Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 14.3.0. De institoria actione.
14.2.0. On the Rhodian law concerning jettison.
Dig. 14.3.0. On the institorial action.
Dig. 14.6.0. De senatus consulto macedoniano.
14.5.0. What is said to have been business transacted with one who is under another’s power.
Dig. 14.6.0. On the senatus consultum Macedonianum.
Utilitatem huius edicti patere nemo est qui ignoret. nam cum interdum ignari, cuius sint condicionis vel quales, cum magistris propter navigandi necessitatem contrahamus, aequum fuit eum, qui magistrum navi imposuit, teneri, ut tenetur, qui institorem tabernae vel negotio praeposuit, cum sit maior necessitas contrahendi cum magistro quam institore. quippe res patitur, ut de condicione quis institoris dispiciat et sic contrahat: in navis magistro non ita, nam interdum locus tempus non patitur plenius deliberandi consilium.
No one is ignorant that the usefulness of this edict is evident. For since sometimes, ignorant of what their condition is or of what sort they are, we contract with masters on account of the necessity of navigation, it has been equitable that the one who has placed a master on a ship be held liable, just as he is held who has set a manager over a shop or a business, since there is a greater necessity of contracting with a master than with a manager. For the situation allows that one examine the condition of a manager and thus contract: not so with a ship’s master, for sometimes the place and the time do not permit a fuller deliberation and counsel.
Sed si cum quolibet nautarum sit contractum, non datur actio in exercitorem, quamquam ex delicto cuiusvis eorum, qui navis navigandae causa in nave sint, detur actio in exercitorem: alia enim est contrahendi causa, alia delinquendi, si quidem qui magistrum praeponit, contrahi cum eo permittit, qui nautas adhibet, non contrahi cum eis permittit, sed culpa et dolo carere eos curare debet.
But if a contract has been made with any one of the sailors, no action is given against the shipowner, although from the delict of any of those who are on the ship for the sake of the ship’s being navigated an action is given against the shipowner: for one thing is the cause for contracting, another for committing a delict; since indeed he who sets a master in charge permits contracting with him, whereas he who employs sailors does not permit contracting with them, but must take care that they be free from fault and fraud.
Magistrum autem accipimus non solum, quem exercitor praeposuit, sed et eum, quem magister: et hoc consultus iulianus in ignorante exercitore respondit: ceterum si scit et passus est eum in nave magisterio fungi, ipse eum imposuisse videtur. quae sententia mihi videtur probabilis: omnia enim facta magistri debeo praestare qui eum praeposui, alioquin contrahentes decipientur: et facilius hoc in magistro quam institore admittendum propter utilitatem. quid tamen si sic magistrum praeposuit, ne alium ei liceret praeponere?
However, we accept “master” not only as the one whom the shipowner set over (the ship), but also as him whom the master set over; and Julianus, when consulted, gave this reply in a case where the shipowner was unaware: but if he knows and has allowed him to perform the mastership on the ship, he himself is seen to have appointed him. Which opinion seems to me probable: for I, who have put him in charge, ought to answer for all the acts of the master, otherwise those contracting will be deceived; and this is more readily to be admitted in the case of a master than of a factor, on account of utility. But what if he appointed the master on such terms that it would not be permitted to set another over him?
Non autem ex omni causa praetor dat in exercitorem actionem, sed eius rei nomine, cuius ibi praepositus fuerit, id est si in eam rem praepositus sit, ut puta si ad onus vehendum locatum sit aut aliquas res emerit utiles naviganti vel si quid reficiendae navis causa contractum vel impensum est vel si quid nautae operarum nomine petent.
The praetor does not, however, grant an action against the ship-operator for every cause, but only in respect of that matter for which he has been put in charge there—that is, if he has been appointed for that matter; for instance, if he has been hired for carrying a load, or has purchased certain things useful for the navigation, or if anything has been contracted or expended for the sake of repairing the ship, or if the sailors demand anything under the title of their services.
Quid si mutuam pecuniam sumpserit, an eius rei nomine videatur gestum? et pegasus existimat, si ad usum eius rei, in quam praepositus est, fuerit mutuatus, dandam actionem, quam sententiam puto veram: quid enim si ad armandam instruendamve navem vel nautas exhibendos mutuatus est?
What if he has taken money on loan—does it appear to have been transacted in the name of that affair? And Pegasus considers that, if he borrowed for the use of the business over which he was put in charge, an action should be given, which opinion I think true: for what, indeed, if he borrowed to arm or equip a ship, or to furnish sailors?
Unde quaerit ofilius, si ad reficiendam navem mutuatus nummos in suos usus converterit, an in exercitorem detur actio. et ait, si hac lege accepit quasi in navem impensurus, mox mutavit voluntatem, teneri exercitorem imputaturum sibi, cur talem praeposuerit: quod si ab initio consilium cepit fraudandi creditoris et hoc specialiter non expresserit, quod ad navis causam accipit, contra esse: quam distinctionem pedius probat.
Whence Ofilius asks, if a man who has borrowed money for repairing the ship has converted it to his own uses, whether an action is given against the shipowner (exercitor). And he says that, if he received it on this condition, as though he were going to expend it on the ship, and soon changed his intention, the shipowner is held liable, having to impute to himself why he appointed such a man; but if from the beginning he formed the plan of defrauding the creditor and did not expressly specify that he receives it for the ship’s business, the contrary holds; which distinction Pedius approves.
Igitur praepositio certam legem dat contrahentibus. quare si eum praeposuit navi ad hoc solum, ut vecturas exigat, non ut locet ( quod forte ipse locaverat), non tenebitur exercitor, si magister locaverit: vel si ad locandum tantum, non ad exigendum, idem erit dicendum: aut si ad hoc, ut vectoribus locet, non ut mercibus navem praestet, vel contra, modum egressus non obligabit exercitorem: sed et si ut certis mercibus eam locet, praepositus est, puta legumini, cannabae, ille marmoribus vel alia materia locavit, dicendum erit non teneri. quaedam enim naves onerariae, quaedam ( ut ipsi dicunt) epibatygoi sunt: et plerosque mandare scio, ne vectores recipiant, et sic, ut certa regione et certo mari negotietur, ut ecce sunt naves, quae brundisium a cassiopa vel a dyrrachio vectores traiciunt ad onera inhabiles, item quaedam fluvii capaces ad mare non sufficientes.
Therefore the appointment gives a definite rule to the contracting parties. Wherefore, if he set him over the ship for this only, to exact fares, not to lease it (which perhaps he himself had leased out), the shipowner will not be bound if the master leases it; or if it is only for leasing, not for exaction, the same must be said; or if for this, that he lease to passengers, not that he provide the ship for goods, or the converse, exceeding the scope will not bind the shipowner. And likewise, if he is appointed to lease it for certain merchandise—say for legumes, for hemp—yet he leased it for marbles or other material, it must be said that he is not held. For certain ships are cargo-ships, certain (as they themselves say) epibatygoi (passenger-carriers); and I know that many mandate that passengers are not to be received, and also that one trade only within a certain region and on a certain sea, as for example there are ships which ferry passengers to Brundisium from Cassiope or from Dyrrhachium, unfit for cargo; likewise certain are river-capable but not sufficient for the sea.
Sed ex contrario exercenti navem adversus eos, qui cum magistro contraxerunt, actio non pollicetur, quia non eodem auxilio indigebat, sed aut ex locato cum magistro, si mercede operam ei exhibet, aut si gratuitam, mandati agere potest. solent plane praefecti propter ministerium annonae, item in provinciis praesides provinciarum extra ordinem eos iuvare ex contractu magistrorum.
But on the contrary, to the one operating a ship no action is promised against those who contracted with the master, because he did not need the same aid; rather, either he can sue on letting (ex locato) against the master, if he renders service to him for a wage, or, if it is gratuitous, he can sue on mandate. Clearly the prefects, on account of the ministry of the grain-supply, and likewise in the provinces the provincial governors, are accustomed to aid those persons, by extraordinary procedure (extra ordinem), on the masters’ contract.
Licet autem detur ^ datur^ actio in eum, cuius in potestate est qui navem exercet, tamen ita demum datur, si voluntate eius exerceat. ideo autem ex voluntate in solidum tenentur qui habent in potestate exercitorem, quia ad summam rem publicam navium exercitio perinet. at institorum non idem usus est: ea propter in tributum dumtaxat vocantur, qui contraxerunt cum eo, qui in merce peculiari sciente domino negotiatur.
Although an action may be given ^ is given^ against the one in whose power is he who operates a ship, nevertheless it is given only if he operates with his (the master’s) will. For this reason, by his will those who have the exercitor in their power are held liable in solidum, because ultimately the exercise of ships pertains to the commonwealth. But as to institores (shop-managers), the same practice does not obtain: for that reason only into contribution (in tributum) are called those who have contracted with him who carries on business in the peculium-merchandise with the master knowing.
but if the contract has been made with the master with knowledge only, not also with consent, do we give an action in solidum as though against one who consented, or rather shall we give it by the example of the tributory action? therefore, in a doubtful matter it is better to abide by the words of the edict, and neither to burden, in the case of ships, the mere and naked knowledge of the father or owner, nor, in peculial merchandise, to extend consent to an obligation for the whole. and thus too Pomponius seems to indicate: if he is under another’s power, then, if he conducts the business with that person’s consent, he is bound in solidum; if not, into the peculium.
Si tamen servus peculiaris volente filio familias in cuius peculio erat, vel servo vicarius eius navem exercuit, pater dominusve, qui voluntatem non accommodavit, dumtaxat de peculio tenebitur, sed filius ipse in solidum. plane si voluntate domini vel patris exerceant, in solidum tenebuntur et praeterea et filius, si et ipse voluntatem accommodavit, in solidum erit obligatus.
If, however, a slave belonging to the peculium, with the consent of the son under paternal power in whose peculium he was, or a vicarius slave of his, ran a ship, the father or master, who did not lend his will (consent), will be held only de peculio, but the son himself will be liable in solidum. Clearly, if they operate with the will of the master or father, they will be liable in solidum; and moreover the son also, if he likewise lent his will, will be bound in solidum.
Haec actio ex persona magistri in exercitorem dabitur, et ideo, si cum utro eorum actum est, cum altero agi non potest. sed si quid sit solutum, si quidem a magistro, ipso iure minuitur obligatio: sed et si ab exercitore, sive suo nomine, id est propter honorariam obligationem, sive magistri nomine solverit, minuetur obligatio, quoniam et alius pro me solvendo me liberat.
