duobus habuerint compertum, de ceteris comperisse.

evidently the rest condemned for free. Therefore he was not circumvented, he was not oppressed by money; nor, as was being maintained in those Quinctian assemblies, are all who condemned Oppianicus in the wrong and to be placed under suspicion. I see that two alone are judged, by the authority of the censors, to be adjoined to that turpitude: or let them bring this forward, that they themselves have ascertained something—namely, that what they have discovered about these two, they have discovered about the rest.

XLVI. 128. Nam illud quidem minime probandum est, ad notationes auctoritatemque censoriam exemplum illos e consuetudine militari transtulisse.

46.128. For that indeed is by no means to be approved, that they transferred an example from military custom to the notations and the censorial authority.

Statuerunt enim ita maiores nostri ut, si a multis esset flagitium rei militaris admissum, sortito in quosdam animadverteretur, ut metus videlicet ad omnes, poena ad paucos perveniret. Quod idem facere censores in delectu dignitatis et in iudicio civium et in animadversione vitiorum qui convenit? Nam miles qui locum non tenuit, qui hostium impetum vimque pertimuit, potest idem postea et miles esse melior et vir bonus et civis utilis.

For our ancestors established thus: if a disgrace in military matters had been committed by many, punishment should be inflicted by lot upon certain men, so that fear, to wit, might reach all, but penalty only a few. How is it fitting that the censors do the same in the selection of dignity and in the judgment of citizens and in the animadversion of vices? For a soldier who did not hold his position, who feared the onrush and force of the enemy, can afterward be both a better soldier and a good man and a useful citizen.

Qua re qui in bello propter hostium metum deliquerat, amplior ei mortis ut supplicii metus est a maioribus constitutus; ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subirent, idcirco illa sortitio comparata est. 129. Hoc tu idem facies censor in senatu legendo?

Wherefore, for one who had done wrong in war on account of fear of the enemies, a greater fear—of death as a punishment—was established for him by our ancestors; but, lest too many should undergo the capital penalty, therefore that sortition was devised. 129. Will you do this same thing, censor, in selecting the senate?

Si erunt plures qui ob innocentem condemnandum pecuniam acceperint, tu non animadvertes in omnes, sed carpes ut velis, et paucos ex multis ad ignominiam sortiere? Habebit igitur te sciente et vidente curia senatorem, populus Romanus iudicem, res publica civem sine ignominia quemquam, qui ad perniciem innocentis fidem suam et religionem pecunia commutarit; et qui pretio adductus eripuerit patriam, fortunas, liberos civi innocenti, is censoriae severitatis nota non inuretur? Tu es praefectus moribus, tu magister veteris disciplinae ac severitatis, si aut retines quemquam sciens in senatu scelere tanto contaminatum, aut statuis qui in eadem culpa sit non eadem poena adfici convenire?

If there will be several who, for the condemning of an innocent, have taken money, will you not animadvert upon all, but pluck out as you please, and by lot assign a few out of many to ignominy? Will the Curia then, with you knowing and seeing, have a senator, the Roman People a judge, the Republic a citizen without ignominy—anyone who, for the perdition of an innocent, has exchanged his good faith and religion for money; and he who, induced by a price, has snatched away fatherland, fortunes, children from an innocent citizen—will that man not be branded with the mark of censorial severity? Are you the prefect of morals, the master of the old discipline and severity, if either you knowingly retain in the Senate anyone contaminated by so great a crime, or you determine that one who is in the same fault ought not to be afflicted with the same punishment?

Aut quam condicionem supplicii maiores in bello timiditati militis propositam esse voluerunt, eandem tu in pace constitues improbitati senatoris? Quod si hoc exemplum ex re militari ad animadversionem censoriam transferendum fuit, sortitione id ipsum factum esse oportuit; sin autem sortiri ad poenam et hominum delictum fortunae iudicio committere minime censorium est, certe in multorum peccato carpi paucos ad ignominiam [et turpitudinem] non oportet.

Or will you establish in peace for a senator’s wickedness the same condition of punishment that the forefathers wished to be set forth in war for a soldier’s timidity? But if this precedent was to be transferred from the military sphere to censorial animadversion, it ought to have been done by lot; but if to draw lots for a penalty and to commit the offense of men to the judgment of fortune is in no way censorial, certainly, when many have sinned, a few ought not to be picked out for ignominy [and disgrace].

XLVII. 130. Verum omnes intellegimus in istis subscriptionibus ventum quendam popularem esse quaesitum.

47.130. But we all understand that in those subscriptions a certain popular wind has been sought.

Iactata res erat in contione a tribuno seditioso; incognita causa probatum erat illud multitudini; nemini licitum est contra dicere; nemo denique ut defenderet contrariam partem laborabat. In invidiam porro magnam illa iudicia venerant: etenim paucis postea mensibus alia vehemens erat in iudiciis ex notatione tabellarum invidia versata. Praetermitti ab censoribus et neglegi macula iudiciorum posse non videbatur.

The matter had been bandied about in the assembly by a seditious tribune; with the cause unknown, that had been approved by the multitude; it was permitted to no one to speak against; no one, finally, was laboring to defend the contrary side. Moreover, those judgments had come into great odium: indeed, a few months afterward, another vehement odium in the courts was in play, arising from the notation of the tablets. It did not seem that the stain of the judgments could be passed over and neglected by the censors.

Homines quos ceteris vitiis atque omni dedecore infames videbant, – et eo magis quod illo ipso tempore, illis censoribus, erant iudicia cum equestri ordine communicata, – ut viderentur per hominum idoneorum ignominiam sua auctoritate illa iudicia reprehendisse. 131. Quod si hanc apud eosdem ipsos censores mihi aut alii causam agere licuisset, hominibus tali prudentia praeditis certe probavissem; res enim indicat nihil ipsos habuisse cogniti, nihil comperti; ex tota ista subscriptione rumorem quendam et plausum popularem esse quaesitum.

Men whom they saw to be infamous for other vices and every disgrace—and all the more because at that very time, under those very censors, the judgments had been shared with the equestrian order—so that they might seem, through the ignominy of men of suitable standing, by their own authority to have censured those judgments. 131. But if it had been permitted to me or to another to plead this cause before those same censors, men endowed with such prudence, I would certainly have proved it; for the matter indicates that they themselves had nothing known, nothing ascertained; that from that whole subscription a certain rumor and popular applause was sought.

Nam in P. Popilium, qui Oppianicum condemnarat, subscripsit L. Gellius, quod is pecuniam accepisset, quo innocentem condemnaret. Iam id ipsum quantae divinationis est scire innocentem fuisse reum, quem fortasse numquam viderat, cum homines sapientissimi, iudices, ut nihil dicam de eis qui condemnarunt, causa cognita sibi dixerunt non liquere! 132.

For against P. Popilius, who had condemned Oppianicus, L. Gellius subscribed, on the ground that he had accepted money, in order that he might condemn an innocent man. Now how much divination is there in that very thing, to know that the defendant was innocent, whom perhaps he had never seen, when most wise men, the judges— not to say those who condemned— after the case had been examined, said for themselves that it was not clear! 132.

Verum esto: condemnat Popilium Gellius, iudicat accepisse a Cluentio pecuniam. Negat hoc Lentulus. Nam Popilium, quod erat libertini filius, in senatum non legit, locum quidem senatorium ludis et cetera ornamenta relinquit, et eum omni ignominia liberat; quod cum facit, iudicat eius sententia gratis esse Oppianicum condemnatum.

But let it be: Gellius condemns Popilius, he judges that he received money from Cluentius. Lentulus denies this. For he did not enroll Popilius, because he was the son of a freedman, into the senate; indeed he leaves to him the senatorial place at the games and the other ornaments, and frees him from all ignominy; and when he does this, he judges by his sentence that Oppianicus was condemned without a bribe.

Et eundem Popilium postea Lentulus in ambitus iudicio pro testimonio diligentissime laudat. Qua re si neque L. Gelli iudicio stetit Lentulus neque Lentuli existimatione contentus fuit Gellius, et si uterque censor censoris opinione standum non putavit, quid est quam ob rem quisquam nostrum censorias subscriptiones omnes fixas et in perpetuum ratas putet esse oportere?

And that same Popilius thereafter Lentulus, in a trial for ambitus (electoral bribery), most diligently commends as a witness. Wherefore, if neither did Lentulus stand by the judgment of L. Gellius nor was Gellius content with the estimation of Lentulus, and if each censor thought one ought not to stand by the opinion of the other censor, what reason is there why any one of us should think that all the censorial subscriptions ought to be fixed and ratified in perpetuity?

XLVIII. 133. At in ipsum Habitum animadverterunt.

48.133. But they took action against Habitus himself.

Nullam quidem ob turpitudinem, nullum ob totius vitae non dicam vitium, sed erratum; neque enim hoc homine sanctior neque probior neque in omnibus officiis retinendis diligentior esse quisquam potest. Neque illi aliter dicunt, sed eandem illam famam iudicii corrupti secuti sunt: neque ipsi secus existimant quam nos existimari volumus de huius pudore, integritate, virtute, sed putarunt praetermitti accusatorem non potuisse, cum animadversum esset in iudices. Qua de re [tota] si unum factum ex omni antiquitate protulero, plura non dicam.

Indeed, not for any turpitude, not for—of his whole life I will not say a vice, but an error; for no one can be holier than this man, nor more upright, nor more diligent in maintaining all duties. Nor do they say otherwise, but they followed that same report of a corrupted judgment: nor do they themselves think otherwise than we wish to be thought concerning this man’s modesty, integrity, virtue; but they thought the accuser could not be passed over, since punishment had been inflicted upon the judges. On which [whole] matter, if I shall bring forward one fact from all antiquity, I will say no more.

134. Non enim mihi exemplum summi et clarissimi viri, P. Africani, praetereundem videtur, qui cum esset censor et in equitum censu C. Licinius Sacerdos prodisset, clara voce, ut omnis contio audire posset, dixit se scire illum verbis conceptis peierasse: si qui contra vellet dicere, usurum esse eum suo testimonio: deinde cum nemo contra diceret, iussit equum traducere. Ita is, cuius arbitrio et populus Romanus et exterae gentes contentae esse consuerant, ipse sua scientia ad ignominiam alterius contentus non fuit.

134. For it does not seem to me that the example of the highest and most illustrious man, P. Africanus, is to be passed over, who, when he was censor and, at the census of the equestrians, Gaius Licinius Sacerdos had come forward, said in a clear voice, so that the whole assembly could hear, that he knew that man had forsworn himself with set words; that, if anyone wished to speak against it, he would employ his own testimony; then, when no one spoke against, he ordered the horse to be led across. Thus he, at whose judgment both the Roman people and foreign nations had been accustomed to be content, was not himself content, for another’s ignominy, with his own knowledge alone.

Quod si hoc Habito facere licuisset, facile illis ipsis iudicibus et falsae suspicioni et invidiae populariter excitatae restitisset.

But if it had been permitted to Habitus to do this, he would easily have withstood those very judges and the false suspicion and the envy popularly aroused.

135. Unam etiam est quod me maxime perturbat, cui loco respondere vix videor posse, quod elogium recitasti de testamento Cn. Egnati patris, hominis honestissimi videlicet et sapientissimi: idcirco se exheredasse filium quod is ob Oppianici condemnationem pecuniam accepisset. De cuius hominis levitate et inconstantia plura non dicam: hoc testamentum ipsum, quod recitas, eius modi est ut ille, cum eum filium exheredaret quem oderat, ei filio coheredes homines alienissimos adiungeret quem diligebat.

135. There is also this one thing which most perturbs me, to which point I scarcely seem able to respond: that clause you recited from the testament of Cn. Egnatius the father, a man most honorable, forsooth, and most wise—that he disinherited his son for this reason, because that man had received money on account of Oppianicus’s condemnation. About whose levity and inconstancy I will not say more: this very testament, which you recite, is of such a sort that he, when he disinherited the son whom he hated, added to the son whom he loved as coheirs men most alien.

Sed tu, Acci, consideres, censeo, diligenter, utrum censorum iudicium grave velis esse an Egnati. Si Egnati, leve est quod censores de ceteris subscripserunt; ipsum enim Cn. Egnatium, quem tu gravem esse vis, ex senatu eiecerunt: sin autem censorum, hunc Egnatium, quem pater censoria subscriptione exheredavit, censores in senatu, cum patrem eicerent, retinuerunt.

But you, Accius, consider, I judge, carefully, whether you wish the censors’ judgment to be weighty or Egnatius’s. If Egnatius’s, what the censors have subscribed concerning the others is light; for they expelled Cn. Egnatius himself, whom you wish to be weighty, from the senate: but if the censors’, the censors kept in the senate this Egnatius, whom his father disinherited by the censorial subscription, when they were expelling the father.

XLIX. 136. At enim senatus universus iudicavit illud corruptum esse iudicium.

49.136. But indeed the whole Senate judged that trial to have been corrupt.

Quo modo? Suscepit causam. An potuit rem delatam eius modi repudiare?

How so? He took up the case. Or could he repudiate a matter of that sort that had been laid before him?

cum tribunus plebis populo concitato rem paene ad manus revocasset, cum vir optimus et homo innocentissimus pecunia circumventus esse diceretur, cum invidia flagraret ordo senatorius, potuit nihil decerni? potuit illa concitatio multitudinis sine summo periculo rei publicae repudiari? At quid est decretum?

when the tribune of the plebs, with the people stirred up, had almost brought the matter to blows, when a most excellent man and a most innocent person was said to have been circumvented by money, when the senatorial order was blazing with ill-will, could nothing be decreed? could that incitement of the multitude be repudiated without the greatest peril to the republic? But what was decreed?

quam iuste! quam sapienter! quam diligenter!

how justly! how wisely! how diligently!

SE QUI SUNT QUORUM OPERA FACTUM SIT UT IUDICIUM PUBLICUM CORRUMPERETUR. Utrum videtur id senatus factum iudicare, an, si factum sit, moleste graviterque ferre? Si ipse A. Cluentius sententiam de iudiciis rogaretur, aliam non diceret atque ii dixerunt quorum sententiis Cluentium condemnatum esse dicitis. 137.

