Gellius: NOCTES ATTICAE

I. Quali proportione quibusque collectionibus Plutarchus ratiocinatum esse Pythagoram philosophum dixerit de comprehendenda corporis proceritate, qua fuit Hercules, cum vitam inter homines viveret.

1. By what proportion and by what computations Plutarch said that the philosopher Pythagoras had reasoned for comprehending the height of the body which Hercules had, when he lived among men.

1 Plutarchus in libro, quem de Herculis, quamdiu inter homines fuit, animi corporisque ingenio atque virtutibus conscripsit, scite subtiliterque ratiocinatum Pythagoram philosophum dicit in reperienda modulandaque status longitudinisque eius praestantia.

1 Plutarch, in the book which he composed on the genius and virtues of Hercules' mind and body, so long as he was among men, says that the philosopher Pythagoras reasoned cleverly and subtly in discovering and measuring the preeminence of his stature and length.

2 Nam cum fere constaret curriculum stadii, quod est Pisis apud Iovem Olympium, Herculem pedibus suis metatum idque fecisse longum pedes sescentos, cetera quoque stadia in terra Graecia ab aliis postea instituta pedum quidem esse numero sescentum, sed tamen esse aliquantulum breviora, facile intellexit modum spatiumque plantae Herculis ratione proportionis habita tanto fuisse quam aliorum procerius, quanto Olympicum stadium longius esset quam cetera.

2 For since it was nearly agreed that the racecourse of the stadium, which is at Pisa by Olympian Jove, had been measured out by Hercules with his own feet and that he made it six hundred feet long, while the other stadia too in the land of Greece, later instituted by others, are indeed six hundred in number of feet, yet are somewhat shorter, he easily understood that the measure and span of Hercules’ sole, account being taken of proportion, was by just so much more ample than that of others as the Olympic stadium was longer than the rest.

3 Comprehensa autem mensura Herculani pedis secundum naturalem membrorum omnium inter se competentiam modificatus est atque ita id collegit, quod erat consequens, tanto fuisse Herculem corpore excelsiorem quam alios, quanto Olympicum stadium ceteris pari numero factis anteiret.

3 Having comprehended the measure of Hercules’ foot, he modulated it according to the natural congruence of all the limbs with one another, and thus collected what was consequent: that Hercules was loftier in body than others by as much as the Olympic stadium outstripped the rest, although made with an equal number of feet.

II. Ab Herode Attico C. V. tempestive deprompta in quendam iactantem et gloriosum adulescentem, specie tantum philosophiae sectatorem, verba Epicteti Stoici, quibus festiviter a vero Stoico seiunxit volgus loquacium nebulonum, qui se Stoicos nuncuparent.

2. The words of Epictetus the Stoic, timely drawn forth by Herodes Atticus, a Most Distinguished Man, against a certain boastful and vainglorious adolescent, a sectator of philosophy in appearance only; by them he wittily severed from the true Stoic the loquacious rabble of good-for-nothings who styled themselves Stoics.

1 Herodes Atticus, vir et Graeca facundia et consulari honore praeditus, accersebat saepe, nos cum apud magistros Athenis essemus, in villas ei urbi proximas me et clarissimum virum Servilianum compluresque alios nostrates, qui Roma in Graeciam ad capiendum ingenii cultum concesserant.

1 Herodes Atticus, a man endowed both with Greek eloquence and with consular honor, would often summon, when we were with our masters at Athens, to the villas nearest that city, me and the most distinguished man Servilianus and several other of our compatriots, who had gone from Rome into Greece to acquire the cultivation of talent.

2 Atque ibi tunc, cum essemus apud eum in villa, cui nomen est Cephisia, et aestu anni et sidere autumni flagrantissimo, propulsabamus incommoda caloris lucorum umbra ingentium, longis ambulacris et mollibus, aedium positu refrigeranti, lavacris nitidis et abundis et collucentibus totiusque villae venustate aquis undique canoris atque avibus personante.

2 And there then, when we were with him at the villa whose name is Cephisia, both in the heat of the year and under the most blazing autumnal star, we were driving off the inconveniences of the heat by the shade of vast groves, with long and soft promenades, with the position of the rooms giving coolness, with baths bright and abundant and gleaming, and with the loveliness of the whole villa, resounding with canorous waters on every side and with birds.

3 Erat ibidem nobiscum simul adulescens philosophiae sectator, disciplinae, ut ipse dicebat, stoicae, sed loquacior inpendio et promptior.

3 There was there with us at the same time an adolescent, a follower of philosophy, of the Stoic discipline, as he himself said, but exceedingly loquacious and over-ready.

4 Is plerumque in convivio sermonibus, qui post epulas haberi solent, multa atque inmodica de philosophiae doctrinis intempestive atque insubide disserebat praeque se uno ceteros omnes linguae Atticae principes gentemque omnem togatam, quodcumque nomen Latinum rudes esse et agrestes praedicabat atque interea vocabulis haut facile cognitis, syllogismorum captionumque dialecticarum laqueis strepebat kyrievontas et hesychazontas et soreitas aliosque id genus griphos neminem posse dicens nisi se dissolvere. Rem vero ethicam naturamque humani ingenii virtutumque origines officiaque earum et confinia aut contra morborum vitiorumque fraudes animorumque labes, pestilentias asseverabat nulli esse ulli magis ea omnia explorata, comperta meditataque.

4 He for the most part at a convivium, in the conversations which are wont to be held after the courses, discoursed many and immoderate things about the doctrines of philosophy, untimely and unsavory; and, setting himself alone before all others, he was proclaiming that the chiefs of the Attic tongue and the whole toga-clad nation, whatever bore the Latin name, were untrained and rustic; and meanwhile, with terms not easily recognized, he was rattling on with the snares of syllogisms and the captious traps of dialectic, kyrievontas and hesychazontas and sorites and other griphoi of that kind, saying that no one could untie them except himself. But the ethical subject, and the nature of the human ingenium, and the origins of the virtues and their offices and confines, or, on the contrary, the diseases and the deceits of vices and the stains and pestilences of souls, he kept averring that to no one whatsoever were all those things more explored, ascertained, and meditated.

5 Cruciatibus autem doloribusque corporis et periculis mortem minitantibus habitum statumque vitae beatae, quem se esse adeptum putabat, neque laedi neque inminui existimabat ac ne oris quoque et vultus serenitatem stoici hominis umquam ulla posse aegritudine obnubilari.

5 But by the torments and pains of the body and by perils threatening death, he thought that the habit and state of the blessed life, which he supposed himself to have attained, could neither be harmed nor diminished, and that not even the serenity of the mouth and of the countenance as well of the Stoic man could ever be clouded by any sickness.

6 Has ille inanes glorias cum flaret iamque omnes finem cuperent verbisque eius defetigati pertaeduissent, tum Herodes Graeca, uti plurimus ei mos fuit, oratione utens "permitte," inquit "philosophorum amplissime, quoniam respondere nos tibi, quos vocas idiotas, non quimus, recitari ex libro, quid de huiuscemodi magniloquentia vestra senserit dixeritque Epictetus, Stoicorum maximus", iussitque proferri dissertationum Epicteti digestarum ab Arriano primum librum, in quo ille venerandus senex iuvenes, qui se Stoicos appellabant, neque frugis neque operae probae, sed theorematis tantum nugalibus et puerilium isagogarum commentationibus deblaterantes obiurgatione iusta incessivit.

6 When he was puffing up these empty glories, and now all were desiring an end and, worn out by his words, had grown thoroughly weary, then Herodes, employing Greek speech, as was very much his custom, said: “Permit, most ample of philosophers, since we, whom you call idiots, are not able to answer you, that there be recited from a book what Epictetus, the greatest of the Stoics, has thought and said about magniloquence of this sort”; and he ordered the first book of the Discourses of Epictetus, digested by Arrian, to be brought forth, in which that venerable old man assailed with just objurgation the youths who called themselves Stoics—of no fruit and of no honest effort—but prating only of trifling theorems and the commentations of puerile isagogic primers.

7 Lecta igitur sunt ex libro, qui prolatus est, ea, quae addidi; quibus verbis Epictetus severe simul et festiviter seiunxit atque divisit a vero atque sincero Stoico, qui esset procul dubio akolytos, ananankastos, aparapodistos, eleutheros, euporon, eudaimonon, volgus aliud nebulonum hominum, qui se Stoicos nuncuparent atraque verborum et argutiarum fuligine ob oculos audientium iacta sanctissimae disciplinae nomen ementirentur:

7 Accordingly there were read from the book that was produced those passages which I have added; with these words Epictetus, both severely and wittily at once, separated and divided from the true and sincere Stoic—who would be, beyond doubt, akolytos (unhindered), ananankastos (uncompelled), aparapodistos (not to be tripped), eleutheros (free), euporon (well-furnished), eudaimonon (fortunate)—another rabble of good-for-nothing men, who styled themselves Stoics and, with the black soot of words and quibbles flung before the eyes of their hearers, falsely claimed the name of the most most-holy discipline:

8 Eipe moi peri agathon kai kakon. Akove. Iliothen me pheron enemos Kikonessi pelassen.

8 Tell me about good and evil. Listen. A wind, carrying me from Ilium, brought me near to the Cicones.

9 Ton onton ta men estin agatha, ta de kaka, ta de adiaphora. Agatha men oun aretai kai ta metechonta auton, kaka de kakia kai ta metechonta kakias, adiaphora de kai ta metaxu touton, ploutos, hygeia, zoe, thanatos, hedone, ponos.

9 Of the things that are, some are good, others bad, and others indifferent. The good, then, are virtues and the things participating in them; the bad are vice and the things participating in vice; and indifferent (adiaphora) are also the things between these: wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, pain.

10 Pothen oidas? Hellanikos legei en tois Aigyptiakois. Ti gar diapherei touto eipein, e hoti Diogenes en tei ethikei e Chrysippos e kleanthes?

10 Whence do you know? Hellanicus says it in the Aegyptiaca. For what difference does it make to say this, rather than to say that Diogenes in the Ethics, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes?

Bebasanikas oun ti auton kai dogma sautou pepoiesai?

So then, have you tested him at all, and made a dogma of your own?

11 Deiknye, pos eiothas en ploioi cheimazesthai; memnesai tautes tes diaireseos, hotan psophesei to histion kai anakraugaseis? An soi tis kakoscholos pos parastas eipei: "lege moi, tous theous soi, ha proien eleges, me ti kakia estin to navagesai, me ti kakias metechon?" ouk ara xylon enseiseis autoi? "ti hemin kai soi, anthrope!

11 Show how you are accustomed to be storm-tossed on a ship; remember this distinction when the sail will make a noise and you will cry out aloud. If some captious fellow, standing by, should say: "Tell me, by the gods, what you were just now saying—surely to be shipwrecked is not some wickedness, surely it partakes in no wickedness?" will you not then brandish a cudgel (a piece of wood) at him? "What is there between us and you, man!"

apollymetha, kai sy elthon paizeis."

we are perishing, and you, having come, are playing."

12 Ean de se ho Kaisar metapempsetai kategoreumenon . . .

12 If Caesar summons you, being accused . . .

His ille auditis insolentissimus adulescens obticuit, tamquam si ea omnia non ab Epicteto in quosdam alios, sed ab Herode in eum ipsum dicta essent.

With these things heard, that most insolent adolescent fell silent, as if all those things had been spoken not by Epictetus against certain others, but by Herodes against himself.

III. Quod Chilo consilium anceps pro salute amici cepit; quodque est circumspecte et anxie considerandum, an pro utilitatibus amicorum delinquendum aliquando sit; notataque inibi et relata, quae et Theophrastus et M. Cicero super ea re scripserunt.

3. What two‑edged counsel Chilo adopted for a friend’s safety; and that it must be considered circumspectly and anxiously whether one ought sometimes to be delinquent for the utilities of friends; and therein are noted and related the things which both Theophrastus and M. Cicero wrote on that matter.

1 Lacedaemonium Chilonem, virum ex illo incluto numero sapientium, scriptum est in libris eorum, qui vitas resque gestas clarorum hominum memoriae mandaverunt, eum Chilonem in vitae suae postremo, cum iam inibi mors occuparet, ad circumstantis amicos sic locutum:

1 The Lacedaemonian Chilo, a man from that famed number of sages, it has been written in the books of those who have consigned to memory the lives and deeds of illustrious men, that that Chilo, at the end of his life, when death was already taking hold of him there, spoke thus to the friends standing around:

2 "Dicta" inquit "mea factaque in aetate longa pleraque omnia fuisse non paenitenda, fors sit ut vos etiam sciatis.

2 "My sayings," he said, "and deeds in a long lifetime have for the most part all been not to be regretted; perhaps you too know it."

3 Ego quidem in hoc certe tempore non fallo me nihil esse quicquam commissum a me, cuius memoria mihi aegritudini sit, ni illud profecto unum sit, quod rectene an perperam fecerim, nondum mihi plane liquet.

3 I indeed at this very time am not mistaken that there is nothing whatsoever committed by me, the memory of which is a grief to me, unless indeed that one thing, as to whether I did it rightly or perversely, is not yet quite clear to me.

4 Super amici capite iudex cum duobus aliis fui. Ita lex fuit, uti eum hominem condemnari necessum esset. Aut amicus igitur capitis perdendus aut adhibenda fraus legi fuit.

4 Over my friend's capital case I was judge with two others. Such was the law, that that man had to be condemned. Either, then, my friend had to be forfeited in respect of his head (i.e., life), or fraud had to be applied to the law.

5 Multa cum animo meo ad casum tam ancipitem medendum consultavi. Visum est esse id, quod feci, praequam erant alia, toleratu facilius:

5 I deliberated many things with my mind to remedy so uncertain a case. It seemed that what I did was, rather than the other options, easier to tolerate:

6 ipse tacitus ad condemnandum sententiam tuli, is qui simul iudicabant, ut absolverent, persuasi.

6 I myself, silent, delivered my vote for condemnation; those who were judging together, I persuaded to acquit.

7 Sic mihi et iudicis et amici officium in re tanta salvum fuit. Hanc capio ex eo facto molestiam, quod metuo, ne a perfidia et culpa non abhorreat in eadem re eodemque tempore inque communi negotio, quod mihi optimum factu duxerim, diversum eius aliis suasisse."

7 Thus for me both the duty of judge and of friend in so great a matter was safe. From this deed I take this vexation, that I fear lest it not abhor from perfidy and fault, that in the same matter and at the same time and in a common business, what I have deemed best to do for myself, I advised to others something diverse for him."

8 Et hic autem Chilo, praestabilis homo sapientiae, quonam usque debuerit contra legem contraque ius pro amico progredi, dubitavit, eaque res in fine quoque vitae ipso animum eius anxit,

8 And here too Chilo, a preeminent man of wisdom, doubted how far he ought to proceed against the law and against justice for a friend, and this matter even at the very end of his life itself distressed his mind,

9 et alii deinceps multi philosophiae sectatores, ut in libris eorum scriptum est, satis inquisite satisque sollicite quaesiverunt, ut verbis, quae scripta sunt, ipsis utar, ei dei boethein toi philoi para to dikaion kai mechri posou kai poia. Ea verba significant quaesisse eos, an nonnumquam contra ius contrave morem faciendum pro amico sit et in qualibus causis et quemnam usque ad modum.

9 and others thereafter, many sectators of philosophy, as in their books it is written, inquired quite inquisitively and quite solicitously, to use the very words that are written: “whether one ought to help a friend contrary to the right, and how far, and of what sort.” Those words signify that they asked whether sometimes something should be done for a friend against law and against custom, and in what kinds of causes, and up to what measure.

10 Super hac quaestione cum ab aliis, sicuti dixi, multis, tum vel diligentissime a Theophrasto disputatur, viro in philosophia peripatetica modestissimo doctissimoque, eaque disputatio scripta est, si recte meminimus, in libro eius de amicitia primo.

10 On this question, as I said, there is disputation by many others, and even most diligently by Theophrastus, a man in Peripatetic philosophy most modest and most learned, and that disputation, if we remember rightly, is written in his first book On Friendship.