This action will be given from the person of the master against the exercitor (shipowner), and therefore, if suit has been brought against either of them, it cannot be brought against the other. But if anything has been paid—if indeed by the master, the obligation is by operation of law (ipso iure) reduced; and likewise if by the exercitor, whether in his own name, that is, on account of the honorary obligation, or in the master’s name he has paid, the obligation will be reduced, since another also, by paying for me, releases me.
Sed si servus plurium navem exerceat voluntate eorum, idem placuit quod in pluribus exercitoribus. plane si unius ex omnibus voluntate exercuit, in solidum ille tenebitur, et ideo puto et in superiore casu in solidum omnes teneri.
But if a slave belonging to several persons operates a ship by their will, the same has been held to be the law as in the case of several ship-operators. Clearly, if he operated by the will of one alone out of all, that one will be held for the whole (in solidum); and therefore I think that in the former case as well all are held for the whole (in solidum).
Si eum, qui in mea potestate sit, magistrum navis habeas, mihi quoque in te competit actio, si quid cum eo contraxero: idem est, si communis servus nobis erit. ex locato tamen mecum ages, quod operas servi mei conduxeris, quia et si cum alio contraxisset, ageres mecum, ut actiones, quas eo nomine habui, tibi praestarem, quemadmodum cum libero, si quidem conduxisses, experieris: quod si gratuitae operae fuerint, mandati ages.
If you have as master of a ship someone who is in my power, an action lies for me also against you, if I have contracted anything with him; the same holds if he is a slave common to us. Nevertheless you will sue me on the action ex locato, because you have hired the services of my slave, since even if he had contracted with someone else, you would sue me to make over to you the actions which I had under that head—just as, in the case of a free man, if indeed you had hired him, you would proceed. But if the services were gratuitous, you will sue on mandate (actio mandati).
Item si servus meus navem exercebit et cum magistro eius contraxero, nihil obstabit, quo minus adversus magistrum experiar actione, quae mihi vel iure civili vel honorario competit: nam et cuivis alii non obstat hoc edictum, quo minus cum magistro agere possit: hoc enim edicto non transfertur actio, sed adicitur.
Likewise, if my slave will operate a ship and I have contracted with its master, nothing will stand in the way to prevent me from proceeding against the master with the action that is competent to me either by civil law or by honorary (praetorian) law: for this edict does not hinder anyone else from being able to sue the master; for by this edict the action is not transferred, but added.
Lucius titius stichum magistrum navis praeposuit: is pecuniam mutuatus cavit se in refectionem navis eam accepisse: quaesitum est, an non aliter titius exercitoria teneretur, quam si creditor probaret pecuniam in refectionem navis esse consumptam. respondit creditorem utiliter acturum, si, cum pecunia crederetur, navis in ea causa fuisset, ut refici deberet: etenim ut non oportet creditorem ad hoc adstringi, ut ipse reficiendae navis curam suscipiat et negotium domini gerat ( quod certe futurum sit, si necesse habeat probare pecuniam in refectionem erogatam esse), ita illud exigendum, ut sciat in hoc se credere, cui rei magister quis sit praepositus, quod certe aliter fieri non potest, quam si illud quoque scierit necessariam refectioni pecuniam esse: quare etsi in ea causa fuerit navis, ut refici deberet, multo tamen maior pecunia credita fuerit, quam ad eam rem esset necessaria, non debere in solidum adversus dominum navis actionem dari.
Lucius titius appointed stichus master of the ship: he, having borrowed money, undertook (gave surety) that he had received it for the refection of the ship: the question was asked whether titius would be held by the exercitory action otherwise than if the creditor should prove that the money had been consumed on the refection of the ship. He answered that the creditor would act to good effect if, when the money was lent, the ship was in that condition that it ought to be refected (repaired): for just as it is not fitting to bind the creditor to this—that he himself take on the care of refecting the ship and manage the business of the owner (which surely would be the case, if he had to prove that the money was disbursed for the refection)—so this must be required: that he know he is lending for this, the matter for which the master has been put in charge, which surely cannot be otherwise than if he also knew that money was necessary for the refection: wherefore even if the ship was in such a condition that it ought to be refected, yet if much greater money was lent than was necessary for that matter, an action ought not to be given against the owner of the ship for the whole (in solidum).
Interdum etiam illud aestimandum, an in eo loco pecunia credita sit, in quo id, propter quod credebatur, comparari potuerit: quid enim, inquit, si ad velum emendum in eiusmodi insula pecuniam quis crediderit, in qua omnino velum comparari non potest? et in summa aliquam diligentiam in ea creditorem debere praestare.
Sometimes also this must be assessed: whether the money was lent in a place where the thing on account of which it was being lent could have been procured; for what, says he, if someone has lent money for buying a sail on such an island where a sail cannot at all be procured? and in sum the creditor ought to exhibit some diligence in this matter.
Eadem fere dicenda ait et si de institoria actione quaeratur: nam tunc quoque creditorem scire debere necessariam esse mercis comparationem, cui emendae servus sit praepositus, et sufficere, si in hoc crediderit, non etiam illud exigendum, ut ipse curam suscipiat, an in hanc rem pecunia eroganda est.
He says that nearly the same things are to be said also if inquiry is made about the institorial action: for then too the creditor ought to know that the procurement of merchandise is necessary, for the buying of which the slave has been put in charge; and it is sufficient if he has given credit for this, nor is it also to be required that he himself assume the care whether money is to be disbursed for this matter.
Si laborante nave iactus factus est, amissarum mercium domini, si merces vehendas locaverant, ex locato cum magistro navis agere debent: is deinde cum reliquis, quorum merces salvae sunt, ex conducto, ut detrimentum pro portione communicetur, agere potest. servius quidem respondit ex locato agere cum magistro navis debere, ut ceterorum vectorum merces retineat, donec portionem damni praestent. immo etsi ^ non^ retineat merces magister, ultro ex locato habiturus est actionem cum vectoribus: quid enim si vectores sint, qui nullas sarcinas habeant?
If, with the ship in distress, a jettison has been made, the owners of the goods that were lost—if they had hired carriage for their goods—ought to proceed ex locato against the master of the ship: he, thereafter, can proceed ex conducto against the rest, whose goods are safe, so that the detriment may be shared in proportion. Servius indeed replied that one should sue ex locato the master of the ship, in order that he may retain the goods of the other passengers, until they pay their portion of the damage. Indeed, even if the master does not retain the goods, he will still have an action ex locato against the passengers: for what if there should be passengers who have no baggage?
plainly it is more commodious, if there be any, to retain them. but if he has not hired the whole ship, he will sue ex conducto, just like the passengers who have hired places on the ship: for it is most equitable that a common detriment be made among those who, thanks to the losses of others, have obtained to have their own merchandise safe.
Si conservatis mercibus deterior facta sit navis aut si quid exarmaverit, nulla facienda est collatio, quia dissimilis earum rerum causa sit, quae navis gratia parentur et earum, pro quibus mercedem aliquis acceperit: nam et si faber incudem aut malleum fregerit, non imputaretur ei qui locaverit opus. sed si voluntate vectorum vel propter aliquem metum id detrimentum factum sit, hoc ipsum sarciri oportet.
If, with the merchandise preserved, the ship has been made worse, or if any part of her gear has been lost, no contribution is to be made, because the cause is dissimilar between things that are prepared for the ship’s sake and those for which someone has received hire (freight): for even if a smith should break an anvil or a hammer, it would not be charged to the one who commissioned the work. But if by the will of the passengers or on account of some fear that loss has been incurred, this very thing ought to be made good.
Cum in eadem nave varia mercium genera complures mercatores coegissent praetereaque multi vectores servi liberique in ea navigarent, tempestate gravi orta necessario iactura facta erat: quaesita deinde sunt haec: an omnes iacturam praestare oporteat et si qui tales merces imposuissent, quibus navis non oneraretur, velut gemmas margaritas? et quae portio praestanda est? et an etiam pro liberis capitibus dari oporteat?
When, in the same ship, several merchants had collected various kinds of merchandise, and, besides, many passengers, slaves and free, were sailing in it, a severe storm having arisen, a jettison was necessarily made: then these questions were asked: whether all ought to make good the jettison, and if any had put on board such goods as do not burden the ship, such as gems, pearls? and what portion is to be rendered? and whether it ought also to be given on account of free persons?
and by what action at law this matter can be resolved? it has been decided that all whose interest it was that the jettison be made must contribute, because the goods that were preserved owe that contribution: and so the owner also of the ship is bound in proportion. the total of the jettison ought to be distributed according to the value of the goods.
no estimation of the bodies of free persons can be made. From the contract of hire the owners of the things lost will bring an action with the sailor—that is, with the master. Likewise it was debated whether an estimation ought also to be made of each person’s clothing and rings; and it seemed to all that it should, unless certain items had been put on board for the purpose of consumption, among which are provisions—so much the more because, if ever these should fail during the navigation, whatever each person had would be contributed into the common stock.
Portio autem pro aestimatione rerum quae salvae sunt et earum quae amissae sunt praestari solet, nec ad rem pertinet, si hae quae amissae sunt pluris veniri poterunt, quoniam detrimenti, non lucri fit praestatio. sed in his rebus, quarum nomine conferendum est, aestimatio debet haberi non quanti emptae sint, sed quanti venire possunt.
However, the portion is usually provided according to the valuation of the things that are intact and of those that are lost; nor does it pertain to the matter if those that are lost could be sold for more, since the prestation is for detriment, not for profit. But in these matters, in respect of which a contribution is to be made, the valuation ought to be had not by how much they were bought, but by how much they can be sold.
Navis onustae levandae causa, quia intrare flumen vel portum non potuerat cum onere, si quaedam merces in scapham traiectae sunt, ne aut extra flumen periclitetur aut in ipso ostio vel portu, eaque scapha summersa est, ratio haberi debet inter eos, qui in nave merces salvas habent, cum his qui in scapha perdiderunt, proinde tamquam si iactura facta esset: idque sabinus quoque libro secundo responsorum probat. contra si scapha cum parte mercium salva est, navis periit, ratio haberi non debet eorum, qui in nave perdiderunt, quia iactus in tributum nave salva venit.
