Tertullian: de Exhortatione Castitatis

[1] Non dubito, frater, te post uxorem in pace praemissam ad compositionem animi conuersum de exitu singularitatis cogitare et utique consilii indigere. Quamquam in huiusmodi cum fide sua conloqui debet unusquisque eiusque uires consulere, tamen quoniam in ista specie carnis necessitas cogitatum mouet, quae fere apud eandem conscientiam fidei resistit, opus est fidei extrinsecus consilio tamquam aduocato aduersus carnis necessitatem.

[1] I do not doubt, brother, that after your wife, sent ahead in peace, you are turned to the composing of your mind, to think about the exit from singleness and by all means to be in need of counsel. Although in matters of this kind each person ought to converse with his own faith and consult its strengths, nevertheless, since in this category the necessity of the flesh moves thought, which for the most part, within that same conscience, resists faith, there is need for faith of counsel from without, as of an advocate against the necessity of the flesh.

[2] Quae quidem necessitas facillime circumscribi potest, si uoluntas potius dei quam indulgentia consideretur. Nemo indulgentia utendo promeretur, sed uoluntati obsequendo.

[2] Which necessity indeed can be most easily circumscribed, if the will of God rather than indulgence is considered. No one earns merit by using indulgence, but by yielding obedience to the will.

[3] Voluntas dei est sanctificatio nostra. Vult enim imaginem suam nos etiam similitudinem fieri, ut simus sancti, sicuti et ipse sanctus est. Id bonum, sanctificationem dico, in species distribuit complures, ut in aliqua earum deprehendamur.

[3] The will of God is our sanctification. For he wills that we, his own image, become likeness also, that we may be holy, just as he himself is holy. That good—I mean sanctification—he distributes into several species, so that we may be found in some one of them.

[4] Prima species est uirginitas a natiuitate: secunda, uirginitas a secunda natiuitate, id est a lauacro, quae aut in matrimonio purificat ex compacto, aut in uiduitate perseuerat ex arbitrio: tertius gradus superest monogamia, cum post matrimonium unum interceptum exinde sexui renuntiatur.

[4] The first species is virginity from nativity; the second, virginity from the second nativity, that is, from the laver, which either, in marriage, keeps purity by compact, or, in widowhood, perseveres by choice; the third grade remains, monogamy, when, after one marriage has been cut short, one thenceforth renounces sex.

[5] Prima uirginitas felicitatis est, non nosse in totum a quo postea optabis liberari: secunda uirtutis est, contemnere cuius uim optime noris: reliqua species, hactenus nubendi post matrimonium morte disiunctum, praeter uirtutis etiam modestiae laus est. Modestia est enim ablatum non desiderare, et ablatum a domino deo, sine cuius uoluntate nec folium de arbore delabitur nec passer assis unius ad terram cadit.

[5] The first virginity is of felicity: not to know at all him from whom afterward you will wish to be freed: the second is of virtue, to contemn him whose force you know very well: the remaining species, thus far of marrying after a marriage sundered by death, is, besides virtue, also a praise of modesty. Modesty is, namely, not to desire what has been taken away, and what has been taken away by the Lord God, without whose will neither a leaf slips from a tree nor a sparrow of one as falls to the earth.

II.

[1] Quam denique modesta illa uox est:Dominus dedit, dominus abstulit, ut domino uisum est, ita factum est. Et ideo si nuptias sublatas restauremus, sine dubio contra uoluntatem dei nitimur, uolentes habere rursus quod habere nos noluit. Si enim uoluisset, non abstulisset.

[1] How finally modest is that utterance:The Lord has given, the Lord has taken away; as it seemed good to the Lord, thus it has been done. And therefore, if we restore marriages that have been taken away, without doubt we strive against the will of God, wishing to have again what he was unwilling that we have. For if he had willed, he would not have taken it away.

Nisi si et hoc uoluntatem dei interpretamur, quasi et rursus nos uoluerit habere quod iam noluit.

Unless perhaps we also interpret this as the will of God, as though he even wished us to have again what he already did not wish.

[2] Non est bonae et solidae fidei sic omnia ad voluntatem dei referre, et ita adulari < sibi > unumquemque dicendo nihil fieri sine nutu eius, ut non intellegamus esse aliquid in nobis ipsis. Ceterum excusabitur omne delictum, si contenderimus nihil fieri a nobis sine dei uoluntate, et ibit definitio ista in destructionem totius disciplinae, etiam ipsius dei, si aut quae non uult de sua uoluntate producat, aut nihil est quod deus non uult.

[2] It is not of good and solid faith thus to refer all things to the will of God, and so to flatter < to himself > each person by saying that nothing is done without his nod, that we do not understand that there is something in our own selves. Otherwise every offense will be excused, if we contend that nothing is done by us without the will of God, and that definition will go into the destruction of the whole discipline, even of God himself, if either he should bring forth from his own will things which he does not will, or else there is nothing which God does not will.

[3] Sed quomodo uetat quaedam quibus etiam supplicium aeternum comminatur (utique enim quae uetat non uult, a quibus et offenditur), sic et e contrario quae uult et praecipit et accepto facit et aeternitatis mercede dispungit. Igitur cum utrumque ex praeceptis eius didicerimus, quid nolit et quid uelit, tamen nobis est uoluntas et arbitrium eligendi alterum, sicut scriptum est:Ecce posui ante te bonum et malum: gustasti enim de agnitionis arbore.

[3] But just as he forbids certain things, against which he even threatens eternal punishment (for indeed the things he forbids he does not will, and by which he is also offended), so also, conversely, the things he wills he both enjoins and commands and makes accepted, and he balances the account with the wage of eternity. Therefore, since from his precepts we have learned both what he does not will and what he does will, nevertheless we have a will and an arbitrament for choosing the one or the other, as it is written:Behold, I have set before you good and evil: for you have tasted of the tree of knowledge.

[4] Et ideo non debemus quod nostro expositum est arbitrio in domini referre uoluntatem, quod non ipse uult aut non uult quod bonum est qui malum non uult. Ita nostra est uoluntas, cum malum uolumus aduersus dei uoluntatem, qui bonum uult.

[4] And therefore we ought not to refer to the Lord’s will what has been set forth to our own free choice, since He Himself does not will it, nor does He fail to will what is good—He who does not will evil. Thus the will is ours, when we will evil against the will of God, who wills the good.

[5] Porro si quaeris, unde uenit ista uoluntas, qua quid uolumus aduersus dei uoluntatem, dicam: ex nobis ipsis. Nec temere. Semini enim tuo respondeas necesse est, siquidem ille princeps et generis et delicti Adam uoluit quod deliquit.

[5] Moreover, if you ask, whence comes that will by which we will something against God’s will, I will say: from ourselves themselves. Not rashly. For you must answer to your seed, since that prince both of the race and of the delict, Adam, willed what he committed.

Neque enim diabolus uoluntatem ei imposuit delinquendi, sed materiam uoluntatis subministrauit. Ceterum uoluntas ei de inobaudientia uenerat.

