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Dig. 21.3.0. De exceptione rei venditae et traditae.
21.2.0. On evictions and the stipulation of the double.
Dig. 21.3.0. On the exception of the thing sold and delivered.
Aiunt aediles: " qui mancipia vendunt certiores faciant emptores, quid morbi vitiive cuique sit, quis fugitivus errove sit noxave solutus non sit: eademque omnia, cum ea mancipia venibunt, palam recte pronuntianto. quodsi mancipium adversus ea venisset, sive adversus quod dictum promissumve fuerit cum veniret, fuisset, quod eius praestari oportere dicetur: emptori omnibusque ad quos ea res pertinet iudicium dabimus, ut id mancipium redhibeatur. si quid autem post venditionem traditionemque deterius emptoris opera familiae procuratorisve eius factum erit, sive quid ex eo post venditionem natum adquisitum fuerit, et si quid aliud in venditione ei accesserit, sive quid ex ea re fructus pervenerit ad emptorem, ut ea omnia restituat.
The aediles say: "Let those who sell slaves inform the buyers what disease or defect each one has, who is a fugitive or a vagrant, who is or is not freed from noxal liability; and let them publicly and properly proclaim all the same things when those slaves are up for sale. But if a slave shall have been sold contrary to these, or if it proves to have been contrary to what was said or promised when it was being sold, in respect of what will be said ought to be warranted: we will grant an action to the buyer and to all to whom the matter pertains, so that that slave may be redhibited. If, however, after the sale and delivery anything has been made worse by the act of the buyer or of his household or his procurator, or if anything from it after the sale has been born or acquired, and if anything else has been added to it in the sale, or if any fruits from the matter have come to the buyer, let him restore all those things."
likewise, if he himself has furnished any accessions, that he may recover them. likewise, if any slave has committed a capital fraud, or has done something for the sake of contriving death for himself, or has been sent into the arena for the purpose of fighting, to the beasts, let all these things be publicly proclaimed in the sale: for from these causes we will grant an action. moreover, if anyone shall be said knowingly and with malicious deceit to have sold contrary to these, we will grant an action".
Causa huius edicti proponendi est, ut occurratur fallaciis vendentium et emptoribus succurratur, quicumque decepti a venditoribus fuerint: dummodo sciamus venditorem, etiamsi ignoravit ea quae aediles praestari iubent, tamen teneri debere. nec est hoc iniquum: potuit enim ea nota habere venditor: neque enim interest emptoris, cur fallatur, ignorantia venditoris an calliditate.
The cause for proposing this edict is that the fallacies of sellers may be met and buyers may be succored, whoever shall have been deceived by sellers: provided that we understand that the seller, even if he was ignorant of those things which the aediles order to be warranted, nevertheless ought to be held liable. Nor is this inequitable: for the seller could have had those things known; for it is not the buyer’s interest why he is deceived, whether by the seller’s ignorance or by craftiness.
Sed sciendum est morbum apud sabinum sic definitum esse habitum cuiusque corporis contra naturam, qui usum eius ad id facit deteriorem, cuius causa natura nobis eius corporis sanitatem dedit: id autem alias in toto corpore, alias in parte accidere ( namque totius corporis morbus est puta fvisis febris, partis veluti caecitas, licet homo itaque natus sit): vitiumque a morbo multum differre, ut puta si quis balbus sit, nam hunc vitiosum magis esse quam morbosum. ego puto aediles tollendae dubitationis gratia bis kata tou autou idem dixisse, ne qua dubitatio superesset.
But it must be known that disease is defined by Sabinus thus: a habit/disposition of anyone’s body contrary to nature, which makes its use worse for that purpose for which nature gave us the health of that body: and this happens at times in the whole body, at times in a part ( for a disease of the whole body is, say fever, of a part, as blindness, even if a man was so born): and that a defect differs much from a disease, as for example if someone is a stammerer, for such a one is rather defective than diseased. i think the aediles, for the sake of removing doubt, said the same thing twice kata tou autou, lest any doubt should remain.
Proinde si quid tale fuerit vitii sive morbi, quod usum ministeriumque hominis impediat, id dabit redhibitioni locum, dummodo meminerimus non utique quodlibet quam levissimum efficere, ut morbosus vitiosusve habeatur. proinde levis febricula aut vetus quartana quae tamen iam sperni potest vel vulnusculum modicum nullum habet in se delictum, quasi pronuntiatum non sit: contemni enim haec potuerunt. exempli itaque gratia referamus, qui morbosi vitiosique sunt.
Accordingly, if there be any such defect or disease as impedes the use and service of the person, this will give occasion for redhibition, provided we remember that not just any most trivial thing suffices to have him considered diseased or defective. accordingly, a slight little fever or an old quartan which, however, can now be disregarded, or a small little wound, has in itself no delict, as though it had not been declared: for these could be contemned. therefore, for the sake of example, let us set forth those who are diseased and defective.
Apud vivianum quaeritur, si servus inter fanaticos non semper caput iactaret et aliqua profatus esset, an nihilo minus sanus videretur. et ait vivianus nihilo minus hunc sanum esse: neque enim nos, inquit, minus animi vitiis aliquos sanos esse intellegere debere: alioquin, inquit, futurum, ut in infinito hac ratione multos sanos esse negaremus ut puta levem superstitiosum iracundum contumacem et si qua similia sunt animi vitia: magis enim de corporis sanitate, quam de animi vitiis promitti. interdum tamen, inquit, vitium corporale usque ad animum pervenire et eum vitiare: veluti contingeret frenytikw, quia id ei ex febribus acciderit.
In Vivianus it is asked whether, if a slave among the fanatics did not always toss his head and had uttered something, he would nonetheless appear sane. And Vivianus says that nonetheless this man is sane: for we ought not, says he, to understand some to be less sane because of vices of the mind; otherwise, says he, it will come about that without limit by this reasoning we would deny many to be sane—for instance a light/fickle, superstitious, irascible, contumacious man, and if there are any similar vices of the mind. For what is promised concerns health of the body rather than vices of the mind. Sometimes, however, says he, a bodily defect reaches all the way to the mind and vitiates it: as it would befall a phrenetic, because this happened to him from fevers.
Idem vivianus ait, quamvis aliquando quis circa fana bacchatus sit et responsa reddiderit, tamen, si nunc hoc non faciat, nullum vitium esse: neque eo nomine, quod aliquando id fecit, actio est, sicuti si aliquando febrem habuit: ceterum si nihilo minus permaneret in eo vitio, ut circa fana bacchari soleret et quasi demens responsa daret, etiamsi per luxuriam id factum est, vitium tamen esse, sed vitium animi, non corporis, ideoque redhiberi non posse, quoniam aediles de corporalibus vitiis loquuntur: attamen ex empto actionem admittit.
The same Vivianus says that, although someone has at some time bacchated around shrines and given responses, nevertheless, if he does not do this now, there is no defect; nor, on the ground that he once did this, is there an action, just as if he once had a fever. But if nonetheless he were to persist in that defect, so that he was wont to bacchate around shrines and to give responses as if demented, even if it was done through luxury, it is nevertheless a defect—but a defect of mind, not of body—and therefore it cannot be redhibited, since the aediles speak about bodily defects; however, he admits an action ex empto.
Idem pomponius ait, quamvis non valide sapientem servum venditor praestare debeat, tamen, si ita fatuum vel morionem vendiderit, ut in eo usus nullus sit, videri vitium. et videmur hoc iure uti, ut vitii morbique appellatio non videatur pertinere nisi ad corpora: animi autem vitium ita demum praestabit venditor, si promisit, si minus, non. et ideo nominatim de errone et fugitivo excipitur: hoc enim animi vitium est, non corporis.
The same Pomponius says that, although the seller need not warrant the slave to be very wise, nevertheless, if he has sold one so fatuous or a buffoon that there is no use in him, it is seen to be a defect. And we seem to employ this law, that the appellation of defect and disease appears to pertain only to bodies; but as to a defect of mind, the seller will warrant it only if he has promised—if not, he will not. And therefore it is expressly excepted by name concerning an errant and a fugitive: for this is a defect of mind, not of body.
In summa si quidem animi tantum vitium est, redhiberi non potest, nisi si dictum est hoc abesse et non abest: ex empto tamen agi potest, si sciens id vitium animi reticuit: si autem corporis solius vitium est aut et corporis et animi mixtum vitium, redhibitio locum habebit.
In sum, if indeed it is a defect of the mind only, it cannot be redhibited, unless it was said that this was absent and it is not absent: nevertheless, an action ex empto can be brought, if he knowingly kept silent about that defect of mind: but if it is a defect of the body alone, or a mixed defect of both body and mind, redhibition will have place.
Eum, qui alterum oculum aut alteram maxillam maiorem habet, si recte iis utatur, sanum videri pedius scribit: ait enim inaequalitatem maxillarum oculorum brachiorum, si nihil ex ministerio praestando subtrahit, extra redhibitionem esse. sed et latus vel crus brevius potest adferre impedimentum: ergo et hic erit redhibendus.
Pedius writes that one who has one eye or one jaw larger, if he uses them properly, appears to be sound; for he says that an inequality of the jaws, eyes, or arms, if it subtracts nothing from the rendering of service, is outside redhibition. But a shorter side or leg can bring an impediment: therefore here too he will be redhibitable.
Is cui os oleat an sanus sit quaesitum est: trebatius ait non esse morbosum os alicui olere, veluti hircosum, strabonem: hoc enim ex illuvie oris accidere solere. si tamen ex corporis vitio id accidit, veluti quod iecur, quod pulmo aut aliud quid similiter dolet, morbosus est.
It has been asked whether one whose mouth smells is sound: Trebatius says that it is not morbid for someone’s mouth to smell, just as being goatish or cross‑eyed; for this is wont to occur from the foulness of the mouth. If, however, it occurs from a vice of the body, for instance because the liver, the lung, or something else similarly aches, he is morbid.
Item de eo qui urinam facit quaeritur. et pedius ait non ob eam rem sanum non esse, quod in lecto somno vinoque pressus aut etiam pigritia surgendi urinam faciat: sin autem vitio vesicae collectum umorem continere non potest, non quia urinam in lecto facit, sed quia vitiosam vesicam habet, redhiberi posse: et verius est quod pedius.
Likewise, inquiry is made about one who urinates. And pedius says that a person is not for that reason unsound, that, in bed, pressed by sleep and wine, or even by laziness in getting up, he urinates: but if, however, by a defect of the bladder he cannot contain the accumulated humor, he can be redhibited—not because he urinates in bed, but because he has a defective bladder: and what pedius says is the truer.
Si venditor nominatim exceperit de aliquo morbo et de cetero sanum esse dixerit aut promiserit, standum est eo quod convenit ( remittentibus enim actiones suas non est regressus dandus), nisi sciens venditor morbum consulto reticuit: tunc enim dandam esse de dolo malo replicationem.
If the seller has expressly excepted some disease and has said or promised that otherwise he is sound, what was agreed must stand ( remittentibus enim actiones suas no regress is to be given), unless the seller, knowing of the disease, deliberately kept silence: for then a replication for dolus malus is to be granted.
Si nominatim morbus exceptus non sit, talis tamen morbus sit, qui omnibus potuit apparere ( ut puta caecus homo venibat, aut qui cicatricem evidentem et periculosam habebat vel in capite vel in alia parte corporis), eius nomine non teneri caecilius ait, perinde ac si nominatim morbus exceptus fuisset: ad eos enim morbos vitiaque pertinere edictum aedilium probandum est, quae quis ignoravit vel ignorare potuit.
If a disease has not been excepted by name, yet it is such a disease as could appear to everyone (for instance, a blind man was being sold, or one who had an evident and perilous cicatrice either on the head or in another part of the body), Caecilius says that one is not held on account of it, just as if the disease had been excepted by name: for the edict of the aediles is to be taken to pertain to those diseases and defects which someone did not know or could have been ignorant of.
Item apud vivianum relatum est fugitivum fere ab affectu animi intellegendum esse, non utique a fuga: nam eum qui hostem aut latronem, incendium ruinamve fugeret, quamvis fugisse verum est, non tamen fugitivum esse. item ne eum quidem, qui a praeceptore cui in disciplinam traditus erat aufugit, esse fugitivum, si forte ideo fugit, quia immoderate eo utebatur. idemque probat et si ab eo fugerit cui erat commodatus, si propter eandem causam fugerit.
Likewise it has been related by Vivianus that “fugitive” is generally to be understood from the affect of mind, not necessarily from flight: for one who was fleeing an enemy or a robber, or a fire or a collapse—although it is true that he fled—yet is not a fugitive. Likewise, not even he who ran away from a praeceptor to whom he had been delivered for discipline is a fugitive, if perchance he fled for this reason, because he was used by him immoderately. And he establishes the same also if he has fled from the one to whom he had been lent, if he fled for the same cause.
Idem ait: interrogatus proculus de eo, qui domi latuisset in hoc scilicet, ut fugae nactus occasionem se subtraheret, ait, tametsi fugere non posset videri, qui domi mansisset, tamen eum fugitivum fuisse: sin autem in hoc tantum latuisset, quoad iracundia domini effervesceret, fugitivum non esse, sicuti ne eum quidem, qui cum dominum animadverteret verberibus se adficere velle, praeripuisset se ad amicum, quem ad precandum perduceret. ne eum quidem fugitivum esse, qui in hoc progressus est, ut se praecipitaret ( ceterum etiam eum quis fugitivum diceret, qui domi in altum locum ad praecipitandum se ascendisset), magisque hunc mortem sibi consciscere voluisse. illud enim, quod plerumque ab imprudentibus, inquit, dici solet, eum esse fugitivum, qui nocte aliqua sine voluntate domini emansisset, non esse verum, sed ab affectu animi cuiusque aestimandum
The same says: Proculus, when asked about a man who had hidden at home for this, namely that, having found an opportunity for flight, he might withdraw himself, said that, although he who had remained at home might not seem to have fled, nevertheless he was a fugitive. But if he had hidden only until the master’s irascibility should effervesce, he is not a fugitive—just as not even he is, who, when he noticed the master wished to afflict him with beatings, had whisked himself away to a friend, whom he would bring along to intercede. Not even is he a fugitive who went so far as to hurl himself down ( moreover someone might even call him a fugitive who at home had climbed to a high place for the purpose of throwing himself down), and rather this one wished to bring death upon himself. For that saying, which is commonly uttered by the imprudent, he says, that he is a fugitive who on some night had stayed out without the master’s will, is not true, but is to be assessed from the affect of each one’s mind (intention).
Idem vivianus ait, si a magistro puer recessit et rursus ad matrem pervenit, cum quaereretur, num fugitivus esset: si celandi causa quo, ne ad dominum reverteretur, fugisset, fugitivum esse: sin vero ut per matrem faciliorem deprecationem haberet delicti alicuius, non esse fugitivum.
The same Vivianus says that, if a boy has withdrawn from his master and has again come to his mother, when it is asked whether he is a fugitive: if he fled to some place for the sake of concealment, so that he might not return to the owner, he is a fugitive; but if indeed it was in order that, through his mother, he might have an easier deprecation of some delict, he is not a fugitive.
Caelius quoque scribit, si servum emeris, qui se in tiberim deiecit, si moriendi dumtaxat consilio suscepto a domino discessisset, non esse fugitivum, sed si fugae prius consilium habuit, deinde mutata voluntate in tiberim se deiecit, manere fugitivum. eadem probat et de eo, qui de ponte se praecipitavit. haec omnia vera sunt, quae caelius scribit.
caelius also writes: if you purchase a slave who threw himself into the tiber, if he left his master with only the counsel of dying undertaken, he is not a fugitive; but if he first had the counsel of flight, then, with his intention changed, threw himself into the tiber, he remains a fugitive. he proves the same also about one who hurled himself from a bridge. all these things that caelius writes are true.
Idem ait, si servus tuus fugiens vicarium suum secum abduxit: si vicarius invitus aut imprudens secutus est neque occasionem ad te redeundi nactus praetermisit, non videri fugitivum fuisse: sed si aut olim cum fugeret intellexit quid ageretur aut postea cognovit quid acti esset et redire ad te cum posset noluit, contra esse. idem putat dicendum de eo, quem plagiarius abduxit.
He likewise says: if your slave, while fleeing, carried off his vicarius with him—if the vicarius followed unwillingly or unwittingly and did not omit any opportunity, once he found it, of returning to you, he is not considered to have been a fugitive; but if either at the time when he was fleeing he understood what was afoot, or afterwards learned what had been done, and, though he could return to you, was unwilling, the contrary holds. He thinks the same must be said of one whom a kidnapper (plagiarius) carried off.
Apud labeonem et caelium quaeritur, si quis in asylum confugerit aut eo se conferat, quo solent venire qui se venales postulant, an fugitivus sit: ego puto non esse eum fugitivum, qui id facit quod publice facere licere arbitratur. ne eum quidem, qui ad statuam caesaris confugit, fugitivum arbitror: non enim fugiendi animo hoc facit. idem puto et in eum, qui in asylum vel quod aliud confugit, quia non fugiendi animo hoc facit: si tamen ante fugit et postea se contulit, non ideo magis fugitivus esse desinit.