For the purpose of lightening a laden ship, because it could not enter a river or port with its load, if certain merchandise was transferred into a skiff, lest it be imperiled either outside the river or in the very mouth or port, and that skiff was submerged, contribution ought to be had between those who have their goods safe on the ship and those who lost them in the skiff, just as if a jettison had been made: and Sabinus also approves this in the second book of his Responsa. Conversely, if the skiff, with part of the merchandise, is safe, but the ship has perished, no contribution ought to be had for those who lost on the ship, because jettison comes into contribution only with the ship safe.
Sed si navis, quae in tempestate iactu mercium unius mercatoris levata est, in alio loco summersa est et aliquorum mercatorum merces per urinatores extractae sunt data mercede, rationem haberi debere eius, cuius merces in navigatione levandae navis causa iactae sunt, ab his, qui postea sua per urinatores servaverunt, sabinus aeque respondit. eorum vero, qui ita servaverunt, invicem rationem haberi non debere ab eo, qui in navigatione iactum fecit, si quaedam ex his mercibus per urinatores extractae sunt: eorum enim merces non possunt videri servandae navis causa iactae esse, quae perit.
But if a ship, which in a tempest was lightened by the jettison of the goods of one merchant, was submerged in another place, and the goods of some merchants were extracted by divers upon payment of a fee, Sabinus likewise answered that account ought to be had in favor of him whose goods were cast, in the navigation, for the sake of lightening the ship, against those who afterwards saved their own by means of divers. But as to those who thus saved [their goods], there ought not in turn to be account had against him who made the jettison in the navigation, if certain of these goods were extracted by divers: for their goods cannot be seen to have been cast for the purpose of saving the ship, which perished.
Cum autem iactus de nave factus est et alicuius res, quae in navi remanserunt, deteriores factae sunt, videndum, an conferre cogendus sit, quia non debet duplici damno onerari et collationis et quod res deteriores factae sunt. sed defendendum est hunc conferre debere pretio praesente rerum: itaque verbi gratia si vicenum merces duorum fuerunt et alterius aspargine decem esse coeperunt, ille cuius res integrae sunt pro viginti conferat, hic pro decem. potest tamen dici etiam illa sententia distinguentibus nobis, deteriores ex qua causa factae sunt, id est utrum propter iacta nudatis rebus damnum secutum est an vero alia ex causa, veluti quod alicubi iacebant merces in angulo aliquo et unda penetravit.
But when a jettison from the ship has been made and someone’s goods that remained on board have become worse, we must consider whether he is to be compelled to contribute, since he ought not to be burdened with a double loss—both of the contribution and of the fact that his goods have become worse. But it should be maintained that he ought to contribute at the present price of the goods: and so, for example, if the merchandise of two was twenty apiece and, by the sprinkling, that of the one began to be ten, he whose goods are intact contributes on twenty, this man on ten. Yet it can also be said, with us making a distinction by what cause they became worse, that is, whether on account of the jettison, with the goods stripped bare, loss followed, or indeed from another cause, as where the merchandise was lying somewhere in a certain corner and a wave penetrated.
then indeed he ought to contribute: or from the prior cause ought he not to bear the burden of contribution, because the jettison also injured this man? further, what if also by the splashing on account of the jettison the goods were made worse? but a more subtle distinction must be applied, which is greater, in the loss or in the contribution: if, for example, these goods were 20 and the contribution indeed makes 10, but the damage is 2, with this deducted, which he has suffered as damage, he ought to contribute the remainder.
What then, if there will be more in the loss than in the contribution? For instance, the goods have been made worse by ten gold pieces, but the contribution is two. Undoubtedly he ought not to bear both burdens; but here let us see whether he himself ought to contribute as well. For what difference is there whether I have lost my jettisoned goods or have begun to have them, stripped bare, in a worse condition? For just as aid is afforded to him who has lost, so it ought to be afforded also to him who, on account of the jettison, has begun to have his goods in a worse state.
Amissae navis damnum collationis consortio non sarcitur per eos, qui merces suas naufragio liberaverunt: nam huius aequitatem tunc admitti placuit, cum iactus remedio ceteris in communi periculo salva navi consultum est.
The loss of a ship that has been lost is not made good, by the consortium of contribution, by those who liberated their merchandise from the shipwreck: for it was decided that the equity of this is to be admitted then, when by the remedy of a jettison provision has been made for the others in a common peril, with the ship saved.
Navis adversa tempestate depressa ictu fulminis deustis armamentis et arbore et antemna hipponem delata est ibique tumultuariis armamentis ad praesens comparatis ostiam navigavit et onus integrum pertulit: quaesitum est, an hi, quorum onus fuit, nautae pro damno conferre debeant. respondit non debere: hic enim sumptus instruendae magis navis, quam conservandarum mercium gratia factus est.
A ship, in an adverse tempest, being driven down, with the rigging and the mast and the yard scorched by a stroke of lightning, was carried to Hippo; and there, with makeshift (tumultuary) equipment for the present procured, it sailed to Ostia and bore the cargo intact: it was asked whether those whose cargo it was ought to contribute to the mariner for the damage. He answered that they ought not: for here the expense was made rather for refitting the ship than for the sake of preserving the merchandise.
Qui levandae navis gratia res aliquas proiciunt, non hanc mentem habent, ut eas pro derelicto habeant, quippe si invenerint eas, ablaturos et, si suspicati fuerint, in quem locum eiectae sunt, requisituros: ut perinde sint, ac si quis onere pressus in viam rem abiecerit mox cum aliis reversurus, ut eandem auferret.
Those who, for the sake of lightening a ship, throw certain things overboard do not have this intention, namely, to treat them as derelict; indeed, if they find them, they will carry them away, and if they suspect into what place they were cast out, they will search for them: so that the case is the same as if someone, weighed down by a load, had thrown a thing into the road, intending soon to return with others in order to carry off the same.
Si vehenda mancipia conduxisti, pro eo mancipio, quod in nave mortuum est, vectura tibi non debetur. paulus: immo quaeritur, quid actum est, utrum ut pro his qui impositi an pro his qui deportati essent, merces daretur: quod si hoc apparere non poterit, satis erit pro nauta, si probaverit impositum esse mancipium.
If you have hired for slaves to be carried, for that slave who died on the ship, freight is not owed to you. paulus: rather, the question is what was agreed—whether the hire was to be paid for those who were put on board or for those who were transported; but if this cannot be made to appear, it will suffice for the sailor if he proves that the slave was put on board.
Si ea condicione navem conduxisti, ut ea merces tuae portarentur easque merces nulla nauta necessitate coactus in navem deteriorem, cum id sciret te fieri nolle, transtulit et merces tuae cum ea nave perierunt, in qua novissime vectae sunt, habes ex conducto locato cum priore nauta actionem. paulus: immo contra, si modo ea navigatione utraque navis periit, cum id sine dolo et culpa nautarum factum esset. idem iuris erit, si prior nauta publice retentus navigare cum tuis mercibus prohibitus fuerit.
If you chartered a ship on this condition, that your merchandise be carried by that ship, and a sailor, compelled by no necessity, transferred those goods into an inferior ship, although he knew that you did not wish this to be done, and your merchandise perished with the ship in which they were most recently conveyed, you have an action on letting-and-hiring (actio ex conducto) against the former sailor. paulus: rather, the contrary, if in that same voyage both ships perished, since this happened without fraud or fault of the sailors. The same law will obtain, if the former sailor, detained by public authority, was prohibited from sailing with your merchandise.
the same law will obtain, when he had been engaged by you on this condition: that he should render to you a fixed penalty, unless before the appointed day he had set out your goods at the place to which he had leased the conveying of those goods; nor will it rest with him that he should look for that penalty to be remitted to him. we shall observe the same law, in the same genus of reasoning, if it be proved that the sailor, impeded by illness, was not able to sail. we shall say the same, if his ship has developed a defect without dolo malo and without his fault.
Si conduxisti navem amphorarum duo milium et ibi amphoras portasti, pro duobus milibus amphorarum pretium debes. paulus: immo si aversione navis conducta est, pro duobus milibus debetur merces: si pro numero impositarum amphorarum merces constituta est, contra se habet: nam pro tot amphoris pretium debes, quot portasti.
If you hired a ship of 2,000 amphoras and there carried amphoras, you owe the freight for 2,000 amphoras. paulus: Rather, if the ship was hired by aversion (i.e., as a whole), the freight is owed for 2,000; if the freight was fixed according to the number of amphoras loaded, it stands the other way: for you owe the price for as many amphoras as you carried.
Aequum praetori visum est, sicut commoda sentimus ex actu institorum, ita etiam obligari nos ex contractibus ipsorum et conveniri. sed non idem facit circa eum qui institorem praeposuit, ut experiri possit: sed si quidem servum proprium institorem habuit, potest esse securus adquisitis sibi actionibus: si autem vel alienum servum vel etiam hominem liberum, actione deficietur: ipsum tamen institorem vel dominum eius convenire poterit vel mandati vel negotiorum gestorum. Marcellus autem ait debere dari actionem ei qui institorem praeposuit in eos, qui cum eo contraxerint.
It seemed equitable to the praetor that, just as we derive advantages from the act of institores, so also we are bound from their contracts and may be sued. But he does not do the same with respect to him who has put an institor in charge, so that he might be able to bring an action: if indeed he has had his own slave as institor, he can be secure, actions having accrued to him; but if it is another’s slave or even a free man, he will be lacking an action. Nevertheless, he will be able to proceed against the institor himself or his owner by an action of mandate or of management of affairs (negotiorum gestorum). Marcellus, however, says that an action ought to be given to him who has put an institor in charge against those who have contracted with him.
Idem labeo ait: si quis pistor servum suum solitus fuit in certum locum mittere ad panem vendendum, deinde is pecunia accepta praesenti, ut per dies singulos eis panem praestaret, conturbaverit, dubitari non oportet, quin, si permisit ei ita dari summas, teneri debeat.
The same Labeo says: if a baker was accustomed to send his slave to a certain place to sell bread, and then that slave, after having received cash in advance so that he might provide them bread day by day, became insolvent, there should be no doubt that, if he permitted sums to be given to him on those terms, he ought to be held liable.