For neither did the devil impose upon him a will of delinquency, but he supplied the material of the will. Moreover, his will had come to him from disobedience.

[6] Proinde et tu si non oboedieris deo, qui te proposito praecepto liberae potestatis instituit, per uoluntatis libertatem uolens deuerges in id quod deus non uult, et ita te putas a diabolo subuersum, qui etsi quid uult te uelle quod deus non uult, non tamen facit ut et uelis, quia nec tunc inuitos protoplastos ad uoluntatem delicti subegit, immo neque inuitos neque ignorantes quid deus nollet.

[6] Accordingly, you too, if you do not obey God, who, with the precept set forth, established you with free power, through the liberty of will, by willing, you will slope down into that which God does not will; and thus you think yourself subverted by the devil, who, even if he wills you to will something which God does not will, yet does not make it so that you also will, since not even then did he subdue the protoplasts, unwilling, to the will of the offense—nay, neither unwilling nor ignorant of what God would not will.

[7] Vtique enim nolebat fieri, cui admisso mortem destinabat. Ita diaboli opus unum est, temptare, quod in te est, an uelis. At ubi uoluisti, sequitur ut te sibi subigat, non operatus in te uoluntatem, sed nactus occasionem uoluntatis.

[7] Assuredly indeed he did not wish it to come to pass, to which, once admitted, he destined death. Thus the devil’s one work is to tempt—what is in you—whether you will. But when you have willed, it follows that he subjugates you to himself, not having operated the will in you, but having obtained an occasion of the will.

[8] Igitur cum solum sit in nobis uelle, et in hoc probetur nostra erga deum mens, an ea uelimus quae cum uoluntate ipsius faciant, alte et impresse recogitandam esse dico dei uoluntatem, quid etiam in occulto uelit.

[8] Therefore, since it is only in us to will, and in this our mind toward god is proved, whether we should will the things which make with his will, I say that the will of god must be recogitated deeply and emphatically, what also he wills in secret.

III.

[1] Quae enim in manifesto, scimus omnes, eaque ipsa qualiter in manifesto sint perspiciendum est. Nam etsi quaedam uidentur uoluntatem dei sapere, dum ab eo permittuntur, non statim omne quod permittitur ex mera et tota uoluntate procedit eius qui permittit.

[1] For the things that are in the manifest, we all know, and those very things—how they are in the manifest—must be examined. For although certain things seem to savor of the will of God, while they are permitted by Him, not at once does everything that is permitted proceed from the pure and entire will of the one who permits it.

[2] Ex indulgentia est quodcumque permittitur. Quae etsi sine uoluntate non est, quia tamen aliquam habet causam in illo cui indulgetur, quasi de inuita uenit uoluntate, passa causam sui quae cogit uoluntatem. Vide qualis sit uoluntas cuius alter est causa.

[2] From indulgence is whatever is permitted. Which, although it is not without will, because nevertheless it has some cause in the one to whom it is indulged, it comes as if from an unwilling will, having suffered its own cause which compels the will. See what sort of will it is whose cause is another.

[3] Secunda item species consideranda est, purae uoluntatis. Vult nos deus agere quaedam placita sibi, in quibus non indulgentia patrocinatur, sed disciplina dominatur. Si tamen alia istis praeposuit, utique quae magis uult, dubiumne est ea nobis sectanda esse quae mauult, cum quae minus uult, quia alia magis uult, perinde habenda sunt atque si nolit?

[3] The second kind likewise is to be considered, of pure will. God wills us to do certain things pleasing to himself, in which it is not indulgence that acts as patron, but discipline dominates. If, however, he has set others before these—namely, those which he more-wills—is it doubtful that those which he prefers are to be followed by us, since those which he less-wills, because he more-wills others, are to be held just as if he does not will them?

[4] Nam ostendens quid magis uelit, minorem uoluntatem maiore deleuit, quantoque notitiae tuae utramque proposuit, tanto definiit id te sectari debere quod declarauit se magis uelle. Ergo si ideo declarauit, ut id secteris quod magis uult, sine dubio, nisi ita facis, contra uoluntatem eius sapis, sapiendo contra potiorem eius uoluntatem, magisque offendis quam promereris, quod uult quidem faciendo et quod mauult respuendo.

[4] For showing what he more wills, he has deleted the lesser will by the greater, and the more he has set both before your knowledge, the more he has determined that you ought to follow that which he has declared that he more wills. Therefore, if for this he has declared, that you might follow what he more wills, without doubt, unless you do so, you are wise against his will, by being wise against his weightier will, and you offend more than you earn merit, by doing what he does will indeed and by spurning what he prefers.

[5] Ex parte delinquis; ex parte, si non delinquis, non tamen promereris. Non porro et promereri nolle delinquere est? Secundum igitur matrimonium si ex illa dei uoluntate quae indulgentia uocatur, negabimus meram uoluntatem cui indulgentia est causa, si ex ea cui potior alia praeponitur continentiae magis appetendae, didicerimus non potiorem a potiore rescindi.

[5] In part you transgress; in part, if you do not transgress, nevertheless you do not thereby merit. Is it not, moreover, also to merit to be unwilling to transgress? Therefore a second marriage, if from that will of God which is called indulgence, we shall deny to be a pure will, for which indulgence is the cause, if from that to which another, stronger—of continence more to be desired—is preferred, we have learned that the preferable is not rescinded by the more preferable.

[6] Haec praestruxerim, ut iam apostoli uoces decurram. In primis autem non uidebor inreligiosus, si quod ipse profitetur animaduertam, omnem illum indulgentiam nuptiarum de suo, id est de humano sensu, non de diuino praescripto induxisse. Nam et cum de uiduis et innuptis definiit uti nubant, si continere non possunt, quia melius sit nubere quam uri, conuersus ad alteram speciem:Nuptis autem denuntio, inquit, non quidem ego, sed dominus.

[6] These things I have premised, so that I may now run through the voices of the apostle. In the first place, however, I shall not seem irreligious, if I take note of what he himself professes, that he introduced all that indulgence of marriages from his own—that is, from human sense—not from divine prescription. For even when he defined concerning widows and the unmarried that they should marry, if they are not able to contain, because it is better to marry than to burn, turning to another category:But to the married I give injunction, he says, not indeed I, but the Lord.

Ita ostendit ex translatione personae suae in dominum id quod supra dixerat non ex domini persona, sed ex sua pronuntiasse: Melius est nubere quam uri.

Thus he shows from
the translation of his person into the Lord that what he had said above he had pronounced not from the Lord’s person, but from his own: It is better to marry than to burn.

[7] Quae uox licet ad eos pertineat qui innupti uel uidui a fide deprehenduntur, quia tamen omnes eam ad nubendi licentiam amplectuntur, uelim retractare quale bonum ostendat quod melius est poena, quod non potest uideri bonum nisi pessimo comparatum, ut ideo bonum sit nubere, quia deterius sit ardere.

[7] Which voice, although it pertains to those who, unmarried or widowed, are found in the faith, because nevertheless all embrace it as a license for marrying, I would like to re-examine what sort of good it shows that is better than a penalty, which cannot be seen as good except when compared with the worst, so that for this reason it is good to marry, because it is worse to burn.

