Justinian: DIGESTA

Cum iudicio bonae fidei disceptatur, arbitrio iudicis usurarum modus ex more regionis ubi contractum est constituitur, ita tamen, ut legi non offendat.

When a dispute is adjudicated by an action of good faith, the rate of interest is established, by the discretion of the judge, according to the custom of the region where it was contracted, yet in such a way that it does not offend the law.

Dig. 22.1.1.1

Digest 22.1.1.1

Papinianus 2 quaest.

Papinian 2 Questions.

Socius si ideo condemnandus erit, quod pecuniam communem invaserit vel in suos usus converterit, omnimodo etiam mora non interveniente praestabuntur usurae.

If a partner is for this reason to be condemned, namely because he has seized the common money or has converted it to his own use, interest shall in any event be payable, even with no delay intervening.

Dig. 22.1.1.2

Digest 22.1.1.2

Papinianus 2 quaest.

Papinian, Questions 2.

Nec tamen iudex iudicii bonae fidei recte iubebit interponi cautiones, ut, si tardius sententiae condemnatus paruerit, futuri temporis pendantur usurae, cum in potestate sit actoris iudicatum exigere. paulus notat: quid enim pertinet ad officium iudicis post condemnationem futuri temporis tractatus?

Nor, however, in a good‑faith action will the judge rightly order that sureties be interposed, to the effect that, if the condemned should obey the sentence too slowly, interest for the future time be paid, since it is within the plaintiff’s power to exact the judgment. Paulus notes: for what has the handling of future time after condemnation to do with the judge’s office?

Dig. 22.1.1.3

Digest 22.1.1.3

Papinianus 2 quaest.

Papinian 2 Questions.

Papinianus: circa tutelae restitutionem pro favore pupillorum latior interpretatio facta est: nemo enim ambigit hodie, sive iudex accipiatur, in diem sententiae, sive sine iudice tutela restituatur, in eum diem quo restituit usuras praestari. plane si tutelae iudicio nolentem experiri tutor ultro convenerit et pecuniam optulerit eamque obsignatam deposuerit, ex eo tempore non praestabit usuras.

Papinian: around restitution of guardianship, for the favor of pupils (wards) a broader interpretation has been made: for no one today doubts that, whether a judge be appointed, up to the day of the sentence, or whether the guardianship be restored without a judge, interest is to be paid up to the day on which he restores it. Clearly, if in the guardianship action the guardian has, unprompted, approached one unwilling to bring suit and has tendered the money and deposited it sealed, from that time he will not be liable for interest.

Dig. 22.1.2

Digest 22.1.2

Papinianus 6 quaest.

Papinianus 6 Questions.

Volgo receptum est, ut, quamvis in personam actum sit, post litem tamen contestatam causa praestetur: cuius opinionis ratio redditur, quoniam quale est, cum petitur, tale dari debet ac propterea postea captos fructus partumque editum restitui oportet.

It is commonly received that, although the action is in personam, nevertheless after the issue has been joined (litis contestatio) the “cause” is to be warranted: the reason given for this opinion is that, as the thing is when it is demanded, such it ought to be delivered; and therefore fruits gathered thereafter and offspring brought forth must be restored.

Dig. 22.1.3pr.

Digest 22.1.3 preface.

Papinianus 20 quaest.

Papinian 20 Questions.

In fideicommissi persecutione, cum post iudicis sententiam moram fecisset heres, iussit imperator marcus antoninus, intermisso legitimo tempore quod condemnatis praestatur ut usque ad sententiam commoda fideicommissarius accipiat. quod decretum ita accipi oportet, si ante iudicis sententiam mora non intervenit: tametsi non facile evenire possit, ut mora non praecedente perveniatur ad iudicem: sed puta legis falcidiae rationem intervenisse. ceterum si ante, quam ad iudicem perveniretur, in mora heres fuit, exinde fructuum praestandorum necessitate adstrictus qua tandem ratione, quoniam et sententia victus est, legitimi temporis spatio fructibus liberabitur, cum ea temporis intercapedo iudicato dilationem dare, non lucrum adferre debeat?

In the prosecution of a fideicommissum, when after the judge’s sentence the heir had caused delay, Emperor Marcus Antoninus ordered that, the lawful time which is afforded to the condemned being omitted, the fideicommissary should receive the benefits up to the sentence. This decree ought to be understood thus, if before the judge’s sentence no delay intervened—although it can scarcely happen that one comes to the judge without delay having preceded; but suppose that consideration of the Lex Falcidia intervened. Moreover, if before one came to the judge the heir was in delay, from that point he is bound by the necessity of furnishing fruits; by what reasoning, then, since he has also been defeated by the sentence, will he be freed from the fruits by the span of lawful time, when that interval of time ought to give a condemned party delay, not bring him profit?

Dig. 22.1.3.1

Digest 22.1.3.1

Papinianus 20 quaest.

Papinian 20 Questions.

In his quoque iudiciis, quae non sunt arbitraria nec bonae fidei, post litem contestatam actori causa praestanda est in eum diem, quo sententia dicitur: certe post rem iudicatam tempus a fructibus dependendis immune est.

In these judgments too, which are neither arbitraria nor of good faith, after the issue has been joined the cause is to be made good to the plaintiff up to the day on which the sentence is pronounced: certainly, after the matter has been adjudged, the time is immune from fruits to be paid.

Dig. 22.1.3.2

Digest 22.1.3.2

Papinianus 20 quaest.

Papinianus 20 Questions.

Nonnumquam evenit, ut, quamquam fructus hereditatis aut pecuniae usura nominatim relicta non sit, nihilo minus debeatur. ut puta si quis rogetur post mortem suam quidquid ex bonis supererit titio restituere: ut enim ea quae fide bona deminuta sunt in causa fideicommissi non deprehenduntur, si pro modo ceterorum quoque bonorum deminuantur, ita quod ex fructibus supererit iure voluntatis restitui oportebit.

Sometimes it happens that, although the fruits of the inheritance or the interest of money has not been expressly bequeathed, nonetheless it is owed. For example, if someone is asked, after his death, to restore to Titius whatever from the goods shall remain: for just as those things which have been diminished in good faith are not taken into account in the case of a fideicommissum, provided they are diminished in proportion to the other goods as well, so too what shall remain from the fruits ought to be restored by virtue of the will (intention).

Dig. 22.1.3.3

Digest 22.1.3.3

Papinianus 20 quaest.

Papinian 20 Questions.

Cum pollidius a propinqua sua heres institutus rogatus fuisset filiae mulieris quidquid ex bonis eius ad se pervenisset, cum certam aetatem puella complesset, restituere, idque sibi mater ideo placuisse testamento comprehendisset, ne filiae tutoribus, sed potius necessitudini res committerentur, eundemque pollidium fundum retinere iussisset: praefectis praetorii suasi fructus, qui bona fide a pollidio ex bonis defunctae percepti essent, restitui debere, sive quod fundum ei tantum praelegaverat sive quod lubrico tutelae fideicommissi remedium mater praetulerat.

When Pollidius, appointed heir by his female kinswoman, had been asked to restore to the woman’s daughter, when the girl had completed a certain age, whatever from her goods had come to him, and the mother had included in her testament that this pleased her for this reason—that the matter be entrusted not to the daughter’s tutors but rather to kinship—and had ordered that the same Pollidius retain the landed estate (fundus): I advised the Praetorian Prefects that the fruits (rents and profits) which had been received in good faith by Pollidius from the goods of the deceased ought to be restored, whether because she had pre-legacy’d the fundus to him only, or because the mother preferred the remedy of a fideicommissum to the slippery nature of tutelage.

Dig. 22.1.3.4

Digest 22.1.3.4

Papinianus 20 quaest.

Papinian 20 Questions.

Si auro vel argento facto per fideicommissum relicto mora intervenerit, an usurarum aestimatio facienda sit, tractari solet. plane si materiam istam ideo relinquit, ut ea distracta pecuniaque refecta fideicommissa solverentur aut alimenta praestarentur, non oportere frustrationem impunitam esse responderi oportet: quod si forte ideo relinquit, ut his vasis uteretur, non sine rubore desiderabuntur usurae ideoque non exigentur.

If, in the case of gold or silver work left by way of a fideicommissum, delay has intervened, it is commonly discussed whether an assessment of interest should be made. Clearly, if he leaves that material for this purpose—that, once it has been sold off and the money made up again, the fideicommissa be discharged or maintenance be provided—it ought to be answered that the frustration should not go unpunished; but if perhaps he leaves it for this purpose, that he may use these vessels, interest would be sought not without shame and therefore will not be exacted.

Dig. 22.1.4pr.

Digest 22.1.4pr.

Papinianus 27 quaest.

Papinian 27 Questions.

Si stipulatus sis rem dari vacuamque possessionem tradi, fructus postea captos actione incerti ex stipulatu propter inferiora verba consecuturum te ratio suadet. an idem de partu ancillae responderi possit, considerandum est. nam quod ad verba superiora pertinet, sive factum rei promittendi sive effectum per traditionem dominii transferendi continent, partus non continetur: verum si emptor a venditore novandi animo ita stipulatus est, factum tradendi stipulatus intellegitur, quia non est verisimile plus venditorem promisisse, quam iudicio empti praestare compelleretur.

If you have stipulated that the thing be given and that vacant possession be delivered, reason advises that you will obtain, by an action for an incertum ex stipulatu, the fruits afterwards taken, on account of the latter words. Whether the same can be answered as to the offspring of a female slave must be considered. For as regards the earlier words—whether they contain the fact of promising the thing or the effect of transferring dominium by delivery—the offspring is not included; but if the buyer from the seller, with the intention of novation, so stipulated, he is understood to have stipulated for the fact of delivery, because it is not likely that the seller promised more than he would be compelled to furnish by the judgment (action) of purchase.

sed tamen propter illa verba " vacuamque possessionem tradi" potest dici partus quoque rationem committi incerti stipulatione: etenim ancilla tradita partum postea editum in bonis suis reus stipulandi habere potuisset.

but nevertheless, on account of those words “and that vacant possession be delivered,” it can be said that the reckoning of the offspring too is committed by an incertum-stipulation: for, once the handmaid had been delivered, the stipulator could have had, among his goods, the child afterwards brought forth.

Dig. 22.1.4.1

Digest 22.1.4.1

Papinianus 27 quaest.

Papinian, 27 Questions.

Si post contractam emptionem ante interpositam stipulationem partus editus aut aliquid per servum venditori adquisitum est, quod ex stipulatu consequi non poterit, iudicio empti consequitur: id enim quod non transfertur in causam novationis iure pristino peti potest.

If, after the purchase has been contracted but before a stipulation has been interposed, offspring has been brought forth or something has been acquired for the seller through the slave—what cannot be obtained from the stipulation is obtained by the action on purchase: for that which is not transferred into the cause of novation can be sought under the former law.

Dig. 22.1.5

Digest. 22.1.5

Papinianus 28 quaest.

Papinianus 28 questions.

Generaliter observari convenit bonae fidei iudicium non recipere praestationem, quae contra bonos mores desideretur.

Generally it is agreed to be observed that a good‑faith action does not receive a prestation that is sought contrary to good morals.

Dig. 22.1.6pr.

Digest 22.1.6pr.

Papinianus 29 quaest.

Papinian 29 questions.

Cum de in rem verso cum herede patris vel domini ageretur et usurarum quaestio moveretur, imperator antoninus ideo solvendas usuras iudicavit, quod eas ipse dominus vel pater longo tempore praestitisset.

When, in a case on in rem verso, suit was brought against the heir of a father or of a master and the question of interest was raised, emperor antoninus therefore judged that interest was to be paid, because he himself, the master or the father, had paid them for a long time.

Dig. 22.1.6.1

Digest 22.1.6.1

Papinianus 29 quaest.

Papinian 29 questions.

Imperator quoque noster severus filiae flavii athenagorae, cuius bona fuerant publicata, de fisco ideo numerari decies centena dotis nomine iussit, quod ea patrem praestitisse dotis usuras allegasset.

Our Emperor Severus also ordered that, for the daughter of Flavius Athenagoras, whose goods had been confiscated, one million to be paid from the fisc in the name of a dowry, because she had alleged that her father had borne the interest on the dowry.

Dig. 22.1.7

Digest 22.1.7

Papinianus 2 resp.

Papinian 2 responses

Debitor usurarius creditori pecuniam optulit et eam, cum accipere noluisset, obsignavit ac deposuit: ex eo die ratio non habebitur usurarum. quod si postea conventus ut solveret moram fecerit, nummi steriles ex eo tempore non erunt.

The interest-paying debtor offered money to the creditor and, when he was unwilling to accept it, he sealed it and deposited it: from that day interest will not be reckoned. But if thereafter, upon being sued to pay, he delays, the money will not be sterile from that time.

Dig. 22.1.8

Digest 22.1.8

Papinianus 7 resp.

Papinian, Book 7 of Responses.

Equis per fideicommissum relictis post moram fetus quoque praestabitur ut fructus, sed fetus secundus ut causa, sicut partus mulieris.

When horses have been left by fideicommissum, after a delay the offspring, too, shall be furnished as fruits; but a subsequent foal is treated as belonging to the stock, just as with a woman’s childbirth.

Dig. 22.1.9pr.

Digest 22.1.9, preface.

Papinianus 11 resp.

Papinian 11 responses.

Pecuniae faenebris, intra diem certum debito non soluto, dupli stipulatum in altero tanto supra modum legitimae usurae respondi non tenere: quare pro modo cuiuscumque temporis superfluo detracto stipulatio vires habebit.

As to money lent at interest, if by the fixed day the debt is not paid, I answered that a stipulation for the double, by as much again beyond the measure of lawful usury, does not hold; therefore, with the superfluous part deducted proportionally to whatever time, the stipulation will have force.

Dig. 22.1.9.1

Digest 22.1.9.1

Papinianus 11 resp.

Papinianus 11 Responses.

Usurarum stipulatio, quamvis debitor non conveniatur, committitur. nec inutilis legitimae usurae stipulatio videtur sub ea condicione concepta " si minores ad diem solutae non fuerint": non enim poena, sed faenus uberius iusta ratione sortis promittitur. si tamen post mortem creditoris nemo fuit cui pecunia solveretur, eius temporis inculpatam esse moram constitit: ideo si maiores usurae prioribus petantur, exceptio doli non inutiliter opponetur.

A stipulation for interest, although the debtor is not called into court, becomes operative. Nor does a stipulation for lawful interest seem useless when framed under this condition, "if the lesser interest shall not have been paid by the due day": for not a penalty, but a more abundant interest is promised on a just account of the principal. If, however, after the creditor’s death there was no one to whom the money could be paid, it is established that the delay for that period is without fault: therefore, if greater interest is sought in comparison with the earlier, the defense of fraud will not be opposed in vain.

Dig. 22.1.10

Digest 22.1.10

Paulus 2 quaest.

Paulus Questions, Book 2.

Partum post litem contestatam editum restituere possessor debet: quem non deberet restituere, si, cum mater peteretur, iam natus fuisset, nisi specialiter et pro hoc egisset.

The possessor must restore the issue brought forth after litis contestation: which he would not have to restore, if, when the mother was being claimed, it had already been born, unless he had proceeded specially and for this.

Dig. 22.1.11pr.

Digest 22.1.11, beginning.

Paulus 25 quaest.

Paulus 25 Questions.

Gaius seius qui rem publicam gerebat faeneravit pecuniam publicam sub usuris solitis: fuit autem consuetudo, ut intra certa tempora non illatis usuris graviores infligerentur: quidam debitores cessaverunt in solvendis usuris, quidam plus intulerunt et sic effectum est, ut omne quod usurarum nomine competebat etiam pro his, qui cessaverant in usuris, suppleatur. quaesitum est, an illud, quod amplius ex consuetudine poenae nomine a quibusdam exactum est, ipsi seio proficere deberet an rei publicae lucro cederet. respondi, si gaius seius a debitoribus usuras stipulatus esset, eas solas rei publicae praestari oportere, quae secundum formam ab is exigi solent, etiamsi non omnia nomina idonea sint.

Gaius Seius, who was administering the commonwealth, lent public money at the customary usuries; but there was a custom that, within fixed periods, heavier charges were imposed if the usuries were not brought in. Some debtors defaulted in paying the usuries, some paid more, and thus it came about that everything which was due under the name of usuries was made up even on behalf of those who had defaulted in usuries. It was asked whether that amount which, in addition, by custom under the name of penalty was exacted from some ought to profit Seius himself or accrue to the profit of the commonwealth. I answered: if Gaius Seius had stipulated usuries from the debtors, only those sums ought to be rendered to the commonwealth which, according to the form, are wont to be exacted from them, even if not all the accounts are adequate.

Dig. 22.1.11.1

Digest 22.1.11.1

Paulus 25 quaest.

Paulus 25 Questions.

Quid si servus publicus obligationem usurarum rei publicae adquisiit? aequum est, quamvis ipso iure usurae rei publicae debeantur, tamen pro defectis nominibus compensationem maiorum usurarum fieri, si non sit parata res publica universorum debitorum fortunam suscipere. eadem fere in tutoribus Marcellus refert.

What if a public slave has acquired an obligation for the State’s interest? It is equitable that, although by the law itself interest is owed to the State, nevertheless, on account of defaulted accounts, compensation by way of greater interest be made, if the State is not prepared to assume the fortune (risk) of all the debtors. Marcellus reports nearly the same in the case of tutors (guardians).

Dig. 22.1.12

Digest 22.1.12

Paulus 4 resp.

