Apuleius: DE DOGMATE PLATONIS

I. Moralis philosophiae caput est, Faustine fili, ut scias quibus ad beatam vitam perveniri rationibus possit. Verum ut beatitudinem bonorum fine ante alia contingere putes, ostendam quae de hoc Plato senserit. Bonorum igitur alia eximia ac prima per se ducebat esse, per praeceptionem cetera bona fieri existimabat.

1. The head of moral philosophy, Faustinus my son, is that you know by what rational means one can arrive at the blessed life. But, so that you may suppose that beatitude is attained by the end of goods before other things, I will show what Plato thought about this. Therefore he held that some goods are outstanding and primary in themselves, and he supposed that the rest become good through participation.

Prima bona esse deum summum mentemque illam, quam νοũν idem vocat; secundum ea quae ex priorum fonte profluerent esse animi virtutes: prudentiam, iustitiam, pudicitiam, fortitudinem; sed his omnibus praestare prudentiam; secundam numero ac potestate continentiam posuit; has iustitiam sequi; fortitudinem quartam esse. Differentiam hanc bonorum esse constituit: partim divina per se et prima simplicia duci bona; alia hominum nec eadem omnium existimari. Divina quapropter esse atque simplicia virtutes animi, humana autem bona eaque quorundam esse[nt], quae cum corporis commodis congruunt, et illa quae nominamus externa, quae sapientibus et cum ratione ac modo viventibus sunt sane bona, stolidis et eorum usum ignorantibus esse oportet mala.

The first goods are the supreme God and that Mind, which he likewise calls Nous; second, those virtues of the soul which flow from the fountain of the former: prudence, justice, pudicity, fortitude; but among all these prudence excels; continence he placed second in number and in power; these justice is to follow; fortitude is the fourth. He established this difference of goods: in part, that some are divine, in themselves and primary, to be reckoned simple goods; others are human, nor thought the same for all. Therefore the virtues of the soul are divine and simple; but human goods—and those to belong to certain persons—are the things that agree with the commodities of the body, and those which we call externals, which are truly good for the wise and for those living with reason and measure, but for the dull and for those ignorant of their use ought to be evils.

II. Bonum primum est verum et divinum illud, optimum et amabile et concupiscendum, cuius pulchritudinem rationabiles adpetunt mentes natura duce instinctae ad[em] eius ardorem. Et quod non omnes id adipisci queunt neque primi boni adipiscendi facultatem possunt habere, ad id feruntur quod hominum est, quod secundum nec commune multis est nec omnibus similiter bonum. Namque adpetitus et agendi aliquid cupido aut ver[b]o bono incitatur aut eo quod videatur bonum.

2. The first good is that true and divine one, the best and lovable and to‑be‑desired, whose beauty rational minds, with nature as guide, instigated, reach out toward its ardor. And because not all are able to attain it nor can have the ability of attaining the first good, they are borne toward that which is human, which is second and is neither common to many nor similarly good for all. For appetite and the desire of doing something are incited either by the true good or by that which seems good.

Unde natura duce cognatio quaedam est cum bonis ei animae portioni[s], quae cum ratione consentit. Accidens autem bonum est et putatur, quod corpori rebusque venientibus extrinsecus copulatur. Et illum quidem, qui natura inbutus est ad sequendum bonum, non modo sibimet intimatum putat, sed omnibus etiam hominibus; nec pari aut simili modo, verum (etiam) ... unumquemque acceptum esse, dehinc proximis et mox ceteris, qui familiari usu vel notitia iunguntur.

Whence, with nature as guide, there is a certain kinship with goods for that portion[s] of the soul which consents with reason. But an accidental good is, and is thought to be, that which is coupled to the body and to things coming from outside. And that man indeed who is imbued by nature for following the good thinks it intimated not only to himself, but to all human beings; and not in an equal or similar way, but (also) ... that each individual has received it, then those nearest, and soon the others, who are conjoined by familiar use or by acquaintance.

III. Hominem ab stirpe ipsa neque absolute malum nec bonum nasci, sed ad utrumque proclive ingenium eius esse; habere semina quidem quaedam utrarumque rerum cum nascendi origine copulata, quae educationis disciplina in partem alteram debeant emicare; doctoresque puerorum nihil antiquius curare oportet quam ut amatores virtutum velint esse, moribus, institutis eos ad id prorsus inbuere, et regere et regi discant magistra iustitia. Quare praeter cetera induci ad hoc eos oportere, ut sciant quae sequenda fugiendaque sint, esse honesta et turpia, plena illa voluptatis ac laudis, haec [tenus] dedecoris ac turpitudinis; honesta eadem, quae sunt bona, confidenter optare non oportere. Tria genera ingeniorum ab eo sunt comprehensa, quorum praestans et egregium appellat unum, alterum deterrimum pessimumque, tertium ex utroque modice temperatum medium nuncupavit: mediocritatis huius vult esse participes puerum docilem et virum progredientem ad modestiam eundemque commodum ac venustum.

3. A human being from the very stock is born neither absolutely evil nor good, but his inborn disposition is inclinable to either; he has indeed certain seeds of both things coupled with the origin of birth, which the discipline of education ought to make shoot forth into the one part; and the teachers of boys ought to care for nothing more important than that they should will them to be lovers of virtues, to imbue them thoroughly to that end by morals and institutions, and that, with Justice as their instructress, they learn both to rule and to be ruled. Wherefore, besides the rest, they ought to be induced to this: that they know what things are to be followed and shunned, that there are honorable and base things—the former full of pleasure and praise, the latter of disgrace and turpitude; the honorable things, the same which are good, are not to be desired with overconfidence. Three kinds of dispositions have been comprehended by him: one he calls outstanding and excellent, another most vile and worst, the third, moderately tempered from the two, he named the mean; of this mediocrity he wishes the teachable boy and the man advancing toward modesty to be participants, and the same to be becoming and winsome.

Eiusmodi quippe medietatis inter virtutes et vitia intercedere dicebat tertium quiddam, ex quo alia laudanda, alia culpanda essent. Inter scientiam et inscientiam validam alteram opinionem, alteram falsam pervicaciae vanitate iactatam, inter pudicitiam libidinosamque vitam abstinentiam et intemperantiam posuit, fortitudini ac timori medios pudorem et ignaviam fecit. Horum quippe, quos mediocres vult videri, neque sinceras esse virtutes nec vitia tamen mera et intemperata, sed hinc atque inde permixta esse.

For he said that, between virtues and vices, there intervenes a certain third something of such mediateness, from which some things would be to be praised, others to be blamed. Between knowledge and ignorance he placed opinion—one valid, the other false, vaunted by the vanity of pervicacity; between pudicity and a libidinous life, abstinence and intemperance; to fortitude and fear he made as middle terms pudor and ignavia. For of these, whom he wants to seem “mediocre,” the virtues are not sincere (pure), nor yet the vices mere and unrestrained, but are mixed from both sides.

IV. Malitiam vero deterrimi et omnibus vitiis inbuti hominis ducebat esse; quod accidere censebat, cum optima et rationabilis portio et quae etiam imperitare ceteris debet, servit aliis, illae vero vitiorum ducatrices, iracundia et libido, ratione sub iugum missa dominantur. Eandem malitiam de diversis, abundantia inopiaque, constare; nec solum eam inaequalitatis vitio claudicare arbitratur, sed etiam incumbere dissimilitudine; neque enim posse[t] cum bonitate congruere, quae a semetipsa tot modis discrepet et non solum disparilitatem, sed etiam inconcinnitatem prae se gerat. Tres quapropter partes animae tribus dicit vitiis urgueri: prudentiam indocilitas inpugnat, quae non abolitionem infert scientiae, sed contraria est disciplinae discendi huius duas ab eo species accipimus, inperitiam et fatuitatem, quarum inperitia sapientiae, fatuitas prudentiae inveniuntur inimicae, iracundiam audacia; in eius comitatum secuntur indignatio et incommobilitas aorgesian sic interim dixerim, quae non extinguit incitamenta irarum, sed ea stupore defigit immobili.

4. Malice indeed he held to be of the most depraved man, imbued with all vices; which he judged to occur when the best and rational portion, that which also ought to imperate the others, serves others, while those leaders of vices, anger and libido, with reason sent under the yoke, hold sway. The same malice consists of contraries, abundance and want; and he thinks it limps not only by the fault of inequality, but also leans upon dissimilarity; for it could not agree with goodness, which differs from itself in so many ways and bears before itself not only disparity but also inconcinnity. Therefore he says the three parts of the soul are pressed by three vices: prudence is impugned by indocility, which does not bring an abolition of science, but is contrary to the discipline of learning—of this we receive two species from him, inexperience and fatuity, of which inexperience is found inimical to sapience, fatuity to prudence; irascibility by audacity; and in its retinue there follow indignation and incommobility—“aorgesia,” thus let me say for the time—which does not extinguish the incitements of angers, but fixes them with an immobile stupor.

Cupiditatibus luxuriam, id est adpetitus adplicat voluptatum et desideriorum ad fruendum potiendumque haustus inexplebiles. Ex hac manat avaritia atque lascivia, quarum altera liberalitatem coercet, altera inmoderatius fundendo patrimonia prodigit facultates.

He applies luxury to cupidities, that is, he attaches appetites of pleasures and of desires for enjoying and obtaining—insatiable draughts. From this flow avarice and lasciviousness, of which the one restrains liberality, the other, by pouring out patrimonies too immoderately, squanders resources.