[8] Bonum ita est, si perseueret nomen obtinens sine comparatione, non dico mali, sed etiam boni alterius, ut, etsi bono alii comparatur et alio adumbratur, nihilominus remaneat in boni nomine. Ceterum si per mali collationem cogitur bonum dici, non tam bonum est quam genus mali inferioris, quod a superiore malo obscuratum ad nomen boni impellitur.

[8] It is a good thus, if it perseveres holding the name without comparison—not, I do not say, with an evil, but even with another good—so that, even if it is compared with another good and adumbrated by another, nonetheless it remains under the name of good. Otherwise, if by a collation with evil it is compelled to be called good, it is not so much good as a genus of an inferior evil, which, obscured by a superior evil, is impelled to the name of good.

[9] Aufer denique condicionem comparationis, ut non dicas:Melius est nubere quam uri, et quaero an dicere audeas: Melius est nubere, non adiciens quid sit id quo melius est. Ergo quod non melius, utique nec bonum, quia abstulisti et remouisti condicionem comparationis, quae dum melius illud facit, ita bonum haberi cogit.

[9] Remove, finally, the condition of comparison, so that you do not say:It is better to marry than to burn, and I ask whether you would dare to say: It is better to marry, not adding what it is by which it is better. Therefore what is not better is assuredly not good, because you have taken away and removed the condition of comparison, which, while it makes that thing better, thus compels it to be held as good.

[10]Melius est nubere quam uri sic accipiendum est, quomodo melius est uno oculo quam duobus carere: si tamen a comparatione discedas, non erit melius unum oculum habere quia nec bonum. Nemo igitur captet ex hoc capitulo defensionem, quod proprie ad innuptos et uiduos spectat, quibus nulla adhuc coniunctio numeratur. Quamquam ostenderim etiam illis intellegendam esse permissi condicionem.

[10]It is better to marry than to be burned is to be taken thus, just as it is better to lack one eye than two: if, however, you depart from comparison, it will not be better to have one eye since it is not good either. Therefore let no one catch from this chapter a defense, which properly regards the unwed and the widowed, for whom no union is as yet reckoned. Although I have shown that even for them the condition of permission is to be understood.

IV.

[1] Ceterum de secundo matrimonio scimus plane apostolum pronuntiasse:Solutus es ab uxore, ne quaesieris uxorem, sed et si duxeris, non delinques. Perinde tamen et huius sermonis ordinem de consilio suo, non de diuino praecepto introducit. Multum autem interest inter dei praeceptum et consilium hominis.

[1] However, concerning a second marriage we plainly know the apostle to have pronounced:You are loosed from a wife; do not seek a wife; but even if you should take one, you will not sin. Nevertheless, likewise, he introduces the order of this discourse from his own counsel, not from a divine precept. Moreover, there is much difference between the precept of God and the counsel of a man.

Praeceptum domini, inquit, non habeo, sed consilium do, quasi misericordiam consecutus a domino fidelis esse.

A precept of the Lord, he says, I do not have, but I give counsel, as one who has obtained mercy from the Lord to be faithful.

[2] Ceterum neque in euangelio neque in ipsius Pauli epistolis ex praecepto dei inuenias permissam matrimonii iterationem. Vnde unum habendum confirmatur, quia quod a domino permissum non inuenitur, id agnoscitur interdictum. Adde quod et haec ipsa humani consilii interiectio, quasi iam recogitationem excessus sui passa, statim se refrenat et reuocat, cum subiungit:Verumtamen huiusmodi pressuram carnis habebunt, cum parcere se eis dicit, cum Tempus in collecto esse adicit, quo oporteat etiam habentes matrimonia pro non habentibus agere, cum sollicitudinem nuptorum et innuptorum committit.

[2] Moreover neither in the Gospel nor in the epistles of Paul himself will you find, by a precept of God, a permission for the iteration of marriage. Whence it is confirmed that one is to be held, since what is not found to have been permitted by the Lord is recognized as interdicted. Add that even this very interjection of human counsel, as if already having undergone a reconsideration of its own excess, immediately restrains and recalls itself, when it subjoins:Nevertheless they will have such tribulation of the flesh, when he says that he spares them, when he adds that The time is contracted to be, at which it is proper that even those having marriages act as not having, when he entrusts the solicitude of the married and the unmarried.

[3] Per haec enim docens cur non expediat nubere, dissuadet ab eo quod supra indulserat. Et hoc de primo matrimonio: quanto magis de secundo? Cum uero nos ad exemplum suum hortatur, utique ostendens quid nos uelit esse, id est continentes, pariter declarat quid nos esse nolit, id est incontinentes.

[3] By these things, indeed, teaching why it is not expedient to marry, he dissuades from that which above he had indulged. And this about the first marriage: how much more about the second? But when he exhorts us to his own example, assuredly showing what he wishes us to be, that is, continent, he likewise declares what he does not wish us to be, that is, incontinent.

Ita et ipse cum aliud uult, id quod non uult nec sponte nec ueritate permittit. Si enim uellet, non permisisset, immo imperasset.

Thus also he himself, when he wills something else, that which he does not will he permits neither spontaneously nor in verity. For if he had willed, he would not have permitted, nay rather he would have commanded.

[4] 'Sed ecce rursus mulierem marito defuncto dicit nubere posse, si cui uelit, tantum in domino'.At enim felicior erit, inquit, si sic permanserit, secundum meum consilium. Puto autem, et ego dei spiritum habeo. Videmus duo consilia, quo supra nubendi ueniam facit, et quo postmodum continentiam nubendi docet.

[4] 'But behold, again he says that a woman, her husband deceased, is able to marry whom she will, only in the Lord'.But indeed she will be happier, he says, if she remains thus, according to my counsel. Moreover, I think that I also have the Spirit of God. We see two counsels, by which above he grants an indulgence for marrying, and by which afterwards he teaches continence with respect to marrying.

[5] Cui ergo, inquis, assentabimur? Inspice et lege. Cum ueniam facit, hominis prudentis consilium allegat, cum continentiam indicit, spiritus sancti consilium affirmat.

[5] To whom therefore, you say, shall we assent? Inspect and read. When he makes a concession, the counsel of a prudent man he alleges, when he enjoins continence, the counsel of the Holy Spirit he affirms.

Sequere admonitionem cui diuinitas patrocinatur. Spiritum quidem dei etiam fideles habent, sed non omnes fideles apostoli. Cum ergo qui se fidelem dixerat adiecit postea spiritum dei se habere, quod nemo dubitaret etiam de fideli, idcirco id dixit, ut sibi apostoli fastigium redderet.

Follow the admonition to which divinity lends patronage. Indeed even the faithful have the Spirit of God, but not all the faithful are apostles. Therefore, when the one who had said himself faithful afterward added that he had the Spirit of God—something no one would doubt even of a faithful man—for that reason he said it, so as to assign to himself the eminence of an apostle.