Sed et cum fullo peregre proficiscens rogasset, ut discipulis suis, quibus tabernam instructam tradiderat, imperaret, post cuius profectionem vestimenta discipulus accepisset et fugisset, fullonem non teneri, si quasi procurator fuit relictus: sin vero quasi institor, teneri eum. plane si adfirmaverit mihi recte me credere operariis suis, non institoria, sed ex locato tenebitur.
But also where a fuller, setting out abroad, had asked that one of his apprentices—to whom he had handed over a fitted-out shop—give orders, and after his departure an apprentice had received garments and fled, the fuller is not held, if he was left as a sort of procurator; but if rather as an institor, he is held. Clearly, if he has affirmed to me that I rightly entrust to his workmen, he will be held not by the institoria, but under ex locato.
Proinde si praeposui ad mercium distractionem, tenebor nomine eius ex empto actione: item si forte ad emendum eum praeposuero, tenebor dumtaxat ex vendito: sed neque si ad emendum, et ille vendiderit, neque si ad vendendum, et ille emerit, debebit teneri, idque cassius probat.
Accordingly, if I have put him in charge for the distraction (sale) of merchandise, I shall be held liable, on his account, by the action ex empto; likewise, if perchance I have put him in charge to purchase, I shall be held liable only by the action ex vendito: but neither, if for purchasing and he should sell, nor if for selling and he should purchase, ought I to be held liable—and Cassius approves this.
Item si institor, cum oleum vendidisset, anulum arrae nomine acceperit neque eum reddat, dominum institoria teneri: nam eius rei, in quam praepositus est, contractum est: nisi forte mandatum ei fuit praesenti pecunia vendere. quare si forte pignus institor ob pretium acceperit, institoriae locus erit.
Likewise, if the shop‑manager, after he has sold oil, has received a ring by way of earnest and does not return it, the master is held liable by the institorial action: for it is a contract of the matter for which he was put in charge; unless perhaps he was mandated to sell for ready money. Wherefore, if perchance the shop‑manager has received a pledge on account of the price, there will be room for the institorial action.
Si ab alio institor sit praepositus, is tamen decesserit qui praeposuit et heres ei extiterit, qui eodem institore utatur, sine dubio teneri eum oportebit. nec non, si ante aditam hereditatem cum eo contractum est, aequum est ignoranti dari institoriam actionem.
If an institor has been put in charge by another, but the one who appointed him has died, and an heir has arisen to him who makes use of the same institor, without doubt he ought to be held liable. And likewise, if a contract was made with him before the inheritance was entered upon, it is equitable that the institorial action be granted to one who was ignorant.
Parvi autem refert, quis sit institor, masculus an femina, liber an servus proprius vel alienus. item quisquis praeposuit: nam et si mulier praeposuit, competet institoria exemplo exercitoriae actionis et si mulier sit praeposita, tenebitur etiam ipsa. sed et si filia familias sit vel ancilla praeposita, competit institoria actio.
It matters little, moreover, who the institor is—male or female, free or a slave, one’s own or another’s. Likewise, whoever has put the person in charge: for even if a woman has put the manager in charge, the institorial action will lie, on the model of the exercitorial action; and if a woman has been put in charge as manager, she too will be liable. And even if a daughter under household power or a maidservant has been put in charge, the institorial action is available.
De quo palam proscriptum fuerit, ne cum eo contrahatur, is praepositi loco non habetur: non enim permittendum erit cum institore contrahere, sed si quis nolit contrahi, prohibeat: ceterum qui praeposuit tenebitur ipsa praepositione.
One about whom it has been publicly posted that no contract is to be made with him is not held to be in the position of a praepositus: for it will not be permitted to contract with the institor; but if anyone does not wish contracting to take place, let him prohibit it; moreover, the one who has put him in charge will be liable by the very act of appointment.
Proscribere palam sic accipimus claris litteris, unde de plano recte legi possit, ante tabernam scilicet vel ante eum locum in quo negotiatio exercetur, non in loco remoto, sed in evidenti. litteris utrum graecis an latinis? puto secundum loci condicionem, ne quis causari possit ignorantiam litterarum.
We take “to post publicly” thus: with clear letters, from which it can be read correctly from level ground, namely in front of the shop or in front of that place in which the business is conducted, not in a remote place, but in a conspicuous one. in letters, whether Greek or Latin? I think according to the condition of the locality, so that no one can plead ignorance of the letters.
Proscriptum autem perpetuo esse oportet: ceterum si per id temporis, quo propositum non erat, vel obscurata proscriptione contractum sit, institoria locum habebit. proinde si dominus quidem mercis proscripsisset, alius autem sustulit aut vetustate vel pluvia vel quo simili contingit, ne proscriptum esset vel non pareret, dicendum eum qui praeposuit teneri. sed si ipse institor decipiendi mei causa detraxit, dolus ipsius praeponenti nocere debet, nisi particeps doli fuerit qui contraxit.
Moreover, the posting ought to be continuous: however, if during that time when it was not posted, or with the posting obscured, a contract was entered, the institorial action will have place. Accordingly, if the owner of the merchandise had indeed posted it, but another removed it, or by age or rain or something similar it happens that it was not posted or did not appear, it must be said that the one who put him in charge is liable. But if the manager himself removed it for the purpose of deceiving me, his fraud ought to harm the one who appointed him, unless the one who contracted was a participant in the fraud.
Condicio autem praepositionis servanda est: quid enim si certa lege vel interventu cuiusdam personae vel sub pignore voluit cum eo contrahi vel ad certam rem? aequissimum erit id servari, in quo praepositus est. item si plures habuit institores, vel cum omnibus simul contrahi voluit vel cum uno solo.
However, the condition of the appointment (praepositio) must be observed: for what if he wished that contracting with him be under a specific term (lex), or with the intervention of a certain person, or under a pledge, or for a specific matter? It will be most equitable that that be observed within which he has been put in charge. Likewise, if he had several factors (institores), either he wished contracting to be with all of them together, or with one alone.
but also, if he gave notice to someone that he should not contract with him, he ought not to be held by the institorial action: for we can prohibit a certain person to contract, or a certain class of men or of traders, or permit it to certain persons. but if at one time he forbade contracting with one, at another with another, by continual variation, an action must be given to all against him; for contracting parties ought not to be deceived.
Si a servo tuo operas vicarii eius conduxero et eum merci meae institorem fecero isque tibi mercem vendiderit, emptio est: nam cum dominus a servo emit, est emptio, licet non sit dominus obligatus, usque adeo, ut etiam pro emptore et possidere et usucapere dominus possit:
If I should hire from your slave the services of his vicar and make him the manager of my merchandise, and he should sell the merchandise to you, there is a purchase: for when a master buys from his slave, there is a purchase, although the master is not obligated, to such a degree that the master can even, as purchaser, both possess and acquire by usucapion:
Et ideo utilis institoria actio adversus me tibi competet, mihi vero adversus te vel de peculio dispensatoris, si ex conducto agere velim, vel de peculio vicarii, quod ei mercem vendendam mandaverim: pretiumque, quo emisti, in rem tuam versum videri poterit eo, quod debitor servi tui factus esses.
And therefore a useful institorial action will lie for you against me, while for me against you there will be an action either de peculio of the dispensator, if I should wish to sue ex conducto, or de peculio of the vicarius, because I had instructed him to sell the merchandise; and the price for which you bought can be deemed to have been converted into your assets, on the ground that you had become a debtor of your slave.
Habebat quis servum merci oleariae praepositum arelatae, eundem et mutuis pecuniis accipiendis: acceperat mutuam pecuniam: putans creditor ad merces eum accepisse egit proposita actione: probare non potuit mercis gratia eum accepisse. licet consumpta est actio nec amplius agere poterit, quasi pecuniis quoque mutuis accipiendis esset praepositus, tamen iulianus utilem ei actionem competere ait.
Someone had a slave put in charge of the olive-oil merchandise at Arelate, and the same man also of receiving moneys lent; he had received money on loan. The creditor, thinking that he had received it for the merchandise, sued by the action set forth; he could not prove that he had received it for the sake of the merchandise. Although the action has been consumed and he will no longer be able to sue, yet Julian says that a useful action is competent to him, as if he had also been put in charge of receiving moneys lent.
Si duo pluresve tabernam exerceant et servum, quem ex disparibus partibus habebant, institorem praeposuerint, utrum pro dominicis partibus teneantur an pro aequalibus an pro portione mercis an vero in solidum, iulianus quaerit. et verius esse ait exemplo exercitorum et de peculio actionis in solidum unumquemque conveniri posse, et quidquid is praestiterit qui conventus est, societatis iudicio vel communi dividundo consequetur, quam sententiam et supra probavimus.
If two or more operate a shop and appoint as institor (manager) a slave whom they held in unequal shares, Julian asks whether they are to be held according to their dominical shares, or equally, or in proportion to the merchandise, or indeed in solidum. And he says it is truer, on the example of the exercitores (ship-operators) and of the actio de peculio, that each can be sued in solidum; and whatever the one who is sued has paid, he will recover by the partnership action or by the action communi dividundo (for dividing common property), which opinion we also above have approved.
Idem erit et si alienus servus communi merci praepositus sit: nam adversus utrumque in solidum actio dari debet et quod quisque praestiterit, eius partem societatis vel communi dividundo iudicio consequetur. certe ubicumque actio societatis vel communi dividundo cessat, quemque pro parte sua condemnari oportere constat, veluti si is, cuius servo creditum est, duobus heredibus institutis ei servo libertatem dederit: nam heredum quisque pro sua parte conveniendi sunt, quia cessat inter eos communi dividundo iudicium.
The same will be the case even if another’s slave has been put in charge of the common merchandise: for an action ought to be granted against each in solidum; and what each shall have rendered, he will obtain his share by an action of partnership or by the judgment for dividing common property. Certainly, wherever the action of partnership or the action for dividing common property ceases, it is agreed that each must be condemned for his own share, as for example if the one to whose slave credit was given, having instituted two heirs, has granted that slave his liberty: for each of the heirs is to be convened for his share, because the judgment for dividing common property ceases between them.
Si cum vilico alicuius contractum sit, non datur in dominum actio, quia vilicus propter fructus percipiendos, non propter quaestum praeponitur. si tamen vilicum distrahendis quoque mercibus praepositum habuero, non erit iniquum exemplo institoriae actionem in me competere.
if a contract has been made with someone’s vilicus (farm-steward), no action is given against the master, because the vilicus is put in charge for collecting the fruits, not for profit. if, however, I have appointed the vilicus also for selling off goods, it will not be inequitable that, by the example of the institorian action, an action should lie against me.