THOSE THEMSELVES WHO ARE THE ONES BY WHOSE AGENCY IT CAME ABOUT THAT A PUBLIC JUDGMENT WAS CORRUPTED. Does the senate seem to judge that to have been done, or, if it was done, to take it ill and grievously? If A. Cluentius himself were asked for an opinion about the courts, he would say nothing other than what those said by whose votes you say that Cluentius was condemned. 137.

Sed quaero a vobis num istam legem ex isto senatus consulto L. Lucullus consul, homo sapientissimus, tulerit, num anno post M. Lucullus et C. Cassius, in quos tum consules designatos idem illud senatus decreverat? Non tulerunt; et quod tu Habiti pecunia factum esse arguis neque id ulla tenuissima suspicione confirmas, factum est primum illorum aequitate et sapientia consulum, ut id, quod senatus decreverat ad illud invidiae praesens incendium restinguendum, id postea ferendum ad populum non arbitrarentur: ipse deinde populus Romanus, qui L. Quincti fictis querimoniis antea concitatus rem illam et rogationem flagitarat, idem C. Iuni filii, pueri parvuli, lacrimis commotus, maximo clamore et concursu totam quaestionem illam et legem repudiavit. 138.

But I ask of you whether L. Lucullus, consul, a most wise man, brought forward that law from that senatorial decree, whether a year later M. Lucullus and C. Cassius, upon whom, when they were then consuls-designate, that same decree of the senate had been voted? They did not; and the thing which you allege to have been done by Habitus’s money, nor do you confirm it by any most slender suspicion, was brought about first by the equity and wisdom of those consuls, to the effect that what the senate had decreed for quenching that present conflagration of ill-will, that they afterwards judged ought not to be carried to the people: then the Roman people themselves, who, stirred earlier by the feigned complaints of L. Quinctius, had demanded that measure and the rogation, the same, moved by the tears of the son of C. Iunius, a very little boy, with the greatest clamor and concourse repudiated that whole inquiry and law. 138.

Ex quo intellegi potuit id quod saepe dictum est: ut mare, quod sua natura tranquillum sit, ventorum vi agitari atque turbari, sic populum Romanum sua sponte esse placatum, hominum seditiosorum vocibus ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari.

From this it could be understood what has often been said: that just as the sea, which by its own nature is tranquil, is agitated and disturbed by the force of winds, so the Roman people is, of its own accord, placid, but by the voices of seditious men is stirred up as by the most violent tempests.

L. Est etiam reliqua permagna auctoritas, quam ego turpiter paene preterii; mea enim esse dicitur. Recitavit ex oratione nescio qua Accius, quam meam esse dicebat, cohortationem quandam iudicum ad honeste iudicandum et commemorationem cum aliorum iudiciorum quae probata non essent, tum illius ipsius iudicii Iuniani; proinde quasi ego non ab initio huius defensionis dixerim invidiosum illud iudicium fuisse, aut, cum de infamia iudiciorum disputarem, potuerim illud quod tam populare esset illo tempore praeterire. 139.

50.There also remains a very great authority, which I almost shamefully passed over; for it is said to be mine. Accius recited from some speech—I know not which—which he said was mine, a certain exhortation of the jurors to judge honorably and a commemoration both of other judgments which had not been approved, and of that very Junian judgment; just as if I had not from the beginning of this defense said that that judgment was invidious, or, when I was disputing about the infamy of judgments, I could have passed over that which was so popular at that time. 139.

Ego vero, si quid eius modi dixi, neque cognitum commemoravi neque pro testimonio dixi, et illa oratio potius temporis mei quam iudicii et auctoritatis fuit. Cum enim accusarem, et mihi initio proposuissem ut animos et populi Romani et iudicum commoverem, cumque omnes offensiones iudiciorum non ex mea opinione sed ex hominum rumore proferrem, istam rem, quae tam populariter esset agitata, praeterire non potui. Sed errat vehementer si quis in orationibus nostris, quas in iudiciis habuimus, auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur; omnes enim illae causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum aut patronorum.

But I indeed, if I said anything of that sort, neither recounted it as something known nor spoke it as testimony, and that speech was rather a product of my time than of judgment and authority. For when I was accusing, and had from the beginning set it before myself to stir the minds both of the Roman people and of the judges, and when I was putting forward all the grievances against the courts not from my own opinion but from the rumor of men, I could not pass over that matter, which had been agitated so popularly. But he errs vehemently if anyone thinks that in our speeches, which we delivered in trials, he has our “authorities” consigned and on record; for all those belong to the cases and to the times, not to the men themselves or to the patrons.

Nam si causae ipsae pro se loqui possent, nemo adhiberet oratorem: nunc adhibemur ut ea dicamus, non quae nostra auctoritate constituantur, sed quae ex re ipsa causaque ducantur. 140. Hominem ingeniosum, M. Antonium, aiunt solitum esse dicere idcirco se nullam umquam orationem scripsisse ut, si quid aliquando non opus esset ab se esse dictum, posset negare dixisse; proinde quasi si quid a nobis dictum aut actum sit, id nisi litteris mandarimus, hominum memoria non comprehendatur

For if the cases themselves could speak for themselves, no one would employ an orator: now we are employed to say those things, not which are established by our authority, but which are drawn from the matter itself and from the cause. 140. They say that an ingenious man, Marcus Antonius, was accustomed to say that for that reason he had never written any speech, so that, if at some time something that he had said should not be needful, he could deny having said it; just as though, if anything has been said or done by us, that, unless we have consigned it to letters, would not be comprehended by the memory of men.

LI. Ego vero in isto genere libentius cum multorum tum hominis eloquentissimi et sapientissimi, L. Crassi, auctoritatem sequor, qui cum Cn. Plancum defenderet, accusante M. Bruto, homine in dicendo vehemente et callido, cum Brutus duobus recitatoribus constitutis ex duabus eius orationibus capita alterna inter se contraria recitanda curasset, quod in dissuasione rogationis eius quae contra coloniam Narbonensem ferebatur quantum potest de auctoritate senatus detrahit, in suasione legis Serviliae summis ornat senatum laudibus, et multa in equites Romanos cum ex ea oratione asperius dicta recitasset, quo animi illorum iudicum in Crassum incenderentur, aliquantum esse commotus dicitur. 141. Itaque in respondendo primum euit utriusque rationem temporis, ut oratio ex re et ex causa habita videretur; deinde ut intellegere posset Brutus quem hominem et non solum qua eloquentia, verum etiam quo lepore et quibus facetiis praeditum lacessisset, tres ipse excitavit recitatores cum singulis libellis quos M. Brutus, pater illius accusatoris, de iure civili reliquit.

51.I for my part in this kind more gladly follow, among many, the authority of that most eloquent and most wise man, L. Crassus, who, when he was defending Cn. Plancus, with M. Brutus prosecuting—a man vehement and crafty in speaking—when Brutus, having appointed two reciters, had arranged for alternating, mutually contrary headings to be read out from two of his orations, because in the dissuasion of that bill which was being brought against the colony of Narbo he detracts as much as possible from the authority of the senate, but in the persuasion of the Servilian law he adorns the senate with the highest praises, and when from that oration he had read out many things said somewhat more sharply against the Roman knights, in order that the minds of those jurors might be inflamed against Crassus, he is said to have been somewhat moved. 141. And so, in replying he first set forth the account of the time of each, so that the speech might seem to have been delivered from the matter and from the cause; then, that Brutus might be able to understand what sort of man he had provoked, endowed not only with eloquence, but also with what charm and with what witticisms, he himself brought forward three reciters with individual little volumes which M. Brutus, the father of that accuser, left about civil law.

Eorum initia cum recitarentur, – ea quae vobis nota esse arbitror: 'Forte evenit ut ruri in Privernati essemus ego et Brutus filius,' fundum Privernatem flagitabat; 'In Albano eramus ego et Brutus filius,' Albanum poscebat; 'In Tiburti forte cum adsedissemus ego et Brutus filius,' Tiburtem fundum requirebat; Brutum autem, hominem sapientem, quod filii nequitiam videret, quae praedia ei relinqueret testificari voluisse dicebat. Quod si potuisset honeste scribere se in balneis cum id aetatis filio fuisse, non praeterisset: eas se tamen ab eo balneas non ex libris patris, sed ex tabulis et ex censu quaerere. Crassus tum ita Brutum ultus est ut illum recitationis suae paeniteret; moleste enim fortasse tulerat se in eis orationibus reprehensum, quas de re publica habuisset, in quibus forsitan magis requiratur constantia.

As the openings of those were being read—those which I reckon are known to you: 'By chance it happened that in the country in the Privernate district we were, I and Brutus the son,' he was clamoring for a Privernate farm; 'We were in the Alban district, I and Brutus the son,' he was demanding an Alban estate; 'By chance when we had sat down at Tibur, I and Brutus the son,' he was seeking a Tiburtine farm; and he said that Brutus, a wise man, because he saw the profligacy of his son, had wished to testify what estates he would leave to him. And if he could have decently written that he had been in the baths with a son of that age, he would not have passed it over; yet he said that he sought those baths from him not from the father’s books, but from documents and from the census. Crassus then avenged himself upon Brutus in such a way that he regretted his recitation; for perhaps he had taken it ill that he had been censured in those speeches which he had delivered on the republic, in which perhaps constancy is more required.

142. Ego autem illa recitata esse non moleste fero; neque enim ab illo tempore quod tum erat, neque ab ea causa quae tum agebatur aliena fuerunt; neque mihi quicquam oneris suscepi, cum ista dixi, quo minus honeste hanc causam et libere possem defendere. Quod si velim confiteri me causam A. Cluenti nunc cognosse, antea fuisse in illa populari opinione, quis tandem id possit reprehendere?

142. As for me, I do not bear it with displeasure that those things were recited; for they were not alien either from the time which then was, or from the cause which was then being handled; nor did I take upon myself any burden, when I said those things, to hinder me from being able to defend this cause honorably and freely. And if I should wish to confess that I have now come to know the case of A. Cluentius, that previously I was in that popular opinion, who, pray, could reprehend that?

praesertim, iudices, cum a vobis quoque ipsis hoc impetrari sit aequissimum, quod ego et ab initio petivi et nunc peto, ut, si quam huc graviorem de illo iudicio opinionem attulistis, hanc causa perspecta atque omni veritate cognita deponatis.

especially, judges, since it is most equitable that this be obtained from you yourselves as well, which I both asked from the beginning and now ask: that, if you have brought here any graver opinion about that judgment, you lay this aside, once the case has been examined and all the truth known.

LII. 143. Nunc, quoniam ad omnia quae abs te dicta sunt, T. Acci, de Oppianici damnatione respondi, confiteare necesse est te opinionem multum fefellise, quod existimaris me causam A. Cluenti non facto eius, sed lege defensurum.

52.143. Now, since I have answered to all the things which have been said by you, T. Accius, about the condemnation of Oppianicus, you must confess that your expectation has greatly deceived you, because you supposed that I would defend the case of A. Cluentius not by his deed, but by the law.

Nam hoc persaepe dixisti tibi sic renuntiari, me habere in animo causam hanc praesidio legis defendere. Itane est? Ab amicis imprudentes videlicet prodimur, et est nescio quis de eis quos amicos nostros arbitramur qui nostra consilia ad adversarios deferat.

For you have said very often that it was reported back to you thus: that I have in mind to defend this case by the protection of the law. Is that so? Evidently we, unwary, are betrayed by friends, and there is I know not who among those whom we reckon our friends who carries our counsels to our adversaries.

Quisnam hoc tibi renuntiavit? quis tam improbus fuit? Cui ego autem narravi?

Who, pray, reported this to you? who was so shameless? But to whom did I tell it?

Nemo, ut opinor, in culpa est: et nimirum tibi istud lex ipsa renuntiavit. Sed num tibi ita defendisse videor ut tota in causa mentionem ullam fecerim legis? num secus hanc causam defendisse ac si lege Habitus teneretur?

No one, as I suppose, is in fault; and indeed the law itself reported that to you. But do I seem to you to have defended in such a way that in the whole case I made any mention at all of the law? Have I defended this case otherwise than as if Habitus were held by the law?

Certe, ut hominem confirmare oportet, nullus est locus a me purgandi istius invidiosi criminis praetermissus. 144. Quid ergo est?

Certainly, as one ought to confirm the man, no opportunity for purging that invidious charge was omitted by me. 144. What then is it?

quaeret fortasse quispiam: displicetne mihi legum praesidio capitis periculum propulsare? Mihi vero, iudices, non displicet, sed utor instituto meo. In hominis honesti prudentisque iudicio non solum meo consilio uti consuevi, sed multum etiam eius quem defendo et consilio et voluntati obtempero.

Someone perhaps will ask: does it displease me to ward off a capital peril by the protection of the laws? To me indeed, judges, it does not displease, but I employ my own established practice. In the judgment of an honest and prudent man I have been accustomed not only to use my own counsel, but I also greatly defer to both the counsel and the will of him whom I defend.

Nam ut haec ad me causa delata est, qui leges eas ad quas adhibemur et in quibus versamur nosse deberem, dixi Habito statim eo capite QUI COISSET QUO QUIS CONDEMNARETUR illum esse liberum, teneri autem nostrum ordinem: atque ille me orare atque obsecrare coepit ne se lege defenderem. Cum ego quae mihi videbantur dicerem, traduxit me ad suam sententiam; adfirmabat enim lacrimans non se cupidiorem esse civitatis retinendae quam existimationis. Morem homini gessi, et tamen idcirco feci – neque enim id semper facere debemus – quod videbam per se ipsam causam sine lege copiosissime posse defendi.

For when this cause was brought to me, since I ought to know the laws to which we are applied and in which we are conversant, I said to Habitus at once that under that head WHO HAD CONVENED IN ORDER THAT SOMEONE BE CONDEMNED he himself was free, but that our order was held; and he began to beg and beseech me not to defend him by law. When I was saying what seemed good to me, he led me over to his own opinion; for he affirmed with tears that he was not more desirous of retaining citizenship than of reputation. I deferred to the man, and yet I did it for this reason—nor indeed ought we always to do this—because I saw that the cause by itself, without the law, could be most copiously defended.