Paulus 4 Responses

Seia mutuam pecuniam accepit a septicio: de usuris ita convenit: nisi sua quaque die usurae supra scriptae exsolverentur vel post tertium mensem, tunc in maiores usuras seia teneretur, et deinceps per singulas pensiones, si condicione data usurae non solverentur, ea condicio observaretur, donec omnis summa debita hoc nomine exsolveretur. quaero, an haec verba " et deinceps per singulas pensiones condicione data usurae non solvantur, ea condicio observaretur" eo pertineant, ut, quamvis commissa sit forte prima stipulatio, non tamen in ampliorem quantitatem usurarum conveniri possit quam eius pensionis nomine, quae egressa est diem praestitutum. paulus respondit plures condiciones continere eam stipulationem, quae de gravioribus usuris praestandis subiecta est, id est ut per singulas pensiones condicio inspectaretur non illatarum suis temporibus leviorum usurarum: et ideo posse evitari poenam sequentium pensionum.

Seia received money as a loan from Septicius; they thus agreed about interest (usury): unless on each of its due days the aforesaid interest were paid, or by the third month, then Seia would be held to greater interest; and thereafter, for each installment, if, the condition having been set, the interest were not paid, that condition would be observed, until the whole sum owed under this head was paid. I ask whether these words, “and thereafter, for each installment, if, the condition having been set, the interest are not paid, that condition would be observed,” pertain to this: that, although perhaps the first stipulation has been incurred, nevertheless one cannot be bound for a larger amount of interest than under the name of that installment which has passed the appointed day. Paulus replied that the stipulation which is subjoined about paying heavier interest contains several conditions, that is, that for each installment the condition be examined with respect to the lighter interest not tendered at their times; and therefore the penalty of the subsequent installments can be avoided.

Dig. 22.1.13pr.

Digest 22.1.13pr.

Scaevola 1 resp.

Scaevola 1 responses.

Qui semissis usuras promisit, per multos annos minores praestitit: heres creditoris semisses petit. cum per debitorem non steterit, quo minus minores solvat, quaero an exceptio doli vel pacti obstet. respondi, si exsolvendis ex more usuris per tanta tempora mora per debitorem non fuit, posse secundum ea, quae proponerentur obstare exceptionem.

He who promised interest at the half-rate (semisses) paid for many years a lesser amount; the creditor’s heir demands the half-rate. Since it was not by the debtor’s doing that only the lesser was paid, I ask whether an exception of fraud (exceptio doli) or of pact (exceptio pacti) stands in the way. I answered that, if in discharging the interest according to custom over so long a time there was no delay attributable to the debtor, then, according to the facts proposed, the exception can bar the claim.

Dig. 22.1.13.1

Digest 22.1.13.1

Scaevola 1 resp.

Scaevola 1 responses.

Quaesitum est, an iudicio negotiorum gestorum vel mandati pro pecunia otiosa usuras praestare debeat, cum dominus nullam pecuniam faeneravit. respondit, si eam pecuniam positam habuisset idque ex consuetudine mandantis fecisset, non debere quicquam usurarum nomine praestare.

It was asked whether, in an action of management of affairs or of mandate, one ought to render interest for idle money, when the principal had not lent any money at interest. He responded that, if he had kept that money deposited and had done this according to the custom of the mandator, he ought not to render anything under the name of interest.

Dig. 22.1.14pr.

Digest 22.1.14, preface.

Paulus 14 resp.

Paul 14 responses.

Respondit paulus moram in solvendo fideicommisso factam partus quoque ancillarum restituendos.

Paulus answered that, if delay had been made in discharging the fideicommissum, the offspring of the female slaves must also be restored.

Dig. 22.1.14.1

Digest 22.1.14.1

Paulus 14 resp.

Paul 14 responses.

Heres rogatus erat post mortem suam sine reditu hereditatem restituere: quaesitum est, an partus ancillarum etiam vivo herede nati restituendi essent propter verba testamenti, quibus de reditu solo deducendo testator sensit. paulus respondit ante diem fideicommissi cedentem partus ancillarum editos fideicommisso non contineri. neratius libro primo ita refert eum, qui similiter rogatus esset, ut mulierem restitueret, partum eius restituere cogendum non esse, nisi tunc editus esset, cum in fideicommisso restituendo moram fecisset.

The heir had been asked to restore the inheritance after his own death, without reversion: it was asked whether the offspring of female slaves, born even while the heir was still alive, had to be restored as well, on account of the words of the testament, by which the testator intended only the return (income) to be deducted. Paulus answered that, before the day on which the fideicommissum vests, the offspring of the female slaves brought forth are not included in the fideicommissum. Neratius, in the first book, reports thus: that a person who had been similarly requested to restore a woman is not to be compelled to restore her offspring, unless it was then brought forth when he had made delay in restoring the fideicommissum.

neque interesse existimo, an ancilla specialiter an hereditas in fideicommisso sit.

Nor do I think it makes a difference whether a slave-girl specifically or the inheritance is in the fideicommissum.

Dig. 22.1.15

Digest 22.1.15

Paulus 16 resp.

Paulus 16 responses.

Respondit neque eorum fructuum, qui post litem contestatam officio iudicis restituendi sunt, usuras praestari oportere, neque eorum, qui prius percepti quasi malae fidei possessori condicuntur.

He responded that interest ought not to be paid either on those fruits which, after the lis contestata, are to be restored by the office of the judge, or on those which, having been previously taken, are claimed by condictio as from a possessor in bad faith.

Dig. 22.1.16pr.

Digest 22.1.16pr.

Paulus 1 decr.

Paulus book 1 of the Decrees.

Liberalitatis in rem publicam factae usurae non exiguntur.

Interest is not exacted on a liberality made to the commonwealth.

Dig. 22.1.16.1

Digest 22.1.16.1

Paulus 1 decr.

Paulus 1 of the Decrees.

Cum usurae pretii fundi ab eo qui a fisco emerat peterentur et emptor negaret traditam sibi possessionem, imperator decrevit iniquum esse usuras ab eo exigi, qui fructus non percepisset.

When interest on the price of the estate was being sought from one who had bought from the fisc, and the purchaser denied that possession had been delivered to him, the emperor decreed it iniquitous for interest to be exacted from one who had not taken the fruits.

Dig. 22.1.17pr.

Digest 22.1.17, preface.

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus in the single book On Usury.

Cum quidam cavisset se quotannis quincunces usuras praestaturum et, si quo anno non solvisset, tunc totius pecuniae ex die qua mutuatus est semisses soluturum, et redditis per aliquot annos usuris mox stipulatio commissa esset, divus marcus fortunato ita rescripsit: " praesidem provinciae adi, qui stipulationem, de cuius iniquitate questus est, ad modum iustae exactionis rediget". haec constitutio ad finitum modum excedit: quid ergo? sic temperanda res est, ut in futurum dumtaxat ex die cessationis crescat usura.

When a certain man had guaranteed that he would each year pay interest of five twelfths, and, if in any year he did not pay, then he would pay, on the whole sum, from the day on which he borrowed, halves (i.e., six twelfths), and after interest had been paid for several years the stipulation was soon incurred, the deified Marcus wrote back thus to Fortunatus: " approach the governor of the province, who will reduce the stipulation, about the inequity of which complaint has been made, to the measure of a just exaction". This constitution goes beyond a defined limit: what then? The matter must be moderated thus, that for the future only interest should accrue from the day of cessation (default).

Dig. 22.1.17.1

Digest 22.1.17.1

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus, in the single book On Usury.

Divus pius ita rescripsit: parum iuste praeteritas usuras petis, quas omisisse te longi temporis intervallum indicat, qui eas a debitore tuo, ut gratior apud eum videlicet esses, petendas non putasti".

The deified Pius thus rescripted: you seek past-due interest somewhat unjustly, which the interval of a long time indicates you have omitted, since you did not think they ought to be demanded from your debtor, evidently so that you might be more agreeable with him".

Dig. 22.1.17.2

Digest 22.1.17.2

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus in the Single Book On Usury.

In tacito fideicommisso omne emolumentum heredi auferendum et fisco praestandum divus pius rescripsit: ergo et usurarum emolumentum aufertur heredi.

In a tacit fideicommissum the deified Pius wrote in a rescript that every emolument is to be taken from the heir and rendered to the fisc: therefore the emolument of usury (interest) is also taken from the heir.

Dig. 22.1.17.3

Digest 22.1.17.3

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus in the single book On Interest.

Si pupillo non habenti tutorem fideicommissum solvi non potuit, non videri moram per heredem factam divus pius rescripsit. ergo nec ei debetur, qui quod rei publicae causa afuit vel ex alia causa iusta impeditus, ex qua restitutio indulgetur, petere non potuit: quid enim potest imputari ei, qui solvere, etiamsi vellet, non potuit? nec simile videri posse, quod placuit minoribus etiam in his succurri quae non adquisierunt: usurae enim non propter lucrum petentium, sed propter moram solventium infliguntur.

If a fideicommissum could not be paid to a ward not having a tutor, the deified Pius rescripted that the delay is not to be seen as having been caused by the heir. Therefore, interest is not owed to him either who, because he was absent on public business or was hindered by another just cause, on account of which restitutio is granted, was not able to demand it: for what can be imputed to him who could not pay, even if he wished? Nor can it seem similar to the rule that it has pleased that minors be given relief even in matters which they did not acquire: for interest is imposed not for the profit of those seeking it, but on account of the delay of those paying.

Dig. 22.1.17.4

Digest 22.1.17.4

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus in the singular book On Interest.

Ex locato qui convenitur, nisi convenerit ut tardius pecuniae illatae usuras deberet, non nisi ex mora usuras praestare debet.

He who is sued under the contract of letting, unless it has been agreed that he should owe interest for money paid in late, ought to pay interest only on account of delay (mora).

Dig. 22.1.17.5

Digest 22.1.17.5

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus, in the single book On Interest.

Fiscus ex suis contractibus usuras non dat, sed ipse accipit: ut solet a foricariis, qui tardius pecuniam inferunt, item ex vectigalibus. cum autem in loco privati successit, etiam dare solet.

The fisc does not pay interest on its own contracts, but itself receives it: as it is wont from the foricarii, who bring in the money more slowly, likewise from the vectigals. But when it has succeeded to the place of a private person, it is also accustomed to pay.

Dig. 22.1.17.6

Digest 22.1.17.6

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus in the single book On Interest.

Si debitores, qui minores semissibus praestabant usuras, fisci esse coeperunt, postquam ad fiscum transierunt, semisses cogendi sunt praestare.

If debtors who were paying interest at less than the half-rate have come to belong to the fisc, after they have passed to the fisc they are to be compelled to pay the half-rate.

Dig. 22.1.17.7

Digest 22.1.17.7

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus, in the Single Book on Usury.

Eos qui ex administratione rerum civitatium conveniuntur usuris obnoxios esse satis notum est. idem observatur in operum curatoribus, si pecunia apud eos remansit. sed in ea quam redemptoribus commiserunt, etiamsi neglegenter dederint, usura eis remittitur: haec autem ita sunt, si nulla fraus arguitur: alioquin etiam usurae applicabuntur.

It is quite well known that those who are proceeded against on account of the administration of the affairs of the municipalities are liable to interest. The same is observed in curators of works, if money has remained with them. But as to that which they entrusted to contractors, even if they disbursed it negligently, interest is remitted to them: however, these things are so if no fraud is charged; otherwise interest also will be imposed.

Dig. 22.1.17.8

Digest 22.1.17.8

Paulus l.S. de usur.

Paulus, in the single book On Interest.

Si dies non sit ab his, qui statuas vel imagines ponendas legaverunt, praefinitus, a praeside tempus statuendum est et nisi posuerint heredes, usuras rei publicae usque ad tertiam centesimae pendent.

If a day has not been pre‑fixed by those who have bequeathed statues or images to be set up, a time is to be set by the governor; and unless the heirs have set them up, they owe interest to the commonwealth up to a third of the centesima.

Dig. 22.1.18pr.

Digest 22.1.18pr.

Paulus 3 resp.

Paulus 3 responses.

Evictis agris, si initio convenit, ut venditor pretium restitueret, usurae quoque post evictionem praestabuntur, quamvis emptor post dominii litem inchoatam fructus adversario restituit: nam incommodum medii temporis emptoris damnum est.

With the lands evicted, if at the outset it was agreed that the seller would restore the price, interest also will be furnished after the eviction, although the buyer, after a suit about ownership has been initiated, has restored the fruits to the adversary: for the incommodity of the intervening time is the buyer’s loss.

Dig. 22.1.18.1

Digest 22.1.18.1

Paulus 3 resp.

Paulus 3 responses.

Post traditam possessionem defuncto venditore, cui successor incertus fuit, medii quoque temporis usurae pretii, quod in causa depositi non fuit, praestabuntur.

After possession has been delivered, with the seller defunct, whose successor was uncertain, the interest on the price also for the intervening time shall be paid, since it was not in the category of a deposit.

Dig. 22.1.19pr.

Digest 22.1.19 pr.

Gaius 6 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius 6 on the Law of the 12 Tables.

Videamus, an in omnibus rebus petitis in fructus quoque condemnatur possessor. quid enim si argentum aut vestimentum aliamve similem rem, quid praeterea si usum fructum aut nudam proprietatem, cum alienus usus fructus sit, petierit? neque enim nudae proprietatis, quod ad proprietatis nomen attinet, fructus ullus intellegi potest, neque usus fructus rursus fructus eleganter computabitur.

Let us see whether, in all things claimed, the possessor is also adjudged for the fruits. For what if he has sought silver or clothing or some other similar thing; what, moreover, if he has sought a usufruct or bare ownership, since the usufruct is another’s? For, so far as pertains to the name of ownership, no fruit at all can be understood of bare ownership, nor will a usufruct, in turn, be properly (so to speak, elegantly) computed as fruits.

quid igitur, si nuda proprietas petita sit? ex quo perdiderit fructuarius usum fructum, aestimabuntur in petitione fructus. item si usus fructus petitus sit, proculus ait in fructus perceptos condemnari.

What then, if the bare ownership has been sought? From the time when the usufructuary has lost the usufruct, the fruits will be valued in the petition. Likewise, if the usufruct has been sought, Proculus says that one is condemned as to the fruits received.

praeterea gallus aelius putat, si vestimenta aut scyphus petita sint, in fructu haec numeranda esse, quod locata ea re mercedis nomine capi potuerit.

furthermore, Gallus Aelius thinks that, if garments or a goblet have been claimed, these are to be counted among the fruits, since, the thing having been leased, a payment could have been taken by way of rent.

Dig. 22.1.19.1

Digest 22.1.19.1

Gaius 6 ad l. xii tab.

Gaius 6 on the law of the 12 tables.

Iter quoque et actus si petitus sit, vix est ut fructus ulli possint aestimari, nisi si quis commodum in fructibus numeraret, quod habiturus esset petitor, si statim eo tempore quo petisset ire agere non prohiberetur: quod admittendum est.

Likewise, if a right of way (iter) and a right of driving (actus) be sued for, it is scarcely the case that any fruits can be assessed, unless one were to number among the fruits the advantage which the petitioner would have had, if immediately at the time when he petitioned he had not been prohibited from going and driving: which is to be admitted.

Dig. 22.1.20

Digest 22.1.20

Paulus 12 ad sab.

Paulus 12 to Sabinus.

Usuras illicitas sorti mixtas ipsas tantum non deberi constat, ceterum sortem non vitiare.

It is established that illicit interest, when mixed with the principal, are themselves only not owed; however, they do not vitiate the principal.

Dig. 22.1.21

Digest 22.1.21

Ulpianus 34 ad ed.

Ulpian 34 on the Edict.

Sciendum est non omne, quod differendi causa optima ratione fiat, morae adnumerandum: quid enim si amicos adhibendos debitor requirat vel expediendi debiti vel fideiussoribus rogandis? vel exceptio aliqua allegetur? mora facta non videtur,

It should be known that not everything which, for the sake of deferring, is done on the best rationale is to be counted as delay: for what if the debtor asks that friends be called in either for the settling of the debt or for requesting fidejussors (sureties)? or if some exception is alleged? he is not considered to have been in delay,

Dig. 22.1.22

Digest 22.1.22

Paulus 37 ad ed.

Paulus 37 On the Edict.

Si modo id ipsum non fraudandi causa simuletur.

Provided only that that very thing is not simulated for the purpose of defrauding.

Dig. 22.1.23pr.

Digest 22.1.23, beginning.

Ulpianus 34 ad ed.

Ulpian, 34 on the Edict.

Sed et si rei publicae causa abesse subito coactus sit, ut defensionem sui mandare non possit, moram facere non videbitur: sive in vinculis hostiumve potestate esse coeperit.

But also, if for the sake of the commonwealth he has been suddenly compelled to be absent, so that he cannot entrust the defense of himself, he will not be seen to be making delay: whether he has begun to be in chains or under the power of the enemy.

Dig. 22.1.23.1

Digest 22.1.23.1

Ulpianus 34 ad ed.

Ulpian 34 on the Edict.

Aliquando etiam in re moram esse decerni solet, si forte non exstat qui conveniatur.

Sometimes too it is customary to decree that there be delay in the matter, if by chance there is no one who can be convened to court.

Dig. 22.1.24pr.

Digest 22.1.24, preface.

Paulus 37 ad ed.

Paulus 37 on the Edict.

Si quis solutioni quidem moram fecit, iudicium autem accipere paratus fuit, non videtur fecisse moram: utique si iuste ad iudicium provocavit.

If someone indeed caused delay in payment, but was prepared to accept judgment, he is not deemed to have caused delay: certainly if he has justly appealed to judgment.