[6] Proprie enim apostoli spiritum sanctum habent, qui plene habent in operibus prophetiae et efficacia uirtutum documentisque linguarum, non ex parte, quod ceteri. Ita spiritus sancti auctoritatem ad eam speciem adire fecit, cui magis nos obsequi uoluit, et factum est iam non consilium diuini spiritus, sed pro eius maiestate praeceptum.

[6] Properly, the apostles have the Holy Spirit, who have him fully in works of prophecy and in the efficacy of powers and in the evidences of tongues, not in part, as the others. Thus he made the authority of the Holy Spirit to approach to that species to which he wished us rather to obey, and it came to pass that it was now not a counsel of the divine Spirit, but, in accordance with his majesty, a precept.

[1] Ad legem semel nubendi dirigendam ipsa origo humani generis patrocinatur, contestans quid deus in primordio constituerit in formam posteritatis recensendum. Nam cum hominem figulasset eique parem necessariam prospexisset, unam de costis eius mutuatus unam illi feminam finxit, cum utique nec artifex nec materia defecisset. Plures costae in Adam et infatigabiles manus in deo, sed non plures uxores apud deum.

[1] For directing the law of marrying once, the very origin of the human race acts as patron, attesting what God in the beginning constituted to be reviewed as the form for posterity. For when He had molded the man as a potter, and had provided for him a necessary peer, borrowing one from his ribs He fashioned for him one woman, although assuredly neither the Craftsman nor the material would have failed. More ribs in Adam and indefatigable hands in God, but not more wives with God.

[2] Et ideo homo dei Adam et mulier dei Eua unis inter se nuptiis functi formam hominibus dei de originis auctoritate et prima dei uoluntate sanxerunt. Denique,erunt, inquit, duo in carne una, non tres, neque quattuor. Alioquin iam non una caro nec duo in unam carnem.

[2] And therefore the man of God Adam and the woman of God Eve, having been joined in single nuptials between themselves, sanctioned for the men of God, by the authority of origin and the first will of God, the form. Finally,they shall be, he says, two in one flesh, not three, nor four. Otherwise, no longer one flesh nor two into one flesh.

Tunc erunt, si coniunctio et concretio in unitatem semel fiat. Si uero rursus aut saepius, iam una esse desiit, et erunt iam non duo in unam carnem, sed una plane caro in plures.

Then they will be, if the conjunction and concretion into unity be made once. If, however, again or more often, already the one has ceased to be, and they will be now not two into one flesh, but one flesh plainly into many.

[3] At cum apostolus in ecclesiam et Christum interpretatur'erunt duo in unam carnem', secundum spiritales nuptias ecclesiae et Christi (unus enim Christus et una eius ecclesia), agnoscere debemus duplicatam et exaggeratam esse nobis unius matrimonii legem tam secundum generis fundamentum quam secundum Christi sacramentum.

[3] But when the apostle interprets for the church and for Christ'the two shall be in one flesh', according to the spiritual nuptials of the church and Christ (for there is one Christ and one church of his), we ought to recognize that the law of single matrimony has been doubled and amplified for us both according to the foundation of the race and according to the sacrament of Christ.

[4] De uno matrimonio censemur utrobique, et carnaliter in Adam et spiritaliter in Christo. Duarum natiuitatum unum est monogamiae praescriptum. In utraque degenerat qui de monogamia exorbitat.

[4] Of one matrimony we are reckoned on both sides, both carnally in Adam and spiritually in Christ. Of the two births there is one prescription of monogamy. In each he degenerates who deviates from monogamy.

Numerus matrimonii a maledicto uiro coepit. Primus Lamech duabus maritatus tres in unam caraem effecit.

The number of marriage began from the accursed man. Lamech first, married to two, made three into one flesh.

VI.

[1] 'Sed et benedicti', inquis, patriarchae non modo pluribus uxoribus, uerum etiam concubinis coniugia miscuerunt'. Ergo propterea nobis quoque licebit innumerum nubere? Sane licebit, si qui adhuc typi alicuius futuri sacramenti supersunt, quod nuptiae tuae figurent, uel si etiam nunc locus est uocis illius:Crescite et multiplicamini, id est, si nondum alia uox superuenit, tempus iam in collecto esse, restare, ut et qui uxores habeant tamquam non habentes agant.

[1] 'But,' you say, 'even the blessed patriarchs mingled conjugal unions not only with several wives, but even with concubines.' Therefore for that reason will it also be permitted to us to marry without number? Certainly it will be permitted, if there still remain types of some future sacrament which your nuptials would prefigure; or if even now there is room for that voice:Increase and multiply, that is, if no other voice has yet supervened—that the time is now contracted—and it remains that even those who have wives should act as though not having.

[2] Vtique enim continentiam indicens et compescens concubitum, seminarium generis, abolefecit'crescite' illud 'et multiplicamini'. Vt opinor autem, unius et eiusdem dei utraque pronuntiatio et dispositio est, qui tum quidem in primordio sementem generis emisit indultis coniugiorum habenis, donec mundus repleretur, donec nouae disciplinae materia proficeret. Nunc uero sub extremitatibus temporum compressit quod emiserat et reuocauit quod indulserat, non sine ratione prorogationis in primordio et repastinationis in ultimo. Semper initia laxantur, fines contrahuntur.

[2] Assuredly in fact, by enjoining continence and restraining intercourse, the seedbed of the race, he has abolished'crescite' that 'et multiplicamini'. As I suppose, however, of one and the same God is both pronouncement and disposition, who then indeed in the primordium sent forth the seed of the race, the reins of marriages being indulged, until the world should be filled, until the material of the new discipline should make progress. Now indeed under the extremities of the times he has compressed what he had sent forth and has recalled what he had indulged, not without a reason of prorogation in the primordium and of repastination at the last. Always beginnings are loosened, ends are contracted.

[3] Propterea siluam quis instituit et crescere sinit, ut tempore suo caedat. Silua erat uetus dispositio, quae ab euangelio nouo deputatur, in quo et securis ad radicem arboris posita. Sic etoculum pro oculo et dentem pro dente iam senuit ex quo iuuenuit 'malum pro malo nemo reddat'. Puto autem etiam humanas constitutiones atque decreta posteriora pristinis praeualere.

[3] Therefore someone institutes a woodland and allows it to grow, in order that in its time he may fell it. The old disposition was a forest, which is pruned by the new evangel, in which also the axe is laid to the root of the tree. Thus alsoan eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth has already grown old ever since 'let no one repay evil for evil' grew young. I suppose, moreover, that even human constitutions and later decrees prevail over the former.

VII.

[1] Cur autem de pristinis exemplis non ea potius agnoscamus quae cum posterioribus communicant de disciplina et formam uetustatis ad nouitatem transmittunt? Ecce enim in uetere lege animaduerto castratam licentiam saepius nubendi. Cautum in Leuitico: 'Sacerdotes mei non plus nubent'. Possum dicere etiam illud plus esse quod semel non est.

[1] Why, however, from the former examples should we not rather recognize those which communicate with the later ones concerning discipline and transmit the form of antiquity to novelty? Behold indeed, in the old Law I observe the license of marrying more often castrated. It is provided in Leviticus: 'My priests will not marry more.' I can also say that even that is more which is not once.