Si impubes patri habenti institores heres exstiterit, deinde cum his contractum fuerit, dicendum est in pupillum dari actionem propter utilitatem promiscui usus, quemadmodum ubi post mortem tutoris, cuius auctoritate institor praepositus est, cum eo contrahitur.
If a prepubescent (minor) has become heir to a father who had institores, and thereafter a contract has been made with these, it must be said that an action is given against the ward on account of the advantage of common use, just as where, after the death of the tutor, under whose authority the institor was appointed, one contracts with him.
Eius contractus certe nomine, qui ante aditam hereditatem intercessit, etiamsi furiosus heres exsistat, dandam esse actionem etiam pomponius scripsit: non enim imputandum est ei, qui sciens dominum decessisse cum institore exercente mercem contrahat.
Under the name of that contract which intervened before the inheritance was entered upon, even if the heir should turn out insane, an action is to be granted, as even pomponius wrote; for it is not to be imputed to one who, knowing that the master has died, contracts with the manager conducting the trade.
Proculus ait, si denuntiavero tibi, ne servo a me praeposito crederes, exceptionem dandam: " si ille illi non denuntiaverit, ne illi servo crederet". sed si ex eo contractu peculium habeat aut in rem meam versum sit nec velim quo locupletior sim solvere, replicari de dolo malo oportet: nam videri me dolum malum facere, qui ex aliena iactura lucrum quaeram.
Proculus says that, if I have given you notice not to trust the slave placed in charge by me, an exception is to be granted: " if he has not given him notice not to trust that slave." But if from that contract he has a peculium or it has been turned to my account, and I am unwilling to pay that whereby I am richer, a replication on malicious fraud ought to be made: for I seem to be committing malicious fraud, who seek gain from another’s loss.
Servus pecuniis tantum faenerandis praepositus per intercessionem aes alienum suscipiens ut institorem dominum in solidum iure praetorio non adstringit: quod autem pro eo, qui pecuniam faeneravit, per delegationem alii promisit, a domino recte petetur, cui pecuniae creditae contra eum qui delegavit actio quaesita est.
A slave appointed only for the lending of monies at interest, by assuming a debt through intercession, does not bind the master, as an institor, for the whole (in solidum) by praetorian law; but what he promised to another, by delegation, on behalf of him who lent the money, will be rightly demanded from the master, to whom an action for money lent has been afforded against the one who delegated.
Lucius titius mensae nummulariae quam exercebat habuit libertum praepositum: is gaio seio cavit in haec verba: " octavius terminalis rem agens octavii felicis domitio felici salutem. habes penes mensam patroni mei denarios mille, quos denarios vobis numerare debebo pridie kalendas maias. " quaesitum est, lucio titio defuncto sine herede bonis eius venditis an ex epistula iure conveniri terminalis possit.
Lucius titius, who operated a money-changers’ table, had a freedman put in charge: this man gave a formal undertaking to gaio seio in these words: " octavius terminalis, acting as agent of octavius felix, greeting to domitius felix. you have at the table of my patron one thousand denarii, which denarii I shall have to count out to you on the day before the kalends of may. " the question was asked, lucius titius having died without an heir and his goods having been sold, whether terminalis can be lawfully convened on the epistle.
Huius quoque edicti non minima utilitas est, ut dominus, qui alioquin in servi contractibus privilegium habet ( quippe cum de peculio dumtaxat teneatur, cuius peculii aestimatio deducto quod domino debetur fit), tamen, si scierit servum peculiari merce negotiari, velut extraneus creditor ex hoc edicto in tributum vocatur.
This edict too has no small utility, namely that the master, who otherwise has a privilege in the slave’s contracts ( for he is held liable only de peculio, the valuation of which peculium is made with what is owed to the master deducted), nevertheless, if he knows the slave to be trading with peculium merchandise, is called into contribution by this edict as though an outside creditor.
Peculiarem autem mercem non sic uti peculium accipimus, quippe peculium deducto quod debetur accipitur, merx peculiaris, etiamsi nihil sit in peculio, dominum tributoria obligat, ita demum si sciente eo negotiabitur.
As for peculial merchandise, we do not take it in the same way as the peculium; for the peculium is taken with what is owed deducted; peculial merchandise, even if there is nothing in the peculium, obligates the master under the actio tributoria, but only if he carries on business with his knowledge.
Sed si servus communis sit et ambo sciant domini, in utrumlibet ex illis dabitur actio: at si alter scit, alter ignoravit, in eum qui scit dabitur actio, deducetur tamen solidum quod ei qui ignoravit debetur. quod si ipsum quis ignorantem convenerit, quoniam de peculio convenitur, deducetur etiam id quod scienti debetur et quidem in solidum: nam et si ipse de peculio conventus esset, solidum quod ei deberetur deduceretur, et ita iulianus libro duodecimo digestorum scripsit.
But if the slave is common and both owners know, the action will be granted against either of them; but if one knows and the other was ignorant, the action will be granted against the one who knows, yet the whole (solidum) that is owed to the one who was ignorant will be deducted. And if someone should sue the ignorant one himself, since he is sued de peculio, there will also be deducted what is owed to the one who knows, and indeed in full; for even if he himself were sued de peculio, the whole that would be owed to him would be deducted; and thus Julian wrote in Book 12 of the Digest.
Si servus pupilli vel furiosi sciente tutore vel curatore in merce peculiari negotietur, dolum quidem tutoris vel curatoris nocere pupillo vel furioso non debere puto, nec tamen lucrosum esse debere, et ideo hactenus eum ex dolo tutoris tributoria teneri, si quid ad eum pervenerit: idem et in furioso puto. quamvis pomponius libro octavo epistularum, si solvendo tutor sit, ex dolo eius pupillum teneri scripsit: et sane hactenus tenebitur, ut actionem, quam contra tutorem habeat, praestet.
If a slave of a ward (minor) or of an insane person, with the guardian or curator knowing, does business in peculium‑merchandise, I think that the fraud (dolus) of the guardian or curator ought not to harm the ward or the insane person, nor yet ought it to be lucrative; and therefore he is to be held by the tributoria action from the guardian’s fraud only to this extent: if anything has come to him. I think the same in the case of the insane person. Although Pomponius, in the eighth book of the Letters, wrote that, if the guardian is solvent, the ward is held on account of his fraud; and indeed he will be held to this extent, that he should assign the action which he has against the guardian.
Sed et si ipsius pupilli dolo factum sit, si eius aetatis sit, ut doli capax sit, efficere ut teneatur, quamvis scientia eius non sufficiat ad negotiationem. quid ergo est? scientia quidem tutoris et curatoris debet facere locum huic actioni: dolus autem quatenus noceat, ostendi.
But also, if it was done by the ward’s own fraud, if he is of such an age as to be capable of fraud (doli capax), it brings about that he is held to account, although his knowledge does not suffice for negotiation. What then? The knowledge of the tutor and the curator ought indeed to make room for this action; but as for the fraud, it must be shown to the extent that it harms.
Si vicarius servi mei negotietur, si quidem me sciente, tributoria tenebor, si me ignorante, ordinario sciente, de peculio eius actionem dandam pomponius libro sexagensimo scripsit, nec deducendum ex vicarii peculio, quod ordinario debetur, cum id quod mihi debetur deducatur. sed si uterque scierimus, et tributoriam et de peculio actionem competere ait, tributoriam vicarii nomine, de peculio vero ordinarii: eligere tamen debere agentem, qua potius actione experiatur, sic tamen, ut utrumque tribuatur et quod mihi et quod servo debetur, cum, si servus ordinarius ignorasset, deduceretur integrum, quod ei a vicario debetur.
If the vicarius of my slave conducts business, then, if indeed with my knowledge, I shall be liable under the actio tributoria; if without my knowledge but with the ordinarius knowing, Pomponius wrote in the sixtieth book that an action de peculio must be granted against his peculium, and that what is owed to the ordinarius is not to be deducted from the peculium of the vicarius, since what is owed to me is deducted. But if we have both known, he says that both the tributory action and the action de peculio are available—the tributory action in the name of the vicarius, but the de peculio in truth for the ordinarius; nevertheless the plaintiff ought to choose by which action he would rather proceed, provided, however, that both be apportioned, both what is owed to me and what is owed to the slave, since, if the ordinarius slave had been ignorant, the whole amount that is owed him by the vicarius would be deducted.
Sed est quaesitum, dominus utrum ita demum partietur ex merce, si quid ei mercis nomine debeatur, an vero et si ex alia causa. et labeo ait, ex quacumque causa ei debeatur, parvique referret, ante mercem an postea ei debere quid servus coeperit: sufficere enim, quod privilegium deductionis perdidit.
But the question has been raised, whether the master will only then take a share out of the merchandise if something is owed to him under the title of merchandise, or indeed also if from another cause. And Labeo says that, from whatever cause it is owed to him, it would matter little whether before the merchandise or afterwards the slave began to owe him anything: for it suffices that he lost the privilege of deduction.
Si praeter mercem servus iste in tabernam habeat instrumentum, an hoc quoque tribuatur? et labeo ait et hoc tribui, et est aequissimum: plerumque enim hic apparatus ex merce est, immo semper. cetera tamen, quae extra haec in peculium habuit, non tribuentur, ut puta argentum habuit vel aurum, nisi si haec ex merce comparavit.
If, besides the merchandise, this slave has equipment for the shop, is that too to be assigned? And Labeo says that this too is assigned, and it is most equitable: for for the most part this apparatus is from the merchandise—indeed, always. The rest, however, which he had in his peculium outside these things will not be assigned—for instance, if he had silver or gold—unless he purchased these from the merchandise.
Si plures habuit servus creditores, sed quosdam in mercibus certis, an omnes in isdem confundendi erunt et omnes in tributum vocandi? ut puta duas negotiationes exercebat, puta sagariam et linteariam, et separatos habuit creditores. puto separatim eos in tributum vocari: unusquisque enim eorum merci magis quam ipsi credidit.
If a slave had several creditors, but some upon certain specific wares, are all to be confused into the same and all to be called into contribution? For instance, he was conducting two businesses, say the cloak-trade and the linen-trade, and he had separate creditors. I think they are to be called into contribution separately: for each of them gave credit to the merchandise rather than to him.