V. Sed virtutem Plato habitum esse dicit mentis optime et nobiliter figuratum, quae concordem sibi, quietem, constantem etiam eum facit, cui fuerit fideliter intimata, non verbis modo sed factis etiam secum et cum ceteris congruentem: haec vero proclivius, si ratio in regni sui solio constituta adpetitus e(s)t iracundias semper [in] domitas et in frenis habet ipsaeque ita oboediunt, ut tranquillo ministerio fugantur. Unimodam vero esse virtutem, quod bonum suapte natura[e] adminiculo non indiget, perfectum autem quod sit solitudine debet esse contentum. Nec solum aequalitas verum etiam similitudo cum virtutis ingenio coniungitur: ita enim secum ex parte omni congruit, ut ex se apta sit sibique respondeat.

5. But Plato says that virtue is a habit of the mind most excellently and nobly configured, which makes him concordant with himself, quiet, and constant, to whom it has been faithfully intimated, not by words only but also by deeds, being congruent with itself and with others: this, indeed, more readily, if reason, established upon the throne of its kingdom, has the appetites and the irascibilities (angers) ever tamed and held in the reins; and they obey in such wise that by a tranquil ministry they are put to flight. And virtue is of a single mode, because the good by its own nature does not need an adminicle, and, since it is perfect, it ought to be content with solitude. Not only equality but also similitude is joined with the genius of virtue: for thus it agrees with itself in every part, that from itself it is fitted and answers to itself.

Hinc et medietates easdemque virtutes ac summitates vocat, non solum quod careant redundantia et egestate, sed quod in meditullio quodam vitiorum sitae sint; fortitudo quippe circumsistitur hinc audacia, inde timiditate; audacia quidem confidentiae fit abundantia, metus vero vitio deficientis audaciae.

Hence also he calls them means, and the same things virtues and summits, not only because they are devoid of redundancy and indigence, but because they are situated in a certain middle-ground of vices; for fortitude is surrounded—on this side by audacity, on that side by timidity; audacity indeed becomes an abundance of confidence, while fear, on the other hand, is the fault of a deficient audacity.

VI. Virtutum perfectae quaedam, inperfectae sunt aliae; et inperfectae illae, quae in omnibus beneficio solo naturae proveniunt vel quae solis disciplinis traduntur et magistra ratione discuntur; eas igitur, quae ex omnibus constent, dicemus esse perfectas. Inperfectas virtutes semet comitari negat; eas vero, quae perfectae sint, individuas sibi et inter se conexas esse ideo maxime arbitratur, quod ei, cui sit egregium ingenium, si accedat industria, usus etiam et disciplina, quam dux rerum ratio fundaverit, nihil relinquetur, quod non virtus administret. Virtutes omnes cum animae partibus dividit et illam virtutem, quae ratione sit nixa et est spectatrix diiudicatrixque omnium rerum, prudentiam dicit atque sapientiam; quarum sapientiam disciplinam vult videri divinarum humanarumque rerum, prudentiam vero scientiam esse intellegendorum bonorum et malorum, eorum etiam, quae media dicuntur.

6. Of virtues, some are perfect, others imperfect; and imperfect are those which in all cases arise by the sole beneficence of nature, or which are handed down by disciplines alone and are learned with reason as instructress; those, therefore, which consist from all these we shall say are perfect. He denies that imperfect virtues accompany one another; but those which are perfect he especially judges to be indivisible to themselves and connected among themselves, for this reason: that for him who has an excellent ingenium, if industry be added, experience also and discipline, which reason, the leader of affairs, has founded, nothing will be left which virtue does not administer. He divides all the virtues according to the parts of the soul, and that virtue which relies on reason and is the spectator and judge of all things he calls prudence and wisdom; of which he wishes wisdom to be seen as the discipline of divine and human things, but prudence to be the science of understanding goods and evils, and also of those which are called intermediate.

In ea vero parte quae iracundior habeatur fortitudinis sedes esse et vires animae nervosque ad ea inplenda, quae nobis severius agenda legum inponuntur imperio. Tertia pars mentis est cupidinum et desideriorum, cui necessario abstinentia comes est, quam vult esse servatricem convenientiae eorum, quae natura recta pravaque sunt in homine. A displicentia(m) ad mediocritatem libido flectitur actusque voluptarios ratione huius dicit ac modestia coerceri.

But in that part which is held to be more irascible there is the seat of fortitude, and the forces of the soul and the sinews for accomplishing those things which are imposed on us, to be done more sternly, by the command of the laws. The third part of the mind is that of desires and longings, to which abstinence is of necessity a companion, which he wishes to be the preserver of the congruity of those things which by nature are right and crooked in man. From displeasure desire is bent toward the mean, and he says that voluptuary acts are restrained by reason and by modesty.

VII. Per has tres animae partes quartam virtutem, iustitiam, aequaliter dividentem se scientiamque causam esse dicit, ut unaquaeque portio(re) ratione ac modo ad fungendum munus oboediat. Hanc ille heros modo iustitiam nominat, nunc universae virtutis nuncupatione conplectitur et item fidelitatis vocabulo nuncupat; sed cum ei a quo possidetur est utilis, benivolentia est, at cum foras spectat et est fida speculatrix utilitatis alienae, iustitia nominatur. Est et illa iustitia, quae quartum in vulgata divisione virtutum locum possidet, quae cum religiositate, id est hosioteti, copulatur; quarum religiositas deum honori ac suppliciis divinae rei mancipata est, illa vero hominum societatis et concordiae remedium atque medicina est.

7. Through these three parts of the soul he says that the fourth virtue, justice, dividing itself equally, and that knowledge is the cause, such that each portion obeys, with reason and measure, to discharge its function. This that hero sometimes names justice, now he embraces it under the appellation of universal virtue, and likewise he designates it by the term fidelity; but when it is useful to the one by whom it is possessed, it is benevolence, yet when it looks outward and is a faithful look-out for another’s advantage, it is named justice. There is also that justice which holds the fourth place in the common division of the virtues, which is coupled with religiosity, that is, hosiety; of which religiosity is dedicated to the honor of God and to the rites and supplications of divine service, while the other is the remedy and medicine of human society and concord.

Duabus autem aequalibus de causis utilitatem hominum iustitia regit, quarum est prima numerorum observantia et divisionum aequalitas et eorum quae pacta sunt symbole, ad haec ponderum mensurarumque custodia et communicatio opum publicarum; secunda finalis est et veniens ex aequitate partitio, ut singulis in agros dominatus congruens deferatur ac servetur, (bonus) opimis optatior, minor non bonis; ad hoc bonus quisque natura et industria in honoribus et officiis praeferatur, pessimi cives luce careant dignitatis. Sed ille iustus in defetendo honore ac servando modus est ei qui est suffragator bonorum et malorum subiugator, ut semper in civitate emineant, quae sunt omnibus profutura, iaceant et subiecta sint cum suis auctoribus vitia.

But the utility of men is governed by justice from two equal causes, of which the first is the observance of numbers and the equality of divisions and the tokens (symbola) of the things that have been pacted; to these are added the custody of weights and measures and the communication of public resources. The second is final and the partition coming from equity, so that to individuals a dominion congruent over fields be conferred and preserved—(good) men having more desirable rich holdings, the not-good having lesser; to this end, every good man by nature and by industry be preferred in honors and offices, the worst citizens lack the light of dignity. But that just man, in defining honor and in preserving measure, is he who is a suffragator of the good and a subjugator of the evil, so that in the commonwealth there may always stand out the things that are going to be of profit to all, and vices with their authors may lie prostrate and be subjected.

VIII. Quod facilius obtinebitur, si duobus exemplis instruamur: unius divini ac tranquilli ac beati, alterius inreligiosi et inhumani ac merito intestabilis, ut pessimo quidem alienus et aversus a recta vivendi ratione, pro facultate sua divino illi et caelesti bonus similior esse velit. Hinc rhetoricae duae sunt apud eum partes, quarum una est disciplina contemplatrix bonorum, iusti tenax, apta et conveniens cum secta eius qui politicus vult videri; alia vero adulandi scientia est, captatrix verisimilium, usus nulla ratione collectus sic enim alogon trithen elocuti sumus, quae persuasum velit quod docere non valeat. Hanc dynamin tou peithein aneu tou didaskein definivit Plato, quam civilitatis articuli umbram, id est imaginem, nominavit.

8. This will be obtained more easily, if we are instructed by two examples: one of a divine and tranquil and blessed man, the other of an irreligious and inhuman and deservedly outlawed one, so that the worst man, indeed alien and averse from the right method of living, may wish, according to his own capacity, to become more similar to that divine and celestial good. Hence with him rhetoric has two parts, of which one is a discipline contemplative of goods, a holder-fast of the just, apt and convenient with the sect of him who wishes to appear “political”; but the other is a science of fawning, a huntress of verisimilitudes, a practice gathered by no ratio—thus indeed we have spoken alogon trithen—which wishes to persuade what it is not able to teach. Plato defined this as dynamin tou peithein aneu tou didaskein, which he named a shadow, that is, an image, of the joints of civil life.

Civilitatem, qua politiken vocat, ita vult a nobis intellegi, ut eam esse ex virtutum numero sentiamus. Nec solum agentem atque in ipsis administrationibus rerum spectari, sed ab ea universa discerni; nec solum providentiam prodesse civilibus rebus, sed omnem sensum eius atque propositum fortunatum et beatum statum facere civitatis.

He wants Civility, which he calls politikē, to be understood by us in such a way that we perceive it to be among the number of virtues. And not only to be active and observed in the very administrations of affairs, but that all things are to be discerned by it; and not only that providence benefits civic affairs, but that its whole meaning and purpose make the state’s condition fortunate and blessed.