With Labeo and Caelius it is asked whether, if someone has taken refuge in an asylum or betakes himself to that place where those who request to be sold (to be venal) are accustomed to come, he is a runaway. I think that he is not a runaway who does what he believes it is permitted publicly to do. Not even him who flees to the statue of Caesar do I consider a runaway; for he does not do this with the intention of fleeing. I think the same of him who has fled into an asylum or to some other place, because he does not do this with the intention of fleeing; nevertheless, if he fled beforehand and afterwards betook himself there, he does not on that account cease to be a runaway.
Apud caelium scriptum est: liberti apud patronum habitantis sic, ut sub una clave tota eius habitatio esset, servus ea mente, ne rediret ad eum, extra habitationem liberti fuit, sed intra aedes patroni, et tota nocte obtulit: videri esse fugitivum caelius ait. plane si talem custodiam ea habitatio non habuit et in ea cella libertus habitavit, cui commune et promiscuum plurium cellarum iter est, contra placere debere caelius ait et labeo probat.
It is written by caelius: in the case of a freedman living with his patron in such a way that his whole habitation was under one key, a slave, with the intention that he not return to him, was outside the freedman’s habitation but within the patron’s house, and he stayed there the whole night: caelius says he is to be seen as a fugitive. Clearly, if that habitation did not have such a guard, and the freedman lived in that cell whose passage is common and promiscuous to several cells, the contrary ought to be held, caelius says, and labeo approves.
Idem caelius ait servum in provinciam missum a domino, cum eum mortuum esse et testamento se liberum relictum audisset et in eodem officio permansisset tantumque pro libero se gerere coepisset, hunc non esse fugitivum: nec enim mentiendo se liberum, inquit, fugitivus esse coepit, quia sine fugae consilio id fecit.
The same Caelius says that a slave who had been sent into a province by his master, when he had heard that he (the master) was dead and that by his testament he (the slave) had been left free, and had remained in the same service and had only begun to conduct himself as a free man, is not a fugitive: for, he says, not even by falsely asserting himself to be free did he begin to be a fugitive, because he did this without a plan of flight.
Quod aiunt aediles " noxa solutus non sit", sic intellegendum est, ut non hoc debeat pronuntiari nullam eum noxam commisisse, sed illud noxa solutum esse, hoc est noxali iudicio subiectum non esse: ergo si noxam commisit nec permanet, noxa solutus videtur.
What the aediles say, " noxa solutus non sit," is to be understood thus: not that it ought to be pronounced that he has committed no noxa, but that that is released from the noxa, that is, not subject to a noxal judgment: therefore, if he committed a noxa and it does not persist, he is seen as freed from the noxa.
Noxas accipere debemus privatas, hoc est eas, quaecumque committuntur ex delictis, non publicis criminibus, ex quibus agitur iudiciis noxalibus: denique specialiter cavetur infra de capitalibus fraudibus. ex privatis autem noxiis oritur damnum pecuniarium, si quis forte noxae dedere noluerit, sed litis aestimationem sufferre.
We ought to take noxae as private—namely those whatever are committed from delicts, not from public crimes—on account of which proceedings are carried on in noxal actions; finally, it is specially provided below concerning capital frauds. From private noxae, however, there arises pecuniary damage, if someone perchance should be unwilling to surrender for the noxa, but to endure the valuation of the suit.
Si quis adfirmaverit aliquid adesse servo nec adsit, vel abesse et adsit, ut puta si dixerit furem non esse et fur sit, si dixerit artificem esse et non sit: hi enim, quia quod adseveraverunt non praestant, adversus dictum promissumve facere videntur.
If someone affirms that something is present in a slave and it is not, or that it is absent and it is present—for instance, if he says that he is not a thief and he is a thief, or says that he is a craftsman and he is not—such persons, because they do not make good what they have averred, seem to act contrary to their word or promise.
Si quid venditor de mancipio adfirmaverit idque non ita esse emptor queratur, aut redhibitorio aut aestimatorio ( id est quanti minoris) iudicio agere potest: verbi gratia si constantem aut laboriosum aut curracem vigilacem esse, aut ex frugalitate sua peculium adquirentem adfirmaverit, et is ex diverso levis protervus desidiosus somniculosus piger tardus comesor inveniatur. haec omnia videntur eo pertinere, ne id quod adfirmaverit venditor amare ab eo exigatur, sed cum quodam temperamento, ut si forte constantem esse adfirmaverit, non exacta gravitas et constantia quasi a philosopho desideretur, et si laboriosum et vigilacem adfirmaverit esse, non continuus labor per dies noctesque ab eo exigatur, sed haec omnia ex bono et aequo modice desiderentur. idem et in ceteris quae venditor adfirmaverit intellegemus.
If the seller has affirmed anything about the slave and the buyer complains that it is not so, he can sue either by the redhibitory action or by the aestimatory action ( that is, for how much less): for example, if he has affirmed that he is steady, or hardworking, or a runner, or wakeful, or that by his own frugality he is acquiring a peculium (private savings), and the man is found, on the contrary, to be frivolous, insolent, idle, drowsy, lazy, slow, a heavy eater. All these things seem to tend to this point: that what the seller has affirmed is not to be exacted of him harshly, but with a certain tempering; so that, if he has affirmed him to be steady, an exact seriousness and constancy, as from a philosopher, is not required; and if he has affirmed him to be hardworking and wakeful, continuous labor by day and night is not demanded of him; but all these things are to be required moderately, according to what is good and equitable. We will understand the same in the other matters that the seller has affirmed.
Sciendum tamen est quaedam et si dixerit praestare eum non debere, scilicet ea, quae ad nudam laudem servi pertinent: veluti si dixerit frugi probum dicto audientem. ut enim pedius scribit, multum interest, commendandi servi causa quid dixerit, an vero praestaturum se promiserit quod dixit.
It must nevertheless be known that there are certain things which, even if he has said them, he ought not to have to warrant—namely those which pertain to the naked praise of a slave: as if he has said “thrifty, upright, obedient to commands.” For, as Pedius writes, it makes much difference whether he said something for the sake of commending the slave, or rather has promised that he would make good what he said.
Dictum a promisso sic discernitur: dictum accipimus, quod verbo tenus pronuntiatum est nudoque sermone finitur: promissum autem potest referri et ad nudam promissionem sive pollicitationem vel ad sponsum. secundum quod incipiet is, qui de huiusmodi causa stipulanti spopondit, et ex stipulatu posse conveniri et redhibitoriis actionibus: non novum, nam et qui ex empto potest conveniri, idem etiam redhibitoriis actionibus conveniri potest.
A dictum is distinguished from a promise thus: we take a dictum as that which has been pronounced merely in words and is concluded by bare speech; a promise, however, can be referred either to a bare promise or pollicitation, or to a sponsum (formal pledge by sponsio). And according to this, he who has promised (spopondit) to a stipulator on account of a matter of this sort will become liable to be sued both ex stipulatu and by redhibitory actions: this is nothing new, for he who can be sued ex empto can likewise be sued by redhibitory actions.
Illud sciendum est: si quis artificem promiserit vel dixerit, non utique perfectum eum praestare debet, sed ad aliquem modum peritum, ut neque consummatae scientiae accipias, neque rursum indoctum esse in artificium: sufficiet igitur talem esse, quales volgo artifices dicuntur.
This is to be known: if someone has promised or declared an artificer, he need not warrant him as perfect, but as skilled to some degree, so that you neither take him as of consummate knowledge nor, on the other hand, as unlearned in the craft: it will suffice, therefore, that he be such as those who are commonly called artificers.
Deinde aiunt aediles: " emptori omnibusque ad quos ea res pertinet iudicium dabimus". pollicentur emptori actionem et successoribus eius qui in universum ius succedunt. emptorem accipere debemus eum qui pretio emit. sed si quis permutaverit, dicendum est utrumque emptoris et venditoris loco haberi et utrumque posse ex hoc edicto experiri.
Then the aediles say: " to the purchaser and to all to whom that matter pertains we will grant an action." They promise an action to the purchaser and to his successors who succeed to the whole right. We ought to understand by “purchaser” one who buys for a price. But if someone has exchanged (bartered), it must be said that each is held in the place of both purchaser and seller, and that each can proceed under this edict.
Tempus autem redhibitionis sex menses utiles habet: si autem mancipium non redhibeatur, sed quanto minoris agitur, annus utilis est. sed tempus redhibitionis ex die venditionis currit aut, si dictum promissumve quid est, ex eo ex quo dictum promissumve quid est.
But the period for redhibition has six useful months: if, however, the slave is not redhibited, but suit is brought for how much less (a price reduction), the period is one useful year. But the time for redhibition runs from the day of sale, or, if anything was said or promised, from the point from which it was said or promised.
Si vero ante venditionis tempus dictum intercesserit, deinde post aliquot dies interposita fuerit stipulatio, caelius sabinus scribit ex priore causa, quae statim, inquit, ut veniit id mancipium, eo nomine posse agere coepit.
If, however, the seller’s declaration has intervened before the time of the sale, and then after several days a stipulation has been interposed, caelius sabinus writes that one may proceed on the earlier ground, since, he says, as soon as that slave was sold, he began to be able to sue under that head.
Cum redditur ab emptore mancipium venditori, de dolo malo promitti oportere ei pomponius ait et ideo cautiones necessarias esse, ne forte aut pignori datus sit servus ab emptore aut iussu eius furtum sive damnum cui datum sit.
When a slave is returned by the buyer to the seller, Pomponius says that a promise ought to be made to him concerning fraud (dolus malus), and therefore that cautions/guarantees are necessary, lest perhaps the slave has been given in pledge by the buyer, or by his order theft or damage has been inflicted upon someone.
Idem pomponius ait interdum etiam dupliciter cautiones interponi debere, alias in praeteritum, alias in futurum, ut puta si eius servi nomine qui redhibetur emptor procuratorve eius iudicium accepit, vel quod cum eo ageretur vel quod ipse eius nomine ageret. cavendum autem esse ait, si quid sine dolo malo emptor condemnatus fuerit aut dederit, his rebus recte praestari, vel si quid ex eo quod egerit ad eum pervenerit dolove malo vel culpa eius factum sit, quo minus perveniret isdem diebus, reddi.
The same Pomponius says that sometimes also stipulations ought to be interposed in duplicate, some for the past, others for the future; for example, if, in the name of the slave who is being redhibited, the buyer or his procurator has received an action, whether one that was being brought against him or one that he himself was bringing in his (the slave’s) name. And he says there should be a stipulation that, if the buyer, without dolus malus, has been condemned or has given anything, these matters are duly to be made good; or that, if anything from what he has prosecuted has come to him, it be returned; and if by his fraud or fault it has been brought about that it did not come to him, that it be returned on the same days.
Idem ait futuri temporis nomine cautionem ei, qui sciens vendidit, fieri solere, si in fuga est homo sine culpa emptoris et nihilo minus condemnatur venditor: tum enim cavere oportere, ut emptor hominem persequatur et in sua potestate redactum venditori reddat,
The same says that, under the heading of “future time,” a caution is regularly taken in favor of him who knowingly sold, if the slave is in flight without the buyer’s fault and nonetheless the seller is condemned: for then it is proper to stipulate that the buyer pursue the slave and, once reduced back into his own power, return him to the seller,
Cum autem redhibitio fit, si deterius mancipium sive animo sive corpore ab emptore factum est, praestabit emptor venditori, ut puta si stupratum sit aut saevitia emptoris fugitivum esse coeperit: et ideo, inquit pomponius, ut ex quacumque causa deterius factum sit, id arbitrio iudicis aestimetur et venditori praestetur. quod si sine iudice homo redhibitus sit, reliqua autem quae diximus nolit emptor reddere, sufficiat venditori ex vendito actio.
But when redhibition takes place, if the slave has been made worse either in mind or in body by the buyer, the buyer shall compensate the seller, as for example if it has been subjected to stuprum (sexual violation) or by the buyer’s cruelty has begun to be a fugitive: and therefore, says pomponius, that from whatever cause it has been made worse, this is to be assessed at the discretion of the judge and made good to the seller. But if the slave has been redhibited without a judge, and the buyer is unwilling to return the remaining things which we have mentioned, the action ex vendito will suffice for the seller.
Excipitur etiam ille, qui capitalem fraudem admisit. capitalem fraudem admittere est tale aliquid delinquere, propter quod capite puniendus sit: veteres enim fraudem pro poena ponere solebant. capitalem fraudem admisisse accipiemus dolo malo et per nequitiam: ceterum si quis errore, si quis casu fecerit, cessabit edictum.
He also is excepted who has committed a capital fraud. To commit a capital fraud is to commit such a delinquency on account of which one ought to be punished capitally; for the ancients were accustomed to use “fraud” for “penalty.” We shall take “to have committed a capital fraud” as done with malicious deceit and through wickedness; but if anyone has done it by error, if by accident, the edict will be inoperative.
Excipitur et ille, qui mortis consciscendae causa quid fecerit. malus servus creditus est, qui aliquid facit, quo magis se rebus humanis extrahat, ut puta laqueum torsit sive medicamentum pro veneno bibit praecipitemve se ex alto miserit aliudve quid fecerit, quo facto speravit mortem perventuram, tamquam non nihil in alium ausurus, qui hoc adversus se ausus est.
An exception is also made for the one who has done something for the purpose of bringing death upon himself. He is deemed a bad slave who does something by which he withdraws himself the more from human affairs, for example he twisted a noose, or drank a medicament as poison, or hurled himself headlong from a height, or did something else, by the doing of which he hoped death would arrive, as one who, having dared this against himself, would be about to venture something against another.
Si servus sit qui vendidit vel filius familias in dominum vel patrem de peculio aedilicia actio competit: quamvis enim poenales videantur actiones, tamen quoniam ex contractu veniunt, dicendum est eorum quoque nomine qui in aliena potestate sunt competere. proinde et si filia familias vel ancilla distraxit, aeque dicendum est actiones aedilicias locum habere.
If the one who sold is a slave or a son of the household, the aedilician action lies against the master or the father from the peculium; for although the actions seem penal, nevertheless, since they arise from contract, it must be said that they too may be brought in the name of those who are in another’s power. Accordingly, even if a daughter of the household or a female slave sold the thing, it must equally be said that the aedilician actions have a place.
Quare sive emptori servus furtum fecerit sive alii cuilibet, ob quod furtum emptor aliquid praestiterit, non aliter hominem venditori restituere iubetur, quam si indemnem eum praestiterit. quid ergo, inquit iulianus, si noluerit venditor hominem recipere? non esse cogendum ait quicquam praestare, nec amplius quam pretio condemnabitur: et hoc detrimentum sua culpa emptorem passurum, qui cum posset hominem noxae dedere, maluerit litis aestimationem sufferre: et videtur mihi iuliani sententia humanior esse.
Wherefore, whether the slave has committed theft against the buyer or against any other person whatsoever, on account of which theft the buyer has furnished something, he is not otherwise ordered to restore the man to the seller than if he shall have rendered him indemnified. What then, says Julianus, if the seller is unwilling to receive the man? He says that he is not to be compelled to furnish anything, nor will he be condemned for more than the price: and that the buyer will suffer this loss by his own fault, who, when he could have surrendered the man for noxal liability, preferred to undergo the valuation of the suit; and it seems to me that the opinion of Julianus is more humane.
Cum redhibetur mancipium, si quid ad emptorem pervenit vel culpa eius non pervenit, restitui oportet, non solum si ipse fructus percepit mercedesve a servo vel conductore servi accepit, sed etiam si a venditore fuerit idcirco consecutus, quod tardius ei hominem restituit: sed et si a quovis alio possessore fructus accepit emptor, restituere eos debebit: sed et si quid fructuum nomine consecutus est, id praestet: item si legatum vel hereditas servo obvenerit. neque refert, potuerit haec consequi venditor an non potuerit, si servum non vendidisset: ponamus enim talem esse, qui capere aliquid ex testamento non potuerat: nihil haec res nocebit. pedius quidem etiam illud non putat esse spectandum, cuius contemplatione testator servum heredem scripserit vel ei legaverit, quia et si venditio remansisset, nihil haec res emptori proderat: et per contrarium, inquit, si contemplatione venditoris institutus proponeretur, tamen diceremus restituere emptorem non debere venditori, si nollet eum redhibere.
When a slave is redhibited, whatever has come to the buyer, or failed to come through his fault, ought to be restored—not only if he himself has taken the fruits or received hire-money from the slave or from the hirer of the slave, but even if he has obtained it from the seller for this reason, that he restored the man to him later; and even if the buyer has received fruits from any other possessor, he will have to restore them; and likewise whatever he has obtained under the name of fruits, let him make it good; likewise if a legacy or an inheritance has fallen to the slave. Nor does it matter whether the seller could have obtained these, or could not have obtained them, if he had not sold the slave: for let us suppose him to be such a person as could not take anything under a will—this circumstance will do no harm. Pedius indeed does not think even this is to be considered, namely in whose contemplation the testator wrote the slave as heir or left him a legacy, because even if the sale had remained in force, this would have profited the buyer nothing; and conversely, he says, if it were put that he was instituted in contemplation of the seller, nevertheless we would say that the buyer ought not to restore to the seller, if he were unwilling to redhibit him.