Dig. 22.1.24.1

Digest 22.1.24.1

Paulus 37 ad ed.

Paulus 37 on the Edict.

Cum reus moram facit, et fideiussor tenetur.

When the debtor is in default, the surety is liable.

Dig. 22.1.24.2

Digest 22.1.24.2

Paulus 37 ad ed.

Paul 37 on the edict.

Mora videtur creditori fieri, sive ipsi sive ei cui mandaverat sive ei qui negotia eius gerebat mora facta sit: nec hoc casu per liberam personam adquiri videtur, sed officium impleri, sicuti, cum quis furtum mihi facientem deprehendit, negotium meum agens manifesti furti actionem mihi parat: item cum procurator interpellaverit promissorem hominis, perpetuam facit stipulationem.

Mora is deemed to be incurred by the creditor, whether the delay has been made to himself or to the one to whom he had given a mandate or to him who was managing his affairs: nor in this case is it considered that acquisition is made through a free person, but that a duty is being fulfilled, just as, when someone catches a person committing theft against me, acting my business, he provides me with the action for manifest theft: likewise, when a procurator has interpellated the promisor of a person, he makes the stipulation perpetual.

Dig. 22.1.25pr.

Digest 22.1.25pr.

Iulianus 7 Dig.

Julian 7 Digest.

Qui scit fundum sibi cum alio communem esse, fructus, quos ex eo perceperit invito vel ignorante socio, non maiore ex parte suos facit quam ex qua dominus praedii est: nec refert, ipse an socius an uterque eos severit, quia omnis fructus non iure seminis, sed iure soli percipitur: et quemadmodum, si totum fundum alienum quis sciens possideat, nulla ex parte fructus suos faciet, quoquo modo sati fuerint, ita qui communem fundum possidet, non faciet suos fructus pro ea parte, qua fundus ad socium eius pertinebit.

One who knows that a farm is common to himself and another does not make the fruits which he has taken from it, the partner being unwilling or unaware, his own in any greater share than that in which he is owner of the estate; nor does it matter whether he himself, or the partner, or both sowed them, because all fruit is taken not by right of the seed, but by right of the soil; and just as, if someone knowingly possesses an entire farm belonging to another, he will in no part make the fruits his own, however they were sown, so he who possesses a common farm will not make the fruits his own for that portion in which the farm pertains to his partner.

Dig. 22.1.25.1

Digest 22.1.25.1

Iulianus 7 Dig.

Julianus 7 Digest.

In alieno fundo, quem titius bona fide mercatus fuerat, frumentum sevi: an titius bonae fidei emptor perceptos fructus suos faciat? respondi, quod fructus qui ex fundo percipiuntur intellegi debet propius ea accedere, quae servi operis suis adquirunt, quoniam in percipiendis fructibus magis corporis ius ex quo percipiuntur quam seminis, ex quo oriuntur aspicitur: et ideo nemo umquam dubitavit, quin, si in meo fundo frumentum tuum severim, segetes et quod ex messibus collectum fuerit meum fieret. porro bonae fidei possessor in percipiendis fructibus id iuris habet, quod dominis praediorum tributum est.

On another’s estate, which Titius had purchased in good faith, I sowed grain: does Titius, a good‑faith buyer, make the fruits he has taken his own? I answered that the fruits which are taken from an estate ought to be understood as coming closer to those things which slaves acquire by their own works, since in the taking of fruits one has regard rather to the right of the body from which they are taken than of the seed from which they arise; and therefore no one ever doubted that, if on my estate I have sown your grain, the crops and what has been gathered from the harvests become mine. Moreover, a possessor in good faith has, in taking fruits, that right which is attributed to owners of estates.

praeterea cum ad fructuarium pertineant fructus a quolibet sati, quanto magis hoc in bonae fidei possessoribus recipiendum est, qui plus iuris in percipiendis fructibus habent? cum fructuarii quidem non fiant, antequam ab eo percipiantur, ad bonae fidei autem possessorem pertineant, quoquo modo a solo separati fuerint, sicut eius qui vectigalem fundum habet fructus fiunt, simul atque solo separati sunt.

Moreover, since fruits sown by anyone pertain to the usufructuary, how much more must this be admitted in the case of possessors in good faith, who have more right in the perceiving of fruits? For fruits do not become the usufructuary’s before they are perceived by him, but they belong to the possessor in good faith in whatever way they have been separated from the soil, just as the fruits of one who has a vectigalian estate become his as soon as they have been separated from the soil.

Dig. 22.1.25.2

Digest 22.1.25.2

Iulianus 7 Dig.

Julianus 7 Dig.

Bonae fidei emptor sevit et antequam fructus perciperet, cognovit fundum alienum esse: an perceptione fructus suos faciat, quaeritur. respondi, bonae fidei emptor quod ad percipiendos fructus intellegi debet, quamdiu evictus fundus non fuerit: nam et servus alienus quem bona fide emero tamdiu mihi ex re mea vel ex operis suis adquiret, quamdiu a me evictus non fuerit.

A good‑faith purchaser sowed, and before he might perceive the fruits, he learned that the estate was another’s: whether by the perception of the fruits he makes them his own is asked. I answered that a good‑faith purchaser ought to be understood, as regards the perceiving of fruits, to be such so long as the estate has not been evicted: for even another’s slave whom I have bought in good faith will, for so long, acquire for me either from my property or from his own works, so long as he has not been evicted from me.

Dig. 22.1.26

Digest 22.1.26

Iulianus 6 ex minic.

Julianus, 6 from Minicius.

Venationem fructus fundi negavit esse, nisi fructus fundi ex venatione constet.

He denied that hunting is the fruits of the estate, unless the fruits of the estate consist in hunting.

Dig. 22.1.27

Digest 22.1.27

Africanus 8 quaest.

Africanus 8 Questions.

Cum patri familias mora facta sit, iam in herede eius non quaeritur mora: nam tunc heredi proximo hereditario iure ea competet ideoque ad ceteros quoque deinceps transmittitur.

Since delay has been incurred against the paterfamilias, delay is no longer inquired into in his heir: for then by hereditary right it will accrue to the next heir, and therefore it is likewise thereafter transmitted to the others.

Dig. 22.1.28pr.

Digest 22.1.28 pr.

Gaius 2 rer. cott.

Gaius Book 2, Everyday Matters.

In pecudum fructu etiam fetus est sicut lac et pilus et lana: itaque agni et haedi et vituli statim pleno iure sunt bonae fidei possessoris et fructuarii.

In the fruit of herd-animals the fetus is also included, just like milk and hair and wool: and so lambs and kids and calves are immediately, by full right, the property of the good-faith possessor and the usufructuary.

Dig. 22.1.28.1

Digest 22.1.28.1

Gaius 2 rer. cott.

Gaius 2 Quotidian Matters.

Partus vero ancillae in fructu non est itaque ad dominum proprietatis pertinet: absurdum enim videbatur hominem in fructu esse, cum omnes fructus rerum natura hominum gratia comparaverit.

But the offspring of a handmaid is not among the fruits; therefore it pertains to the owner of the property: for it seemed absurd that a human being be in the fruits, since the nature of things has prepared all fruits for the sake of human beings.

Dig. 22.1.29

Digest 22.1.29

Marcianus 14 inst.

Marcianus 14 Institutes

Placuit, sive supra statutum modum quis usuras stipulatus fuerit sive usurarum usuras, quod illicite adiectum est pro non adiecto haberi et licitas peti posse.

It is decreed that, whether someone has stipulated interest above the statute-fixed measure or interest upon interest, what has been illicitly added is to be held as not added, and the lawful [portion] may be sought.

Dig. 22.1.30

Digest 22.1.30

Paulus l.S. reg.

Paul, in the single book of Rules.

Etiam ex nudo pacto debentur civitatibus usurae creditarum ab eis pecuniarum.

Even from a naked pact, interest is owed to municipalities for monies loaned by them.

Dig. 22.1.31

Digest 22.1.31

Ulpianus 1 resp.

Ulpian Book 1 of Responses.

Quod in stipulatione sic adiectum est: " et usuras, si quae competierint", nullius esse momenti, si modus certus non adiciatur.

That which is thus added in a stipulation: " and interest, if any shall have accrued", is of no effect, if a definite rate is not added.

Dig. 22.1.32pr.

Digest 22.1.32, preface.

Marcianus 4 reg.

Marcianus 4 Rules.

Mora fieri intellegitur non ex re, sed ex persona, id est, si interpellatus oportuno loco non solverit: quod apud iudicem examinabitur: nam, ut et pomponius libro duodecimo epistularum scripsit, difficilis est huius rei definitio. divus quoque pius tullio balbo rescripsit, an mora facta intellegatur, neque constitutione ulla neque iuris auctorum quaestione decidi posse, cum sit magis facti quam iuris.

Delay (mora) is understood to arise not from the thing, but from the person—that is, if, upon demand at a suitable place, he does not pay; which will be examined before the judge. For, as Pomponius also wrote in the twelfth book of his Letters, the definition of this matter is difficult. The deified Pius likewise issued a rescript to Tullius Balbus on whether delay is to be understood to have occurred, that it can be decided neither by any constitution nor by any inquiry of the juristic authors, since it is rather a matter of fact than of law.

Dig. 22.1.32.1

Digest 22.1.32.1

Marcianus 4 reg.

Marcianus Rules, book 4.

Et non sufficit ad probationem morae, si servo debitoris absentis denuntiatum est a creditore procuratoreve eius, cum etiam si ipsi, inquit, domino denuntiatum est, ceterum postea cum is sui potestatem faceret, omissa esset repetendi debiti instantia, non protinus per debitorem mora facta intellegitur.

And it does not suffice for the proof of delay (mora) if notice was given to the slave of an absent debtor by the creditor or his procurator; since even if, he says, notice was given to the master himself, yet if thereafter, when he made himself available, the pressing for recovery of the debt was omitted, delay is not straightway understood to have been brought about by the debtor.

Dig. 22.1.32.2

Digest 22.1.32.2

Marcianus 4 reg.

Marcianus Book 4 of the rules.

In bonae fidei contractibus ex mora usurae debentur.

In good-faith contracts, interest is owed because of delay.

Dig. 22.1.32.3

Digest 22.1.32.3

Marcianus 4 reg.

Marcianus Rules book 4.

Quid ergo: si et filius familias et pater ex persona eius teneatur ( sive iussu eius contractum est sive in rem versum est patris vel in peculium), cuius persona circa moram spectabitur? et si quidem pater dumtaxat convenietur, ex mora sua non tenetur: in filium tamen dabitur actio in hoc, ut quod minus a patre actor consecutus est, filius praestet: quod si filius moram fecerit, tunc actor vel cum ipso in solidum vel cum patre dumtaxat de peculio habebit.

What then? If both a son in the household and the father are held on his account (whether the contract was made by his order, or it was turned to the father’s benefit in rem versum, or into the peculium), whose person will be looked to with respect to delay (mora)? And if indeed the father only is sued, he is not held for his own delay; however, an action will be given against the son to this effect, that the son shall make good what less the plaintiff has obtained from the father. But if the son has caused delay, then the plaintiff will have his remedy either against him in solidum, or against the father only de peculio.

Dig. 22.1.32.4

Digest 22.1.32.4

Marcianus 4 reg.

Marcianus 4 Rules.

Sed si duo rei promittendi sint, alterius mora alteri non nocet.

But if there are two obligors on a promise, the delay of one does not harm the other.

Dig. 22.1.32.5

Digest 22.1.32.5

Marcianus 4 reg.

Marcianus book 4 of the rules.

Item si fideiussor solus moram fecerit, non tenetur, sicuti si stichum promissum occiderit: sed utilis actio in hunc dabitur.

Likewise, if the fidejussor alone has caused delay, he is not held liable, just as if he had killed the promised Stichus: but a useful action (actio utilis) will be granted against him.

Dig. 22.1.33pr.

Digest 22.1.33, preface.

Ulpianus l.S. de off. curat. rei p.

Ulpian in the single book On the Office of the Curator of the Republic.

Si bene collocatae sunt pecuniae publicae, in sortem inquietari debitores non debent et maxime, si parient usuras: si non parient, prospicere rei publicae securitati debet praeses provinciae, dummodo non acerbum se exactorem nec contumeliosum praebeat, sed moderatum et cum efficacia benignum et cum instantia humanum: nam inter insolentiam incuriosam et diligentiam non ambitiosam multum interest.

If public monies have been well placed, the debtors ought not to be disturbed as to the principal, and especially if they will bear interest; if they will not bear, the governor of the province ought to look to the security of the commonwealth, provided that he does not show himself a harsh collector nor an insulting one, but moderate, and benevolent with efficacy and humane with persistence: for there is much difference between incurious insolence and unambitious diligence.

Dig. 22.1.33.1

Digest 22.1.33.1

Ulpianus l.S. de off. curat. rei p.

Ulpian in the single book on the office of the curator of the republic.

Praeterea prospicere debet, ne pecuniae publicae credantur sive pignoribus idoneis vel hypothecis.

Moreover, he ought to provide that public monies not be lent, except upon suitable pledges or hypothecs.

Dig. 22.1.34

Digest 22.1.34

Ulpianus 15 ad ed.

Ulpian 15 on the Edict.

Usurae vicem fructuum optinent et merito non debent a fructibus separari: et ita in legatis et fideicommissis et in tutelae actione et in ceteris iudiciis bonae fidei servatur. hoc idem igitur in ceteris obventionibus dicemus.

Interest holds the place of fruits and deservedly ought not to be separated from the fruits; and thus it is observed in legacies and fideicommissa and in the guardianship action and in the other suits of good faith. Therefore we shall say the same concerning the other obventions (receipts).

Dig. 22.1.35

Digest 22.1.35

Paulus 57 ad ed.

Paulus 57 on the Edict.

Lite contestata usurae currunt.

Once the suit is joined, interest runs.

Dig. 22.1.36

Digest 22.1.36

Ulpianus 61 ad ed.

Ulpian, 61 on the Edict.

Praediorum urbanorum pensiones pro fructibus accipiuntur.

The rents of urban estates are taken as fruits.

Dig. 22.1.37

Digest 22.1.37

Ulpianus 10 ad ed.

Ulpian, 10 on the Edict.

Et in contraria negotiorum gestorum actione usurae veniunt, si mutuatus sum pecuniam, ut creditorem tuum absolvam, quia aut in possessionem mittendus erat bonorum tuorum aut pignora venditurus. quid si domi habens propter eandem causam solvi? puto verum, si liberavi ex magno incommodo, debere dici usuras venire, eas autem, quae in regione frequentantur, ut est in bonae fidei iudiciis constitutum: sed si mutuatus dedi, hae venient usurae quas ipse pendo, utique si plus tibi praestarim commodi, quam usurae istae colligunt.

And in the counter action on management of affairs, interest accrues, if I have borrowed money in order to discharge your creditor, because he was either to be put into possession of your goods or about to sell the pledges. What if, having the money at home, I paid for the same reason? I think it true that, if I freed you from a great inconvenience, it ought to be said that interest accrues—those, however, which are customary in the region, as is established in actions of good faith; but if I paid with money borrowed, there will accrue the interest which I myself am paying, at any rate if I have furnished you more advantage than those interests amount to.

Dig. 22.1.38pr.

Digest 22.1.38pr.

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on Plautius.

Videamus generali, quando in actione quae est in personam etiam fructus veniant.

Let us see in general, when in an action which is in personam the fruits also are recoverable.

Dig. 22.1.38.1

Digest 22.1.38.1

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on plaut.

Et quidem si fundus ob rem datus sit, veluti dotis causa, et renuntiata adfinitas, fructus quoque restituendi sunt, utique hi qui percepti sunt eo tempore quo sperabatur adfinitas, sed et posteriores, si in re mora fuit, ut ab illo, qui reddere debeat, omnimodo restituendi sunt. sed et si per mulierem stetit, quo minus nuptiae contrahantur, magis est, ut debeat fructus recipere: ratio autem haec est, quod, si sponsus non conveniebatur restituere fructus, licuerat ei neglegere fundum.

And indeed, if an estate has been given for a purpose, such as on account of a dowry, and the affinity is renounced, the fruits also must be restored—specifically those which were taken in the time when the affinity was being hoped for, but also later ones, if there was delay in the matter, so that they must by all means be restored by the one who ought to give back. But also, if it was due to the woman that the nuptials were not contracted, it is all the more the case that he ought to receive the fruits: and the reason is this, that, if the bridegroom were not being convened to restore the fruits, it would have been permitted him to neglect the estate.

Dig. 22.1.38.2

Digest 22.1.38.2

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on Plautius.

Item si indebitum fundum solvi et repeto, fructus quoque repetere debeo.

Likewise, if I have paid an estate not owed and seek to recover it, I ought also to recover the fruits.

Dig. 22.1.38.3

Digest 22.1.38.3

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paul 6 on Plautius.

Idemque est, si mortis causa fundus sit donatus et revaluerit qui donavit atque ita condictio nascatur.

And it is the same, if an estate (fundus) has been donated mortis causa and the one who donated has recovered, and thus a condictio arises.

Dig. 22.1.38.4

Digest 22.1.38.4

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paul 6 to Plautius.

In fabiana quoque actione et pauliana, per quam quae in fraudem creditorum alienata sunt revocantur, fructus quoque restituuntur: nam praetor id agit, ut perinde sint omnia, atque si nihil alienatum esset: quod non est iniquum ( nam et verbum " restituas", quod in hac re praetor dixit, plenam habet significationem), ut fructus quoque restituantur.