IX. Haec eadem utilitati animae procurat duobus modis; altera namque legalis est, iuridicialis altera. Sed prior consimilis est exercitationi, per quam pulchritudo animae et robur adquiritur, sicut exercitatione valitudo corpis gratiaque retinetur; iuridicialis illa medicinae par(s) est, nam morbis animae medetur sicut illa corporis. Has disciplinas vocat plurimumque earum curationem commoditatis adferre profitetur.

9. This same thing also provides for the utility of the soul in two ways; one, namely, is legal, the other juridical. But the former is similar to exercise, through which the beauty of the soul and its vigor are acquired, just as by exercise the health of the body and its grace are retained; that juridical one is on a par with medicine, for it treats the diseases of the soul as that does those of the body. He calls these disciplines, and professes that their curation brings the greatest advantage of commodiousness.

Harum imitatrices esse coquinam et unguentariam et artem sophisticam professionemque iuris blandas et adsentationum inlecebris turpes profitentibus, inutiles cunctis. Quarum sophisticam coquinae coniungit; nam ut illa medicinae professione interdum opinionem inprudentium captat, quasi ea quae agit cum morborum medela conveniant, sic sophisticen imitata iuridicialem statum dat opinionem stultis, quasi iustitiae studeat, quam iniquitati favere constat. Unguentariam vero professio[nes] iuris imita[n]tur; nam sicut illa dum remedio vult esse, per quod species corporibus ac valitudo serventur, non modo utilitatem corporum minuit, sed robur etiam viresque frangit et verum colorem ad desidiam sanguinis mutat, sic haec (in) scientiam imitata iuris simulat quidem virtutem se animis augere, cenervat autem, quod in illis nativae fuerit industriae.

The kitchen, perfumery, the sophistic art, and the profession of law are imitators of these—alluring, and base with the enticements of adulations, for those professing them, useless to all. Of these he couples sophistic with the kitchen; for just as that sometimes captures the opinion of the imprudent by a profession of medicine, as if the things it does agreed with the healing of diseases, so sophistic, having imitated the juridical, gives to fools the impression that it is devoted to justice, whereas it is known to favor iniquity. Moreover, the professions of law imitate perfumery; for just as that, while it wishes to be a remedy by which appearance and health may be preserved for bodies, not only diminishes the utility of bodies, but even breaks strength and forces and changes true color into the languor of the blood, so these, having imitated (into) the knowledge of law, indeed pretend that they increase virtue in souls, but they enervate what in them was native industry.

Virtutes eas doceri et studeri posse arbitrabatur, quae ad rationabilem animum pertinent, id est sapientiam et prudentiam; et illas, quae vitiosis partibus pro remedio resistunt, id est fortitudinem et continentiam, rationabiles quidem esse, sed superiores virtutes pro disciplinis haberi, ceteras, si perfectae sunt, virtutes appellat; si semiperfectae sunt, non illas quidem disciplinas vocandas esse censet, sed nec in totum existimat disciplinis alienas. Iustitiam vero, quod trinis animae regionibus sparsa sit, artem vivendi ac disciplinam putat, et nunc docilem esse, nunc usu et experiendo provenire.

He judged that those virtues which pertain to the rational mind, that is, sapience and prudence, can be taught and studied; and those which resist the vicious parts as a remedy, that is, fortitude and continence, to be rational indeed, but that the higher virtues are to be held as disciplines; the rest, if they are perfect, he calls virtues; if they are semi-perfect, he deems that they are not to be called disciplines, yet he does not think them altogether alien from disciplines. Justice, moreover, because it is scattered through the three regions of the soul, he considers an art of living and a discipline, and now to be teachable, now to arise by use and experience.

X. Bonorum autem quaedam sui gratia adserit adpetenda, ut beatitudinem, ut bonum gaudium; alia non sui, ut medicinam; alia et sui et alterius, ut providentiam ceterasque virtutes, quas et sui causa expetimus ut praestantes per se et honestas et alterius, id est beatitudinis, qui virtutum exoptatissimus fructus est. Hoc pacto etiam mala quaedam sui causa fugitanda sunt, alia ceterorum, pleraque et sui et aliorum, ut stultitia et eiusmodi vitia, quae et sui causa vitanda sunt et eorum quae accidere ex his possunt, id est miseriae atque infelicitatis. Eorum, quae adpetenda sunt, quaedam absolute bona dicimus, quae semper atque omnibus, cum adsunt, inchunt commoda, ut virtutes, quarum beatitas fructus est, alia quibusdam nec cunctis vel perpetuo bona, ut vires, valitudo, divitiae et quaecumque corporis et fortunae sunt.

10. Moreover, he asserts that certain goods are to be sought for their own sake, such as beatitude, such as good joy; others not for their own sake, such as medicine; others both for their own and for another’s, such as providence and the other virtues, which we seek both for their own sake as excellent in themselves and honorable, and for another’s, that is, for beatitude, which is the most greatly desired fruit of the virtues. In this manner also certain evils are to be avoided for their own sake, others for the sake of others, and most both for their own and for others’, such as stupidity and vices of this sort, which are to be avoided both for their own sake and for the things that can happen from them, that is, misery and infelicity. Of the things that are to be sought, we call some absolutely good, which always and for all, when they are present, bring advantages, such as the virtues, whose fruit is beatitude; others are good for some, not for all nor perpetually, such as strength, health, riches, and whatever things belong to the body and to fortune.

Pari pacto et eorum quae declinanda sunt, quaedam omnibus ac semper videri mala, quando nocent atque obsunt, ut sunt vitia et infortunia, quaedam aliis nec ea semper nocere, ut aegritudinem, egestatem et cetera.

In like fashion, also of those things that are to be declined, some seem evils to all and always, since they harm and are of disadvantage, as are vices and infortunes; others harm some persons, and not always, such as illness, indigence, and the rest.

XI. Sed virtutem liberam et in nobis sitam et nobis voluntate adpetendam; peccata vero esse non minus libera et in nobis sita, non tamen ea suscipi voluntate. Namque ille virtutis spectator cum eam penitus intellexerit bonam esse et benignitate praestare, ad eam adfectabit profecto et sectandam existimabit sui causa; (a)ut item ille, qui senserit vitia non solum turpitudinem existimationi invehere, sed nocere alio pacto fraudique esse, qui potest sponte se ad eorum consortium iungere? Sed si ad eiusmodi mala pergit ac sibi usuram eorum utilem credit, deceptus errore et imagine boni sollicitatus quidem, insciens vero ad mala praecipitatur; discrepes quippe a communi sententia, si non quidem ignores quid pauperiem ac divitias intersit et, cum hec in proclivi sita sint nec pauperies honestatem vel turpitudinem divitiae adlaturae sint, si egestatem rerum victui necessariarum copiis praeferas ineptire videaris; et adhuc illud absurdius, si quis sanitatem corporis spernat eligens morbos; sed illud postremae dementiae est, cum, qui virtutis pulchritudinem oculis animae viderit utilitatemque eius usu et ratione perspexerit, non ignarus quantum dedecoris atque incommodi adipiscatur ex participatione vitiorum, tamen addictum se velit vitiis.

11. But virtue is free and situated in us and to be sought by us by will; sins, however, are no less free and situated in us, yet they are not to be undertaken by will. For that spectator of virtue, when he has thoroughly understood that it is good and that it excels in benignity, will assuredly aspire to it and will deem it to be followed for its own sake; (or likewise he, who has perceived that vices not only bring turpitude upon reputation, but also harm in another way and are a fraud/detriment), how can he of his own accord join himself to their consortium? But if he proceeds to such evils and believes the use/profit of them to be useful to himself, deceived by error and indeed solicited by the image of good, he is in truth unwittingly precipitated into evils; for you would surely disagree with common sentiment, if you do not, to be sure, ignore what difference there is between poverty and riches, and, since these things lie in the open and neither will poverty bring honesty nor riches turpitude, if you should prefer the want of things necessary for sustenance to supplies, you would seem to be inept; and more absurd still, if someone should spurn the health of the body, choosing diseases; but that is the extremity of dementia, when one who has seen the beauty of virtue with the eyes of the soul and has perceived its utility by use and by reason, not ignorant how much disgrace and incommodity he acquires from participation in vices, nevertheless should wish himself to be addicted to vices.

XII. Corporis sanitatem, vires, indolentiam ceteraque eius bona extraria, item divitias et cetera quae fortunae commoda ducimus, ea non simpliciter bona nuncupanda sunt. Nam si quis ea possidens usu se abdicet, ea illi inutilia erunt; si quis autem eorum usum converterit ad malas artes, ea illi etiam noxia videbuntur. Vitiis subiectus erit qui ea possidet, haberi haec etiam oberit.

12. Health of body, strength, indolence (freedom from pain), and its other extraneous goods, likewise riches and the other things which we reckon as the advantages of fortune, are not to be denominated simply “good.” For if someone, while possessing them, renounces their use, they will be useless to him; but if someone converts their use to evil arts, they will even appear harmful to him. He who possesses them will be subject to vices; to have these will even be a detriment.

Unde colligitur simpliciter bona haec dici non oportere, ut ea etiam quae sunt . . ., morbos atque pauperiem ceteraque . . . existimari oportet. Nam qui tenuis est, si modificetur in sumptibus, nullam noxam ex eo sentiet et qui recte pauperie sua utitur non solum nihil capiet incommodi, verum ad tollenda cetera melior atque praestantior fiet. Si igitur nec habere pauperiem neque eam ratione regere contrarium est, paupertas per se malum non est.