Pedius ait aequum fuisse id dumtaxat imputari emptori ex facto procuratoris et familiae, quod non fuit passurus servus nisi venisset: quod autem passurus erat etiam, si non venisset, in eo concedi emptori servi sui noxae deditionem et ex eo, inquit, quod procurator commisit, solum actionum praestandarum necessitatem ei iniungi.
Pedius says it was equitable that only this be imputed to the buyer from the act of the procurator and the household, namely what the slave would not have been going to suffer unless he had come; but as for what he was going to suffer even if he had not come, in that it is granted, he says, to the buyer to have the noxal surrender of his (the seller’s) slave, and from that which the procurator committed, only the necessity of furnishing actions is imposed upon him.
Item sciendum est haec omnia, quae exprimuntur edicto aedilium, praestare eum debere, si ante iudicium acceptum facta sint: idcirco enim necesse habuisse ea enumerari, ut, si quid eorum ante litem contestatam contigisset, praestaretur. ceterum post iudicium acceptum tota causa ad hominem restituendum in iudicio versatur, et tam fructus veniunt quam id quo deterior factus est ceteraque veniunt: iudici enim statim atque iudex factus est omnium rerum officium incumbit, quaecumque in iudicio versantur: ea autem quae ante iudicium contingunt non valde ad eum pertinent, nisi fuerint ei nominatim iniuncta.
Likewise it must be known that he ought to make good all these things which are set forth in the aediles’ edict, if they happened before the adjudication was accepted: for it was necessary that they be enumerated for this reason, namely, that, if any of them had occurred before the suit was contested, they would be provided. However, after the adjudication has been accepted, the whole case is handled in court with a view to restoring the person, and both the fruits are included and that by which he has been made worse off, and the rest likewise are included: for as soon as he has been made judge, the duty concerning all matters that are in litigation rests upon the judge; but the things which happen before the adjudication do not much pertain to him, unless they have been enjoined upon him by name.
Videamus tamen, ne iniquum sit emptorem compelli dimittere corpus et ad actionem iudicati mitti, si interdum nihil praestatur propter inopiam venditoris, potiusque res ita ordinanda sit, ut emptor caveat, si intra certum tempus pecunia sibi soluta sit, se mancipium restituturum.
Let us consider, however, whether it would not be unjust that the buyer be compelled to release the body and be sent to an actio on the judgment, if sometimes nothing is paid because of the seller’s poverty; and rather that the matter should be arranged thus: that the buyer give security that, if within a fixed time the money is paid to him, he will restore the slave.
Debet autem recipere pecuniam, quam dedit pro eo homine, vel si quid accessionis nomine. dari autem non id solum accipiemus, quod numeratur venditori, ut puta pretium et usuras eius, sed et si quid emptionis causa erogatum est. hoc autem ita demum deducitur, si ex voluntate venditoris datur: ceterum si quid sua sponte datum esse proponatur, non imputabitur: neque enim debet quod quis suo arbitrio dedit a venditore exigere.
He ought, however, to receive back the money which he paid for that person, and anything by way of accession. Moreover, by “to be given” we will not take only what is counted out to the seller, as, for example, the price and its interest, but also whatever has been disbursed for the sake of the purchase. But this is deducted only if it is given with the consent of the seller; otherwise, if anything is alleged to have been given of one’s own accord, it will not be imputed: for one ought not to exact from the seller what someone gave by his own discretion.
Condemnatio autem fit, quanti ea res erit: ergo excedet pretium an non, videamus. et quidem continet condemnatio pretium accessionesque. an et usuras pretii consequatur, quasi quod sua intersit debeat accipere, maxime cum fructus quoque ipse restituat?
Now the condemnatio is made for as much as that thing will be worth: therefore, will it exceed the price or not, let us see. And indeed the condemnatio includes the price and the accessions. Whether it also attains the interest on the price, as though he ought to receive the amount of his own interest, especially since he himself also restores the fruits?
Si quid tamen damni sensit vel si quid pro servo impendit, consequetur arbitrio iudicis, sic tamen, non ut ei horum nomine venditor condemnetur, ut ait iulianus, sed ne alias compellatur hominem venditori restituere, quam si eum indemnem praestet.
If, however, he has suffered any loss, or has expended anything for the slave, he will obtain it by the judge’s arbitrament; yet in such a way—not that the seller be condemned to him under these heads, as Julian says, but rather that he is not compelled to restore the slave to the seller except upon being held harmless (indemnified).
Item si servi redhibendi nomine emptor iudicium accepit vel ipse eius nomine dictavit, cavendum ex utraque parte erit, ut, si quid sine dolo malo condemnatus sit vel si quid ex eo quod egerit ad eum pervenerit dolove malo eius factum sit quo minus perveniret, id reddat.
Likewise, if, under the title of redhibiting the slave, the buyer has accepted the action or himself has dictated it in his name, there must be security taken from both sides, that, if he be condemned in anything without dolus malus, or if anything from that which he has pursued has come to him, or it has by his dolus malus been brought about that it did not come, he shall render it.
Quas impensas necessario in curandum servum post litem contestatam emptor fecerit, imputabit: praecedentes impensas nominatim comprehendendas pedius: sed cibaria servo data non esse imputanda aristo, nam nec ab ipso exigi, quod in ministerio eius fuit.
The buyer will impute, as a set-off, whatever expenses he necessarily incurred in caring for the slave after the suit was contested; the preceding expenses, pedius [says], must be expressly included by name; but the food-rations given to the slave are not to be imputed, aristo [says], for not even can that be exacted from him which was in his service.
Quodsi nolit venditor hominem recipere, non in maiorem summam, inquit, quam in pretium ei condemnandum. ob haec ergo, quae propter servum damna sensit, solam dabimus ei corporis retentionem: ceterum poterit evitare praestationem venditor, si nolit hominem recipere, quo facto pretii praestationem eorumque quae pretium sequuntur solam non evitabit.
But if the seller is unwilling to take the man back, he says, he is not to be condemned in a greater sum than the price. Therefore, on account of these matters—the damages which he has sustained because of the slave—we will grant him only retention of the body; moreover, the seller will be able to avoid performance, if he is unwilling to take the man back; by which act the only thing he will not avoid is the prestation of the price and of the things that follow the price.
Si plures heredes sint emptoris, an omnes ad redhibendum consentire debeant, videamus. et ait pomponius omnes consentire debere ad redhibendum dareque unum procuratorem, ne forte venditor iniuriam patiatur, dum ab alio partem recipit hominis, alii in partem pretii condemnatur, quanti minoris is homo sit.
If there are several heirs of the buyer, let us see whether all ought to consent to redhibit. And Pomponius says that all ought to consent to redhibit and to appoint a single procurator, lest perhaps the seller suffer injury, while from one he receives a part of the slave, and against another he is condemned for a part of the price, in the amount by which that slave is worth less.
Idem ait homine mortuo vel etiam redhibito singulos pro suis portionibus recte agere. pretium autem et accessiones pro parte recipient: sed et fructus accessionis et si quo deterior homo factus est pro parte praestabitur ab ipsis, nisi forte tale sit, quod divisionem non recipiat, ut puta ancillae partus: in hoc enim idem servandum est, quod in ipsa matre vendita, quam pro parte redhiberi posse negavimus.
He likewise says that, when the person has died or even has been redhibited, each may properly sue for his own portion. The price, moreover, and the accessions they receive in proportion; but also the fruits by way of accession, and, if in any respect the person has been made worse, shall be made good by them proportionally—unless perhaps it is of such a kind as does not admit division, for example the offspring of a maidservant: for in this the same is to be observed as in the mother herself sold, whom we have denied can be redhibited in part.
Idem Marcellus ait non posse alterum ex dominis consequi actione ex empto, ut sibi pro parte venditor tradat, si pro portione pretium dabit: et hoc in emptoribus servari oportere ait: nam venditor pignoris loco quod vendidit retinet, quoad emptor satisfaciat.
Likewise Marcellus says that one of the co-owners cannot obtain by an action ex empto that the seller deliver to him his share, if he will pay the price according to his portion; and he says that this ought to be observed also among purchasers: for the seller retains what he has sold as a pledge, until the purchaser gives satisfaction.
Pomponius ait, si unus ex heredibus vel familia eius vel procurator culpa vel dolo fecerit rem deteriorem, aequum esse in solidum eum teneri arbitrio iudicis: hoc autem expeditius esse, si omnes heredes unum procuratorem ad agendum dederunt. tunc et si quo deterior servus culpa unius heredum factus est et hoc solutum est, ceteri familiae herciscundae iudicium adversus eum habent, quia propter ipsum damnum sentiunt impediunturque redhibere.
Pomponius says that, if one of the heirs or his household or his procurator has made the thing worse by fault or by fraud, it is equitable that he be held liable in solidum at the judge’s discretion; and that this is more expeditious if all the heirs have appointed one procurator for litigating. Then also, if in any respect a slave has been made worse through the fault of one of the heirs and the amount has been paid, the others have the action for dividing the family (familiae herciscundae iudicium) against him, because on account of him they feel the loss and are hindered from redhibiting.
Si venditori plures heredes exstiterint, singulis pro portione hereditaria poterit servus redhiberi. et si servus plurium venierit, idem erit dicendum: nam si unus a pluribus vel plures ab uno vel plura mancipia ab uno emantur, verius est dicere, si quasi plures rei fuerunt venditores, singulis in solidum redhibendum: si tamen partes emptae sint a singulis, recte dicetur alteri quidem posse redhiberi, cum altero autem agi quanto minoris. item si plures singuli partes ab uno emant, tunc pro parte quisque eorum experietur: sed si in solidum emant, unusquisque in solidum redhibebit.
If several heirs have arisen to the seller, the slave can be redhibited to each according to the hereditary portion. And if the slave belonged to several persons and was sold, the same is to be said: for if one is bought from several, or several from one, or several mancipia from one are bought, it is more correct to say that, if as it were there were several parties liable as sellers, it should be redhibited to each in solidum. If, however, parts were bought from each, it will rightly be said that it can indeed be redhibited as to the one, but with the other an action is to be brought for “how much less” (abatement of price). Likewise, if several persons each buy parts from one, then each of them will proceed for his part; but if they buy in solidum, each one will redhibit in solidum.
Si mancipium quod redhiberi oportet mortuum erit, hoc quaeretur, numquid culpa emptoris vel familiae eius vel procuratoris homo demortuus sit: nam si culpa eius decessit, pro vivo habendus est, et praestentur ea omnia, quae praestarentur, si viveret.
If a slave which ought to be redhibited has died, this will be inquired: whether the man died through the fault of the buyer or of his household or of his procurator; for if he died through his fault, he is to be treated as alive, and all those things are to be provided which would be provided if he were living.
Sed hoc dicemus, si ante iudicium acceptum decessit: ceterum si post iudicium acceptum decessisse proponatur, tunc in arbitrium iudicis veniet, qualiter mortuus sit: ut enim et pedio videtur, ea, quaecumque post litis contestationem contingunt, arbitrium iudicis desiderant.
But we shall say this, if he died before the action was accepted: however, if it is alleged that he died after the action was accepted, then it will come into the judge’s arbitrament in what manner he died: for, as also Pedius sees it, those things—whatever occur after the contestation of the suit—require the judge’s arbitrament.
Quod in procuratore diximus, idem et in tutore et curatore dicendum erit ceterisque, qui ex officio pro aliis interveniunt: et ita pedius ait, et adicit, quibus administratio rerum, culpam abesse praestare non inique dominum cogi.
What we have said about the procurator must likewise be said of the tutor and the curator and of the others who intervene on behalf of others by virtue of their office: and so Pedius says, and he adds that, for those to whom the administration of affairs is entrusted, it is not unfair that the master be compelled to warrant that fault is absent.
Si quis egerit quanto minoris propter servi fugam, deinde agat propter morbum, quanti fieri condemnatio debeat? et quidem saepius agi posse quanto minoris dubium non est, sed ait iulianus id agendum esse, ne lucrum emptor faciat et bis eiusdem rei aestimationem consequatur.
If someone has brought an action for “how much less” on account of a slave’s flight, and then later sues on account of illness, for how much ought the condemnation to be made? And indeed that it is not doubtful that the “how much less” can be sued for more than once; but Julian says that it should be proceeded with in such a way that the buyer not make a profit and obtain twice the estimation of the same thing.
In factum actio competit ad pretium reciperandum, si mancipium redhibitum fuerit: in qua non hoc quaeritur, an mancipium in causa redhibitionis fuerit, sed hoc tantum, an sit redhibitum, nec immerito: iniquum est enim, posteaquam venditor agnovit recipiendo mancipium esse id in causa redhibitionis, tunc quaeri, utrum debuerit redhiberi an non debuerit: nec de tempore quaeretur, an intra tempora redhibitus esse videatur.
An action on the fact lies for recovering the price, if the slave has been redhibited: in which the inquiry is not whether the slave was in a case for redhibition, but only whether it has been redhibited, and not without cause; for it is inequitable, after the seller has acknowledged, by receiving back the slave, that it was in a case for redhibition, then to ask whether it ought to have been redhibited or not; nor will there be inquiry about the time, whether he appears to have been redhibited within the time-limits.
Quia adsidua est duplae stipulatio, idcirco placuit etiam ex empto agi posse, si duplam venditor mancipii non caveat: ea enim, quae sunt moris et consuetudinis, in bonae fidei iudiciis debent venire.
Because the stipulation for the double is customary, therefore it has been decided that one can also proceed by the action ex empto, if the seller of the mancipium does not give security for the double; for those things which are of custom and usage ought to be taken into account in good‑faith judgments.
Qui mancipia vendunt, nationem cuiusque in venditione pronuntiare debent: plerumque enim natio servi aut provocat aut deterret emptorem: idcirco interest nostra scire nationem: praesumptum etenim est quosdam servos bonos esse, quia natione sunt non infamata, quosdam malos videri, quia ea natione sunt, quae magis infamis est. quod si de natione ita pronuntiatum non erit, iudicium emptori omnibusque ad quos ea res pertinebit dabitur, per quod emptor redhibet mancipium.
Those who sell slaves ought to announce the nation of each in the sale: for very often the nation of a slave either provokes or deters the buyer; therefore it is in our interest to know the nation: for it is presumed that certain slaves are good, because they are of a nation not infamous, while certain others seem bad, because they are of that nation which is more infamous. But if nothing shall have been thus pronounced concerning the nation, an action will be given to the buyer and to all to whom that matter shall pertain, by which the buyer redhibits the slave.
Si quid ita venierit, ut, nisi placuerit, intra praefinitum tempus redhibeatur, ea conventio rata habetur: si autem de tempore nihil convenerit, in factum actio intra sexaginta dies utiles accommodatur emptori ad redhibendum, ultra non. si vero convenerit, ut in perpetuum redhibitio fiat, puto hanc conventionem valere.
If anything has been sold on the terms that, unless it proves pleasing, it shall be redelivered by way of redhibition within a pre‑defined period, that convention is held valid; but if nothing has been agreed about the period, an action in fact is afforded to the buyer for redhibition within sixty useful days, not beyond. But if it has been agreed that redhibition be in perpetuity, I consider this convention to be valid.
Item si tempus sexaginta dierum praefinitum redhibitioni praeteriit, causa cognita iudicium dabitur: in causae autem cognitione hoc versabitur, si aut mora fuit per venditorem, aut non fuit praesens cui redderetur, aut aliqua iusta causa intercessit, cur intra diem redhibitum mancipium non est, quod ei magis displicuerat.
Likewise, if the period of 60 days fixed for redhibition has passed, upon the cause being examined an action will be granted: and in the examination of the cause the matter will turn on this—whether either there was delay on the seller’s part, or the person to whom it was to be returned was not present, or some just cause intervened why the slave was not redhibited within the day, which had been more displeasing to him.
Itaque sicut superius venditor de morbo vitiove et ceteris quae ibi comprehensa sunt praedicere iubetur, et praeterea in his causis non esse mancipium ut promittat praecipitur: ita et cum accedat alii rei homo, eadem et praedicere et promittere compellitur. quod non solum hoc casu intellegendum est, quo nominatim adicitur accessurum fundo hominem stichum, sed etiam si generaliter omnia mancipia quae in fundo sint accedant venditioni.
And so, just as above the seller is ordered to declare about disease or defect and the other matters that are included there, and, moreover, in these cases is directed to promise that the slave is not subject to them: so also when a human being is accessory to another thing, he is compelled both to declare and to promise the same. This is to be understood not only in the case in which it is expressly added that the slave Stichus will be appended to the estate, but also if, in general terms, all the slaves that are on the estate are to be annexed to the sale.