Sed si duas tabernas eiusdem negotiationis exercuit et ego fui tabernae verbi gratia quam ad bucinum habuit ratiocinator, alius eius quam trans tiberim, aequissimum puto separatim tributionem faciendam, ne ex alterius re merceve alii indemnes fiant, alii damnum sentiant.
But if he operated two shops of the same business, and I was, for example, the accountant (ratiocinator) of the shop which he had at the Bucinum, while another was [accountant] of the one across the Tiber, I consider it most equitable that distribution be made separately, lest from the property or merchandise of the one some be left indemnified while others sustain loss.
Sed si dedi mercem meam vendendam et exstat, videamus, ne iniquum sit in tributum me vocari. et si quidem in creditum ei abiit, tributio locum habebit: enimvero si non abiit, quia res venditae non alias desinunt esse meae, quamvis vendidero; nisi aere soluto vel fideiussore dato vel alias satisfacto, dicendum erit vindicare me posse.
But if I have given my merchandise to be sold and it is extant, let us consider whether it would not be iniquitous for me to be called into the contribution. And if indeed it has been entered to his credit, the contribution will have place; but truly, if it has not gone so, since things sold do not otherwise cease to be mine, although I have sold, unless the money has been paid or a surety has been given or satisfaction otherwise rendered, it must be said that I am able to vindicate it.
Tributio autem fit pro rata eius quod cuique debeatur, et ideo, si unus creditor veniat desiderans tribui, integram portionem consequitur, sed quoniam fieri potest, ut alius quoque vel alii exsistere possint mercis peculiaris creditores, cavere debet creditor iste pro rata se refusurum, si forte alii emerserint creditores.
But distribution is made pro rata of that which is owed to each; and therefore, if a single creditor comes desiring to be allotted, he obtains his entire portion. But since it can happen that another or others may also exist as creditors of the wares of the peculium, this creditor ought to give security that he will refund pro rata, if perchance other creditors emerge.
Illud quoque cavere debet, si quid aliud domini debitum emerserit, refusurum se ei pro rata. finge enim condicionale debitum imminere vel in occulto esse: hoc quoque admittendum est: nam iniuriam dominus pati non debet, licet in tributum vocatur.
He ought also to stipulate this, that, if any other debt of the master should emerge, he will refund to him pro rata. imagine indeed a conditional debt to be imminent or to be occult: this too must be admitted; for the master ought not to suffer an injury, although he is called into the apportionment.
Quid tamen si dominus tribuere nolit nec hanc molestiam suscipere, sed peculio vel mercibus cedere paratus sit? pedius refert audiendum eum, quae sententia habet aequitatem: et plerumque arbitrum in hanc rem praetor debebit dare, cuius interventu tribuantur merces peculiares.
What, however, if the master is unwilling to grant and does not undertake this trouble, but is prepared to cede the peculium or the merchandise? Pedius reports that he should be heard, which opinion carries equity; and for the most part the praetor ought to appoint an arbiter for this matter, by whose intervention the peculial earnings are allotted.
Si cuius dolo malo factum est, quo minus ita tribueretur, in eum tributoria datur, ut quanto minus tributum sit quam debuerit, praestet: quae actio dolum malum coercet domini. minus autem tribuere videtur etiam si nihil tributum sit. si tamen ignorans in merce servum habere minus tribuit, non videtur dolo minus tribuisse, sed re comperta si non tribuat, dolo nunc non caret.
If by someone’s dolus malus it has been brought about that the distribution be made the less, the actio tributoria is given against him, so that he make good as much as has been distributed less than ought to have been; which action restrains the master’s dolus malus. Moreover, one seems to distribute less even if nothing has been distributed. If, however, being ignorant that he had a slave in the stock-in-trade he distributed less, he does not seem to have distributed less by dolus; but once the fact is discovered, if he does not distribute, he is now not without dolus.
Eligere quis debet, qua actione experiatur, utrum de peculio an tributoria, cum scit sibi regressum ad aliam non futurum. plane si quis velit ex alia causa tributoria agere, ex alia causa de peculio, audiendus erit.
Someone ought to choose by which action he will proceed, whether by the de peculio or by the actio tributoria, since he knows that there will be no recourse for him to the other. Clearly, if someone wishes to sue by the actio tributoria on one cause and by the de peculio on another cause, he will be heard.
Si servo testamento manumisso peculium legatum sit, non debere heredem tributoria teneri, quasi neque ad eum pervenerit neque dolo fecerit, labeo ait. sed pomponius libro sexagensimo scripsit heredem nisi curaverit caveri sibi a servo vel deduxit a peculio quod tribuendum erat, teneri tributoria, quae sententia non est sine ratione: ipse enim auctor doli est, qui id egit, ne intribueret: totiens enim in heredem damus de eo quod ad eum pervenit, quotiens ex dolo defuncti convenitur, non quotiens ex suo.
If, to a slave manumitted by testament, the peculium has been bequeathed, Labeo says the heir ought not to be held under the actio tributoria, on the ground that neither has it come to him nor has he acted with dolus. But Pomponius, in the sixtieth book, wrote that unless the heir took care either to have security (cautio) taken for himself from the slave, or to deduct from the peculium what had to be distributed, he is liable under the actio tributoria—which opinion is not without reason: for he himself is the author of the dolus, who contrived that he should not contribute (tribuere). For we grant against the heir, in respect of that which has come to him, as often as he is sued on account of the deceased’s dolus, not as often as on account of his own.
Aliquando etiam agentibus expedit potius de peculio agere quam tributoria: nam in hac actione de qua loquimur hoc solum in divisionem venit, quod in mercibus est quibus negotiatur quodque eo nomine receptum est: at in actione de peculio totius peculii quantitas spectatur, in quo et merces continentur. et fieri potest, ut dimidia forte parte peculii aut tertia vel etiam minore negotietur: fieri praeterea potest, ut patri dominove nihil debeat.
Sometimes it is also expedient for those bringing suit to proceed rather by the de peculio action than by the tributoria: for in this action of which we speak, only that comes into division which is in the merchandise with which he trades, and what has been received under that head; but in the de peculio action the quantity of the entire peculium is considered, in which the wares are likewise contained. And it can happen that he conducts business perhaps with half of the peculium, or a third, or even a smaller part; moreover, it can happen that he owes nothing to the father or to the master.
Alius dumtaxat de peculio, alius tributoria servi nomine cum domino agit: quaesitum est, an deducere dominus de peculio debeat, quod tributoria agenti praestaturus sit. respondit: tributoria actione tunc demum agi potest, cum dominus in distribuendo pretio mercis edicto praetoris non satisfecit, id est cum maiorem partem debiti sui deduxit quam creditoribus tribuit, veluti si, cum in merce triginta fuissent, in quam ipse quidem quindecim crediderat, duo autem extranei triginta, tota quindecim deduxerit, et creditoribus reliqua quindecim dederit, cum deberet sola decem deducere, extraneis dena tribuere. cum igitur hoc fecit, nec intellegendus est servum a se liberasse eo, quod quinque adhuc nomine eius tributoria actione praestaturus sit: quare si agi de peculio coeperit, cum forte extra mercem peculium esset, quinque tamquam adhuc creditor servi deducere debebit.
One sues only concerning the peculium; another brings the tributoria in the slave’s name against the master: the question was asked whether the master ought to deduct from the peculium what he will have to pay to the one bringing the tributoria. He answered: the tributoria action can be brought only when the master, in distributing the price of the merchandise, has not satisfied the praetor’s edict, that is, when he has deducted for his own debt a larger share than he has assigned to the creditors—for example, if, when there were thirty in the merchandise, in which he himself had indeed credited fifteen, but two outsiders thirty, he has deducted the whole fifteen and has given the remaining fifteen to the creditors, whereas he ought to have deducted only ten and to have assigned ten each to the outsiders. Therefore, when he has done this, he is not to be understood to have released the slave on his own part by the fact that he will still have to pay five in his name by the tributoria action: wherefore, if suit de peculio has been begun, since perchance there was peculium outside the merchandise, he will have to deduct the five as still a creditor of the slave.
Omnia proconsul agit, ut qui contraxit cum eo, qui in aliena potestate sit, etiamsi deficient superiores actiones, id est exercitoria institoria tributoriave, nihilo minus tamen in quantum ex bono et aequo res patitur suum consequatur. sive enim iussu eius, cuius in potestate sit, negotium gestum fuerit, in solidum eo nomine iudicium pollicetur: sive non iussu, sed tamen in rem eius versum fuerit, eatenus introducit actionem, quatenus in rem eius versum fuerit: sive neutrum eorum sit, de peculio actionem constituit.
The proconsul makes every provision, so that one who has contracted with a person who is under another’s power, even if the superior actions fail—that is, the exercitoria, institoria, or tributoria—nonetheless may obtain what is his, in so far as the matter allows according to what is good and equitable. For if the business was transacted by order (iussu) of the one in whose power he is, he promises an action for the whole (in solidum) under that head; or if not by order (non iussu), but nevertheless it has been turned to his account (in rem eius versum), he introduces an action to that extent, in so far as it has been turned to his account; or if neither of these applies, he establishes an action de peculio.
Ait praetor: " in eum, qui emancipatus aut exheredatus erit quive abstinuit se hereditate eius cuius in potestate cum moritur fuerit, eius rei nomine, quae cum eo contracta erit, cum is in potestate esset, sive sua voluntate sive iussu eius in cuius potestate erit contraxerit, sive in peculium ipsius sive in patrimonium eius cuius in potestate fuerit ea res redacta fuerit, actionem causa cognita dabo in quod facere potest. "
The praetor says: " against him who has been emancipated or disinherited, or who has abstained from the inheritance of him in whose power he was when he died, on account of that matter which was contracted with him when he was in potestate, whether he contracted by his own will or by the order of him in whose power he will be, whether that matter has been brought into his peculium or into the patrimony of him in whose power he was, I will grant an action, the cause having been taken into cognizance, for as much as he is able to perform. "
Sed et si citra emancipationem sui iuris factus sit vel in adoptionem datus, deinde pater naturalis decesserit, item si quis ex minima parte sit institutus, aequissimum est causa cognita etiam in hunc dari actionem in id quod facere potest.