Whence it is collected that these things ought not to be called simply good, so that even those things which are . . ., diseases and poverty and the other . . ., ought to be esteemed. For he who is of slender means, if he be moderated in expenditures, will feel no harm from it; and he who rightly uses his poverty will not only seize upon nothing of incommodity, but indeed will become better and more preeminent for taking away the other things. If therefore neither to have poverty nor to rule it by reason is contrary, poverty in itself is not an evil.

Voluptatem vero neque bonum esse absolute neque simpliciter malum, sed eam, quae sit honesta nec pedendis rebus sed gloriosis actibus veniat, non esse fugiendam, illam vero, quam aspernetur natura ipsa turpi delectatione quaesitam, vitari oportere censebat. Sollicitudinem et laborem, si naturabiles essent et ab ipsa virtute descenderent et essent pro aliqua praeclara administratione susceptae, adpetibiles ducebat esse; sed si adversum naturam turpissimarum rerum causa gignerentur, malas intestabilesque esse. Non sola tristia et voluptates accidere animis et venire corporibus, sed esse medium quendam statum, qualis est cum abest tristitia nec tamen laetitiam adesse sentimus.

He judged pleasure to be neither absolutely a good nor simply an evil, but that pleasure which is honorable and comes not from things to be weighed out as commodities but from glorious acts is not to be fled; whereas that which nature itself spurns, sought in base delectation, ought to be avoided. He held solicitude and toil, if they were natural and descended from virtue itself and were undertaken for some preeminent administration, to be appetible; but if they were generated against nature for the sake of the most shameful things, to be evil and detestable. Not only sorrows and pleasures befall souls and come upon bodies, but there is a certain middle state, such as when sorrow is absent and yet we do not feel joy to be present.

XIII. Ex his quae in nobis sunt, primum bonum atque laudabile est virtus, bonum studenti. Ideo honestum appellari oportet; solum quippe quoad honestum est bonum ducimus, ut e(s)t malum turpe; ac merito quod turpe est bonum non potest esse. Amicitiam ait sociam eamque consensu consistere reciprocamque esse ac delectationis vicem reddere, quando aequaliter redamat.

13. Of the things that are in us, the prime good and praiseworthy is virtue, a good for the student. Therefore it ought to be called the honorable; for indeed we reckon as good only insofar as it is honorable, just as the shameful is an evil; and deservedly, what is shameful cannot be good. He says friendship is a companion, and that it consists by consensus and is reciprocal, and that it renders in return a delectation, when it loves back equally.

Hoc amicitiae commodum provenit, cum amicus eum quem diligit partiter ac se cupit prosperis rebus potiri. Aequalitas ista non aliter provenit nisi similitudo utroque parili caritate conveniat. Nam ut pares paribus inresolubili nexu iunguntur, ita discrepantes et inter se disiuncti sunt nec aliorum amici.

This benefit of friendship comes about, when a friend desires that the one whom he loves, equally as himself, should obtain possession of prosperous affairs. That equality comes about in no other way, unless similitude agree in both with equal charity. For just as equals are joined to equals in an indissoluble nexus, so the discrepant are disjoined among themselves and are not friends of others.

Inimicitiarum autem vitia gignuntur ex malivolentia, per dissimilitudinem morum et distantiam vitae et sectas atque ingenia contraria. Alia etiam amicitiae genera dicit esse, quarum pars voluptatis gignitur causa, pars necessitatis. Necessitudinum et liberorum amor naturae congruus est, ille alius abhorrens ab humanitatis clementia, qui vulgo amor dicitur, est adpetitus ardens, cuius instinctu per libidinem capti amatores corporum in eo quod viderint totum hominem putant.

But the vices of enmities are engendered from malevolence, through a dissimilarity of morals and a distance of life, and through sects and contrary dispositions. He says there are also other kinds of friendship, of which part are engendered for the sake of pleasure, part from necessity. The love of kinships and of children is congruous to nature; that other, however, abhorrent from the clemency of humanity, which is commonly called love, is a burning appetite; by its instinct, lovers of bodies, captured through libido, think the whole human to be in that which they have seen.

Eiusmodi calamitates animarum amicitias idem appellari vetat, quod nec mutuae sint nec reciprocari queant, ut ament atque redamentur, nec constantia illis adsit et diuturnitas desit amoresque eiusmodi satietate ac paenitentia terminentur.

He likewise forbids such calamities of souls to be called friendships, because they are neither mutual nor able to be reciprocated, so that they love and are loved in return; nor is constancy present to them and long duration is lacking, and loves of this kind are ended by satiety and penitence.

XIV. Plato tres amores hoc genere dinumerat, quod sit unus divinus cum incorrupta mente et virtutis ratione conveniens, non paenitendus; alter degeneris animi et corruptissimae voluptatis; tertius ex utroque permixtus, mediocris ingenii et cupidinis modicae. Animas vero fusciores inpelli cupidine corporum unumque illis propositum esse, ut eorum usura potiantur atque eiusmodi voluptate et delectatione ardorem suum mulceant; illas vero quae facetae et urbanae sint animas bonorum de amare et studere illis factumque velle, uti quam plurimum potiantur binis artibus et meliores praestantioresque reddantur. Medias ex utroque constare nec delectationibus corporum prorsus carere et lepidis animarum ingeniis capi posse.

14. Plato numbers three loves of this kind: that one is divine, agreeing with an incorrupt mind and the reason of virtue, not to be repented of; another of a degenerate spirit and most corrupt pleasure; a third commingled from both, of mediocre talent and moderate cupidity. As for the duskier souls, they are driven by cupidity of bodies, and one purpose is set before them: that they may get possession of the use of them and by such pleasure and delectation soothe their ardor; but those souls which are facetious and urbane love the goods and are devoted to them, and wish it to be brought to pass that, by twin arts, they may obtain as much as possible and be rendered better and more preeminent. The middle sort consist from both, neither do they entirely lack the pleasures of bodies, and they can be captivated by the charming talents of souls.

Ut ille igitur amor taeterrimus et inhumanissimus atque turpis non ex rerum natura, sed aegritudine corporali morboque colligitur, sic ille divinus, deorum munere beneficioque concessus, adspirante caelesti cupidine in animos hominum credatur venire. Est amoris tertia species, quam diximus mediam, divini atque terreni proximitate collectus nexuque et consortio parili copulatus, et ut rationi propinquus est divinus ille, ita terrenus ille cupidini iunctus est et voluptati.

Therefore, just as that most foul and most inhuman and base love is gathered not from the nature of things but from bodily ailment and disease, so that divine love, granted by the gift and beneficence of the gods, as celestial desire breathes upon it, is believed to come into the souls of men. There is a third species of love, which we said is intermediate, collected by the proximity of the divine and the terrestrial and coupled by a like nexus and consortium; and as that divine one is near to reason, so that terrene one is joined to concupiscence and to pleasure.

XV. Culpabilium autem virorum quattuor formae sunt, quarum prima honori p(o)etarum est, sequens abstemiorum, tertia popularis, tyrannicae dominationis est ultima. Evenit quapropter primum illud mentibus vitium, cum vigor rationis elanguerit superiorque et robustior fuerit animae portio in qua ira dominatur. at quae oligarchia dicitur, ea sic nascitur, cum, propter pessimum pastum eius partis animae quae ex cupiditatibus constat, non solo rationabilitatis et irascentiae loca possidentur, sed etiam eorum quae non necessaria sunt cupidine.

15. But there are four forms of culpable men, of which the first is for the honor of the poets, the next of the abstemious, the third popular, the last is of tyrannical domination. Wherefore that first vice in minds comes about when the vigor of reason has grown languid and the portion of the soul in which anger rules has become superior and more robust. But that which is called oligarchy is born thus: when, because of the worst feeding of that part of the soul which consists of cupidities, not only are the seats of rationality and of irascibility occupied, but also by the cupidity for things which are not necessary.

Hunc talem Plato lucri cupidinem atque accipitrem pecuniae nominavit. Qualitas popularis existit, cum indulgentia cupidines roboratae non solum iustis desideriis exardescunt, sed sibi etiam quasi obviae atque occursantes et illam consiliariam et illam alteram iratiorem animam condicionibus suis presserint. Tyrannidis genus ex luxuriosa et plena libidinis vita, quae ex infinitis et diversis et inlicitis voluptatibus conflata mente tota dominatur.

Plato named such a one the greed for lucre and the hawk of money. The popular (democratic) quality comes into being when, through indulgence, the cupidities, strengthened, blaze up not only for just desires, but even, as if meeting and colliding face to face, press both that counseling (rational) soul and the other, the more irascible one, on their own terms. The kind of tyranny arises from a luxurious life full of lust, which, compounded from infinite, diverse, and illicit pleasures, rules over the whole mind.

XVI. Qui sit autem pessimus, eum non solum turpem et damnosum et contemptorem deorum et inhumanam atque insociabilem vitam ait vivere, sed nec cum proximis secumque congruere atque ideo non a ceteris modo, verum etiam a se discrepare nec aliis tantum, sed sibi etiam inimicum esse et idcirco hunc talem neque bonis nec omnino cuiquam nec sibi quidem amicum esse. Sed eum pessimum videri quem nulla malignitatis superlatio possit excedere; hunc talem numquam in agendis rebus expedire se posse, non solum propter inscientiam, sed quod ipse etiam sibimet sit ignotus et quod malitia perfecta seditionem mentibus pariat, inpediens incepta eius atque meditata consilia nec permittens quicquam eorum quae volet. Pessimo quapropter deterrimoque non ea tantum vitia quae contra naturam sunt pariunt exsecrabilitatem, ut est invidentia, ut est de alienis incommodis gaudium, sed etiam quae natura non respuit, voluptatem dico atque aegritudinem, desiderium, amorem, misericordiam, metum, pudorem, iracundiam.