Proinde pomponius ait iustam causam esse, ut quod in venditione accessurum esse dictum est tam integrum praestetur, quam illud praestari debuit quod principaliter veniit: nam iure civili, ut integra sint quae accessura dictum fuerit, ex empto actio est, veluti si dolia accessura fundo dicta fuerint. sed hoc ita, si certum corpus accessurum fuerit dictum: nam si servus cum peculio venierit, ea mancipia quae in peculio fuerint sana esse praestare venditor non debet, quia non dixit certum corpus accessurum, sed peculium tale praestare oportere, et quemadmodum certam quantitatem peculii praestare non debet, ita nec hoc. eandem rationem facere pomponius ait, ut etiam, si hereditas aut peculium servi venierit, locus edicto aedilium non sit circa ea corpora, quae sunt in hereditate aut in peculio.
Accordingly Pomponius says there is just cause that what in the sale was said would accrue be provided as intact as that ought to be provided which was principally sold: for by the civil law there is an action ex empto that the things which were said would accrue be entire, for instance if casks were said to be going to accrue to a farm. But this is so if a determinate corpus was said to be going to accrue: for if a slave is sold with his peculium, the seller ought not to warrant that the slaves which are in the peculium are sound, because he did not say that a specific corpus would accrue, but that he ought to provide such-and-such a peculium; and just as he ought not to provide a fixed quantity of the peculium, so neither this. Pomponius says the same reasoning holds, that even if an inheritance or a slave’s peculium is sold, there is no place for the edict of the aediles regarding those corporeal things which are in the inheritance or in the peculium.
Cum eiusdem generis plures res simul veneant, veluti comoedi vel chorus, referre ait, in universos an in singulos pretium constituatur, ut scilicet interdum una, interdum plures venditiones contractae intellegantur: quod vel eo quaeri pertinere, ut, si quis eorum forte morbosus vel vitiosus sit, vel omnes simul redhibeantur.
When several things of the same kind are sold at once, as comic actors or a chorus, he says it makes a difference whether the price is constituted for all collectively or for each individually, so that at times one sale, at times several sales are understood to have been contracted; and the inquiry pertains also for this reason, that, if any one of them should happen to be sickly or defective, then all together may be redhibited.
Interdum etsi in singula capita pretium constitutum sit, tamen una emptio est, ut propter unius vitium omnes redhiberi possint vel debeant, scilicet cum manifestum erit non nisi omnes quem empturum vel venditurum fuisse, ut plerumque circa comoedos vel quadrigas vel mulas pares accidere solet, ut neutri non nisi omnes habere expediat.
Sometimes even if a price has been fixed for each head individually, nevertheless it is one purchase, so that on account of the defect of one they all can or ought to be redhibited (returned), namely when it will be manifest that one would have bought or sold only all of them, as very often happens with comedians/actors or with quadrigae (four-horse teams) or with paired mules, such that for neither party is it expedient to have anything but all.
Plerumque propter morbosa mancipia etiam non morbosa redhibentur, si separari non possint sine magno incommodo vel ad pietatis rationem offensam. quid enim, si filio retento parentes redhibere maluerint vel contra? quod et in fratribus et in personas contubernio sibi coniunctas observari oportet.
Oftentimes, on account of diseased slaves, even those not diseased are redhibited, if they cannot be separated without great inconvenience or with an offense to the claims of pietas. For what, for example, if, the son being retained, they should prefer to redhibit the parents, or the reverse? This ought to be observed also in the case of brothers and of persons joined to one another by contubernium.
Si plura mancipia uno pretio venierint et de uno eorum aedilicia actione utamur, ita demum pro bonitate eius aestimatio fiet, si confuse universis mancipiis constitutum pretium fuerit: quod si singulorum mancipiorum constituto pretio universa tanti venierunt, quantum ex consummatione singulorum fiebat, tunc cuiusque mancipii pretium, seu pluris seu minoris id esset, sequi debemus.
If several slaves have been sold for one price and we employ the aedilician action with respect to one of them, then only if a price was set in a lump indiscriminately for all the slaves will the valuation be made according to that one’s quality; but if, with the price of each slave having been fixed, the whole lot was sold for as much as resulted from the totaling of the several prices, then we must follow the price of each slave, whether that was higher or lower.
Praecipiunt aediles, ne veterator pro novicio veneat. et hoc edictum fallaciis venditorum occurrit: ubique enim curant aediles, ne emptores a venditoribus circumveniantur. ut ecce plerique solent mancipia, quae novicia non sunt, quasi novicia distrahere ad hoc, ut pluris vendant: praesumptum est enim ea mancipia, quae rudia sunt, simpliciora esse et ad ministeria aptiora et dociliora et ad omne ministerium habilia: trita vero mancipia et veterana difficile est reformare et ad suos mores formare.
The aediles prescribe that a veteran not be sold as a novice. And this edict counters the deceits of sellers: everywhere the aediles take care that buyers not be cheated by sellers. For example, many are accustomed to sell off slaves that are not novices as if they were novices, to this end, that they may sell them for a higher price; for it is presumed that those slaves which are raw are simpler, more apt for services, more docile, and fit for every service, whereas well-worn and veteran slaves are difficult to reform and to shape to one’s own habits.
Since therefore slave-dealers know that people readily resort to the purchase of novices, they accordingly “touch up” the old hands and sell them as novices. Lest this be done, the aediles give notice by this edict: and so, if anything has been sold thus with the buyer unaware, it shall be redhibited.
Aediles aiunt: " qui iumenta vendunt, palam recte dicunto, quid in quoque eorum morbi vitiique sit, utique optime ornata vendendi causa fuerint, ita emptoribus tradentur. si quid ita factum non erit, de ornamentis restituendis iumentisve ornamentorum nomine redhibendis in diebus sexaginta, morbi autem vitiive causa inemptis faciendis in sex mensibus, vel quo minoris cum venirent fuerint, in anno iudicium dabimus. si iumenta paria simul venierint et alterum in ea causa fuerit, ut redhiberi debeat, iudicium dabimus, quo utrumque redhibeatur".
The Aediles say: "Those who sell draft animals shall declare openly and correctly what disease or defect there is in each of them, and that, just as they have been most excellently adorned for the purpose of selling, so they shall be delivered to the buyers. If anything has not been done thus, we will grant an action for restoring the ornaments, or for the animals to be redhibited under the name of the ornaments within sixty days; but on account of disease or defect, for making them as not bought within six months; or for the amount by which they would have been of lesser price when they were sold, within a year we will grant an action. If pairs of animals have been sold together and one is in such a condition that it ought to be redhibited, we will grant an action by which both are redhibited."
Sed enim sunt quaedam, quae in hominibus quidem morbum faciunt, in iumentis non adeo: ut puta si mulus castratus est, neque morbi neque vitii quid habere videtur, quia neque de fortitudine quid eius detrahitur neque de utilitate, cum ad generandum numquam sit habilis. caelius quoque scribit non omnia animalia castrata ob id ipsum vitiosa esse, nisi propter ipsam castrationem facta sunt inbecilliora: et ideo mulum non esse vitiosum. idem refert ofilium existimasse equum castratum sanum esse, sicuti spado quoque sanus est, sed si emptor ignoravit, venditor scit, ex empto esse actionem: et verum est quod ofilius.
But indeed there are certain things which do produce disease in human beings, but in beasts of burden not so much: for instance, if a mule has been castrated, it seems to have nothing of either disease or defect, because nothing is taken away from its fortitude or from its utility, since it is never fit for generating. caelius also writes that not all animals are for that very reason defective because they are castrated, unless on account of the castration itself they have been made more weak; and therefore a mule is not defective. the same man reports that ofilius considered a castrated horse to be sound, just as a eunuch too is sound; but if the buyer was ignorant and the seller knows, there is an action on the purchase (ex empto); and what ofilius says is true.
Vendendi autem causa ornatum iumentum videri caelius ait non, si sub tempus venditionis, hoc est biduo ante venditionem ornatum sit, sed si in ipsa venditione ornatum sit, aut ideo, inquit, venale cum esset sic ornatum inspiceretur: semperque cum de ornamentis agitur, et in actione et in edicto adiectum est: " vendendi causa ornata ducta esse": poterit enim iumentum ornatum itineris causa duci, deinde venire.
Caelius says that a beast of burden is not considered adorned for the purpose of sale if, around the time of the sale—that is, two days before the sale—it was adorned, but if at the sale itself it was adorned; or for this reason, he says, that when it was for sale it would be inspected thus adorned. And always, when the matter is about ornaments, both in the action and in the edict it is added: "that it was led adorned for the purpose of sale"; for a beast of burden can be led adorned for the purpose of a journey, and then be sold.
Si forte iugum mularum sit, quarum altera vitiosa est, non ex pretio tantum vitiosae, sed ex utriusque erit componendum, quanti minoris sit: cum enim uno pretio utraeque venierint, non est separandum pretium, sed quanto minoris cum veniret utrumque fuit, non alterum quod erat vitiosum.
If perchance there is a yoke of mules, of which one is defective, the abatement is to be assessed not from the price of the defective one alone, but from that of both—namely, by how much less it is worth; for since both were sold for a single price, the price is not to be separated, but the measure is by how much less the pair was worth when it was sold, not merely the one that was defective.
Cum autem iumenta paria veneunt, edicto expressum est, ut, cum alterum in ea causa sit, ut redhiberi debeat, utrumque redhibeatur: in qua re tam emptori quam venditori consulitur, dum iumenta non separantur. simili modo et si triga venierit, redhibenda erit tota, et si quadriga, redhibeatur. sed si duo paria mularum sint et una mula vitiosa sit vel par, solum par redhibebitur, alterum non: si tamen nondum sint paria constituta, sed simpliciter quattuor mulae uno pretio venierint, unius erit mulae redhibitio, non omnium: nam et si polia venierit, dicemus unum equum qui vitiosus est, non omnem poliam redhiberi oportere.
But when draught animals are sold in pairs, it is set forth by the edict that, when one is in such a condition that it ought to be redhibitted, both are to be redhibitted: in which matter provision is made for both buyer and seller, so long as the animals are not separated. In a similar way, if a three-horse team (triga) has been sold, the whole must be redhibitted, and if a four-horse team (quadriga), it must be redhibitted. But if there are two pairs of mules and one mule is unsound or one pair is, only the pair will be redhibitted, not the other: however, if the pairs have not yet been constituted, but simply four mules have been sold for one price, the redhibition will be of one mule, not of all: for even if a team (polia) has been sold, we will say that the one horse which is defective ought to be redhibitted, not the entire team.
" qua vulgo iter fiet, ita habuisse velit, ut cuiquam nocere damnumve dare possit. si adversus ea factum erit et homo liber ex ea re perierit, solidi ducenti, si nocitum homini libero esse dicetur, quanti bonum aequum iudici videbitur, condemnetur, ceterarum rerum, quanti damnum datum factumve sit, dupli".
"Where a way is commonly taken, if someone should wish to keep it so that it can harm anyone or give damage: if an act is done against these terms and a free man has perished from that matter, let there be condemnation in 200 solidi; if it shall be said that harm has been done to a free man, let him be condemned in as much as shall seem good and equitable to the judge; for other things, in double the amount for which the damage has been given or the deed done."
Si quis servum emerit et rapto eo vi bonorum raptorum actione quadruplum consecutus est, deinde servum redhibeat, reddere debebit quod accepit: sed si per eum servum iniuriam passus iniuriae nomine egerit, non reddet venditori: aliter forsitan atque si loris ab aliquo caeso aut quaestione de eo habita emptor egerit.
If someone has bought a slave, and, the slave having been carried off, has by the action for goods taken by force obtained fourfold, then if he redhibits the slave he will have to give back what he received: but if on account of that slave he has suffered an injury and has sued under the head of iniuria, he will not give it back to the seller—perhaps otherwise than if the buyer has brought suit because the slave was lashed with thongs by someone or because a quaestio was held concerning him.
Aliquando etiam redhiberi mancipium debebit, licet aestimatoria, id est quanto minoris, agamus: nam si adeo nullius sit pretii, ut ne expediat quidem tale mancipium domini habere, veluti si furiosum aut lunaticum sit, licet aestimatoria actum fuerit, officio tamen iudicis continebitur, ut reddito mancipio pretium recipiatur.
Sometimes the slave will even have to be redhibitted, although we are proceeding by the aestimatory—that is, how-much-less—action: for if it is of so no value that it is not even expedient for the owner to have such a slave, for instance if it is insane or a lunatic, although the action has been brought as aestimatory, nevertheless it will be encompassed within the judge’s office that, the slave being returned, the price be recovered.
Si sub condicione homo emptus sit, redhibitoria actio ante condicionem exsistentem inutiliter agitur, quia nondum perfecta emptio arbitrio iudicis imperfecta fieri non potest: et ideo etsi ex empto vel vendito vel redhibitoria ante actum fuerit, expleta condicione iterum agi poterit.
If a person has been bought under a condition, a redhibitory action brought before the condition exists is prosecuted ineffectually, because a sale not yet perfected cannot be made imperfect by the arbitrament of the judge; and therefore, even if an action ex empto or ex vendito or a redhibitory action has been brought beforehand, once the condition is fulfilled it can be brought again.
Interdum etiamsi pura sit venditio, propter iuris condicionem in suspenso est, veluti si servus, in quo alterius usus fructus, alterius proprietas est, aliquid emerit: nam dum incertum est, ex cuius re pretium solvat, pendet, cui sit adquisitum, et ideo neutri eorum redhibitoria competit.
Sometimes, even if the sale is pure (unconditional), because of the legal condition it is in suspense, as, for instance, if a slave, in whom the usufruct belongs to one person and the ownership to another, has bought something: for while it is uncertain from whose property he will pay the price, it hangs in doubt to whom it has been acquired, and therefore the redhibitory action belongs to neither of them.
Iustissime aediles noluerunt hominem ei rei quae minoris esset accedere, ne qua fraus aut edicto aut iure civili fieret: ut ait pedius, propter dignitatem hominum: alioquin eandem rationem fuisse et in ceteris rebus: ridiculum namque esse tunicae fundum accedere. ceterum hominis venditioni quidvis adicere licet: nam et plerumque plus in peculio est quam in servo, et nonnumquam vicarius qui accedit pluris est quam is servus qui venit.
Most justly the aediles did not wish a human being to accede to a thing which was of lesser value, lest any fraud be done either against the edict or the civil law: as Pedius says, on account of the dignity of human beings: otherwise the same reasoning would have applied also in other things: for it is ridiculous for the hem of a tunic to accede. Moreover, to the sale of a person one may add anything: for often there is more in the peculium than in the slave, and sometimes the vicarius who is added is of greater price than the slave who is being sold.
Proponitur actio ex hoc edicto in eum cuius maxima pars in venditione fuerit, quia plerumque venaliciarii ita societatem coeunt, ut quidquid agunt in commune videantur agere: aequum enim aedilibus visum est vel in unum ex his, cuius maior pars aut nulla parte minor esset, aedilicias actiones competere, ne cogeretur emptor cum multis litigare, quamvis actio ex empto cum singulis sit pro portione, qua socii fuerunt: nam id genus hominum ad lucrum potius vel turpiter faciendum pronius est.
An action is set forth under this edict against him who had the greatest part in the sale, because for the most part the slave-dealers (venaliciarii) enter into partnership in such a way that whatever they do seems to be done in common: for it seemed equitable to the aediles that the aedilician actions should be available even against one of these, whose share was greater or in no part lesser, lest the buyer be compelled to litigate with many, although the action ex empto exists against individuals in proportion to the share in which they were partners: for that kind of men is more prone to profit, even to making it by shameful means.
In redhibitoria vel aestimatoria potest dubitari, an, quia alienum servum vendidit, et ob evictionem et propter morbum forte vel fugam simul teneri potest: nam potest dici nihil interesse emptoris sanum esse, fugitivum non esse eum, qui evictus sit. sed interfuit emptoris sanum possedisse propter operas, neque ex postfacto decrescat obligatio: statim enim ut servus traditus est committitur stipulatio quanti interest emptoris.
In the redhibitory or the estimatory action, it can be doubted whether, because he sold another’s slave, he can be held at the same time both on account of eviction and on account of disease perhaps or flight: for it can be said that it is of no interest to the buyer that he be sound, that he not be a fugitive, who has been evicted. But it did matter to the buyer to have possessed him sound for the sake of his services, nor does the obligation diminish ex post facto: for immediately, as soon as the slave has been delivered, the stipulation for how much the buyer’s interest amounts to is triggered.
Redhibitoria actio duplicem habet condemnationem: modo enim in duplum, modo in simplum condemnatur venditor. nam si neque pretium neque accessionem solvat neque eum qui eo nomine obligatus erit liberet, dupli pretii et accessionis condemnari iubetur: si vero reddat pretium et accessionem vel eum qui eo nomine obligatus est liberet, simpli videtur condemnari.
The redhibitory action has a twofold condemnation: for at one time the seller is condemned in double, at another in single. For if he pays neither the price nor the accessions, nor releases the person who is obligated on that account, he is ordered to be condemned for double the price and the accessions; but if he does return the price and the accessions, or releases the person who is obligated on that account, he is deemed to be condemned for the single.