11 Eum librum M. Cicero videtur legisse, cum ipse quoque librum de amicitia componeret. Et cetera quidem, quae sumenda a Theophrasto existimavit, ut ingenium facundiaque eius fuit, sumpsit et transposuit commodissime aptissimeque;

11 That book M. Cicero seems to have read, when he himself also was composing a book on friendship. And indeed the other things which he judged were to be taken from Theophrastus, as his ingenuity and facundity were, he took and transposed most commodiously and most aptly;

12 hunc autem locum, de quo satis quaesitum esse dixi, omnium rerum aliarum difficillimum strictim atque cursim transgressus est, neque ea, quae a Theophrasto pensiculate atque enucleate scripta sunt, exsecutus est, sed anxietate illa et quasi morositate disputationis praetermissa genus ipsum rei tantum paucis verbis notavit.

12 but this passage, about which I said enough inquiry had been made, he passed over briefly and cursorily, the most difficult of all the other matters, nor did he carry out those things which were written by Theophrastus with careful weighing and clear enucleation, but, with that anxiety and, as it were, fastidiousness of disputation left aside, he merely noted the very genus of the matter in a few words.

13 Ea verba Ciceronis, si recensere quis vellet, apposui: "His igitur finibus utendum esse arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sunt, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut etiam, si qua fortuna acciderit, ut minus iustae voluntates amicorum adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim, quatenus amicitiae venia dari possit." "Cum agetur" inquit "aut caput amici aut fama, declinandum est de via, ut etiam iniquam voluntatem illius adiutemus."

13 I set down those words of Cicero, if anyone should wish to review them: "Therefore, I judge that these boundaries must be used, that, when the morals of friends are amended, then there be between them a community of all things, counsels, volitions without any exception, so that even, if some fortune should befall, that the less just volitions of friends ought to be helped, in which either their life or fame is at stake, one should turn aside from the road, provided only that no supreme turpitude follow; for there is, to what extent indulgence may be given to friendship." "When either a friend's life or fame will be at stake," he says, "one must turn aside from the road, so that we even aid that man's iniquitous volition."

14 Sed cuiusmodi declinatio esse ista debeat qualisque ad adiuvandum digressio et in quanta voluntatis amici iniquitate, non dicit.

14 But what sort of declination that ought to be, and what kind of digression for aiding, and in how great an iniquity of a friend's will, he does not say.

15 Quid autem refert scire me in eiusmodi periculis amicorum, si non magna me turpitudo insecutura est, de via esse recta declinandum, nisi id quoque me docuerit, quam putet magnam turpitudinem, et cum decessero de via, quousque degredi debeam? "Est enim" inquit "quatenus dari amicitiae venia possit."

15 What, however, does it matter for me to know, in perils of friends of this kind, that, if no great turpitude is going to follow me, one must turn aside from the straight road, unless he also teaches me how great a turpitude he thinks it, and, when I have departed from the road, how far I ought to step down? "For" he says "there is a limit to which pardon may be given to friendship."

16 Hoc immo ipsum est, quod maxime discendum est quodque ab his, qui docent, minime dicitur, quatenus quaque fini dari amicitiae venia debeat.

16 This—nay rather this very thing—is what most of all must be learned, and what is least said by those who teach: to what extent and to what limit license ought to be granted to friendship.

17 Chilo ille sapiens, de quo paulo ante dixi, conservandi amici causa de via declinavit. Sed video, quousque progressus sit; falsum enim pro amici salute consilium dedit.

17 Chilo, that wise man, of whom I spoke a little before, for the sake of preserving a friend turned aside from the way. But I see how far he advanced; for he gave false counsel for a friend’s safety.

18 Id ipsum tamen in fine quoque vitae, an iure posset reprehendi culparique, dubitavit. "Contra patriam" inquit Cicero "arma pro amico sumenda non sunt."

18 That very thing, nevertheless, even at the end of life, he doubted whether it could by right be reprehended and blamed. "Against the fatherland," said Cicero, "arms are not to be taken up for a friend."

19 Hoc profecto nemo ignoravit, et "priusquam Theognis", quod Lucilius ait, "nasceretur". Set id quaero, id desidero: cum pro amico contra ius, contra quam licet, salva tamen libertate atque pace faciendum est et cum de via, sicut ipse ait, declinandum est, quid et quantum et in quali causa et quonam usque id fieri debeat.

19 This, assuredly, no one ignored, even "before Theognis", as Lucilius says, "was born." But this I ask, this I desire: when for a friend, against right, beyond what is permitted, yet with liberty and peace preserved, something must be done, and when, as he himself says, one must turn aside from the road, what and how much and in what kind of cause and how far this ought to be done.

20 Pericles ille Atheniensis, vir egregio ingenio bonisque omnibus disciplinis ornatus, in una quidem specie, set planius tamen, quid existimaret, professus est. Nam cum amicus eum rogaret, ut pro re causaque eius falsum deiuraret, his ad eum verbis usus est: Dei men symprattein tois philois, alla mechri ton theon.

20 That Pericles the Athenian, a man of distinguished ingenuity and adorned with all good disciplines, in one aspect indeed, yet more plainly, professed what he thought. For when a friend asked him to swear falsely on behalf of his matter and cause, he used these words to him: “I do indeed cooperate with my friends, but only up to the gods.”

21 Theophrastus autem in eo, quo dixi, libro inquisitius quidem super hac ipsa re et exactius pressiusque quam Cicero disserit.

21 Theophrastus, however, in that book which I mentioned, discusses this very matter more inquisitively and more exactly and more precisely than Cicero.

22 Set is quoque in docendo non de unoquoque facto singillatim existimat neque certis exemplorum documentis, set generibus rerum summatim universimque utitur ad hunc ferme modum:

22 But he also, in teaching, does not estimate each deed singly nor by certain documentary proofs of examples, but uses genera of things summarily and universally, to about this mode:

23 "Parva" inquit "et tenuis vel turpitudo vel infamia subeunda est, si ea re magna utilitas amico quaeri potest. Rependitur quippe et compensatur leve damnum delibatae honestatis maiore alia gravioreque in adiuvando amico honestate, minimaque illa labes et quasi lacuna famae munimentis partarum amico utilitatium solidatur.

23 "Small," he says, "and slight disgrace or infamy must be undergone, if by that act a great utility can be sought for a friend. For the light damage of a delibated (nibbled-at) honesty is repaid and compensated by another greater and graver honesty in aiding a friend, and that very minimal blemish and, as it were, lacuna of fame is made firm by the muniments of the utilities procured for the friend.

24 "Neque nominibus" inquit "moveri nos oportet, quod paria genere ipso non sunt honestas meae famae et rei amici utilitas. Ponderibus haec enim potestatibusque praesentibus, non vocabulorum appellationibus neque dignitatibus generum diiudicanda sunt.

24 "Nor by names," he says, "ought we to be moved, because the honesty of my fame and the utility of a friend's matter are not equal in their very kind. By weights and present powers, indeed, these things are to be adjudged, not by the appellations of words nor by the dignities of kinds.

25 Nam cum in rebus aut paribus aut non longe secus utilitas amici aut honestas nostra consistit, honestas procul dubio praeponderat; cum vero amici utilitas nimio est amplior, honestatis autem nostrae in re non gravi levis iactura est, tunc, quod utile amico est, id prae illo, quod honestum nobis est, fit plenius, sicuti est magnum pondus aeris parva lamna auri pretiosius."

25 For when in matters either equal or not far otherwise the utility of a friend or our honesty consists, honesty beyond doubt outweighs; but when indeed the friend’s utility is by far more ample, and the slight loss of our honesty is in a matter not grave, then what is useful to the friend, in preference to that which is honest for us, becomes more fully so, just as a great weight of bronze is more precious than a small plate of gold."

26 Verba adeo ipsa Theophrasti super ea re adscripsi: Ouk, ei de pou touto toi genei timioteron, ede kai, hotioun an ei meros toutou, pros to telikon thaterou synkrinomenon haireton estai. Lego de oion, ouk, ei chrysion timioteron chalkou megethos antiparaballomenon pleon doxei: alla poiesei tina rhopen kai to plethos kai to megethos.

26 Accordingly I have appended Theophrastus’s very words on that matter: “Not that, if in some way this is in its genus more estimable, then also whatever part of this it may be, when compared with the final end of the other, will be choiceworthy. I say, for example: not that, if gold is more precious than bronze, it will seem greater when a magnitude is set in counter-comparison; rather, quantity and magnitude will produce a certain inclination (of the scale).”

27 Favorinus quoque philosophus huiuscemodi indulgentiam gratiae tempestive laxato paulum remissoque subtili iustitiae examine his verbis definivit: He kaloumene charis para tois anthropois, touto estin hyphesis akribeias en deonti.

27 Favorinus the philosopher also defined an indulgence of favor of this sort, with the subtle examination of justice seasonably relaxed a little and remitted, in these words: “The so‑called grace among men is a relaxation of exactness in what is due.”

28 Post deinde idem Theophrastus ad hanc ferme sententiam disseruit: "Has tamen" inquit "parvitates rerum et magnitudines atque has omnes officiorum aestimationes alia nonnumquam momenta extrinsecus atque aliae quasi appendices personarum et causarum et temporum et circumstantiae ipsius necessitates, quas includere in praecepta difficilest, moderantur et regunt et quasi gubernant et nunc ratas efficiunt, nunc inritas."

28 Afterwards then the same Theophrastus discoursed to about this sense: "These, however," he says, "the smallnesses of things and the magnitudes and all these estimations of duties are sometimes by other moments from without and by other quasi appendices of persons and of causes and of times and by the necessities of the circumstance itself—which it is very difficult to include in precepts—are moderated and ruled and, as it were, governed, and now rendered ratified, now void."

29 Haec taliaque Theophrastus satis caute et sollicite et religiose cum discernendi magis disceptandique diligentia quam cum decernendi sententia atque fiducia scripsit, quoniam profecto causarum ac temporum varietates discriminumque ac differentiarum tenuitates derectum atque perpetuum distinctumque in rebus singulis praeceptum, quod ego nos in prima tractatus istius parte desiderare dixeram, non capiunt.

29 Theophrastus wrote these and such things quite cautiously and solicitously and religiously, with a diligence of discerning and disputing rather than with a sentence of decreeing and confidence, since indeed the varieties of causes and times and the subtleties of discriminations and differences do not admit a straight and perpetual and distinct precept in individual matters, which I said that we were desiring in the first part of this treatise.

30 Eius autem Chilonis, a quo disputatiunculae huius initium fecimus, cum alia quaedam sunt monita utilia atque prudentia, tum id maxime exploratae utilitatis est, quod duas ferocissimas adfectiones amoris atque odii intra modum cautum coercuit. "Hac" inquit "fini ames, tamquam forte fortuna et osurus, hac itidem tenus oderis, tamquam fortasse post amaturus."

30 But of that Chilon, from whom we made the beginning of this little disputation, since certain other admonitions are useful and prudent, yet this is of the most well-tested utility: that he coerced within a guarded measure the two most ferocious affections of love and of hate. "To this limit," he says, "love, as if by chance and going also to hate; likewise to this extent hate, as if perhaps afterward you will be going to love."

31 Super hoc eodem Chilone Plutarchus philosophus in libro peri psyches primo verbis his ita scripsit: Cheilon ho palaios akousas tinos legontos medena echein echthron erotesen, ei medena philon echei, nomizon ex anankes epakolouthein kai synemplekesthai philiais apechtheias.

31 On this same Chilon, Plutarch the philosopher in the first book On the Soul wrote thus in these words: Chilon the elder, on hearing someone saying that he had no enemy, asked whether he had no friend, thinking that of necessity hatreds follow upon and are interwoven with friendships.

IV. Quam tenuiter curioseque exploraverit Antonius Iulianus in oratione M. Tullii verbi ab eo mutati argutiam.

4. How Antonius Julianus subtly and meticulously explored, in a speech of M. Tullius, the subtlety of a word changed by him.

1 Antonius Iulianus rhetor perquam fuit honesti atque amoeni ingeni. Doctrina quoque ista utiliore ac delectabili veterumque elegantiarum cura et memoria multa fuit; ad hoc scripta omnia antiquiora tam curiose spectabat et aut virtutes pensitabat aut vitia rimabatur, ut iudicium esse factum ad amussim diceres.

1 Antonius Iulianus the rhetorician was of an exceedingly honorable and agreeable wit. His learning too was of that more useful and delectable kind, and he was abundant in care and memory of the elegances of the ancients; to this, he regarded all the more ancient writings so curiously and either weighed the virtues or probed the vices, that you would say a judgment had been made to the line.

2 Is Iulianus super eo enthymemati, quod est in oratione M. Tullii, quam pro Cn. Plancio dixit, ita existimavit—sed verba prius, de quibus iudicium ab eo factum est, ipsa ponam:

2 That Julianus, concerning that enthymeme which is in the oration of M. Tullius, which he delivered on behalf of Cn. Plancius, judged thus—but first I will set down the very words, about which judgment was made by him:

3 "Quamquam dissimilis est pecuniae debitio et gratiae. Nam qui pecuniam dissolvit, statim non habet id, quod reddidit, qui autem debet, is retinet alienum: gratiam autem et qui refert habet, et qui habet, in eo ipso, quod habet, refert.

3 "Although the indebtedness of money and of favor is dissimilar. For he who pays out money immediately does not have that which he has rendered, but he who owes retains what is another’s; whereas a favor both he who returns it has, and he who has it, by that very having, returns it."

4 Neque ego nunc Plancio desinam debere, si hoc solvero, nec minus ei redderem voluntate ipsa, si hoc molestiae non accidisset"—"crispum sane" inquit "agmen orationis rotundumque ac modulo ipso numerorum venustum, sed quod cum venia legendum sit verbi paulum ideo inmutati, ut sententiae fides salva esset.

4 "Nor shall I now cease to owe Plancius, if I discharge this, nor would I repay him less by the will itself, if this annoyance had not occurred"—"crisp indeed," he says, "a column of oration, rounded and charming by the very module of the numbers, but one which ought to be read with indulgence, with a word slightly for this reason altered, so that the fidelity of the sense might be preserved."

5 Namque debitio gratiae et pecuniae conlata verbum hoc utrubique servari postulat.

5 For the indebtedness of favor and of money, when collated, postulates that this word be preserved in both cases.

6 Ita enim recte opposita inter sese gratiae pecuniaeque debitio videbitur, si et pecunia quidem deberi dicatur et gratia, sed quid eveniat in pecunia debita solutave, quid contra in gratia debita redditave, debitionis verbo utrimque servato disseratur. Cicero autem," inquit "cum gratiae pecuniaeque debitionem dissimilem esse dixisset eiusque sententiae rationem redderet, verbum "debet" in pecunia ponit, in gratia "habet" subicit pro "debet"; ita enim dicit: "gratiam autem et qui refert habet, et qui habet, in eo ipso, quod habet, refert."

6 For the indebtedness of gratitude and of money set in opposition to each other will rightly appear thus, if both money indeed is said to be owed and gratitude as well, but it be discussed, with the term of indebtedness preserved on both sides, what happens in money owed or paid, what, conversely, in gratitude owed or rendered. But Cicero," he says, "after he had said that the indebtedness of gratitude and of money is dissimilar and had given the rationale of that opinion, sets the word 'owes' in the case of money, in the case of gratitude he puts 'has' in place of 'owes'; for thus he says: 'gratitude, moreover, both he who returns it has, and he who has it, in that very thing which he has, returns.'"

7 Sed id verbum "habet" cum proposita comparatione non satis convenit. Debitio enim gratiae, non habitio, cum pecunia confertur, atque ideo consequens quidem fuerat sic dicere: "et qui debet, in eo ipso, quod debet, refert"; sed absurdum et nimis coactum foret, si nondum redditam gratiam eo ipso redditam diceret, quia debetur.

