Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Trinitatem certe quaerimus, non quamlibet sed illam trinitatem quae deus est, uerusque ac summus et solus deus. Exspecta ergo, quisquis haec audis; adhuc enim quaerimus, et talia quaerentem nemo iuste reprehendit si tamen in fide firmissimus quaerat quod aut nosse aut eloqui difficillimum est. Affirmantem uero cito iusteque reprehendit quisquis melius uel uidet uel docet.

[1 1] We are certainly seeking the Trinity, not just any whatsoever, but that Trinity which is God, and the true and supreme and sole God. Therefore wait, whoever hears these things; for we are still seeking, and no one justly reprehends one seeking such things, provided that, most firm in faith, he seek what it is most difficult either to know or to utter. But one who affirms is quickly and justly reprehended by whoever either sees or teaches better.

Quaerite, inquit, dominum, et uiuet anima uestra. Et ne quisquam se tamquam apprehendisse temere gaudeat: Quaerite, inquit, faciem eius semper. Et apostolus: Si quis se, inquit, putat aliquid scire, nondum scit quemadmodum scire oporteat.

“Seek,” he says, “the Lord, and your soul shall live.” And lest anyone rashly rejoice as though he had apprehended: “Seek,” he says, “his face always.” And the Apostle: “If anyone,” he says, “thinks that he knows anything, he does not yet know as he ought to know.”

Quisquis autem diligit deum, hic cognitus est ab illo. Ne sic quidem dixit, 'cognouit illum,' quae periculosa praesumptio est, sed, cognitus est ab illo. Sic et alibi cum dixisset: Nunc autem cognoscentes deum, statim corrigens, immo cogniti, inquit, a deo.

But whoever loves God, this man has been known by Him. Not even thus did he say, 'he has known Him,' which is a perilous presumption, but: has been known by Him. So also elsewhere, when he had said: But now, knowing God, immediately correcting, nay rather, he says, being known by God.

Maximeque illo loco: Fratres, inquit, ego me ipsum non arbitror apprehendisse; unum autem, quae retro oblitus, in ea quae ante sunt extentus secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae uocationis dei in Christo Iesu. Quotquot ergo perfecti hoc sapiamus. Perfectionem in hac uita dicit non aliud quam ea quae retro sunt olbliuisci et in ea quae ante sunt extendi secundum intentionem.

And especially in that place: “Brethren,” he says, “I do not reckon myself to have apprehended; but one thing, forgetful of the things which are behind, stretched out toward the things which are before according to intention, I pursue toward the palm of the supernal vocation of God in Christ Jesus. As many of us therefore as are perfect, let us be wise in this.” He says that perfection in this life is nothing other than to forget the things which are behind and to be stretched out toward the things which are before, according to intention.

Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio donec apprehendatur illud quo tendimus et quo extendimur. Sed ea recta intentio est quae proficiscitur a fide. Certa enim fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem; cognitio uero certa non perficietur nisi post hanc uitam cum uidebimus facie ad faciem.

For the intention of the seeker is most safe until that is apprehended toward which we tend and toward which we are extended. But that intention is right which proceeds from faith. For certain faith in some fashion initiates cognition; yet truly certain cognition will not be perfected except after this life, when we shall see face to face.

Hoc ergo sapiamus ut nouerimus tutiorem esse affectum uera quaerendi quam incognita pro cognitis praesumendi. Sic ergo quaeramus tanquam inuenturi, et sic inueniamus tamquam quasituri. Cum enim consummauerit homo, tunc incipit.

Let us therefore be wise in this, so that we may know that the affection for seeking the true is safer than presuming unknown things as known. Thus let us seek as though about to find, and thus let us find as though about to seek. For when a man has consummated, then he begins.

De credendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intellegendis nulla temeritate affirmemus; in illis auctoritas tenenda est, in his ueritas exquirenda. Quod ergo ad istam quaestionem attinet credamus patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum esse unum deum, uniuersae creaturae conditorem atque rectorem; nec patrem esse filium nec spiritum sanctum uel patrem esse uel filium, sed trinitatem relatarum ad inuicem personarum et unitatem aequalis essentiae. Quaeramus hoc autem intellegere ab eo ipso quem intellegere uolumus auxilium precantes, et quantum tribuitur quod intellegimus explicare tanta cura et sollicitudine pietatis ut etiam si aliquid aliud pro alio dicimus, nihil tamen dicamus indignum.

Concerning things to be believed let us not, with any infidelity, doubt; concerning things to be understood let us not, with any temerity, affirm; in the former, authority is to be held, in the latter, truth is to be sought out. Therefore, as this question pertains, let us believe the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit to be one God, the creator and ruler of the whole creation; and that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit either Father or Son, but a Trinity of persons related to one another and a unity of equal essence. Moreover, let us seek to understand this from Him himself whom we wish to understand, praying for help, and, insofar as it is granted, to explain what we understand with such care and solicitude of piety that, even if we say one thing for another, nevertheless we say nothing unworthy.

Vt si quid uerbi gratia de patre dicimus quod patri proprie non conueniat, aut filio conueniat aut spiritui sancto aut ipsi trinitati; et si quid de filio quod filio proprie non congruat, saltem congruat patri aut spiritui sancto aut trinitati; item si quid de spiritu sancto quod proprietatem spiritus sancti non doceat, non tamen alienum sit a patre aut a filio aut ab uno deo ipsa trinitate, ueluti nunc cupimus uidere utrum illa excellentissima caritas proprie spiritus sanctus sit. Quod si non est, aut pater est caritas aut filius aut ipsa trinitas quoniam resistere non possumus certissimae fidei et ualidissimae auctoritati scripturuae dicentis: Deus caritas est. Non tamen debemus deuiare sacrilego errore ut aliquid de trinitate dicamus quod non creatori sed creaturae potius conueniat aut inani cogitatione fingatur.

So that, if, for example, we say anything about the Father which does not properly befit the Father, let it either befit the Son or the Holy Spirit or the Trinity itself; and if we say anything about the Son which does not properly agree with the Son, at least let it agree with the Father or the Holy Spirit or the Trinity; likewise, if we say anything about the Holy Spirit which does not show the property of the Holy Spirit, let it nonetheless not be alien to the Father or to the Son or to the one God, the Trinity itself—just as now we desire to see whether that most excellent Charity is properly the Holy Spirit. But if it is not, either the Father is Charity or the Son or the Trinity itself, since we cannot resist the most certain faith and the most strong authority of Scripture saying: “God is Charity.” Yet we ought not to deviate in sacrilegious error so as to say something about the Trinity which fits not the Creator but rather a creature, or is fashioned by empty cogitation.

[II 2] Quae cum ita sint attendamus ista tria quae inuenisse nobis uidemur. Nondum de supernis loquimur, nondum de deo patre et filio et spiritu sancto, sed de hac impari imagine attamen imagine, id est homine; familiarius enim eam et facilius fortassis intuetur nostrae mentis infirmitas.

[2 2] Since these things are so, let us attend to those three which we seem to have found. We are not yet speaking of the supernal things, not yet of God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but of this unequal image, yet an image, that is, of man; for the infirmity of our mind perhaps contemplates it more familiarly and more easily.

Ecce ego qui hoc quaero cum aliquid amo tria sunt, ego et quod amo et ipse amor. Non enim amo amorem nisi amantem amem, nam non est amor ubi nihil amatur. Tria ergo sunt, amans et quod amatur et amor.