Etiam in fundo vendito redhibitionem procedere nequaquam incertum est, veluti si pestilens fundus distractus sit: nam redhibendus erit. et benignum est dicere vectigalis exactionem futuri temporis post redhibitionem adversus emptorem cessare.
Even in the case of a sold estate, it is by no means uncertain that redhibition proceeds, as for example if a pestilent estate has been sold: for it will have to be redhibited. And it is equitable to say that the exaction of the vectigal (tax/rent) for future time, after redhibition, ceases as against the purchaser.
Cum mancipium morbosum vel vitiosum servus emat et redhibitoria vel ex empto dominus experiatur, omnimodo scientiam servi, non domini spectandam esse ait, ut nihil intersit, peculiari an domini nomine emerit et certum incertumve mandante eo emerit, quia tunc et illud ex bona fide est servum, cum quo negotium sit gestum, deceptum non esse, et rursus delictum eiusdem, quod in contrahendo admiserit, domino nocere debet. sed si servus mandatu domini hominem emerit, quem dominus vitiosum esse sciret, non tenetur venditor.
When a slave buys a sick or defective mancipium, and the master brings the redhibitory action or the action from purchase, he says that in every way it is the knowledge of the slave, not of the master, that must be looked to, so that it makes no difference whether he bought with his peculium or in the master’s name, and whether he bought on a definite or an indefinite mandate from him; for then this too is a matter of good faith: that the slave with whom the business has been transacted not be deceived; and, conversely, the delict of that same person, which he has committed in contracting, ought to prejudice the master. But if the slave, by the master’s mandate, has bought a person whom the master knew to be defective, the seller is not liable.
Circa procuratoris personam, cum quidem ipse scierit morbosum vitiosum esse, non dubitandum, quin, quamvis ipse domino mandati vel negotiorum gestorum actione sit obstrictus, nihilo magis eo nomine agere possit: at cum ipse ignorans esse vitiosum mandatu domini qui id sciret emerit et redhibitoria agat, ex persona domini utilem exceptionem ei non putabat opponendam.
Concerning the procurator’s person: when indeed he himself knew it to be diseased and defective, there is no doubt that, although he himself is bound to the master by the action of mandate or of negotia gesta, he is none the more able to sue under that head; but when he himself, ignorant that it was defective, has purchased by the mandate of the master who knew it and brings the redhibitory action, he did not think that a useful exception derived from the person of the master ought to be set up against him.
Cum sex menses utiles, quibus experiundi potestas fuit, redhibitoriae actioni praestantur, non videbitur potestatem experiundi habuisse, qui vitium fugitivi latens ignoravit: non idcirco tamen dissolutam ignorationem emptoris excusari oportebit.
Since six useful months, during which there was a power of bringing suit, are afforded to the redhibitory action, he will not be seen to have had the power of bringing suit who was ignorant of the latent defect of fugitive status; not on that account, however, ought the buyer’s lax ignorance to be excused.
Si servus mancipium emit et dominus redhibitoria agat, non aliter ei venditor daturus est, quam si omnia praestiterit quae huic actioni continentur et quidem solida, non peculio tenus: nam et si ex empto dominus agat, nisi pretium totum solverit, nihil consequitur.
If a slave buys a mancipium, and the master brings the redhibitory action, the vendor will be bound to give to him only if he has made good everything that is contained in this action, and indeed in solidum, not merely up to the peculium: for even if the master sues ex empto, unless he has paid the whole price, he obtains nothing.
Quod si servus vel filius vendiderit, redhibitoria in peculium competit. in peculio autem et causa redhibitionis continebitur: nec nos moveat, quod antequam reddatur servus non est in peculio ( non enim potest esse in peculio servus, qui adhuc emptoris est): sed causa ipsius redhibitionis in peculio computatur: igitur si servus decem milibus emptus quinque milibus sit, haec quoque in peculio esse dicemus. hoc ita, si nihil domino debeat aut ademptum peculium non est: quod si plus domino debeat, eveniet, ut hominem praestet et nihil consequatur.
But if a slave or a son has sold, the redhibitory action lies against the peculium. In the peculium, moreover, the cause of redhibition will also be contained: nor let it move us that before the slave is given back he is not in the peculium ( for a slave who is still the buyer’s cannot be in the peculium): but the cause of the redhibition itself is computed in the peculium: therefore, if a slave bought for ten thousand stands at five thousand, we shall say that this too is in the peculium. This is so, if he owes nothing to the master or the peculium has not been taken away; but if he owes more to the master, it will come about that he furnishes the man and recovers nothing.
Quaero, an, si servus apud emptorem fugit et in causa redhibitionis esse pronuntiatus fuerit, non prius venditori restitui debeat, quam rerum ablatarum a servo aestimationem praestiterit. paulus respondit venditorem cogendum non tantum pretium servi restituere, sed etiam rerum ablatarum aestimationem, nisi si pro his paratus sit servum noxae nomine relinquere.
I inquire whether, if a slave has fled while with the buyer and has been pronounced to be in a case for redhibition, he ought not to be restored to the seller before he has provided the valuation of the things carried off by the slave. paulus responded that the seller must be compelled not only to restore the price of the slave, but also the valuation of the things carried off, unless he is ready, for these, to relinquish the slave by way of noxal surrender.
Item quaero, si nolit aestimationem et pretia rerum restituere, an servus retinendus sit et danda sit actio de peculio vel de pretio redhibiti servi ex duplae stipulatione. paulus respondit de pretio servi repetendo competere actionem etiam ex duplae stipulatione: de rebus per furtum ablatis iam responsum est.
Likewise I ask, if he is unwilling to restore the valuation and the prices of the items, whether the slave should be retained and whether an action be given de peculio or for the price of the redhibited slave from the stipulation for the double. paulus replied that an action lies for recovering the price of the slave even from the stipulation for the double: as to things carried off by theft, it has already been answered.
Servum dupla emi, qui rebus ablatis fugit: mox inventus praesentibus honestis viris interrogatus, an et in domo venditoris fugisset, respondit fugisse: quaero, an standum sit responso servi. paulus respondit: si et ^ ei^ alia indicia prioris fugae non deficiunt, tunc etiam servi responso credendum est ^ ^ .
I bought a slave on double terms, who, after the goods had been removed, fled: soon found, with honorable men present, being interrogated whether he had also fled in the seller’s house, he replied that he had fled: I ask whether one should stand by the slave’s response. paulus responded: if also ^ to him^ other indicia of the prior flight are not lacking, then even the slave’s response is to be believed ^ ^ .
Si quis duos homines uno pretio emerit et alter in ea causa est, ut redhibeatur, deinde petatur pretium totum, exceptio erit obicienda: si tamen pars pretii petatur, magis dicetur non nocere exceptionem, nisi forte ea sit causa, in qua propter alterius vitium utrumque mancipium redhibendum sit.
If someone has bought two persons for a single price, and one is in such a condition that he is to be redhibited, then if the whole price is demanded, an exception must be pleaded; however, if a part of the price is demanded, it will rather be said that the exception does not harm, unless perhaps it is a case in which, because of the defect of the other, both slaves must be redhibited.
Ad res donatas edictum aedilium curulium non pertinere dicendum est: etenim quid se restituturum donator repromittit, quando nullum pretium interveniat? quid ergo si res ab eo cui donata est melior facta sit, numquid quanti eius qui meliorem fecit interest donator conveniatur? quod minime dicendum est, ne eo casu liberalitatis suae donator poenam patiatur.
It should be said that the edict of the curule aediles does not pertain to things donated: for what does the donor promise to restore, when no price has intervened? What then if the thing has been made better by the one to whom it was donated—should the donor be sued for as much as it is the interest of him who made it better? This is by no means to be said, lest in that case the donor suffer a penalty for his own liberality.
Sciendum est ad venditiones solas hoc edictum pertinere non tantum mancipiorum, verum ceterarum quoque rerum. cur autem de locationibus nihil edicatur, mirum videbatur: haec tamen ratio redditur vel quia numquam istorum de hac re fuerat iurisdictio vel quia non similiter locationes ut venditiones fiunt.
It must be known that this edict pertains to venditions (sales) alone, not only of slaves but also of other things. But why nothing is proclaimed by edict concerning lettings (leases) seemed strange: yet this rationale is given, either because jurisdiction over this matter had never belonged to these men, or because lettings are not effected in the same way as venditions (sales).
Quotiens morbus sonticus nominatur, eum significari cassius ait, qui noceat: nocere autem intellegi, qui perpetuus est, non qui tempore finiatur: sed morbum sonticum eum videri, qui inciderit in hominem postquam is natus sit: sontes enim nocentes dici.
Whenever a morbus sonticus is named, Cassius says that what is signified is that which harms; and to harm is understood to be that which is perpetual, not that which is finished by time; but a morbus sonticus is considered to be that which has fallen upon a man after he has been born; for the sontes are said to be nocentes.
Servus tam veterator quam novicius dici potest. sed veteratorem non spatio serviendi, sed genere et causa aestimandum caelius ait: nam quicumque ex venalicio noviciorum emptus alicui ministerio praepositus sit, statim eum veteratorum numero esse: novicium autem non tirocinio animi, sed condicione servitutis intellegi. nec ad rem pertinere, latine sciat nec ne: nam ob id veteratorem esse, si liberalibus studiis eruditus sit.
A slave can be termed either a “veterator” or a “novice.” But Caelius says that a veterator is to be assessed not by the span of serving, but by the kind and the cause: for whoever, though bought from the sales-room of novices, has been put in charge of some service for someone, is immediately in the number of the veteratores; while a novice is understood not by an apprenticeship of mind, but by the condition of servitude. Nor does it pertain to the matter whether he knows Latin or not: for on that account he is a veterator, if he has been instructed in liberal studies.
Sive tota res evincatur sive pars, habet regressum emptor in venditorem. sed cum pars evincatur, si quidem pro indiviso evincatur, regressum habet pro quantitate evictae partis: quod si certus locus sit evictus, non pro indiviso portio fundi, pro bonitate loci erit regressus. quid enim, si quod fuit in agro pretiosissimum, hoc evictum est, aut quod fuit in agro vilissimum?
Whether the whole thing is evicted or a part, the buyer has recourse against the seller. But when a part is evicted, if indeed it is evicted as an undivided share (pro indiviso), he has recourse for the quantity of the evicted part; but if a definite place is evicted, not an undivided portion of the farm, the recourse will be according to the quality of the place. For what if that which was the most valuable in the field is what has been evicted, or what if that which was the least valuable in the field?
Cum in venditione servi peculium semper exceptum esse intellegitur, is homo ex peculio summam quandam secum abstulerat. si propter hanc causam furti cum emptore actum sit, non reverteretur emptor ad venditorem ex stipulatione duplae, quia furtis noxisque solutum esse praestari debet venditionis tempore, haec autem actio postea esse coeperit.
Since in the sale of a slave the peculium is always understood to be excepted, this man had carried off with himself a certain sum from the peculium. If on this account an action for theft has been brought against the purchaser, the purchaser would not revert to the seller on the stipulation for the double, because at the time of the sale it must be warranted that he is free from thefts and noxal liabilities, whereas this action arose only afterward.
Si impuberis nomine tutor vendiderit, evictione secuta papinianus libro tertio responsorum ait dari in eum cuius tutela gesta sit utilem actionem, sed adicit in id demum, quod rationibus eius accepto latum est. sed an in totum, si tutor solvendo non sit, videamus: quod magis puto: neque enim male contrahitur cum tutoribus.
If a tutor has sold in the name of a minor, and eviction has followed, Papinian, in the third book of the Responsa, says that a useful action is given against him whose tutelage has been administered, but he adds: only up to that which, in his accounts, has been entered as received for him. But whether for the whole, if the tutor is not solvent, let us consider: which I rather think; for one does not contract badly with tutors.
Servi venditor peculium accessurum dixit. si vicarius evictus sit, nihil praestaturum venditorem labeo ait, quia sive non fuit in peculio, non accesserit, sive fuerit, iniuriam a iudice emptor passus est: aliter atque si nominatim servum accedere dixisset: tunc enim praestare deberet in peculio eum esse.
The seller of the slave said that the peculium would accede. If a vicarius has been evicted, Labeo says the seller will owe/warrant nothing, because whether he was not in the peculium, he did not accede; or if he was, the buyer suffered a wrong at the hands of the judge. It is otherwise than if he had said by name that the slave would accede: for then he ought to warrant that he is in the peculium.
Venditor hominis emptori praestare debet, quanti eius interest hominem venditoris fuisse. quare sive partus ancillae sive hereditas, quam servus iussu emptoris adierit, evicta fuerit, agi ex empto potest: et sicut obligatus est venditor, ut praestet licere habere hominem quem vendidit, ita ea quoque quae per eum adquiri potuerunt praestare debet emptori, ut habeat.
The seller of a slave must make good to the buyer, to the extent of the buyer’s interest, that the man belonged to the seller. Wherefore, whether the offspring of a handmaid or an inheritance which the slave, by the buyer’s order, has entered upon, is evicted, an action ex empto can be brought; and just as the seller is bound to warrant that it is permissible to have the man whom he sold, so too he must make good to the buyer those things which could have been acquired through him, so that the buyer may have them.
Lucius titius praedia in germania trans renum emit et partem pretii intulit: cum in residuam quantitatem heres emptoris conveniretur, quaestionem rettulit dicens has possessiones ex praecepto principali partim distractas, partim veteranis in praemia adsignatas: quaero, an huius rei periculum ad venditorem pertinere possit. paulus respondit futuros casus evictionis post contractam emptionem ad venditorem non pertinere et ideo secundum ea quae proponuntur pretium praediorum peti posse.
Lucius Titius bought estates in Germany across the Rhine and paid part of the price: when the heir of the buyer was proceeded against for the remaining amount, he referred a question, saying that these possessions, by imperial precept, had been partly sold off, partly assigned to the veterans as rewards: I ask whether the risk of this matter can pertain to the seller. Paulus responded that future cases of eviction, after the purchase has been contracted, do not pertain to the seller, and therefore, according to the things set forth, the price of the estates can be demanded.
Si servus, cuius nomine duplam stipulati sumus, evictus fuerit a nobis: ob id quod fugitivus vel sanus non fuerit an agere nihilo minus possimus, quaeritur. proculus videndum ait, ne hoc quoque intersit, utrum tum evictus sit, cum meus factus non esset, an tum cum meus factus esset: in eo enim casu quo meus factus est statim mea interest, quanto ob id deterior est, et quam actionem semel ex stipulatu habere coepi, eam nec evictione nec morte nec manumissione nec fuga servi nec ulla simili causa amitti: at si in bonis meis factus non sit, nihil ob ea quod fugitivus sit pauperior sim, utpote cum in bonis meis non sit. quod si sanum esse, erronem non esse stipulatus essem, tantum mea interesse, quantum ad praesentem usum pertineret, tametsi in obscuro esset ( utpote ignorantibus nobis, quamdiu eum habiturus essem et an futurum esset, ut eum quisquam aut a me aut ab eo cui vendidissem cuive similiter promisissem evinceret). summam autem opinionis suae hanc esse, ut tantum ex ea stipulatione consequar, quanti mea intersit aut post stipulationem interfuerit eum servum fugitivum non esse.
If a slave, in whose name we have stipulated the double, has been evicted from us: the question is asked whether, on account of his having been a fugitive or not sound, we can nonetheless bring an action. Proculus says one must consider whether this also makes a difference, whether he was evicted at a time when he had not become mine, or at a time when he had become mine: for in the case in which he has become mine, immediately it is my concern by how much he is worse on that account, and the action which once I have begun to have from the stipulation (ex stipulatu) is not lost either by eviction or by death or by manumission or by the slave’s flight or by any similar cause; but if he has not come into my goods, I am by nothing the poorer because he is a fugitive, seeing that he is not in my goods. And if I had stipulated that he be sound, that he be not an errant, only so much would it be my concern as pertained to the present use, although it would be in the dark ( utpote ignorantibus nobis, how long I would have him and whether it would be going to happen that someone would evict him either from me or from the one to whom I had sold him or to whom I had similarly promised). But the sum of his opinion is this: that I obtain from that stipulation only as much as my interest is, or after the stipulation would have been, that that slave not be a fugitive.
Vindicantem venditorem rem, quam ipse vendidit, exceptione doli posse summoveri nemini dubium est, quamvis alio iure dominium quaesierit: improbe enim rem a se distractam evincere conatur. eligere autem emptor potest, utrum rem velit retinere intentione per exceptionem elisa, an potius re ablata ex causa stipulationis duplum consequi.
That a seller vindicating the thing which he himself sold can be warded off by the exceptio of fraud (dolus) is doubted by no one, even if he has acquired ownership by another right; for he is attempting, unscrupulously, to evict a thing that he himself alienated. Moreover, the buyer can choose whether he wishes to retain the thing, the claim (intentio) having been crushed by the exception, or rather, if the thing is taken away, to obtain the double under the stipulation cause (ex causa stipulationis duplum).