Videbam in hac defensione qua iam sum usus plus dignitatis, in illa qua me hic uti noluit minus laboris futurum: quod si nihil aliud esset actum nisi ut hanc causam obtineremus, lege recitata perorassem.

I saw that in this defense, which I have already used, there would be more dignity, in that other, which this man did not wish me to employ, less labor: and if nothing else had been done except that we should prevail in this case, once the law had been recited I would have brought my speech to a close.

LIII. Neque me illa oratio commovet, quod ait Accius indignum esse facinus, si senator iudicio quempiam circumvenerit, legibus eum teneri: si eques Romanus hoc idem fecerit, non teneri. Ut tibi concedam hoc indignum esse, quod cuius modi sit iam videro, tu mihi concedas necesse est multo esse indignius in ea civitate quae legibus contineatur discedi ab legibus.

53.Nor does that oration move me, because Accius says it is an unworthy crime that, if a senator has circumvented someone by a judgment, he is held by the laws; but if a Roman equestrian has done this same, he is not held. Granted that I concede to you that this is unworthy—of what sort it is I will presently see—you must needs concede to me that it is much more unworthy, in that commonwealth which is contained by laws, to depart from the laws.

Hoc enim vinculum est huius dignitatis qua fruimur in re publica, hoc fundamentum libertatis, hic fons aequitatis: mens et animus et consilium et sententia civitatis posita est in legibus. Ut corpora nostra sine mente, sic civitas sine lege suis partibus, ut nervis et sanguine et membris, uti non potest. Legum ministri magistratus, legum interpretes iudices, legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus.

For this is the bond of that dignity which we enjoy in the commonwealth; this, the foundation of liberty; this, the fountain of equity: the mind and the spirit and the counsel and the judgment of the commonwealth are set in the laws. Just as our bodies without mind cannot make use of their own parts—nerves and blood and limbs—so the commonwealth without law cannot. The magistrates are ministers of the laws, the judges interpreters of the laws; of the laws, finally, we all are servants, in order that we may be able to be free.

147. Quid est, Q. Naso, cur tu in isto loco sedeas? Quae vis est, qua abs te hi iudices tali dignitate praediti coerceantur?

147. What is it, Q. Naso, that you should be seated in that place? What power is there, by which these judges, endowed with such dignity, are to be coerced by you?

Vos autem, iudices, quam ob rem ex tanta multitudine civium tam pauci de hominum fortunis sententiam fertis? Quo iure Accius quae voluit dixit? Cur mihi tam diu potestas dicendi datur?

But you, judges, for what reason, out of so great a multitude of citizens, do so few deliver judgment on the fortunes of men? By what right did Accius say whatever he wished? Why is the power of speaking granted to me for so long?

Quid sibi autem illi scribae, quid lictores, quid ceteri quos apparere huic quaestioni video, volunt? Opinor haec omnia lege fieri totumque hoc iudicium, ut ante dixi, quasi mente quadam regi legis et administrari. Quid ergo?

What do those clerks want, moreover, what the lictors, what the rest whom I see appearing at this court of inquiry, want? I suppose all these things are done by law, and that this whole court, as I said before, is, as it were, governed by a certain mind of the law and administered. What then?

haec quaestio sola ita gubernatur? Quid M. Plaetori et C. Flamini inter sicarios, quid C. Orchivi peculatus, quid mea de pecuniis reptundis, quid C. Aquili, apud quem nunc de ambitu causa dicitur, quid reliquae quaestiones? Circumspicite omnes rei publicae partes: 148.

Is this court of inquiry alone governed thus? What of M. Plaetorius and C. Flaminus in the court for assassins, what of C. Orchivius’s peculation, what of my own on monies to be recovered (repetundae), what of C. Aquilius, before whom a case is now being pleaded on ambitus, what of the remaining quaestiones? Look around at all the parts of the commonwealth: 148.

omnia legum imperio et praescripto fieri videbitis. Si quis apud me, T. Acci, te reum velit facere, clames te lege pecuniarum repetundarum non teneri; neque haec tua recusatio confessio sit captae pecuniae, sed laboris et periculi non legitimi declinatio

you will see that all things are done by the command and prescript of the laws. If anyone before me, T. Accius, should wish to make you a defendant, you would cry out that you are not bound by the law on the recovery of monies; nor would this refusal of yours be a confession of taken money, but a declination of labor and peril not lawful

LIV. Nunc quid agatur et quid abs te iuris constituatur vide. Iubet lex ea, qua lege haec quaestio constituta est, iudicem quaestionis, hoc est Q. Voconium, cum eis iudicibus qui ei obvenerint – vos appellat, iudices – quaerere de veneno.

54.Now see what is being done and what of right is being established by you. The law by which this quaestio was established orders the judge of the quaestio, that is Quintus Voconius, together with those jurors who have fallen to his lot – it addresses you, jurors – to inquire concerning poison.

In quem quaerere? Infinitum est: QUICUMQUE, FECERIT, VENDIDERIT, EMERIT, HABUERIT, DEDERIT. Quid eadem lex statim adiungit? recita.

Against whom to inquire? It is infinite: WHOEVER SHALL HAVE MADE, SOLD, BOUGHT, SHALL HAVE HAD, GIVEN. What does the same law immediately add? recite.

DEQUE EIUS CAPITE QUAERITO. Cuius? qui coierit, convenerit? Non ita est.

AND INQUIRE CONCERNING HIS CAPITAL CASE. Whose? one who has come together, has convened? It is not so.

Quid ergo est? dic. QUI TRIBUNUS MILITUM LEGIONIBUS QUATTUOR PRIMIS, QUIVE QUAESTOR, TRIBUNUS PLEBIS – deinceps omnes magistratus nominavit – QUIVE IN SENATU SENTENTIAM DIXIT, DIXERIT. Quid tum?

What then is it? Say. WHOEVER IS MILITARY TRIBUNE OF THE FIRST FOUR LEGIONS, OR QUAESTOR, TRIBUNE OF THE PLEBS – in succession he named all the magistrates – OR WHOEVER HAS GIVEN, SHALL HAVE GIVEN, AN OPINION IN THE SENATE. What then?

QUI EORUM COIT, COIERIT, CONVENIT, CONVENERIT, QUO QUIS IUDICIO PUBLICO CONDEMNARETUR. 'Qui eorum': quorum? videlicet, qui supra scripti sunt. Quid interest utro modo scriptum sit?

WHO OF THEM MEETS, SHALL HAVE MET, CONVENES, SHALL HAVE CONVENED, FOR THE PURPOSE THAT SOMEONE BE CONDEMNED BY PUBLIC JUDGMENT. 'Which of them': of whom? namely, those who are written above. What difference does it make which way it is written?

Etsi est apertum, ipsa tamen lex nos docet. Ubi enim omnes mortales adligat ita loquitur, QUI VENENUM MALUM FECIT, FECERIT: omnes viri, mulieres, liberi, servi in iudicium vocantur. Si idem de coitione voluisset, adiunxisset: QUIVE, COIERIT. Nunc ita est: DEQUE EIUS CAPITE QUAERITO QUI MAGISTRATUM HABUERIT INVE SENATU SENTENTIAM DIXERIT, QUI EORUM COIT, COIERIT. 149.

Although it is plain, nevertheless the law itself teaches us. For where it binds all mortals it speaks thus, WHO HAS MADE, SHALL HAVE MADE A BAD POISON: all men, women, free persons, slaves are called into judgment. If he had wished the same about combination, he would have added: OR WHO, HAS COME TOGETHER. Now it is thus: AND MAKE INQUIRY CONCERNING THE CAPITAL CHARGE OF HIM WHO HAS HELD A MAGISTRACY OR HAS SPOKEN HIS OPINION IN THE SENATE, WHO AMONG THEM MEETS, HAS MET. 149.

Num is est Cluentius? Certe non est. Quis ergo est Cluentius?

Is that Cluentius? Certainly it is not. Who, then, is Cluentius?

Qui tamen defendi causam suam lege noluit. Itaque abicio legem: morem Cluentio gero. Tibi tamen, Acci, pauca quae ab huius causa seiuncta sunt respondebo.

Who, however, did not wish his case to be defended by the law. Therefore I cast aside the law: I comply with Cluentius. To you, however, Accius, I will answer a few things which are separated from this man’s case.

Est enim quiddam in hac causa quod Cluentius ad se, est aliquid quod ego ad me putem pertinere. Hic sua putat interesse se re ipsa et gesto negotio, non lege defendi; ego autem mea existimo interesse me nulla in disputatione ab Accio videri esse superatum. Non enim mihi haec causa sola dicenda est; omnibus hic labor meus propositus est, quicumque hac facultate defensionis contenti esse possunt.

For there is indeed something in this case which Cluentius thinks pertains to himself, there is something which I think pertains to myself. He thinks it is to his own interest to be defended by the thing itself and by the business as conducted, not by the statute; but I consider it to be to my own interest that I seem in no disputation to have been overcome by Accius. For this case is not the only one that must be pleaded by me; this effort of mine is set forth for all, whoever can be content with this faculty of defense.

Nolo quemquam eorum qui adsunt existimare me, quae de lege ab Accio dicta sunt, si reticuerim, comprobare. Quam ob rem, Cluenti, de te tibi obsequor, neque enim legem recito neque hoc loco pro te dico; sed ea quae a me desiderari arbitror non relinquam.

I do not wish any of those present to think that, if I keep silent, I approve the things that have been said about the law by Accius. Wherefore, Cluentius, I defer to you in your own matter; for I neither recite the statute nor at this point do I speak on your behalf; but I will not leave aside those things which I judge to be expected from me.

LV. 150. Iniquum tibi videtur, Acci, esse non isdem legibus omnes teneri. Primum, ut id iniquissimum esse confitear, eius modi est ut commutatis eis opus sit legibus, non ut his quae sunt non pareamus.

55.150. It seems inequitable to you, Accius, that all are not held by the same laws. First, while I confess that this is most inequitable, it is of such a kind that there is need for those laws to be changed, not that we should not obey these which exist.

Deinde quis umquam hoc senator accusavit, ut cum altiorem gradum dignitatis beneficio populi Romani esset consecutus, eo se putaret durioribus legum condicionibus uti oportere? Quam multa sunt commoda quibus caremus, quam multa molesta et difficilia quae subimus! atque haec omnia tantum honoris et amplitudinis commodo compensantur.

Then who ever of the senators has accused this, that when he has attained a higher step of dignity by the benefit of the Roman people, he should think that he ought to be subject to harsher conditions of the laws? How many advantages we lack, how many troublesome and difficult things we undergo! and all these things are compensated by the advantage of so much honor and amplitude.

Converte nunc ad equestrem ordinem atque in ceteros ordines easdem vitae condiciones: non perferent. Putant enim minus multos sibi laqueos legum et condicionum ac iudiciorum propositos esse oportere, qui summum locum civitatis aut non potuerunt ascendere aut non petiverunt. 151.

Now apply the same conditions of life to the equestrian order and to the other orders: they will not endure them. For they think that fewer snares of laws and of conditions and of judgments ought to be set before themselves, they who either have not been able to ascend to or have not sought the highest place of the state. 151.

Atque ut omittam leges alias omnes quibus nos tenemur, ceteri autem sunt ordines liberati, hanc ipsam legem NE QUIS IUDICIO CIRCUMVENIRETUR C. Gracchus tulit: eam legem pro plebe, non in plebem tulit. Postea L. Sulla, homo a populi causa remotissimus, tamen, cum eius rei quaestionem hac ipsa lege constitueret qua vos hoc tempore iudicatis, populum Romanum, quem ab hoc genere liberum acceperat, adligare novo quaestionis genere ausus non est. Quod si fieri posse existimasset, pro illo odio quod habuit in equestrem ordinem nihil fecisset libentius quam omnem illam acerbitatem prosciptionis suae, qua est usus in veteres iudices, in hanc unam quaestionem contulisset.

And, to omit all the other laws by which we are held, while the other orders are liberated, this very law THAT NO ONE BE CIRCUMVENTED IN JUDGMENT Gaius Gracchus carried: he carried that law for the plebs, not against the plebs. Afterwards Lucius Sulla, a man most remote from the people’s cause, nevertheless, when he constituted the inquiry of that matter by this very law by which you at this time judge, did not dare to bind the Roman people, whom he had received free from this kind of thing, by a new kind of inquiry. But if he had thought it could be done, given that hatred which he had toward the equestrian order, nothing would he have done more willingly than to have transferred all that acerbity of his proscription, which he employed against the former judges, into this one inquiry.

152. Nec nunc quicquam agitur – mihi credite, iudices, et prospicite id quod providendum est – nisi ut equester ordo in huiusce legis periculum concludatur. Neque hoc agitur ab omnibus, sed a paucis.

152. Nor now is anything being done—believe me, judges, and look ahead to that which must be provided for—except that the equestrian order be confined within the peril of this very law. Nor is this being done by everyone, but by a few.

Nam ii senatores qui se facile tuentur integritate et innocentia – quales, ut vere dicam, vos estis, et ceteri qui sine cupiditate vixerunt – equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos, concordia coniunctissimos esse cupiunt; sed ii qui sese volunt posse omnia neque praeterea quicquam esse aut in homine ullo aut in ordine hoc uno metu se putant equites Romanos in potestatem suam redacturos, si constitutum sit ut de eis qui rem iudicarint huiusce modi iudicia fieri possint. Vident enim auctoritatem huius ordinis confirmari: vident iudicia comprobari: hoc metu proposito evellere se aculeum severitatis vestrae posse confidunt. 153.

For those senators who easily defend themselves by integrity and innocence—such as, to speak truly, you are, and the others who have lived without cupidity—desire the equites to be nearest to the senatorial order in dignity, most closely joined in concord; but those who wish themselves to be able to do everything and that, besides, there be nothing either in any individual or in any order, think that by this one fear they will bring the Roman equites into their power, if it is established that judgments of this sort can be made concerning those who have judged a case. For they see the authority of this order being confirmed; they see the judgments being approved; with this fear set forth, they are confident that they can pluck out the sting of your severity. 153.