In the Fabian action as well as the Paulian, through which things that have been alienated in fraud of creditors are recalled, the fruits also are restored: for the praetor aims that all things be just as if nothing had been alienated: which is not iniquitous (for even the word " restituas", which in this matter the praetor used, has full signification), that the fruits also be restored.

Dig. 22.1.38.5

Digest 22.1.38.5

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 to plaut.

Et ideo cum restitui praetor vult, veluti in interdicto unde vi, etiam fructus sunt restituendi.

And therefore, when the praetor wishes restoration to be made, as in the interdict unde vi, the fruits also must be restored.

Dig. 22.1.38.6

Digest 22.1.38.6

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus book 6 on Plautius.

Item si vi metusve causa rem tradam, non aliter mihi restituisse videtur, quam si fructus mihi restituat: nec mora mea mihi aliquid aufert.

Likewise, if I deliver a thing on account of force or fear, he is not considered to have made restitution to me unless he restores the fruits to me; nor does my delay take anything away from me.

Dig. 22.1.38.7

Digest 22.1.38.7

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on plaut.

Si actionem habeam ad id consequendum quod meum non fuit, veluti ex stipulatu, fructus non consequar, etiamsi mora facta sit: quod si acceptum est iudicium, tunc sabinus et cassius ex aequitate fructus quoque post acceptum iudicium praestandos putant, ut causa restituatur, quod puto recte dici.

If I have an action to achieve what was not mine, for example out of a stipulation, I do not recover the fruits, even if delay (mora) has occurred; but if the suit has been accepted, then Sabinus and Cassius think, on grounds of equity, that the fruits also, after the suit has been accepted, must be rendered, so that the situation may be restored—which I think is rightly said.

Dig. 22.1.38.8

Digest 22.1.38.8

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on Plautius.

Ex causa etiam emptionis fructus restituendi sunt.

Even on the ground of a purchase, the fruits must be restored.

Dig. 22.1.38.9

Digest 22.1.38.9

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus, book 6 on Plautius.

Sed in societatibus fructus communicandi sunt.

But in partnerships the profits must be shared.

Dig. 22.1.38.10

Digest 22.1.38.10

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paul 6 on Plautius.

Si possessionem naturalem revocem, proprietas mea manet, videamus de fructibus. et quidem in deposito et commodato fructus quoque praestandi sunt, sicut diximus.

If I resume natural possession, my ownership remains; let us consider the fruits. and indeed in deposit and in commodatum the fruits also are to be furnished, as we have said.

Dig. 22.1.38.11

Digest 22.1.38.11

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on plaut.

In interdicto quoque quod vi aut clam magis est, ut omnis causa et fructus restituantur.

In the interdict too which is “by force or clandestinely,” the rule rather is that the whole situation and the fruits be restored.

Dig. 22.1.38.12

Digest 22.1.38.12

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on Plautius.

Ante matrimonium quoque fructus percepti dotis fiunt et cum ea restituuntur.

Before the marriage too, the fruits collected become part of the dowry and are restored together with it.

Dig. 22.1.38.13

Digest 22.1.38.13

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on plaut.

Eadem ratio est in fructibus praediorum urbanorum.

The same rule holds in the fruits of urban estates.

Dig. 22.1.38.14

Digest 22.1.38.14

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on Plautius.

Item si dividere fundum tecum velim, tu nolis et colam, an fructus dividi debeant post deductionem impensarum? et puto dividendos.

Likewise, if I should wish to divide the farm with you, you are unwilling, and I cultivate it, should the fruits be divided after deduction of expenses? and I think they should be divided.

Dig. 22.1.38.15

Digest 22.1.38.15

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on Plautius.

In ceteris quoque bonae fidei iudiciis fructus omnimodo praestantur.

In the other good‑faith actions too, fruits are in every way rendered.

Dig. 22.1.38.16

Digest 22.1.38.16

Paulus 6 ad plaut.

Paulus 6 on Plautius.

Si dos praelegata fuerit, ante nuptias percepti fructus in causa legati veniunt.

If a dowry has been bequeathed as a pre-legacy, the fruits received before the nuptials are counted on the side of the legacy.

Dig. 22.1.39

Digest 22.1.39

Modestinus 9 diff.

Modestinus Book 9 of Differences

Equis per fideicommissum legatis post moram heredis fetus quoque debentur. equitio autem legato etiamsi mora non intercedat, incremento gregis fetus accedunt.

When horses are bequeathed through a fideicommiss, after the heir’s delay the offspring too are owed. equitio, however, when bequeathed, even if no delay intervenes, the offspring accrue as an increment of the herd.

Dig. 22.1.40

Digest 22.1.40

Modestinus 4 reg.

Modestinus Rules, Book 4.

In eum diem, quo creditor pignora distraxit, recte usurae fiet reputatio.

Up to the day on which the creditor sold the pledges, the reckoning of interest will properly be made.

Dig. 22.1.41pr.

Digest 22.1.41, opening (pr.).

Modestinus 3 resp.

Modestinus 3 Responses.

Tutor condemnatus per appellationem traxerat exsecutionem sententiae. herennius modestinus respondit eum qui de appellatione cognovit potuisse, si frustratoriam morandi causa appellationem interpositam animadverteret, etiam de usuris medii temporis eum condemnare.

The guardian, having been condemned, had by an appeal dragged out the execution of the sentence. Herennius Modestinus replied that the one who took cognizance of the appeal could, if he observed that an appeal had been interposed frustratorily for the sake of delay, also condemn him for the interest of the intervening period.

Dig. 22.1.41.1

Digest 22.1.41.1

Modestinus 3 resp.

Modestinus Responses, Book 3.

Lucius titius cum centum et usuras aliquanti temporis deberet, minorem pecuniam quam debebat obsignavit: quaero, an titius pecuniae quam obsignavit usuras praestare non debeat. modestinus respondit, si non hac lege mutua pecunia data est, uti liceret et particulatim quod acceptum est exsolvere, non retardari totius debiti usurarum praestationem, si, cum creditor paratus esset totum suscipere, debitor, qui in exsolutione totius cessabat, solam partem deposuit.

Lucius titius, when he owed one hundred and interest for some time, executed under seal for a smaller sum of money than he owed: I ask whether titius ought not to pay interest on any money beyond what he sealed. modestinus responded: if the loaned money was not given on this condition, that it should be permitted also to pay off piecemeal what was received, the performance of interest on the whole debt is not delayed, if, when the creditor was ready to receive the whole, the debtor, who was failing in paying off the whole, deposited only a part.

Dig. 22.1.41.2

Digest 22.1.41.2

Modestinus 3 resp.

Modestinus 3 Responses.

Ab aulo agerio gaius seius mutuam quandam quantitatem accepit hoc chirographo: " ille scripsi me accepisse et accepi ab illo mutuos et numeratos decem, quos ei reddam kalendis illis proximis cum suis usuris placitis inter nos": quaero, an ex eo instrumento usurae peti possint et quae. modestinus respondit, si non appareat de quibus usuris conventio facta sit, peti eas non posse.

From aulo agerio, gaius seius received a certain quantity as a mutuum by this chirograph: " I have written that I have received, and I did receive, from him, ten as a loan, counted out, which I will repay to him on those next Kalends with the interest agreed between us": I ask whether, from that instrument, interest can be sought, and what. Modestinus replied that, if it does not appear what interest the agreement was made about, they cannot be sought.

Dig. 22.1.42

Digest 22.1.42

Modestinus 11 resp.

Modestinus Responses 11.

Herennius modestinus respondit fructus, qui post adquisitum ex causa fideicommissi dominium ex terra percipiuntur, ad fideicommissarium pertinere, licet maior pars anni ante diem fideicommissi cedentem praeterisse dicatur.

Herennius Modestinus responded that the fruits which, after ownership has been acquired by reason of a fideicommissum, are taken from the land, pertain to the fideicommissary, even if the greater part of the year is said to have passed before the day on which the fideicommissum accrues.

Dig. 22.1.43

Digest 22.1.43

Modestinus 18 resp.

Modestinus 18 responses.

Herennius modestinus respondit eius temporis quod cessit, postquam fiscus debitum percepit, eum, qui mandatis a fisco actionibus experitur, usuras quae in stipulatum deductae non sunt petere non posse.

Herennius Modestinus responded that, for the time which accrued after the fisc received the debt, the one who proceeds by mandates from the fisc with actions cannot seek interest which has not been deducted into the stipulation.

Dig. 22.1.44

Digest 22.1.44

Modestinus 10 pand.

Modestinus 10 Pandects.

Poenam pro usuris stipulari nemo supra modum usurarum licitum potest.

No one can stipulate a penalty for interest beyond the lawful measure of interest.

Dig. 22.1.45

Digest 22.1.45

Pomponius 22 ad q. muc.

Pomponius 22 on Q. Mucius.

Fructus percipiendo uxor vel vir ex re donata suos facit, illos tamen, quos suis operis adquisierit, veluti serendo: nam si pomum decerpserit vel ex silva caedit, non fit eius, sicuti nec cuiuslibet bonae fidei possessoris, quia non ex facto eius is fructus nascitur.

By perceiving the fruits, a wife or a husband from a thing donated makes them his or her own—yet only those which he or she has acquired by his or her own works, as by sowing: for if he or she has plucked a fruit or cut from a wood, it does not become his or hers, just as it does not for any possessor in good faith, because that fruit is not generated from his or her act.

Dig. 22.1.46

Digest 22.1.46

Ulpianus 62 ad ed.

Ulpian 62 on the Edict.

Quod in fructus redigendos impensum est, non ambigitur ipsos fructus deminuere debere.

It is not doubted that what has been expended for bringing the fruits in ought to diminish the fruits themselves.

Dig. 22.1.47

Digest 22.1.47

Scaevola 9 Dig.

Scaevola 9 Digest.

Respondit paratum iudicium accipere, si ab adversario cessatum est, moram facere non videri.

He responded that he was ready to accept the trial; if there has been delay by the adversary, he does not appear to be making delay.

Dig. 22.1.48

Digest 22.1.48

Scaevola 22 Dig.

Scaevola 22 Digest.

Maritus uxori suae usum fructum tertiae partis et, cum liberos habuisset, proprietatem legavit: eam uxorem heredes falsi testamenti et aliorum criminum accusaverunt, qua re impedita est legatorum petitio: interea et filius ei mulieri natus est eoque condicio legati exstitit. quaesitum est, cum testamentum falsum non esse apparuerit, an fructus etiam mulieri praestari debeant. respondit praestandos.

A husband bequeathed to his wife the usufruct of a third part and, when she should have had children, the ownership: the heirs accused that wife of the crime of a false testament and of other crimes, by which matter the pursuit of the legacies was impeded: meanwhile a son also was born to that woman, and thereby the condition of the legacy came into being. It was asked, since it had appeared that the testament was not false, whether the fruits also ought to be rendered to the woman. He responded that they must be rendered.

Dig. 22.1.49

Digest 22.1.49

Iavolenus 3 ex post. lab.

Iavolenus 3 from the Later Books of Labeo.

Fructus rei est vel pignori dare licere.

A fruit of the thing is that even to give it in pledge is permitted.

Dig. 22.2.0. De nautico faenore.

Dig. 22.2.0. On nautical interest.

Dig. 22.2.1

Digest 22.2.1

Modestinus 10 pand.

Modestinus 10 Pandects.

Traiecticia ea pecunia est quae trans mare vehitur: ceterum si eodem loci consumatur, non erit traiecticia. sed videndum, an merces ex ea pecunia comparatae in ea causa habentur? et interest, utrum etiam ipsae periculo creditoris navigent: tunc enim traiecticia pecunia fit.

Trajectitious money is that which is carried across the sea: but if it is consumed in the same place, it will not be trajectitious. But one must see whether merchandise bought with that money is held in that condition? And it is of interest whether they also sail at the creditor’s peril: for then indeed the money becomes trajectitious money.

Dig. 22.2.2

Digest 22.2.2

Pomponius 3 ex plaut.

Pomponius 3 from Plautius.

Labeo ait, si nemo sit, qui a parte promissoris interpellari traiecticiae pecuniae possit, id ipsum testatione complecti debere, ut pro petitione id cederet.

Labeo says that, if there is no one who, on the promisor’s side, can be interpellated regarding the trajectitious money (the sea-loan), this very point ought to be included in an attestation, so that it would serve in place of a petition.

Dig. 22.2.3

Digest 22.2.3

Modestinus 4 reg.

Modestinus 4 Rules.

In nautica pecunia ex eo die periculum spectat creditorem, ex quo navem navigare conveniat.

In a maritime loan, from the day on which it is agreed that the ship shall sail, the risk falls upon the creditor.

Dig. 22.2.4pr.

Digest 22.2.4, preface.

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinian 3 Responses.

Nihil interest, traiecticia pecunia sine periculo creditoris accepta sit an post diem praestitutum et condicionem impletam periculum esse creditoris desierit. utrubique igitur maius legitima usura faenus non debebitur, sed in priore quidem specie semper, in altera vero discusso periculo: nec pignora vel hypothecae titulo maioris usurae tenebuntur.

It makes no difference whether money for shipment (a sea-loan) has been received without the creditor’s peril, or whether, after the appointed day and the condition has been fulfilled, the creditor’s peril has ceased. In both cases, therefore, a return greater than the lawful interest will not be owed—indeed always in the former case, but in the latter once the peril is dispelled; nor shall pledges or hypothecs be held for interest at a higher rate.

Dig. 22.2.4.1

Digest 22.2.4.1

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinianus 3 Responses.

Pro operis servi traiecticiae pecuniae gratia secuti quod in singulos dies in stipulatum deductum est, ad finem centesimae non ultra duplum debetur. in stipulatione faenoris post diem periculi separatim interposita quod in ea legitimae usurae deerit, per alteram stipulationem operarum supplebitur.

For the slave’s services, taken as consideration for a maritime loan, in accordance with what has been brought under stipulation for each single day, up to the centesima-limit not more than double is owed. In a stipulation of usury, inserted separately for the time after the day of peril, whatever of lawful interest is lacking in it will be supplemented by another stipulation for services.

Dig. 22.2.5pr.

Digest 22.2.5, preface.

Scaevola 6 resp.

Scaevola 6 responses.

Periculi pretium est et si condicione quamvis poenali non existente recepturus sis quod dederis et insuper aliquid praeter pecuniam, si modo in aleae speciem non cadat: veluti ea, ex quibus condictiones nasci solent, ut " si non manumittas", " si non illud facias", " si non convaluero" et cetera. nec dubitabis, si piscatori erogaturo in apparatum plurimum pecuniae dederim, ut, si cepisset, redderet, et athletae, unde se exhiberet exerceretque, ut, si vicisset, redderet.

It is a price of risk even if, with no penal condition existing, you are to receive what you gave and, moreover, something besides the money, provided only that it does not fall into the species of gaming: for example those things from which condictions are wont to arise, such as " si non manumittas", " si non illud facias", " si non convaluero" and so forth. Nor will you doubt, if I have given a very great sum of money to a fisherman about to expend it on equipment, that, if he should catch, he should repay, and to an athlete, for the means whereby he might present himself and train, that, if he should win, he should repay.

Dig. 22.2.5.1

Digest 22.2.5.1

Scaevola 6 resp.

Scaevola 6 Responses.

In his autem omnibus et pactum sine stipulatione ad augendam obligationem prodest.

In all these cases, moreover, even a pact without stipulation is effective for augmenting the obligation.

Dig. 22.2.6

Digest 22.2.6

Paulus 25 quaest.

Paulus 25 Questions.

Faenerator pecuniam usuris maritimis mutuam dando quasdam merces in nave pignori accepit, ex quibus si non potuisset totum debitum exsolvi, aliarum mercium aliis navibus impositarum propriisque faeneratoribus obligatarum si quid superfuisset, pignori accepit. quaesitum est nave propria perempta, ex qua totum solvi potuit, an id damnum ad creditorem pertineat, intra praestitutos dies amissa nave, an ad ceterarum navium superfluum admitti possit. respondi: alias quidem pignoris deminutio ad damnum debitoris, non etiam ad creditoris pertinet: sed cum traiecticia pecunia ita datur, ut non alias petitio eius creditori competat, quam si salva navis intra statuta tempora pervenerit, ipsius crediti obligatio non exsistente condicione defecisse videtur, et ideo pignorum quoque persecutio perempta est etiam eorum, quae non sunt amissa.

A moneylender, by giving money at maritime interest, took certain merchandise on a ship as a pledge; and if the whole debt could not be paid out of these, he took as a pledge whatever surplus there might be of other merchandise loaded on other ships and pledged to their own moneylenders. The question was, the ship itself having been destroyed—out of which the whole could have been paid—whether that loss pertains to the creditor, the ship having been lost within the days prescribed, or whether he can be admitted to the surplus of the other ships. I answered: in other cases, indeed, the diminution of a pledge pertains to the debtor’s loss, and not also to the creditor’s; but since money under a traiecticia (maritime) loan is given on the footing that no action for it accrues to the creditor unless the ship arrives safe within the fixed times, the obligation of the very credit, the condition not existing, seems to have failed, and therefore the pursuit of the pledges is likewise extinguished, even of those which have not been lost.

si navis intra praestitutos dies perisset, et condicionem stipulationis defecisse videri, ideoque sine causa de pignorum persecutione, quae in aliis navibus fuerunt, quaeri. quando ergo ad illorum pignorum persecutionem creditor admitti potuerit? scilicet tunc cum condicio exstiterit obligationis et alio casu pignus amissum fuerit vel vilius distractum vel si navis postea perierit, quam dies praefinitus periculo exactus fuerit.