Behold, I who inquire into this: when I love something there are three, I and what I love and love itself. For I do not love love unless I love a lover, for there is no love where nothing is loved. Therefore there are three: the lover, what is loved, and love.

Quid si non amem nisi me ipsum, nonne duo erunt, quod amo et amor? Amans enim et quod amatur hoc idem est quando se ipse amat, sicut amare et amari eodem modo idipsum est cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe res bis dicitur cum dicitur, amat se, et, amatur a se. Tunc non est aliud atque aliud amare et amari, sicut non est alius atque alius amans et amatus.

But what if I love nothing except myself—will there not be two, what I love and the love? For the lover and what is loved are the same thing when he loves himself, just as to love and to be loved are in the same way the selfsame thing when each person loves himself. For the same thing is said twice when it is said, “he loves himself,” and, “he is loved by himself.” Then to love and to be loved are not one thing and another, just as the lover and the loved are not one person and another.

At uero amor et quod amatur etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim quisquis se amat amor est nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud amare amorem suum.

But indeed love and that which is loved are even so two. For one who loves himself is not thereby love, unless love itself is loved. Moreover, to love oneself is one thing, to love one’s own love is another.

Non enim amatur amor nisi iam aliquid amans quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt cum se quisque amat, amor et quod amatur; tunc enim amans et quod amatur unum est. Vnde uidetur non esse consequens ut ubicumque amor fuerit iam tria intellegantur.

For love is not loved unless already loving something, since where nothing is loved, there is no love. Therefore there are two when each person loves himself, the love and that which is loved; for then the lover and that which is loved are one. Whence it seems not to be a consequence that wherever love shall be, three are already to be understood.

Auferamus enim ab hac consideratione cetera quae multa sunt quibus homo constat, atque ut haec quae nunc requirimus quantum in his rebus possumus liquido reperiamus, de sola mente tractemus. Mens igitur cum amat se ipsam duo quaedam ostendit, mentem et amorem. Quid est autem amare se nisi praesto sibi esse uelle ad fruendum se? Et cum tantum se uult esse quantum est, par menti uoluntas est et amanti amor aequalis.

Let us remove, then, from this consideration the other things—many in number—of which a human being consists; and, so that we may find what we are now inquiring after as clearly as we can in these matters, let us treat of the mind alone. Therefore the mind, when it loves itself, shows two certain things: the mind and love. But what is it to love oneself except to will to be present to oneself for the enjoying of oneself? And when it wills to be as much as it is, the will is equal to the mind, and love is equal to the lover.

Et si aliqua substantia est amor, non est utique corpus sed spiritus, nec mens corpus sed spiritus est. Neque tamen amor et mens duo spiritus sed unus spiritus, nec essentiae duae sed una; et tamen duo quaedam unum sunt, amans et amor, siue sic dicas, quod amatur et amor. Et haec quidem duo relatiue ad inuicem dicuntur.

And if love is some substance, it is assuredly not a body but a spirit, nor is mind a body but a spirit. Yet neither are love and mind two spirits but one spirit, nor two essences but one; and yet certain two are one, the lover and the love, or, if you say it thus, that which is loved and the love. And these two indeed are said relatively to one another.

Amans quippe ad amorem refertur et amor ad amantem; amans enim aliquo amore amat, et amor alicuius amantis est. Mens uero et spiritus non relatiue dicuntur sed essentiam demonstrant. Non enim quia mens et spiritus alicuius hominis est, ideo mens et spiritus est.

For the lover is referred to the love and the love to the lover; for the lover loves with some love, and love is of some lover. But mind and spirit are not said relatively, but designate the essence. For it is not because it is the mind and spirit of some human being that therefore it is mind and spirit.

Retracto enim eo quod homo est, quod adiuncto corpore dicitur, retracto ergo corpore mens et spiritus manet. Retracto autem amante nullus est amor, et retracto amore nullus est amans. Ideoque quantum ad inuicem referuntur duo sunt; quod autem ad se ipsa dicuntur, et singula spiritus et simul utrumque unus spiritus, et singula mens et simul utrumque una mens.

For when I withdraw that which is “man,” which is said with the body adjoined, therefore with the body withdrawn the mind and the spirit remain. But with the lover withdrawn there is no love, and with love withdrawn there is no lover. And so, inasmuch as they are referred to one another, they are two; but as they are said with respect to themselves, each singly is spirit and together both are one spirit, and each singly is mind and together both are one mind.

Vbi ergo trinitas? Attendamus quantum possumus et inuocemus lucem sempiternam ut inluminet tenebras nostras et uideamus in nobis quantum sinimur imaginem dei.

Where then is the Trinity? Let us attend as much as we can and invoke the sempiternal light, that it may illuminate our darkness, and let us see in ourselves, insofar as we are permitted, the image of God.

[III 3] Mens enim amare se ipsam non potest nisi etiam nouerit se. Nam quomodo amat quod nescit? Aut si quisquam dicit ex notitia generali uel speciali mentem credere se esse talem quales alias experta est et ideo amare semetipsam, insipientissime loquitur. Vnde enim mens aliquam mentem nouit si se non nouit?

[3 3] For the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself. For how does it love what it does not know? Or if anyone says that by general or special knowledge the mind believes itself to be such as it has experienced others to be, and therefore loves itself, he speaks most foolishly. For whence does the mind know any mind if it does not know itself?

Neque enim ut oculus corporis uidet alios oculos et se non uidet, ita mens nouit alias mentes et ignorat semetipsam. Per oculos enim corporis corpora uidemus quia radios, qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt, refringere ac retorquere in ipsos non possumus nisi cum specula intuemur. Quod subtilissime obscurissimeque disseritur donec apertissime demonstretur uel ita se rem habere uel non ita.

Nor indeed, as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself, so does the mind know other minds and ignore itself. For through the eyes of the body we see bodies because we cannot refract and turn back into them the rays which flash forth through them and touch whatever we discern, except when we gaze upon mirrors. This is discussed most subtly and most obscurely until it is shown most plainly either that the matter stands thus or not thus.

Sed quoquo modo se habeat uis qua per oculos cernimus, ipsam certe uim, siue sint radii siue aliud aliquid, oculis cernere non ualemus; sed mente quaerimus, et si fieri potest etiam hoc mente comprehendimus. Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et se ipsam per se ipsam nouit quoniam est incorporea.

But however the power by which we discern through the eyes may stand, the very power itself—whether it be rays or something else—we are not able to behold with the eyes; rather we seek it by the mind, and, if it can be done, we even comprehend this by the mind. Therefore the mind itself, just as it gathers the knowledges of corporeal things through the senses of the body, so [it gathers] those of incorporeal things through itself. Therefore it also knows itself through itself, since it is incorporeal.

Nam si non se nouit, non se amat.

For if it does not know itself, it does not love itself.

[IV 4] Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia eius, cum se nouit. Ipsa igitur mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt. Si enim minus se amat quam est ut uerbi gratia tantum se amet hominis mens quantum amandum est corpus hominis, cum plus sit ipsa quam corpus, peccat et non est perfectus amor eius.

[4 4] Just as, moreover, there are, as it were, two things—the mind and its love—when it loves itself; so there are, as it were, two things—the mind and its knowledge—when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself and its love and its knowledge are, as it were, three, and these three are one, and when they are perfect they are equal. For if it loves itself less than is fitting—for example, if the mind of a human loves itself only as much as the body of a human ought to be loved—since it itself is more than the body, it sins, and its love is not perfect.