7 But that word "has" does not sufficiently agree with the proposed comparison. For the debition of gratitude, not habition, is compared with money, and therefore it would indeed have been consequent to speak thus: "and he who owes, in the very fact that he owes, pays back"; but it would be absurd and too forced, if he should say that gratitude not yet repaid is by that very fact repaid, because it is owed.

8 Inmutavit ergo," inquit "subdidit verbum ei verbo, quod omiserat, finitimum, ut videretur et sensum debitionis conlatae non reliquisse et concinnitatem sententiae retinuisse." Ad hunc modum Iulianus enodabat diiudicabatque veterum scriptorum sententias, quas aput eum adulescentes lectitabant.

8 "He altered, therefore," he said, "he substituted a word for that word which he had omitted, a neighboring one, so that he might seem both not to have left behind the sense of the debition conferred and to have retained the concinnity of the sentence." In this manner Julianus unraveled and adjudged the opinions of the ancient writers, which adolescents used to read with him.

V. Quod Demosthenes rhetor cultu corporis atque vestitu probris obnoxio infamique munditia fuit; quodque item Hortensius orator ob eiusmodi munditias gestumque in agendo histrionicum Dionysiae saltatriculae cognomento compellatus est.

V. That Demosthenes the rhetor, in the care of the body and in dress, was liable to reproaches and to infamous neatness; and that likewise Hortensius the orator, on account of such neatnesses and a histrionic gesture in delivery, was addressed by the cognomen of Dionysia the little dancing-girl.

1 Demosthenen traditum est vestitu ceteroque cultu corporis nitido venustoque nimisque accurato fuisse. Et hinc ei ta kompsa illa chlaniskia et malakoi chitoniskoi ab aemulis adversariisque probro data, hinc etiam turpibus indignisque in eum verbis non temperatum, quin parum vir et ore quoque polluto diceretur.

1 It has been handed down that Demosthenes, in dress and in the rest of bodily adornment, was neat and charming and overly meticulous. And from this came the reproach from rivals and adversaries of those elegant little cloaks and soft little tunics, and hence too they did not refrain from shameful and unworthy words against him; indeed he was said to be scarcely a man and even foul-mouthed.

2 Ad eundem modum Q. Hortensius omnibus ferme oratoribus aetatis suae, nisi M. Tullio, clarior, quod multa munditia et circumspecte compositeque indutus et amictus esset manusque eius inter agendum forent argutae admodum et gestuosae, maledictis compellationibusque probris iactatus est, multaque in eum, quasi in histrionem, in ipsis causis atque iudiciis dicta sunt.

2 In the same manner Q. Hortensius, more renowned than almost all the orators of his age, save M. Tullius, because he was dressed and draped with much elegance, circumspectly and neatly composed, and his hands, in the course of pleading, were very expressive and full of gesture, was assailed with insults and abusive appellations and reproaches, and many things were said against him, as if against an actor, in the very cases and trials.

3 Sed cum L. Torquatus, subagresti homo ingenio et infestivo, gravius acerbiusque apud consilium iudicum, cum de causa Sullae quaereretur, non iam histrionem eum esse diceret, sed gesticulariam Dionysiamque eum notissimae saltatriculae nomine appellaret, tum voce molli atque demissa Hortensius "Dionysia," inquit "Dionysia malo equidem esse quam quod tu, Torquate, amousos, anaphroditos, aprosdionysos".

3 But when L. Torquatus, a man of somewhat rustic and boorish disposition, pressed more heavily and more bitterly before the council of judges, when Sulla’s case was under inquiry, saying that he was no longer a histrion but a pantomimist, and calling him by the name “Dionysia,” that of a very well-known little dancing-girl, then, in a soft and low voice, Hortensius said: “Dionysia,” he said, “Dionysia I indeed would rather be than what you are, Torquatus—amousos, anaphroditos, aprosdionysos.”

VI. Verba ex oratione Metelli Numidici, quam dixit in censura ad populum, cum eum ad uxores ducendas adhortaretur; eaque oratio quam ob causam reprehensa et quo contra modo defensa sit.

6. Words from the oration of Metellus Numidicus, which he delivered in his censorship to the people, when he was exhorting them to take wives; and for what cause that oration was censured, and in what way, in reply, it was defended.

1 Multis et eruditis viris audientibus legebatur oratio Metelli Numidici, gravis ac diserti viri, quam in censura dixit ad populum de ducendis uxoribus, cum eum ad matrimonia capessenda hortaretur.

1 While many and learned men were listening, the oration of Metellus Numidicus, a grave and eloquent man, which he delivered in his censorship to the people about taking wives, as he was exhorting them to undertake marriages, was being read.

2 In ea oratione ita scriptum fuit: "Si sine uxore possemus, Quirites, omnes ea molestia careremus; set quoniam ita natura tradidit, ut nec cum illis satis commode, nec sine illis uno modo vivi possit, saluti perpetuae potius quam brevi voluptati consulendum est."

2 In that oration it was written thus: "If we could be without a wife, Quirites, we all would be free from that annoyance; but since nature has handed it down thus, that neither with them quite commodiously, nor without them in any single way can life be lived, we must provide rather for perpetual safety than for brief pleasure."

3 Videbatur quibusdam Q. Metellum censorem, cui consilium esset ad uxores ducendas populum hortari, non oportuisse de molestia incommodisque perpetuis rei uxoriae confiteri, neque id hortari magis esse quam dissuadere absterrereque; set contra in id potius orationem debuisse sumi dicebant, ut et nullas plerumque esse in matrimoniis molestias adseveraret et, si quae tamen accidere nonnumquam viderentur, parvas et leves facilesque esse toleratu diceret maioribusque eas emolumentis et voluptatibus oblitterari easdemque ipsas neque omnibus neque naturae vitio, set quorundam maritorum culpa et iniustitia evenire.

3 It seemed to some that Q. Metellus, censor, whose design was to exhort the people to take wives, ought not to have confessed the trouble and perpetual inconveniences of the uxorial/marital affair, nor was that exhorting so much as dissuading and deterring; but on the contrary they said the speech ought rather to have been taken up to this end, that he should asseverate that there are for the most part no annoyances in marriages, and, if any nevertheless might seem sometimes to occur, that they are small and light and easy to tolerate, and that they are obliterated by greater emoluments and pleasures, and that those very same things befall neither all nor by fault of nature, but by the fault and injustice of certain husbands.

4 Titus autem Castricius recte atque condigne Metellum esse locutum existimabat. "Aliter" inquit "censor loqui debet, aliter rhetor. Rhetori concessum est sententiis uti falsis, audacibus, versutis, subdolis, captiosis, si veri modo similes sint et possint movendos hominum animos qualicumque astu inrepere." Praeterea turpe esse ait rhetori, si quid in mala causa destitutum atque inpropugnatum relinquat.

4 Titus Castricius, however, judged that Metellus had spoken rightly and condignly. "Differently," he says, "ought a censor to speak, differently a rhetor. To a rhetor it is conceded to use statements that are false, audacious, wily, crafty, captious, provided only they be like the truth and can, by whatever stratagem, insinuate themselves into the minds of men to move them." Moreover, he says it is disgraceful for a rhetor, if he leaves anything in a bad cause abandoned and undefended.

5 "Sed enim Metellum," inquit "sanctum virum, illa gravitate et fide praeditum cum tanta honorum atque vitae dignitate aput populum Romanum loquentem, nihil decuit aliud dicere, quam quod verum esse sibi atque omnibus videbatur, praesertim cum super ea re diceret, quae cotidiana intellegentia et communi pervolgatoque vitae usu comprenderetur.

5 "But indeed Metellus," he said "a sacred man, endowed with that gravity and faith, speaking with such dignity of honors and of life among the Roman People, it was fitting for him to say nothing other than what seemed to himself and to all to be true, especially since he was speaking about a matter which is comprehended by daily intelligence and by the common and pervulgated practice of life.

6 De molestia igitur cunctis hominibus notissima confessus eaque confessione fidem sedulitatis veritatisque commeritus, tum denique facile et procliviter, quod fuit rerum omnium validissimum atque verissimum, persuasit civitatem salvam esse sine matrimoniorum frequentia non posse."

6 Therefore, having confessed the trouble most well-known to all men, and by that confession having merited credence for sedulousness and verity, then at last easily and readily he persuaded—what was of all things the most valid and the truest—that the commonwealth cannot be safe without the frequency of marriages."

7 Hoc quoque aliud ex eadem oratione Q. Metelli dignum esse existimavimus adsidua lectione non hercle minus, quam quae a gravissimis philosophis scripta sunt.

7 We have esteemed this other thing also, from the same oration of Q. Metellus, to be worthy of assiduous reading, not, by Hercules, less than the things that have been written by the most grave philosophers.

8 Verba Metelli haec sunt. "Di immortales plurimum possunt; sed non plus velle nobis debent quam parentes. At parentes, si pergunt liberi errare, bonis exheredant.

8 The words of Metellus are these. "The immortal gods can do very much; but they ought not to will more for us than parents. But parents, if children persist in erring, disinherit them of their goods.

Quid ergo nos ab immortalibus dissimilius exspectemus, nisi malis rationibus finem facimus? Is demum deos propitios esse aecum est, qui sibi adversarii non sunt. Dii immortales virtutem adprobare, non adhibere debent."

What, then, should we expect anything different from the immortals, unless we put an end to bad counsels? It is right that the gods be propitious only to those who are not adversaries to themselves. The immortal gods ought to approve virtue, not to supply it."

VII. In hisce verbis Ciceronis ex oratione quinta in Verrem "hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum" neque mendum esse neque vitium errareque istos, qui bonos libros violant et "futuram" scribunt; atque ibi de quodam alio Ciceronis verbo dictum, quod probe scriptum perperam mutatur; et aspersa pauca de modulis numerisque orationis, quos Cicero avide sectatus est.

7. In these words of Cicero from the fifth oration Against Verres, "hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum"—"they hope this matter will be for a protection to themselves"—there is neither a mistake nor a fault, and those men err who violate good books and write "futuram"; and there was said there about a certain other word of Cicero, which, though properly written, is wrongly altered; and a few things are sprinkled about the moduli and numbers of oration, which Cicero eagerly pursued.

1 In oratione Ciceronis quinta in Verrem in libro spectatae fidei Tironiana cura atque disciplina facto scriptum fuit:

1 In Cicero’s fifth oration Against Verres, in a book of approved fidelity made by Tironian care and discipline, it was written:

2 "Homines tenues obscuro loco nati navigant; adeunt ad ea loca, quae numquam antea adierant. Neque noti esse iis, quo venerunt, neque semper cum cognitoribus esse possunt, hac una tamen fiducia civitatis non modo apud nostros magistratus, qui et legum et existimationis periculo continentur, neque apud cives solum Romanos, qui et sermonis et iuris et multarum rerum societate iuncti sunt, fore se tutos arbitrantur, sed quocumque venerint, hanc sibi rem praesidio sperant futurum."

2 "Men of slender means, born in an obscure place, sail; they go to those places which they had never before approached. Nor can they be known to those to whom they have come, nor can they always be with acquaintances; yet with this one confidence of citizenship they think that they will be safe, not only with our magistrates, who are restrained by the peril of laws and of repute, nor with Roman citizens only, who are joined by the society of speech and law and many things, but, wherever they may come, they hope that this thing will be for them a safeguard."

3 Videbatur compluribus in extremo verbo menda esse. Debuisse enim scribi putabant non "futurum", sed "futuram", neque dubitabant, quin liber emendandus esset, ne, ut in Plauti comoedia moechus, sic enim mendae suae inludiabant, ita in Ciceronis oratione soloecismus esset "manifestarius".

3 It seemed to several that there was a fault in the last word. For they thought it ought to be written not "futurum", but "futuram", and they did not doubt that the book should be emended, lest, as in Plautus’s comedy the adulterer—thus they made sport of their own blemish—be "manifestarius", so in Cicero’s oration there should be a "manifestarius" solecism.

4 Aderat forte ibi amicus noster, homo lectione multa exercitus, cui pleraque omnia veterum litterarum quaesita, meditata evigilataque erant.

4 By chance a friend of ours was present there, a man exercised by much reading, for whom almost all of ancient letters had been researched, meditated upon, and kept vigil over.

5 Is libro inspecto ait nullum esse in eo verbo neque mendum neque vitium et Ciceronem probe ac vetuste locutum.

5 He, the book inspected, said that in that word there was neither a mistake nor a fault, and that Cicero had spoken properly and in the old-fashioned way.

6 "Nam "futurum"" inquit "non refertur ad rem, sicut legentibus temere et incuriose videtur, neque pro participio positum est, set verbum est indefinitum, quod Graeci appellant aparemphaton, neque numeris neque generibus praeserviens, set liberum undique et inpromiscum, quali C. Gracchus verbo usus est in oratione, cuius titulus est de P. Popilio circum conciliabula, in qua ita scriptum est:

6 "For 'futurum,'" he says, "is not referred to the thing, as it seems to those reading rashly and carelessly, nor is it set in place as a participle, but it is an indefinite verb, which the Greeks call an aparemphaton, subservient to neither numbers nor genders, but free on all sides and indiscriminate, a word such as C. Gracchus used in a speech, whose title is On P. Popilius around the meeting-places, in which it is written thus:

7 "Credo ego inimicos meos hoc dicturum." "Inimicos dicturum" inquit, non "dicturos";

7 "I believe my enemies will say this." "'Enemies will say,'" he says, not "'will say' (in the plural)";

8 videturne ea ratione positum esse aput Gracchum "dicturum", qua est aput Ciceronem "futurum"? sicut in Graeca oratione sine ulla vitii suspicione omnibus numeris generibusque sine discrimine tribuuntur huiuscemodi verba: erein, poiesein, esesthai, et similia."

8 does it seem by that rationale that "dicturum" has been set with Gracchus, as "futurum" is with Cicero? just as in Greek oratory, without any suspicion of fault, words of this kind are assigned to all numbers and genders without distinction: erein, poiesein, esesthai, and the like."

9 In Claudi quoque Quadrigarii tertio annali verba haec esse dixit: "Dum i conciderentur, hostium copias ibi occupatas futurum"; in duodevicesimo annali eiusdem Quadrigarii principium libri sic scriptum: "Si pro tua bonitate et nostra voluntate tibi valitudo subpetit, est quod speremus deos bonis bene facturum";

9 He said that in the third Annal of Claudius Quadrigarius these words too are found: "While they were being cut down, the enemy’s forces would be occupied there"; in the eighteenth Annal of the same Quadrigarius the beginning of the book is written thus: "If, in proportion to your goodness and our will, health is forthcoming for you, there is reason for us to hope that the gods will do well for the good";

10 item in Valerii Antiatis libro quarto vicesimo simili modo scriptum esse: "Si eae res divinae factae recteque perlitatae essent, haruspices dixerunt omnia ex sententia processurum esse".

10 likewise, in the twenty-fourth book of Valerius Antias it was written in a similar manner: "If those divine rites had been performed and duly propitiated, the haruspices said that everything would proceed according to plan".

11 "Plautus etiam in Casina, cum de puella loqueretur, "occisurum" dixit, non "occisuram", his verbis:

11 "Plautus also in Casina, when he was speaking about a girl, said "occisurum," not "occisuram," in these words:

        etiamne habet Casina gladium? -
        habet, sed duos.—Quid duos ?—altero te
        occisurum ait, altero vilicum.

Does Casina even have a sword? -
She has, but two.—Why two ?—With one, she says she will kill you; with the other, the bailiff.

12 Item Laberius in Gemellis:

12 Likewise Laberius in the Twins:

non putavi, inquit, hoc eam facturum.

“I did not think,” he says, “that she would do this.”