XVI. As to who is the worst, he says that such a one not only lives a shameful and damaging life, a contemner of the gods, and inhuman and unsociable, but also neither agrees with his neighbors nor with himself, and therefore differs not only from others but even from himself, and is an enemy not only to others but also to himself; and on that account such a man is a friend neither to the good nor, in general, to anyone, nor indeed to himself. But he seems the worst whom no superlative of malignity can surpass; such a man is never able to extricate himself in affairs, not only on account of ignorance, but because he is even unknown to himself, and because perfected malice begets sedition in minds, hindering his undertakings and premeditated counsels and not permitting anything of the things he wishes. To the worst, therefore, the very worst, not only the vices which are against nature produce execrability—such as envy, such as joy at others’ misfortunes—but also those which nature does not reject: I mean pleasure and grief, desire, love, mercy, fear, shame, irascibility.

Idcirco autem hoc evenit, quod inmoderatum ingenium, in quaecumque proruerit, modum non habet atque ideo semper ei aut deest aliquid aut redundat. Hinc eiusmodi homini est amor omni tenore corruptus, quod non solum effrenatis cupiditatibus et inexplebili[s] siti haurire avet omnia genera voluptatis, sed quod ipso etiam formae iudicio inrationabili errore distrahitur, ignorans veram pulchritudinem et corporis effetam et eneruem et fluxam cutem deamans, nec saltem coloratos sole aut exercitatione solidatos, sed opacos umbra vel desidia molles et cura nimia emedullatos artus magni facit.

Therefore this comes about because an immoderate temperament, into whatever it has rushed headlong, has no measure, and so it always either lacks something or redundates. Hence for a man of such a sort love is corrupted in every measure, because not only, with unbridled cupidities and an unquenchable thirst, he is eager to drain all kinds of pleasures, but because even in the very judgment of form he is torn asunder by irrational error, ignorant of true pulchritude, and enamoring himself of a body’s skin that is effete, enervated, and loose; nor does he even value those who are colored by the sun or hardened by exercise, but he prizes limbs made opaque by shade, or soft through sloth, and, by excessive care, demarrowed.

XVII. Non sponte grassari malitiam multis modis constat; namque iniuriam inordinatam passionem et aegritudinem mentis esse ait. Unde ad delinquendum arbitratur homines non sponte ferri. Quis enim tantum mali voluntate susciperet, ut in optima mentis suae parte scelus et flagitium sciens veheret?

17. It is established in many ways that malice does not proceed of its own accord; for he says that injustice is an inordinate passion and a sickness of the mind. Whence he judges that human beings are not borne to delinquency of their own accord. For who would undertake so great an evil by will, as to carry knowingly, in the best part of his mind, crime and flagitiousness?

Cum igitur possessio mali ab inprudentibus capitur, usum eius et actiones oportet ab ignorantibus sustineri idcircoque peius est nocere quam noceri, quod enim his rebus nocetur quae sunt viliores, corporis et externis, qua vel inminui possunt vel fraudibus interire, inlaesis potioribus, quae ad ipsam attinent animam. Sed nocere longe peius esse ex eo intellegi potest, quod animi<s> bonis eo vitio pernicies infertur plusque sibi obest qui alium cupit perditum quam illi nocet, adversum quem talia machinatur. Et cum nocere alteri malorum omnium maximum sit, multo fit gravius, si qui nocet habeat inpune, graviusque est et acerbius omni supplicio, si noxio inpunitas deferatur nec hominum interim animadversione plectatur, sicut gravis est acerbissimorum morborum carere medicina, medentes fallere nec uri aut secari eas partes, quarum dolore incolumitati residuarum partium consulatur.

Since, therefore, the possession of evil is seized by the imprudent, its use and operations must be borne by the ignorant—and on that account it is worse to harm than to be harmed; for the harm that is suffered touches those things which are viler—of the body and external things—which can either be diminished or perish through frauds, while the better things remain uninjured, those which pertain to the soul itself. But that to harm is far worse may be understood from this: that by that vice ruin is brought upon the goods of the mind, and he does himself more damage who desires another to be ruined than he harms him against whom he machinates such things. And since to harm another is the greatest of all evils, it becomes much more serious if the one who harms has impunity; and it is more grievous and more bitter than any punishment if impunity is granted to the guilty man and he is not meanwhile chastised by the animadversion of men—just as it is grievous, in the case of the most acrid diseases, to lack a remedy, to deceive the healers, and not to burn or cut those parts by whose pain provision is made for the safety of the remaining parts.

XVIII. Quare, ut optumi medici conclamatis desperatisque corporibus non adhibent medentes manus, ne nihil profutura curatio doloribus spatia promulget, ita eos quorum animae vitiis inbutae sunt nec curari queunt medicina sapientiae, e[o]mori praesta[n]t. Namque eum cui non ex natura nec ex industria recte vivendi studium conciliari potest, vita existimat Plato esse pellendum vel, si cupido vitae eum teneat, oportere sapientibus tradi, quorum arte quadam ad rectiora flectatur. Et est sane melius talem regi nec ipsum regendi habere alios potestatem nec dominari, sed servire servitium, inpotem ipsum aliorum addici potestati parendi potius quam iubendi officia sorditum. Virum pessimum non solum deteriorem, sed miseriorem etiam dicebat esse, quod distrahatur semper seditione vitiorum et desideriorum aestibus differatur; qui quanto pluri<m>um cupitior sit, tanto egentior sibimet et propterea aliis videri potest.

18. Wherefore, just as the best physicians, when bodies have been declared and despaired of, do not apply healing hands, lest a treatment that will profit nothing prolong spans of pains, so those whose souls are imbued with vices and cannot be cured by the medicine of wisdom, they deem it preferable that they die. For the man for whom a zeal of living rightly can be conciliated neither by nature nor by industry, Plato esteems is to be expelled from life, or, if a desire of life holds him, that he ought to be handed over to the wise, by whose art in some manner he may be bent toward more rectified things. And indeed it is better that such a one be ruled, and that he himself have no power of ruling others nor be a lord, but serve servitude, himself impotent, to be assigned to the power of others—rather to the offices of obeying than of commanding, the latter being sordid. He used to say that a most-wicked man is not only worse, but also more miserable, because he is always torn apart by the sedition of vices and is carried off by the heats of desires; and the more desirous he is, by so much the more needy to himself, and for that reason he can also seem so to others.

Sperata quippe atque exoptata vix pauca et cum maxima aerumna proveniunt iisque flagrantiores cupidines furoresque succedunt nec futuris modo angitur malis, verum etiam praeteritis transactisque torquetur. Quos omnes morte sola ab eiusmodi malis educi posse manifestum est.

For of the things hoped-for and longed-for, scarcely a few come to pass, and with the greatest tribulation; and to these there succeed more burning desires and furies, and one is anguished not only by evils to come, but is even tortured by those past and done. It is manifest that by death alone can all such be led out from evils of this sort.

XIX. Sed adprime bonos et sine mediocritate deterrimos paucos admodum rarioresque et, ut ipse ait, numerabiles esse; eos autem, qui nec plane optimi nec oppido deterrimi sint, sed quasi medie morati, plures esse. Sed neque superiores obtinere recta omnia neque culpabiles in omnibus labi. Horum vitia nec gravata nec intempestiva sunt aut nimium criminosa, quorum substantia est ex redundantia vel defectu, quibus et adprobationis integritas et modus est et qui inter laudem vituperationemque mediam viam vadunt.

19. But the first-rate good and, without mediocrity, the very worst are few indeed, very rare, and, as he himself says, numerable; whereas those who are neither plainly optimum nor exceedingly most-deteriorate, but as it were middlingly-behaved, are more numerous. Yet the superiors do not obtain all things straight, nor do the culpable slip in all things. The vices of these are neither weighty nor untimely nor excessively criminous, whose substance is from redundancy or defect; for them there is both the integrity and the measure of approbation, and they go a middle way between laud and vituperation.

Iisque rerum capessendarum eiusmodi studia excitantur, ut nunc boni atque honesti eos rationes invitent, nunc inhonesta lucra et turpes inliciant voluptates.Talibus viris nec amicitiarum fides perseverat et amores non semper inprobi nec honesti tamen eorum animos incurrunt.

And in them pursuits of undertaking affairs of such a kind are aroused, that now reasons of the good and the honest invite them, now dishonest lucre and foul pleasures entice them.To such men neither does the faith of friendships persevere, and loves, not always improper nor yet honest, assail their minds.

XX. Perfecte sapientem esse non posse dicit Plato, nisi ceteris ingenio praestet, artibus et prudentiae partibus absolutus atque iis iam tum a pueris inbutus, factis congruentibus et dictis adsuetus, purgata et efficata animi voluptate, eiectis ex animo hinc ... abstinentia atque patientia omnibusque doctrinis ex rerum scientia eloquentiae venientibus. Eum qui per haec profectus fidenti et securo gradu virtutis via graderetur, adeptum solidam vivendi rationem, repente fieri perfectum; hunc repente praeteriti futurique aevi ultimas partes adtingere et esse quodammodo intemporalem. Tum post hoc, vitiis exclusis incertisque etiam missis, omnia quae ad beatam vitam f(u)erunt non ex aliis pendere nec ab aliis deferri sibi posse, sed in sua manu esse sapiens recte putat.