If the ship had perished within the days prescribed, the condition of the stipulation would seem to have failed, and therefore it would be without cause to inquire about the pursuit (enforcement) of the pledges which were on the other ships. When, then, could the creditor be admitted to the pursuit of those pledges? Namely, when the condition of the obligation has come into effect, and in another case the pledge has been lost or sold off at a cheaper price, or if the ship has perished after the day fixed for the risk has elapsed.

Dig. 22.2.7

Digest 22.2.7

Paulus 3 ad ed.

Paulus 3 on the Edict.

In quibusdam contractibus etiam usurae debentur quemadmodum per stipulationem. nam si dedero decem traiecticia, ut salva nave sortem cum certis usuris recipiam, dicendum est posse me sortem cum usuris recipere.

In certain contracts interest is owed as well, just as by stipulation. For if I have given ten by way of a sea-loan (traiecticia), so that, the ship being safe, I may receive the principal with certain interest, it must be said that I can receive the principal with interest.

Dig. 22.2.8

Digest 22.2.8

Ulpianus 77 ad ed.

Ulpian 77 on the Edict.

Servius ait pecuniae traiecticiae poenam peti non posse, si per creditorem stetisset, quo minus eam intra certum tempus praestitutum accipiat.

Servius says that the penalty for trajectitious money cannot be sought, if it was by the creditor’s doing that he did not receive it within the certain prescribed time.

Dig. 22.2.9

Digest 22.2.9

Labeo 5 pith. a paulo epit.

Labeo, book 5 of the Pithanon, epitomized by Paul.

Si traiecticiae pecuniae poena ( uti solet) promissa est, quamvis eo die, qui primus solvendae pecuniae fuerit, nemo vixerit, qui eam pecuniam deberet, tamen perinde committi poena potest, ac si fuisset heres debitoris.

If the penalty for money sent across (as is customary) has been promised, although on the day which would have been the first for the money to be payable no one was alive who would owe that money, nevertheless the penalty can be incurred just as if there had been an heir of the debtor.

Dig. 22.3.0. De probationibus et praesumptionibus.

Digest 22.3.0. On proofs and presumptions.

Dig. 22.3.1

Digest 22.3.1

Papinianus 3 quaest.

Papinian 3 Questions.

Quotiens quaereretur, genus vel gentem quis haberet nec ne, eum probare oportet.

Whenever it is asked whether someone has a lineage or a clan or not, it is for him to prove it.

Dig. 22.3.2

Digest 22.3.2

Paulus 69 ad ed.

Paulus 69 on the Edict.

Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.

The proof lies upon the one who asserts, not upon the one who denies.

Dig. 22.3.3

Digest 22.3.3

Papinianus 9 resp.

Papinian, 9 Responses.

Cum tacitum fideicommissum ab eo datur, qui tam in primo quam in secundo testamento pro eadem parte vel postea pro maiore heres scribitur, probatio mutatae voluntatis ei debet incumbere qui convenitur, cum secreti suscepti ratio plerumque dominis rerum persuadeat eos ita heredes scribere, quorum fidem elegerunt.

When a tacit fideicommiss is given by one who is written as heir both in the first and in the second testament for the same share, or later for a greater share, the proof of a changed intention ought to rest on the one who is sued, since the rationale of the secrecy undertaken for the most part persuades owners of property to write as heirs those whose good faith they have chosen.

Dig. 22.3.4

Digest 22.3.4

Paulus 6 resp.

Paulus, book 6 of Responses.

Respondit emptorem probare debere, eum servum de quo quaeritur antequam emeret fugisse.

He replied that the purchaser ought to prove that the slave about whom inquiry is made had fled before he bought.

Dig. 22.3.5pr.

Digest 22.3.5pr.

Paulus 9 resp.

Paulus 9 Responses.

Ab ea parte, quae dicit adversarium suum ab aliquo iure prohibitum esse specialiter lege vel constitutione, id probari oportere.

It must be proved by that party which says that its adversary is prohibited from some right specifically by law or by constitution.

Dig. 22.3.5.1

Digest 22.3.5.1

Paulus 9 resp.

Paulus 9 Responses

Idem respondit, si quis negat emancipationem recte factam, probationem ipsum praestare debere.

The same answered that, if anyone denies that the emancipation was rightly effected, he himself ought to furnish the proof.

Dig. 22.3.6

Digest 22.3.6

Scaevola 2 resp.

Scaevola 2 responses.

Patronum manifeste docere debere libertum in fraudem suam aliquid dedisse, ut partem eius quod in fraudem datum esset, posset avocare.

The patron ought manifestly to show that the freedman gave something in fraud of him, so that he could reclaim a part of that which had been given in fraud.

Dig. 22.3.7

Digest 22.3.7

Paulus 2 sent.

Paul 2 sent.

Cum probatio prioris fugae deficit, servi quaestioni credendum est: in se enim interrogari, non pro domino aut in dominum videtur.

When the proof of the prior flight fails, the slave’s interrogation is to be believed: for he seems to be questioned about himself, not for the master nor against the master.

Dig. 22.3.8

Digest 22.3.8

Paulus 18 ad plaut.

Paulus, 18 on Plautius.

Si filius in potestate patris esse neget, praetor cognoscit, ut prior doceat filius, quia et pro pietate quam patri debet praestare hoc statuendum est et quia se liberum esse quodammodo contendit: ideo enim et qui ad libertatem proclamat, prior docere iubetur.

If a son denies that he is under the power of his father, the praetor takes cognizance, to the effect that the son should be the first to make proof, both because, out of the piety which he ought to render to his father, this must be determined, and because he is in a certain measure contending that he is free: for that reason also he who proclaims for liberty is ordered to make proof first.

Dig. 22.3.9

Digest 22.3.9

Celsus 1 Dig.

Celsus 1 Digest.

Si pactum factum sit, in quo heredis mentio non fiat, quaeritur, an id actum sit, ut ipsius dumtaxat persona eo statueretur. sed quamvis verum est, quod qui excipit probare debeat quod excipitur, attamen de ipso dumtaxat ac non de herede eius quoque convenisse petitor, non qui excipit probare debet, quia plerumque tam heredibus nostris quam nobismet ipsis cavemus.

If a pact has been made in which no mention is made of the heir, the question is whether it was transacted that only his own person should be stipulated thereby. But although it is true that he who raises an exception ought to prove that which is excepted, nevertheless that it was agreed concerning himself only and not concerning his heir as well—the claimant, not the one who excepts, must prove; because for the most part we provide safeguards as much for our heirs as for ourselves.

Dig. 22.3.10

Digest 22.3.10

Marcellus 3 Dig.

Marcellus Book 3 of the Digest.

Census et monumenta publica potiora testibus esse senatus censuit.

The Senate decreed that the census and public records are weightier than witnesses.

Dig. 22.3.11

Digest 22.3.11

Celsus 11 Dig.

Celsus Digest 11.

Non est necesse pupillo probare fideiussores pro tutore datos, cum accipiebantur, idoneos non fuisse: nam probatio exigenda est ab his, quorum officii fuit providere, ut pupillo caveretur.

It is not necessary for the ward to prove that the sureties furnished for the tutor, when they were accepted, were not fit: for proof is to be demanded from those whose office it was to provide that the ward be safeguarded.

Dig. 22.3.12

Digest 22.3.12

Celsus 17 Dig.

Celsus 17 Digest.

Quingenta testamento tibi legata sunt: idem scriptum est in codicillis postea scriptis: refert, duplicare legatum voluerit an repetere et oblitus se in testamento legasse id fecerit: ab utro ergo probatio eius rei exigenda est? prima fronte aequius videtur, ut petitor probet quod intendit: sed nimirum probationes quaedam a reo exiguntur: nam si creditum petam, ille respondeat solutam esse pecuniam, ipse hoc probare cogendus est. et hic igitur cum petitor duas scripturas ostendit, heres posteriorem inanem esse, ipse heres id adprobare iudici debet.

Five hundred have been bequeathed to you by testament; the same has been written in codicils written afterward: it matters whether he wished to duplicate the legacy or to repeat it and, having forgotten that he had bequeathed it in the testament, did this. From which of the two, then, should proof of this matter be required? At first sight it seems more equitable that the claimant prove what he alleges; yet of course certain proofs are demanded from the defendant: for if I sue for a loan (creditum), and he replies that the money has been paid, he himself is compelled to prove this. And so here, since the claimant produces two writings, the heir must approve to the judge that the later one is void; the heir himself ought to establish that.

Dig. 22.3.13

Digest 22.3.13

Celsus 30 Dig.

Celsus Digest 30.

Cum de aetate hominis quaereretur, caesar noster in haec verba rescripsit: " et durum et iniquum est, cum de statu aetatis alicuius quaereretur et diversae professiones proferuntur, ea potissimum stare, quae nocet: sed causa cognita veritatem excuti oportet et ex eo potissimum annos computari, ex quo praecipuam fidem in ea re constare credibilius videtur".

When inquiry was made about the age of a person, our caesar wrote back in these words: " and it is harsh and inequitable, when the status of someone’s age is in question and diverse declarations are put forward, that that should especially stand which harms; but, once the case has been examined, the truth ought to be sifted out, and the years are to be computed especially from that point from which the chief credibility in the matter more plausibly seems to consist".

Dig. 22.3.14

Digest 22.3.14

Ulpianus 2 de off. cons.

Ulpian 2 on the office of the consul.

Circa eum, qui se ex libertinitate ingenuum dicat, referendum est, quis actoris partibus fungatur. et si quidem in possessionem libertinitatis fuit, sine dubio ipsum oportebit ingenuitatis causam agere docereque se ingenuum esse: sin vero in possessione ingenuitatis sit et libertinus esse dicatur, scilicet eius qui ei controversiam movet, hoc probare debet qui eum dicit libertum suum: quid enim interest, servum suum quis an libertum contendat? si quis autem fiducia ingenuitatis suae ultro in se suscipiat probationes ad hoc, ut sententiam ferat pro ingenuitate facientem, hoc est, ingenuum se esse ut pronuntietur, an obtemperare ei debeat, tractari potest.

Concerning one who, being out of libertinity (freedman status), says that he is freeborn, it must be considered who should fill the plaintiff’s part. And if indeed he has been in possession of libertinity, without doubt he himself will have to plead the cause of freeborn status and show that he is freeborn; but if he is in possession of freeborn status and it is said that he is a freedman, namely, the one who raises the controversy against him must prove this—the one who says that he is his freedman. For what difference is there whether someone contends that he is his slave or his freedman? If, however, someone, in confidence of his freeborn status, of his own accord takes upon himself proofs to this end, that he may obtain a sentence making for freeborn status—that is, that it be pronounced that he is freeborn—it can be discussed whether one ought to comply with him.

et non ab re esse opinor morem ei geri probandi se ingenuum et sententiam secundum se dandam, cum nulla captio intercedat iuris.

and I think it is not out of place that the practice be afforded him of proving himself freeborn and that judgment be given in his favor, since no legal cavil intervenes.

Dig. 22.3.15

Digest 22.3.15

Modestinus 12 resp.

Modestinus 12 Responses.

Quidam quasi ex seia susceptus a gaio seio, cum gaius fratres haberet, hereditatem gaii invasit et fratribus eiusdem quasi ex mandatu defuncti fideicommissa solvit, cautionem accepit: qui postea cognito, quod filius fratris eorum non fuisset, quaerebant, an cum eo de hereditate fratris possint, propter emissam manum ab eis quasi filio, agere. modestinus respondit cautione exsoluti fideicommissi statum eius, qui probari potest a fratribus defuncti filius mortui non esse, minime confirmatum esse: sed hoc ipsum a fratribus probari debet.

A certain man, as if taken up from seia by gaius seius, when gaius had brothers, invaded the inheritance of gaius and paid out to his brothers, as if by the mandate of the deceased, the fideicommissa, and received a bond (cautio). They, after learning that he had not been the son of their brother, were asking whether they could proceed against him concerning their brother’s inheritance, because an emancipation had been issued by them to him as if to a son. modestinus replied that by the bond for the fideicommissum paid out the status of him who can be proven by the brothers of the deceased not to be the son of the dead man is by no means confirmed; but this very point must be proven by the brothers.

Dig. 22.3.16

Digest 22.3.16

Clementius 3 ad l. iul. et pap.

Clementius Book 3 on the Julian and Papian law.

Etiam matris professio filiorum recipitur: sed et avi recipienda est.

Even the mother’s profession of children is received: but the grandfather’s too is to be received.

Dig. 22.3.17

Digest 22.3.17

Celsus 6 Dig.

Celsus Digest 6.

Cum de lege falcidia quaeritur, heredis probatio est locum habere legem falcidiam: quod dum probare non potest, merito condemnabitur.

When the Falcidian law is inquired into, it is the heir’s burden to prove that the Falcidian law has place; and when he cannot prove this, he will deservedly be condemned.

Dig. 22.3.18pr.

Digest 22.3.18pr.

Ulpianus 6 disp.

Ulpian, book 6 of the Disputations.

Quotiens operae quasi a liberto petuntur, probationes ab eo qui se patronum dicit exiguntur: et ideo iulianus scripsit, licet in praeiudicio possessor patronus esse videtur, verum partibus actoris non libertum fungi debere, sed eum qui se patronum esse contendit.

Whenever services are sought as if from a freedman, proofs are demanded from him who says he is the patron: and therefore Julianus wrote that, although in the prejudgment the possessor appears to be the patron, nevertheless in the capacity of plaintiff it should not be the freedman who acts, but he who contends that he is the patron.

Dig. 22.3.18.1

Digest 22.3.18.1

Ulpianus 6 disp.

Ulpian Disputations, Book 6.

Qui dolo dicit factum aliquid, licet in exceptione, docere dolum admissum debet.

He who alleges that something was done by fraud, even by way of exception, ought to demonstrate the fraud that was committed.

Dig. 22.3.18.2

Digest 22.3.18.2

Ulpianus 6 disp.

Ulpian, Disputations, book 6.

Interrogationis factae probationem actori imponi debere, id est ei, qui in iure interrogatum dixit respondisse se solum heredem esse. vel si tacuisse dicatur interrogatus, aeque tantundem erit dicendum impositam improbationem non ei qui excepit se non respondisse, sed actori.

The proof of the interrogation made ought to be imposed on the plaintiff, that is, on him who, in iure, said that the person interrogated replied that he was the sole heir. Or, if the interrogated is said to have kept silent, equally it must be said that the burden of disproof is imposed not on him who pleaded that he did not respond, but on the plaintiff.

Dig. 22.3.19pr.

Digest 22.3.19, preface.

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

In exceptionibus dicendum est reum partibus actoris fungi oportere ipsumque exceptionem velut intentionem implere: ut puta si pacti conventi exceptione utatur, docere debet pactum conventum factum esse.

In exceptions it must be said that the defendant ought to perform the plaintiff’s parts and himself to make out the exception as though an intentio; for instance, if he uses the exception of pactum conventum, he must prove that a pactum conventum was made.

Dig. 22.3.19.1

Digest 22.3.19.1

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian, Disputations 7.

Cum quis promisisset iudicio se sisti et rei publicae causa afuisse dicat et ob id non stetisse, vel dolo malo adversarii factum quo minus sisteretur, vel valetudinem sibi impedimento fuisse vel tempestatem, probare eum id oportet.

When someone has promised to present himself in court and says that he was absent for the cause of the republic and on that account did not appear, or that by the malicious fraud of the adversary it was brought about that he was hindered from being presented, or that ill-health was an impediment to him, or a tempest, he ought to prove this.

Dig. 22.3.19.2

Digest 22.3.19.2

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

Sed et si procuratoria quis exceptione utatur, eo quod non licuisset adversario dare vel fieri procuratorem, probare id oportet obicientem exceptionem.

But also, if someone employs the procuratorial exception, on the ground that it had not been permitted to the adversary to appoint or to become a procurator, it is necessary that the one bringing the exception prove it.

Dig. 22.3.19.3

Digest 22.3.19.3

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

Idem erit dicendum et si ea pecunia petatur, quae pensata dicitur.

The same will have to be said also if that money is claimed which is called weighed.

Dig. 22.3.19.4

Digest 22.3.19.4

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

Hoc amplius, si iudicatae rei vel iurisiurandi condicio delata dicatur de eo quod nunc petitur, sive in alea gestum esse contendatur, eum implere probationes oportet.

Moreover, if it is said that a defense of res judicata or of an oath tendered has been raised regarding that which is now sought, or it is contended that the transaction was done in gaming, it is for him to make good the proofs.

Dig. 22.3.20

Digest 22.3.20

Iulianus 43 Dig.

Julian 43 Digest.

Si quis liberum hominem vi rapuerit, in vinculis habuerit, is indignissime commodum possessoris consequeretur, quia probari non poterit hominem eo tempore quo primum lis ordinaretur in libertate fuisse.

If anyone should have seized a free man by force and kept him in chains, he would most unworthily obtain the benefit of the possessor, because it cannot be proved that the man was in liberty at the time when the suit was first instituted.

Dig. 22.3.21

Digest 22.3.21

Marcianus 6 inst.

Verius esse existimo ipsum qui agit, id est legatarium, probare oportere scisse alienam rem vel obligatam legare defunctum, non heredem probare oportere ignorasse alienam vel obligatam, quia semper necessitas probandi incumbit illi qui agit.

I consider it truer that the very person who brings the action, that is, the legatee, ought to prove that the deceased knew he was bequeathing another’s thing or an obligated (encumbered) one, not that the heir ought to prove that he was ignorant that it was another’s or obligated, because the necessity of proving always lies upon him who brings the action.

Dig. 22.3.22

Digest 22.3.22

Ulpianus 1 resp.

Ulpian Book 1 of the Responses.