13 Non ergo isti omnes, soloecismus quid esset, ignorarunt, sed et Gracchus "dicturum" et Quadrigarius "futurum" et "facturum" et Antias "processurum" et Plautus "occisurum" et Laberius "facturum" indefinito modo dixerunt,

13 Therefore not all those men were ignorant what a solecism was, but even Gracchus said “going to say,” and Quadrigarius “going to be” and “going to do,” and Antias “going to proceed,” and Plautus “going to kill,” and Laberius “going to do,” in an indefinite mode,

14 qui modus neque in numeros neque in personas neque in tempora neque in genera distrahitur, sed omnia istaec una eademque declinatione complectitur,

14 which mood is divided neither into numbers nor into persons nor into tenses nor into genders, but embraces all these by one and the same declension,

15 sicuti M. Cicero "futurum" dixit non virili genere neque neutro, soloecismus enim plane foret, sed verbo usus est ab omni necessitate generum absoluto."

15 just as M. Cicero said "futurum" not in the masculine gender nor in the neuter—for it would plainly be a solecism—but he used the word absolved from every necessity of genders."

16 Idem autem ille amicus noster in eiusdem M. Tullii oratione, quae est de imperio Cn. Pompei, ita scriptum esse a Cicerone dicebat atque ipse ita lectitabat: "Cum vestros portus atque eos portus, quibus vitam ac spiritum ducitis, in praedonum fuisse potestatem sciatis",

16 But that same friend of ours said that in the oration of that same M. Tullius, which is On the command of Cn. Pompeius, it had been written thus by Cicero, and he himself kept reading it thus: "Since you know that your harbors, and those harbors by which you draw life and breath, have been in the power of pirates,"

17 neque soloecismum esse aiebat "in potestatem fuisse", ut vulgus semidoctum putat, sed ratione dictum certa et proba contendebat, qua et Graeci ita uterentur et Plautus verborum Latinorum elegantissimus in Amphitruone dixit:

17 he was saying that “to have been into power” was not a solecism, as the half-learned vulgar suppose, but he contended it was said with a definite and approved rationale, which both the Greeks likewise employ, and Plautus, most elegant in Latin diction, said in the Amphitruo:

num vero mi in mentem fuit,
non, ut dici solitum est, "in mente".

did it truly come to my mind,
not, as it is wont to be said, "in the mind".

18 Sed enim praeter Plautum, cuius ille in praesens exemplo usus est, multam nos quoque apud veteres scriptores locutionum talium copiam offendimus atque his vulgo adnotamentis inspersimus.

18 But indeed, besides Plautus, whose example he used for the present, we too have encountered among the ancient writers a great abundance of such locutions, and have sprinkled these with annotations for general use.

19 Vt et rationem autem istam missam facias et auctoritates, sonus tamen et positura ipsa verborum satis declarat id potius epimeleiai ton lexeon modulamentisque orationis M. Tulli convinisse, ut, quoniam utrumvis dici Latine posset, "potestatem" dicere mallet, non "potestate".

19 Even if you set aside that line of reasoning and the authorities, nevertheless the sound and the very position of the words sufficiently declares that this rather agreed with M. Tullius’s care for wording and the modulations of his oration, so that, since either could be said in Latin, he preferred to say "potestatem," not "potestate".

20 Illud enim sic compositum iucundius ad aurem completiusque, insuavius hoc inperfectiusque est, si modo ita explorata aure homo sit, non surda nec iacenti; sicuti est hercle, quod "explicavit" dicere maluit quam "explicuit", quod esse iam usitatius coeperat.

20 For that, being composed thus, is more pleasant to the ear and more complete; this is more unpleasing and more imperfect, provided only that a man have an ear so tested, not deaf nor sluggish; just as, by Hercules, it is the case that he preferred to say "explicavit" rather than "explicuit", which had already begun to be more usual.

Verba sunt haec ipsius ex oratione, quam de imperio Cn. Pompei habuit: "Testis est Sicilia, quam multis undique cinctam periculis, non terrore belli, sed consilii celeritate explicavit." At si "explicuit" diceret, inperfecto et debili numero verborum sonus clauderet.

These are his own words from the oration which he delivered concerning the command of Cn. Pompey: "Sicily is witness, which, though encircled on all sides by many dangers, he resolved not by the terror of war, but by the swiftness of counsel." But if he were to say "explicuit," the sound would close in an imperfect and feeble number of words.

VIII. Historia in libris Sotionis philosophi reperta super Laide meretrice et Demosthene rhetore.

8. A history found in the books of Sotion the philosopher concerning Lais the courtesan and Demosthenes the rhetor.

1 Sotion ex peripatetica disciplina haut sane ignobilis vir fuit. Is librum multae variaeque historiae refertum composuit eumque inscripsit keras Amaltheias.

1 Sotion was a man not at all ignoble from the Peripatetic discipline. He composed a book crammed with many and various histories, and he entitled it keras Amaltheias.

2 Ea vox hoc ferme valet, tamquam si dicas "cornum Copiae".

2 That expression means about this, as if you were to say "the horn of Plenty."

3 In eo libro super Demosthene rhetore et Laide meretrice historia haec scripta est: "Lais" inquit "Corinthia ob elegantiam venustatemque formae grandem pecuniam demerebat, conventusque ad eam ditiorum hominum ex omni Graecia celebres erant, neque admittebatur, nisi qui dabat, quod poposcerat; poscebat autem illa nimium quantum."

3 In that book, concerning Demosthenes the rhetor and Laïs the courtesan, this story is written: "Lais," he says, "the Corinthian, on account of the elegance and loveliness of her form, was earning great sums of money, and the gatherings of wealthier men from all Greece to her were celebrated; nor was anyone admitted unless he gave what she had demanded; moreover, she demanded an excessively great amount."

4 Hinc ait natum esse illud frequens apud Graecos adagium: ou pantos andros es Korinthon esth'ho plous quod frustra iret Corinthum ad Laidem, qui non quiret dare, quod posceretur.

4 Hence, he says, that adage frequent among the Greeks was born: ou pantos andros es Korinthon esth'ho plous, that he goes to Corinth to Lais in vain who could not give what was demanded.

5 "Ad hanc ille Demosthenes clanculum adit et, ut sibi copiam sui faceret, petit. At Lais myrias drachmas poposcit", hoc facit nummi nostratis denarium decem milia.

5 "To her Demosthenes went clandestinely and asked that she grant him access to herself. But Lais demanded a myriad of drachmas," this amounts to 10,000 denarii of our native coin.

6 "Tali petulantia mulieris atque pecuniae magnitudine ictus expavidusque Demosthenes avertitur et discedens "ego" inquit "paenitere tanti non emo". Sed Graeca ipsa, quae fertur dixisse, lepidiora sunt: ouk onoumai, inquit, drachmon metameleian.

6 "Struck by such petulance of the woman and by the magnitude of the money, and made fearful, Demosthenes turns away and, departing, says, 'I do not buy repentance at such a price.' But the Greek words themselves, which he is said to have spoken, are wittier: ouk onoumai, he says, drachmon metameleian.

IX. Quis modus fuerit, quis ordo disciplinae Pythagoricae, quantumque temporis imperatum observatumque sit discendi simul ac tacendi.

9. What the mode was, what the order of the Pythagorean discipline, and how much time was commanded and observed for learning as well as for keeping silence.

1 Ordo atque ratio Pythagorae ac deinceps familiae et successionis eius recipiendi instituendique discipulos huiuscemodi fuisse traditur:

1 The order and method of Pythagoras, and thereafter of his family and succession, for receiving and instituting disciples is handed down to have been of this sort:

2 Iam a principio adulescentes, qui sese ad discendum obtulerant, ephysiognomonei. Id verbum significat mores naturasque hominum coniectatione quadam de oris et vultus ingenio deque totius corporis filo atque habitu sciscitari.

2 Already from the beginning, the adolescents who had offered themselves for learning, they “ephysiognomonei.” That word signifies to inquire into the manners and natures of men, by a certain conjecture from the character of the mouth and countenance and from the fiber and habit of the whole body.

3 Tum qui exploratus ab eo idoneusque fuerat, recipi in disciplinam statim iubebat et tempus certum tacere: non omnes idem, sed alios aliud tempus pro aestimato captu sollertiae.

3 Then whoever had been tested by him and found suitable, he would order to be received into discipline immediately, and to keep silence for a fixed time: not the same for all, but one time for some, another for others, according to the appraised capacity of cleverness.

4 Is autem, qui tacebat, quae dicebantur ab aliis, audiebat, neque percontari, si parum intellexerat, neque commentari, quae audierat, fas erat; sed non minus quisquam tacuit quam biennium: hi prorsus appellabantur intra tempus tacendi audiendique akoustikoi.

4 But he who was silent listened to what was being said by others, nor was it permitted to inquire, if he had understood too little, nor to comment on what he had heard; but no one kept silence for less than a biennium: these were precisely called within the time of being silent and of listening, akoustikoi.

5 Ast ubi res didicerant rerum omnium difficillimas, tacere audireque, atque esse iam coeperant silentio eruditi, cui erat nomen echemythia, tum verba facere et quaerere quaeque audissent scribere et, quae ipsi opinarentur, expromere potestas erat;

5 But when they had learned the things most difficult of all, to be silent and to listen, and had already begun to be educated by silence, which had the name echemythia, then there was authority to speak and to inquire and to write whatever they had heard and, what they themselves opined, to bring forth;

6 hi dicebantur in eo tempore mathematikoi, ab his scilicet artibus, quas iam discere atque meditari inceptaverant: quoniam geometriam, gnomonicam, musicam ceterasque item disciplinas altiores mathemata veteres Graeci appellabant; vulgus autem, quos gentilicio vocabulo "Chaldaeos" dicere oportet, "mathematicos" dicit.

6 these were called at that time mathematikoi, from those arts, of course, which they had now begun to learn and to meditate: since geometry, gnomonics, music, and likewise the other higher disciplines the ancient Greeks called "mathemata"; but the common crowd, whom it is proper to call by the gentilic name "Chaldaeans," says "mathematicians."

7 Exinde his scientiae studiis ornati ad perspicienda mundi opera et principia naturae procedebant ac tunc denique nominabantur physikoi.

7 Thereafter, adorned with these studies of science, they proceeded to scrutinize the works of the world and the principles of nature, and then at last they were named physikoi.

8 Haec eadem super Pythagora noster Taurus cum dixisset: "nunc autem" inquit "isti, qui repente pedibus inlotis ad philosophos devertunt, non est hoc satis, quod sunt omnino atheoretoi, amousoi, ageometretoi, sed legem etiam dant, qua philosophari discant.

8 When our Taurus had said these same things about Pythagoras: "but now," he said, "those men who suddenly, with unwashed feet, turn aside to the philosophers—this is not enough, that they are altogether atheoretical, amusical, a-geometrical, but they even lay down a law by which they may learn to philosophize.

9 Alius ait "hoc me primum doce", item alius "hoc volo" inquit "discere, istud nolo"; hic a symposio Platonis incipere gestit propter Alcibiadae comisationem, ille a Phaedro propter Lysiae orationem.

9 Another says "teach me this first," likewise another says "this I want" he says "to learn, that I do not want"; this one is eager to begin from Plato’s Symposium on account of Alcibiades’ comissation, that one from the Phaedrus on account of Lysias’s oration.

10 Est etiam," inquit "pro Iuppiter! qui Platonem legere postulet non vitae ornandae, sed linguae orationisque comendae gratia, nec ut modestior fiat, sed ut lepidior."

10 There is also," he said, "by Jupiter! one who asks to read Plato not for the sake of adorning life, but for the sake of language and oration to be commended, and not that he may become more modest, but more charming."

11 Haec Taurus dicere solitus novicios philosophorum sectatores cum veteribus Pythagoricis pensitans.

11 Taurus was accustomed to say these things, weighing the novice sectators of philosophers with the ancient Pythagoreans.

12 Sed id quoque non praetereundum est, quod omnes, simul atque a Pythagora in cohortem illam disciplinarum recepti erant, quod quisque familiae, pecuniae habebat, in medium dabat, et coibatur societas inseparabilis, tamquam illud fuit anticum consortium, quod iure atque verbo Romano appellabatur "ercto non cito".

12 But this too must not be passed over: that all, as soon as they were received by Pythagoras into that cohort of disciplines, whatever each had of household and of money he gave into the common stock, and an inseparable society was brought together, as though it were that ancient consortium which in Roman law and terminology was called "ercto non cito".

X. Quibus verbis compellaverit Favorinus philosophus adulescentem casce nimis et prisce loquentem.

10. With what words the philosopher Favorinus addressed an adolescent speaking too archaically and too anciently.

1 Favorinus philosophus adulescenti veterum verborum cupidissimo et plerasque voces nimis priscas et ignotas in cotidianis communibusque sermonibus expromenti: "Curius" inquit "et Fabricius et Coruncanius, antiquissimi viri, et his antiquiores Horatii illi trigemini plane ac dilucide cum suis fabulati sunt neque Auruncorum aut Sicanorum aut Pelasgorum, qui primi coluisse Italiam dicuntur, sed aetatis suae verbis locuti sunt;

1 Favorinus the philosopher, to an adolescent most desirous of the words of the ancients and bringing forth very archaic and unknown words in quotidian and common conversations, said: "Curius," he says, "and Fabricius and Coruncanius, most ancient men, and those Horatii triplets more ancient than these, conversed plainly and lucidly with their own people, and not in the speech of the Aurunci or the Sicani or the Pelasgians, who are said to have first cultivated Italy, but with the words of their own age they spoke;

2 tu autem, proinde quasi cum matre Evandri nunc loquare, sermone abhinc multis annis iam desito uteris, quod scire atque intellegere neminem vis, quae dicas. Nonne, homo inepte, ut, quod vis, abunde consequaris, taces?

2 but you, just as if you were now speaking with the mother of Evander, use a discourse long since discontinued many years back, because you wish no one to know and understand the things you say. Will you not, foolish man, be silent, so that, what you wish, you may abundantly attain?

3 Sed antiquitatem tibi placere ais, quod honesta et bona et sobria et modesta sit.

3 But you say that antiquity pleases you, because it is honorable and good and sober and modest.

4 Vive ergo moribus praeteritis, loquere verbis praesentibus atque id, quod a C. Caesare, excellentis ingenii ac prudentiae viro, in primo de analogia libro scriptum est, habe semper in memoria atque in pectore, ut "tamquam scopulum, sic fugias inauditum atque insolens verbum"."

4 Therefore live by bygone customs, speak with present-day words, and that, which was written by C. Caesar, a man of excellent genius and prudence, in the first book On Analogy, keep always in memory and in your breast, that "just as a rock, so you should shun an unheard-of and insolent word"."

XI. Quod Thucydides, scriptor inclutus, Lacedaemonios in acie non tuba, sed tibiis esse usos dicit verbaque eius super ea re posita; quodque Herodotus Alyattem regem fidicinas in procinctu habuisse tradit; atque inibi quaedam notata de Gracchi fistula contionaria.

11. That Thucydides, an illustrious writer, says that the Lacedaemonians in the battle-line used not the trumpet, but pipes (tibiae), and he sets down his words on that matter; and that Herodotus relates that King Alyattes had lyre-players (fidicines) in battle-array; and therein certain things are noted about the assembly-pipe (fistula contionaria) of Gracchus.

1 Auctor historiae Graecae gravissimus Thucydides Lacedaemonios, summos bellatores, non cornuum tubarumve signis, sed tibiarum modulis in proeliis esse usos refert non prorsus ex aliquo ritu religionum neque rei divinae gratia neque autem, ut excitarentur atque evibrarentur animi, quod cornua et litui moliuntur, sed contra, ut moderatiores modulatioresque fierent, quod tibicinis numeris temperatur.

1 Thucydides, the most authoritative author of Greek history, reports that the Lacedaemonians, preeminent warriors, used not the signals of horns or trumpets, but the measures of pipes in battles, not precisely from any rite of religions nor for the sake of divine service, nor yet in order that their spirits might be excited and brandished, which horns and clarions contrive, but on the contrary, in order that they might become more moderate and more modulated, which is tempered by the piper’s rhythms.

2 Nihil adeo in congrediendis hostibus atque in principiis proeliorum ad salutem virtutemque aptius rati, quam si permulti sonis mitioribus non inmodice ferocirent.