20. Plato says that one cannot be perfectly wise unless he excel the rest in ingenuity, be complete in the arts and the parts of prudence and already from boyhood be imbued with these, accustomed to deeds and words that are congruent, the mind’s pleasure purged and made effectual, with what is from here ejected from the mind hinc ... with abstinence and patience and with all doctrines coming to eloquence from the knowledge of things. He who, having advanced through these, would walk the way of virtue with a confident and secure step, having acquired a solid ratio of living, suddenly becomes perfect; this man suddenly reaches the farthest bounds of past and future age and is in a certain manner atemporal. Then after this, with vices excluded and even uncertainties dismissed, the wise man rightly thinks that all things which pertain to the blessed life do not depend on others nor can be delivered by others to him, but are in his own hand.

Quare nec in secundis rebus effertur nec contrahitur in adversis, cum se ornamentis suis ita instructum sciat, ut ab his nulla vi segregetur. Hunc talem non solum inferre, sed ne referre quidem oportet iniuriam. Non enim eam contumeliam putat, quam inprobus faciat, set (eam non putat, quam) patientia firmiter toleret, quando quidem naturae lege in animo eius sculptum sit quod nihil horum possit nocere sapienti, quae opinantur ceteri mala esse.

Wherefore he is neither carried aloft in prosperous affairs nor contracted in adverse ones, since he knows himself to be so equipped with his own ornaments that by no force can he be segregated from them. Such a man ought not only not to inflict an injury, but not even to repay one. For he does not reckon as contumely what a wicked man does, nor does he reckon as such what he firmly tolerates with patience, since by the law of nature it is sculpted upon his mind that none of these things—which the others suppose to be evils—can harm the wise man.

Equidem sapientem illum conscientia sua fretum, securum et confidentem in omni vita dicit futurum, quod et omnia accidentia reputet ad meliores rationes trahens et quod nihilo morose vel difficulter excipiat sibique persuadeat pertinere res suas ad inmortales deos. Iam ille diem mortis suae propitius nec invitus exspectat, quod de animae inmortalitate confidat; nam vinculis liberata corporeis, sapientis anima remigrat ad deos et pro merito vitae purius castiusque transactae hoc ipso usu deorum se condicioni conciliat.

Indeed, he says that that wise man, relying on his own conscience, will be secure and confident in his whole life, because he both reckons all accidents, drawing them toward better rationales, and because he receives them neither morosely nor with difficulty, and persuades himself that his affairs pertain to the immortal gods. Now that man awaits the day of his death propitiously and not unwillingly, because he is confident about the immortality of the soul; for, freed from bodily bonds, the soul of the wise man remigrates to the gods, and, in proportion to the merit of a life passed more purely and more chastely, by this very fellowship with the gods he reconciles himself to their condition.

XXI. Eundem sapientem optimum nominat ac bonus ac prudentem recte arbitratur, cuius sane consilia cum factis rectissimis congruunt et cui principia profecta sunt a iusti ratione. Ad hoc sapientem et fortissimum dicit esse, ut qui vigore mentis ad omnia perpetienda sit paratus. Inde est quod fortitudinem nervos animi ipsasque cervices ait, ut ignaviam animae dicit inbecillitati esse finitimam.

21. He calls that same wise man the best, and rightly deems him good and prudent, inasmuch as his counsels agree with the most upright deeds, and his principles have proceeded from a just reason. In addition, he says the wise man is most brave, as one who, by vigor of mind, is prepared to endure all things. Hence it is that he calls fortitude the sinews of the mind and the very backbone, while he says that the soul’s cowardice is contiguous to imbecility.

Divitem hunc solum quidem recte putat, quippe cum thensauris omnibus pretiosiorem solus videatur possidere virtutem. Opes etiam quia solus sapiens potest in usibus necessariis regere, videri ditissimus debet. Nam ceteri quamvis sint opibus adfluentes, tamen quod vel usum earum nesciant vel deducant eas ad pessimas partes inopes videtur.

He rightly deems this man alone rich, since he alone seems to possess virtue more precious than all treasures. Wealth also, because the wise man alone can rule it in necessary uses, ought to seem the richest. For the others, although abounding in wealth, nevertheless, because they either do not know the use of it or lead it down to the worst purposes, seem needy.

Egestatem namque non abstinentia pecuniae, sed (p)raesentia, inmoderatum cupidinum gignit. Philosophum oportet, si nihil indigens erit et omnium contumax et superior iis quae homines acerba toleratu arbitrantur, nihil secus agere quam ut semper studeat animam corporis consortio separare, et ideo existimandam philosophiam esse mortis adfectum consuetudinemque moriendi.

For it is not the abstinence from money, but its (p)resence, that begets immoderate cupidities. A philosopher ought, if he is to be indigent of nothing and contumacious toward all things and superior to those things which men reckon bitter to endure, to act in no other way than always to strive to separate the soul from the consortium of the body; and therefore philosophy is to be esteemed the affect of death and the habit of dying.

XXII. Bonos omnes oportet inter se amicos esse, etsi sunt minus noti, et potestate ipsa, qua mores eorum sectaeque conveniunt, amici sunt habendi; paria quippe a similibus non abhorrent. Unde inter solos bonos fidem amicitiae esse constat. Sapientia amatorem boni adulescentem facit, sed eum qui probitate ingenii sit ad artes bonas promptior.

22. All the good ought to be friends among themselves, even if they are less known, and by the very power by which their morals and their sects agree, they are to be held as friends; for equals do not shrink from similars. Whence it is established that the fidelity of friendship exists among the good alone. Wisdom makes an adolescent a lover of the good, namely one who, by the probity of his innate character, is more prompt toward the good arts.

Nec deformitas corporis talem abigere poterit adpetitum; nam cum ipsa anima conplacita est, homo totus adamatur; cum corpus expetitur, pars eius deterior est cordi. Iure igitur putandum est eum qui sit gnarus bonorum cupitorem quoque eiusmodi rerum esse; is enim solus boni<s> desideriis accenditur, qui bonum illud oculis animi videt; hunc esse sapientem. Stultus vero quoniam est ignarus, osor quoque nec amicus virtutum sit necesse est.

Nor will deformity of the body be able to drive away such an appetite; for when the soul itself is well-pleased, the whole man is loved; when the body is desired, the worse part of him is dear to the heart. Therefore, by right it must be thought that he who is cognizant of good things is also a desirer of such things; for he alone is kindled by desires of the good, who sees that good with the eyes of the mind—this man is the wise man. The fool, however, since he is ignorant, must also be a hater and not a friend of virtues.

Nec frustra hic talis amator est turpium voluptatum. Sapiens nullo modo merae voluptatis quidem alicuius gratia veniet ad agendum, nisi praesto fuerint honesta emolumenta virtutis. Hunc eundem cum eiusmodi voluntate oportet vitam vivere honestam et admirabilem plenamque laudis et gloriae neque harum modo rerum causa ceteris omnibus praeferri, verum etiam iucunditate et securitate solum et semper frui.

Nor is it without cause that he is such a lover of base pleasures. The wise man will by no means come to action for the sake of mere pleasure of any kind, unless the honest emoluments of virtue are at hand. This same man, with such a will, ought to live a life honorable and admirable and full of praise and glory, and to be preferred before all other things not only for the sake of these things, but also to enjoy delight and security only and always.

Nec angetur carissimis orbatus adfectibus, vel quod ex se omnia sunt apta quae ad beatitudinem pergunt, vel quod decreto et lege rectae rationis interdicitur eiusmodi adflictatio et quod, si de tali se causa discruciet, illam aegritudinem vel propter eum qui est emortuus suscipiat, quasi in peiore sit parte, aut sua gratia, quod tali necessitudine doleat se privatum esse: sed neque obiti causa lamentationes suscipi oportet, si sciamus illum neque aliquid mali passum ac, si bonae fuerit voluntatis, etiam melioribus adgregatum, neque sui gratia, ut qui in se reponit omnia nec cuiusquam absentia virtutis esse indigens potest, cuius perpetuam possessionem sibi vindicat. Igitur sapiens non erit tristis.

Nor will he be anguished when bereft of most dear affections, either because from himself are all things apt which go toward beatitude, or because such affliction is interdicted by the decree and law of right reason; and because, if he tortures himself on account of such a cause, he would assume that sickness either for the sake of him who is deceased, as though he were in the worse condition, or for his own sake, because he grieves that he has been deprived of such a bond: but neither ought lamentations to be undertaken on account of the departed, if we know that he has suffered nothing evil and, if he shall have been of good will, has even been aggregated to better things, nor for one’s own sake, as one who reposes all things in himself and cannot be needy by anyone’s absence, who claims for himself the perpetual possession of virtue. Therefore the wise man will not be sad.

XXIII. Sapientiae finis est, ut ad dei meritum sapiens provehatur hancque futuram eius operam, ut aemulatione vitae ad deorum actus accedat. Verum hoc ei poterit provenire, si virum perfecte iustum, pium, prudentem se praebeat. Unde non solum in perspectandi cognitione, verum etiam agendi opera sequi eum convenit, quae diis atque hominibus sint probata, quippe cum summus deorum cuncta haec non solum cogitationum ratione consideret, sed prima, media, ultima obeat conpertaque intime providae ordinationis universitate et constantia regat.