Quod non unum est, numerus est. Denique post unum incipit numerus. Vnum autem est omne quod semel est.

What is not one is a number. Indeed, after one, number begins. One, however, is whatever is once.

[2] Sed Christo seruabatur, sicut in ceteris, ita in isto quoque legis plenitudo. Inde igitur apud nos plenius atque instructius praescribitur unius matrimonii esse oportere qui alleguntur in ordinem sacerdotalem. Vsque adeo quosdam memini digamos loco deiectos.

[2] But for Christ there was reserved, as in the others, so in this as well, the plenitude of the law. Therefore among us it is more fully and more instructively prescribed that those who are enrolled into the sacerdotal order ought to be of a single matrimony. To such a degree I remember certain digamists deposed from their place.

Sed dices: ergo ceteris licet, cum quibus non liceat excipit. Vani erimus, si putauerimus quod sacerdotibus non liceat laicis licere.

But you will say: therefore it is permitted to the others; it excepts those for whom it is not permitted. We shall be vain, if we shall have supposed that what is not lawful for priests is lawful for laymen.

[3] Nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus? Scriptum est:Regnum quoque nos et sacerdotes deo et patri suo fecit. Differentiam inter ordinem et plebem constituit ecclesiae auctoritas et honor per ordinis consessum sanctificatus.

[3] Are not even the laity priests? It is written:He has also made us a kingdom and priests to his God and Father. The authority of the Church has established the distinction between the Order and the plebs, and the honor has been sanctified through the session of the Order.

Adeo ubi ecclesiastici ordinis non est consessus, et offers et tinguis et sacerdos es tibi solus. Sed ubi tres, ecclesia est, licet laici.

So then, where there is not the assembly of the ecclesiastical order, and you both offer and baptize and are a priest for yourself alone. But where there are three, there is a church, even if laymen.

[4] Vnusquisque enimfide sua uiuit, nec est personarum exceptio apud deum, quoniam non auditores legis iustificantur a domino, sed factores, secundum quod et apostolus dicit. Igitur si habes ius sacerdotis in temetipso ubi necesse est, habeas oportet etiam disciplinam sacerdotis, ubi necesse sit habere ius sacerdotis. Digamus tinguis?

[4] For each person indeedlives by his own faith, and there is no exception of persons with God, since not the hearers of the law are justified by the Lord, but the doers, according to what even the apostle says. Therefore, if you have the right of a priest in yourself where it is necessary, you ought also to have the discipline of a priest, where it may be necessary to have the right of a priest. Do you baptize a digamist?

digamus offers?

do you, a digamist, offer?

[5] Quanto magis laico digamo capitale est agere pro sacerdote, cum ipsi sacerdoti digamo facto auferatur agere sacerdotem! 'Sed necessitati', inquis, 'indulgetur'. Nulla necessitas excusatur quae potest non esse. Noli denique digamus deprehendi, et non committis in necessitatem administrandi quod non licet digamo.

[5] How much more is it capital for a lay digamist to act as priest, when to the priest himself, once he has become a digamist, it is taken away to act as priest! 'But to necessity,' you say, 'indulgence is granted.' No necessity is excused which is able not to be. Do not, in fine, let yourself be detected as a digamist, and you will not commit yourself into the necessity of administering what is not permitted to a digamist.

[6] Omnes nos deus ita uult dispositos esse, ut ubique sacramentis eius obeundis apti simus. Vnus deus, una fides, una et disciplina. Vsque adeo nisi et laici ea obseruent per quae presbyteri alleguntur, quomodo erunt presbyteri qui de laicis alleguntur?

[6] All of us God wills to be thus disposed, that everywhere we may be fit for undertaking his sacraments. One God, one faith, and one discipline. To such an extent that, unless even laymen observe those things by which presbyters are chosen, how will there be presbyters who from laymen are chosen?

Ergo pugnare debemus ante laicum iussum a secundo matrimonio abstinere, dum presbyter esse non alius potest quam laicus semel fuerit maritus.

Therefore we ought to contend that the layman be ordered beforehand to abstain from a second matrimony, since a presbyter can be none other than a layman who has been a husband once.

VIII.

[1] Liceat nunc denuo nubere, si omne quod licet bonum est. Idem apostolus exclamat:Omnia licent, sed non omnia prosunt. Quod non prodest, oro te, bonum potest dici?

[1] Let it be permitted now to marry anew, if everything which is permitted is good. The same apostle exclaims:All things are permitted, but not all things are profitable. What does not profit, I pray you, can it be called good?

Si licita sunt et quae non prosunt, ergo et quae non bona sunt licita sunt. Quid autem magis uelle debebis, quod ideo bonum est quia licet, an quod ideo quia prodest? Multum existimo esse inter licentiam et salutem.

If even the things which do not profit are permitted, then therefore the things which are not good are permitted too. What however ought you to wish more: that which is good for this reason, because it is permitted, or that which is so because it profits? I reckon there is much between license and salvation.

De bono non dicitur 'licet', quia bonum permitti non exspectat, sed assumi.

One does not say 'it is permitted' of the good, because the good does not expect to be permitted, but to be assumed.

[2] Permittitur autem quod an bonum sit in dubio est, quod potest etiam non permitti, si non habeat aliquam sui causam, primam, quia propter incontinentiae periculum permittitur nubere, secundo, quia nisi licentia alicuius non bonae rei subiaceret, non esset in quo probaretur qui diuinae uoluntati et qui potestati suae obsequeretur, quis nostrum utilitatis praesentiam sectetur et quis occasionem licentiae amplexetur.

[2] It is permitted however that whose being good is in doubt, which also can be not permitted if it does not have some cause of its own: first, because on account of the peril of incontinence it is permitted to marry; secondly, because unless license lay under some not-good thing, there would not be that in which it might be proved who would comply with the divine will and who with his own power, who of us would pursue the presence of utility and who would embrace the occasion of license.

[3] Licentia plerumque temptatio est disciplinae, quoniam disciplina per temptationem probatur, temptatio per licentiam operatur. Ita fit, ut omnia liceant, sed non omnia expediant, dum temptatur cui permittitur, et iudicatur dum in permissione temptatur. Licebat et apostolis nubere et uxores circumducere.

[3] License is for the most part a temptation of discipline, since discipline through temptation is proved, temptation through license operates. Thus it comes about that all things may be licit, but not all expedient, while the one to whom it is permitted is tempted, and it is judged while in permission he is tempted. It was licit also for the apostles to marry and to lead about wives.

Licebat et de euangelio ali. Sed qui iure hoc usus non est in occasionem, ad exemplum nos suum prouocat, docens in eo esse probationem in quo licentia experimentum abstinentiae praestruxit.

It was also permitted to live from the gospel. But he who by right did not use this as an occasion, calls us to his own example, teaching that in this there is probation, in which license has pre-structured the experiment of abstinence.

IX.