2 They reckoned nothing so apt to safety and virtue, in engaging with enemies and in the beginnings of battles, as that very many, by milder sounds, should not be immoderately ferocious.

3 Cum procinctae igitur classes erant et instructa acies coeptumque in hostem progredi, tibicines inter exercitum positi canere inceptabant.

3 When therefore the fleets were in battle trim and the battle line drawn up, and the advance against the enemy had been begun, the pipers, set among the army, began to play.

4 Ea ibi praecentione tranquilla et delectabili atque adeo venerabili ad quandam quasi militaris musicae disciplinam vis et impetus militum, ne sparsi dispalatique proruerent, cohibebatur.

4 By that tranquil and delectable, and indeed venerable, precention there, to a kind of, as it were, discipline of military music, the force and impetus of the soldiers was being held in check, lest scattered and straggling they should rush headlong.

5 Sed ipsius illius egregii scriptoris uti verbis libet, quae et dignitate et fide graviora sunt: Kai meta tauta he xynodos en; Argeioi men kai hoi symmachoi entonos orgei chorountes, Lakedaimonioi de bradeos kai hypo auleton pollon nomou enkathestoton ou tou theiou charin, all'hina homalos meta rhythmou bainontes proselthoien kai me diaspastheie autois he taxis, hoper philei ta megala stratopeda en tais prosodois poiein.

5 But to use the words of that distinguished writer himself, which are weightier both in dignity and in credibility: And after these things the synod was convened; the Argives and their allies, dancing in intense wrath, but the Lacedaemonians slowly, and under many pipers with a nomos set—not for the sake of the divine, but so that, stepping evenly with rhythm, they might advance and their taxis (order) might not be torn apart, which great armies are wont to do in their advances.

6 Cretenses quoque proelia ingredi solitos memoriae datum est praecinente ac praemoderante cithara gressibus;

6 It has been consigned to memory that the Cretans also were accustomed to enter battles, with the cithara pre-singing and pre-moderating their steps;

7 Alyattes autem, rex terrae Lydiae more atque luxu barbarico praeditus, cum bellum Milesiis faceret, ut Herodotus in historiis tradit, concinentes habuit fistulatores et fidicines atque feminas etiam tibicinas in exercitu atque in procinctu habuit, lascivientium delicias conviviorum.

7 Alyattes, however, king of the land of Lydia, endowed with barbaric custom and luxury, when he was making war upon the Milesians, as Herodotus relates in the Histories, had pipers and lyre-players sounding in concert, and even women tibia-players (flute-players), in the army and in the battle-line—the delights of lascivious banquets.

8 Sed enim Achaeos Homerus pugnam indipisci ait non fidicularum tibiarumque, sed mentium animorumque concentu conspiratuque tacito nitibundos:

8 But indeed Homer says that the Achaeans press for battle not by fiddles and pipes, but by the tacit consonance and conspiracy of minds and spirits, striving:

hoi d'ar'isan sigei menea pneiontes Achaioi
ei thymoi memaotes alexemen alleloisin.

the Achaeans went in silence, breathing valor,
eager in spirit to defend one another.

9 Quid ille vult ardentissimus clamor militum Romanorum, quem in congressibus proeliorum fieri solitum scriptores annalium memoravere? contrane institutum fiebat antiquae disciplinae tam probabile? an tum et gradu clementi et silentio est opus, cum ad hostem itur in conspectu longinquo procul distantem, cum vero prope ad manus ventum est, tum iam e propinquo hostis et impetu propulsandus et clamore terrendus est?

9 What is meant by that most ardent clamor of the Roman soldiers, which the writers of the annals have recorded was wont to be raised in the encounters of battles? Was it being done contrary to the institution of ancient discipline—so plausible? or is it that both a clement pace and silence are needed, when one goes toward the enemy in a long-distant view, far off; but when in truth it has come close to hand-to-hand, then now from close quarters the enemy must be driven back by impetus and terrified by clamor?

10 Ecce autem per tibicinia Laconica tibiae quoque illius contionariae in mentem venit, quam C. Graccho cum populo agente praeisse ac praeministrasse modulos ferunt.

10 Behold, moreover, through the Laconian pipings there came to mind also that assembly tibia, which they report to have led and pre-administered the measures for Gaius Gracchus as he was addressing the people.

11 Sed nequaquam sic est, ut a vulgo dicitur, canere tibia solitum, qui pone eum loquentem staret, et variis modis tum demulcere animum actionemque eius, tum intendere.

11 But it is by no means as is said by the vulgar, that a piper was accustomed to play, who would stand behind him as he spoke, and in various modes now soothe his spirit and his action (delivery), now intensify them.

12 Quid enim foret ista re ineptius, si, ut planipedi saltanti, ita Graccho contionanti numeros et modos et frequentamenta quaedam varia tibicen incineret?

12 For what, indeed, would be more inept in this matter, if, as for a flat-footed dancer, so for Gracchus addressing an assembly, a piper were to strike up measures and modes and certain various refrains?

13 Sed qui hoc compertius memoriae tradiderunt, stetisse in circumstantibus dicunt occultius, qui fistula brevi sensim graviusculum sonum inspiraret ad reprimendum sedandumque inpetus vocis eius effervescentes;

13 But those who have handed this down to memory more exactly say that there stood, more covertly, among the bystanders someone who, with a short pipe, would little by little inspire a somewhat graver sound, to repress and to sedate the effervescent impulses of his voice;

14 namque inpulsu et instinctu extraneo naturalis illa Gracchi vehementia indiguisse non, opinor, existimanda est.

14 for that natural vehemence of Gracchus is not, I think, to be thought to have needed an extraneous impulse and instigation.

15M. tamen Cicero fistulatorem istum utrique rei adhibitum esse a Graccho putat, ut sonis tum placidis tum citatis aut demissam iacentemque orationem eius erigeret aut ferocientem saevientemque cohiberet.

15M. Cicero nevertheless thinks that that piper was employed for both purposes by Gracchus, so that with sounds now placid now hastened he might either raise up his oration when lowered and lying, or cohibit it when ferocious and raging.

16 Verba ipsius Ciceronis apposui: "Itaque idem Gracchus, quod potes audire, Catule, ex Licinio cliente tuo, litterato homine, quem servum sibi ille habuit ad manum, cum eburnea solitus est habere fistula, qui staret occulte post ipsum, cum contionaretur, peritum hominem, qui inflaret celeriter eum sonum, qui illum aut remissum excitaret aut a contentione revocaret."

16 I have set down the very words of Cicero: "Therefore the same Gracchus, which you can hear, Catulus, from Licinius your client, a literate man, whom he had as a slave at hand, when he was accustomed to have an ivory pipe, who would stand covertly behind him when he was haranguing, a skilled man, who would blow quickly that sound which would either rouse him when remiss or recall him from contention."

17 Morem autem illum ingrediendi ad tibicinum modulos proelii institutum esse a Lacedaemonis Aristoteles in libris problematon scripsit, quo manifestior fieret exploratiorque militum securitas et alacritas.

17 Aristotle wrote in the books of the Problems that that custom of marching to the measures of the flute-players in battle was instituted by the Lacedaemonians, whereby the soldiers’ security and alacrity might become more manifest and more ascertained.

18 "Nam diffidentiae" inquit "et timori cum ingressione huiuscemodi minime convenit, et maesti atque formidantes ab hac tam intrepida ac tam decora incedendi modulatione alieni sunt."

18 "For diffidence," he says, "and fear are by no means in agreement with an ingress of this kind, and the downcast and the timorous are alien from this so intrepid and so decorous modulation of marching."

19 Verba pauca Aristotelis super ea re apposui: Dia ti, epeidan kindynevein mellosin, pros aulon embainousin? hina tous deilous aschemonountas ginoskosin. . . .

19 I have appended a few words of Aristotle on that matter: “Why, whenever they are about to incur danger, do they step to the pipe? So that they may recognize the cowards behaving unseemly.” . . .

XII. Virgo Vestae quid aetatis et ex quali familia et quo ritu quibusque caerimoniis ac religionibus ac quo nomine a pontifice maximo capiatur et quo statim iure esse incipiat, simul atque capta est; quodque, ut Labeo dicit, nec intestato cuiquam nec eius intestatae quisquam iure heres est.

12. The Vestal Virgin: of what age and from what sort of family, and by what rite, with what ceremonies and religious observances, and under what designation she is taken by the Pontifex Maximus, and with what immediate legal standing she begins to be, as soon as she has been taken; and that, as Labeo says, neither is she heir to anyone dying intestate, nor is anyone by right heir to her when she is intestate.

1 Qui de virgine capienda scripserunt, quorum diligentissime scripsit Labeo Antistius, minorem quam annos sex, maiorem quam annos decem natam negaverunt capi fas esse;

1 Those who have written about the taking of the virgin, of whom Labeo Antistius wrote most diligently, have denied it to be in accord with divine law that one younger than six years, or older than ten years of age, be taken;

2 item quae non sit patrima et matrima;

2 likewise one who is not patrima and matrima (that is, with both father and mother living);

3 item quae lingua debili sensuve aurium deminuta aliave qua corporis labe insignita sit;

3 likewise she who is with a feeble tongue or diminished in the sense of the ears, or is marked by any other blemish of the body;

4 item quae ipsa aut cuius pater emancipatus sit, etiamsi vivo patre in avi potestate sit;

4 likewise she who herself, or whose father, has been emancipated, even if with her father living she is in the power of her grandfather;

5 item cuius parentes alter ambove servitutem servierunt aut in negotiis sordidis versantur.

5 likewise, she whose parents, either one or both, have served in servitude, or are engaged in sordid businesses.

6 Sed et eam, cuius soror ad id sacerdotium lecta est, excusationem mereri aiunt; item cuius pater flamen aut augur aut quindecimvirum sacris faciundis aut septemvirum epulonum aut Salius est.

6 But they say that she too, whose sister has been chosen to that priesthood, merits an excuse; likewise she whose father is a flamen or an augur or a quindecimvir for performing sacred rites or a septemvir of the Epulones or a Salius.

7 Sponsae quoque pontificis et tubicinis sacrorum filiae vacatio a sacerdotio isto tribui solet.

7 Also to the bride of the pontifex and to the daughter of the trumpeter of the sacred rites, exemption from this priesthood is usually granted.

8 Praeterea Capito Ateius scriptum reliquit neque eius legendam filiam, qui domicilium in Italia non haberet, et excusandam eius, qui liberos tres haberet.

8 Moreover, Capito Ateius left it written that the daughter of one who did not have a domicile in Italy was not to be chosen, and that the daughter of one who had three children was to be excused.

9 Virgo autem Vestalis, simul est capta atque in atrium Vestae deducta et pontificibus tradita est, eo statim tempore sine emancipatione ac sine capitis minutione e patris potestate exit et ius testamenti faciundi adipiscitur.

9 But the Vestal Virgin, as soon as she is seized and led into the atrium of Vesta and handed over to the pontiffs, at that very time, without emancipation and without diminution of status, goes out from her father's power and acquires the right of making a testament.

10 De more autem rituque capiundae virginis litterae quidem antiquiores non exstant, nisi, quae capta prima e t, a Numa rege esse captam.

10 As for the custom and ritual of taking the virgin, more ancient writings do not exist, except that she who was first taken was taken by King Numa.

11 Sed Papiam legem invenimus, qua cavetur, ut pontificis maximi arbitratu virgines e populo viginti legantur sortitioque in contione ex eo numero fiat et, cuius virginis ducta erit, ut eam pontifex maximus capiat eaque Vestae fiat.

11 But we find a Papian law, by which it is provided that, at the discretion of the pontifex maximus, twenty virgins be chosen from the people and that sortition in the assembly be made from that number; and of whichever virgin the lot shall have been drawn, that the pontifex maximus take her, and she become Vesta’s.

12 Sed ea sortitio ex lege Papia non necessaria nunc videri solet. Nam si quis honesto loco natus adeat pontificem maximum atque offerat ad sacerdotium filiam suam, cuius dumtaxat salvis religionum observationibus ratio haberi possit, gratia Papiae legis per senatum fit.

12 But that sortition from the Papian law now is wont to seem not necessary. For if anyone born of honorable rank should approach the pontifex maximus and offer for the priesthood his own daughter, provided only that, with the observances of the rites safeguarded, consideration can be had of her, by the grace of the Papian law it is done through the senate.

13 "Capi" autem virgo propterea dici videtur, quia pontificis maximi manu prensa ab eo parente, in cuius potestate est, veluti bello capta abducitur.

13 The virgin seems to be said to be "taken" for this reason: because, with her hand seized by the pontifex maximus, she is led away from that parent in whose power she is, as if captured in war.

14 In libro primo Fabii Pictoris, quae verba pontificem maximum dicere oporteat, cum virginem capiat, scriptum est. Ea verba haec sunt: "Sacerdotem Vestalem, quae sacra faciat, quae ius siet sacerdotem Vestalem facere pro populo Romano Quiritibus, uti quae optima lege fuit, ita te, Amata, capio."

14 In the first book of Fabius Pictor it is written what words the pontifex maximus ought to say when he takes the virgin. These words are these: "A Vestal priestess, to perform the sacred rites, who may have the ius to make a Vestal priestess for the Roman People, the Quirites, as by the best law it has been, thus I take you, Amata."

15 Plerique autem "capi" virginem solam debere dici putant. Sed flamines quoque Diales, item pontifices et augures "capi" dicebantur.

15 Most, however, think that "to be taken" ought to be said of the virgin alone. But the Dialis flamens as well, and likewise the pontiffs and augurs, were said "to be taken."

16 L. Sulla rerum gestarum libro secundo ita scripsit: "P. Cornelius, cui primum cognomen Sullae impositum est, flamen Dialis captus."

16 L. Sulla wrote thus in the second book of his deeds: "P. Cornelius, on whom the cognomen Sulla was first imposed, was taken as the Dialis flamen."

17M. Cato de Lusitanis, cum Servium Galbam accusavit: "Tamen dicunt deficere voluisse. Ego me nunc volo ius pontificium optime scire; iamne ea causa pontifex capiar? si volo augurium optime tenere, ecquis me ob eam rem augurem capiat?"

17M. Cato about the Lusitanians, when he accused Servius Galba: "Yet they say that he wished to revolt. I now want myself to know the pontifical law very well; am I now for that reason to be 'taken' as pontifex? if I want to hold augury very well, is there anyone on that account who will 'take' me as augur?"

18 Praeterea in commentariis Labeonis, quae ad duodecim tabulas composuit, ita scriptum est: "Virgo Vestalis neque heres est cuiquam intestato, neque intestatae quisquam, sed bona eius in publicum redigi aiunt. Id quo iure fiat, quaeritur."

18 Furthermore, in the commentaries of Labeo, which he composed on the Twelve Tables, it is written thus: "A Vestal Virgin is neither heir to anyone intestate, nor is anyone heir to her if she is intestate; but they say her goods are brought into the public domain. By what law this is done is asked."

19 "Amata" inter capiendum a pontifice maximo appellatur, quoniam, quae prima capta est, hoc fuisse nomen traditum est.

19 "Amata" is called during the capturing by the pontifex maximus, because it has been handed down that the one who was first captured had this name.

XIII. Quaesitum esse in philosophia, quidnam foret in recepto mandato rectius, idne omnino facere, quod mandatum est, an nonnumquam etiam contra, si id speres ei, qui mandavit, utilius fore; superque ea quaestione expositae diversae sententiae.

13. It has been inquired in philosophy what would be more correct in a received mandate: whether to do altogether that which has been mandated, or sometimes even the contrary, if you hope that will be more useful to him who mandated it; and upon that question diverse opinions have been set forth.

1 In officiis capiendis, censendis iudicandisque, quae kathekontai appellant, quaeri solet, an negotio tibi dato et, quid omnino faceres, definito contra quid facere debeas, si eo facto videri possit res eventura prosperius exque utilitate eius, qui id tibi negotium mandavit.

1 In taking up, assessing, and judging duties, which are called kathekontai, it is usually asked whether, when a business has been given to you and it has been defined what exactly you should do, you ought instead to do something contrary, if by that deed the affair might seem likely to turn out more prosperously and to the advantage of the one who entrusted that business to you.