Quis enim de homine audeat paulo maioribus opibus praedito vere et fortiter iudicare, cum videat sibi de eo quod coierit aut consenserit causam esse dicendam?

For who, indeed, would dare to judge truly and bravely about a man endowed with somewhat greater resources, when he sees that he himself must plead his case concerning that which he has entered into in concert or consented to?

LVI. O viros fortes, equites Romanos, qui homini clarissimo ac potentissimo, M. Druso, tribuno plebis restiterunt, cum ille nihil aliud ageret cum illa cuncta quae tum erat nobilitate, nisi ut ii qui rem iudicassent huiusce modi quaestionibus in iudicium vocarentur. Tunc C. Flavius Pusio, Cn. Titinius, C. Maecenas, illa robora populi Romani, ceterique eiusdem ordinis non fecerunt idem quod nunc Cluentius ut aliquid culpae suscipere se putarent recusando, sed apertissime repugnarunt, cum haec recusarent et palam fortissime atque honestissime dicerent se potuisse iudicio populi Romani in amplissimum locum pervenire, si sua studia ad honores petendos conferre voluissent; sese vidisse in ea vita qualis splendor inesset, quanta ornamenta, quae dignitas; quae se non contempsisse, sed ordine suo patrumque suorum contentos fuisse et vitam illam tranquillam et quietam, remotam a procellis invidiarum et huiusce modi iudiciorum sequi maluisse: 154.

56.O brave men, Roman equestrians, who withstood a most illustrious and most powerful man, M. Drusus, tribune of the plebs, when he, together with all the nobility that then existed, was pursuing nothing other than that those who had judged a matter be called into judgment by inquests of this sort. Then C. Flavius Pusio, Cn. Titinius, C. Maecenas, those bulwarks of the Roman people, and the rest of the same order did not do the same as Cluentius now, so as to think that by refusing they were taking upon themselves some blame, but they most openly resisted, when they refused these things and declared openly, most bravely and most honorably, that they could have attained the most distinguished station by the judgment of the Roman people, if they had wished to devote their pursuits to seeking honors; that they had seen what splendor would be in that life, how great the ornaments, what dignity; which they had not despised, but had been content with their own order and that of their fathers and had preferred to follow that tranquil and quiet life, removed from the tempests of envies and of trials of this sort: 154.

aut sibi ad honores petendos aetatem integram restitui oportere, aut, quoniam id non posset, eam condicionem vitae quam secuti petitionem reliquissent manere; iniquum esse eos qui honorum ornamenta propter periculorum multitudinem praetermisissent populi beneficiis esse privatos, iudiciorum novorum periculis non carere; senatorem hoc queri non posse, propterea quod ea condicione proposita petere coepisset, quodque permulta essent ornamenta quibus eam mitigare molestiam posset, locus, auctoritas, domi splendor, apud exteras nationes nomen et gratia, toga praetexta, sella curulis, insignia, fasces, exercitus, imperia, provinciae: quibus in rebus cum summa recte factis maiores nostri praemia tum plura peccatis pericula proposita esse voluerunt. Illi non hoc recusabant, ne ea lege accusarentur qua nunc Habitus accusatur, quae tunc erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia; intellegebant enim ea lege equestrem ordinem non teneri; sed ne nova lege adligarentur laborabant. 155.

either that for themselves a full term of age be restored for seeking honors, or, since that could not be, that the condition of life which, when they had followed a petition (campaign), they had left, should remain; that it was inequitable that those who had passed over the ornaments of honors on account of the multitude of dangers should be deprived of the people’s benefices, yet not lack the dangers of new courts; that a senator could not complain of this, for the reason that he had begun to seek with that condition set forth, and because there were very many ornaments by which he could mitigate that vexation—standing (locus), authority, splendor at home, name and favor among foreign nations, the toga praetexta, the curule chair, insignia, fasces, armies, commands, provinces: in which matters our ancestors wished the highest rewards to be set for right deeds, and then more dangers to be set forth for misdeeds. They were not refusing this, that they not be accused by that law by which Habitus is now accused, which then was the Sempronian, now is the Cornelian; for they understood that by that law the equestrian order was not held; but they strove that they not be bound by a new law. 155.

Habitus ne hoc quidem umquam recusavit, quo minus vel ea lege rationem vitae suae redderet qua non tenetur. Quae si vobis condicio placet, omnes id agamus ut haec quam primum in omnes ordines quaestio perferatur.

Habitus has not even ever refused this, so as not to render an account of his life even under that law by which he is not held. If that condition pleases you, let us all strive that this inquiry be carried, as soon as possible, into all orders.

LVII. Interea quidem, per deos immortales! quoniam omnia commoda nostra, iura, libertatem, salutem denique legibus obtinemus, a legibus non recedamus.

57.Meanwhile indeed, by the immortal gods! since we obtain all our advantages, rights, liberty, and, finally, safety by the laws, let us not recede from the laws.

Simul et illud quam sit iniquum cogitemus populum Romanum aliud nunc agere; vobis rem publicam et fortunas suas commisisse, ipsum sine cura esse; non metuere ne lege ea quam numquam ipse iusserit, et quaestione qua se solutum liberumque esse arbitretur, per paucos iudices astringatur. 156. Agit enim sic causam T. Accius, adulescens bonus et disertus, omnes cives legibus teneri omnibus; vos attenditis et auditis silentio sicut facere debetis; A. Cluentius causam dicit eques Romanus ea lege qua lege senatores et ii qui magistratum habuerunt soli tenentur; mihi per eum recusare et in arce legis praesidia constituere defensionis meae non licet.

At the same time let us consider also how unjust it is that the Roman people are now engaged in something else; that it has entrusted to you the Republic and its fortunes, while it itself is carefree; that it does not fear lest by a law which it itself has never ordered, and by an inquest by which it deems itself released and free, it be constrained by a few judges. 156. For thus does T. Accius, a good and eloquent young man, conduct the case: that all citizens are held by all laws; you attend and listen in silence, as you ought to do; A. Cluentius, a Roman knight, pleads his case under that law by which senators and those who have held magistracy alone are bound; it is not permitted to me, through him, to lodge a recusation and to establish, in the citadel of the law, the safeguards of my defense.

Si obtinuerit causam Cluentius, sicuti vestra aequitate nixi confidimus, omnes existimabunt, id quod erit, obtinuisse propter innocentiam, quoniam ita defensus sit; in lege autem, quam attingere noluerit, praesidii nihil fuisse. 157. Hic nunc est quiddam quod ad me pertineat, de quo ante dixi, quod ego populo Romano praestare debeam, quoniam is vitae meae status est ut omnis mihi cura et opera posita sit in hominum periculis defendendis.

If Cluentius shall prevail in the case, as relying on your equity we are confident, everyone will reckon that—what will be the fact—he prevailed on account of innocence, since he has been defended in such a way; but that in the law, which he was unwilling to touch, there was no safeguard. 157. Now here there is something that pertains to me, about which I spoke before, which I ought to render to the Roman people, since the status of my life is such that all my care and effort are set upon defending men in their perils.

Video quanta et quam periculosa et quam infinita quaestio temptetur ab accusatoribus, cum eam legem quae in nostrum ordinem scripta sit in populum Romanum transferre conentur. Qua in lege est QUI COIERIT, quod quam late pateat videtis; CONVENERIT aeque incertum et infinitum est; CONSENSERIT, hoc vero cum infinitum tum obscurum et occultum; FALSUMVE TESTIMONIUM DIXERIT, – quis de plebe romana testimonium dixit umquam cui non hoc periculum T. Accio auctore paratum esse videatis? Nam dicturum quidem certe, si hoc iudicium plebi Romanae propositum sit, neminem umquam esse confirmo.

I see how great and how dangerous and how boundless an inquiry is being attempted by the accusers, when they try to transfer that law which has been written for our order onto the Roman people. In which law there is WHO SHALL HAVE COME TOGETHER, which you see how widely it extends; SHALL HAVE MET is equally uncertain and infinite; SHALL HAVE CONSENTED, this indeed both infinite and obscure and hidden; OR SHALL HAVE SPOKEN FALSE TESTIMONY, – who of the Roman plebs has ever given testimony for whom you do not see that this danger has been prepared, with T. Accius as author? For as to anyone who would speak, indeed I affirm that, if this judgment be proposed to the Roman plebs, there will never be anyone.

158. Sed hoc polliceor omnibus, si cui forte hac lege negotium facessetur qui lege non teneatur, si is uti me defensore voluerit, me eius causam legis praesidio defensurum, et vel his iudicibus vel horum similibus facillime probaturum, et omni me defensione usurum esse legis, qua nunc ut utar ab eo cuius voluntati mihi obtemperandum est non conceditur

158. But this I promise to all: if by chance anyone not held by the law should be harassed with a case under this law, if he shall have wished to use me as his defender, I will defend his cause by the protection of the law, and will very easily prove it before either these judges or others like them, and I will employ every defense of the law—which now, that I may use it, is not permitted by him whose will I must obey.

LVIII. Non enim debeo dubitare, iudices, quin, si qua ad vos causa eius modi delata sit eius qui lege non teneatur, etiam si is invidiosus aut multis offensus esse videatur, etiam si eum oderitis, etiam si inviti absoluturi sitis, tamen absolvatis et religioni potius vestrae quam odio pareatis. 159.

58.For I ought not to doubt, judges, that, if any case of such a kind has been brought before you of one who is not bound by the law, even if he seems invidious or offensive to many, even if you hate him, even if you would acquit him unwillingly, nevertheless you will acquit him and obey your own conscience rather than hatred. 159.

Est enim sapientis iudicis cogitare tantum sibi a populo Romano esse permissum quantum commissum sit et creditum, et non solum sibi potestatem datam, verum etiam fidem habitam esse meminisse: posse quem oderit absolvere, quem non oderit condemnare, et semper non quid ipse velit, sed quid lex et religio cogat cogitare; animadvertere qua lege reus citetur, de quo reo cognoscat, quae res in quaestione versetur. Cum haec sunt videnda tum vero illud est hominis magni, iudices, atque sapientis, cum illam iudicandi causa tabellam sumpserit, non se reputare solum esse neque sibi quodcumque concupierit licere, sed habere in consilio legem, religionem, aequitatem, fidem; libidinem autem, odium, invidiam, metum cupiditatesque omnes amovere maximique aestimare conscientiam mentis suae, quam ab dis immortalibus accepimus, quae a nobis divelli non potest; quae si optimorum consiliorum atque factorum testis in omni vita nobis erit, sine ullo metu et summa cum honestate vivemus. 160.

For it is of a wise judge to consider that only so much has been permitted to him by the Roman people as has been committed and entrusted, and to remember not only that power has been given to him, but also that faith has been placed in him: that he can acquit one whom he hates, condemn one whom he does not hate, and always think not what he himself wishes, but what law and religion compel him to think; to observe by what law the defendant is summoned, about which defendant he takes cognizance, what matter is in question. When these things are to be looked to, then indeed this is the part of a great and wise man, judges, when he has taken up that tablet for the purpose of judging: not to reckon that he is alone nor that whatever he has coveted is permitted to him, but to have in counsel Law, Religion, Equity, Faith; but to remove libido, odium, envy, fear, and all cupidities, and to value most highly the conscience of his mind, which we have received from the immortal gods, which cannot be torn from us; which, if it shall be for us a witness of the best counsels and deeds in our whole life, we shall live without any fear and with the highest honesty. 160.

Haec si T. Accius aut cognovisset aut cogitasset, profecto ne conatus quidem esset dicere, id quod multis verbis egit, iudicem quod ei videatur statuere et non devinctum legibus esse oportere.

If T. Accius had either known or considered these things, assuredly he would not even have attempted to say—that which he urged with many words—that a judge should decide what seems good to him and ought not to be bound by the laws.

Quibus de rebus mihi pro Cluenti voluntate nimium, pro rei dignitate parum, pro vestra prudentia satis dixisse videor. Reliqua perpauca sunt; quae quia vestrae quaestionis erant, idcirco illi statuerunt fingenda esse sibi et proferenda, ne omnium turpissimi reperirentur si in iudicium nihil praeter invidiam attulissent

On which matters I seem to myself to have spoken too much for Cluentius’s inclination, too little for the dignity of the cause, enough for your prudence. The remaining points are very few; and because these belonged to your quaestio, therefore those men decided that they must be feigned by themselves and brought forward, lest they be found the most disgraceful of all if they had brought into the judgment nothing beyond envy.

LIX. Atque ut existimetis necessario me de his rebus de quibus iam dixerim pluribus egisse verbis, attendite reliqua: profecto intellegetis ea quae paucis demonstrari potuerint brevissime esse defensa.

59.And so that you may judge that I have of necessity handled with more words those matters about which I have already spoken, attend to the remaining points: surely you will understand that those things which could be demonstrated in a few words have been defended most briefly.

161. Cn. Decidio Samniti, ei qui proscriptus est, iniuriam in calamitate eius ab huius familia factam esse dixistis. Ab nullo ille liberalius quam a Cluentio tractatus est: huius illum opes in rebus eius incommodissimis sublevarunt, atque hoc cum ipse tum eius amici necessariique omnes cognorunt.

161. You said that, in the calamity of Cn. Decidius the Samnite, the one who was proscribed, an injustice was done by this man’s household. By no one was he treated more liberally than by Cluentius: this man’s resources supported him in his most incommodious circumstances, and both he himself and all his friends and near relations have recognized this.

Anchari et Paceni pastoribus huius vilicum vim et manus attulisse. Cum quaedam in callibus, ut solet, controversia pastorum esset orta, Habiti vilici rem domini et privatam possessionem defenderunt: cum esset etulatio facta, causa illis demonstrata, sine iudicio controversiaque discessum est. 162.

that the steward of this man used force and laid hands upon the shepherds of Anchar and Pacenus. When, on the cattle-tracks, as is usual, a certain controversy of shepherds had arisen, the stewards of Habitus defended their master’s property and private possession: after an outcry had been raised, with the case shown to them, they departed without judgment and without further controversy. 162.