[1] Si penitus sensus eius interpretemur, non aliud dicendum erit secundum matrimonium quam species stupri. Cum enim dicat maritos hoc in sollicitudine habere, quemadmodum sibi placeant, non utique de moribus (nam bonam sollicitudinem non suggillaret), sed de cultu et ornatu et omni studio formae ad inlecebras moliendas sollicitos intellegi uelit, de forma autem et cultu placere carnalis concupiscentiae ingenium sit, quae etiam stupri causa est, ecquid uidetur tibi stupri affine esse secundum matrimonium, quoniam ea in illo deprehenduntur quae stupro competunt?

[1] If we interpret his meaning thoroughly, nothing else will have to be said about a second marriage than that it is a kind of debauchery. For since he says that husbands have this anxiety, how they may please their wives, he certainly does not mean in morals (for he would not stigmatize a good solicitude), but that he wishes it to be understood they are anxious about dress and adornment and every pursuit of beauty for the contriving of allurements; moreover, to please by form and dress is the disposition of carnal concupiscence, which also is a cause of debauchery. Does a second marriage seem to you to be akin to debauchery, since those things are found in it which belong to debauchery?

[2] Ipse dominus,qui uiderit, inquit, mulierem ad concupiscendum, iam stuprauit eam in corde suo. Qui autem eam ad ducendum uiderit, minus an plus fecit? Quid si etiam duxerit?

[2] The lord himself,whoever has looked, he says, at a woman for concupiscence, has already committed fornication with her in his heart. But he who has looked at her with a view to taking her in marriage, has he done less or more? What if he has even taken her?

quod non faceret, nisi et ad ducendum concupisset et ad concupiscendum uidisset. Nisi si potest duci uxor quam non uideris nec concupieris.

which he would not do, unless he had both desired to take her and had looked with a view to desiring. Unless, perhaps, a wife can be taken whom you have neither seen nor desired.

[3] Multum sane interest, maritus an caelebs aliam concupiscat. Omnis mulier etiam caelibi alia est, quamdiu aliena, nec per aliud tamen fit marita, nisi per quod et adultera. Leges uidentur matrimonii et stupri differentiam facere, per diuersitatem inliciti, non per condicionem rei ipsius.

[3] It truly makes much difference whether a husband or a bachelor desires another woman. Every woman is, even to a bachelor, another, so long as she is alien (another’s), nor is she made a wife by anything other than that by which she is also an adulteress. The laws seem to make the difference between matrimony and stuprum through a diversity of what is illicit, not through the condition of the thing itself.

Alioquin quae res et uiris et feminis omnibus adest ad matrimonium et stuprum? commixtio carnis scilicet, cuius concupiscentiam dominus stupro adaequauit.

Otherwise, what thing is present to both men and women to all alike for marriage and for fornication? The commixture of flesh, of course, whose concupiscence the Lord equated with fornication.

[4] 'Ergo', inquit, 'iam et primas, id est unas nuptias destruis?' Nec immerito, quia et ipsae ex eo constant quod est stuprum. Ideooptimum est homini mulierem non attingere, et ideo uirginis principalis est sanctitas, quia caret stupri affinitate. Et cum haec etiam de primis et unis nuptiis praetendi ad causam continentiae possint, quanto magis secundo matrimonio recusando praeiudicabunt?

[4] 'Therefore,' he says, 'do you now also destroy the first nuptials, that is, the single ones?' And not without cause, because they themselves also consist of that which is stupration. Thereforeit is best for a man not to touch a woman, and therefore the virgin’s is the principal sanctity, because she lacks affinity with stupration. And since these things too can be put forward even about first and sole nuptials for the cause of continence, how much more will they prejudice by the refusing of a second marriage?

Gratus esto, si semel tibi indulsit deus nubere. Gratus autem eris, si iterum indulsisse illum tibi nescias. Ceterum abuteris indulgentia, cum sine modestia uteris.

Be grateful, if God has once indulged you to marry. Yet you will be grateful, if you do not know that he has indulged you a second time. Otherwise you abuse indulgence, when you use it without modesty.

Modestia a modo intellegitur.

Modesty is understood from mode.

[5] Non tibi sufficit de summo illo immaculatae uirginitatis gradu in secundum recidisse nubendo, sed in tertium adhuc deuolueris, et in quartum, et fortassis in plures, postquam in secunda statione continens non fuisti, quia nec prohibere plures nuptias uoluit qui de secundis prouocandis retractauit. Nubamus igitur quotidie, et nubentes ab ultimo die deprehendamur, tamquam Sodoma et Gomorra, quo die 'uae' illud super praegnantes et lactantes adimplebitur, id est super maritos et incontinentes; de nuptiis enim uteri et ubera et infantes. Et quando finis nubendi?

[5] It does not suffice for you to have fallen, by marrying, from that highest grade of immaculate virginity into the second, but you have still devolved into the third, and into the fourth, and perhaps into more, after you were not continent in the second station, since he who reconsidered about calling off second marriages did not wish to prohibit multiple marriages. Let us therefore marry every day, and let us be caught as marrying on the last day, like Sodom and Gomorrah, on which day that “woe” will be fulfilled upon the pregnant and the nursing, that is, upon husbands and the incontinent; for from nuptials come wombs and breasts and infants. And when is the end of marrying?

Credo post finem uiuendi.

I believe after the end of living.

10.

[1] Renuntiemus carnalibus, ut aliquando spiritalia fructificemus. Rape occasionem, etsi non exoptatissimam, attamen opportunam, non habere cui debitum solueres et a quo exsoluereris. Desisti esse debitor: o te felicem!

[1] Let us renounce carnal things, that we may at some time fructify spiritual things. Seize the occasion, although not most earnestly desired, yet opportune: of not having one to whom you would pay the debt and by whom you would be released. You have ceased to be a debtor: O happy you!

Dimisisti debitorem: sustine damnum. Quid si, quod diximus damnum, lucrum senties? Per continentiam enim negotiaberis magnam substantiam sanctitatis, parsimonia carnis spiritum acquires.

You have dismissed the debtor: sustain the loss.
What if that which we called loss you will feel as lucre? For by continence you will negotiate a great substance of sanctity, the parsimony of the flesh acquires the spirit.

[2] Recogitemus enim ipsam conscientiam nostram, quam alium se homo sentiat, cum forte a sua femina cessat. Spiritaliter sapit; si orationem facit ad dominum, prope est caelo; si scripturis incumbit, totus illic est; si psalmum canit, placet sibi; si daemonem adiurat, confidit sibi. Ideo apostolus temporalem purificationem orationum commendandarum causa adiecit, ut sciremus, quod ad tempus prodest semper nobis exercendum esse, ut semper prosit.

[2] Let us recall, then, our own conscience, how different a man feels himself to be when perchance he refrains from his woman. He savors spiritually; if he makes prayer to the Lord, he is near to heaven; if he leans upon the Scriptures, he is wholly there; if he sings a psalm, he is pleased with himself; if he adjures a demon, he is confident in himself. Therefore the apostle added a temporary purification for the sake of prayers to be commended, so that we might know that what profits for a time ought always to be exercised by us, that it may always profit.