2 Anceps quaestio et in utramque partem a prudentibus viris arbitrata est.

2 A two-edged question, and it has been adjudged on either side by prudent men.

3 Sunt enim non pauci, qui sententiam suam una in parte defixerint et re semel statuta deliberataque ab eo, cuius id negotium pontificiumque esset, nequaquam putaverint contra dictum eius esse faciendum, etiamsi repentinus aliqui casus rem commodius agi posse polliceretur, ne, si spes fefellisset, culpa inpatientiae et poena indeprecabilis subeunda esset,

3 For there are not a few who have fixed their opinion on one side, and, the matter once established and deliberated by him whose business and pontifical office it was, have thought that by no means should anything be done contrary to his dictum, even if some sudden contingency should promise that the matter could be conducted more advantageously, lest, if the hope should have disappointed, the fault of impatience and an inexorable penalty would have to be undergone,

4 si res forte melius vertisset, dis quidem gratia habenda, sed exemplum tamen intromissum videretur, quo bene consulta consilia religione mandati soluta corrumperentur.

4 if by chance the matter had turned out better, thanks indeed would have to be given to the gods, but an example nevertheless would seem to have been admitted, by which well-considered counsels, with the religion of the mandate loosened, would be corrupted.

5 Alii existimaverunt incommoda prius, quae metuenda essent, si res gesta aliter foret, quam imperatum est, cum emolumento spei pensitanda esse et, si ea leviora minoraque, utilitas autem contra gravior et amplior spe quantum potest firma ostenderetur, tum posse adversum mandata fieri censuerunt, ne oblata divinitus rei bene gerendae occasio amitteretur,

5 Others estimated that the inconveniences, which would have to be feared if the matter were carried out otherwise than was commanded, must first be weighed together with the emolument of hope; and, if those were lighter and smaller, but the utility, on the contrary, graver and ampler, shown as firm as possible by hope, then they judged that it could be done contrary to the mandates, lest the divinely offered occasion for managing the matter well be lost,

6 neque timendum exemplum non parendi crediderunt, si rationes dumtaxat huiuscemodi non abessent.

6 nor did they believe the precedent of not obeying was to be feared, if only reasons of this kind were not absent.

7 Cumprimis autem respiciendum putaverunt ingenium naturamque illius, cuia res praeceptumque esset: ne ferox, durus, indomitus inexorabilisque sit, qualia fuerunt Postumiana imperia et Manliana.

7 Above all, however, they thought one must have regard to the temperament and nature of the one whose affair and precept it was: that he not be ferocious, hard, indomitable, and inexorable, such as were the Postumian and Manlian commands.

8 Nam si tali praeceptori ratio reddenda sit, nihil faciendum esse monuerunt aliter, quam praeceptum est.

8 For if to such a preceptor an account must be rendered, they warned that nothing is to be done otherwise than as it has been prescribed.

9 Instructius deliberatiusque fore arbitramur theorematium hoc de mandatis huiuscemodi obsequendis, si exemplum quoque P. Crassi Muciani, clari atque incluti viri, apposuerimus.

9 We judge that this little theorem on obeying mandates of this sort will be more instructive and more considered, if we also append the example of P. Crassus Mucianus, a famous and illustrious man.

10 Is Crassus a Sempronio Asellione et plerisque aliis historiae Romanae scriptoribus traditur habuisse quinque rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua: quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iurisconsultissimus, quod pontifex maximus.

10 That Crassus is recorded by Sempronius Asellio and very many other writers of Roman history to have had five greatest and principal good things: that he was the richest, the most noble, the most eloquent, the most learned in jurisprudence, and pontifex maximus.

11 Is cum in consulatu obtineret Asiam provinciam et circumsedere oppugnareque Leucas pararet opusque esset firma atque procera trabe, qui arietem faceret, quo muros eius oppidi quateret, scripsit ad magistratum Mylattensium, sociorum amicorumque populi Romani, ut ex malis duobus, quos apud eos vidisset, uter maior esset, cum mittendum curaret.

11 He, when in his consulship he held the province of Asia and was preparing to besiege and assault Leucas, and there was need of a firm and tall beam for making a battering-ram, with which to batter the walls of that town, wrote to the magistrate of the Mylattenses, allies and friends of the Roman people, to take care that, from the two masts which he had seen among them, whichever was the larger should be sent.

12 Tum magistratus comperto, quamobrem malum desideraret, non, uti iussus erat, maiorem, sed quem esse magis idoneum aptioremque faciendo arieti facilioremque portatu existimabat, minorem misit.

12 Then the magistrate, having learned for what reason he desired the spar, did not, as he had been ordered, send the larger, but sent the smaller, which he esteemed to be more suitable and more apt for making a battering-ram, and easier for transport.

13 Crassus eum vocari iussit et, cum interrogasset, cur non, quem iusserat, misisset, causis rationibusque, quas dictitabat, spretis vestimenta detrahi imperavit virgisque multum cecidit corrumpi atque dissolvi officium omne imperantis ratus, si quis ad id, quod facere iussus est, non obsequio debito, sed consilio non desiderato respondeat.

13 Crassus ordered that he be called, and, when he had asked why he had not sent the one whom he had ordered, having spurned the causes and reasons which he kept alleging, he commanded that his garments be stripped off and beat him much with rods, thinking that the whole office of the one commanding is corrupted and dissolved, if anyone responds to that which he is ordered to do not with due obedience, but with counsel not desired.

XIV. Quid dixerit feceritque C. Fabricius, magna vir gloria magnisque rebus gestis, sed familiae pecuniaeque inops, cum ei Samnites tamquam indigenti grave aurum donarent.

14. What Gaius Fabricius said and did, a man of great glory and with great deeds achieved, but poor in household and money, when the Samnites, as to a needy man, were bestowing weighty gold upon him.

1 Iulius Hyginus in libro de vita rebusque inlustrium virorum sexto legatos dicit a Samnitibus ad C. Fabricium, imperatorem populi Romani, venisse et memoratis multis magnisque rebus, quae bene ac benivole post redditam pacem Samnitibus fecisset, obtulisse dono grandem pecuniam orasseque, uti acciperet utereturque, atque id facere Samnites dixisse, quod viderent multa ad splendorem domus atque victus defieri neque pro amplitudine dignitateque lautum paratum esse.

1 Julius Hyginus, in the sixth book on the life and deeds of illustrious men, says that legates came from the Samnites to Gaius Fabricius, general of the Roman people, and, after recounting many and great things which he had done well and benevolently for the Samnites after peace had been restored, offered as a gift a great sum of money and begged that he accept and use it; and that the Samnites said they did this because they saw many things for the splendor of his house and victuals were lacking, and that, in proportion to his greatness and dignity, no lavish provision had been prepared.

2 Tum Fabricium planas manus ab auribus ad oculos et infra deinceps ad nares et ad os et ad gulam atque inde porro ad ventrem imum deduxisse et legatis ita respondisse: dum illis omnibus membris, quae attigisset, obsistere atque imperare posset, numquam quicquam defuturum; propterea se pecuniam, qua nihil sibi esset usus, ab his, quibus eam sciret usui esse, non accipere.

2 Then Fabricius drew his flat hands from the ears to the eyes and thereafter down in order to the nostrils and to the mouth and to the gullet, and from there further to the lowest belly, and thus replied to the legates: so long as with all those members which he had touched he was able to withstand and to command, nothing would ever be lacking; therefore he did not accept money—of which he had no use—from those for whom he knew it to be for use.

XV. Quam inportunum vitium plenumque odii sit futtilis inanisque loquacitas et quam multis in locis a principibus utriusque linguae viris detestatione iusta culpata sit.

15. How inopportune a vice and full of odium futile and inane loquacity is, and in how many places it has been with just detestation blamed by principal men of both tongues.

1 Qui sunt leves et futtiles et inportuni locutores quique nullo rerum pondere innixi verbis uvidis et lapsantibus diffluunt, eorum orationem bene existimatum est in ore nasci, non in pectore; linguam autem debere aiunt non esse liberam nec vagam, sed vinclis de pectore imo ac de corde aptis moveri et quasi gubernari.

1 Those who are light and futile and importunate talkers, and who, leaning on no weight of things, with wet and slippery words flow away, it has been well judged that their speech is born in the mouth, not in the breast; they say, moreover, that the tongue ought not to be free nor wandering, but to be moved and, as it were, governed with bonds fitted on from the inmost breast and from the heart.

2 Sed enim videas quosdam scatere verbis sine ullo iudicii negotio cum securitate multa et profunda, ut loquentes plerumque videantur loqui sese nescire.

2 But indeed you may see certain people bubbling over with words without any exercise of judgment, with great and profound carelessness, so that, as they are speaking, they for the most part seem not to know how to speak.

3 Vlixen contra Homerus, virum sapienti facundia praeditum, vocem mittere ait non ex ore, sed ex pectore, quod scilicet non ad sonum magis habitumque vocis quam ad sententiarum penitus conceptarum altitudinem pertineret, petulantiaeque verborum coercendae vallum esse oppositum dentium luculente dixit, ut loquendi temeritas non cordis tantum custodia atque vigilia cohibeatur, sed et quibusdam quasi excubiis in ore positis saepiatur.

3 Ulysses, on the contrary, Homer says, a man endowed with wise eloquence, sends forth his voice not from the mouth, but from the breast, which plainly pertains not so much to the sound and habit of the voice as to the depth of thoughts deeply conceived; and he said clearly that for restraining the petulance of words the rampart of the teeth is set opposite, so that the rashness of speaking may be restrained not only by the guardianship and vigilance of the heart, but also may be hedged in by certain, as it were, sentries placed in the mouth.

4 Homerica, de quibus supra dixi, haec sunt: all'hote de opa te megalen ek stetheos heie, et: poion se epos phygein herkos odonton.

4 The Homeric passages, about which I said above, are these: but when he sent forth a great voice from his breast, and: what kind of word has fled the fence of your teeth?

5M. Tullii quoque verba posui, quibus stultam et inanem dicendi copiam graviter et vere detestatus est:

5 I also have set the words of M. Tullius, by which he gravely and truly detested the foolish and empty copiousness of speaking:

6 "Dummodo" inquit "hoc constet neque infantiam eius, qui rem norit, sed eam explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscientiam illius, cui res non subpetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam: quorum si alterum sit optandum, malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultam loquacitatem."

6 "Provided," he said, "that this be settled: that neither the inarticulateness of him who knows the matter but cannot explicate it by speaking, nor the ignorance of him to whom the matter is not at hand, though words are not lacking, is to be praised: of which, if one must be chosen, I for my part would prefer ineloquent prudence to foolish loquacity."

7 Item in libro de oratore primo verba haec posuit: "Quid enim est tam furiosum quam verborum vel optimorum atque ornatissimorum sonitus inanis nulla subiecta sententia nec scientia?"

7 Likewise, in the first book De Oratore he set down these words: "For what is so frenzied as the empty sound of words—even the best and most ornate—with no meaning nor knowledge underlying?"

8 Cumprimis autem M. Cato atrocissimus huiusce vitii insectator est.

8 Above all, however, M. Cato is the most ferocious assailant of this vice.

9 Namque in oratione, quae inscripta est si se Caelius tribunus plebis appellasset: "numquam" inquit "tacet, quem morbus tenet loquendi tamquam veternosum bibendi atque dormiendi. Quod si non coveniatis, cum convocari iubet, ita cupidus orationis conducat, qui auscultet. Itaque auditis, non auscultatis, tamquam pharmacopolam.

9 For in the oration which is inscribed: if Caelius, tribune of the plebs, had appealed to him: "never," he says, "is he silent whom the disease of speaking holds, just as a lethargic man [is held] by drinking and sleeping. But if you do not convene, when he orders you to be convoked, let him, so desirous of oration, hire someone who will listen. And so you hear, you do not listen, as if [he were] a pharmacopolist.

Nam eius verba audiuntur; verum se nemo committit, si aeger est."

"For his words are heard; but in truth no one commits himself to him, if he is sick."

10 Idem Cato in eadem oratione eidem M. Caelio tribuno plebi vilitatem obprobrans non loquendi tantum, verum etiam tacendi: "frusto" inquit "panis conduci potest, vel uti taceat vel uti loquatur."

10 The same Cato in the same oration, upbraiding the same M. Caelius, tribune of the plebs, for cheapness not only of speaking but even of keeping silence: "with a morsel of bread," he says, "he can be hired, either to be silent or to speak."

11 Neque non merito Homerus unum ex omnibus Thersitam ametroepe et akritomython appellat verbaque illius multa et akosma strepentium sine modo graculorum similia esse dicit.

11 And not without merit does Homer call Thersites, alone of all, ametroepe and akritomython, and he says that his many and akosma words are like the chattering of jackdaws clattering without measure.

12 Quid enim est aliud ekoloa? Eupolidis quoque versus de id genus hominibus consignatissime factus est: lalein aristos, adynatotatos legein, quod Sallustius noster imitari volens sic scribit:

12 For what else is ekoloa? A verse of Eupolis too has been most appositely made about men of that kind: best at chattering, most unable to speak, which Sallust, our own, wishing to imitate, writes thus:

13 "loquax" inquit "magis quam facundus."

13 "loquacious," he says, "rather than facund."

14 Quapropter Hesiodus, poetarum prudentissimus, linguam non vulgandam, sed recondendam esse dicit proinde ut thesaurum, eiusque esse in promendo gratiam plurimam, si modesta et parca et modulata sit:

14 Wherefore Hesiod, the most prudent of poets, says that the tongue is not to be made public, but to be hidden away, just like a treasure, and that in bringing it forth there is the utmost grace, if it be modest and sparing and modulated:

glosses toi thesauros en anthropoisin aristos,
pheidoles pleiste de charis kata metron iouses.

indeed, among men the tongue is the best treasure,
and of a sparing one there is the most grace, going according to measure.

15 Epicharmium quoque illud non inscite se habet:
ou legein tyg'essi deinos, alla sigan adynatos,

15 That saying of Epicharmus too is not unwittily put:
you are not clever at speaking, but incapable of keeping silent,

16 ex quo hoc profecto sumptum est: "qui cum loqui non posset, tacere non potuit."

16 whence this indeed has been taken: "he who, when he could not speak, could not keep silent."

17 Favorinum ego audivi dicere versus istos Euripidi:

17 I heard Favorinus say that those verses are Euripides’:

         achalinon stomaton
         anomou t'aphrosynas
        to telos dystychia,

         of unbridled mouths
         and anomic folly
        the end is misfortune,

non de his tantum factos accipi debere, qui impia aut inlicita dicerent, sed vel maxime de hominibus quoque posse dici stulta et inmodica blaterantibus, quorum lingua tam prodiga infrenisque sit, ut fluat semper et aestuet conluvione verborum taeterrima, quod genus homines a Graecis significantissimo vocabulo kataglossoi appellantur.

that they ought to be taken as composed not only about those who would say impious or illicit things, but most of all that they can also be said about men blathering foolish and immoderate things, whose tongue is so prodigal and unbridled that it always flows and seethes with a most foul confluence of words, a kind of men whom the Greeks call by a most significant term kataglossoi.

18 Valerium Probum, grammaticum inlustrem, ex familiari eius, docto viro, comperi Sallustianum illud: "satis eloquentiae, sapientiae parum", brevi antequam vita decederet, sic legere coepisse et sic a Sallustio relictum affirmavisse: "satis loquentiae, sapientiae parum", quod "loquentia" novatori verborum Sallustio maxime congrueret, "eloquentia" cum insipientia minime conveniret.

18 I ascertained from his familiar, a learned man, that Valerius Probus, an illustrious grammarian, shortly before he departed from life, had begun to read that Sallustian phrase, "enough of eloquence, too little of wisdom," thus, and to affirm that it had been left by Sallust thus: "enough of loquacity, too little of wisdom," because "loquacity" would most agree with Sallust, an innovator of words, whereas "eloquence" would least agree with insipience.