Fundum meum obligavi, deinde alienavi tibi: ut eo nomine non obligeris, si eum postea abs te emam et satis pro evictione mihi des, excipiendum cautione, quod pro me obligatus sit, quia etiam non excepto eo agendo eo nomine contra te doli mali exceptione possim summoveri.
I mortgaged my estate, and then alienated it to you: so that you be not bound under that head, if I later buy it back from you and you give me satisfaction for eviction, there must be an exception inserted in the cautio (stipulation) to the effect that you are bound on my account; for even if that be not excepted, if I proceed to sue you on that ground, I can be warded off by the exception of fraud (exceptio doli mali).
Et ideo ait, si emptor hominis mota sibi controversia venditorem dederit procuratorem isque victus litis aestimationem sustulerit, stipulationem duplae non committi, quia nec mandati actionem procurator hic idemque venditor habet, ut ab emptore litis aestimationem consequatur: cum igitur neque corpus neque pecunia emptori absit, non oportet committi stipulationem: quamvis, si ipse iudicio accepto victus esset et litis aestimationem sustulisset, placeat committi stipulationem, ut et ipse iulianus eodem libro scripsit. neque enim habere licet eum, cuius si pretium quis non dedisset, ab adversario auferretur: prope enim hunc ex secunda emptione, id est ex litis aestimatione emptori habere licet, non ex pristina.
And therefore he says that, if the buyer of a person, a controversy having been raised against him, should appoint the seller as procurator, and he, being defeated, has borne the valuation of the suit (litis aestimatio), the stipulation for the double (duplae) is not incurred, because the procurator, who here is the same as the seller, does not have an action of mandate (actio mandati) to obtain from the buyer the valuation of the suit; since therefore neither the body nor money is absent from the buyer, the stipulation ought not to be incurred. Although, if he himself, having accepted the action, had been defeated and had borne the valuation of the suit, it is approved that the stipulation be incurred, as Julian also wrote in the same book. For it is not permitted to be said to “have” him, one who, if someone had not paid the price, would be taken away by the adversary: for, as it were, he is allowed to have him from a second purchase, that is, from the valuation of the suit, not from the original one.
Idem iulianus eodem libro scribit, si lite contestata fugerit homo culpa possessoris, damnatus quidem erit possessor, sed non statim eum ad venditorem regressurum et ex duplae stipulatione acturum, quia interim non propter evictionem, sed propter fugam ei hominem habere non licet: plane, inquit, cum adprehenderit possessionem fugitivi, tunc committi stipulationem iulianus ait. nam et si sine culpa possessoris fugisset, deinde cautionibus interpositis absolutus esset, non alias committeretur stipulatio, quam si adprehensum hominem restituisset. ubi igitur litis aestimationem optulit, sufficit adprehendere: ubi cavit, non prius, nisi restituerit.
The same Julian writes in the same book that, if after joinder of issue a man (slave) has fled through the possessor’s fault, the possessor will indeed be condemned, but he will not immediately regress to the seller and proceed on the stipulation for the double, because meanwhile it is not on account of eviction, but on account of the flight, that it is not permitted him to have the man: clearly, he says, when he has apprehended possession of the fugitive, then the stipulation is committed, says Julian. For even if he had fled without the possessor’s fault, and thereafter, securities having been interposed, he had been absolved, the stipulation would not be committed otherwise than if he had restored the apprehended man. Where therefore he has offered the valuation of the suit, it suffices to apprehend; where he has given security, not earlier, unless he has restored.
Si pro evictione fundi quem emit mulier satis accepisset et eundem fundum in dotem dedisset, deinde aliquis eum a marito per iudicium abstulisset, potest mulier statim agere adversus fideiussores emptionis nomine, quasi minorem dotem habere coepisset vel etiam nullam, si tantum maritus optulisset, quanti fundus esset.
If a woman had received surety for the eviction of a fundus which she purchased and had given the same fundus as dowry, then if someone had removed it from the husband by judgment, the woman can at once bring an action against the sureties in the name of the purchase, as though she had begun to have a smaller dowry, or even none, if the husband had tendered only as much as the fundus was worth.
Non tamen ei consequens esse, ut et, si ipsi domino nuptura in dotem eum dederit, committi stipulationem dicamus, quamvis aeque indotata mulier futura sit, quoniam quidem, etiamsi verum sit habere ei non licere servum, illud tamen verum non sit iudicio eum evictum esse. ex empto tamen contra venditorem mulier habet actionem.
Nevertheless, it does not follow for her that, if she, about to marry the master himself, has given him the slave as a dowry, we should say the stipulation is triggered, although the woman will be equally undowered, since indeed, even if it is true that it is not permitted for her to have a slave, yet it is not true that he has been evicted by judgment. From purchase, however, the woman has an action against the seller.
Hoc iure utimur, ut exceptiones ex persona emptoris obiectae si obstant, venditor ei non teneatur, si vero ad personam venditoris respicient, contra: certe nec ex empto nec ex stipulatione duplae nec simplae actio competit emptori, si exceptio ei ex facto ipsius opposita obstiterit.
We employ this law: that if exceptions objected from the person of the buyer stand in the way, the seller is not held to him; but if they regard the person of the seller, the contrary. Certainly neither an action ex empto nor an action from a stipulation for the double (duplae) nor for the simple (simplae) accrues to the buyer, if an exception, opposed to him from his own deed, has obstructed him.
Si rem, quam mihi alienam vendideras, a domino redemerim, falsum esse quod nerva respondisset posse te a me pretium consequi ex vendito agentem, quasi habere mihi rem liceret, celsus filius aiebat, quia nec bonae fidei conveniret et ego ex alia causa rem haberem.
If I have bought back from the owner a thing which you had sold to me as belonging to another, Celsus the son said that what Nerva had replied was false—that you could obtain the price from me by bringing an action ex vendito—as though it were permitted for me to have the thing, because it would not accord with good faith, and I would possess the thing on a different ground.
Si duplae stipulator ex possessore petitor factus et victus sit, quam rem si possideret retinere potuerit, peti ita ^ ^ autem utiliter non poterit, vel ipso iure promissor duplae tutus erit vel certe doli mali exceptione se tueri poterit, sed ita, si culpa vel sponte duplae stipulatoris possessio amissa fuerit.
If the stipulator for the double, having become a claimant against the possessor, should be defeated, in a matter which, if he were possessing it, he could have retained, it cannot, thus ^ ^, be usefully sought; rather the promissor of the double will be secure ipso iure, or at any rate he will be able to protect himself by the exception of dolus malus—but only if the possession was lost through the fault of the stipulator for the double, or voluntarily.
Si ita quis stipulanti spondeat " sanum esse, furem non esse, vispellionem non esse" et cetera, inutilis stipulatio quibusdam videtur, quia si quis est in hac causa, impossibile est quod promittitur, si non est, frustra est. sed ego puto verius hanc stipulationem " furem non esse, vispellionem non esse, sanum esse" utilem esse: hoc enim continere, quod interest horum quid esse vel horum quid non esse. sed et si cui horum fuerit adiectum " praestari", multo magis valere stipulationem: alioquin stipulatio quae ab aedilibus proponitur inutilis erit, quod utique nemo sanus probabit.
If someone thus promises to one stipulating " to be sane, not to be a thief, not to be a corpse-handler" and so forth, the stipulation seems useless to some, because if someone is in this condition, what is promised is impossible; if he is not, it is in vain. But I think more truly that this stipulation " not to be a thief, not to be a corpse-handler, to be sane" is useful: for it contains this, that it is of interest that some of these be or that some of these not be. But even if to any of these there has been added " to be warranted", the stipulation is all the more valid: otherwise the stipulation which is proposed by the aediles will be useless, which surely no sane person will approve.
Quia dicitur, quotiens plures res in stipulationem deducuntur, plures esse stipulationes, an et in duplae stipulatione hoc idem sit, videamus. cum quis stipulatur " fugitivum non esse, erronem non esse" et cetera quae ex edicto aedilium curulium promittuntur, utrum una stipulatio est an plures? et ratio facit, ut plures sint.
Because it is said that, whenever several things are brought into stipulation, there are several stipulations, let us see whether this same holds also in the stipulation for the double. When someone stipulates, “that he is not a fugitive, that he is not a wanderer,” and the rest which are promised from the edict of the curule aediles, is it one stipulation or several? And reason makes it that they are several.
Ergo et illud procedit, quod iulianus libro quinto decimo digestorum scribit. egit, inquit, quanti minoris propter fugam servi, deinde agit propter morbum: id agendum est, inquit, ne lucrum faciat emptor et bis eiusdem vitii aestimationem consequatur. fingamus emptum decem, minoris autem empturum fuisse duobus, si tantum fugitivum esse scisset emptor: haec consecutum propter fugam mox comperisse, quod non esset sanus: similiter duobus minoris empturum fuisse, si de morbo non ignorasset: rursus consequi debebit duo: nam et si de utroque simul egisset, quattuor esset consecuturus, quia eum forte, qui neque sanus et fugitivus esset, sex tantum esset empturus.
Therefore this too holds, which Julian writes in the fifteenth book of the Digesta. “He brought,” he says, “an action for how much less on account of the slave’s flight; then he brings an action on account of sickness.” It must be arranged, he says, that the buyer not make a profit and obtain twice the valuation of the same defect. Let us suppose the thing was bought for ten, and that he would have bought it for two less if the buyer had only known it was a fugitive: having obtained this on account of the flight, he soon learned that it was not sound. Likewise, he would have bought it for two less if he had not been ignorant of the sickness: he should obtain two again. For even if he had sued for both at the same time, he would have obtained four, because for one who was both not sound and a fugitive, he would have bought it for only six.
Si mancipium ita emeris, ne prostituatur et, cum prostitutum fuisset, ut liberum esset: si contra legem venditionis faciente te ad libertatem pervenerit, tu videris quasi manumisisse et ideo nullum adversus venditorem habebis regressum.
If you purchase a slave on these terms—that he not be prostituted and that, if he should have been prostituted, he be free—then, if contrary to the law of the sale, by your own act he has come to liberty, you will be regarded as though you had manumitted him, and therefore you will have no recourse against the seller.
Si communi dividundo mecum actum esset et adversario servus adiudicatus sit, quia probavit eum communem esse, habebo ex duplae stipulatione actionem, quia non interest, quo genere iudicii evincatur, ut mihi habere non liceat.
If proceedings for dividing common property had been carried on with me and the slave has been adjudicated to the adversary, because he proved him to be held in common, I shall have an action on the stipulation for the double, because it makes no difference by what kind of judgment he is evicted, so that it is not permitted for me to have him.
Evictus autem a creditore tunc videtur, cum fere spes habendi abscisa est: itaque si serviana actione evictus sit, committitur quidem stipulatio: sed quoniam soluta a debitore pecunia potest servum habere, si soluto pignore venditor conveniatur, poterit uti doli exceptione.
However, he is deemed evicted by a creditor when the hope of having is almost cut off: and so, if he has been evicted by the Servian action, the stipulation does indeed come into effect; but since, with the money paid by the debtor, he can have the slave, if, the pledge having been released, the seller is sued, he will be able to use the exception of fraud.
Quod autem diximus duplam promitti oportere, sic erit accipiendum, ut non ex omni re id accipiamus, sed de his rebus, quae pretiosiores essent, si margarita forte aut ornamenta pretiosa vel vestis serica vel quid aliud non contemptibile veneat. per edictum autem curulium etiam de servo cavere venditor iubetur.
But as to what we have said, that the double ought to be promised, it is to be understood thus: that we do not take this from every thing, but for those items which are more precious—if, for instance, a pearl or precious ornaments or a silk garment, or some other not contemptible thing, is sold. Moreover, by the edict of the Curule Aediles the seller is ordered also to give security concerning a slave.
Si simplam pro dupla per errorem stipulatus sit emptor, re evicta consecuturum eum ex empto neratius ait, quanto minus stipulatus sit, si modo omnia facit emptor, quae in stipulatione continentur: quod si non fecit, ex empto id tantum consecuturum, ut ei promittatur quod minus in stipulationem superiorem deductum est.
If the buyer, by error, stipulated simple instead of double, upon eviction Neratius says he will obtain under the ex empto action as much as he stipulated less, provided only that the buyer does everything that is contained in the stipulation; but if he has not done so, he will obtain under ex empto only this: that there be promised to him what was less brought into the earlier stipulation.
In creditore qui pignus vendidit tractari potest, an re evicta vel ad hoc teneatur ex empto, ut quam habet adversus debitorem actionem, eam praestet: habet autem contrariam pigneraticiam actionem. et magis est ut praestet: cui enim non aequum videbitur vel hoc saltem consequi emptorem, quod sine dispendio creditoris futurum est?
In the case of a creditor who has sold the pledge, it can be discussed whether, upon eviction of the thing, he is liable under the action ex empto at least to this extent: that he should provide (assign) the action which he has against the debtor; moreover, he has the contrary pignoratitious action. And it is more reasonable that he should provide it: for to whom will it not seem equitable that the purchaser should obtain at least this, which will be without loss to the creditor?
Minor viginti quinque annis fundum vendidit titio, eum titius seio: minor se in ea venditione circumscriptum dicit et impetrat cognitionem non tantum adversus titium, sed etiam adversus seium: seius postulabat apud praetorem utilem sibi de evictione stipulationem in titium dari: ego dandam putabam. respondi: iustam rem seius postulat: nam si ei fundus praetoria cognitione ablatus fuerit, aequum erit per eundem praetorem et evictionem restitui.
A minor under twenty-five years sold a landed estate to titius, and titius [sold] it to seius: the minor says that he was overreached in that sale and secures a cognition not only against titius but also against seius: seius was petitioning before the praetor that a useful stipulation for himself concerning eviction be granted against titius: I thought it ought to be granted. I answered: seius requests a just thing: for if the estate shall have been taken from him by praetorian cognition, it will be equitable that through the same praetor the eviction likewise be restored.
Si servus tuus emerit hominem et eundem vendiderit titio eiusque nomine duplam promiserit et tu a venditore servi stipulatus fueris: si titius servum petierit et ideo victus sit, quod servus tuus in tradendo sine voluntate tua proprietatem hominis transferre non potuisset, supererit publiciana actio et propter hoc duplae stipulatio ei non committetur: quare venditor quoque tuus agentem te ex stipulatu poterit doli mali exceptione summovere. alias autem si servus hominem emerit et duplam stipuletur, deinde eum vendiderit et ab emptore evictus fuerit: domino quidem adversus venditorem in solidum competit actio, emptori vero adversus dominum dumtaxat de peculio. denuntiare vero de evictione emptor servo, non domino debet: ita enim evicto homine utiliter de peculio agere poterit: sin autem servus decesserit, tunc domino denuntiandum est.
If your slave has bought a man and sold the same to Titius, and in his favor has promised the double, and you have stipulated from the vendor of the slave: if Titius has claimed the slave and for this reason has been defeated, because your slave, in delivering, could not have transferred the ownership of the man without your will, the Publician action will remain, and on this account the stipulation for the double will not be incurred for him; wherefore your vendor too will be able to ward you off, as you proceed ex stipulatu, by the exceptio doli mali. But otherwise, if the slave has bought a man and stipulates the double, then sells him and has been evicted by the buyer: the master indeed has an action in solidum against the vendor, but the buyer has against the master only de peculio. The buyer ought to give notice about the eviction to the slave, not to the master: thus, when the man has been evicted, he will be able to sue usefully de peculio; but if the slave has died, then notice must be given to the master.
Si a me bessem fundi emeris, a titio trientem, deinde partem dimidiam fundi a te quis petierit: si quidem ex besse quem a me acceperas semis petitus fuerit, titius non tenebitur, si vero triens quem titius tibi tradiderat et sextans ex besse quem a me acceperas petitus fuerit, titius quidem pro triente, ego pro sextante evictionem tibi praestabimus.
If you buy from me a bessis (two-thirds) of an estate, and from Titius a triens (one-third), then someone should demand from you a half share of the estate: if indeed a semis (one-half) out of the bessis which you had received from me is claimed, Titius will not be held liable; but if the triens which Titius had delivered to you and a sextans (one-sixth) out of the bessis which you had received from me are claimed, Titius for the triens, and I for the sextans, will furnish you warranty for eviction.
Pater sciens filium suum quem in potestate habebat ignoranti emptori vendidit: quaesitum est, an evictionis nomine teneatur. respondit: qui liberum hominem sciens vel ignorans tamquam servum vendat, evictionis nomine tenetur: quare etiam pater, si filium suum tamquam servum vendiderit, evictionis nomine obligatur.
A father, knowing, sold his son—whom he had in his power—to an unknowing buyer: it was asked whether he is held under the head of eviction. He answered: one who sells a free man, whether knowingly or unknowingly, as a slave, is held under the head of eviction: wherefore the father also, if he has sold his son as a slave, is bound under the head of eviction.
Qui servum venditum tradit et dicit usum fructum in eo seii esse, cum ad sempronium pertineat, sempronio usum fructum petente perinde tenetur, ac si in tradendo dixisset usus fructus nomine adversus seium non teneri. et si re vera seii usus fructus fuerit, legatus autem ita, ut, cum ad seium pertinere desisset, sempronii esset, sempronio usum fructum petente tenebitur, seio agente recte defugiet.