Item si amplius se amet quam est uelut si tantum se amet quantum amandus est deus, cum incomparabiliter minus sit ipsa quam deus, etiam sic nimio peccat et non perfectum habet amorem sui. Maiore autem peruersitate et iniquitate peccat cum corpus tantum amat quantum amandus est deus. Item notitia si minor est quam est illud quod noscitur et plene nosci potest, perfecta non est.

Likewise, if it loves itself more than it is—as, if it loves itself as much as God is to be loved, since it is incomparably less itself than God—even so it sins by excess and does not have a perfect love of itself. But with greater perversity and iniquity it sins when it loves the body as much as God is to be loved. Likewise, if the knowledge is less than that which is known and can be fully known, it is not perfect.

Si autem maior est, iam superior est natura quae nouit quam illa quae nota est, sicut maior est notitia corporis quam ipsum corpus quod ea notitia notum est. Illa enim uita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis; corpus autem non est uita. Et uita quaelibet quolibet corpore maior est, non mole sed ui. Mens uero cum se ipsa cognoscit, non se superat notitia sua quia ipsa cognoscit, ipsa cognoscitur.

But if it is greater, then the nature which knows is already superior to that which is known, just as the knowledge of a body is greater than the body itself which by that knowledge is made known. For that is a certain life in the reason of the knower; but a body is not life. And any life is greater than any body, not by bulk but by power. But the mind, when it knows itself, its own knowledge does not surpass itself, because it itself knows, it itself is known.

Cum ergo se totam cognoscit neque secum quidquam aliud, par illi est cognitio sua quia neque ex alia natura est eius cognitio cum se ipsa cognoscit. Et cum se totam nihilque amplius percipit, nec minor nec maior est. Recte igitur diximus haec tria cum perfecta sunt esse consequenter aequalia.

When therefore it knows itself whole, and along with itself nothing else, its cognition is equal to it, because its cognition is not from another nature when it knows itself. And when it perceives itself whole and nothing further, it is neither lesser nor greater. Rightly therefore we have said that these three, when they are perfect, are consequently equal.

[5] Simul etiam admonemur si utcumque uidere possumus haec in anima exsistere et tamquam inuoluta euolui ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter uel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tamquam in subiecto ut color aut figura in corpore aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Quidquid enim tale est non excedit subiectum in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis.

[5] At the same time we are admonished, if in any way we can see, that these exist in the soul and, as if wrapped up, are unrolled so that they may be perceived and enumerated substantially, or, so to speak, essentially, not as in a subject like color or figure in a body, or any other quality or quantity. For whatever is of such a kind does not exceed the subject in which it is. For this color or figure of this body cannot be that of another body.

Mens autem amore quo se amat potest amare et aliud praeter se. Item non se solam cognoscit mens sed et alia multa. Quamobrem non amor et cognitio tamquam in subiecto insunt menti, sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt sicut ipsa mens quia et si relatiue dicuntur ad inuicem, in sua tamen sunt singula quaeque substantia; non sicut color et coloratum relatiue ita dicuntur ad inuicem ut color in subiecto colorato sit non habens in se ipso propriam substantiam, quoniam coloratum corpus substantia est, ille autem in substantia; sed sicut duo amici etiam duo sunt homines quae sunt substantiae, cum homines non relatiue dicantur, amici autem relatiue.

But the mind, by the love with which it loves itself, can love also another besides itself. Likewise, the mind does not cognize only itself, but also many other things. Wherefore love and cognition are not in the mind as in a subject, but even these are substantially, like the mind itself; for although they are said relatively to one another, yet each individually is in its own substance—not as color and the colored are said relatively to one another in such a way that color is in a colored subject, not having in itself a proper substance, since the colored body is a substance, whereas that (color) is in a substance—but as two friends are also two men, which are substances, since “men” is not said relatively, but “friends” is said relatively.

[6] Sed item quamuis substantia sit amans uel sciens, substantia sit scientia, substantia sit amor, sed amans et amor aut sciens et scientia relatiue ad se dicantur sicut amici; mens uero aut spiritus non sint relatiua sicut nec homines relatiua sunt; non tamen sicut amici homines possunt seorsum esse ab inuicem, sic amans et amor aut sciens et scientia. Quamquam et amici corpore uidentur separari posse, non animo in quantum amici sunt, uerumtamen fieri potest ut amicus amicum etiam odisse incipiat, et eo ipso amicus esse desinat nesciente illo et adhuc amante. Amor autem quo se mens amat si esse desinat, simul et illa desinit esse amans.

[6] Yet although the lover or the knower is a substance, knowledge is a substance, love is a substance, still “lover” and “love,” or “knower” and “knowledge,” are said relatively to one another, like friends; but the mind or spirit is not relative, just as men are not relatives. Nevertheless, not as human friends can exist apart from one another, so the lover and the love, or the knower and the knowledge. Although even friends seem able to be separated in body, not in mind insofar as they are friends, yet it can come about that a friend even begins to hate his friend, and thereby ceases to be a friend, the other not knowing and still loving. But the love by which the mind loves itself, if it should cease to be, at the same time that mind ceases to be loving.

Item notitia qua se mens nouit si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse se desinet. Sicut caput capitati alicuius utique caput est et relatiue ad se dicuntur quamuis etiam substantiae sint; nam et caput corpus est et capitatum, et si non sit corpus nec capitatum erit. Sed haec praecisione ab inuicem separari possunt, illa non possunt.

Likewise, if the knowledge by which the mind knows itself should cease to be, at once it too will cease to know itself. Just as the head of some headed thing is of course a head, and they are spoken of relatively to each other, although they also are substances; for both the head is a body and the headed thing is a body, and if it be not a body neither will it be headed. But these can be separated from each other by precision, those cannot.

[7] Quod si sunt aliqua corpora quae secari omnino et diuidi nequeunt, tamen nisi partibus suis constarent corpora non essent. Pars ergo ad totum relatiue dicitur quia omnis pars alicuius totius pars est et totum omnibus partibus totum est. Sed quoniam et pars corpus est et totum, non tantum ista relatiue dicuntur, sed etiam substantialiter sunt.

[7] But if there are certain bodies which cannot at all be cut and divided, nevertheless unless they consisted of their parts they would not be bodies. A part, therefore, is said relatively to the whole, because every part is a part of some whole, and the whole is a whole with respect to all its parts. But since both part is a body and whole is [a body], these are said not only relatively, but they also are substantially.

Fortassis ergo mens totum est et eius quasi partes amor quo se amat et scientia qua se nouit, quibus duabus partibus illud totum constat? An tres sunt aequales partes quibus totum unum completur? Sed nulla pars totum cuius pars est complectitur.

Perhaps, then, the mind is a whole, and its as-it-were parts are love by which it loves itself and knowledge by which it knows itself, of which two parts that whole consists? Or are there three equal parts by which the one whole is completed? But no part comprehends the whole of which it is a part.

Mens uero cum se totam nouit, hoc est perfecte nouit, per totum eius est notitia eius; et cum se perfecte amat, totam se amat et per totum eius est amor eius. Num ergo sicut ex uino et aqua et melle una fit potio et singula per totum sunt et tamen tria sunt (nulla enim pars est potionis quae non habeat haec tria; non enim iuncta uelut si aqua et oleum essent, sed omnino commixta sunt, et substantiae sunt omnes, et totus ille liquor una quaedam est ex tribus confecta substantia), tale aliquid arbitrandum est esse simul haec tria, mentem, amorem, notitiam? Sed non unius substantiae sunt aqua, uinum, et mel, quamuis ex eorum commixtione fiat una substantia potionis.