23. The finis of wisdom is that the wise man be advanced to the merit of God, and that this be his future exertion: that by emulation of life he may approach to the acts of the gods. But this will be able to come to him, if he show himself a man perfectly just, pious, prudent. Whence it is fitting to follow him not only in the cognition of survey (perspective), but also in the works of acting, which are approved by gods and men, since the highest of the gods not only considers all these things by the reason of thoughts, but attends to first, middle, and last things and, having them intimately known, rules them with the universality and constancy of provident ordination.

Verum enimvero illum omnibus beatum videri, cui[us] et bona suppetunt et, quemadmodum carere vitiis debeat, callet. Una quidem beatitudo est, cum ingenii nostra praesentia tutamur quae perficimus; alia, cum ad perfectionem vitae nihil deest atque ipsa sumus contemplatione contenti. Utrarumque autem felicitatum origo ex virtute manat.

But indeed in very truth that man seems blessed to all, whose goods are at hand and who is expert in how he ought to be without vices. One beatitude indeed is, when by the presence of our inborn ingenium we keep safe what we accomplish; another, when nothing is lacking to the perfection of life and we are ourselves content with contemplation. But the origin of both felicities flows forth from virtue.

Et ad ornamentum quidem genialis locis (est virtutis) nullis extrinsecus eorum quae bona ducimus adminiculis indigemus. Ad usum autem vitae communis corporis cura et eorum quae extrinsecus veniunt praesidiis opus est; ita tamen ut haec eadem fiant virtute meliora eiusque suffragio beatitudinis commodis copulentur, sine qua haec in bonis minime sunt habenda. Nec frustra est quod sola virtus fortunatissimos potest facere, cum absque ha(e)c ex aliis prosperis non possit felicitas inveniri.

And indeed for the ornament of genial places (it is of virtue) we need no supports from outside, from those things which we reckon goods. But for the use of common life, there is need of care for the body and of protections from those things that come from without; yet in such a way that these same things become better through virtue and, by its suffrage, are coupled to the advantages of beatitude, without which these are by no means to be held among goods. Nor is it in vain that only virtue can make men most fortunate, since without this happiness cannot be found from other prosperities.

Sapientem quippe pedisequum et imitatorem dei dicimus et sequi arbitramur deum; id est enim hepou theoi. Non solum oportet, dum vitam colit, digna dis gerere nec agere ea quae eorum maiestati displiceant, verum et tunc cum corpus relinquit, quod non faciet invito deo; nam etsi in eius manu est mortis facultas, quamvis sciat se terrenis relictis consecuturum esse meliora, non accerset sibi tamen eam, nisi necessario perpetiendum esse istud lex divina decreverit. Mortem eius etsi ante actae vitae ornamenta cohonestant, honestiorem tamen et rumoris secundi oportet esse.

For we call the wise man a foot-attendant and an imitator of God, and we judge him to follow God; for that is, “follow God.” Not only ought he, while he cultivates life, to do things worthy of the gods and not to do things which would displease their majesty, but also then when he leaves the body—which he will not do with God unwilling; for although the faculty of death is in his hand, although he knows that, with earthly things left behind, he will obtain better things, nevertheless he does not summon it to himself, unless the divine law has decreed that this is necessarily to be endured. And although the ornaments of a life previously lived dignify his death, yet it ought to be more honorable and of favorable report.

Cum securus de posteritatis suae vita ad inmortalitatem animam permittit ire, eam, quod pie vixerit, praecipit fortunatorum habituram loca, deorum choreis semideumque permixtam.

When, secure about the life of his posterity, he permits his soul to go on to immortality, he enjoins that it, because he has lived piously, will have the abodes of the fortunate, mingled with the choruses of the gods and of the demigods.

XXIV. De cuitatum vero constitutione et de observatione regendarum rerum publicarum ita censet Plato. Iam principio civitatis formam definit ad hunc modum: civitatem esse convictum inter se hominum plurimorum, in quibus sint regentes alii, ceteri inferiores, coniuncti inter se concordia et invicem sibi opem atque auxilium deferentes, isdem legibus, rectis tamen, officia sua temperantes; unamque civitatem isdem moenibus illam futuram, ut eadem velle atque eadem nolle incolarum mentes adsueverint. Quare suadendum est fundatoribus rerum publicarum, ut usque ad id locorum plebes suas augeant, dum rectori omnes noti esse possunt nec sibimet incogniti; sic enim fiet ut omnes una mente sint invicemque sibi factum velint.

24. On the constitution of states and on the observance of the ruling of republics Plato judges thus. Already at the beginning he defines the form of a civitas in this way: that a city is the living-together of many human beings among themselves, in which some are rulers, the rest inferiors, joined among themselves by concord and, in turn, bringing help and auxiliary aid to one another, under the same laws—yet upright ones—tempering their duties; and that there will be one city within the same walls, such that the minds of the inhabitants have become accustomed to will the same things and to not will the same things. Wherefore it is to be advised to the founders of commonwealths that they augment their peoples only up to that point at which all can be known to the rector and are not unknown to one another; for thus it will come about that all are of one mind and will wish what is done to be done for one another.

Magnam sane civitatem non habitantium multitudine eorumque magis virtutibus niti oportet; vires enim non corporis nec pecuniae collectas dominatione multorum existimandas putat cum vecordia inpotentiaque, sed cum decreto communi virtutibus omnibus ornati viri incolae et omnes fundati legibus obsecuntur. Ceteras vero, quae non ad hunc modum forent constitutae, non arbitrabatur sanas civitates, sed taetras et morbis tumentes. Res publicas eas demum fundatas ratione dicebat esse, quae ordinatae ad instar animarum forent, ut pars optima, quae prudentia sapientiaque praecellit, imperitet multitudini et, ut illa totius habet curam corporis, ita prudentiae dilectus tueatur universae commoda civitatis.

A great city, to be sure, ought not to rely on the multitude of its inhabitants but rather on their virtues; for he thinks strength is not to be esteemed that of the body nor of money amassed under the domination of the many, together with folly and lack of self-mastery, but when, by a common decree, the inhabitants—men adorned with all virtues—and all, being grounded by laws, obey. The other cities, indeed, which should not be constituted in this manner, he did not judge healthy, but foul and swollen with diseases. He said that those commonwealths were then at last founded by reason which were ordered after the likeness of souls, so that the best part, which excels in prudence and wisdom, may command the multitude, and, as that part has the care of the whole body, so the selection of prudence may protect the interests of the entire city.

Fortitudo etiam, pars virtutis secunda, ut vi sua adpetentiam castigat et reprimit, ita in civitate vigilet. Excubitorum loco quidem militet iuventus pro utilitate cunctorum, sed inquietos et indomitos ac propterea pessimos cives refrenet, contineat ac, si necesse sit, frangat potioris ex consilii disciplina. Illam vero desideriorum tertiam partem plebi et agricolis partem ducit, quam existimat moderatis utilitatibus sustinendam.

Fortitude also, the second part of virtue, just as by its own force it castigates and represses appetite, so too should keep vigil in the city. In the place of sentries indeed, let the youth serve as soldiers for the utility of all; but let it curb the restless and untamed, and therefore worst, citizens—restrain them and, if it is necessary, break them—by the discipline of better counsel. And he assigns that third part of desires to the plebs and to farmers, which he judges must be sustained by moderate advantages.

At enim rem publicam negat posse consistere, nisi is qui imperitat habeat sapientiae studium, aut is ad imperandum deligatur quem esse inter omnes sapientissimum constat.

But indeed he declares that the commonwealth cannot stand, unless the one who commands has a zeal for wisdom, or the one be chosen for commanding who is acknowledged among all to be the most wise.

XXV. Moribus et huiuscemodi cunctos cives inbuendos esse dicit, ut iis inquorum tutelam et Fidem res publica illa creditur auri atque argenti habendi cupido nulla sit, ne specie communi privatas opes adpetant, nec eiusmodi hospitia succedant, ut ceteris non reclusa sit ianua; cibos victumque ita sibi curent, ut acceptam mercedem ab his, quos protegunt, communibus epulis insumant. Matrimonia quoque non privatim maritanda esse, sed fieri communia despondente ipsa eiusmodi nuptias publice civitate[s], sapientibus magistratibus sorte quadam ei negotio praeditis idque praecipue curantibus, ne dispares sui vel inter se dissimiles copulentur. Hic adnectitur utilis necessariaque confusio, ut permixta nutrimenta puerorum ignotorum adhuc agnitionis parentibus adferant difficultatem, ut, dum suos liberos nesciunt, omnes quos viderint aetatis eius suos credant et veluti communium liberorum omnes omnium sint parentes.

25. He says that all citizens are to be imbued with mores of this sort: that those into whose tutelage and Faith that commonwealth is entrusted should have no desire of having gold and silver, lest under a common appearance they pursue private wealth, nor should they take up such hostels that the door is not open to the rest; let them care for their food and victuals in such a way that they expend the wage received from those whom they protect on common banquets. Matrimonies too are not to be arranged privately, but to be made common, the state itself publicly betrothing such nuptials, with wise magistrates—endowed by a certain lot for that task—especially seeing to this: that those unequal to themselves or unlike among themselves not be coupled. Here there is annexed a useful and necessary commingling, that the mixed nurture of children, still unknown, bring difficulty of recognition to the parents, so that, while they do not know their own children, they may deem all whom they see of that age to be theirs, and, as it were, in the case of common children, all may be parents of all.