He who delivers a slave that has been sold and says that the usufruct in him is Seius’s, when it belongs to sempronius, is held liable, upon sempronius suing for the usufruct, in the same way as if, in delivering, he had said that under the title of usufruct he is not bound against seius. And if in truth the usufruct was seius’s, but a legacy had been made thus, that, when it ceased to belong to seius, it would be sempronius’s, upon sempronius suing for the usufruct he will be liable; if seius brings the action, he will rightly escape.
Si ei cui vendidi et duplam promissi, cum ipse eadem stipulatione mihi cavisset, heres exstiterim, evicto homine nulla parte stipulatio committitur: neque enim mihi evinci videtur, cum vendiderim eum, neque ei cui me promissorem praestarem, quoniam parum commode dicar ipse mihi duplam praestare debere.
If, to the one to whom I sold and promised the double, I have become heir—he himself having secured me by the same stipulation—then, upon eviction of the person, the stipulation is not incurred in any part: for neither does it appear that eviction lies against me, since I sold him, nor against him to whom I would present myself as promissor, since it would be somewhat incommodious to say that I myself must render the double to myself.
Si is, qui fundum emerit et satis de evictione acceperit et eundem fundum vendiderit, emptori suo heres exstiterit, vel ex contrario emptor venditori heres exstiterit: an evicto fundo cum fideiussoribus agere possit, quaeritur. existimo autem utroque casu fideiussores teneri, quoniam et cum debitor creditori suo heres exstiterit, ratio quaedam inter heredem et hereditatem ponitur et intellegitur maior hereditas ad debitorem pervenire, quasi soluta pecunia quae debebatur hereditati, et per hoc minus in bonis heredis esse: et ex contrario cum creditor debitori suo exstitit heres, minus in hereditate habere videtur, tamquam ipsa hereditas heredi solverit. sive ergo is qui de evictione satis acceperat emptori cui ipse vendiderat, sive emptor venditori suo heres exstiterit, fideiussores tenebuntur.
If someone who has bought a farm and has received security regarding eviction and has sold the same farm, becomes heir to his buyer, or conversely the buyer becomes heir to the seller, the question is whether, the farm having been evicted, he can sue against the sureties. I consider, however, that in either case the sureties are liable, since even when a debtor has become heir to his creditor, a certain reckoning is set between the heir and the inheritance, and it is understood that a greater inheritance comes to the debtor, as though the money that was owed to the inheritance had been paid, and through this there is less in the heir’s goods; and conversely, when a creditor has become heir to his debtor, he seems to have less in the inheritance, as though the inheritance itself had paid the heir. Therefore, whether he who had received security about eviction has become heir to the buyer to whom he himself had sold, or the buyer has become heir to his seller, the sureties will be held liable.
Vaccae emptor, si vitulus qui post emptionem natus est evincatur, agere ex duplae stipulatione non potest, quia nec ipsa nec usus fructus evincitur. nam quod dicimus vitulum fructum esse vaccae, non ius, sed corpus demonstramus, sicuti praediorum frumenta et vinum fructum recte dicimus, cum constet eadem haec non recte usum fructum appellari.
The buyer of a cow, if a calf that was born after the purchase is evicted, cannot sue on the stipulation for the double, because neither the cow itself nor the usufruct is evicted. For when we say that the calf is the fruit of the cow, we indicate not a right but a body, just as we rightly call the grain and the wine of estates “fruit,” while it is established that these same things are not properly called “usufruct.”
Fundum cuius usus fructus attii erat, mihi vendidisti nec dixisti usum fructum attii esse: hunc ego maevio detracto usu fructu tradidi. attio capite minuto non ad me, sed ad proprietatem usum fructum redire ait, neque enim potuisse constitui usum fructum eo tempore, quo alienatus esset: sed posse me venditorem te de evictione convenire, quia aequum sit eandem causam meam esse, quae futura esset, si tunc usus fructus alienus non fuisset.
You sold me a farm whose usufruct was attii’s, and you did not say that the usufruct was attii’s: I delivered it to maevio with the usufruct deducted. When attio suffered capitis deminutio, he says the usufruct returned not to me, but to the ownership, for a usufruct could not have been constituted at a time when it had been alienated; but that I can proceed against you the seller on eviction, because it is equitable that my case be the same as it would be, if at that time the usufruct had not been another’s.
Si per alienum fundum mihi viam constitueris, evictionis nomine te obligari ait: etenim quo casu, si per proprium constituentis fundum concessa esset via, recte constitueretur, eo casu, si per alienum concederetur, evictionis obligationem contrahit.
If you were to establish for me a right of way through another’s estate, he says you are bound under the heading of eviction: for in the case in which, if the way had been granted through the constitutor’s own estate, it would be rightly constituted, in that same case, if it were granted through another’s, he contracts an obligation of eviction.
Cum tibi stichum venderem, dixi eum statuliberum esse sub hac condicione manumissum " si navis ex asia venerit", is autem " si titius consul factus fuerit" manumissus erat: quaerebatur, si prius navis ex asia venerit ac post titius consul fiat atque ita in libertatem evictus sit, an evictionis nomine teneatur. respondit non teneri eum: etenim dolo malo emptorem facere, cum prius exstiterit ea condicio, quam evictionis nomine exsolverit.
When I was selling you Stichus, I said that he was statuliber, manumitted under this condition, "if a ship should come from Asia"; but he had been manumitted on "if Titius should be made consul." It was asked whether, if first a ship from Asia arrived and afterwards Titius became consul, and so he were adjudged into freedom, the seller would be held under the head of eviction. He answered that he is not held: for indeed the buyer acts in bad faith, since that condition had already come to pass before he exacted payment under the name of eviction.
Item si post biennium liberum fore dixi, qui post annum libertatem acceperit, et post biennium in libertate evincatur, vel decem dare iussum dixerim quinque et is decem datis ad libertatem pervenerit, magis esse, ut his quoque casibus non tenear.
Likewise, if I said that he would be free after a biennium, and he received liberty after a year, and after the biennium he is evinced in liberty; or if I said that one ordered to give ten would be free upon five, and he has attained liberty when ten have been given, it is the sounder view that in these cases too I am not bound.
Cum fundus " uti optimus maximusque est" emptus est et alicuius servitutis evictae nomine aliquid emptor a venditore consecutus est, deinde totus fundus evincitur, ob eam evictionem id praestari debet quod ex duplo reliquum est: nam si aliud observabimus, servitutibus aliquibus et mox proprietate evicta amplius duplo emptor quam quanti emit consequeretur.
When a fundus is bought “as being the best and greatest,” and, under the head of the eviction of some servitude, the buyer has obtained something from the seller, then the whole fundus is thereafter evicted; for that eviction there must be rendered what remains out of the double: for if we were to observe otherwise, with certain servitudes evicted and soon the proprietorship evicted as well, the buyer would obtain more than double the amount for which he bought.
Si pignora veneant per apparitores praetoris extra ordinem sententias sequentes, nemo umquam dixit dandam in eos actionem re evicta: sed si dolo rem viliori pretio proiecerunt, tunc de dolo actio datur adversus eos domino rei.
If pledges are sold through the praetor’s apparitors, proceeding extra ordinem and following the sentences, no one has ever said that an action should be granted against them upon eviction of the thing (res evicta): but if by dolus they have knocked down the thing at a cheaper price, then an action for fraud (de dolo) is given against them in favor of the owner of the thing.
Si per imprudentiam iudicis aut errorem emptor rei victus est, negamus auctoris damnum esse debere: aut quid refert, sordibus iudicis an stultitia res perierit? iniuria enim, quae fit emptori, auctorem non debet contingere.
If through the imprudence of the judge or an error the purchaser has been defeated concerning the thing, we deny that the loss ought to be the warrantor’s: or what does it matter whether the matter has perished through the judge’s sordidness or through stupidity? For the injury which is done to the purchaser ought not to touch the warrantor.
Si titius stichum post mortem suam liberum esse iussum vendiderit, mortuo deinde eo stichus ad libertatem pervenerit, an stipulatio de evictione interposita teneat? et ait iulianus committi stipulationem: quamvis enim titius hoc casu denuntiari pro evictione non potuisset, heredi tamen eius denuntiari potuisset.
If Titius should have sold Stichus, who was ordered to be free after his death, and then, once he died, Stichus came to liberty, does the interposed stipulation concerning eviction hold? And Julian says the stipulation is incurred: for although in this case Titius could not have been given notice for eviction, nevertheless his heir could have been given notice.
Non mirum autem est, ut evicto homine de evictione teneatur heres, quamvis defunctus non similiter fuerit obstrictus, cum et aliis quibusdam casibus plenior adversus heredem vel heredi competat obligatio, quam competierat defuncto: ut cum servus post mortem emptoris heres institutus est iussuque heredis emptoris adiit hereditatem: nam actione ex empto praestare debet hereditatem, quamvis defuncto in hoc tantum fuit utilis ex empto actio, ut servus traderetur.
Nor is it surprising, moreover, that when the man is evicted the heir is held on account of eviction, although the deceased would not likewise have been bound, since in certain other cases as well a fuller obligation lies against the heir or to the heir than lay to the deceased: as when a slave, after the buyer’s death, is instituted heir and, by the order of the buyer’s heir, enters upon the inheritance: for by the action ex empto he ought to make good the inheritance, although for the deceased the action ex empto was useful only to this extent, that the slave be delivered.
Si fundo tradito pars evincatur, si singula iugera venierint certo pretio, tunc non pro bonitate, sed quanti singula venierint quae evicta fuerint, praestandum, etiamsi ea quae meliora fuerint evicta sint.
If, a fundus having been conveyed, a part is evicted, if the individual iugera were sold at a fixed price, then recompense is to be made not according to quality, but for as much as each of the individual parcels that shall have been evicted was sold, even if those which were better are the ones evicted.
Si heres statuliberum, qui sub condicione pecuniae dandae liber esse iussus est, vendiderit et maiorem pecuniam in condicione esse dixerit quam dare ei iussus est, ex empto tenetur, si modo talis est condicio, ut ad emptorem transiret, id est si heredi dare iussus est servus: nam si alii dare iussus, quamvis veram pecuniae quantitatem dixerit, tamen, si non admonuerit alii dare iussum, evictionis nomine tenebitur.
If an heir has sold a statuliber, who was ordered to be free under the condition of giving money, and has said that the sum in the condition is greater than he was ordered to have him give, he is liable ex empto, provided only the condition is such as to pass to the buyer—that is, if the slave was ordered to give to the heir: for if he was ordered to give to another, although he stated the true quantity of the money, nevertheless, if he did not admonish that he was ordered to give to another, he will be held under the head of eviction.
Si ideo contra emptorem iudicatum est, quod defuit, non committitur stipulatio: magis enim propter absentiam victus videtur quam quod malam causam habuit. quid ergo, si ille quidem contra quem iudicatum est ad iudicium non adfuit, alius autem adfuit et causam egit: quid dicemus? ut puta acceptum quidem cum pupillo tutore auctore fuit iudicium, sed absente pupillo tutor causam egit et iudicatum est contra tutorem: quare non dicemus committi stipulationem?
If therefore judgment has been rendered against the buyer because he failed to appear, the stipulation is not committed: for he seems to have been defeated more on account of absence than because he had a bad cause. What then, if he, indeed, against whom judgment has been rendered did not attend the trial, but another attended and pleaded the cause: what shall we say? Suppose, for instance, that the suit was accepted with the ward, with the tutor authorizing, but with the ward absent the tutor pleaded the cause and judgment was rendered against the tutor: why shall we not say that the stipulation is committed?
Si dictum fuerit vendendo, ut simpla promittatur, vel triplum aut quadruplum promitteretur, ex empto perpetua actione agi poterit. non tamen, ut vulgus opinatur, etiam satisdare debet qui duplam promittit, sed sufficit nuda repromissio, nisi aliud convenerit.
If in the course of selling it has been stipulated that the simple be promised, or that triple or quadruple be promised, one can proceed by an ex empto action that is perpetual. Not, however—as the common crowd supposes—must he who promises the double also give surety; but a naked repromise suffices, unless something else has been agreed.
Habere licere rem videtur emptor et si is, qui emptorem in evictione rei vicerit, ante ablatam vel abductam rem sine successore decesserit, ita ut neque ad fiscum bona pervenire possint neque privatim a creditoribus distrahi: tunc enim nulla competit emptori ex stipulatu actio, quia rem habere ei licet.
It seems that the buyer is permitted to have the thing even if the one who has defeated the buyer in the eviction of the thing dies, before the thing is taken away or carried off, without a successor, such that the goods can neither come to the fisc nor be sold off privately by the creditors: for then no action ex stipulatu lies for the buyer, because it is permitted for him to have the thing.
Quod cum ita est, videamus, num et si ab eo qui vicerit donata legatave res fuerit emptori, aeque dicendum sit ex stipulatu actionem non nasci, scilicet si antequam abduceret vel auferret donaverit aut legaverit: alioquin semel commissa stipulatio resolvi non potest.
Since this is so, let us see whether, if the thing has been given as a gift or bequeathed to the buyer by him who has won, it should likewise be said that an action ex stipulatu does not arise—namely, if he made the gift or bequest before he led it away or carried it off; otherwise, a stipulation once incurred cannot be resolved.
Si ei qui mihi vendidit plures heredes exstiterunt, una de evictione obligatio est omnibusque denuntiari et omnes defendere debent: si de industria non venerint in iudicium, unus tamen ex is liti substitit, propter denuntiationis vigorem et praedictam absentiam omnibus vincit aut vincitur, recteque cum ceteris agam, quod evictionis nomine victi sint.
If several heirs have arisen to the one who sold to me, there is a single obligation concerning eviction, and notification must be given to all and all ought to defend: if they have deliberately not come into court, yet one of them has taken his stand in the suit, then by the force of the notification and the aforesaid absence he wins or is defeated for all; and I may rightly proceed against the rest, because under the head of eviction they have been defeated.
Si fundum, in quo usus fructus titii erat, qui ei relictus est quoad vivet, detracto usu fructu ignoranti mihi vendideris et titius capite deminutus fuerit et aget titius ius sibi esse utendi fruendi, competit mihi adversus te ex stipulatione de evictione actio: quippe si verum erat, quod mihi dixisses in venditione, recte negarem titio ius esse utendi fruendi.
If you sold to me, I being unaware, a farm on which there was the usufruct of Titius, which had been left to him for as long as he should live, with the usufruct deducted; and Titius should suffer capitis deminutio and bring an action that the right of using and enjoying is his, an action on the stipulation concerning eviction is available to me against you: for if what you had said to me at the sale were true, I would rightly deny that Titius has the right of using and enjoying.
Gaia seia ^ sei^ fundum a lucio titio emerat et quaestione mota fisci nomine auctorem laudaverat et evictione secuta fundus ablatus et fisco adiudicatus est venditore praesente: quaeritur, cum emptrix non provocaverat, an venditorem poterit convenire. herennius modestinus respondit, sive quod alienus fuit cum veniret sive quod tunc obligatus, evictus est, nihil proponi, cur emptrici adversus venditorem actio non competat.
gaia seia ^ sei^ had bought a farm from lucius titius; and when a proceeding was set in motion in the name of the fisc, she had called in the auctor (warrantor); and, eviction having followed, the farm was taken away and adjudged to the fisc with the seller present. the question is, since the buyer did not appeal, whether she can sue the seller. herennius modestinus responded: whether because it was another’s when it was sold, or because it was then obligated (encumbered), it has been evicted; nothing is put forward why an action should not lie for the buyer against the seller.
Ex mille iugeribus traditis ducenta flumen abstulit. si postea pro indiviso ducenta evincantur, duplae stipulatio pro parte quinta, non quarta praestabitur: nam quod perit, damnum emptori, non venditori attulit. si totus fundus quem flumen deminuerat evictus sit, iure non deminuetur evictionis obligatio, non magis quam si incuria fundus aut servus traditus deterior factus sit: nam et e contrario non augetur quantitas evictionis, si res melior fuerit effecta.
Out of a thousand iugera delivered, the river carried off two hundred. If afterwards two hundred are evicted pro indiviso, the stipulation for the double will be furnished for a fifth part, not a fourth: for what has perished brought loss to the buyer, not to the seller. If the whole estate which the river had diminished is evicted, by law the obligation of eviction will not be diminished, no more than if through neglect the estate or the slave delivered had been made worse: for also conversely the quantity of the eviction is not increased, if the thing has been made better.
Quod si modo terrae integro qui fuerat traditus ducenta iugera per alluvionem accesserunt ac postea pro indiviso pars quinta totius evicta sit, perinde pars quinta praestabitur, ac si sola ducenta de illis mille iugeribus quae tradita sunt fuissent evicta, quia alluvionis periculum non praestat venditor.
But if, to one to whom land, intact as to title, had been delivered, two hundred iugera accrued by alluvion, and afterward a fifth part of the whole was evicted pro indiviso, a fifth part will be made good just as if only two hundred out of those one thousand iugera that were delivered had been evicted, because the seller does not warrant the risk of alluvion.