Indeed, when the mind knows itself as a whole, that is, knows perfectly, through its whole there is its knowledge; and when it loves itself perfectly, it loves itself as a whole, and through its whole there is its love. Are we then to think that, just as from wine and water and honey one potion is made and the individual things are through the whole and yet they are three (for there is no part of the potion which does not have these three; for they are not merely joined, as if water and oil were the case, but are altogether commixed, and they are all substances, and that whole liquor is a certain one substance compounded from three), something of this sort is what these three are together, mind, love, knowledge? But water, wine, and honey are not of one substance, although from their commixture one substance of the potion is made.

Quomodo autem illa tria non sint eiusdem essentiae non uideo, cum mens ipsa se amet atque ipsa se nouerit atque ita sint haec tria ut non alteri alicui rerum mens uel amata uel nota sit. Vnius ergo eiusdemque essentiae necesse est haec tria sint, et ideo si tamquam commixtione confusa essent, nullo modo essent tria nec referri ad inuicem possent. Quemadmodum si ex uno eodemque auro tres anulos similes facias quamuis connexos sibi, referuntur ad inuicem quod similes sunt; omnis enim similis alicui similis est, et trinitas anulorum est et unum aurum.

How, however, those three are not of the same essence I do not see, since the mind itself loves itself and itself knows itself, and thus these three are such that the mind is neither loved nor known with reference to some other thing. Of one and the same essence, therefore, it is necessary that these three be; and therefore, if they were as though confounded by a commixture, in no way would they be three nor could they be referred to one another. Just as if from one and the same gold you make three similar rings, although connected to one another, they are referred to one another in that they are similar; for every similar thing is similar to something, and there is a trinity of rings and one gold.

At si misceantur sibi et per totam singuli massam suam conspergantur, intercidet illa trinitas et omnino non erit, ac non solum unum aurum dicetur sicut in illis tribus anulis dicebatur, sed iam nulla aurea tria.

But if they be mixed together and each be besprinkled with its mass through the whole, that trinity will perish and will not be at all, and not only will it be called one gold, as it was said in the case of those three rings, but now there will be no golden three.

[V 8] At in illis tribus cum se nouit mens et amat se, manet trinitas, mens, amor, notitia; et nulla commixtione confunditur quamuis et singula sint in se ipsis et inuicem tota in totis, siue singula in binis siue bina in singulis, itaque omnia in omnibus. Nam et mens est utique in se ipsa quoniam ad se ipsam mens dicitur, quamuis noscens uel nota uel noscibilis ad suam notitiam relatiue dicatur; amans quoque et amata uel amabilis ad amorem referatur quo se amat. Et notitia quamuis referatur ad mentem cognoscentem uel cognitam, tamen et ad se ipsam nota et noscens dicitur; non enim sibi est incognita notitia qua se mens ipsa cognoscit.

[V 8] But in those three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, the triad remains—mind, love, knowledge—and by no commixture is it confounded, although both each is in itself and, reciprocally, the wholes are wholly in the wholes, whether each is in the two or the two in each, and thus all in all. For the mind is indeed in itself, since the mind is spoken of with reference to itself, although, as knowing or known or knowable, it is said relatively to its own knowledge; likewise, as loving and loved or lovable, it is referred to the love by which it loves itself. And knowledge, although it is referred to the mind that knows or is known, nevertheless with reference to itself is said to be known and knowing; for the knowledge by which the mind itself knows itself is not unknown to itself.

Et amor quamuis referatur ad mentem amantem cuius amor est, tamen et ad se ipsum est amor ut sit etiam in se ipso quia et amor amatur, nec alio nisi amore amari potest, id est se ipso. Ita sunt haec singula in se ipsis. In alternis autem ita sunt quia et mens amans in amore est et amor in amantis notitia et notitia in mente noscente.

And love, although it is referred to the loving mind of which it is the love, nevertheless is also love with respect to itself, so that it is also in itself, because love too is loved, nor can it be loved by anything other than love, that is, by itself. Thus these singulars are in themselves. In one another, however, they are thus: for the loving mind is in love, and love in the lover’s knowledge, and knowledge in the knowing mind.

Singula in binis ita sunt quia mens quae se nouit et amat in amore et notitia sua est, et amor amantis mentis seseque scientis in mente notitiaque eius est, et notitia mentis se scientis et amantis in mente atque in amore eius est quia scientem se amat et amantem se nouit. Ac per hoc et bina in singulis quia mens quae se nouit et amat cum sua notitia est in amore et cum suo amore in notitia, amorque ipse et notitia simul sunt in mente quae se amat et nouit. Tota uero in totis quemadmodum sint iam supra ostendimus cum se totam mens amat et totam nouit et totum amorem suum nouit totamque amat notitiam suam quando tria ista ad se ipsa perfecta sunt.

Each singly is in the pairs in this way, because the mind which knows and loves itself is in its love and in its knowledge; and the love of the mind that loves and knows itself is in its mind and its knowledge; and the knowledge of the mind knowing and loving itself is in its mind and in its love, because it loves itself as knowing and knows itself as loving. And through this, also the pairs are in each single, because the mind which knows and loves itself, along with its knowledge, is in love, and along with its love is in knowledge; and love itself and knowledge together are in the mind which loves and knows itself. But as for the whole in the wholes, we have already shown how it is, since the mind loves itself whole and knows itself whole, and knows its whole love and loves its whole knowledge, when these three are perfected unto themselves.

Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis, et tamen eorum singulum quidque substantia est et simul omnia una substantia uel essentia cum et relatiue dicantur ad inuicem.

In a wondrous manner, therefore, these three are inseparable from themselves, and yet each single one of them is substance, and at the same time all are one substance or essence, since they are also said relatively to one another.

[VI 9] Sed cum se ipsam nouit humana mens et amat se ipsam, non aliquid incommutabile nouit et amat. Aliterque unusquisque homo loquendo enuntia mentem suam quid in se ipso agatur attendens; aliter autem humanam mentem speciali aut generali cognitione definit. Itaque cum mihi de sua propria loquitur, utrum intellegat hoc aut illud an non intellegat, et utrum uelit an nolit hoc aut illud, credo; cum uero de humana specialiter aut generaliter uerum dicit, agnosco et approbo.

[6 9] But when the human mind knows itself and loves itself, it does not know and love something incommutable. And in one way each person, by speaking, enunciates his mind, attending to what is being done in himself; but in another way he defines the human mind by special or general cognition. Therefore, when he speaks to me about what is his own in particular—whether he understands this or that or does not understand, and whether he wills or is unwilling for this or that—I believe; but when he says what is true about the human mind specifically or generally, I recognize and approve.

Vnde manifestum est aliud unumquemque uidere in se quod sibi alius dicenti credat, non tamen uideat; aliud autem in ipsa ueritate quod alius quoque possit intueri, quorum alterum mutari per tempora, alterum incommutabili aeternitate consistere. Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes uidendo per similitudinem colligimus generalem uel specialem mentis humanae notitiam, sed intuemur inuiolabilem ueritatem ex qua perfecte quantum possumus definiamus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat.