Eum, qui voluntatem mutatam dicit, probare hoc debere.

He who says that the intention has been changed ought to prove this.

Dig. 22.3.23

Digest 22.3.23

Marcianus l.S. ad form. hypoth.

Marcianus in the single book on the hypothecary form.

Ante omnia probandum est, quod inter agentem et debitorem convenit, ut pignori hypothecaeve sit: sed et si hoc probet actor, illud quoque implere debet rem pertinere ad debitorem eo tempore quo convenit de pignore, aut cuius voluntate hypotheca data sit.

Before all, it must be proved that between the plaintiff and the debtor it was agreed that the thing be for pledge or hypothec; but even if the plaintiff proves this, he must also make good that the thing pertained to the debtor at the time when it was agreed about the pledge, or that the hypothec was given with his will.

Dig. 22.3.24

Digest 22.3.24

Modestinus 4 reg.

Modestinus book 4 of the rules.

Si chirographum cancellatum fuerit, licet praesumptione debitor liberatus esse videtur, in eam tamen quantitatem, quam manifestis probationibus creditor sibi adhuc deberi ostenderit, recte debitor convenitur.

If the chirograph has been canceled, although by presumption the debtor appears to have been released, nevertheless for that amount which by manifest proofs the creditor has shown to be still owed to himself, the debtor is rightly sued.

Dig. 22.3.25pr.

Digest 22.3.25pr.

Paulus 3 quaest.

Paul 3 Questions.

Cum de indebito quaeritur, quis probare debet non fuisse debitum? res ita temperanda est, ut, si quidem is, qui accepisse dicitur rem vel pecuniam indebitam, hoc negaverit et ipse qui dedit legitimis probationibus solutionem adprobaverit, sine ulla distinctione ipsum, qui negavit sese pecuniam accepisse, si vult audiri, compellendum esse ad probationes praestandas, quod pecuniam debitam accepit: per etenim absurdum est eum, qui ab initio negavit pecuniam suscepisse, postquam fuerit convictus eam accepisse, probationem non debiti ab adversario exigere. sin vero ab initio confiteatur quidem suscepisse pecunias, dicat autem non indebitas ei fuisse solutas, praesumptionem videlicet pro eo esse qui accepit nemo dubitat: qui enim solvit numquam ita resupinus est, ut facile suas pecunias iactet et indebitas effundat, et maxime si ipse qui indebitas dedisse dicit homo diligens est et studiosus pater familias, cuius personam incredibile est in aliquo facile errasse.

When there is inquiry concerning the not‑owed, who must prove that it was not owed? The matter is to be so adjusted, that, if indeed the one who is said to have received a thing or money not owed should deny this, and the very person who gave it has established the payment by lawful proofs, then, without any distinction, he who denied that he had received the money, if he wishes to be heard, must be compelled to furnish proofs that he received money that was owed: for indeed it is absurd that he who from the beginning denied that he had taken the money, after he has been proved to have received it, should demand from his adversary proof of the not‑owed. But if, however, from the beginning he confesses that he did receive the monies, yet says that monies not‑owed were not paid to him, plainly the presumption is in favor of the one who received—no one doubts this: for he who pays is never so supine as to throw about his monies and pour out sums not owed, especially if the very one who says he gave not‑owed sums is a diligent and careful paterfamilias, whose character it is unbelievable to have easily erred in anything.

et ideo eum, qui dicit indebitas solvisse, compelli ad probationes, quod per dolum accipientis vel aliquam iustam ignorantiae causam indebitum ab eo solutum, et nisi hoc ostenderit, nullam eum repetitionem habere.

and therefore the one who says he has paid things not owed is to be compelled to provide proofs, that the not‑owed was paid by him through the fraud of the recipient or some just cause of ignorance; and unless he shows this, he has no repetition.

Dig. 22.3.25.1

Digest 22.3.25.1

Paulus 3 quaest.

Paulus 3 questions.

Sin autem is qui indebitum queritur vel pupillus vel minor sit vel mulier vel forte vir quidem perfectae aetatis, sed miles vel agri cultor et forensium rerum expers vel alias simplicitate gaudens et desidia deditus: tunc eum qui accepit pecunias ostendere bene eas accepisse et debitas ei fuisse soltuas et, si non ostenderit, eas redhibere.

But if the person who complains of an indebitum is either a ward, or a minor, or a woman, or perhaps indeed a man of full age, but a soldier, or a cultivator of fields and unacquainted with forensic (forum) matters, or otherwise one rejoicing in simplicity and given over to idleness: then the one who received the monies must show that he properly received them and that debts owed to him were paid; and, if he does not show it, to restore them.

Dig. 22.3.25.2

Digest 22.3.25.2

Paulus 3 quaest.

Paulus 3 questions.

Sed haec ita, si totam summam indebitam fuisse solutam is qui dedit contendat. sin autem pro parte queritur, quod pars pecuniae solutae debita non est, vel quod ab initio quidem debitum fuit, sed vel dissoluto debito postea ignarus iterum solvit vel exceptione tutus errore eius pecunias dependit: ipsum omnimodo hoc ostendere, quod vel plus debito persolvit vel iam solutam pecuniam per errorem repetita solutione dependit vel tutus exceptione suam nesciens proiecit pecuniam, secundum generalem regulam, quae eos, qui opponendas esse exceptiones adfirmant vel solvisse debita contendunt, haec ostendere exigit.

But these things are thus, if he who gave contends that the whole sum not owed was paid. But if he complains as to a part—that part of the money paid is not owed, or that although it was owed from the beginning, yet either, the debt having been dissolved, he later, unaware, paid again, or, being protected by an exception, he paid out monies through his error—he must in every way show this: that either he paid more than was due, or that money already paid he disbursed through error by a repeated payment, or, protected by an exception, not knowing it, he threw away his own money, according to the general rule, which requires those who affirm that exceptions are to be opposed or contend that they have paid debts to show these things.

Dig. 22.3.25.3

Digest 22.3.25.3

Paulus 3 quaest.

Paulus Questions book 3.

In omnibus autem visionibus quas praeposuimus licentia concedenda est ei, cui onus probationis incumbit, adversario suo rei veritate iusiurandum ferre, prius ipso pro calumnia iurante, ut iudex iuramenti fidem secutus ita suam sententiam possit formare, iure referendae religionis ei servando.

In all the cases, however, which we have set forth, leave must be granted to him upon whom the burden of proof rests to tender to his adversary an oath on the truth of the matter, he himself first swearing against calumny, so that the judge, following the credence of the oath, may thus be able to shape his sentence, the right of referring the religion being preserved to him.

Dig. 22.3.25.4

Digest 22.3.25.4

Paulus 3 quaest.

Paulus 3 Questions.

Sed haec, ubi de solutione indebiti quaestio est. sin autem cautio indebite exposita esse dicatur et indiscrete loquitur, tunc eum, in quem cautio exposita est, compelli debitum esse ostendere, quod in cautionem deduxit, nisi ipse specialiter qui cautionem exposuit causas explanavit, pro quibus eandem conscripsit: tunc enim stare eum oportet suae confessioni, nisi evidentissimis probationibus in scriptis habitis ostendere paratus sit sese haec indebite promisisse.

But this applies where the question is about payment of what was not owed. But if, however, a bond is said to have been unduly set forth and it speaks indiscriminately, then the person in whose favor the bond has been set forth is compelled to show that what he has reduced into the bond is owed, unless the very one who set forth the bond has specifically explained the causes for which he composed the same: for then he ought to stand by his own confession, unless he is prepared to show by the most evident proofs contained in writings that he promised these things when they were not owed.

Dig. 22.3.26

Digest 22.3.26

Papinianus 20 quaest.

Papinian, 20 questions.

Procula magnae quantitatis fideicommissum a fratre sibi debitum post mortem eius in ratione cum heredibus compensare vellet, ex diverso autem allegaretur numquam id a fratre quamdiu vixit desideratum, cum variis ex causis saepe rationi fratris pecunias ratio proculae solvisset: divus commodus cum super eo negotio cognosceret, non admisit compensationem, quasi tacite fratri fideicommissum fuisset remissum.

Procula wished, after his death, to compensate in the account with the heirs a fideicommissum of great amount owed to herself by her brother; but on the other side it was alleged that this had never been demanded from the brother as long as he lived, since for various causes the account of Procula had often paid monies to the brother’s account: when the deified Commodus was taking cognizance over that business, he did not admit the compensation (set-off), as if the fideicommissum had been tacitly remitted to the brother.

Dig. 22.3.27

Digest 22.3.27

Scaevola 33 Dig.

Scaevola 33 Digest.

Qui testamentum faciebat ei qui usque ad certum modum capere potuerat legavit licitam quantitatem, deinde ita locutus est: " titio centum do lego, quae mihi pertulit: quae ideo ei non cavi, quod omnem fortunam et substantiam, si quam a matre susceperat in sinu meo habui sine ulla cautione. item eidem titio reddi et solvi volo de substantia mea centum quinquaginta, quae ego ex reditibus praediorum eius ( quorum ipse fructum percepi et distraxi), item de calendario ( si qua a matre receperat titius) in rem meam converti". quaero, an titius ea exigere potest. respondit, si titius supra scripta ex ratione sua ad testatorem pervenisse probare potuerit, exigi: videtur enim eo, quod ille plus capere non poterat, in fraudem legis haec in testamento adiecisse.

He who was making a testament legated to one who could receive only up to a certain limit the lawful quantity, and then spoke thus: “To Titius I give and bequeath one hundred, which he brought in to me: which I therefore did not secure to him, because I held all his fortune and substance, if he had received any from his mother, in my bosom without any security. Likewise, to the same Titius I wish to be returned and paid out of my substance one hundred fifty, which I converted to my own use from the revenues of his estates (the fruits of which I myself took and sold), likewise from the calendarium (if Titius had received anything from his mother).” I ask whether Titius can exact these. He answered: if Titius can prove that the items written above had come to the testator from his account, they can be exacted; for it seems that he, because that man could not take more, added these in the testament in fraud of the law.

Dig. 22.3.28

Digest 22.3.28

Labeo 7 pith. a paulo epit.

Labeo 7 Persuasives, epitomized by Paul.

Si arbiter animadvertere debeat, an operis facti memoria exstet, hoc ei quaerendum est, an aliquis meminerit id opus factum esse. paulus: immo cum in arbitrio quaeritur, memoria facti operis exstet nec ne, non hoc quaeritur, num aliquis meminerit, quo die aut quo consule factum sit, sed num hoc aliquo modo probari possit, quando id opus factum sit: et hoc ita, quod graece dici solet en platei. enim potest hoc memoria non teneri: intra annum puta factum, cum interim nemo sit eorum, qui meminerit, quibus consulibus id viderit, sed cum omnium haec est opinio nec audisse nec vidisse, cum id opus fieret, neque ex eis audisse, qui vidissent aut audissent: et hoc infinite similiter susum versum accidet, cum memoria operis facti non exstaret.

If an arbiter ought to take note whether a memory of the work done exists, this is what he must inquire: whether anyone remembers that that work was done. Paulus: nay rather, when in an arbitration the question is whether the memory of the work done exists or not, this is not what is inquired—whether someone remembers on what day or under which consul it was done—but whether it can somehow be proved when that work was done; and this in the way which is wont to be said in Greek, “en platei” (in general terms). For it may be that this is not held in memory: suppose it was done within a year, while meanwhile there is no one of those who remembers under which consuls he saw it, but when the opinion of all is that they neither heard nor saw when the work was being done, nor heard it from those who had seen or heard: and this, in general, will similarly happen up and down, when the memory of the work done does not exist.

Dig. 22.3.29pr.

Digest 22.3.29, preface.

Scaevola 9 Dig.

Scaevola 9 Digest.

Imperatores antoninus et verus augusti claudio apolinari ^ apollinari^ rescripserunt in haec verba: " probationes quae de filiis dantur, non in sola adfirmatione testium consistunt, sed et epistulas, quae uxoribus missae allegarentur, si de fide earum constet, nonnullam vicem instrumentorum optinere decretum est".

The emperors Antoninus and Verus, Augusti, issued a rescript to Claudius Apolinarius ^ Apollinarius^ in these words: " proofs which are given concerning sons do not consist in the mere affirmation of witnesses, but it has been decreed that letters which are adduced as having been sent to wives, if their authenticity is established, obtain some standing in the place of formal instruments."

Dig. 22.3.29.1

Digest 22.3.29.1

Scaevola 9 Dig.

Mulier gravida repudiata, filium enixa, absente marito ut spurium in actis professa est. quaesitum est an is in potestate patris sit et matre intestata mortua iussu eius hereditatem matris adire possit nec obsit professio a matre irata facta. respondit veritati locum superfore.

A woman, repudiated while pregnant, after bearing a son, with her husband absent, declared in the records that he was illegitimate. It was asked whether he is under the father’s power and, the mother having died intestate, whether at his order he may enter upon the mother’s inheritance, and that the declaration made by the mother in anger be no impediment. He replied that there would remain room for the truth.

Dig. 22.4.0. De fide instrumentorum et amissione eorum.

Digest 22.4.0. On the credibility of instruments and their loss.

Dig. 22.4.1

Digest 22.4.1

Paulus 2 sent.

Paulus 2 Sentences.

Instrumentorum nomine ea omnia accipienda sunt, quibus causa instrui potest: et ideo tam testimonia quam personae instrumentorum loco habentur.

By the name of instruments all those things are to be received by which a case can be equipped; and therefore both testimonies and persons are held in the place of instruments.

Dig. 22.4.2

Digest 22.4.2

Paulus 5 sent.

Paul Sentences, Book 5.

Quicumque a fisco convenitur, non ex indice et exemplo alicuius scripturae, sed ex authentico conveniendus est et ita, si contractus fides possit ostendi: ceterum calumniosam scripturam vim in iudicio optinere non convenit.

Whoever is proceeded against by the fisc must be proceeded against not on the basis of an index and an exemplar of some writing, but on the basis of the authentic instrument; and thus, if the credit of the contract can be shown: moreover, it is not fitting that a calumnious writing should obtain force in judgment.

Dig. 22.4.3

Digest 22.4.3

Paulus 3 resp.

Paulus 3 Responses.

Respondit repetita quidem die cautionem interponi non debuisse, sed falsi crimen quantum ad eos, qui in hoc consenserunt, contractum non videri, cum inter praesentes et convenientes res actitata sit magisque debitor quam creditor deliquerit.

He responded that, the day indeed having been repeated, a caution ought not to have been interposed; but that the crime of falsity, so far as concerns those who consented to this, does not seem to have been contracted, since the matter was transacted among present and agreeing parties, and the debtor rather than the creditor was delinquent.

Dig. 22.4.4

Digest 22.4.4

Gaius l.S. de form. hypoth.

Gaius in the single book on the form of hypothec.

In re hypothecae nomine obligata ad rem non pertinet, quibus fit verbis, sicuti est et in his obligationibus, quae consensu contrahuntur: et ideo et sine scriptura si convenit, ut hypothecae sit, et probari poterit, res obligata erit de qua conveniunt. fiunt enim de his scripturae, ut quod actum est per eas facilius probari possit: et sine his autem valet quod actum est, si habeat probationem, sicut et nuptiae sunt, licet testatio sine scriptis habita est.

In a matter where a thing is obligated under the name of hypothec, it does not pertain to the thing with what words it is effected, just as also in those obligations which are contracted by consent: and therefore even without a writing, if it is agreed that it be by way of hypothec, and it can be proved, the thing about which they agree will be bound. For writings are made about these matters, so that what has been transacted may be more easily proved through them: and even without these, however, what has been transacted is valid, if it have proof, just as nuptials are, although the attestation has been had without writings.

Dig. 22.4.5

Digest 22.4.5

Callistratus 2 quaest.

Callistratus 2 Questions.

Si res gesta sine litterarum quoque consignatione veritate factum suum praebeat, non ideo minus valebit, quod instrumentum nullum de ea intercessit.

If the act, even without the signing of writings, presents its own fact by truth, it will not for that reason be of less force, because no instrument regarding it intervened.

Dig. 22.4.6

Digest 22.4.6

Ulpianus 50 ad ed.

Ulpian 50 on the Edict.

Si de tabulis testamenti deponendis agatur et dubitetur, cui eas deponi oportet, semper seniorem iuniori et amplioris honoris inferiori et marem feminae et ingenuum libertino praeferemus.

If it be a matter concerning the depositing of the tablets of a testament, and there is doubt to whom they ought to be deposited, we will always prefer the elder to the younger, the one of ampler honor to the inferior, the male to the female, and the freeborn to the freedman.

Dig. 22.5.0. De testibus.

Digest 22.5.0. On witnesses.

Dig. 22.5.1pr.

Digest 22.5.1 pr.

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius in the single book on witnesses.

Testimoniorum usus frequens ac necessarius est et ab his praecipue exigendus, quorum fides non vacillat.

The use of testimonies is frequent and necessary, and is to be required especially from those whose credibility does not vacillate.

Dig. 22.5.1.1

Digest 22.5.1.1

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius law S. on witnesses.

Adhiberi quoque testes possunt non solum in criminalibus causis, sed etiam in pecuniariis litibus sicubi res postulat, ex his quibus non interdicitur testimonium nec ulla lege a dicendo testimonio excusantur.

Witnesses also can be employed not only in criminal causes, but also in pecuniary suits wherever the matter demands, from among those for whom testimony is not interdicted and who are not by any law excused from giving testimony.

Dig. 22.5.1.2

Digest 22.5.1.2

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius in a single book on witnesses.