'P. Aeli testamento propinquus exheredatus cum esset, heres hic alienior institutus est.' P. Aelius Habiti merito fecit, neque hic in testamento faciendo interfuit, idque testamentum ab huius inimico Oppianico est obsignatum. Floro legatum ex testamento infitiatum esse. Non est ita; sed cum HS XXX milia scripta essent pro HS CCC milibus, neque ei cautum satis videretur, voluit eum aliquid acceptum referre liberalitati suae.

'When a kinsman had been disinherited in the will of P. Aelius, this more distant man was appointed heir.' P. Aelius did this on account of Habitus’s deserts, nor did this man take part in the making of the will, and that testament was sealed by Oppianicus, his enemy. That Florus had denied a legacy from the testament. It is not so; but since HS 30 thousand had been written instead of HS 300 thousand, and it did not seem that he had been sufficiently guaranteed, he wished him to enter as received some amount in acknowledgment of his liberality.

Primo debere negavit; post sine controversia solvit. Cei cuiusdam Samnitis uxorem post bellum ab hoc esse repetitam. Mulierem cum emisset a sectoribus, quo tempore eam primum liberam esse audivit, sine iudicio reddidit Ceio.

At first he denied that he owed; afterwards he paid without controversy. That the wife of a certain Samnite, Ceius, after the war was reclaimed by this man. When he had bought the woman from the auction-purchasers, at the time when he first heard that she was free, he returned her to Ceius without judgment.

163. Ennium esse quendam cuius bona teneat Habitus. Est hic Ennius egens quidam calumniator, mercennarius Oppianici, qui permultos annos quievit; deinde aliquando cum servis Habiti furti egit; nuper ab ipso Habito petere coepit.

163. That there is a certain Ennius, whose estate Habitus holds. This Ennius is a certain needy calumniator, a hireling of Oppianicus, who kept quiet for very many years; then at some point he brought an action of theft together with Habitus’s slaves; recently he began to press a claim against Habitus himself.

Hic illo privato iudicio, mihi credite, vobis isdem fortasse patronis, calumniam non effugiet. Atque etiam, ut nobis renuntiatur, hominem multorum hospitem, Ambivium quendam, coponem de via Latina, subornatis, qui sibi a Cluentio servisque eius in taberna sua manus adlatas esse dicat. Quo de homine nihil etiam nunc dicere nobis est necesse: si invitaverit, id quod solet, sic hominem accipiemus ut moleste ferat se de via decessisse.

This man, in that private judgment, believe me, with you perhaps the same patrons, will not escape a charge of calumny. And furthermore, as it is reported back to us, you have suborned a certain Ambivius, a guest-friend of many, an innkeeper from the Via Latina, to say that hands were laid upon him by Cluentius and his slaves in his own tavern. About this man there is even now no necessity for us to say anything: if he shall invite it, as he is wont, we will receive the man in such a way that he will take it ill that he has departed from the road.

164. Habetis, iudices, quae in totam causam de moribus A. Cluenti, quem illi invidiosum esse reum volunt, annos octo meditati accusatores collegerunt; quam levia genere ipso! quam falsa re! quam brevia responsu!

164. You have, judges, what the accusers—after eight years of meditation—have gathered for the whole case concerning the morals of A. Cluentius, whom they wish to be an invidious defendant; how slight in their very kind! how false in fact! how brief in reply!

LX. Cognoscite nunc id quod ad vestrum ius iurandum pertinet, quod vestri iudicii est, quod vobis oneris imposuit ea lex qua coacti huc convenistis, de criminibus veneni; ut omnes intellegant quam paucis verbis haec causa perorari potuerit, et quam multa a me dicta sint quae ad huius voluntatem maxime, ad vestrum iudicium minime pertinerent.

60. Recognize now that which pertains to your oath, which belongs to your judgment, which the law by which you were compelled to assemble here has imposed upon you as a burden, concerning the charges of poison; so that all may understand in how few words this case could have been pleaded to its end, and how many things have been said by me which pertained chiefly to his will, and least to your judgment.

165. Obiectum est C. Vibium Cappadocem ab hoc A. Cluentio veneno esse sublatum. Opportune adest homo summa fide et omni virtute praeditus, L. Plaetorius, senator, qui illius Vibi hospes fuit et familiaris.

165. It has been alleged that Gaius Vibius, a Cappadocian, was taken off by poison by this Aulus Cluentius. At a timely moment there is present a man of highest good faith and endowed with every virtue, Lucius Plaetorius, a senator, who was that Vibius’s guest‑friend and intimate.

Apud hunc ille Romae habitavit, apud hunc aegrotavit, huius domi est mortuus. At heres est Cluentius. Intestatum dico esse mortuum possessionemque eius bonorum, ex edicto praetoris, huic, illius sororis filio, adulescenti pudentissimo et in primis honesto, equiti Romano datam, Numerio Cluentio, quem videtis.

With this man he lived at Rome, with this man he fell ill, in this man’s house he died. But the heir is Cluentius. I say he died intestate, and that the possession of his goods, by the edict of the praetor, was given to this man, the son of his sister, a most modest and especially honorable young man, a Roman knight, Numerius Cluentius, whom you see.

166. Alterum veneficii crimen Oppianico huic adulescenti, cum eius in nuptiis more Larinatium multitudo hominum pranderet, venenum Habiti consilio paratum; id cum daretur in mulso, Balbutium quendam, eius familiarem, intercepisse, bibisse, statimque esse mortuum. Hoc ego si sic agerem tamquam mihi crimen esset diluendum, haec pluribus verbis dicerem per quae nunc paucis percurrit oratio mea.

166. A second charge of poisoning was laid against Oppianicus regarding this young man: when, at his wedding, in the custom of the Larinates, a multitude of people were lunching, poison had been prepared by the counsel of Habitus; and when it was being given in honeyed wine, a certain Balbutius, his intimate, intercepted it, drank it, and immediately died. If I were conducting this as though a charge had to be washed away by me, I would say these things with more words, whereas now my speech runs through them in few.

167. Quid umquam Habitus in se admisit ut hoc tantum ab eo facinus non abhorrere videatur? quid autem magno opere Oppianicum metuebat, cum ille verbum omnino in hac ipsa causa nullum facere potuerit, huic autem accusatores viva matre deesse non possint?

167. What has Habitus ever admitted in himself, that so great a crime should seem not to be abhorrent to him? and why, moreover, was he so greatly fearing Oppianicus, since that man could not at all have been able to utter a single word in this very case, whereas for this one accusers cannot be lacking while his mother is alive?

id quod iam intellegetis. An ut de causa eius periculi nihil decederet, ad causam novum crimen accederet? Quod autem tempus veneni dandi illo die, illa frequentia?

which you will now understand. Or was it that, so that nothing might be subtracted from the case of that peril, a new crime should be added to the case? But what time was there for the giving of poison on that day, with that concourse?

per quem porro datum? unde sumptum? quae deinde interceptio poculi?

by whom, then, was it given? from where was it obtained? what, then, was the interception of the cup?

cur non de integro autem datum? Multa sunt quae dici possunt, sed non committam ut videar non dicendo voluisse dicere; res enim iam se ipsa defendit. 168.

why, however, was it not given afresh? Many things can be said, but I will not bring it about that I seem, by not saying them, to have wished to say them; for the matter now defends itself. 168.

Nego illum adulescentem, quem statim epoto poculo mortuum esse dixistis, omnino illo die esse mortuum. Magnum crimen et impudens mendacium! Perspicite cetera.

I deny that that young man, whom you said died immediately after the cup was drained, died at all on that day. A great crime and an impudent lie! Examine the rest.

Dico illum, cum ad illud prandium crudior venisset et, ut aetas illa fert, sibi tum non pepercisset, aliquot dies aegrotasse et ita esse mortuum. Quis huic rei testis est? Idem qui sui luctus, pater, – pater, inquam, illius adulescentis; quem propter animi dolorem pertenuis suspicio potuisset ex illo loco testem in A. Cluentium constituere, is hunc suo testimonio sublevat; quod recita.

I say that he, when he had come to that luncheon rather raw and, as that age is wont, had not then spared himself, was ailing for several days and thus died. Who is witness to this matter? The same as to his own mourning, the father—the father, I say, of that young man; whom, on account of the pain of spirit, the very slightest suspicion could have set, from that position, as a witness against A. Cluentius—he it is who supports this man by his own testimony; read that.

Tu autem, nisi molestum est, paulisper exsurge; perfer hunc dolorem commemorationis necessariae, in qua ego diutius non morabor, quoniam, quod fuit viri optimi, fecisti ut ne cui innocenti maeror tuus calamitatem et falsum crimen adferret.

But you, unless it is troublesome, rise for a little while; bear this pain of necessary commemoration, in which I will not tarry longer, since, as was fitting for a most excellent man, you have brought it about that your mourning should not bring calamity and a false crime upon any innocent person.

LXI. 169. Unum etiam mihi reliquum eius modi crimen est, iudices, ex quo illud perspicere possitis quod a me initio orationis meae dictum est: quicquid mali per hosce annos A. Cluentius viderit, quicquid hoc tempore habeat sollicitudinis ac negotii, id omne a matre esse conflatum.

61.169. One charge also of this sort remains to me, judges, from which you can perceive clearly that which was said by me at the beginning of my oration: whatever evil A. Cluentius has seen through these years, whatever solicitude and business he has at this time, all of it has been concocted by his mother.

Oppianicum veneno necatum esse quod ei datum sit in pane per M. Asellium quendam, familiarem illius, idque Habiti consilio factum esse dicitis. In quo primum illud quaero, quae causa Habito fuerit cur interficere Oppianicum vellet. Inimicitias enim inter eos fuisse confiteor; sed homines inimicos suos morte adfici volunt aut quod [eos] metuunt aut quod oderunt.

You say that Oppianicus was slain by poison, because it was given to him in bread through a certain M. Asellius, a familiar of that man, and that this was done by the counsel of Habitus. In which matter first I ask this: what cause had Habitus why he should wish to kill Oppianicus? For I confess that there were enmities between them; but men wish their enemies to be visited with death either because they fear [them] or because they hate them.

170. Quo tandem igitur Habitus metu adductus tantum in se facinus suscipere conatus est? quid erat quod iam Oppianicum poena adfectum pro maleficiis et eiectum e civitate quisquam timeret?

170. By what fear, then, was Habitus induced to attempt to take upon himself so great a crime? What was there, that anyone would now fear Oppianicus, already visited with punishment for his misdeeds and cast out from the state?

quid metuebat? ne oppugnaretur a perdito? an ne accusaretur a damnato?

what was he afraid of? that he might be attacked by a man lost to perdition? or that he might be accused by a condemned man?

an ne exsulis testimonio laederetur? Si autem quod oderat Habitus inimicum, idcirco illum vita frui noluit, adeone erat stultus ut illam, quam tum ille vivebat vitam esse arbitraretur, damnati, exsulis, deserti ab omnibus? quem propter animi importunitatem nemo recipere tecto, nemo adire, nemo adloqui, nemo aspicere vellet?

or lest he be harmed by the testimony of an exile? If, however, because Habitus hated an enemy, on that account he did not wish him to enjoy life, was he so foolish as to deem that life, which he was then living—the life of a condemned man, of an exile, deserted by all—to be life? whom, on account of the importunity of his temper, no one was willing to receive beneath a roof, no one to approach, no one to address, no one to look upon?

171. Huius igitur Habitus vitae invidebat? Hunc si acerbe et penitus oderat, non eum quam diutissime vivere velle debebat?

171. Was he therefore envious of Habitus’s life? If he bitterly and utterly hated this man, ought he not to wish him to live as long as possible?

huic mortem maturabat inimicus, quod illi unum in malis erat perfugium calamitatis? Qui si quid animi et virtutis habuisset, ut multi saepe fortes viri in eius modi dolore, mortem sibi ipse conscisset, huis quam ob rem id vellet inimicus offerre quod ipse sibi optare deberet? Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulit?

was his enemy hastening death to this man, because for him the only refuge in his misfortunes was that? Who, if he had had any spirit and virtue, as many brave men often do in pain of that sort, would have procured death for himself—why then should an enemy offer that which he ought himself to wish for himself? For now indeed, what harm at length has death brought to him?

nisi forte ineptis fabulis ducimur ut existimemus illum ad inferos impiorum supplicia perferre ac plures illic offendisse inimicos quam hic reliquisse: a socrus, ab uxorum, a fratris, a liberum Poenis actum esse praecipitem in sceleratorum sedem ac regionem. Quae si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intellegunt, quid ei tandem mors eripuit praeter sensum doloris? 172.

unless perhaps we are led by inept fables to suppose that he in the underworld is enduring the punishments of the impious and has there encountered more enemies than he left here: that by his mother-in-law, by his wives, by his brother, by the punishments of his children he has been driven headlong into the seat and region of the wicked. Which things if they are false, as everyone understands, what, pray, has death snatched from him except the sensation of pain? 172.

Age vero, per quem venenum datum? per M. Asellium

Come now, by whom was the poison given? by M. Asellius

LXII. Quid huic cum Habito? nihil, atque adeo, quod ille Oppianico familiarissime est usus, potius etiam simultas.

62.What has he to do with Habitus? Nothing; and indeed, since he was most intimately associated with Oppianicus, there is rather even a feud.

Eine igitur quem sibi offensiorem, Oppianico familiarissimum sciebat esse, potissimum et scelus suum et illius periculum committebat? Cur igitur tu, qui pietate ad accusandum excitatus es, hunc Asellium esse inultum tam diu sinis? Cur non Habiti exemplo usus es, ut per illum qui attulisset venenum de hoc praeiudicaretur?

Was it then to the man whom he knew to be more hostile to himself, most familiar with Oppianicus, that he was especially committing both his own crime and that man’s peril? Why then do you, who have been aroused by piety to accuse, allow this Asellius to be unavenged for so long? Why did you not use the example of Habitus, that through the man who had brought the poison a prejudgment might be made concerning this one?