Whence it is manifest that there is one thing each person sees in himself, which another, upon his telling it, believes him about, yet does not see; and another thing in Truth itself, which the other also can contemplate—of which the one may be changed through times, the other stands fast in incommutable eternity. For we do not, with bodily eyes, by seeing many minds, collect by similitude a general or a special knowledge of the human mind; rather we gaze upon inviolable Truth, from which we define, as perfectly as we can, not of what sort the mind of any individual human is, but of what sort it ought to be by sempiternal reasons.

[10] Vnde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas et quodam modo infusas memoriae, ex quibus etiam ea quae non uisa sunt ficto phantasmate cogitantur siue aliter quam sunt siue fortuito sicuti sunt, aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus uel approbare apud nosmetipsos uel improbare conuincimur cum recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus. Nam et cum recolo Carthaginis moenia quae uidi et cum fingo Alexandriae quae non uidi easdemque imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam praeferens, rationabiliter praefero. Viget et claret desuper iudicium ueritatis ac sui iuris incorruptissimis regulis firmum est, et si corporalium imaginum quasi quodam nubilo subtexitur, non tamen inuoluitur atque confunditur.

[10] Whence also the phantasies of corporeal things, drawn in through the body’s sense and in a certain manner infused into memory—out of which even things not seen are thought by a feigned phantasm, whether otherwise than they are or by chance just as they are—we are convinced, with altogether other rules abiding unchangeably above our mind, either to approve with ourselves or to disapprove, when we rightly approve or disapprove anything. For both when I recollect the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and when I fashion those of Alexandria which I have not seen, and, in preferring certain of these same imaginary forms to others, I prefer reasonably. The judgment of truth thrives and shines from above and, being of its own right, is firm by the most incorrupt rules; and if it is, as it were, underwoven by a kind of cloud of corporeal images, nevertheless it is not wrapped up and confounded.

[11] Sed interest utrum ego sub illa uel in illa caligine tamquam a caelo perspicuo secludar, an sicut in altissimis montibus accidere solet inter utrumque aere libero fruens et serenissimam lucem supra et densissimas nebulas subter aspiciam. Nam unde in me fraterni amoris inflammatur ardor cum audio uirum aliquem pro fidei pulchritudine et firmitate acriora tormenta tolerasse? Et si mihi digito ostendatur ipse homo, studeo mihi coniungere, notum facere, amicitia conligare.

[11] But it makes a difference whether I am shut off from or within that gloom, as if from a perspicuous sky, or whether, as is wont to happen on the highest mountains, enjoying free air between the two I behold the most serene light above and the densest mists below. For whence in me is the ardor of fraternal love inflamed when I hear that some man has borne harsher torments for the beauty and firmness of faith? And if the man himself is pointed out to me with the finger, I strive to join myself to him, to make him known to me, to be bound by friendship.

Itaque si facultas datur, accedo, alloquor, sermonem confero, affectum meum in illum quibus uerbis possum exprimo, uicissimque in eo fieri quem in me habeat atque exprimi uolo, spiritalemque complexum credendo molior quia peruestigare tam cito et cernere penitus eius interiora non possum. Amo itaque fidelem ac fortem uirum amore casto atque germano. Quod si mihi inter nostras loquelas fateatur aut incautus aliquo modo sese indicet quod uel de deo credat incongrua atque in illo quoque aliquid carnale desideret et pro tali errore illa pertulerit, uel speratae pecuniae cupiditate uel inani auiditate laudis humanae, statim amor ille quo in eum ferebar offensus et quasi repercussus atque ab indigno homine ablatus in ea forma permanet ex qua eum talem credens amaueram.

Therefore, if the opportunity is given, I approach, I address, I confer conversation, I express my affection toward him with whatever words I can, and in turn I want that to come to be in him and be expressed which he has toward me; and by believing I endeavor a spiritual embrace, because I cannot so quickly perinvestigate and thoroughly discern his inner parts. I love, then, a faithful and brave man with chaste and germane love. But if, in the course of our talks, he should confess to me, or incautiously in some way indicate of himself, that either he believes incongruous things about God and in that matter also desires something carnal, and that on account of such an error he has endured those sufferings, either from cupidity of hoped-for money or from a vain avidity of human praise, immediately that love by which I was borne toward him, offended and as it were repelled and withdrawn from an unworthy man, remains in that form from which, believing him to be such, I had loved him.

Nisi forte ad hoc amor iam ut talis sit cum talem non esse comperero. At in illo homine nihil mutatum est; mutari tamen potest ut fiat quod eum iam esse credideram. In mente autem mea mutata est utique ipsa existimatio quae de illo aliter se habebat et aliter habet, idemque amor ab intentione perfruendi ad intentionem consulendi incommutabili desuper iustitia iubente deflexus est.

Unless perhaps love is now precisely for this: to be such as this when I discover that he is not such. But in that man nothing has been changed; yet he can be changed, so that he may become what I had already believed him to be. In my mind, however, the very estimation has indeed been changed, which concerning him was one way and is another; and the same love has been deflected from the intention of enjoying to the intention of giving counsel, the unchangeable justice from above commanding.

Ipsa uero forma inconcussae ac stabilis ueritatis et in qua fruerer homine bonum eum credens et in qua consulo ut bonus sit eadem luce incorruptibilis sincerissimaeque rationis et meae mentis aspectum et illam phantasiae nubem quam desuper cerno cum eundem hominem quem uideram cogito imperturbabili aeternitate perfundit.

But the very form of unshaken and stable verity, both in which I was enjoying the man, believing him good, and in which I consult that he may be good, with the same light of incorruptible and most sincere reason bathes both the aspect of my mind and that cloud of phantasy which from above I discern when I think upon that same man whom I had seen, with imperturbable eternity.

Item cum arcum pulchre et aequabiliter intortum quem uidi uerbi gratia Carthagine animo reuoluo, res quaedam menti nuntiata per oculos memoriaeque transfusa imaginarium conspectum facit. Sed aliud mente conspicio secundum quod mihi opus illud placet, unde etiam si displiceret corrigerem. Itaque de istis secundum illam iudicamus, et illam cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu.

Item, when I revolve in mind a bow beautifully and evenly twisted, which I saw, for example, at Carthage, a certain thing announced to the mind through the eyes and transfused into memory makes an imaginary sight. But I behold with the mind another thing, according to which that work pleases me, whence also, if it displeased, I would correct it. And so we judge about these things according to that, and we discern that by the intuition of rational mind.

Ista uero aut praesentia sensu corporis tangimus aut imagines absentium fixas in memoria recordamur aut ex earum similitudine talia fingimus qualia nos ipsi si uellemus atque possemus etiam opere moliremur, aliter figurantes animo imagines corporum aut per corpus corpora uidentes, aliter autem rationes artemque ineffabiliter pulchram talium figurarum super aciem mentis simplici intellegentia capientes.

But these things we either touch, when present, by the sense of the body, or we recall the images of absent things fixed in memory, or from their likeness we figure such things as we ourselves, if we were willing and able, would also work out in deed; in one way shaping in the mind the images of bodies or, through the body, seeing bodies; in another way, however, grasping by simple intelligence the reasons and the ineffably beautiful art of such figures, above the keen edge of the mind.