Ad hoc ipsorum conubiorum quaeritur tempestiva coniunctio, cuius futuram stabilem fidem credit, si cum harmonia musicae dierum consonent numeri. Et qui de nuptiis talibus erunt orti studiis congruentibus inbuentur et optimis disciplinis communi praeceptorum magisterio docebuntur, non virile secus modo, verum etiam feminarum, quas vult Plato omnibus [p]artibus quae propriae virorum putantur coniungendas esse, bellicis et gymnicis et musicis; quippe utriusque cum natura una sit, eandem esse virtutem. Eiusmodi civitatem nullis extrinsecus latis legibus indigere; regi eam quippe prudentia et eiusmodi institutis ac moribus, quibus fundata ceteras leges non requirat.

To this end a timely conjunction of the marriages themselves is sought, whose future stable fidelity he believes will come about if the numbers are consonant with the harmony of music of the days. And those who will be born from such nuptials will be imbued with congruent studies and will be taught by the common magistery of precepts in the best disciplines—not only of the male sex, but also of the female, whom Plato wants to be conjoined in all [p]arts which are thought proper to men—warlike, gymnic, and musical; since the nature of both being one, the virtue is the same. A state of this kind has no need of laws laid down from outside; indeed let it be ruled by prudence and by such institutions and morals, by which being founded it does not require the rest of the laws.

Et hanc quidem et figmentum aliquod veritatis exempli causa per se compositam vult esse rem publicam.

And he wants the commonwealth to be both this, indeed, and also, for the sake of an example, some figment of truth composed in itself.

XXVI. Est et alia optima quidem et satis iusta quidem et ipsa specie et dicis causa civitas fabricata, non ut superior sine evidentia, sed iam cum aliqua substantia. In hac non suo nomine de statu et de commodis civitatis requirens originis eius principia et fundamenta disponit, sed eo tendit quemadmodum civilis gubernator, eiusmodi locum conventusque multitudinum nactus, iuxta naturam praesentium rerum et convenarum debeat fecere civitatem plenam bonarum legum et morum bonorum. In hac equidem easdem puerorum nutricationes, easdem vult esse artium disciplinas; sed in conubiis et partibus et patrimoniis ac domibus desciscit a prioris observatione rei publicae, matrimonia privata et singularia faciens; procorumque ipsorum, etsi in contrahendo matrimonio consulere ex voluntate sua debeant, universae tamen civitatis principibus ut communis commodi causam decernit spectandam esse.

26. There is also another city, indeed very excellent and quite just, fashioned both in its very appearance and for the sake of argument, not like the previous one without evidence, but now with some substance. In this one he does not, under his own name, by inquiring about the condition and the advantages of the city, lay out the principles and foundations of its origin; rather, he aims at how a civil governor, having found such a site and such gatherings of multitudes, ought, according to the nature of present realities and of the settlers, to make a city full of good laws and good morals. In this, to be sure, he wants the same nurturings of boys, the same disciplines of the arts; but in marriages and shares and patrimonies and households he departs from the prior observance of the commonwealth, making marriages private and individual; and as for the suitors themselves, although in contracting marriage they ought to consult their own will, nevertheless he decrees that the leaders of the whole city must have in view the cause of the common good.

Quare et dites inferiores nuptias non recusent et locupletium consortium inopes consequantur; et, si vires opum congruunt, ingenia tamen diversa miscenda esse, ut iracundo tranquilla iungatur et sedato homini incitatior mulier adplicetur, ut talibus observationum remediis et profectibus suboles natura discrepante confecta morum proventu meliore coalescat et ita conpositarum domorum opibus civitas ageatur; puerperia ipsa morum dissimili seminio concepta cum utriusque instar similitudinis traxerint, neque illis vigorem in rebus gerendis neque tamen spectandis consilium defuturum. Instituendos vero eos esse, non utcumque parentes nec ita sexus esse stratus censuerit civitatis. Domus vero et possessionen habeant privatas, ut queunt singuli, quae quidem nec inmensum augeri per avaritiam nec prodigi per luxuriam aut deseri per neglegentiam sinit.

Wherefore let the rich not refuse inferior marriages, and let the needy attain a consortium with the wealthy; and, if the powers of resources agree, nevertheless the diverse dispositions ought to be mingled, so that to an irascible man a tranquil woman be joined, and to a sedate man a more incitative woman be attached, so that by such remedies of observances and advances the progeny, fashioned with a discrepant nature, may coalesce by a better yield of morals, and the commonwealth be conducted by the resources of households composed in this way; and the very births, conceived from a dissimilar seed of character, since they draw an image of likeness from each, will lack neither vigor for conducting affairs nor counsel for contemplating them. Indeed, they ought to be educated, not just as parents please in any fashion, nor merely as the city’s stratification by sex shall have decreed. But let them have private houses and possessions, as individuals are able, which indeed does not allow these to be increased immeasurably by avarice, nor squandered by luxury, nor deserted by negligence.

Legesque huic civitati promulgari iubet et legum moderatorem, cum aliquid tale concipiet, ad contemplandas virtutes hortatur.

And he orders that laws be promulgated for this city, and he urges the moderator of the laws, when he conceives anything of this sort, to contemplate the virtues.

XXVII. Inperitandi autem modum eum esse utilem censet qui ex tribus fuerit temperatus. Nec enim vel optimatium vel etiam popularis imperii solos et meros status utiles arbitratur nec inpunitas rectorum culpas relinquit, sed magis censet his debere constare rationem, qui sint potestate potiores. Et alii publicarum rerum status definiti ab eo putantur nitentes ad bonos mores et super ea re publica, quam vult emendatione constare, rectori mandat non prius residuas conpleat aut vitiosas leges correctas velit quam mores perniciosos et disciplinas corrumpentes commoda civitatis ad meliora converterit.

27. Moreover, he judges that a mode of ruling is useful which has been tempered from three. For he does not deem the sole and pure constitutions either of aristocratic rule or even of popular rule to be useful, nor does he leave the faults of rulers unpunished; rather, he judges that the reckoning ought to rest with those who are superior in power. And other statuses of public affairs defined by him are thought to strive toward good morals; and concerning that commonwealth, which he wishes to consist in emendation, he enjoins the ruler not first to complete the remaining matters or to desire the faulty laws corrected before he has converted to the better the pernicious morals and the disciplines that corrupt the advantages of the commonwealth.

A quibus si consilio et suadela depravata multitudo deflecti non poterit, abducenda est tamen ab incepto vi et ingratis. In actuosa vero civitate describit quemadmodum simul omnis hominum multitudo bonitate et iustitia conducta habeatur. Hi tales conplectentur proximos, honores custodient, intemperantiam arcebunt, iniuriam refrenabunt, pudicitiae ornamentisque ceteris vitae honores maximos deferentes.

If by counsel and suasion the depraved multitude cannot be deflected, nevertheless it must be led away from its undertaking by force and against their will. In a truly active commonwealth he describes how at once the whole multitude of men may be conducted and held by goodness and justice. Such men will embrace their neighbors, will safeguard honors, will ward off intemperance, will bridle injustice, bestowing the greatest honors upon chastity and upon the other ornaments of life.

Nec temere multitudo convertetur ad eiusmodi rerum publicarum status, nisi qui optimis legibus et egregiis institutis fuerint educati, moderati erga ceteros, inter se congruentes.

Nor will the multitude readily be converted to such statuses of republics, unless they be those who have been educated under the best laws and outstanding institutions, moderate toward the others, agreeing among themselves.

XXVIII. Quattuor culpabilium civium genera esse: unum eorum qui sunt Honore praecipui, alterum paucorum penes quos rerum est potestas, tertium omnium, ultimum dominationis tyrannicae. Et primum quidem confit, cum prudentiores viri per magistratus seditiosos civitate pelluntur deferturque ad illos potestas qui sint manu tantummodo strevi, nec [h]ii qui blandiore consilio agere res possint adipiscuntur imperii facultatem, sed qui turbidi violentique sunt. Paucorum vero status obtinentur, cum inopes criminosi multi simul paucorum divitum inpotentiae subiacentes dederint se atque permiserint omnemque regendi potestatem non mores boni sed opulentia fuerit consecuta.

28. There are four kinds of culpable citizens: one of those who are preeminent in Honor, a second of the Few in whose hands is the power of affairs, a third of all (the multitude), and a last of tyrannical domination. And the first indeed comes about when the more prudent men are expelled from the commonwealth by seditious magistrates, and power is carried over to those who are only strong in the fist, nor do those who could conduct affairs with gentler counsel obtain the faculty of command, but rather those who are turbulent and violent. The regime of the Few, moreover, is secured when many needy and criminal men, together lying under the unbridled power of a few rich men, have surrendered and given themselves up, and the whole power of ruling has been attained not by good morals but by opulence.

Popularis factio roboratur, cum inops multitudo viribus obtinuerit adversus divitum facultates lexque (e) iussu populi fuerit promulgata, ut ex aequo liceat omnibus honores capessere. Ad haec tyrannis illa, singulare dominationis caput, tunc oritur, cum [h]is qui leges contumacia sua ruperit simili legum coniuratione adoptatus imperium invaserit, constituens deinceps uti omnis civium multitudo, desideriis eius et cupiditatibus parens, obsequium suum tali fine moderetur.

The popular faction is strengthened, when the needy multitude has prevailed by force against the resources of the rich, and a law (e) by the command of the people has been promulgated, that it may be permitted to all to seize honors on equal terms. Moreover, that tyranny, the singular head of domination, then arises, when [h]e who has broken the laws by his contumacy, having been adopted by a similar conspiracy of the laws, has usurped power, establishing thereafter that the whole multitude of citizens, obeying his desires and cupidities, should moderate their obedience to such an end.