Quamquam quibusdam legibus amplissimus numerus testium definitus sit, tamen ex constitutionibus principum haec licentia ad sufficientem numerum testium coartatur, ut iudices moderentur et eum solum numerum testium, quem necessarium esse putaverint, evocari patiantur, ne effrenata potestate ad vexandos homines superflua multitudo testium protrahatur.

Although by certain laws a most ample number of witnesses has been defined, nevertheless by the constitutions of the princes this license is curtailed to a sufficient number of witnesses, so that judges may moderate and allow only that number of witnesses to be summoned which they shall have considered necessary, lest by unbridled power a superfluous multitude of witnesses be dragged forth to harass persons.

Dig. 22.5.2

Digest 22.5.2

Modestinus 8 reg.

Modestinus Book 8 of the Rules.

In testimoniis autem dignitas fides mores gravitas examinanda est: et ideo testes, qui adversus fidem suae testationis vacillant, audiendi non sunt.

In witnesses, however, dignity, credibility (faith), morals, and gravity are to be examined; and therefore witnesses who waver against the credibility of their own testimony are not to be heard.

Dig. 22.5.3pr.

Digest 22.5.3 pr.

Callistratus 4 de cogn.

Callistratus 4 On Hearings.

Testium fides diligenter examinanda est. ideoque in persona eorum exploranda erunt in primis condicio cuiusque, utrum quis decurio an plebeius sit: et an honestae et inculpatae vitae an vero notatus quis et reprehensibilis: an locuples vel egens sit, ut lucri causa quid facile admittat: vel an inimicus ei sit, adversus quem testimonium fert, vel amicus ei sit, pro quo testimonium dat. nam si careat suspicione testimonium vel propter personam a qua fertur ( quod honesta sit) vel propter causam ( quod neque lucri neque gratiae neque inimicitiae causa fit), admittendus est.

The credibility of witnesses must be diligently examined. and therefore, as to their person, there are to be explored first and foremost the condition of each, whether someone is a decurion or a plebeian: and whether he is of an honorable and inculpate life, or rather someone marked and reprehensible: whether he is wealthy or needy, such that for the sake of lucre he might readily admit something: or whether he is an enemy to him against whom he bears testimony, or a friend to him for whom he gives testimony. for if the testimony is free from suspicion either on account of the person by whom it is borne ( quod she is honorable) or on account of the cause ( quod it is done neither for the sake of lucre nor of favor nor of enmity), he is to be admitted.

Dig. 22.5.3.1

Digest 22.5.3.1

Callistratus 4 de cogn.

Callistratus 4 on Cognitions.

Ideoque divus hadrianus vibio varo legato provinciae ciliciae rescripsit eum qui iudicat magis posse scire, quanta fides habenda sit testibus. verba epistulae haec sunt: " tu magis scire potes, quanta fides habenda sit testibus, qui et cuius dignitatis et cuius existimationis sint, et qui simpliciter visi sint dicere, utrum unum eundemque meditatum sermonem attulerint an ad ea quae interrogaveras ex tempore verisimilia responderint".

and so the deified hadrian wrote back to vibius varus, legate of the province of cilicia, that he who judges can better know how much credence is to be given to witnesses. the words of the letter are these: " you can better know how much credence is to be given to witnesses, who and of what dignity and of what estimation they are, and who have seemed to speak simply, whether they have brought one and the same premeditated discourse, or have answered ex tempore with verisimilar things to those matters which you had asked".

Dig. 22.5.3.2

Digest 22.5.3.2

Callistratus 4 de cogn.

Callistratus 4 on cognitions.

Eiusdem quoque principis exstat rescriptum ad valerium verum de excutienda fide testium in haec verba: " quae argumenta ad quem modum probandae cuique rei sufficiant, nullo certo modo satis definiri potest. sicut non semper, ita saepe sine publicis monumentis cuiusque rei veritas deprehenditur. alias numerus testium, alias dignitas et auctoritas, alias veluti consentiens fama confirmat rei de qua quaeritur fidem.

There exists also a rescript of the same emperor to Valerius Verus on the sifting of the good faith of witnesses in these words: " what arguments, and in what manner, suffice for proving any given matter cannot be adequately defined by any fixed rule. Just as not always, so often the truth of a matter is discovered without public records. At one time the number of witnesses, at another their dignity and authority, at another, as it were, a consenting report confirms the credibility of the matter about which inquiry is made.

hoc ergo solum tibi rescribere possum summatim non utique ad unam probationis speciem cognitionem statim alligari debere, sed ex sententia animi tui te aestimare oportere, quid aut credas aut parum probatum tibi opinaris".

therefore this alone I can write back to you in brief: that the inquiry ought not by any means to be immediately bound to one kind of proof, but that you ought to assess, by the judgment of your own mind, what you either believe or think has been insufficiently proved".

Dig. 22.5.3.3

Digest 22.5.3.3

Callistratus 4 de cogn.

Callistratus 4 on cognitions.

Idem divus hadrianus iunio rufino proconsuli macedoniae rescripsit testibus se, non testimoniis crediturum. verba epistulae ad hanc partem pertinentia haec sunt: " quod crimina obiecerit apud me alexander apro et quia non probabat nec testes producebat, sed testimoniis uti volebat, quibus apud me locus non est ( nam ipsos interrogare soleo), quem remisi ad provinciae praesidem, ut is de fide testium quaereret et nisi implesset quod intenderat, relegaretur".

the same deified hadrian wrote back to junius rufinus, proconsul of macedonia, that he would trust witnesses, not testimonies. the words of the epistle pertinent to this part are these: "because alexander had brought charges before me against apro, and since he did not prove them nor produce witnesses, but wished to use testimonies, for which with me there is no place (for I am accustomed to question the men themselves), him I sent back to the governor of the province, that he should inquire into the good faith of the witnesses, and that, unless he fulfilled what he had intended, he should be relegated".

Dig. 22.5.3.4

Digest 22.5.3.4

Callistratus 4 de cogn.

Callistratus 4 On Judicial Inquiries.

Gabinio quoque maximo idem princeps in haec verba rescripsit: " alia est auctoritas praesentium testium, alia testimoniorum quae recitari solent: tecum ergo delibera, ut, si retinere eos velis, des eis impendia".

The same emperor also wrote back to Gabinius Maximus in these words: "The authority of witnesses who are present is one thing, the authority of testimonies which are accustomed to be recited is another: therefore deliberate with yourself, that, if you wish to retain them, you give them expenses."

Dig. 22.5.3.5

Digest 22.5.3.5

Callistratus 4 de cogn.

Callistratus 4 On Cognitions.

Lege iulia de vi cavetur, ne hac lege in reum testimonium dicere liceret, qui se ab eo parenteve eius liberaverit, quive impuberes erunt, quique iudicio publico damnatus erit qui eorum in integrum restitutus non erit, quive in vinculis custodiave publica erit, quive ad bestias ut depugnaret se locaverit, quaeve palam quaestum faciet feceritve, quive ob testimonium dicendum vel non dicendum pecuniam accepisse iudicatus vel convictus erit. nam quidam propter reverentiam personarum, quidam propter lubricum consilii sui, alii vero propter notam et infamiam vitae suae admittendi non sunt ad testimonii fidem.

By the Julian law on violence it is provided that, under this law, it is not permitted to give testimony against the defendant for one who has freed himself from him or from his parent, or who will be under age, and one who will have been condemned in a public judgment and has not been restored in full, or who will be in chains or in public custody, or who has hired himself out to fight against beasts, or any woman who openly makes or has made gain (a common prostitute), or one who shall have been adjudged or convicted to have received money for giving or not giving testimony. For some, on account of reverence for persons, some on account of the slipperiness of their counsel, and others, indeed, on account of the blot and infamy of their life, are not to be admitted to the credibility of testimony.

Dig. 22.5.3.6

Digest 22.5.3.6

Callistratus 4 de cogn.

Callistratus 4 on cognitions.

Testes non temere evocandi sunt per longum iter et multo minus milites avocandi sunt a signis vel muneribus perhibendi testimonii causa, idque divus hadrianus rescripsit. sed et divi fratres rescripserunt: " quod ad testes evocandos pertinet, diligentiae iudicantis est explorare, quae consuetudo in ea provincia, in quam iudicat, fuerit". nam si probabitur saepe in aliam civitatem testimonii gratia plerosque evocatos, non esse dubitandum, quin evocandi sint, quos necessarios in ipsa cognitione deprehenderit qui iudicat.

Witnesses are not to be summoned rashly over a long journey, and much less are soldiers to be called away from their standards or duties for the purpose of giving testimony; and this the deified hadrian wrote in a rescript. But the deified brothers also wrote in a rescript: "As to summoning witnesses, it pertains to the diligence of the judge to ascertain what the custom has been in that province in which he judges." For if it is proved that many have often been summoned to another city for the sake of testimony, there is to be no doubt that those whom the judge has found necessary in the very hearing are to be summoned.

Dig. 22.5.4

Digest 22.5.4

Paulus 2 ad l. iul. et pap.

Paulus 2 on the Julian and Papian Law.

Lege iulia iudiciorum publicorum cavetur, ne invito denuntietur, ut testimonium litis dicat adversus socerum generum, vitricum privignum, sobrinum sobrinam, sobrino sobrina natum, eosve qui priore gradu sint, item ne liberto ipsius, liberorum eius, parentium, viri uxoris, item patroni patronae: et ut ne patroni patronae adversus libertos neque liberti adversus patronum cogantur testimonium dicere.

By the Julian law of public trials it is provided that a summons not be served upon an unwilling person, that he speak testimony in a lawsuit against a father-in-law or a son-in-law, a stepfather or a stepson, a cousin (male) or cousin (female), a child born of a cousin (male or female), or those who are in a nearer degree; likewise not against his own freedman, those of his children, of his parents, of his husband or wife, likewise of his patron or patroness: and that patrons or patronesses not be compelled to give testimony against their freedmen, nor freedmen against their patron.

Dig. 22.5.5

Digest 22.5.5

Gaius 4 ad l. iul. et pap.

Gaius 4 on the Julian and Papian law.

In legibus, quibus excipitur, ne gener aut socer invitus testimonium dicere cogeretur, generi appellatione sponsum quoque filiae contineri placet: item soceri sponsae patrem.

In the laws by which an exception is made, lest a son-in-law or a father-in-law be forced to give testimony against their will, it is deemed that under the appellation “son-in-law” there is also included the daughter’s betrothed; likewise, under “father-in-law,” the father of the betrothed (woman).

Dig. 22.5.6

Digest 22.5.6

Licinius 2 reg.

Licinius 2 rule.

Idonei non videntur esse testes, quibus imperari potest ut testes fiant.

Those who can be ordered to become witnesses do not seem to be suitable witnesses.

Dig. 22.5.7

Digest 22.5.7

Modestinus 3 reg.

Modestinus Rules book 3

Servi responso tunc credendum est, cum alia probatio ad eruendam veritatem non est.

The slave’s response is then to be believed, when there is no other proof for unearthing the truth.

Dig. 22.5.8

Digest 22.5.8

Scaevola 4 reg.

Scaevola Rules, Book 4.

Inviti testimonium dicere non coguntur senes valetudinarii vel milites vel qui cum magistratu rei publicae causa absunt vel quibus venire non licet.

The unwilling are not compelled to give testimony—valetudinary elders, or soldiers, or those who are absent with a magistrate for the sake of the republic, or those to whom it is not permitted to come.

Dig. 22.5.9

Digest 22.5.9

Paulus 1 ad sab.

Paulus 1 on Sabinus.

Testis idoneus pater filio aut filius patri non est.

A father is not a competent witness for a son, nor a son for a father.

Dig. 22.5.10

Digest 22.5.10

Pomponius 1 ad sab.

Pomponius 1 on Sabinus.

Nullus idoneus testis in re sua intellegitur.

No one is considered a fit witness in his own case.

Dig. 22.5.11

Digest 22.5.11

Pomponius 33 ad sab.

Pomponius 33 on Sabinus.

Ad fidem rei gestae faciendam etiam non rogatus testis intellegitur.

For establishing the credibility of the act, even a witness not asked is understood.

Dig. 22.5.12

Digest 22.5.12

Ulpianus 37 ad ed.

Ulpian 37 on the Edict.

Ubi numerus testium non adicitur, etiam duo sufficient: pluralis enim elocutio duorum numero contenta est.

Where the number of witnesses is not added, even two will suffice: for plural expression is satisfied by the number of two.

Dig. 22.5.13

Digest 22.5.13

Papinianus 1 de adult.

Papinian, 1 On Adultery.

Quaesitum scio, an in publicis iudiciis calumniae damnati testimonium iudicio publico perhibere possunt. sed neque lege remmia prohibentur et iulia lex de vi et repetendarum et peculatus eos homines testimonium dicere non vetuerunt. verumtamen quod legibus omissum est, non omittetur religione iudicantium ad quorum officium pertinet eius quoque testimonii fidem, quod integrae frontis homo dixerit, perpendere.

I know it has been asked whether, in public trials, those condemned for calumny can bear testimony in a public trial. But neither are they prohibited by the Remmian law, and the Julian law on violence and on extortions and on peculation did not forbid those men to give testimony. Nevertheless, what has been omitted by the laws will not be omitted by the scrupulousness of the judges, to whose office it pertains to weigh even the credibility of that testimony which a man of unblemished brow (unimpeached character) has uttered.

Dig. 22.5.14

Digest 22.5.14

Papinianus l.S. de adult.

Papinianus in the single book On Adultery.

Scio quidem tractatum esse, an ad testamentum faciendum adhiberi possit adulterii damnatus: et sane iuste testimonii officio ei interdicetur. existimo ergo neque iure civili testamentum valere, ad quod huiusmodi testis processit, neque iure praetorio, quod ius civile subsequitur, ut neque hereditas adiri neque bonorum possessio dari possit.

I know indeed that it has been discussed whether one condemned for adultery can be employed for making a testament; and assuredly he is justly interdicted from the duty of testimony. I therefore consider that neither by civil law does a testament to which a witness of this sort has appeared have validity, nor by praetorian law, which follows the civil law, so that neither can the inheritance be entered upon nor can possession of the goods be granted.

Dig. 22.5.15pr.

Digest 22.5.15, preface.

Paulus 3 sent.

Paulus Sentences 3.

Repetundarum damnatus nec ad testamentum nec ad testimonium adhiberi potest.

One convicted of extortion cannot be admitted either to a testament or to testimony.

Dig. 22.5.15.1

Digest 22.5.15.1

Paulus 3 sent.

Paulus book 3 of the Sentences.

Hermaphroditus an ad testamentum adhiberi possit, qualitas sexus incalescentis ostendit.

Whether a hermaphrodite can be adhibited to a testament is shown by the quality of the sex that is incalescent.

Dig. 22.5.16

Digest 22.5.16

Paulus 5 sent.

Paulus 5 Sentences.

Qui falso vel varie testimonia dixerunt vel utrique parti prodiderunt, a iudicibus competenter puniuntur.

Those who have given testimony falsely or variously, or have betrayed to both parties, are appropriately punished by the judges.

Dig. 22.5.17

Digest 22.5.17

Ulpianus l.S. reg.

Ulpian, in the single book of the Rules.

Pater et filius qui in potestate eius est, item duo fratres qui in eiusdem patris potestate sunt testes utrique in eodem testamento vel eodem negotio fieri possunt, quoniam nihil nocet ex una domo plures testes alieno negotio adhiberi.

A father and a son who is under his power, likewise two brothers who are under the power of the same father, either pair can be made witnesses in the same testament or the same transaction, since it does no harm for several witnesses from one household to be employed in another’s business.

Dig. 22.5.18

Digest 22.5.18

Paulus 2 de adult.

Paulus 2 On Adulteries.

Ex eo, quod prohibet lex iulia de adulteriis testimonium dicere condemnatam mulierem, colligitur etiam mulieres testimonii in iudicio dicendi ius habere.

From the fact that the Lex Julia on adulteries forbids a condemned woman to give testimony, it is inferred that women also have the right of giving testimony in court.

Dig. 22.5.19pr.

Digest 22.5.19, beginning.

Ulpianus 8 de off. procons.

Ulpian 8 On the Office of the Proconsul.

Inviti testimonium non dicunt publicani, item is qui non detractandi testimonii causa aberit, item is qui quid exercitui praebendum conduxerit.

The publicani do not give testimony when unwilling, likewise one who will be absent not for the sake of shirking testimony, likewise one who has contracted to furnish something to the army.

Dig. 22.5.19.1

Digest 22.5.19.1

Ulpianus 8 de off. procons.

Ulpian 8 on the office of the proconsul.

Sed nec pupillis testimonium denuntiari potest.

But a summons to give testimony cannot be served upon wards.

Dig. 22.5.20

Digest 22.5.20

Venonius 2 de iudic. publ.

Venonius 2 on public prosecutions.

In testimonium accusator citare non debet eum, qui iudicio publico reus erit aut qui minor viginti annis erit.

For testimony the accuser ought not to cite one who will be a defendant in a public trial, or one who will be under twenty years of age.

Dig. 22.5.21pr.

Digest 22.5.21pr.

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius in the single book, On Witnesses.

Ob carmen famosum damnatus intestabilis fit.

On account of a defamatory song, one condemned becomes intestable.

Dig. 22.5.21.1

Digest 22.5.21.1

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius l.S. on testaments.

Illud quoque incunctabile est, ut, si res exigat, non tantum privati, sed etiam magistratus, si in praesenti sint, testimonium dicant. item senatus censuit praetorem testimonium dare debere in iudicio adulterii causa.

That too is beyond question: that, if the matter requires it, not only private persons but also magistrates, if they are present, should give testimony. Likewise the senate decreed that the praetor ought to give testimony in a trial for adultery.