[VII 12] In illa igitur aeterna ueritate ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia formam secundum quam sumus et secundum quam uel in nobis uel in corporibus uera et recta ratione aliquid operamur uisu mentis aspicimus, atque inde conceptam rerum ueracem notitiam tamquam uerbum apud nos habemus et dicendo intus gignimus, nec a nobis nascendo discedit. Cum autem ad alios loquimur, uerbo intus manenti ministerium uocis adhibemus aut alicuius signi corporalis ut per quandam commemorationem sensibilem tale aliquid fiat etiam in animo audientis quale de loquentis animo non recedit. Nihil itaque agimus per membra corporis in factis dictisque nostris quibus uel approbantur uel improbantur mores hominum quod non uerbo apud nos intus edito praeuenimus.

[7 12] In that eternal Truth from which the temporal things have been made, we behold with the vision of the mind the form according to which we are, and according to which, whether in ourselves or in bodies, we do something by a true and right ratio; and from there we have the truthful knowledge of things, conceived as it were a word with us, and by speaking we beget it within, nor does it depart from us by being born. But when we speak to others, we apply to the word remaining within the ministry of the voice or of some bodily sign, so that through a certain sensible commemoration something of the kind may also come to be in the mind of the hearer, such as does not depart from the mind of the speaker. Therefore we do nothing through the members of the body in our deeds and sayings, by which the morals of men are either approved or disapproved, which we do not anticipate by a word issued within us.

Nemo etiam aliquid uolens facit quod non in corde suo prius dixerit.

No one even does anything willingly that he has not first said in his heart.

[13] Quod uerbum amore concipitur siue creaturae siue creatoris, id est aut naturae mutabilis aut incommutabilis ueritatis.

[13] Which word is conceived by love, whether of the creature or of the creator, that is, either of mutable nature or of incommutable truth.

[VIII] Ergo aut cupiditate aut caritate, non quo non sit amanda creatura, sed si ad creatorem refertur ille amor, non iam cupiditas sed caritas erit. Tunc enim est cupiditas cum propter se amatur creatura. Tunc non utentem adiuuat sed corrumpit fruentem.

[8] Therefore either by cupidity or by charity— not that the creature is not to be loved, but if that love is referred to the creator, it will no longer be cupidity but charity. For then it is cupidity when the creature is loved on account of itself. Then it does not aid the one using, but it corrupts the one enjoying.

Cum ergo aut par nobis aut inferior creatura sit, inferiore utendum est ad deum, pari autem fruendum sed in deo. Sicut enim te ipso non in te ipso frui debes sed in eo qui fecit te, sic etiam illo quem diligis tamquam te ipsum. Et nobis ergo et fratribus in domino fruamur, et inde nos nec ad nosmetipsos remittere et quasi relaxare deorsum uersus audeamus.

Therefore, since a creature is either a peer to us or inferior, the inferior is to be used unto God, but the peer is to be enjoyed—yet in God. For just as you ought not to enjoy your very self in yourself, but in Him who made you, so also him whom you love as yourself. And so let us enjoy both ourselves and our brothers in the Lord, and from that source let us not presume to refer ourselves back to our very selves and, as it were, to relax downward.

Nascitur autem uerbum cum excogitatum placet aut ad peccandum aut ad recte faciendum. Verbum ergo nostrum et mentem de qua gignitur quasi medius amor coniungit seque cum eis tertium complexu incorporeo sine ulla confusione constringit.

However, the word is born when what has been thought out is pleasing, either for sinning or for doing rightly. Therefore, as it were a middle love joins our word and the mind from which it is begotten, and, as a third with them, it binds itself in an incorporeal embrace without any confusion.

[IX 14] Conceptum autem uerbum et natum idipsum est cum uoluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritalium. Qui enim uerbi gratia perfecte nouit perfecteque amat iustitiam, iam iustus est etiamsi nulla exsistat secundum eam forinsecus per membra corporis operandi necessitas. In amore autem carnalium temporaliumque rerum sicut in ipsis animalium fetibus alius est conceptus uerbi, alius partus.

[9 14] But the word conceived and born is the selfsame thing when the will comes to rest in the knowledge itself, which happens in the love of spiritual things. For whoever, for example, knows justice perfectly and loves it perfectly is already just, even if there exists no necessity of acting outwardly according to it through the members of the body. But in the love of carnal and temporal things, as in the very births of animals, the conception of the word is one thing, the birth another.

Illic enim quod cupiendo concipitur adipiscendo nascitur quoniam non sufficit auaritiae nosse et amare aurum nisi et habeat, neque nosse et amare uesci aut concumbere nisi etiam id agat, neque nosse et amare honores et imperia nisi proueniant. Quae tamen omnia nec adepta sufficiunt: Qui enim biberit, inquit, ex hac aqua sitiet iterum; ideoque et in psalmis: Concepit, inquit, dolorem et peperit iniquitatem. Dolorem uel laborem dicit concipi cum ea concipiuntur quae nosse ac uelle non sufficit, et inardescit atque aegratat animus indigentia donec ad ea perueniat et quasi pariat ea. Vnde eleganter in latina lingua parta dicuntur et reperta atque comperta, quae uerba quasi a partu ducta resonant, quia concupiscentia cum conceperit parit peccatum.

For there what is conceived by desiring is born by attaining, since it does not suffice for avarice to know and to love gold unless it also have it, nor to know and to love to eat or to lie with unless it also do that, nor to know and to love honors and commands unless they also come to pass. Yet all these things, even when obtained, do not suffice: “For whoever drinks,” he says, “of this water will thirst again”; and therefore also in the Psalms: “He has conceived pain and has borne iniquity,” he says. He says that pain or toil is conceived when those things are conceived for which to know and to will does not suffice, and the soul kindles and falls sick with want until it arrives at them and, as it were, gives birth to them. Whence it is elegant in the Latin tongue that things are called parta and reperta and comperta, which words echo as though derived from partus, because concupiscence, when it has conceived, bears sin.

Vnde dominus clamat: Venite ad me omnes qui laboratis et onerati estis, et alio loco: Vae praegnantibus et mammantibus in illis diebus. Cum itaque ad partum uerbi referret omnia uel recte facta uel peccata: Ex ore, inquit, tuo iustificaberis et ex ore tuo condemnaberis, os uolens intellegi non hoc uisibile sed interius inuisibile cogitationis et cordis.

Whence the Lord cries out: Come to me all who labor and are burdened, and in another place: Woe to the pregnant and the nursing in those days. Since therefore he referred all things, whether deeds done rightly or sins, to the parturition of the word: From your mouth, he says, you will be justified, and from your mouth you will be condemned—wishing “mouth” to be understood not as this visible one, but as the interior invisible one of cogitation and of the heart.

[X 15] Recte ergo quaeritur utrum omnis notitia uerbum an tantum amata notitia. Nouimus enim et ea quae odimus, sed nec concepta nec parta dicenda sunt animo quae nobis displicent. Non enim omnia quae quoquo modo tangunt concipiuntur, ut tantum nota sint non tamen uerba dicantur ista de quibus nunc agimus.

[10 15] Therefore it is rightly inquired whether every knowledge is a word, or only knowledge that is loved. For we know even the things which we hate; but the things that displease us are not to be said to be conceived or brought forth in the mind. For not all things that touch us in whatever way are conceived, so that they are only known, yet the things about which we are now dealing are not on that account called “words.”

Aliter enim dicuntur uerba quae spatia temporum syllabis tenent siue pronuntientur siue cogitentur; aliter omne quod notum est uerbum dicitur animo impressum quamdiu de memoria proferri et definiri potest, quamuis res ipsa displiceat; aliter cum placet quod mente concipitur. Secundum quod genus uerbi accipiendum est quod ait apostolus: Nemo dicit: Dominus Iesus, nisi in spiritu sancto; cum secundum aliam uerbi notionem dicant hoc et illi de quibus ipse dominus ait: Non omnis qui mihi dicit: Domine, domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum.