173. Iam vero illud quam non probabile, quam inusitatum, iudices, quam novum, in pane datum venenum! Num latius potuit abditum aliqua in parte panis quam si totum colliquefactum in potione esset, celerius potuis comestum quam epotum in venas atque in omnes partes corporis permanere?

173. And indeed how improbable, how unaccustomed, judges, how novel—poison administered in bread! Num could it have been more broadly concealed in some part of the bread than if the whole had been liquefied in a potion; could what is eaten more swiftly than what is quaffed remain in the veins and in all parts of the body?

facilius fallere in pane, si esset animadversum, quam in poculo, cum ita confusum esset ut secerni nullo modo posset? 174. 'At repentina morte periit.' Quod si esset ita factum, tamen ea res propter multorum eius modi casum minime firmam veneni suspicionem haberet; quod si esset suspiciosum, tamen potius ad alios quam ad Habitum pertineret.

easier to pass undetected in bread, even if it had been observed, than in the cup, since it would have been so commingled that it could in no way be separated? 174. 'But he perished by a sudden death.' But even if it had so happened, nevertheless that matter, on account of the accident of many of this kind, would carry a very unfounded suspicion of poison; and if it were suspicious, nevertheless it would pertain rather to others than to Habitus.

Verum in eo ipso homines impudentissime mentiuntur: id ut intellegatis, et mortem eius et quem ad modum post mortem in Habitum sit crimen a matre quaesitum cognoscite.

But in this very matter men lie most impudently: that you may understand this, learn both about his death and in what manner, after his death, a charge against Habitus was sought by the mother.

175. Cum vagus et exsul erraret atque undique exclusus Oppianicus in Falernum se ad L. Quinctium contulisset, ibi primum in morbum incidit ac satis vehementer diuque aegrotavit. Cum esset una Sassia, eaque Sex.

175. While, a wanderer and exile, he was roaming and shut out on every side, Oppianicus had betaken himself into Falernum to L. Quinctius; there for the first time he fell into illness and was quite severely and for a long time sick. Since Sassia was there together, and she, Sex.

Albio quodam colono, homines valenti, qui simul esse solebat, familiarius uteretur quam vir dissolutissimus incolumi fortuna pati posset, et ius illud matrimonii castum atque legitimum damnatione viri sublatum arbitraretur, Nicostratus quidam, fidelis Oppianici servulus, percuriosus et minime mendax, multa dicitur domino renuntiare solitus esse. Interea Oppianicus cum iam convalesceret neque improbitatem coloni in Falerno diutius ferre posset et huc ad urbem profectus esset – solebat enim extra portam aliquid habere conducti – cecidisse de equo dicitur et homo infirma valetudine latus offendisse vehementer, et, postea quam ad urbem cum febri venerit, paucis diebus esse mortuus. Mortis ratio, iudices, eius modi est ut aut nihil habeat suspicionis aut, si quid habet, id intra parietes in domestico scelere versetur

with a certain Albius, a tenant-farmer, a strong fellow, who used to be in company with her, she would associate more familiarly than a most dissolute man, with his fortune unimpaired, could endure; and she would consider that that chaste and legitimate right of matrimony, removed by the condemnation of the husband, had been taken away. Nicostratus, a certain faithful little slave of Oppianicus, very curious and by no means mendacious, is said to have been accustomed to report many things to his master. Meanwhile Oppianicus, when he was now convalescing and could no longer bear the wickedness of the tenant-farmer in Falernum and had set out for the city here – for he used to have something rented outside the gate – is said to have fallen from his horse and, being a man of weak health, to have badly injured his side; and, after he came to the city with a fever, he died in a few days. The account of the death, judges, is of such a sort that either it has nothing of suspicion, or, if it has anything, that it is confined within the walls, engaged in a domestic crime

LXIII. 176. Post mortem eius Sassia moliri statim nefaria mulier coepit insidias filio: quaestionem habere de viri morte constituit.

63.176. After his death, Sassia, a nefarious woman, immediately began to contrive plots against her son: she decided to hold an inquiry about her husband’s death.

Emit de A. Rupilio, quo erat usus Oppianicus medico, Stratonem quendam, quasi ut idem faceret quod Habitus in emendo Diogene fecerat. De hoc Stratone et de Ascla quodam servo suo quaesituram esse dixit; praeterea servum illum Nicostratum, quem nimium loquacem fuisse ac nimium domino fidelem arbitrabatur, ab hoc adulescente Oppianico in quaestionem postulavit. Hic cum esset illo tempore puer et illa quaestio de patris sui morte constitui diceretur, etsi illum servum et sibi benivolum esse et patri fuisse arbitrabatur, nihil tamen est ausus recusare.

She bought from A. Rupilius, the physician whom Oppianicus had employed, a certain Strato, as if to do the same thing that Habitus had done in buying Diogenes. She said that she would conduct an inquisition about this Strato and about a certain Ascla, her own slave; moreover, she demanded from this young Oppianicus that that slave Nicostratus, whom she judged to have been too loquacious and too faithful to his master, be put to the question. He, since at that time he was a boy and it was being said that that inquisition about his father’s death was being instituted, although he thought that that slave was benevolent toward himself and had been toward his father, nevertheless dared not refuse anything.

Advocantur amici et hospites Oppianici et ipsius mulieris multi, homines honesti atque omnibus rebus ornati. Tormentis omnibus vehementissime quaeritur. Cum essent animi servorum et spe et metu temptati ut aliquid in quaestione dicerent, tamen, ut arbitror, auctoritate advocatorum [et vi tormentorum] adducti in veritate manserunt neque se quicquam scire dixerunt.

The friends and guest-friends of Oppianicus and of the woman herself are summoned, many in number, men honorable and adorned with every distinction. A most vehement inquiry is conducted with every kind of torture. Although the minds of the slaves were tempted both by hope and by fear, to make them say something under the examination, nevertheless, as I judge, led by the authority of the advocates [and by the force of the torments], they remained in the truth and said that they knew nothing.

177. Quaestio illo die de amicorum sententia dimissa est; satis longo intervallo post iterum advocantur. Habetur de integro quaestio; nulla vis tormentorum acerrimorum praetermittitur.

177. The inquiry on that day, by the opinion of the friends, was dismissed; after a fairly long interval they are summoned again. A fresh inquiry is held; no force of the keenest torments is omitted.

Adversari advocati et iam vix ferre posse; furere crudelis atque importuna mulier sibi nequaquam ut sperasset ea quae cogitasset procedere. Cum iam tortor atque essent tormenta ipsa defensa neque tamen illa finem facere vellet, quidam ex advocatis, homo et honoribus populi ornatus et summa virtute praeditus, intellegere se dixit non id agi ut verum inveniretur, sed ut aliquid falsi dicere cogerentur. Hoc postquam ceteri comprobarunt, ex omnium sententia constitutum est satis videri esse quaesitum.

The opposing advocates now could hardly bear it; the cruel and importunate woman was raving, and for her the things she had devised were by no means proceeding as she had hoped. When by now both the torturer and the torments themselves were exhausted, and yet that woman was not willing to make an end, a certain one of the advocates, a man adorned with the honors of the people and endowed with the highest virtue, said that he understood that what was being driven at was not that the truth be found, but that they be compelled to say something false. After the rest approved this, by the judgment of all it was established that the inquiry seemed to have been conducted sufficiently.

178. Redditur Oppianico Nicostratus, Larinum ipsa proficiscitur cum suis maerens, quod iam certe incolumem filium fore putabat, ad quem non modo verum crimen, sed ne ficta quidem suspicio perveniret et cui non modo aperta inimicorum oppugnatio, sed ne occultae quidem matris insidiae nocere potuissent. Larinum postquam venit, quae a Stratone illo venenum antea viro suo datum sibi persuasum esse simulasset, instructam ei continuo et ornatam Larini medicinae exercendae causa tabernam dedit.

178. Nicostratus is returned to Oppianicus; she herself sets out for Larinum with her household, mourning, because she now surely thought her son would be unharmed, against whom not only a true crime, but not even a feigned suspicion would reach, and to whom not only the open oppugnation of his enemies, but not even the hidden snares of his mother could have done harm. After she came to Larinum, she—who had previously pretended that she had been persuaded that that Strato had given poison to her husband—immediately gave to him, at Larinum, a shop equipped and adorned for the purpose of exercising medicine.

LXIV. Unum, alterum, tertium annum Sassia quiescebat, ut velle atque optare aliquid calamitatis filio potius quam id struere et moliri videretur. 179.

64.For one year, then a second, then a third, Sassia kept quiet, so that she might seem to wish and to desire some calamity for her son rather than to be constructing and contriving it.179.

Tum interim Q. Hortensio Q. Metello consulibus, ut hunc Oppianicum aliud agentem ac nihil eius modi cogitantem ad hanc accusationem detraheret, invito despondit ei filiam suam, – illam quam ex genero susceperat, – ut eum nuptiis adligatum simul et testamenti spe devinctum posset habere in potestate. Hoc ipso fere tempore Strato ille medicus domi furtum fecit et caedem eius modi. Cum esset in aedibus armarium, in quo sciret esse nummorum aliquantum et auri, noctu duos conservos dormientes occidit in piscinamque deiecit: ipse armarii fundum exsecuit, et HS* et auri quinque pondo abstulit, uno ex servis puero non grandi conscio.

Then meanwhile, when Q. Hortensius and Q. Metellus were consuls, in order to drag this Oppianicus, attending to other matters and thinking nothing of this sort, down to this accusation, she, he being unwilling, betrothed to him her daughter — that one whom she had borne from her son‑in‑law — so that she might be able to have him in her power, bound by nuptials and at the same time tied by the hope of a testament. At about this very time that Strato, the physician, committed a theft at home and a murder of such a kind. Since there was in the house a cupboard, in which he knew there was some amount of coin and of gold, by night he killed two fellow‑slaves as they slept and threw them into the fishpond; he himself cut out the bottom of the cupboard, and carried off HS* and 5 pounds of gold, one of the slaves — a boy not grown — being privy.

180. Furto postridie cognito omnis suspicio in eos servos qui non comparebant commovebatur. cum exsectio illa fundi in armario animadverteretur, quaerebant homines quonam modo fieri potuisset.

180. The theft having been discovered on the next day, all suspicion was stirred against those slaves who did not appear. when that cutting-out of the bottom in the cabinet was noticed, people were asking by what manner it could have been done.

Quidam ex amicis Sassiae recordatus est se nuper in auctione quadam vidisse in rebus minutis aduncam ex omni parte dentatam et tortuosam venire serrulam, qua illud potuisse ita circumsecari videretur. Ne multa, perquiritur a coactoribus: invenitur ea serrula ad Stratonem pervenisse. Hoc initio suspicionis orto et aperte insimulato Stratone, puer ille conscius pertimuit; rem omnem dominae indicavit; homines in piscina inventi sunt; Strato in vincula coniectus est, atque etiam in taberna eius nummi, nequaquam omnes, reperiuntur.

One of Sassia’s friends remembered that he had recently seen at a certain auction, among the small items, a little saw coming up for sale, hooked, toothed on every side, and twisted, by which that bottom could seem to have been cut around in that way. In short, inquiry is made of the auction-brokers: that little saw is found to have come to Strato. With this beginning of suspicion having arisen and Strato openly charged, that boy who was privy took fright; he disclosed the whole matter to the mistress; the men were found in the fishpond; Strato was cast into chains, and even in his shop coins, by no means all, are discovered.

181. Constituitur quaestio de furto; nam quid quisquam suspicari aliud potest? An hoc dicitis, armario expilato, pecunia ablata, non omni reciperata, occisis hominibus, institutam esse quaestionem de morte Oppianici?

181. An inquiry is established concerning theft; for what else can anyone suspect? Or do you say this, with the cabinet rifled, the money carried off, not all recovered, men slain, that an inquiry was instituted about the death of Oppianicus?

Cui probatis? quid est quod minus veri simile proferre potuistis? Deinde, ut omittam cetera, triennio post mortem Oppianici de eius morte quaerebatur?

To whom do you prove it? What is there that you could have put forward that is less plausible? Then, to omit the rest, three years after the death of Oppianicus was an inquiry being made about his death?

Atque etiam incensa odio pristino Nicostratum eundem illum tum sine causa in quaestionem postulavit. Oppianicus primo recusavit: postea, cum illa abducturam se filiam, mutaturam esse testamentum minaretur, mulieri crudelissimae servum fidelissimum non in quaestionem tulit, sed plane ad supplicium dedidit

And moreover, inflamed with her former hatred, she then demanded without cause that that same Nicostratus be put to the question. Oppianicus at first refused; afterwards, when she threatened that she would carry off her daughter and would change her testament, he did not bring a most faithful slave into the question for that most cruel woman, but plainly surrendered him to execution

LXV. 182. Post triennum igitur agitata denuo quaestio de viri morte habebatur.

65.182. After three years, therefore, the inquest concerning the man's death, taken up anew, was being held.

Et de quibus servis habebatur? Nova, credo, res obiecta, novi quidam homines in suspicionem vocati sunt. De Stratone et de Nicostrato.

And over which slaves was it being held? A novel, I suppose, matter was objected; certain new persons were called into suspicion. About Strato and about Nicostratus.

Quid? Romae quaesitum de istis hominibus non erat? Itane tandem?

What? Was inquiry about those men not made at Rome? Is it so, then?

Mulier iam non morbo, sed scelere furiosa, cum quaestionem habuisset Romae, cum de T. Anni, L. Rutili, P. Saturi, ceterorum honestissimorum virorum sententia constitutum esset satis quaesitum videri, eadem de re triennio post, isdem de hominibus, nullo adhibito non dicam viro, ne colonum forte adfuisse dicatis, sed bono viro, in filii caput quaestionem habere conata est? 183. An hoc dicitis (mihi enim venit in mentem quid dici possit, tametsi ab hoc non esse hoc dictum mementote), cum haberetur de furto quaestio, Stratonem aliquid de veneno esse confessum?