Quaesitum est, si mille iugeribus traditis perissent ducenta, mox alluvio per aliam partem fundi ducenta attulisset ac postea pro indiviso quinta pars evicta esset: pro qua parte auctor teneretur. dixi consequens esse superioribus, ut neque pars quinta mille iugerum neque quarta debeatur evictionis nomine, sed perinde teneatur auctor, ac si de octingentis illis residuis sola centum sexaginta fuissent evicta: nam reliqua quadraginta, quae universo fundo decesserunt, pro rata novae regionis esse intellegi.
It was asked, if, after 1,000 iugera had been delivered, 200 had perished, then alluvion had brought in 200 along another part of the estate, and afterward an undivided one-fifth had been evicted: for what portion the warrantor would be held. I said it follows from what precedes that neither a one-fifth of the 1,000 iugera nor a one-fourth is owed under the heading of eviction, but the warrantor is held just as if, out of those 800 remaining, only 160 had been evicted: for the remaining 40, which departed from the entire estate, are to be understood, pro rata, as belonging to the new region.
Rem hereditariam pignori obligatam heredes vendiderunt et evictionis nomine pro partibus hereditariis spoponderunt: cum alter pignus pro parte sua liberasset, rem creditor evicit: quaerebatur an uterque heredum conveniri possit? idque placebat propter indivisam pignoris causam. nec remedio locus esse videbatur, ut per doli exceptionem actiones ei qui pecuniam creditori dedit praestarentur, quia non duo rei facti proponerentur.
The heirs sold an hereditary thing that had been bound in pledge and, under the name of eviction, promised according to their hereditary shares: when one of them had freed the pledge as to his own share, the creditor evicted the thing: the question was raised whether each of the heirs could be sued? and this was approved on account of the indivisible cause of the pledge. Nor did there seem to be room for the remedy, that through the exception of fraud the actions be afforded to the one who gave money to the creditor, because it was not a case of two co-defendants in fact being put forward.
But the action for partitioning the inheritance (familiae herciscundae) is useful on that account: for what does it matter whether one of the heirs has freed the pledge in its entirety or only to the extent of his own share? since the coheir’s damaging negligence ought not to be to the other’s detriment.
Si, cum venditor admonuisset emptorem, ut publiciana potius vel ea actione quae de fundo vectigali proposita est experiretur, emptor id facere supersedit, omnimodo nocebit ei dolus suus nec committitur stipulatio. non idem in serviana quoque actione probari potest: haec enim etsi in rem actio est, nudam tamen possessionem avocat et soluta pecunia venditori dissolvitur: unde fit, ut emptori suo nomine non competat.
If, when the seller had admonished the buyer to proceed rather by the Publician action or by that action which is proposed concerning a vectigalian estate, the buyer refrained from doing this, his own dolus will in every way prejudice him, and the stipulation is not incurred. The same cannot be approved in the Servian action as well: for although this is an in rem action, nevertheless it calls only for bare possession, and, once the money has been paid, it is dissolved for the seller; whence it results that it does not lie for the buyer in his own name.
Si secundus emptor venditorem eundemque emptorem ad litem hominis dederit procuratorem et non restituto eo damnatio fuerit secuta, quodcumque ex causa iudicati praestiterit procurator ut in rem suam datus, ex stipulatu consequi non poterit: sed quia damnum evictionis ad personam pertinuit emptoris, qui mandati iudicio nihil percepturus est, non inutiliter ad percipiendam litis aestimationem agetur ex vendito.
If the second buyer has given, for a suit concerning the slave, as procurator the person who is both the seller and the same buyer, and, without his being restored, condemnation has followed, whatever the procurator, appointed as in rem suam, has furnished by reason of the judgment, he will not be able to recover ex stipulatu: but since the damage of eviction pertained to the person of the buyer, who will receive nothing by the action of mandate, an action ex vendito will not be brought to no purpose for receiving the assessment of the suit.
Divisione inter coheredes facta si procurator absentis interfuit et dominus ratam habuit, evictis praediis in dominum actio dabitur, quae daretur in eum qui negotium absentis gessit, ut quanti sua interest actor consequatur, scilicet ut melioris aut deterioris agri facti causa finem pretii, quo fuerat tempore divisionis aestimatus, deminuat vel excedat.
When a division among coheirs has been made, if the procurator of an absentee took part and the dominus ratified it, upon eviction of the estates an action will be granted against the dominus, such as would be granted against him who managed the business of the absentee, so that the plaintiff may recover to the extent of his interest—namely, that, by reason of the land’s having become better or worse, the limit of the price at which it had been appraised at the time of the division may be diminished or exceeded.
Qui autem in tradendo statuliberum dicit, intellegetur hanc speciem dumtaxat libertatis excipere, quae ex testamento impleta condicione ex praeterito possit optingere: et ideo si praesens testamento libertas data fuerit et venditor statuliberum pronuntiavit, evictionis nomine tenetur.
However, one who, in delivering, declares the person to be statuliber will be understood to be excepting only that species of liberty which can be obtained from a testament, the condition having been fulfilled in the past; and therefore, if liberty has been granted as present by the testament and the seller pronounced him statuliber, he is held liable under the name of eviction.
Rursus qui statuliberum tradit, si certam condicionem pronuntiaverit, sub qua dicit ei libertatem datam, deteriorem condicionem suam fecisse existimabitur, quia non omnem causam statutae libertatis, sed eam dumtaxat quam pronuntiaverit excepisse videbitur: veluti si quis hominem dixerit decem dare iussum isque post annum ad libertatem pervenerit, quia hoc modo libertas data fuerit: " stichus post annum liber esto", evictionis oblgiatione tenebitur.
Again, he who delivers a conditionally-free person, if he has pronounced a specific condition under which he says liberty was given to him, will be considered to have made his own condition worse, because he will be seen not to have excepted every cause of the stipulated liberty, but only that which he has pronounced: for example, if someone has said that the man was ordered to give ten, and he has attained liberty after a year, since in this way liberty had been given: " Stichus shall be free after a year", he will be held by the obligation of eviction.
Quid ergo, qui iussum decem dare pronuntiat viginti dare debere, nonne in condicionem mentitur? verum est hunc quoque in condicionem mentiri et ideo quidam existimaverunt hoc quoque casu evictionis stipulationem contrahi: sed auctoritas servii praevaluit existimantis hoc casu ex empto actionem esse, videlicet quia putabat eum, qui pronuntiasset servum viginti dare iussum, condicionem excepisse, quae esset in dando.
What then? He who pronounces that one ordered to give ten ought to give twenty—does he not lie as to the condition? It is true that he also lies as to the condition, and therefore some thought that in this case too a stipulation for eviction is contracted; but the authority of Servius prevailed, who considered that in this case the action ex empto lies, namely because he supposed that he who had declared that a slave was ordered to be given for twenty had excepted the condition, which would be in the giving.
Servus rationibus redditis liber esse iussus est: hunc heres tradidit et dixit centum dare iussum. si nulla reliqua sunt quae servus dare debeat et per hoc adita hereditate liber factus est, obligatio evictionis contrahitur, eo quod liber homo tamquam statuliber traditur. si centum in reliquis habet, potest videri heres non esse mentitus, quoniam rationes reddere iussus intellegitur summam pecuniae quae ex reliquis colligitur iussus dare: cui consequens est, ut, si minus quam centum in reliquis habuerit, veluti sola quinquaginta, ut, cum eam pecuniam dederit, ad libertatem pervenerit, de reliquis quinquaginta actio ex empto competat.
A slave, the accounts having been rendered, was ordered to be free: the heir delivered this man and said that he was ordered to give one hundred. If there are no outstandings (reliqua) which the slave ought to pay, and by this, the inheritance having been entered upon, he has been made free, an obligation of eviction is contracted, for a free man is being delivered as though statuliber. If he has one hundred among the outstandings, the heir can seem not to have lied, since “ordered to render accounts” is understood as “ordered to give the sum of money that is gathered from the outstandings”: consequent to which is that, if he has less than one hundred in the outstandings, say only fifty, then when he has paid that money he will have attained freedom; as to the remaining fifty, an action ex empto is available.
Sed et si quis in venditione statuliberum perfusorie dixerit, condicionem autem libertatis celaverit, empti iudicio tenebitur, si id nescierit emptor: hic enim exprimitur eum, qui dixerit statuliberum et nullam condicionem pronuntiaverit, evictionis quidem nomine non teneri, si condicione impleta servus ad libertatem pervenerit, sed empti iudicio teneri, si modo condicionem, quam sciebat praepositam esse, celavit: sicuti qui fundum tradidit et, cum sciat certam servitutem deberi, perfusorie dixerit: " itinera actus quibus sunt utique sunt, recte recipitur", evictionis quidem nomine se liberat, sed quia decepit emptorem, empti iudicio tenetur.
But also, if someone, in a sale, has perfunctorily said that the slave is statuliber, but has concealed the condition of the freedom, he will be liable by the action on purchase, if the buyer did not know it: for it is here expressed that he who has said statuliber and has announced no condition is not liable under the head of eviction, if, the condition being fulfilled, the slave has come to freedom, but is liable by the action on purchase, if only he concealed the condition which he knew had been prefixed: just as one who has delivered a tract of land and, although he knows that a certain servitude is owed, has said perfunctorily: " ways of passage and of driving, wherever they exist, of course they exist, it is duly accepted", he indeed frees himself under the head of eviction, but because he has deceived the buyer, he is liable by the action on purchase.
Pater filiae nomine fundum in dotem dedit: evicto eo an ex empto vel duplae stipulatio committatur, quasi pater damnum patiatur, non immerito dubitatur: non enim sicut mulieris dos est, ita patris esse dici potest nec conferre fratribus cogitur dotem a se profectam manente matrimonio. sed videamus, ne probabilius dicatur committi hoc quoque casu stipulationem: interest enim patris filiam dotatam habere et spem quandoque recipiendae dotis, utique si in potestate sit. quod si emancipata est, vix poterit defendi statim committi stipulationem, cum uno casu ad eum dos regredi possit.
A father gave an estate as a dowry in his daughter’s name: when that is evicted, whether the action ex empto or the stipulation for the double is incurred—on the ground that the father suffers loss—is not without reason doubted; for just as the dowry is the woman’s, so it cannot be said to be the father’s, nor is she compelled to contribute to her brothers the dowry that proceeded from him while the marriage continues. But let us consider whether it is not more plausible to say that in this case too the stipulation is incurred: for it is to the father’s interest to have his daughter endowed and to have the hope of the dowry being someday recovered, especially if she is in his power. But if she has been emancipated, it can hardly be defended that the stipulation is incurred at once, since in only one case can the dowry return to him.
Is it then only at that time that he can bring suit—namely, when, the daughter having died in marriage, she could have reclaimed the dowry, if the farm had not been evicted? Or does the father’s interest in having a dowered daughter obtain even in this case, so that he may at once proceed against the promisor? This is rather suggested by paternal affection.
Cum plures fundi specialiter nominatim uno instrumento emptionis interposito venierint, non utique alter alterius fundus pars videtur esse, sed multi fundi una emptione continentur. et quemadmodum, si quis complura mancipia uno instrumento emptionis interposito vendiderit, evictionis actio in singula capita mancipiorum spectatur, et sicut aliarum quoque rerum complurium una emptio facta sit, instrumentum quidem emptionis interpositum unum est, evictionem autem tot actiones sunt, quot et species rerum sunt quae emptione comprehensae sunt: ita et in proposito non utique prohibebitur emptor evicto ex his uno fundo venditorem convenire, quod una cautione emptionis complures fundos mercatus comprehenderit.
When several estates have been sold, specifically and by name, with one instrument of purchase interposed, it is certainly not the case that one estate is seen to be a part of another, but rather many estates are contained in a single purchase. And just as, if someone has sold several slaves with one instrument of purchase interposed, the action of eviction is regarded for each head of the slaves; and just as, if one purchase likewise has been made of several other things, the instrument of purchase interposed is one, yet there are as many actions for eviction as there are species of things that have been included in the purchase: so also in the case proposed the buyer will not at all be prohibited, if one of these estates is evicted, from proceeding against the seller, because in one bond of purchase he has included the purchase of several estates.
Seia fundos maevianum et seianum et ceteros doti dedit: eos fundos vir titius viva seia sine controversia possedit: post mortem deinde seiae sempronia heres seiae quaestionem pro praedii proprietate facere instituit: quaero, cum sempronia ipsa sit heres seiae, an iure controversiam facere possit. paulus respondit iure quidem proprio, non hereditario semproniam, quae seiae de qua quaeritur heres exstitit, controversiam fundorum facere posse, sed evictis praediis eandem semproniam heredem seiae conveniri posse: vel exceptione doli mali summoveri posse.
seia gave the estates maevianus and seianus and the others as a dowry: those estates the husband titius, while seia was alive, possessed without controversy: after seia’s death, then, sempronia, heir of seia, set about bringing an action for the proprietorship of the estate: i ask, since sempronia herself is heir of seia, whether she can by right bring a controversy. paulus replied that by her own right indeed, not by hereditary right, sempronia, who turned out to be the heir of seia in question, can bring a controversy regarding the estates, but if the properties are evicted, that the same sempronia, as heir of seia, can be proceeded against: or she can be warded off by the defense of fraud (exceptio doli mali).
Si iussu iudicis rei iudicatae pignus captum per officium distrahatur, post evincatur, ex empto contra eum qui pretio liberatus est, non quanti interest, sed de pretio dumtaxat eiusque usuris habita ratione fructuum dabitur, scilicet si hos ei qui evicit restituere non habebat necesse.
If, by order of the judge, a pledge seized for a res judicata is sold off by the office, and afterwards eviction occurs, an action from purchase will be granted against the one who was freed by the price, not for the amount of the interest, but only for the price and its interest, account being had of the fruits—namely, if he was not obliged to restore these to the one who evicted.
Quod ad servitutes praediorum attinet, si tacite secutae sunt et vindicentur ab alio, quintus mucius et sabinus existimant venditorem ob evictionem teneri non posse: nec enim evictionis nomine quemquam teneri in eo iure, quod tacite soleat accedere: nisi ut optimus maximusque esset traditus fuerit fundus: tunc enim liberum ab omni servitute praestandum. si vero emptor petat viam vel actum, venditorem teneri non posse, nisi nominatim dixerit accessurum iter vel actum: tunc enim teneri eum, qui ita dixerit. et vera est quinti muci sententia, ut qui optimum maximumque fundum tradidit, liberum praestet, non etiam deberi alias servitutes, nisi hoc specialiter ab eo accessum sit.
As regards praedial servitudes, if they have followed tacitly and are claimed by another, Quintus Mucius and Sabinus think the seller cannot be held on account of eviction; for under the name of eviction no one is held in that right which is wont to be added tacitly, unless the fundus has been delivered as “best and greatest”: for then it must be provided free from every servitude. If, however, the buyer demands a road (via) or a drive (actus), the seller cannot be held unless he has expressly said that an iter or an actus would be added; for then he who has so said is liable. And the opinion of Quintus Mucius is true, that he who has delivered a fundus as “best and greatest” must warrant it free, but that other servitudes are not also owed, unless this has been specially added by him.
Si servus merces peculiariter emerit, deinde dominus eum, priusquam proprietatem rerum nancisceretur, testamento liberum esse iusserit eique peculium praelegaverit et venditor a servo merces petere coeperit: exceptio in factum locum habebit, quia is tunc servus fuisset cum contraxisset.
If a slave purchases wares with his peculium, and then the master, before he has obtained ownership of the things, orders by testament that he be free and pre-legacy bequeaths the peculium to him, and the seller begins to demand the price from the slave: an exceptio in factum will have place, because he was then a slave when he contracted.
Si quis rem emerit, non autem fuerit ei tradita, sed possessionem sine vitio fuerit nactus, habet exceptionem contra venditorem, nisi forte venditor iustam causam habeat, cur rem vindicet: nam et si tradiderit possessionem, fuerit autem iusta causa vindicanti, replicatione adversus exceptionem utetur.
If someone has bought a thing, but it has not been delivered to him, yet he has acquired possession without vice, he has an exception against the seller, unless perhaps the seller has a just cause why he should vindicate the thing: for even if he has delivered possession, and there is a just cause for the one vindicating, he will use a replication against the exception.
Si a titio fundum emeris qui sempronii erat isque tibi traditus fuerit, pretio autem soluto titius sempronio heres exstiterit et eundem fundum maevio vendiderit et tradiderit: iulianus ait aequius esse priorem te tueri, quia et si ipse titius fundum a te peteret, exceptione summoveretur et si ipse titius eum possideret, publiciana peteres.
if you were to buy an estate from titius which was sempronius’s and it were delivered to you, but after the price was paid titius became heir to sempronius and sold and delivered the same estate to maevius: julian says it is more equitable that you, as the prior, be protected, because both if titius himself were to demand the estate from you, he would be removed by an exception, and if titius himself were in possession of it, you would bring the publician action.