For “words” are understood in one way—those which occupy spans of time with syllables, whether they are pronounced or thought; in another way, everything that is known is called a word impressed upon the mind as long as it can be brought forth from memory and defined, although the thing itself displeases; in yet another way, when what is conceived in the mind is pleasing. According to which kind of word is that to be taken which the Apostle says: No one says, “Lord Jesus,” except in the Holy Spirit; since according to another notion of word this also is said by those of whom the Lord himself says: Not everyone who says to me, “Lord, Lord,” will enter into the kingdom of heaven.

Verumtamen cum et illa quae odimus recte displicent recteque improbantur, approbatur eorum improbatio et placet et uerbum est. neque uitiorum notitia nobis displicet sed ipsa uitia. Nam placet mihi quod noui et definio quid sit intemperantia, et hoc est uerbum eius.

Nevertheless, since even those things which we hate rightly displease and are rightly disapproved, their improbation is approved and pleases, and it is a word. Nor does the knowledge of vices displease us, but the vices themselves. For it pleases me that I know and define what intemperance is, and this is its word.

Sicuti sunt in arte nota uitia, et recte approbatur eorum notitia cum discernit cognitor speciem priuationemque uirtutis sicut aiere et negare et esse et non esse; attamen uirtute priuari atque in uitium deficere damnabile est. Et definire intemperantiam uerbumque eius dicere pertinet ad artem morum; esse autem intemperantem ad id pertinet quod illa arte culpatur. Sicut nosse ac definire quid sit soloecismus pertinet ad artem loquendi; facere autem uitium est quod eadem arte reprehenditur.

Just as in an art the vices are known, and their knowledge is rightly approved when the knower discerns the species and the privation of virtue, as to affirm and to deny and to be and not to be; yet to be deprived of virtue and to fail into vice is condemnable. And to define intemperance and to speak its word pertains to the art of morals; but to be intemperate pertains to that which by that art is blamed. Just as to know and to define what a solecism is pertains to the art of speaking; but to commit it is a vice which by the same art is reprehended.

Verbum est igitur quod nunc discernere et insinuare uolumus, cum amore notitia. Cum itaque se mens nouit et amat, iungitur ei amore uerbum eius. Et quoniam amat notitiam et nouit amorem, et uerbum in amore est et amor in uerbo et utrumque in amante atque dicente.

Therefore the word is what we now wish to discern and insinuate: knowledge with love. When therefore the mind knows itself and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love and love in the word, and both in the lover and the speaker.

[16] Sed omnis secundum speciem notitia similis est ei rei quam nouit. Est enim alia notitia secundum priuationem quam cum improbamus loquimur, et haec priuationis improbatio speciem laudat ideoque approbatur.

[16] But every knowledge according to species is similar to that thing which it knows. For there is another knowledge according to privation, which we speak of when we disapprove, and this disapproval of privation lauds the species and therefore is approved.

[XI] Habet ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudinem siue cum ea placet siue cum eius priuatio displicet. Quocirca in quantum deum nouimus similes sumus, sed non ad aequalitatem similes quia nec tantum eum nouimus quantum ipse se. Et quemadmodum cum per sensum corporis discimus corpora fit aliqua eorum similitudo in animo nostro quae phantasia memoriae est (non enim omnino ipsa corpora in animo sunt cum ea cogitamus sed eorum similitudines, itaque cum eas pro illis approbamus erramus; error est namque pro alio alterius approbatio; melior est tamen imaginatio corporis in animo quam illa species corporis in quantum haec in meliore natura est, id est in substantia uitali sicuti est animus), ita cum deum nouimus, quamuis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata uerbum est fitque aliqua dei similitudo illa notitia, tamen inferior est quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, creator autem deus. Ex quo colligitur quia cum se mens ipsa nouit atque approbat sic est eadem notitia uerbum eius ut ei sit par omnino et aequale atque identidem quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est sicut corporis neque superioris sicut dei.

[11] Therefore the mind has some similitude of the known species whether it pleases or whether the privation of it displeases. Wherefore, inasmuch as we know God we are similar, but not similar unto equality, because we do not know him as much as he himself knows himself. And just as, when through the sense of the body we learn bodies, there is made in our mind some likeness of them, which is the phantasy of memory (for the very bodies themselves are by no means in the mind when we think them, but their likenesses; and thus when we approbate these in place of those, we err—for error is the approbation of one thing for another; yet the imagination of the body in the mind is better than that species of the body, inasmuch as this is in a better nature, that is, in a vital substance such as the mind is), so when we know God, although we are made better than we were before we knew, and especially when the same knowledge also, being pleasing and worthily loved, is a word, and that knowledge becomes some similitude of God, nevertheless it is inferior because it is in an inferior nature; for the mind is a creature, but God a creator. Whence it is gathered that when the mind itself knows itself and approbates itself, the same knowledge is so its word that it is altogether equal to it and identical, because it is the knowledge neither of an inferior essence, as of a body, nor of a superior, as of God.

Et cum habeat notitia similitudinem ad eam rem quam nouit, hoc est cuius notitia est, haec habet perfectam et aequalem qua mens ipsa quae nouit est nota. Ideoque et imago et uerbum est quia de illa exprimitur cum cognoscendo eidem coaequatur, et est gignenti aequale quod genitum est.

And since knowledge has a likeness to that thing which it knows, that is, of which it is the knowledge, this has a perfect and equal likeness, whereby the mind itself that knows is known. And therefore it is both image and word, because it is expressed from it, when by knowing it is made coequal to it; and that which is begotten is equal to the begetter.

[XII 17] Quid ergo? Amor non erit imago, non uerbum, non genitus? Cur enim mens notitiam suam gignit cum se nouit, et amorem suum non gignit cum se amat?

[12 17] What then? Will Love not be an image, not a word, not begotten? For why does the mind beget its notion when it knows itself, and not beget its love when it loves itself?

Nam si propterea est notionis suae causa quia noscibilis est, amoris etiam sui causa est quia est amabilis. Cur itaque non utrumque genuerit difficile est dicere. Haec enim quaestio etiam de ipsa summa trinitate, omnipotentissimo creatore deo, ad cuius imaginem homo factus est solet mouere homines quos ueritas dei per humanam locutionem inuitat ad fidem, cur non spiritus quoque sanctus a patre deo genitus uel creditur uel intellegitur, ut filius etiam ipse dicatur.

For if for this reason it is the cause of its own knowledge because it is knowable, it is also the cause of its own love because it is lovable. Why, therefore, it would not have begotten both is difficult to say. For this question too is wont to stir men concerning the very supreme Trinity, the most omnipotent Creator God, to whose image man was made, whom the truth of God invites to faith through human locution: why the Holy Spirit also is not believed or understood to be begotten by God the Father, so that he too might be called Son.

Quod nunc in mente humana utcumque uestigare conamur ut ex inferiore imagine in qua nobis familiarius natura ipsa nostra quasi interrogata respondet exercitatiorem mentis aciem ab inluminata creatura ad lumen incommutabile dirigamus; si tamen ueritas ipsa persuaserit, sicut dei uerbum filium esse nullus christianus dubitat, ita caritatem esse spiritum sanctum. Ergo ad illam imaginem quae creatura est, hoc est ad rationalem mentem diligentius de hac re interrogandam considerandamque redeamus ubi temporaliter exsistens nonnullarum rerum notitia quae ante non erat, et aliquarum rerum amor quae antea non amabantur, distinctius nobis aperit quid dicamus quia et ipsi locutioni temporaliter dirigendae facilior est ad explicandum res quae in ordine temporum comprehenditur.