19 Huiuscemodi autem loquacitatem verborumque turbam magnitudine inani vastam facetissimus poeta Aristophanes insignibus vocabulis denotavit in his versibus:

19 But a loquacity of this kind and a throng of words, vast with inane magnitude, the most facetious poet Aristophanes denoted with notable vocables in these verses:

        anthropon agriopoion, authadostomon,
         echont'achalinon, akrates, apyloton stoma,
         aperilaleton, kompophakelorrhemona,

        a man savage-making, self-willed-mouthed,
         having an unbridled, akratic, ungated mouth,
         not-to-be-out-chattered, a boast-bundle-utterer,

20 neque minus insigniter veteres quoque nostri hoc genus homines in verba proiectos "locutuleios" et "blaterones" et "linguaces" dixerunt.

20 and no less notably did our own ancients also call this kind of men, projected into words, “locutuleii” and “blaterones” and “linguaces.”

XVI. Quod verba istaec Quadrigari ex annali tertio "ibi mille hominum occiditur" non licenter neque de poetarum figura, sed ratione certa et proba grammaticae disciplinae dicta sunt.

16. That those words of Quadrigarius from the third annal, "there a thousand men is slain," were said not licentiously nor from a figure of the poets, but by a sure and approved rationale of grammatical discipline.

1 Quadrigarius in tertio annalium ita scripsit: "Ibi occiditur mille hominum."

1 Quadrigarius in the third book of the Annals wrote thus: "There a thousand men are killed."

2 "Occiditur", inquit, non "occiduntur". Item Lucilius in tertio satirarum:

2 "Occiditur," he says, not "occiduntur." Likewise Lucilius in the third of the Satires:

ad portam mille a porta est; exinde Salernum,
"mille" inquit "est" non "mille sunt".

to the gate a thousand is from the gate; thence to Salernum,
"a thousand," he says, "is," not "a thousand are".

3 Varro in XVII. humanarum: "Ad Romuli initium plus mille et centum annorum est."

3 Varro in 17. humanarum: "To Romulus’s beginning there are more than a thousand and a hundred years."

4M. Cato in primo originum: "Inde est ferme mille passum."

4M. Cato in the first book of the Origins: "From there it is about a thousand paces."

5M. Cicero in sexta in Antonium: "Itane Ianus medius in L. Antonii clientela est? quis umquam in illo Iano inventus est, qui L. Antonio mille nummum ferret expensum?"

5M. Cicero in the sixth Against Antony: "Is the Middle Janus then in the clientage of L. Antonius? Who was ever found in that Janus who would pay out to L. Antonius a thousand coins entered as an expense?"

6 In his atque in multis aliis "mille" numero singulari dictum est;

6 In these and in many others, "mille" has been said in the singular number;

7 neque hoc, ut quidam putant, vetustati concessum est aut per figurarum concinnitatem admissum est, sed sic videtur ratio poscere.

7 nor is this, as some think, granted to antiquity or admitted through the concinnity of figures, but thus does reason seem to require.

8 "Mille" enim non pro eo ponitur, quod Graece chilioi dicitur, sed quod chilias, et sicuti una chilias et duae chiliades, ita "unum mille" et "duo milia" certa atque directa ratione dicitur.

8 For “mille” is not employed for that which in Greek is called chilioi, but for chilias; and just as one chilias and two chiliades, so “one thousand” and “two thousand” are said by a definite and straightforward rationale.

9 Quamobrem id quoque recte et probabiliter dici solitum "mille denarium in arca est" et "mille equitum in exercitu est".

9 Wherefore, this too has rightly and plausibly been customary to be said: "a thousand denarii is in the chest" and "a thousand horsemen is in the army".

10 Lucilius autem, praeterquam supra posui, alio quoque in loco id manifestius demonstrat; nam in libro XV. ita dicit:

10 Lucilius, moreover, besides what I have set forth above, also in another place demonstrates this more manifestly; for in book 15. he thus says:

11 hunc, milli passum qui vicerit atque duobus,

11 this one, who shall have outstripped him by a thousand paces and two,

Campanus sonipes succussor nullus sequetur
maiore in spatio ac diversus videbitur ire;

No jostling pursuer will follow the Campanian steed;
over a greater space he will seem to go off on a different course;

12 item in libro nono:

12 likewise in the ninth book:

tu milli nummum potes uno quaerere centum;

you can, with one thousand-coin, earn a hundred;

13 "milli passum" dixit pro "mille passibus" et "uno milli nummum" pro "unis mille nummis" aperteque ostendit "mille" et vocabulum esse et singulari numero dici eiusque plurativum esse "milia" et casum etiam capere ablativum.

13 "milli passum," he said, in place of "mille passibus," and "uno milli nummum" in place of "unis mille nummis," and he openly showed that "mille" is both a vocable and is said in the singular number, and that its plural is "milia," and that it even takes the ablative case.

14 Neque ceteros casus requiri oportet, cum sint alia pleraque vocabula, quae in singulos tantum casus, quaedam etiam, quae in nullum inclinentur.

14 Nor ought the other cases to be required, since there are very many other vocables which are declined only into single cases, and some even which are declined into none.

15 Quapropter nihil iam dubium est, quin M. Cicero in oratione, quam scripsit Pro Milone, ita scriptum reliquerit: "Ante fundum Clodi, quo in fundo propter insanas illas substructiones facile mille hominum versabatur valentium", non "versabantur", quod in libris minus accuratis scriptum est; alia enim ratione "mille homines", alia "mille hominum" dicendum est.

15 Wherefore there is now nothing doubtful, that M. Cicero in the oration which he wrote Pro Milone left it written thus: "Ante fundum Clodi, quo in fundo propter insanas illas substructiones facile mille hominum versabatur valentium", not "versabantur", which is written in the less accurate books; for "mille homines" must be said in one way, "mille hominum" in another.

XVII. Quanta cum animi aequitate toleraverit Socrates uxoris ingenium intractabile; atque inibi quid M. Varro in quadam satura de officio mariti scripserit.

17. With what equanimity of mind Socrates bore his wife’s intractable temperament; and therein what M. Varro wrote in a certain satire about the duty of a husband.

1 Xanthippe, Socratis philosophi uxor, morosa admodum fuisse fertur et iurgiosa irarumque et molestiarum muliebrium per diem perque noctem scatebat.

1 Xanthippe, the wife of the philosopher Socrates, is reported to have been very morose and quarrelsome, and she was brimming with womanly angers and vexations through the day and through the night.

2 Has eius intemperies in maritum Alcibiades demiratus interrogavit Socraten, quaenam ratio esset, cur mulierem tam acerbam domo non exigeret.

2 Alcibiades, marveling at these intemperances of hers against her husband, asked Socrates what reason there was, why he did not expel from the house so bitter a woman.

3 "Quoniam," inquit Socrates "cum illam domi talem perpetior, insuesco et exerceor, ut ceterorum quoque foris petulantiam et iniuriam facilius feram."

3 "Because," said Socrates, "since I endure her such as she is at home, I am inured and exercised, so that I may more easily bear the petulance and injury of others as well out of doors."

4 Secundum hanc sententiam M. quoque Varro in satura Menippea, quam de officio mariti scripsit: "Vitium" inquit "uxoris aut tollendum aut ferendum est. Qui tollit vitium, uxorem commodiorem praestat; qui fert, sese meliorem facit."

4 According to this opinion, M. Varro also, in a Menippean satire which he wrote on the office of a husband: "A wife's fault," he says, "is either to be removed or to be borne. He who removes the fault provides a more commodious wife; he who bears it makes himself better."

5 Haec verba Varronis "tollere" et "ferre" lepide quidem composita sunt, sed "tollere" apparet dictum pro "corrigere".

5 These words of Varro, "to remove" and "to bear," are indeed wittily composed, but "to remove" appears to be said in place of "to correct".

6 Id etiam apparet eiusmodi vitium uxoris, si corrigi non possit, ferendum esse Varronem censuisse, quod ferri scilicet a viro honeste potest; vitia enim flagitiis leviora sunt.

6 It also appears that a fault of a wife of such a kind, if it cannot be corrected, was judged by Varro to be to be borne, because, of course, it can be borne honorably by the husband; for vices are lighter than flagitious crimes.

XVIII. Quod M. Varro in quarto decimo humanarum L. Aelium magistrum suum in etymologiai falsa reprehendit; quodque idem Varro in eodem libro falsum furis etymon dicit.

18. That M. Varro in the fourteenth of the Human (Antiquities) reprehends his master L. Aelius for false etymology; and that the same Varro in the same book says the etymon of “fur” is false.

1 In XIV. rerum divinarum libro M. Varro doctissimum tunc civitatis hominem L. Aelium errasse ostendit, quod vocabulum Graecum vetus traductum in linguam Romanam, proinde atque si primitus Latine fictum esset, resolverit in voces Latinas ratione etymologica falsa.

1 In the 14th book of Divine Matters M. Varro shows that L. Aelius, at that time the most learned man of the state, erred, in that a Greek vocable of old, translated into the Roman language, just as if it had been originally fashioned in Latin, he resolved into Latin words by a false etymological rationale.

2 Verba ipsa super ea re Varronis posuimus: "In quo L. Aelius noster, litteris ornatissimus memoria nostra, erravit aliquotiens. Nam aliquot verborum Graecorum antiquiorum, proinde atque essent propria nostra, reddidit causas falsas. Non enim "leporem" dicimus, ut ait, quod est levipes, sed quod est vocabulum anticum Graecum.

2 We have set down Varro’s own words on that matter: "In this our L. Aelius, most adorned with letters in our memory, erred several times. For of several more ancient Greek words, just as though they were our own proper ones, he rendered false causes. For we do not say "leporem," as he says, because it is levipes, but because it is an ancient Greek vocable."

Multa vetera illorum ignorantur, quod pro his aliis nunc vocabulis utuntur; et illorum esse plerique ignorent "Graecum", quod nunc nominant Hellena, "puteum", quod vocant phrear, "leporem", quod lagoon dicunt. In quo non modo L. Aelii ingenium non reprehendo, sed industriam laudo: successum enim fert fortuna, experientiam laus sequitur."

Many of their ancient vocables are unknown, because in place of these they now use other words; and most are unaware that these are theirs: "Graecum," which they now name "Hellena," "puteum," which they call "phrear," "leporem," which they say "lagoon." In this I not only do not reprehend the ingenuity of L. Aelius, but I praise his industry: for fortune brings success, praise follows experience."

3 Haec Varro in primore libro scripsit, de ratione vocabulorum scitissime, de usu utriusque linguae peritissime, de ipso L. Aelio clementissime.

3 Varro wrote these things in the first book, most knowledgeably about the rationale of vocables, most expertly about the use of both languages, about L. Aelius himself most clemently.

4 Sed in posteriore eiusdem libri parte "furem" dicit ex eo dictum, quod veteres Romani "furvum" atrum appellaverint et fures per noctem, quae atra sit, facilius furentur.

4 But in the posterior part of the same book he says that "thief" is said to be derived from this: that the ancient Romans appellated "furvus" as "black," and that thieves by night, which is black, steal more easily.

5 Nonne sic videtur Varro de fure, tamquam L. Aelius de lepore? Nam quod a Graecis nunc kleptes dicitur, antiquiore Graeca lingua phor dictum est. Hinc per adfinitatem litterarum, qui phor Graece, est Latine "fur".

5 Does not Varro seem thus about the thief, just as L. Aelius about the hare? For what by the Greeks is now called kleptes, in the more ancient Greek tongue was said phor. Hence, through an affinity of letters, what is phor in Greek is in Latin "fur".

6 Sed ea res fugeritne tunc Varronis memoriam, an contra aptius et cohaerentius putarit "furem" a "furvo", id est nigro, appellari, in hac re de viro tam excellentis doctrinae non meum iudicium est.

6 But whether that matter then escaped Varro’s memory, or, on the contrary, he thought it more apt and more coherent that "furem" be named from "furvo", that is, black, in this matter, concerning a man of such excellent learning, it is not my place to judge.

XIX. Historia super libris Sibyllinis ac de Tarquinio Superbo rege.

19. History concerning the Sibylline books and about King Tarquinius Superbus.

1 In antiquis annalibus memoria super libris Sibyllinis haec prodita est:

1 In the ancient annals, the record concerning the Sibylline books has been transmitted as follows:

2 Anus hospita atque incognita ad Tarquinium Superbum regem adiit novem libros ferens, quos esse dicebat divina oracula; eos velle venundare.

2 An old woman, a guest and unknown, came to King Tarquinius Superbus, bearing nine books, which she said were divine oracles; she wished to vend them.

3 Tarquinius pretium percontatus est. Mulier nimium atque inmensum poposcit;

3 Tarquinius inquired about the price. The woman demanded an excessive and immense price;

4 rex, quasi anus aetate desiperet, derisit.

4 the king, as if the old woman were raving from age, derided her.

5 Tum illa foculum coram cum igni apponit, tris libros ex novem deurit et, ecquid reliquos sex eodem pretio emere vellet, regem interrogavit.

5 Then that woman set a brazier with fire before him, burned up three books out of nine, and, whether he wished to buy the remaining six at the same price, asked the king.

6 Sed enim Tarquinius id multo risit magis dixitque anum iam procul dubio delirare.

6 But indeed Tarquinius laughed at that much more and said that the old woman now beyond doubt was delirious.

7 Mulier ibidem statim tris alios libros exussit atque id ipsum denuo placide rogat, ut tris reliquos eodem illo pretio emat.

7 The woman, right there, immediately burned up three other books, and again calmly asks for that very same thing, that he buy the remaining three at that same price.

8 Tarquinius ore iam serio atque attentiore animo fit, eam constantiam confidentiamque non insuper habendam intellegit, libros tris reliquos mercatur nihilo minore pretio, quam quod erat petitum pro omnibus.

8 Tarquinius, now serious in countenance and of a more attentive mind, understands that that constancy and confidence are not to be disregarded, the three remaining books he purchases at a price not at all less than that which had been asked for all.

9 Sed eam mulierem tunc a Tarquinio digressam postea nusquam loci visam constitit.

9 But it was established that that woman, then having departed from Tarquin, was afterwards seen nowhere.

10 Libri tres in sacrarium conditi "Sibyllini" appellati;

10 The three books were placed in the sacrarium, called "Sibylline";

11 ad eos quasi ad oraculum quindecimviri adeunt, cum di immortales publice consulendi sunt.

11 to them, as to an oracle, the Fifteen go, when the immortal gods must be consulted publicly.

XX. Quid geometrae dicant epipedon, quid stereon, quid kybon, quid grammen; quibusque ista omnia Latinis vocabulis appellentur.

20. What geometers call epipedon, what stereon, what kybon, what grammen; and by which Latin vocables all these are to be named.

1 Figurarum, quae geometrae appellant, genera sunt duo, "planum" et "solidum".

1 Of figures, which the geometers so call, the genera are two, "plane" and "solid".

2 Haec ipsi vocant epipedon kai stereon. "Planum" est, quod in duas partis solum lineas habet, qua latum est et qua longum: qualia sunt triquetra et quadrata, quae in area fiunt, sine altitudine.

2 These they themselves call epipedon kai stereon. "Plane" is that which has only lines in two directions, wherein it is broad and wherein it is long: such as triangular and quadrate (square) figures, which are made on a surface (area), without altitude.

3 "Solidum" est, quando non longitudines modo et latitudines planas numeri linearum efficiunt, sed etiam extollunt altitudines, o quales sunt ferme metae triangulae, quas "pyramidas" appellant, vel qualia sunt quadrata undique, quae kybous illi nos "quadrantalia" dicimus.

3 "Solid" is, when not only lengths and flat breadths make up the number of lines, but also raise altitudes, or such as are almost triangular cones, which they call "pyramids", or such as are square on every side, which they call kybous, we call "quadrantalia".

4 Kybos enim est figura ex omni latere quadrata, "quales sunt" inquit M. Varro "tesserae, quibus in alticolo luditur, ex quo ipsae quoque appellatae kyboi."