Quotidie, omni momento oratio hominibus necessaria, utique et continentia, postquam oratio necessaria est.

Daily, at every moment prayer is necessary for human beings, and assuredly continence as well, since prayer is necessary.

[3] Oratio de conscientia procedit: si conscientia erubescat, erubescit oratio. Spiritus deducit orationem ad deum. Si spiritus reus apud se sit conscientiae erubescentis, quomodo audebit orationem deducere ad altare, qua erubescente et ipse suffunditur sanctus minister?

[3] Prayer proceeds from conscience: if conscience blushes, prayer blushes. The spirit leads the prayer to God. If the spirit be guilty to itself of a blushing conscience, how will it dare to lead the prayer to the altar, with which blushing even the holy minister himself is suffused?

[4] Etenim est prophetica uox ueteris testamenti:Sancti eritis, quia et deus sanctus, et rursus: Cum sancto sanctificaberis, et cum uiro innocenti innocens eris et cum electo electus. Debemus enim ita ingredi in disciplina domini ut dignum est, non secundum carnis squalentes concupiscentias.

[4] For indeed there is a prophetic voice of the Old Testament:You shall be holy, because God also is holy, and again: With the holy one you shall be sanctified, and with an innocent man you shall be innocent, and with the elect you shall be elect. For we ought thus to enter into the discipline of the Lord as is worthy is, not according to the squalid concupiscences of the flesh.

[5] Ita enim et apostolus dicit quod sapere secundum carnem mors sit, secundum spiritum uero sapere uita aeterna sit in Christo Iesu domino nostro. Item per sanctam prophetidem Priscam ita euangelizatur, quod sanctus minister sanctimoniam nouerit ministrare. 'Purificantia enim concordat, ait, et uisiones uident, et ponentes faciem deorsum etiam uoces audiunt manifestas, tam salutares quam et occultas.'

[5] Thus indeed even the Apostle says that to be wise according to the flesh is death, but according to the Spirit to be wise is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord. Likewise through the holy prophetess Prisca it is evangelized thus, that the holy minister should know to minister sanctity. 'For purification harmonizes, she says, and they see visions, and setting the face downward they also hear manifest voices, both salutary and also occult.'

[6] Si haec obtusio, etiam cum in unis nuptiis res carnis exercetur, spiritum sanctum auertit, quanto magis, cum in secundo matrimonio agitur?

[6] If this dulling, even when the affair of the flesh is exercised within one marriage, turns aside the Holy Spirit, how much more when it is conducted in a second marriage?

XI.

11.

[1] Duplex enim rubor est, quia in secundo matrimonio duae uxores eundem circumstant maritum, una spiritu, alia in carne. Neque enim pristinam poteris odisse, cui etiam religiosiorem reseruas affectionem, ut iam receptae apud dominum, pro cuius spiritu postulas, pro qua oblationes annuas reddis.

[1] For there is a double blush, since in a second marriage two wives surround the same husband, one in spirit, the other in flesh. For neither will you be able to hate the former one, to whom you even reserve a more religious affection, as one now received with the Lord, for whose spirit you make petitions, for whom you render annual oblations.

[2] Stabis ergo ad dominum cum tot uxoribus quot in oratione commemores et offeres pro duabus et commendabis illas duas per sacerdotem de monogamia ordinatum aut etiam de uirginitate sancitum, circumdatum uiduis uniuiris? et ascendet sacrificium tuum libera fronte, et inter cetera bonae mentis postulabis tibi et uxoris castitatem?

[2] Will you then stand before the Lord with as many wives as you commemorate in prayer, and will you make offerings for two and commend those two through a priest ordained for monogamy or even consecrated to virginity, surrounded by widows and one‑husbanded women? And will your sacrifice ascend with an unashamed brow, and among the other petitions of a good mind will you ask for chastity for yourself and your wife?

XII.

12.

[1] Scio quibus causationibus coloremus insatiabilem carnis cupiditatem. Praetendimus necessitates adminiculorum: domum administrandam, familiam regendam, loculos, claues custodiendas, lanificium dispensandum, uictum procurandum, curas comminuendas. Scilicet solis maritorum domibus bene est.

[1] I know
with what pretexts we color the insatiable carnal cupidity. We put forward
the necessities of supports: a house to be administered, a household to be ruled, cash-boxes,
keys to be guarded, wool‑work to be dispensed, victuals to be procured, cares
to be diminished. Of course, only in the houses of married men is it well.

Perierunt caelibum familiae, res spadonum, fortunae militum aut peregrinantium sine uxoribus. Non enim nos et milites sumus, eo quidem maioris disciplinae, quanto tanti imperatoris? Non et nos peregrinantes in isto saeculo sumus?

The households of celibates have perished, the goods of eunuchs, the fortunes of soldiers or of peregrinators without wives. For are not we also soldiers, indeed of the greater discipline, inasmuch as of so great an Emperor? Are not we also peregrinators in this age?

Cur autem ita dispositus es, o Christiane, ut sine uxore non possis?

Why, however, are you so disposed, o Christian, that you cannot be without a wife?

[2] Nunc et consors onerum domesticorum necessaria est? Habe aliquam uxorem spiritalem. Assume de uiduis fide pulchram, paupertate dotatam, aetate signatam: bonas nuptias feceris.

[2] Now and is a consort of domestic burdens necessary as well? Have some spiritual wife. Assume from the widows one beautiful in faith, dowered with poverty, signed by age: you will have made good nuptials.

Huiusmodi uxores etiam plures haberi deo gratum est.

Wives of this sort, even several, being had is gratifying to God.

[3] Sed posteritatem recogitant Christiani, quibus crastinum non est? Haeredes dei seruus desiderabit, qui semetipsum de saeculo exhereditauit? Et ideo quis repetat matrimonium, si de pristino non habeat liberos?

[3] But do Christians, for whom there is no tomorrow, ponder posterity? Will the servant of God desire heirs, he who has disinherited himself from the world? And therefore who would repeat marriage, if he does not have children from the former?

Habebit itaque hoc primum bonum, ut diutius uelit uiuere, ipso apostolo festinante ad dominum? Certe expeditissimus in persecutionibus, constantissimus in martyriis, promptissimus in communicationibus rerum, temperantissimus in acquisitionibus, postremo securus morietur, relictis filiis, forsitan qui illi parentent.

He will therefore have this as the first good: that he should wish to live longer, while the apostle himself is hastening to the Lord? Surely, most unencumbered in persecutions, most steadfast in martyrdoms, most prompt in the communions of goods, most temperate in acquisitions, at last he will die secure, with sons left behind, perhaps such as will render parentation to him.

[4] Numquid ergo huiusmodi et rei publicae prospectu aguntur? ne ciuitates deficiant, si suboles non exerceantur, ne legis iura, ne commercia delabantur, ne templa derelinquantur, ne non sint qui acclament 'Christianis leonem!' Haec enim audire desiderant qui filios quaerunt.