The woman, now frantic not by disease but by crime, after she had held an inquiry at Rome, when by the opinion of T. Annius, L. Rutilius, P. Saturius, and the other most honorable men it had been established that it seemed that enough had been inquired, about the same matter three years later, concerning the same men, with no— I will not say man, lest you say perhaps that a tenant-farmer had been present— but good man brought in, did she attempt to hold an inquiry upon her son’s head? 183. Or do you say this (for it comes to my mind what can be said, although remember that this has not been said by this man): that, when an inquiry was being held about theft, Strato confessed something about poison?

Hoc uno modo, iudices, saepe multorum improbitate depressa veritas emergit et innocentiae defensio interclusa respirat, quod aut ii qui ad fraudem callidi sunt non tantum audent quantum excogitant, aut ii quorum eminet audacia atque proiecta est a consiliis malitiae deseruntur. Quod si aut confidens astutia aut callida esset audacia, vix ullo eis obsisti modo posset. Utrum furtum factum non est?

In this one way, judges, often, when the truth has been pressed down by the depravity of many, it emerges, and the defense of innocence, shut in, draws breath again: because either those who are clever for fraud do not dare as much as they devise, or those whose audacity stands out and whose malice has cast counsel aside are deserted. But if either astuteness were confident or audacity were crafty, scarcely by any means could they be resisted. Was the theft not committed?

at nihil clarius Larini. An ad Stratonem suspicio non pertinuit? at is et ex serrula insimulatus et a puero conscio est indicatus.

but nothing is clearer at Larinum. Or did suspicion not pertain to Strato? but he was both accused on the score of the little saw and denounced by a boy privy to it.

An id actum non est in quaerendo? quae fuit igitur alia causa quaerendi? An, id quod vobis dicendum est et quod tum Sassia dictitavit: cum de furto quaereretur, tum Stratonem isdem in tormentis dixisse de veneno?

Or was that not what was aimed at in the inquiry? What then was another reason for inquiring? Or is it, that which you must say and which at that time Sassia kept saying: that when inquiry was being made about the theft, then Strato, under the same tortures, spoke about the poison?

184. En hoc illud est quod ante dixi: mulier abundat audacia, consilio et ratione deficitur. Nam tabellae quaestionis plures proferuntur, quae recitatae vobisque editae sunt, illae ipsae quas tum obsignatas esse dixit; in quibus tabellis de furto nulla littera invenitur.

184. Behold, this is that which I said before: the woman abounds in audacity, she fails in counsel and reason. For several tablets of the inquiry are produced, which have been read aloud and issued to you, those very ones which she then said had been sealed; in which tablets not a single letter about the theft is found.

Non venit in mentem primum orationem Stratonis conscribere de furto, post aliquod dictum adiungere de veneno, quod non percontatione quaesitum, sed per dolorem expressum videretur. Quaestio de furto est; veneni iam suspicio superiore quaestione sublata; quod ipsum haec eadem mulier iudicarat, quae ut Romae de amicorum sententia statuerat satis esse quaesitum, postea per triennium maxime ex omnibus servis Stratonem illum dilexerat, in honore habuerat, commodis omnibus adfecerat. 185.

Did it not come into mind first to compose Strato’s oration about the theft, and afterwards to add some remark about the poison, which would seem not to have been elicited by interrogation, but expressed—wrung out—by pain? The quaestio is about theft; the suspicion of poison has already been removed by the prior quaestio; and this very thing the same woman had judged, who, when at Rome, by the opinion of her friends had determined that enough had been inquired, afterwards for three years, above all her slaves, had cherished that Strato, had held him in honor, had furnished him with every convenience. 185.

Cum igitur de furto quaereretur, et eo furto quod ille sine controversia fecerat, tum ille de eo quod quaerebatur verbum nullum fecit? De veneno statim dixit, de furto si non eo loco quo debuit, ne in extrema quidem aut media aut aliqua denique parte quaestionis verbum fecit ullum? LXVI.

Since therefore inquiry was being made about theft, and about that theft which he had committed without controversy, then did he say not a single word about that which was being inquired? About poison he spoke at once; about the theft, if not in the place where he ought, not even in the final or middle or any, in short, part of the questioning did he utter any word? 66.

Iam videtis illam nefariam mulierem, iudices, eadem manu qua, si detur potestas, interficere filium cupiat, hanc fictam quaestionem conscripsisse. Atque istam ipsam quaestionem dicite qui obsignarit unum aliquem nominatim: neminem reperietis, nisi forte eius modi hominem quem ego proferri malim quam neminem nominari. 186.

Now you see that nefarious woman, judges, with the same hand with which, if power be granted, she would desire to kill her son, to have composed this fabricated inquiry. And say who has sealed that very inquiry—name some one person by name: you will find no one, unless perhaps a person of such a sort as I would prefer to be produced rather than that no one be named. 186.

Quid ais, T. Acci? tu periculum capitis, tu indicium sceleris, tu fortunas alterius litteris conscriptas in iudicium adferas, neque earum auctorem litterarum neque obsignatorem neque testem ullum nominabis? et quam tu pestem innocentissimo filio de matris sinu deprompseris, hanc hi tales viri comprobabunt?

What do you say, T. Accius? you bring into court a capital peril, an indication of crime, the fortunes of another written down in letters, and you will name neither the author of those letters nor the sealer nor any witness? and the ruin which you have drawn forth for a most innocent son from a mother's bosom, will men such as these approve this?

Esto, in tabellis nihil est auctoritatis: quid, ipsa quaestio iudicibus, quid, amicis hospitibusque Oppianici, quos adhibuerat antea, quid, huic tandem ipsi tempori cur non servata est? Quid istis hominibus factum est, Stratone et Nicostrato? 187.

Granted, there is no authority in the tablets: what of the inquisition itself before the judges? what of Oppianicus’s friends and guests, whom she had previously summoned? what of this very time—why was it not kept?What became of those men, Strato and Nicostratus?187.

Quaero abs te, Oppianice, servo tuo Nicostrato quid factum esse dicas; quem tu, cum hunc brevi tempore accusaturus esses, Romam deducere, dare potestatem indicandi, incolumem denique servare quaestioni, servare his iudicibus, servare huic tempori debuisti. Nam Stratonem quidem, iudices, in crucem esse actum exsecta scitote lingua; quod nemo Larinatium est qui nesciat. Timuit mulier amens non suam conscientiam, non odium municipum, non famam omnium, sed quasi non omnes eius sceleris testes essent futuri, sic metuit ne condemnaretur extrema servuli voce morientis.

I ask of you, Oppianicus, what you say has happened to your slave Nicostratus; whom you, when you were about to accuse this man in a short time, ought to have brought to Rome, to grant the power of giving evidence, and finally to keep him unharmed for the inquest, to preserve him for these judges, to preserve him for this occasion. For know, judges, that Strato, with his tongue cut out, was driven to the cross; a thing which none of the people of Larinum is ignorant of. The mad woman feared not her own conscience, not the hatred of her fellow townsmen, not the repute of all, but, as though not all were going to be witnesses of that crime, so she feared lest she be condemned by the final voice of the dying little slave.

188. Quod hoc portentum, di immortales! quod tantum monstrum in ullis locis, quod tam infestum scelus et immane aut unde natum esse dicamus?

188. What is this portent, immortal gods! what so great a monster anywhere, what so baleful and immense a crime, or whence are we to say it was born?

Iam enim videtis profecto, iudices, non sine necessariis me ac maximis causis principio orationis meae de matre dixisse. Nihil est enim mali, nihil sceleris quod illa non ab initio filio voluerit, optaverit, cogitaverit, effecerit. Mitto illam primam libidinis iniuriam, mitto nefarias generi nuptias, mitto cupiditate matris expulsam ex matrimonio filiam, quae nondum ad huiusce vitae periculum, sed ad commune familiae dedecus pertinebant; nihil de alteris Oppianici nuptiis queror, quarum illa cum obsides filios ab eo mortuos accepisset, tum denique in familiae luctum atque in privignorum funus nupsit; praetereo quod A. Aurium, cuius illa quondam socrus, paulo ante uxor fuisset, cum Oppianici esse opera proscriptum occisumque cognosset, eam sibi domum sedemque delegit in qua cotidie superioris viri mortis indicia et spolia fortunarum videret.

For now indeed you surely see, judges, that it was not without necessary and very great causes that I spoke about the mother at the beginning of my speech. For there is no evil, no crime, which she did not from the outset wish, desire, devise, and accomplish against her son. I pass over that first injury of lust, I pass over the nefarious marriage to her son-in-law, I pass over the daughter driven out of marriage by the mother’s cupidity—things which did not yet pertain to the danger of this man’s life, but to the common disgrace of the family; I lodge no complaint about Oppianicus’s second marriage, at which, after she had accepted as pledges the sons killed by him, then at last she married into the family’s mourning and the funeral of the stepchildren; I pass over the fact that, when she learned that A. Aurius—of whom she had once been the mother-in-law and a little before had been the wife—had been proscribed and killed by the agency of Oppianicus, she chose for herself that house and seat in which she might daily behold the evidences of her former husband’s death and the spoils of his fortunes.

189. Illud primum queror, de illo scelere quod nunc denique patefactum est, Fabriciani veneni. Quod iam tum recens suspiciosum ceteris, huic incredibile, nunc vero apertum iam omnibus ac manifestum videtur: non est profecto de illo veneno celata mater.

189. This first I lament, about that crime which now at last has been laid open, the Fabrician poison. Which already then, fresh, was suspicious to the rest, to this man unbelievable, now indeed seems open and manifest to all: assuredly the mother was not kept in the dark about that poison.

Nihil est ab Oppianico sine consilio mulieris cogitatum; quod si esset, certe postea, deprehensa re, non illa ut a viro improbo discessisset, sed ut a crudelissimo hoste fugisset domumque illam in perpetuum scelerum omnium adfluentem reliquisset. 190. Non modo id non fecit, sed ab illo tempore nullum locum praetermisit in quo non strueret insidias aliquas ac dies omnes atque noctes tota mente mater de pernicie filii cogitaret.

Nothing was devised by Oppianicus without the counsel of the woman; but if there had been, surely afterward, once the affair had been detected, she would not have departed as from a depraved husband, but would have fled as from a most cruel enemy, and would have left that house forever overflowing with all crimes. 190. Not only did she not do that, but from that time she omitted no place in which she did not construct some ambush, and through all the days and nights the mother with her whole mind was thinking concerning the perdition of her son.

Quae primum ut illum confirmaret Oppianicum accusatorem filio suo, donis, muneribus, collocatione filiae, spe hereditatis obstrinxit

She, first, in order to confirm him—Oppianicus—as accuser against her son, bound him with gifts, munificences, the collocation of her daughter in marriage, and the hope of an inheritance

LXVII. Ita quod apud ceteros novis inter propinquos susceptis inimicitiis saepe fieri divortia atque adfinitatum discidia videmus, haec mulier satis firmum accusatorem filio suo fore neminem putavit, nisi qui in matrimonium sororem eius antea duxisset. Ceteri novis adfinitatibus adducti veteres inimicitias saepe deponunt: illa sibi ad confirmandas inimicitias adfinitatis coniunctionem pignori fore putavit.

67.Thus, because among others, when new enmities have been undertaken among kin, we often see divorces and the severings of affinities occur, this woman thought that no one would be a sufficiently firm accuser against her son, except one who had previously taken his sister in marriage. Others, induced by new affinities, often lay down old enmities: she thought that the conjunction of affinity would be a pledge to herself for the confirming of enmities.

191. Neque in eo solum diligens fuit ut accusatorem filio suo compararet, sed etiam cogitavit quibus eum rebus armaret. Hinc enim illae sollicitationes servorum et minis et promissis, hinc illae infinitae crudelissimaeque de morte Oppianici quaestiones; quibus finem aliquando non mulieris modus, sed amicorum auctoritas fecit.

191. Nor was she diligent only in this, to procure an accuser for her son, but she also considered with what means she might arm him. For hence came those solicitations of the slaves with both threats and promises, hence those endless and most cruel inquisitions concerning the death of Oppianicus; an end to which at last was made not by the woman’s moderation, but by the authority of her friends.

Ab eodem scelere illae triennio post habitae Larini quaestiones; eiusdem amentiae falsae conscriptiones quaestionum; ex eodem furore etiam illa conscelerata exsectio linguae; totius denique huius ab illa est et inventa et adornata comparatio criminis. 192. Atque his rebus cum instructum accusatorem filio suo Romam misisset, ipsa paulisper conquirendorum et conducendorum testium causa Larini est commorata; postea autem quam appropinquare huius iudicium ei nuntiatum est, confestim huc advolavit, ne aut accusatoribus diligentia aut pecunia testibus deesset, aut ne forte mater hoc sibi optatissimum spectaculum huius sordium atque luctus et tanti squaloris amitteret.

From the same crime were those inquiries held at Larinum three years later; of the same dementia the false conscriptions of the interrogations; from the same fury even that criminal cutting out of the tongue; finally, the entire arrangement of this charge was both invented and adorned by that woman. 192. And when with these measures she had sent to Rome for her son an accuser equipped, she herself lingered for a little at Larinum for the sake of seeking out and hiring witnesses; but after it was announced to her that this man’s trial was approaching, she flew here immediately, lest either diligence be lacking to the accusers or money to the witnesses, or lest perchance the mother should miss this spectacle most desired by herself, of this man’s filth and grief and so great squalor.

LXVIII. Iam vero quod iter Romam eius mulieris fuisse existimatis? quod ego propter vicinitatem Aquinatium et Fabraternorum ex multis audivi et comperi; quos concursus in his oppidis, quantos et virorum et mulierum gemitus esse factos?

68.Now indeed, what do you think that woman’s journey to Rome was like? as to which I, on account of the proximity of the Aquinates and the Fabraterni, have heard and found out from many—what concourses in these towns, what groans of both men and women were made?

Mulierem quandam Larino adesse, atque illam usque a mari supero Romam proficisci cum magno comitatu et pecunia, quo facilius circumvenire iudicio capitis atque opprimere filium possit! 193. Nemo erat illorum, paene dicam, quin expiandum illum locum esse arbitraretur, quacumque illa iter fecisset; nemo quin terram ipsam violari, quae mater est omnium, vestigiis consceleratae matris putaret.