But also, if without emancipation he has been made sui iuris or has been given into adoption, and then the natural father has deceased, likewise if someone has been instituted from the smallest part, it is most equitable, when the cause has been examined, that an action also be granted against this person for that which he is able to do.
Sed an hic detrahi debeat quod aliis debetur, tractari potest. et si quidem sint creditores, qui, cum esset alienae potestatis, cum eo contraxerunt, recte dicetur occupantis meliorem esse condicionem, nisi si quis privilegiarius veniat: huius enim non sine ratione prioris ratio habebitur. quod si qui sint, qui, posteaquam sui iuris factus est, cum eo contraxerunt, puto horum rationem habendam.
But whether in this case what is owed to others ought to be subtracted can be discussed. And if indeed there are creditors who, when he was under another’s power, contracted with him, it will rightly be said that the condition of the occupier (seizer) is better, unless some privileged party should appear: for consideration of this one as prior will not without reason be had. But if there are those who, after he became sui iuris, contracted with him, I think regard should be had to these.
Interdum autem et si exheredatus filius vel emancipatus sit, in solidum actio adversus eum dabitur, ut puta si patrem familias se mentitus est, cum contraheretur cum eo: nam libro secundo digestorum Marcellus scripsit, etiamsi facere non possit, conveniendum propter mendacium.
Sometimes, however, even if a son has been disinherited or has been emancipated, an in solidum action will be given against him, for example if he claimed falsely that he was a paterfamilias when the contract was being made with him: for Marcellus wrote in Book 2 of the Digest that, even if he cannot perform, he is to be sued on account of the lie.
Sed an etiam temporis haberi debeat ratio, ut, si quidem ex continenti cum filio agatur, detur actio in id quod facere potest, sin vero post multos annos, non debeat indulgeri? et mihi videtur rationem habendam esse: in hoc enim causae cognitio vertitur.
But whether account also ought to be taken of time, so that, if indeed immediately action is brought against the son, an action be granted up to that which he is able to do, but if truly after many years, indulgence ought not to be granted? And it seems to me that account ought to be taken: for on this the cognition of the case turns.
Eum, qui se patrem familias simulavit et mandante aliquo stipulatus est, mandati teneri Marcellus scripsit , quamvis rem praestare non possit: et sane verum est teneri eum debere, quia dolo fecit. hoc et in omnibus bonae fidei iudiciis dicendum erit.
Marcellus wrote that the one who pretended himself to be a paterfamilias and, at someone’s mandate, stipulated is liable under the mandate , although he cannot render the thing: and indeed it is true that he ought to be held liable, because he acted by dolus. this also will have to be said in all actions of good faith.
Pater filio permisit mutuam pecuniam accipere et per epistulam creditori mandavit, ut ei crederet: filius ex minima parte patri heres exstitit. respondi esse in potestate creditoris, utrum filium, cui credidisset, in solidum, an heres, pro qua parte quisque successisset, mallet convenire: sed filius condemnatur in quantum facere potest.
A father permitted his son to receive money on loan and by letter mandated to the creditor that he should credit him; the son turned out to be his father’s heir in the smallest share. I responded that it is in the creditor’s power whether he prefers to sue the son, to whom he had lent, for the whole (in solidum), or the heir(s), according to the share in which each had succeeded; but the son is condemned only in so far as he is able to perform (to pay).
Titianus primus praeposuerat servum mutuis pecuniis dandis et pignoribus accipiendis: is servus etiam negotiatoribus hordei solebat pro emptore suscipere debitum et solvere. cum fugisset servus et is, cui delegatus fuerat dare pretium hordei, conveniret dominum nomine institoris, negabat eo nomine se conveniri posse, quia non in eam rem praepositus fuisset. cum autem et alia quaedam gessisse et horrea conduxisse et multis solvisse idem servus probaretur, praefectus annonae contra dominum dederat sententiam.
Titianus had at the outset put a slave in charge for the giving of loans of money and the receiving of pledges; this slave also used to assume, as purchaser, the debt owed to the barley dealers and discharge it. When the slave had fled, and the person to whom the paying of the price of the barley had been delegated brought suit against the master under the institor title, he denied that he could be sued under that title, because the slave had not been appointed for that business. But when it was proved that the same slave had also transacted certain other matters, had leased granaries, and had made many payments, the prefect of the grain-supply gave judgment against the master.
we were saying it would seem as a fideiussion (suretyship), when he paid the debt for another, not that he undertakes debts for others: moreover, it is not customary on that account for an action to be given against the master, nor does the master seem to have mandated this. but because he seemed in all things to have substituted him in his own name, the emperor preserved the judgment.
Verba senatus consulti macedoniani haec sunt: " cum inter ceteras sceleris causas macedo, quas illi natura administrabat, etiam aes alienum adhibuisset, et saepe materiam peccandi malis moribus praestaret, qui pecuniam, ne quid amplius diceretur incertis nominibus crederet: placere, ne cui, qui filio familias mutuam pecuniam dedisset, etiam post mortem parentis eius, cuius in potestate fuisset, actio petitioque daretur, ut scirent, qui pessimo exemplo faenerarent, nullius posse filii familias bonum nomen exspectata patris morte fieri. "
The words of the Macedonian senatorial decree are these: " since, among the other causes of the crime, Macedo—which nature furnished to him—had also brought in debt, and often material for sinning was supplied by bad morals, by those who would lend money under uncertain names so that nothing further might be said: it is resolved that to no one who has given a son in paternal power a loan of money shall an action or claim be granted even after the death of that parent in whose power he had been, so that those who lend at interest by the worst example may know that no son in paternal power can acquire a good name (i.e., credit) by waiting for his father’s death. "
Si pendeat, an sit in potestate filius, ut puta quoniam patrem apud hostes habet, in pendenti est, an in senatus consultum sit commissum: nam si recciderit in potestatem, senatus consulto locus est, si minus, cessat: interim igitur deneganda est actio.
If it is in suspense whether the son is in paternal power—for instance, because he has his father among the enemy—the question is in suspense whether the senatorial decree applies: for if he has fallen back into power, there is room for the senatorial decree; if not, it lapses: therefore, in the meantime, the action must be denied.
In filio familias nihil dignitas facit, quo minus senatus consultum macedonianum locum habeat: nam etiamsi consul sit vel cuiusvis dignitatis, senatus consulto locus est: nisi forte castrense peculium habeat: tunc enim senatus consultum cessabit.
In the case of a son under paternal power, no dignity makes it so that the Macedonian senatus consultum does not have effect: for even if he be consul or of any dignity whatsoever, the senatus consultum has place: unless perhaps he has a military peculium: then indeed the senatus consultum will cease.
Proinde et in eo, qui scire non potuit, an filius familias sit, iulianus libro duodecimo cessare senatus consultum ait, ut puta in pupillo vel minore viginti quinque annis. sed in minore, causa cognita et a praetore succurrendum: in pupillo autem etiam alia ratione debuit dicere cessare senatus consultum, quod mutua pecunia non fit, quam sine tutoris auctoritate pupillus dat, quemadmodum ipse dicit iulianus libro duodecimo, si filius familias crediderit, cessare senatus consultum, quod mutua pecunia non fit, quamvis liberam peculii administrationem habuit: non enim perdere ei peculium pater concedit, cum peculii administrationem permittit: et ideo vindicationem nummorum patri superesse ait.
Accordingly, also in the case of one who could not know whether he is a filius familias, iulianus in book twelve says that the senatorial decree is inoperative, for instance in the case of a pupillus or one under twenty-five years. But as to the minor, the praetor, the case having been examined, ought to bring succor; in the case of a pupillus, however, he ought also on another ground to have said that the senatorial decree is inoperative, because a mutuum of money does not come into being which a pupillus gives without the authority of his tutor—just as iulianus himself says in book twelve: if a filius familias has given credit, the senatorial decree is inoperative, because a mutuum of money does not come into being, although he had free administration of the peculium; for the father does not grant him to lose the peculium when he permits administration of the peculium; and therefore he says that vindication of the coins remains to the father.
Is autem solus senatus consultum offendit, qui mutuam pecuniam filio familias dedit, non qui alias contraxit, puta vendidit locavit vel alio modo contraxit: nam pecuniae datio perniciosa parentibus eorum visa est. et ideo etsi in creditum abii filio familias vel ex causa emptionis vel ex alio contractu, in quo pecuniam non numeravi, etsi stipulatus sim: licet coeperit esse mutua pecunia, tamen quia pecuniae numeratio non concurrit, cessat senatus consultum. quod ita demum erit dicendum, si non fraus senatus consulto sit cogitata, ut qui credere non potuit magis ei venderet, ut ille rei pretium haberet in mutui vicem.
He alone, however, offends the senatorial decree who gave a loan (mutuum) of money to a son in paternal power, not one who contracted otherwise, for instance sold, let (leased), or contracted in some other way: for the giving of money seemed pernicious to their parents. And therefore, even if I extended credit to a son in paternal power either on the ground of a purchase or from some other contract in which I did not count out money, even if I have taken a stipulation: although it may have begun to be a loan of money, nevertheless, because the numeration (counting-out) of money did not concur, the senatorial decree does not apply. This is to be said only if fraud upon the senatorial decree was not contrived, as where one who could not lend rather sold to him, so that he might have the price of the thing in the stead of a loan.
Si a filio familias stipulatus sim et patri familias facto crediderim, sive capite deminutus sit sive morte patris vel alias sui iuris sine capitis deminutione fuerit effectus, debet dici cessare senatus consultum, quia mutua iam patri familias data est:
If I have stipulated from a filius familias and, after he has been made a pater familias, I have given him credit, whether he has been capitis deminutus or has been made sui iuris by the death of his father or otherwise without capitis deminutio, it ought to be said that the senatus consultum ceases, because the mutuum has now been given to a pater familias:
Item si filius familias fideiusserit, neratius libro primo et secundo responsorum cessare senatus consultum ait. idem celsus libro quarto. sed iulianus adicit, si color quaesitus sit, ut filius familias, qui mutuam accepturus erat, fideiuberet alio reo dato, fraudem senatus consulto factam nocere et dandam exceptionem tam filio familias quam reo, quoniam et fideiussori filii subvenitur.