What we are now trying to investigate in the human mind, so that from the lower image—in which our very nature, as if questioned, responds more familiarly to us—we may direct the more exercised keenness of mind from the illuminated creature to the immutable light; if, however, Truth itself shall persuade, that just as no Christian doubts that the Word of God is the Son, so Charity is the Holy Spirit. Therefore let us return to that image which is a creature, that is, to the rational mind, to be more carefully questioned and considered about this matter, where, existing temporally, a knowledge of certain things which before was not, and a love of certain things which previously were not loved, more distinctly opens to us what we should say, since even the locution itself, to be directed temporally, is easier for explaining things that are comprehended in the order of times.

[18] Primo itaque manifestum sit posse fieri ut sit aliquid scibile, id est quod sciri possit, et tamen nesciatur; illud autem fieri non posse ut sciatur quod scibile non fuerit. Vnde liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus congenerat in nobis notitiam sui; ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito. Itaque mens cum se ipsa cognoscit sola parens est notitiae suae; et cognitum enim et cognitor ipsa est.

[18] First, therefore, let it be manifest that it can come to pass that there is something knowable, that is, which can be known, and yet it is not known; but that cannot come to pass, that there be known what had not been knowable. Whence it must be held clearly that every thing whatsoever we come to know co-generates in us a knowledge of itself; for knowledge is begotten from both, from the knower and the known. Thus the mind, when it knows itself, is alone the parent of its knowledge; for it is both the known and the knower.

Erat autem sibi ipsa noscibilis et antequam se nosset, sed notitia sui non erat in ea cum se ipsa non nouerat. Quod ergo cognoscit se parem sibi notitiam sui gignit quia non minus se nouit quam est nec alterius essentiae est notitia eius non solum quia ipsa nouit, sed etiam quia se ipsam sicut supra diximus.

But it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, yet the knowledge of itself was not in it when it had not known itself. Therefore that which knows itself begets a knowledge of itself equal to itself, because it does not know itself less than it is; nor is the knowledge of it of another essence, not only because it is itself that knows, but also because it is itself that it knows, as we said above.

Quid igitur de amore dicendum est cur non etiam cum se amat ipsum quoque amorem sui genuisse uideatur? Erat enim amabilis sibi et antequam se amaret quia poterat se amare, sicut erat sibi noscibilis et antequam se nosset quia se poterat nosse. Nam si non sibi esset noscibilis, numquam se nosse potuisset; ita si non sibi esset amabilis, numquam se amare potuisset.

What then is to be said about love: why does it not also, when it loves itself, seem to have begotten the love of itself as well? For it was lovable to itself even before it loved itself, because it could love itself, just as it was knowable to itself even before it knew itself, because it could know itself. For if it were not knowable to itself, it could never have known itself; so, if it were not lovable to itself, it could never have been able to love itself.

Cur itaque amando se non genuisse dicatur amorem suum sicut cognoscendo se genuit notitiam suam? An eo quidem manifeste ostenditur hoc amoris esse principium unde procedit? Ab ipsa quippe mente procedit quae sibi est amabilis antequam se amet, atque ita principium est amoris sui quo se amat.

Why, therefore, is it said that by loving herself she did not beget her own love, just as by knowing herself she begot her own knowledge? Or is it indeed thereby plainly shown to be the principle of love whence it proceeds? For it proceeds from the mind itself, which is lovable to itself before it loves itself, and thus it is the principle of its own love by which it loves itself.

Sed ideo non recte dicitur genitus ab ea sicut notitia sui qua se nouit quia notitia iam inuentum est quod partum uel repertum dicitur, quod saepe praecedit inquisitio eo fine quietura. Nam inquisitio est appetitus inueniendi, quod idem ualet si dicas reperiendi. Quae autem reperiuntur quasi pariuntur, unde proli similia sunt.

But for this reason it is not rightly said to be begotten by it as is the knowledge of itself by which it knows itself, because knowledge is already a thing found (an invention), which is called a birth or a discovery, which an inquiry often precedes, to come to rest in that end. For inquiry is an appetite for finding—which amounts to the same if you say for discovering. And the things that are discovered are, as it were, brought forth; whence they are like to progeny.

Vbi nisi in ipsa notitia? Ibi enim quasi expressa formantur. Nam etsi iam erant res quas quaerendo inuenimus, notitia tamen ipsa non erat quam sicut prolem nascentem deputamus.

Where, if not in the knowledge itself? For there they are, as it were, formed as expressed. For although the things which we find by inquiring already existed, yet the knowledge itself was not, which we deem to be nascent progeny.

Porro appetitus ille qui est in quaerendo procedit a quaerente et pendet quodam modo, neque requiescit fine quo intenditur nisi id quod quaeritur inuentum quaerenti copuletur. Qui appetitus, id est inquisitio, quamuis amor esse non uideatur quo id quod notum est amatur (hoc enim adhuc ut cognoscatur agitur), tamen ex eodem genere quiddam est. Nam uoluntas iam dici potest quia omnis qui quaerit inuenire uult, et si id quaeritur quod ad notitiam pertineat, omnis qui quaerit nosse uult.

Moreover, that appetite which is in seeking proceeds from the seeker and in a certain manner depends, nor does it rest in the end toward which it is aimed unless that which is sought, once found, is coupled to the seeker. Which appetite, that is, inquiry, although it does not seem to be love by which that which is known is loved (for this is being done still in order that it may be known), nevertheless is something of the same genus. For it can already be called will, since everyone who seeks wants to find; and if that is sought which pertains to knowledge, everyone who seeks wants to know.

Quod si ardenter atque instanter uult, studere dicitur, quod maxime in assequendis atque adipiscendis quibusque doctrinis dici solet. Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam quo id quod nosse uolumus quaerendo et inueniendo nascitur proles ipsa notitia, ac per hoc appetitus ille quo concipitur pariturque notitia partus et proles recte dici non potest. Idemque appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae fit amor cognitae dum tenet atque amplectitur placitam prolem, id est notitiam gignentique coniungit.

But if one wills ardently and insistently, he is said to study—a phrase especially used in attaining and acquiring the several doctrines. Therefore a certain appetite precedes the birth of the mind, by which that which we wish to know, through seeking and finding, brings forth the offspring itself, notitia; and through this, that appetite by which notitia is conceived and brought forth cannot rightly be called the offspring and the child. And the same appetite, by which one yearns for the thing to be known, becomes love of the known, while it holds and embraces the pleasing offspring, that is, the notitia, and joins it to the begetter.

Et est quaedam imago trinitatis, ipsa mens et notitia eius, quod est proles eius ac de se ipsa uerbum eius, et amor tertius, et haec tria unum atque una substantia. Nec minor proles dum tantam se nouit mens quanta est, nec minor amor dum tantum se diligit quantum nouit et quanta est.

And there is a certain image of the Trinity: the mind itself and its knowledge, which is its offspring and its word about itself; and love as the third; and these three are one and of one substance. Neither is the offspring lesser, while the mind knows itself to be as great as it is, nor is the love lesser, while it loves itself as much as it knows itself and as great as it is.