That a certain woman was to be present at Larinum, and that she set out all the way from the Upper Sea to Rome with a great retinue and with money, so that she might more easily entrap in a capital trial and oppress her son! 193. There was no one of them, I might almost say, who did not think that that place, wherever she had made her journey, must be expiated; no one who did not think that the very earth itself, which is the mother of all, was being violated by the footprints of a crime-stained mother.

Itaque nullo in oppido consistendi potestas ei fuit, nemo ex tot hospitibus inventus est qui non contagionem aspectus fugeret: nocti se potius ac solitudini quam ulli aut urbi aut hospiti committebat. 194. Nunc vero quid agat, quid moliatur, quid denique cotidie cogitet quem ignorare nostrum putat?

And so in no town had she the power of taking up a stay; out of so many hosts no one was found who did not flee the contagion of her very sight: she entrusted herself rather to night and to solitude than to any city or host. 194. Now indeed—what is she doing, what is she contriving, what at last does she daily ponder—whom of us does she think is ignorant of it?

Quos appellarit, quibus pecuniam promiserit, quorum fidem pretio labefactere conata sit tenemus. Quin etiam nocturna sacrificia, quae putat occultiora esse, sceleratasque eius preces et nefaria vota cognovimus; quibus illa etiam deos immortales de suo scelere testatur neque intellegit pietate et religione et iustis precibus deorum mentes, non contaminata superstitione neque ad scelus perficiendum caesis hostiis posse placari. Cuius ego furorem atque crudelitatem deos immortales a suis aris atque templis aspernatos esse confido.

We know whom she has addressed, to whom she has promised money, whose good faith she has tried to undermine by a price. Nay even the nocturnal sacrifices, which she thinks are more occult, and her criminal prayers and nefarious vows we have come to know; by which she even makes the immortal gods witnesses of her own crime, nor does she understand that by piety and religion and just prayers the minds of the gods can be placated, not by contaminated superstition nor by victims slain for the accomplishing of crime. I am confident that the immortal gods have spurned her frenzy and cruelty from their own altars and temples.

LXIX. 195. Vos iudices, quos huic A. Cluentio quosdam alios deos ad omne vitae tempus fortuna esse voluit, huius importunitatem matris a filii capite depellite.

69.195. You, judges, whom Fortune has willed to be, for this A. Cluentius, certain other gods for all the time of his life, drive away the insolence of his mother from the son’s person.

Multi saepe in iudicando peccata liberum parentum misericordiae concesserunt: vos ne huius honestissime actam vitam matris crudelitati condonetis rogamus, praesertim cum ex altera parte totum municipium videre possitis. Omnes scitote, iudices, – incredibile dictu est, sed a me verissime dicetur – omnes Larinates, qui valuerunt, venisse Romam, ut hunc studio frequentiaque sua quantum possent in tanto eius periculo sublevarent. Pueris illud hoc tempore et mulieribus oppidum scitote esse traditum, idque in praesentia [communi Italiae pace] in domesticis copiis esse totum.

Many have often, in judging, granted the sins of children to the mercy of parents: we ask you not to hand over this man’s most honorably conducted life to the cruelty of his mother, especially since on the other side you can see the whole municipality. Know, judges,—it is incredible to say, but by me it will be said most truly,—that all the Larinates who were able have come to Rome, so that by their zeal and their attendance they might, as much as they could, succor him in so great a peril. Know that at this time the town has been delivered over to boys and to women, and that for the present [by the common peace of Italy] it relies wholly on its domestic resources.

Quos tamen ipsos aeque, et eos quos praesentes videtis, huius exspectatio iudicii dies noctesque sollicitat. 196. Non illi vos de unius municipis fortunis arbitrantur, sed de totius municipii statu, dignitate, commodisque omnibus sententias esse laturos.

Yet both those very men themselves, and those whom you see present, are troubled day and night by the expectation of this trial. 196. They do not suppose that you will decide about the fortunes of a single townsman, but that you will render decisions concerning the status, dignity, and all the advantages of the entire municipality.

Summa est enim, iudices, hominis in communem municipii rem diligentia, in singulos municipes benignitas, in omnes homines iustitia et fides. Praeterea nobilitatem illam inter suos locumque a maioribus traditum sic tuetur ut maiorum gravitatem, constantiam, gratiam, liberalitatem adsequatur. Itaque eis eum verbis publice laudant ut non solum testimonium suum iudiciumque significent, verum etiam curam animi ac dolorem.

For the sum, judges, is this: the man’s diligence in the common affair of the municipality, benignity toward individual municipes, justice and good faith toward all men. Moreover, he so maintains that nobility among his own and the place handed down from his ancestors that he attains the gravity, constancy, grace, and liberality of his forebears. And so they praise him publicly with such words that they signify not only their testimony and judgment, but also the care of their mind and their grief.

Quae dum laudatio recitatur, vos, quaeso, qui eam detulistis, adsurgite.

While this laudation is being recited, you, I pray, who have brought it forward, rise.

197. Ex lacrimis horum, iudices, existimare potestis omnes haec decuriones decrevisse lacrimantes. Age vero, vicinorum quantum studium, quam incredibilis benevolentia, quanta cura est!

197. From the tears of these men, judges, you can estimate that all the decurions decreed these things weeping. Come now, how great the zeal of the neighbors, how incredible the benevolence, how great the care is!

Non illi in libellis laudationem decretam miserunt, sed homines honestissimos, quos nossemus omnes, huc frequentes adesse et hunc praesentes laudare voluerunt. Adsunt Frentani, homines nobilissimi, Marrucini item pari dignitate; Teano Apulo atque Luceria equites Romanos, homines honestissimos, laudatores videtis; Boviano totoque ex Samnio cum laudationes honestissimae missae sunt tum homines amplissimi nobilissimique venerunt. 198.

They did not send the decreed laudation in booklets, but wished that most honorable men, whom we all knew, be present here in numbers and praise this man in person. The Frentani are present, men most noble, likewise the Marrucini with equal dignity; from Teanum Apulum and Luceria you see Roman equites, most honorable men, as laudators; from Bovianum and from all Samnium not only have most honorable laudations been sent, but also men most distinguished and most noble have come. 198.

Iam qui in agro Larinati praedia, qui negotia, qui res pecuarias habent, honesti homines et summo splendore praediti, difficile dictu est quam sint solliciti, quam laborent. Non multi mihi ab uno sic diligi videntur, ut hic ab eis universis.

Now those who in the Larinatian countryside have estates, who have businesses, who have livestock concerns, honorable men and endowed with the highest splendor, it is difficult to say how anxious they are, how they labor. Not many seem to me to be thus loved by one man, as this man is by them all together.

LXX. Quam doleo abesse ab huius iudicio L. Volusienum, summo splendore hominem ac virtute praeditum! Vellem praesentem possem P. Helvidium Rufum, equitem Romanum omnium ornatissimum, nominare!

70.How I grieve that L. Volusienus is absent from this trial, a man endowed with the highest splendor and virtue!I wish I could name as present P. Helvidius Rufus, a Roman equestrian most distinguished of all!

qui cum huius causa dies noctesque vigilaret et cum me hanc causam doceret, in morbum gravem periculosumque incidit; in quo tamen non minus de capite huius quam de sua vita laborat. Cn. Tudici senatoris, viri optimi et honestissimi, par studium ex testimonio et laudatione cognoscetis. Eadem spe, sed maiore verecundia de te, P. Volumni, quoniam iudex es in A. Cluentium, dicimus; et, ne longum sit, omnium vicinorum summam esse in hunc benevolentiam confirmamus.

who, while he was keeping vigil days and nights on behalf of this man’s cause and, as he was instructing me in this cause, fell into a grave and perilous morbus; in which nevertheless he is no less anxious about this man’s head (i.e., life) than about his own life. You will come to know an equal zeal of Cn. Tudicius, a senator, a most excellent and most honorable man, from his testimony and laudation. With the same hope, but with greater modesty concerning you, Publius Volumnius, since you are a iudex in the case of Aulus Cluentius, we speak; and, that it may not be long, we affirm that there is the highest benevolence of all the neighbors toward this man.

199. Horum omnium studium, curam, diligentiam, meumque una laborem, qui totam hanc causam vetere instituto solus peroravi, vestramque simul, iudices, aequitatem et mansuetudinem una mater oppugnat. At quae mater?

199. The zeal, the concern, the diligence of all these, and together my own toil—I who, by ancient practice, have alone delivered the entire peroration of this case—and at the same time, judges, your equity and gentleness, one mother alone is assailing. But what mother?

Quam caecam crudelitate et scelere ferri videtis; cuius cupiditatem nulla umquam turpitudo retardavit; quae vitiis animi in deterrimas partes iura hominum convertit omnia; cuius ea stultitia est ut eam nemo hominem, ea vis ut nemo feminam, ea crudelitas ut nemo matrem appellare possit. Atque etiam nomina necessitudinum, non solum naturae nomen et iura mutavit, – uxor generi, noverca filii, filiae pelex; eo iam denique adducta est ut sibi praeter formam nihil ad similitudinem hominis reservarit.

How blind, as you see, she is carried by cruelty and crime; whose cupidity no turpitude has ever retarded; who, by vices of mind, turns all the rights of men into the most dire parts; whose stupidity is such that no one can call her a human being, whose force is such that no one can call her a woman, whose cruelty is such that no one can call her a mother. And she has even changed the names of relationships, not only the name and rights of nature—wife to her son-in-law, stepmother to her son, concubine to her daughter; and now at last she has been brought to this point, that she has reserved for herself, apart from form, nothing of the likeness of a human being.

200. Qua re, iudices, si scelus odistis, prohibete aditum matris a filii sanguine, date parenti hunc incredibilem dolorem ex salute, ex victoria liberum; patimini matrem, ne orbata filio laetetur, victam potius vestra aequitate discedere. Sin autem, id quod vestra natura postulat, pudorem, veritatem, virtutemque diligitis, levate hunc aliquando supplicem vestrum, iudices, tot annos in falsa invidia periculisque versatum, qui nunc primum post illam flammam aliorum facto et cupiditate excitatam spe vestrae aequitatis erigere animum et paulum respirare a metu coepit, cui posita sunt in vobis omnia, quem servatum esse plurimi cupiunt, servare soli vos potestis.

200. Wherefore, judges, if you detest crime, forbid a mother’s approach to a son’s blood; grant to the parent this unbelievable grief, freed by safety, by victory; allow the mother, lest she rejoice when bereft of her son, rather to depart vanquished by your equity. But if, however—as your nature demands—you love modesty, truth, and virtue, raise up at last this your suppliant, judges, tossed for so many years in false ill-repute and perils, who now for the first time after that conflagration, stirred up by the deed and desire of others, has begun, by hope of your equity, to lift his spirit and to breathe a little from fear, for whom everything is placed in you, whom very many desire to see preserved, you alone are able to preserve.

201. Orat vos Habitus, iudices, et flens obsecrat, ne se invidiae, quae in iudiciis valere non debet, ne matri, cuius vota et preces a vestris mentibus repudiare debetis, ne Oppianico, homini nefario, condemnato iam et mortuo, condonetis

201. Habitus entreats you, judges, and, weeping, beseeches that you not consign him to envy, which ought not to prevail in the courts, nor to his mother, whose vows and prayers you ought to repudiate from your minds, nor to Oppianicus, a nefarious man, already condemned and dead

LXXI. Quod si qua calamitas hunc in hoc iudicio adflixerit innocentem, ne iste miser, si, id quod difficile factu est, in vita remanebit, saepe et multum queretur deprehensum esse illud quondam Fabricianum venenum. Quod si tum indicatum non esset, non huic aerumnosissimo venenum illud fuisset, sed multorum medicamentum laborum; postremo etiam fortasse mater exsequias illius funeris prosecuta mortem se filii lugere simulasset.

71.But if any calamity should afflict this innocent man in this trial, that wretch, if—which is difficult to do—he remains alive, will often and much complain that that once-Fabrician poison was detected. For if it had not then been indicated, that poison would not have been a poison for this most burdened-by-troubles man, but a medicament for many labors; finally, perhaps even the mother, having accompanied the obsequies of that funeral, would have simulated that she was mourning her son’s death.

Nunc vero quid erit profectum nisi ut huius ex mediis mortis insidiis vita ad luctum conservata, mors sepulcro patris privata esse videatur? 202. Satis diu fuit in miseriis, iudices, satis multos annos ex invidia laboravit.

Now indeed what will have been accomplished, except that this man’s life, preserved from the very midst of death’s ambushes, has been kept for mourning, and that his death seems to be deprived of his father’s tomb? 202. He has been long enough in miseries, judges; he has labored under envy for enough years.

Nemo huic tam iniquus praeter parentem fuit cuius non animum iam expletum esse putemus. Vos, qui aequi estis omnibus, qui, ut quisque crudelissime oppugnatur, eum lenissime sublevatis, conservate A. Cluentium; restituite incolumem municipio; amicis, vicinis, hospitibus, quorum studia videtis, reddite; vobis in perpetuum liberisque vestris obstringite. Vestrum est hoc, iudices, vestrae dignitatis, vestrae clementiae; recte hoc repetitur a vobis, ut virum optimum atque innocentissimum plurimisque mortalibus carissimum atque iucundissimum his aliquando calamitatibus liberetis, ut omnes intellegant in contionibus esse invidiae locum, in iudiciis veritati.

No one has been so iniquitous to him, except his parent, whose mind we may not suppose not to be by now satisfied. You, who are equitable to all, who, as each is attacked most cruelly, do most gently relieve him, preserve A. Cluentius; restore him unharmed to the municipality; give him back to his friends, neighbors, guests, whose zeal you see; bind him to yourselves forever and to your children.This is yours, judges—of your dignity, of your clemency; this is rightly demanded of you, that you may at length free from these calamities a man most excellent and most innocent and to very many mortals most dear and most pleasant, so that all may understand that in assemblies there is a place for envy, in judgments for truth.