[4] Are such as these then also moved by regard for the republic? lest the cities fail, if the offspring be not trained; lest the rights of law, lest commerce, decline; lest the temples be abandoned; lest there not be those who shout, 'The lion for the Christians!' For these things, indeed, they desire to hear who seek sons.

[5] Sufficiat ad consilium uiduitatis uel ista, praecipue apud nos, importunitas liberorum, ad quos suscipiendos legibus compelluntur homines, quia sapiens quisque numquam libens filios desiderasset. Quid ergo facies, si nouam uxorem de tua conscientia impleueris? dissoluas medicaminibus conceptum?

[5] Let even this suffice for the counsel of widowhood, especially among us—the importunity of children, for the undertaking of whom men are compelled by the laws, since any wise man would never willingly have desired sons. What then will you do, if you have, upon your own conscience, made a new wife pregnant? will you dissolve the conception by medicaments?

Puto nobis magis non licere nascentem nocere quam et natum. Sed fortasse illo tempore praegnantis uxoris remedium tantae sollicitudini a deo petere audebis, quod in te positum recusasti?

I think it is even more not permitted for us
to harm the one being born than also the one born. But perhaps at that time of your pregnant wife
you will dare to ask from God a remedy for so great anxiety, which, though it was placed in you,
you refused?

[6] Aliqua, opinor, sterilis prospicietur, iam uel frigidioris aetatis. Satis consulte et imprimis fideliter. Nullam enim credidimus deo uolente sterilem aut anum enixam.

[6] Some woman, I suppose, will be provided for as sterile, now even of a colder age.
Quite prudently and, first and foremost, faithfully.
For we have believed that, with God willing, no woman is sterile, and that even an old woman has brought forth.

Quod adeo magis euenire potest, si quis praesumptione huius prouidentiae suae dei aemulationem prouocarit. Scimus denique quendam ex fratribus, cum propter filiam suam secundo matrimonio sterilem captasset uxorem, tam iterum patrem factum quam et iterum maritum.

Which can all the more come to pass, if someone, by the presumption of this providence of his, should provoke the jealousy of God. We know, finally, of a certain one from among the brethren who, on account of his daughter barren in her second marriage, had taken a wife, and he was made both a father again and also a husband again.

XIII.

13.

[1] Ad hanc meam cohortationem, frater dilectissime, accedunt etiam saecularia exempla, quae saepe nobis etiam in testimonio posita sunt, cum quid bonum et deo placitum ab extraneis quoque agnoscitur et testimonio honoratur. Denique monogamia apud ethnicos ita in summo honore est, ut et uirginibus legitime nubentibus uniuira pronuba adhibeatur; et si auspicii causa, utique boni auspicii est; item, ut in quibusdam sollemnibus et officiis prior sit uniuirae locus. Certe Flaminica non nisi uniuira est; quae et Flaminis lex est.

[1] To this my exhortation, most beloved brother, there also accede secular examples, which are often set before us as testimony as well, when something good and pleasing to God is acknowledged even by outsiders and honored with testimony. Indeed, monogamy is among the ethnics in such highest honor, that even for maidens lawfully marrying a univira is brought in as pronuba; and if for the sake of auspice, assuredly it is of good auspice; likewise, that in certain solemnities and offices the place of the univira is prior. Certainly the Flaminica is none but a univira; which too is the law of the Flamen.

Nam quod ipsi Pontifici Maximo iterare matrimonium non licet utique monogamiae gloria est.

For the fact that the Pontifex Maximus himself is not permitted to remarry is assuredly a glory of monogamy.

[2] Cum autem dei sacramenta satanas affectat, prouocatio est nostra, immo suffusio, si pigri simus ad continentiam deo exhibendam, quam diabolo quidam praestant, nunc uirginitate, nunc uiduitate perpetua. Nouimus uirgines Vestae, et lunonis apud Achaiae oppidum, et Apollinis apud Delphos, et Mineruae et Dianae quibusdam locis. Nouimus et continentes uiros, et quidem tauri illius Aegyptii antistites: feminas uero Cereri Africanae, cui etiam sponte abdicato matrimonio assenescunt, auersantes exinde contactum masculorum usque ad oscula filiorum.

[2] When however Satan aspires to the sacraments of God, it is our provocation—nay, our blush—if we are sluggish to exhibit continence to God, which certain people render to the devil, now by virginity, now by perpetual widowhood. We know the virgins of Vesta, and of Juno at a town of Achaia, and of Apollo at Delphi, and of Minerva and Diana in certain places. We know also continent men, indeed the high-priests of that Egyptian bull: and women, moreover, for the African Ceres, for whom they even grow old with marriage voluntarily renounced, shunning thereafter the contact of males even to the kisses of sons.

Inuenit scilicet diabolus post luxuriam etiam castitatem perditricem, quo magis reus sit Christianus qui castitatem recusauerit conseruatricem.

The devil discovered
to wit, after lust, even chastity as a destroyer, so that the more guilty may be
the Christian who has refused chastity as a preserver.

[3] Erunt nobis in testimonium et feminae quaedam saeculares ob uniuiratus obstinationem famam consecutae; aliqua Dido, quae profuga in alieno solo, ubi nuptias regis ultro optasse debuerat, ne tamen secundas experiretur, maluit e contrario uri quam nubere; uel illa Lucretia, quae etsi semel per uim et inuita alium uirum passa est, sanguine suo maculatam carnem abluit, ne uiueret iam non sibi uniuira. Plura exempla curiosius de nostris inuenias, et quidem alteris potiora, quanto maius est uiuere in castitate quam pro ea mori. Facilius animam ponas quia bonum amiseris, quam uiuendo serues ob quod emori malis.

[3] There will be for us, as testimony, also certain secular women who have attained renown on account of their obstinacy for one-husbandedness: some such as Dido, who, an exile on an alien soil, where she ought of her own accord to have desired the nuptials of a king, yet, lest she should experience a second [marriage], preferred contrariwise to be burned rather than to marry; or that Lucretia, who, although once by force and unwilling she suffered another man, washed with her own blood her stained flesh, so that she might not go on living no longer a one-husband woman. You will find more examples, if you look more carefully, from among our own, and indeed better than the former, inasmuch as it is greater to live in chastity than to die for it. It is easier to lay down your life because you have lost a good, than by living to preserve that for which you would prefer to die.

4. Quanti igitur et quantae in ecclesiasticis ordinibus de continentia censentur, qui deo nubere maluerunt, qui carnis suae honorem restituere, quique se iam illius aeui filios dicauerunt, occidentes in se concupiscentiam libidinis, et totum illud quod intra paradisum non potuit admitti! Vnde praesumendum est hos qui intra paradisum recipi uolent tandem debere cessare ab ea re a qua paradisus intactus est.

4. How many men, then,
and how many women in ecclesiastical orders are accounted for continence, who have preferred to wed God,
who restore the honor of their flesh, and who have already dedicated themselves as sons of that age,
slaying within themselves the concupiscence of lust, and the whole of that which
could not be admitted within paradise! Whence it is to be presumed that those who wish to be received
within paradise ought at length to cease from that thing from which paradise remained untouched.