Likewise, if a son under paternal power has stood surety, Neratius, in book 1 and book 2 of the Responses, says that the senatorial decree does not apply. The same [is said by] Celsus in book 4. But Julianus adds that, if a pretext (color) has been contrived so that the son under paternal power, who was about to receive a mutuum (loan), should give surety with another defendant supplied, the fraud done against the senatorial decree is prejudicial, and that an exception is to be granted both to the son under paternal power and to the defendant, since aid is afforded also to the surety for the son.
Idem ait, si duos reos accepero filium familias et titium, cum ad filium familias esset perventura pecunia, ideo autem reum titium acceperim, ne quasi fideiussor auxilio senatus consulti uteretur, utilem esse exceptionem adversus fraudem dandam.
The same says: if I have accepted two defendants, a filius familias and Titius, when the money was going to be payable to the filius familias, but I accepted Titius as defendant for this reason—that, as a surety (fideiussor), he might not use the aid of the senatus consultum—then a useful exception should be granted against the fraud.
Sed et si filius familias patre suo relegato vel longo tempore absente dotem pro filia promiserit et rem patris pignori dederit, senatus consultum cessabit. patris tamen res non tenebitur: plane si patri heres exstiterit filius et pignus persequatur, exceptione doli summovebitur.
But also, if a son in the household, his father having been relegated or long absent, has promised a dowry for his daughter and has given a thing of his father in pledge, the senatus consultum will be inoperative. Nevertheless, the father’s property will not be bound: clearly, if the son has become heir to his father and pursues the pledge, he will be driven off by the exception of fraud.
Mutui dationem non solum numeratae pecuniae, verum omnium, quae mutua dari possunt, an accipere debeamus, videndum. sed verba videntur mihi ad numeratam pecuniam referri: ait enim senatus " mutuam pecuniam dedisset". sed si fraus sit senatus consulto adhibita, puta frumento vel vino vel oleo mutuo dato, ut his distractis fructibus uteretur pecunia, subveniendum est filio familias.
Whether we ought to take the giving of a mutuum to include not only counted money (cash), but all things that can be given by way of mutuum, must be considered. But the words seem to me to be referred to counted money: for the senate says, "that he had given money as a mutuum." But if fraud has been applied to the senatorial decree—suppose grain or wine or oil has been given on mutuum, so that, these fruits having been sold, money might be used—aid must be afforded to the filius familias.
Proinde et si alius mutuam dedit, alius stipulatus est, dabitur adversus eum exceptio, licet hic non dederit. sed et si alteruter eorum ignoravit in patris esse potestate, severius dicendum est utrique nocere. idem est et in duobus reis stipulandi.
Accordingly, even if one person gave a loan (mutuum) and another stipulated, an exception (defense) will be granted against him, although this man did not give it. But also, if either of them was ignorant that he was under a father’s power, more strictly it must be said that it harms both. The same holds in the case of two joint stipulators (duo rei stipulandi).
Item si duos filios familias accepero reos, sed alterum putavi patrem familias, intererit, ad quem pecunia pervenit, ut, si eum scivi filium familias ad quem pervenit pecunia, exceptione summovear, si ad eum quem ignorem, non summovear.
Likewise, if I shall have accepted two filii familias as defendants, but I supposed one of them to be a paterfamilias, it will be material to whom the money has come, so that, if I knew him to be a filius familias to whom the money came, I am warded off by an exceptio; if it has come to one whom I did not know, I am not warded off.
Interdum tamenetsi senatus consulto locus sit, tamen in alium datur actio, ut puta filius familias institor mutuam pecuniam accepit: scribit enim iulianus libro duodecimo ipsum quidem institorem exceptione senatus consulti usurum, si conveniatur, sed institoriam actionem adversus eum qui praeposuit competere. quamquam, inquit, si ipse pater eum praeposuisset merci suae vel peculiarem exercere passus esset, cessaret senatus consultum, quoniam patris voluntate contractum videretur: nam si scit eum negotiari, etiam hoc permisisse videtur, si non nominatim prohibuit merces accipere.
Sometimes, although indeed there is scope for the senatus consultum, nevertheless the action is given against another; for example, a son in power, acting as a manager, has received money on loan: for Julian, in book 12, writes that the manager himself will avail himself of the defense of the senatus consultum if he is sued, but that the institorian action lies against the one who appointed him. Although, he says, if the father himself had put him in charge of his own merchandise or had allowed him to carry on a separate (peculiar) business, the senatus consultum would cease to apply, since it would seem to have been contracted with the father’s will: for if he knows that he is trading, he also seems to have permitted this as well, unless he expressly forbade the receiving of merchandise.
Proinde si acceperit pecuniam et in rem patris vertit, cessat senatus consultum: patri enim, non sibi accepit. sed et si ab initio non sic accepit, verum postea in rem patris vertit, cessare senatus consultum libro duodecimo digestorum iulianus ait intellegendumque ab initio sic accepisse, ut in rem verteret. non tamen vertisse videbitur, si mutuam pecuniam acceptam patri in proprium debitum solvit et ideo, si pater ignoravit, adhuc senatus consulto locus erit.
Accordingly, if he has received the money and turned it into the father’s estate, the senatorial decree ceases to operate: for he received it for the father, not for himself. But even if he did not so receive it from the beginning, yet afterwards turned it into the father’s estate, Julianus in Book 12 of the Digest says that the senatorial decree is to be understood to cease, and that it must be understood that he received it from the beginning so as to turn it to that estate. Nevertheless, he will not be deemed to have “turned” it, if he pays to the father, on account of his own debt, money received as a loan; and therefore, if the father did not know, there will still be room for the senatorial decree.
Si ab alio donatam sibi pecuniam filius creditori solverit, an pater vindicare vel repetere possit? et ait iulianus, si quidem hac condicione ei donata sit pecunia, ut creditori solvat, videri a donatore profectam protinus ad creditorem et fieri nummos accipientis: si vero simpliciter ei donavit, alienationem eorum filium non habuisse et ideo, si solverit, condictionem patri ex omni eventu competere.
If a son pays his creditor with money that has been given to him by another, can the father vindicate or recover? And Julian says: if indeed the money was given to him on this condition, that he pay the creditor, it is considered to have proceeded from the donor straightaway to the creditor, and the coins become those of the recipient; but if he gave it to him simply, the son did not have alienation of them, and therefore, if he pays, the condiction (action for recovery) belongs to the father in every event.
Hoc senatus consultum et ad filias quoque familiarum pertinet nec ad rem pertinet, si adfirmetur ornamenta ex ea pecunia comparasse: nam et ei quoque qui filio familias credidit decreto amplissimi ordinis actio denegatur nec interest, consumpti sint nummi an exstent in peculio. multo igitur magis severitate senatus consulti eius contractus improbabitur, qui filiae familias mutuum dedit.
This senatus consultum pertains also to daughters of households, nor does it matter if it is affirmed that she purchased ornaments with that money: for even to him who trusted a son of the household, by decree of the most august order, an action is denied, nor does it make a difference whether the coins have been consumed or whether they remain in the peculium. Therefore, much more, under the severity of that senatus consultum, the contract will be disapproved which gave a loan (mutuum) to a daughter of the household.
Non solum filio familias et patri eius succurritur, verum fideiussori quoque et mandatori eius, qui et ipsi mandati habent regressum, nisi forte donandi animo intercesserunt: tunc enim, cum nullum regressum habeant, senatus consultum locum non habebit. sed et si non donandi animo, patris tamen voluntate intercesserunt, totus contractus a patre videbitur comprobatus.
Not only is succor afforded to the son of the household and to his father, but also to the surety and to his mandator, who themselves have a right of regress by the action of mandate, unless perhaps they interceded with the intention of making a gift: for then, since they have no regress, the senatorial decree will not apply. But even if not with an intention of gift, yet they interceded with the father’s consent, the whole contract will be seen as ratified by the father.
Et hi tamen, qui pro filio familias sine voluntate patris eius intercesserunt, solvendo non repetent: hoc enim et divus hadrianus constituit et potest dici non repetituros. atquin perpetua exceptione tuti sunt: sed et ipse filius, et tamen non repetit, quia hi demum solutum non repetunt, qui ob poenam creditorum actione liberantur, non quoniam exonerare eos lex voluit.
And yet those who have interceded on behalf of a son-in-power (filius familias) without his father’s consent, upon paying do not reclaim: for the deified Hadrian established this, and it may be said that they will not recover. However, they are protected by a perpetual exception; but the son himself also does not reclaim, and yet he does not, because only those fail to reclaim what has been paid who are freed from the creditors’ action by way of a penalty, not because the law wished to exonerate them.
Si tantum sciente patre creditum sit filio, dicendum est cessare senatus consultum. sed si iusserit pater filio credi, deinde ignorante creditore mutaverit voluntatem, locus senatus consulto non erit, quoniam initium contractus spectandum est.
If credit has been given to the son merely with the father being aware, it must be said that the senatorial decree is in abeyance. But if the father has ordered that credit be given to the son, and then, with the creditor unaware, has changed his intention, there will be no place for the senatorial decree, since the beginning of the contract must be looked to.
Filium habeo et ex eo nepotem: nepoti meo creditum est iussu patris eius: quaesitum est, an contra senatus consultum fieret. dixi, etiamsi verbis senatus consulti filii continerentur, tamen et in persona nepotis idem servari debere: iussum autem huius patris non efficere, quo minus contra senatus consultum creditum existimaretur, cum ipse in ea causa esset, ut pecuniam mutuam invito patre suo accipere non possit.
I have a son and from him a grandson: credit was given to my grandson by the order of his father: it was asked whether this was done contrary to the senatorial decree. I said that, even if by the words of the senatorial decree sons were included, nevertheless the same ought to be observed also in the person of a grandson: moreover, the command of this father does not effect that it be not considered that the loan was given contrary to the senatorial decree, since he himself is in such a case that he cannot receive money as a loan with his own father unwilling.
Creditorem filii familias mortuo eo fideiussorem accipere non posse iulianus scribit, quia nulla obligatio aut civilis aut naturalis supersit, cui fideiussor accedat: plane a patre eius actionis nomine, quae de peculio adversus eum competat, fideiussorem recte accipi.
Julian writes that a creditor of a filiusfamilias, with him having died, cannot accept a fideiussor, because no obligation, either civil or natural, survives to which a fideiussor might accede; plainly, from his father, in the name of that action which lies against him de peculio, a fideiussor is rightly accepted.