Dig. 22.5.21.2

Digest 22.5.21.2

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius, in the single book On Witnesses.

Si ea rei condicio sit, ubi harenarium testem vel similem personam admittere cogimur, sine tormentis testimonio eius credendum non est.

If the condition of the case be such that we are compelled to admit an arena-attendant as a witness, or a similar person, his testimony is not to be believed without torments.

Dig. 22.5.21.3

Digest 22.5.21.3

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius in the single book on wills.

Si testes omnes eiusdem honestatis et existimationis sint et negotii qualitas ac iudicis motus cum his concurrit, sequenda sunt omnia testimonia: si vero ex his quidam eorum aliud dixerint, licet inpari numero, credendum est id quod naturae negotii convenit et quod inimicitiae aut gratiae suspicione caret, confirmabitque iudex motum animi sui ex argumentis et testimoniis et quae rei aptiora et vero proximiora esse compererit: non enim ad multitudinem respici oportet, sed ad sinceram testimoniorum fidem et testimonia, quibus potius lux veritatis adsistit.

If all the witnesses are of the same honesty and estimation, and the quality of the business and the judge’s movement concur with these, all the testimonies are to be followed; but if among them certain have said something different, even though unequal in number, credence is to be given to that which accords with the nature of the business and which is free from suspicion of enmity or of favor; and the judge will confirm the movement of his mind from the arguments and the testimonies and from those things which he has found to be more apt to the matter and nearer to the truth: for one ought not to look to the multitude, but to the sincere faith of the testimonies and to the testimonies to which rather the light of truth stands by.

Dig. 22.5.22

Digest 22.5.22

Venonius 2 de off. procons.

Venonius 2 on the office of the proconsul.

Curent magistratus cuiusque loci testari volentibus et se ipsos et alios testes vel signatores praebere, quo facilius negotia explicentur et probatio rerum salva sit.

Let the magistrates of each locality take care to furnish to those wishing to attest both themselves and others as witnesses or signatories, so that business may be more easily transacted and the proof of matters may be safeguarded.

Dig. 22.5.23

Digest 22.5.23

Venonius 1 de iudic. publ.

Venonius 1 on public prosecutions.

Produci testis is non potest, qui ante in eum reum testimonium dixit.

A witness cannot be produced who previously gave testimony against that defendant.

Dig. 22.5.24

Digest 22.5.24

Paulus 5 sent.

Paulus 5 sentences.

Testes eos, quos accusator de domo produxerit, interrogari non placuit.

It was not deemed proper that those witnesses whom the accuser has produced from his household be questioned.

Dig. 22.5.25

Digest 22.5.25

Arcadius l.S. de test.

Arcadius in the singular book On Witnesses.

Mandatis cavetur, ut praesides attendant, ne patroni in causa cui patrocinium praestiterunt testimonium dicant. quod et in exsecutoribus negotiorum observandum est.

It is provided in the Mandates that the presidents (provincial governors) should take care that patrons (advocates) do not give testimony in a case in which they have provided patronage; which is also to be observed in the executors of business.

Dig. 22.6.0. De iuris et facti ignorantia.

Digest 22.6.0. On ignorance of law and of fact.

Dig. 22.6.1pr.

Digest 22.6.1, preface.

Paulus 44 ad ed.

Paulus 44 on the Edict.

Ignorantia vel facti vel iuris est.

Ignorance is either of fact or of law.

Dig. 22.6.1.1

Digest 22.6.1.1

Paulus 44 ad ed.

Paulus 44 on the Edict.

Nam si quis nesciat decessisse eum, cuius bonorum possessio defertur, non cedit ei tempus: sed si sciat quidem defunctum esse cognatum, nesciat autem proximitatis nomine bonorum possessionem sibi deferri, aut se sciat scriptum heredem, nesciat autem quod scriptis heredibus bonorum possessionem praetor promittit, cedit ei tempus, quia in iure errat. idem est, si frater consanguineus defuncti credat matrem potiorem esse.

For if someone does not know that the person has died, to whom bonorum possessio is conferred, the time does not run against him; but if he does indeed know that his kinsman is deceased, yet does not know that, under the title of proximity, bonorum possessio is being tendered to him, or if he knows himself to be a named heir, yet does not know that the praetor promises bonorum possessio to heirs named in the will, the time runs against him, because he errs in law. The same is true if a consanguine brother of the deceased believes the mother to have the superior right.

Dig. 22.6.1.2

Digest 22.6.1.2

Paulus 44 ad ed.

Paulus 44 on the Edict.

Si quis nesciat se cognatum esse, interdum in iure, interdum in facto errat. nam si et liberum se esse et ex quibus natus sit sciat, iura autem cognationis habere se nesciat, in iure errat: at si quis ( forte expositus) quorum parentium esset ignoret, fortasse et serviat alicui putans se servum esse, in facto magis quam in iure errat.

If someone does not know himself to be a cognate, sometimes he errs in law, sometimes in fact. For if he both knows that he is free and from whom he was born, but does not know that he has the rights of cognation, he errs in law; but if someone (perhaps exposed) is ignorant whose child he was, and perhaps even serves someone, thinking himself to be a slave, he errs more in fact than in law.

Dig. 22.6.1.3

Digest 22.6.1.3

Paulus 44 ad ed.

Paulus 44 On the Edict.

Item si quis sciat quidem alii delatam esse bonorum possessionem, nesciat autem ei tempus praeterisse bonorum possessionis, in facto errat. idem est, si putet eum bonorum possessionem accepisse. sed si sciat eum non petisse tempusque ei praeterisse, ignoret autem sibi ex successorio capite competere bonorum possessionem, cedet ei tempus, quia in iure errat.

Likewise, if someone does indeed know that the possession of the estate (bonorum possessio) has been conferred upon another, but does not know that for him the time for the possession of the estate has elapsed, he errs in fact. The same holds if he thinks that that person has accepted the possession of the estate. But if he knows that he did not apply for it and that the time has passed for him, yet is unaware that for himself, under a successorial head (ex successorio capite), the possession of the estate is competent, the time will be allowed to him, because he errs in law.

Dig. 22.6.1.4

Digest 22.6.1.4

Paulus 44 ad ed.

Paulus 44 on the Edict.

Idem dicemus, si ex asse heres institutus non putet se bonorum possessionem petere posse ante apertas tabulas: quod si nesciat esse tabulas, in facto errat.

We will say the same, if an heir instituted for the whole does not think that he can seek bonorum possession before the tablets are opened: but if he does not know that there are tablets, he errs in fact.

Dig. 22.6.2

Digest 22.6.2

Nerva 5 membr.

Nerva 5 membranes.

In omni parte error in iure non eodem loco quo facti ignorantia haberi debebit, cum ius finitum et possit esse et debeat, facti interpretatio plerumque etiam prudentissimos fallat.

In every respect, error in law ought not to be held in the same place as ignorance of fact, since the law both can and ought to be finite, while the interpretation of fact for the most part deceives even the most prudent.

Dig. 22.6.3pr.

Digest 22.6.3pr.

Pomponius 3 ad sab.

Pomponius 3 on Sabinus.

Plurimum interest, utrum quis de alterius causa et facto non sciret an de iure suo ignorat.

It matters very much whether someone did not know about another’s cause and fact, or is ignorant of his own right.

Dig. 22.6.3.1

Digest 22.6.3.1

Pomponius 3 ad sab.

Pomponius Book 3 on Sabinus.

Sed cassius ignorantiam sabinum ita accipiendam existimasse refert non deperditi et nimium securi hominis.

But cassius reports that Sabinus thought ignorance was to be understood thus, not as that of a profligate and overly careless man.

Dig. 22.6.4

Digest 22.6.4

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 on Sabinus.

Iuris ignorantiam in usucapione negatur prodesse: facti vero ignorantiam prodesse constat.

Ignorance of law is denied to avail in usucaption: but ignorance of fact is established to avail.

Dig. 22.6.5

Digest 22.6.5

Clementius 2 ad l. iul. et pap.

Clementius 2 on the Julian and Papian law.

Iniquissimum videtur cuiquam scientiam alterius quam suam nocere vel ignorantiam alterius alii profuturam.

It seems most inequitable that anyone should be injured by another’s knowledge rather than his own, or that another’s ignorance should be profitable to someone else.

Dig. 22.6.6

Digest 22.6.6

Ulpianus 18 ad l. iul. et pap.

Ulpian 18 on the Julian and Papian law.

Nec supina ignorantia ferenda est factum ignorantis, ut nec scrupulosa inquisitio exigenda: scientia enim hoc modo aestimanda est, ut neque neglegentia crassa aut nimia securitas satis expedita sit neque delatoria curiositas exigatur.

Nor is supine ignorance to be tolerated in the act of one who is ignorant, just as neither is a scrupulous inquisition to be required: for knowledge is to be assessed in this way, that neither crass negligence or excessive complacency be sufficient to set one free, nor is delatory curiosity (that of an informer) to be exacted.

Dig. 22.6.7

Digest 22.6.7

Papinianus 19 quaest.

Papinianus 19 questions.

Iuris ignorantia non prodest adquirere volentibus, suum vero petentibus non nocet.

Ignorance of the law does not benefit those wishing to acquire, but it does not harm those seeking what is their own.

Dig. 22.6.8

Digest 22.6.8

Papinianus 1 def.

Papinian 1 Definitions.

Error facti ne maribus quidem in damnis vel compendiis obest, iuris autem error nec feminis in compendiis prodest: ceterum omnibus iuris error in damnis amittendae rei suae non nocet.

An error of fact is not detrimental, not even to men, in losses or in gains; however, an error of law does not benefit women even in gains: moreover, for all, an error of law, in losses involving the forfeiture of one’s own property, does not harm.

Dig. 22.6.9pr.

Digest 22.6.9, beginning.

Paulus l.S. de iuris et facti ign.

Paulus in the single book on the ignorance of law and fact.

Regula est iuris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti vero ignorantiam non nocere. videamus igitur, in quibus speciebus locum habere possit, ante praemisso quod minoribus viginti quinque annis ius ignorare permissum est. quod et in feminis in quibusdam causis propter sexus infirmitatem dicitur: et ideo sicubi non est delictum, sed iuris ignorantia, non laeduntur.

The rule is that ignorance of law does indeed harm each person, but ignorance of fact does not harm. Let us, therefore, see in what species (cases) it may have place, with this premised beforehand: that it is permitted for those under 25 years to be ignorant of law. This is said also of women in certain causes, on account of the infirmity of the sex; and therefore, wherever there is not a delict but ignorance of law, they are not prejudiced.

hac ratione si minor viginti quinque annis filio familias crediderit, subvenitur ei, ut non videatur filio familias credidisse.

By this reasoning, if a minor under twenty-five years has extended credit to a filius familias, relief is afforded to him, so that he is not deemed to have given credit to a filius familias.

Dig. 22.6.9.1

Digest 22.6.9.1

Paulus l.S. de iuris et facti ign.

Paulus in the single book On ignorance of law and of fact.

Si filius familias miles a commilitone heres institutus nesciat sibi etiam sine patre licere adire per constitutiones principales, ius ignorare potest et ideo ei dies aditionis cedit.

If a filiusfamilias soldier, appointed heir by a fellow-soldier, does not know that by imperial constitutions it is permitted for him to enter upon the inheritance even without his father, he may be ignorant of the law, and therefore the day for adition accrues to him.

Dig. 22.6.9.2

Digest 22.6.9.2

Paulus l.S. de iuris et facti ign.

Paulus in the single book On Ignorance of Law and Fact.

Sed facti ignorantia ita demum cuique non nocet, si non ei summa neglegentia obiciatur: quid enim si omnes in civitate sciant, quod ille solus ignorat? et recte labeo definit scientiam neque curiosissimi neque neglegentissimi hominis accipiendam, verum eius, qui cum eam rem ut, diligenter inquirendo notam habere possit.

But ignorance of fact only then does not harm a person, if gross negligence is not imputed to him: for what if everyone in the city knows what he alone is ignorant of? And labeo rightly defines that knowledge is not to be taken of the most curious nor of the most negligent man, but of the one who can have that matter known by diligent inquiry.

Dig. 22.6.9.3

Digest 22.6.9.3

Paulus l.S. de iuris et facti ign.

Paulus in the single book On ignorance of law and of fact.

Sed iuris ignorantiam non prodesse labeo ita accipiendum existimat, si iuris consulti copiam haberet vel sua prudentia instructus sit, ut, cui facile sit scire, ei detrimento sit iuris ignorantia: quod raro accipiendum est.

But Labeo thinks that “ignorance of the law does not profit” is to be taken thus, if he had ready access to a jurisconsult or were instructed by his own prudence, so that, for one to whom it is easy to know, ignorance of the law is to his detriment: which is to be admitted rarely.

Dig. 22.6.9.4

Digest 22.6.9.4

Paulus l.S. de iuris et facti ign.

Paulus, in the single book On ignorance of law and of fact.

Qui ignoravit dominum esse rei venditorem, plus in re est, quam in existimatione mentis: et ideo, tametsi existimet se non a domino emere, tamen, si a domino ei tradatur, dominus efficitur.

He who has been ignorant that the owner is the seller of the thing—there is more in the thing than in the estimation of the mind: and therefore, although he supposes that he is not buying from the owner, nevertheless, if it is delivered to him by the owner, he is made owner.

Dig. 22.6.9.5

Digest 22.6.9.5

Paulus l.S. de iuris et facti ign.

Paulus, in the single book On the ignorance of law and of fact.

Si quis ius ignorans lege falcidia usus non sit, nocere ei dicit epistula divi pii. sed et imperatores severus et antoninus in haec verba rescripserunt: " quod ex causa fideicommissi indebitum datum est, si non per errorem solutum est, repeti non potest. quamobrem gargiliani heredes, qui, cum ex testamento eius pecuniam ad opus aquae ductus rei publicae cirtensium relictam solverint, non solum cautiones non exegerunt, quae interponi solent, ut quod amplius cepissent municipes quam per legem falcidiam licuisset redderent, verum etiam stipulati sunt, ne ea summa in alios usus converteretur et scientes prudentesque passi sunt eam pecuniam in opus aquae ductus impendi, frustra postulant reddi sibi a re publica cirtensium, quasi plus debito dederint, cum sit utrumque iniquum pecuniam, quae ad opus aquae ductus data est, repeti et rem publicam ex corpore patrimonii sui impendere in id opus, quod totum alienae liberalitatis gloriam repraesentet.

If someone, ignorant of the law, has not availed himself of the Falcidian Law, the letter of the deified Pius says this harms him. But the emperors Severus and Antoninus also wrote back in these words: "What has been given, as not owed, on account of a fideicommissum, if it was not paid by error, cannot be reclaimed. Wherefore the heirs of Gargilianus, who, when they paid, under his testament, money left for the work of an aqueduct to the res publica of the Cirtenses, not only did not exact the cautiones that are wont to be interposed, to the effect that the municipes should return whatever they had received in excess beyond what the Falcidian Law would have permitted, but even stipulated that that sum not be converted to other uses, and, knowing and prudent, allowed that money to be expended on the aqueduct work, vainly demand that it be returned to them by the res publica of the Cirtenses, as though they had given more than was due, since both are inequitable: for money that has been given for the work of the aqueduct to be reclaimed, and for the res publica to spend from the very substance of its patrimony upon that work, which would display the whole glory of another’s liberality."

quod si ideo repetitionem eius pecuniae habere credunt, quod imperitia lapsi legis falcidiae beneficio usi non sunt, sciant ignorantiam facti, non iuris prodesse nec stultis solere succurri, sed errantibus".

But if for that reason they believe they have recovery of that money, because, having lapsed through inexperience, they did not use the benefit of the Lex Falcidia, let them know that ignorance of fact, not of law, is of benefit, and that it is not customary to succor fools, but those who err".

Dig. 22.6.9.6

Digest 22.6.9.6

Paulus l.S. de iuris et facti ign.

Paulus in the singular book On ignorance of law and fact.

Et licet municipum mentio in hac epistula fiat, tamen et in qualibet persona idem observabitur. sed nec quod in opere aquae ductus relicta esse pecunia proponitur, in hunc solum casum cessare repetitionem dicendum est. nam initium constitutionis generale est: demonstrat enim, si non per errorem solutum sit fideicommissum, quod indebitum fuit, non posse repeti: item et illa pars aeque generalis est, ut qui iuris ignorantia legis falcidiae beneficio usi non sunt, non possint repetere: ut secundum hoc possit dici etiam, si pecunia, quae per fideicommissum relicta est quaeque soluta est, non ad aliquid faciendum relicta sit, et licet consumpta non sit, sed exstet apud eum cui soluta est, cessare repetitionem.

And although mention of municipalities is made in this letter, nevertheless the same will be observed in any person whatsoever. But nor must it be said that, because in the work of an aqueduct money is proposed to have been left, repetition ceases in this single case. For the beginning of the constitution is general: it demonstrates, namely, that if a fideicommissum which was not owed has been paid not through error, it cannot be reclaimed; likewise that part is equally general, that those who, through ignorance of the law, have not made use of the benefit of the Lex Falcidia cannot recover. So that according to this it can also be said that, if the money which has been left by fideicommissum and has been paid was not left for doing something, and although it has not been consumed but exists with the person to whom it was paid, repetition ceases.

Dig. 22.6.10

Digest 22.6.10

Papinianus 6 resp.

Papinian, 6 Responses

Impuberes sine tutore agentes nihil posse vel scire intelleguntur.

Minors acting without a guardian are understood to be able to do or to know nothing.