4 For kybos is a figure quadrate on every side, "such as are," says M. Varro, "the tesserae, with which one plays at the dice-game, whence they themselves also are called kyboi."

5 In numeris etiam similiter Kybos dicitur, cum omne latus eiusdem numeri aequabiliter in sese solvitur, sicuti fit, cum ter terna ducuntur atque ipse numerus terplicatur.

5 In numbers likewise a Kybos is so called, when every side of the same number is evenly resolved into itself, as happens when three by three are multiplied and the number itself is triplicated.

6 Huius numeri cubum Pythagoras vim habere lunaris circuli dixit, quod et luna orbem suum lustret septem et viginti diebus et numerus ternio, qui trias Graece dicitur tantundem efficiat in cubo.

6 Pythagoras said that the cube of this number has the power of the lunar circle, since both the moon surveys its orb in twenty-seven days and the number ternion, which is called trias in Greek, effects the same in the cube.

7 "Linea" autem a nostris dicitur, quam grammen Graeci nominant.

7 "Line," however, is what our people call it, which the Greeks name grammen.

8 Eam M. Varro ita definit: "Linea est" inquit "longitudo quaedam sine latitudine et altitudine.

8M. Varro defines it thus: "A line," he says, "is a certain length without latitude and altitude."

9 Eukleides autem brevius praetermissa altitudine: "gramme" inquit "est mekos aplates", quod exprimere uno Latine verbo non queas, nisi audeas dicere "inlatabile".

9 Euclid, however, more briefly, height being passed over: “gramme,” he says, “is mekos aplates,” which you cannot express in a single Latin word, unless you dare to say “inlatabile.”

XXI. Quod Iulius Hyginus affirmatissime contendit legisse se librum P. Vergilii domesticum, ubi scriptum esset "et ora tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror", non quod vulgus legeret "Sensu torquebit amaro".

21. That Julius Hyginus most emphatically contended that he had read a household copy of P. Vergilius, where it had been written "et ora tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror," not what the vulgar read, "Sensu torquebit amaro."

1 Versus istos ex georgicis Vergilii plerique omnes sic legunt:

1 These verses from the Georgics of Virgil almost everyone reads thus:

at sapor indicium faciet manifestus et ora
tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro.

but savor will make a manifest indication, and the mouths
of those attempting it, sad, it will torment with a bitter sensation.

2 Hyginus autem, non hercle ignobilis grammaticus, in commentariis, quae in Vergilium fecit, confirmat et perseverat non hoc a Vergilio relictum, sed quod ipse invenerit in libro, qui fuerit ex domo atque familia Vergilii:

2 But Hyginus, not, by Hercules, an ignoble grammarian, in the commentaries which he made on Vergil, affirms and insists that this was not left by Vergil, but that he himself found it in a book which had been from the house and family of Vergil:

et ora
tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror,

and the faces
sad of those attempting it, bitterness will torment the senses,

3 neque id soli Hygino, sed doctis quibusdam etiam viris complacitum, quoniam videtur absurde dici "sapor sensu amaro torquet". "Cum ipse" inquiunt "sapor sensus sit, non alium in semet ipso sensum habeat ac proinde sit, quasi dicatur "sensus sensu amaro torquet"."

3 nor has that been pleasing to Hyginus alone, but even to certain learned men, since it seems absurd to say "flavor torments with a bitter sense." "Since flavor itself," they say, "is a sense, it does not have another sense in itself, and accordingly it is as though it were being said 'sense torments with a bitter sense'."

4 Sed enim cum Favorino Hygini commentarium legissem atque ei statim displicita esset insolentia et insuavitas illius "sensu torquebit amaro", risit et: "Iovem lapidem," inquit "quod sanctissimum iusiurandum habitum est, paratus ego iurare sum Vergilium hoc numquam scripsisse, sed Hyginum ego verum dicere arbitror.

4 But indeed, when together with Favorinus I had read Hyginus’s commentary, and straightway the insolence and unsavoriness of that “sensu torquebit amaro” displeased him, he laughed and said: “By Jupiter’s stone,” he says, “which has been held the most sacred oath, I am ready to swear that Vergil never wrote this; but I judge that Hyginus speaks the truth.”

5 Non enim primus finxit hoc verbum Vergilius insolenter, sed in carminibus Lucreti invento usus est non aspernatus auctoritatem poetae ingenio et facundia praecellentis."

5 For Vergil did not first coin this word insolently, but, in the poems of Lucretius, he made use of the invention, not having spurned the authority of a poet excelling in genius and facundity."

6 Verba ex IV Lucreti haec sunt:

6 These are the words from Lucretius 4:

dilutaque contra
cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror.

and, on the contrary, diluted,
when we behold absinthe being mixed in, bitterness touches.

7 Non verba autem sola, sed versus prope totos et locos quoque Lucreti plurimos sectatum esse Vergilium videmus.

7 We see that Vergil has followed not words alone, but almost whole verses and also very many passages of Lucretius.

XXII. An qui causas defendit, recte Latineque dicat "superesse se" is, quos defendit; et "superesse" proprie quid sit.

CHAPTER 22. Whether the man who defends causes may, rightly and in good Latin, say "that he is superesse" to those whom he defends; and what "superesse" properly is.

1 Inroboravit inveteravitque falsa atque aliena verbi significatio, quod dicitur "hic illi superest", cum dicendum est advocatum esse quem cuipiam causamque eius defendere.

1 A false and alien signification of the word has grown robust and become inveterate, in that one says "hic illi superest", whereas it ought to be said that someone is an advocate for someone and defends his cause.

2 Atque id dicitur non in compitis tantum neque in plebe volgaria, sed in foro, in comitio, apud tribunalia.

2 and this is said not at the crossroads only nor among the vulgar plebs, but in the forum, in the comitium, before the tribunals.

3 Qui integre autem locuti sunt, magnam partem "superesse" ita dixerunt, ut eo verbo significarent superfluere et supervacare atque esse supra necessarium modum.

3 But those who spoke with integrity, for the greater part said “superesse” thus, so that by that word they signified to superflow and to be supervacant and to be above the necessary measure.

4 Itaque M. Varro in satura, quae inscripta est nescis quid vesper vehat, "superfuisse" dicit immodice et intempestive fuisse.

4 Therefore M. Varro, in the satire which is entitled nescis quid vesper vehat, says that "to have superfuit" meant to have been immoderate and untimely.

5 Verba ex eo libro haec sunt: "In convivio legi nec omnia debent et ea potissimum, quae simul sint biopsele et delectent, potius ut id quoque videatur non defuisse quam superfuisse."

5 The words from that book are these: "At a banquet not everything ought to be read, and chiefly those things which at the same time are biopsele and give delight, rather so that this too may seem not to have been lacking than to have been superfluous."

6 Memini ego praetoris, docti hominis, tribunali me forte assistere atque ibi advocatum non incelebrem sic postulare, ut extra causam diceret remque, quae agebatur, non attingeret. Tunc praetorem ei, cuia res erat, dixisse advocatum eum non habere, et cum is, qui verba faciebat, reclamasset: "ego illi V. C. supersum", respondisse praetorem festiviter: "tu plane superes, non ades".

6 I remember that I, by chance, was standing beside the tribunal of a praetor, a learned man, and there an advocate of no small renown was thus making a motion, in such a manner that he spoke outside the case and did not touch the matter that was being tried. Then the praetor said to the man whose case it was that he had no advocate; and when the one who was speaking protested, “I, to him, a most distinguished man, am ‘supersum’,” the praetor wittily replied, “you plainly ‘superes,’ you do not ‘ades.’”

7M. autem Cicero in libro, qui inscriptus est de iure civili in artem redigendo, verba haec posuit: "nec vero scientia iuris maioribus suis Q. Aelius Tubero defuit, doctrina etiam superfuit." In quo loco "superfuit" significare videtur "supra fuit et praestitit superavitque maiores suos doctrina sua superfluenti tamen et nimis abundanti": disciplinas enim Tubero stoicas dialecticas percalluerat.

7M. Cicero, moreover, in the book which is inscribed On Reducing Civil Law to an Art, set down these words: "nor indeed did knowledge of law fail Q. Aelius Tubero’s elders; learning even was in excess." In which place "was in excess" seems to signify "was above and excelled and surpassed his elders by his learning, yet overflowing and too abundant": for Tubero had thoroughly mastered the Stoic dialectical disciplines.

8 In libro quoque de republica secundo id ipsum verbum Cicero ponit non temere transeundum. Verba ex eo libro haec sunt: "Non gravarer, Laeli, nisi et hos velle putarem et ipse cuperem te quoque aliquam partem huius nostri sermonis attingere, praesertim cum heri ipse dixeris te nobis etiam superfuturum. Verum id quidem fieri non potest; ne desis, omnes te rogamus."

8 In the second book also of On the Republic Cicero puts down that very word as not to be rashly passed over. The words from that book are these: "I would not be burdened, Laelius, if I did not think that these too wish it and I myself did not desire that you also touch some part of this our discourse, especially since yesterday you yourself said that you would even be on hand for us besides. But indeed that cannot be done; only do not be absent, we all beg you."

9 Exquisite igitur et comperte Iulius Paulus dicebat, homo in nostra memoria doctissimus, "superesse" non simplici ratione dici tam Latine quam Graece: Graecos enim perisson in utramque partem ponere, vel quod supervacaneum esset ac non necessarium, vel quod abundans nimis et afluens et exuberans;

9 Precisely, therefore, and with sure knowledge, Julius Paulus used to say, a man in our memory most learned, that “to be over, superesse,” is not said with a single account as much in Latin as in Greek: for the Greeks employ perisson in both directions, either for what would be superfluous and not necessary, or for what is too abundant and affluent and exuberant;

10 sic nostros quoque veteres "superesse" alias dixisse pro superfluenti et vacivo neque admodum necessario, ita, ut supra posuimus, Varronem dicere, alias ita, ut Cicero dixit, pro eo, quod copia quidem et facultate ceteris anteiret, super modum tamen et largius prolixiusque flueret, quam esset satis.

10 thus our own ancients also said “to be superfluous” at times for what was superfluent and vacuous and not very necessary, as we set above, Varro to say, at other times in the way that Cicero said, for that which in copiousness and faculty did indeed outstrip the rest, yet flowed beyond measure and more largely and more prolixly than was enough.

11 Qui dicit ergo "superesse se" ei, quem defendit,

11 He who says therefore "that he is superfluous" to him whom he defends,

12 nihil istorum vult dicere, sed nescio quid aliud indictum inscitumque dicit ac ne Vergilii quidem poterit auctoritate uti, qui in georgicis ita scripsit: primus ego in patriam mecum, modo vita supersit. Hoc enim in loco Vergilius akyroteron eo verbo usus videtur, quod "supersit" dixit pro "longinquius diutiusque adsit",

12 he wishes to say none of those things, but says I know not what other thing, ill‑said and unlearned, and he will not even be able to use the authority of Vergil, who in the georgics thus wrote: I shall be the first into my fatherland with me, provided only that life may remain. For in that passage Vergil seems to have used an akyroteron with that word, in that he said "may it remain" instead of "be present longer and for a longer time",

13 illudque contra eiusdem Vergili aliquanto est probabilius:

13 and, on the contrary, that of the same Vergil is somewhat more probable:

florentisque secant herbas fluviosque ministrant
farraque, ne blando nequeat superesse labori;
significat enim supra laborem esse neque opprimi a labore.

and they cut the flowering herbs and minister to the streams and the spelt,
lest he be unable to be above the blandishing labor;
for he signifies to be above labor and not to be oppressed by labor.

14 An autem "superesse" dixerint veteres pro "restare et perficiendae rei deesse", quaerebamus.

14 Whether, however, the ancients used "superesse" for "to remain and to be lacking to the perfecting of a thing," we were inquiring.

15 Nam Sallustius in significatione ista non "superesse", sed "superare" dicit. Verba eius in Iugurtha haec sunt: "Is plerumque seorsum a rege exercitum ductare et omnis res exsequi solitus erat, quae Iugurthae fesso aut maioribus astricto superaverant."

15 For Sallust, in that signification, does not say "to be left over" (superesse), but "to remain over" (superare). His words in the Jugurtha are these: "He, for the most part, separately from the king, was accustomed to lead the army and to execute all affairs which had remained over, when Jugurtha was weary or bound by greater matters."

16 Sed invenimus in tertio Enni annalium in hoc versu:

16 But we have found in the third of Ennius’s Annals in this verse:

inde sibi memorat unum super esse laborem,

thence he recounts that one labor remains for him,

id est relicum esse et restare, quod, quia id est, divise pronuntiandum est, ut non una pars orationis esse videatur, sed duae.

that is, to be relict and to remain; which, because that is so, must be pronounced with division, so that it may not seem to be one part of the oration, but two.

17 Cicero autem in secunda Antonianarum, quod est relicum, non "superesse", sed "restare" dicit.

17 Cicero, however, in the second of the Antonian speeches, which is the remaining one, does not say "to be left over," but "to remain."

18 Praeter haec "superesse" invenimus dictum pro "superstitem esse".

18 Besides these, we have found "superesse" used for "to be surviving".

19 Ita enim scriptum est in libro epistularum M. Ciceronis ad L. Plancum et in epistula M. Asini Pollionis ad Ciceronem verbis his: "Nam neque deesse reipublicae volo neque superesse", per quod significat, si respublica emoriatur et pereat, nolle se vivere.

19 For thus it is written in the book of the epistles of M. Cicero to L. Plancus and in the epistle of M. Asinius Pollio to Cicero in these words: "For I wish neither to be lacking to the republic nor to survive it," by which he signifies that, if the republic should die out and perish, he does not wish to live.

20 In Plauti autem Asinaria manifestius id ipsum scriptum est in his versibus, qui sunt eius comoediae primi:

20 But in the Asinaria of Plautus, that very thing is written more manifestly in these verses, which are the first of that comedy:

sicut tuum vis unicum gnatum tuae
superesse vitae sospitem et superstitem.

just as you wish your only-begotten son your
life to outlive, safe and surviving.

21 Cavenda igitur est non inproprietas sola verbi, sed etiam pravitas ominis, si quis senior advocatus adulescenti "superesse se" dicat.

21 Therefore to be avoided is not only the impropriety of the word, but also the pravity of the omen, if any senior advocate says to a young man "that he himself will survive."

XXIII. Quis fuerit Papirius Praetextatus; quae istius causa cognomenti sit; historiaque ista omnis super eodem Papirio cognitu iucunda.

23. Who Papirius “Praetextatus” was; what the cause of that cognomen is; and the whole story about that same Papirius, agreeable to learn.

1 Historia de Papirio Praetextato dicta scriptaque est a M. Catone in oratione, qua usus est ad milites contra Galbam, cum multa quidem venustate atque luce atque munditia verborum.

1 The history about Papirius Praetextatus was told and written by M. Cato in the oration which he employed to the soldiers against Galba, with indeed much charm and light and polish of words.

2 Ea Catonis verba huic prorsus commentario indidissem, si libri copia fuisset id temporis, cum haec dictavi.

2 I would have inserted those words of Cato into this very commentary, if there had been a copy of the book at that time when I dictated these things.

3 Quod si non virtutes dignitatesque verborum, sed rem ipsam scire quaeris, res ferme ad hunc modum est:

3 But if you seek to know not the virtues and dignities of the words, but the thing itself, the matter is roughly in this way:

4 Mos antea senatoribus Romae fuit in curiam cum praetextatis filiis introire.

4 There used to be a custom for the senators at Rome to enter the curia with their praetextate sons.

5 Tum, cum in senatu res maior quaepiam consultata eaque in diem posterum prolata est, placuitque, ut eam rem, super qua tractavissent, ne quis enuntiaret, priusquam decreta esset, mater Papirii pueri, qui cum parente suo in curia fuerat, percontata est filium, quidnam in senatu patres egissent.

5 Then, when in the senate some rather greater matter had been deliberated and it was postponed to the following day, and it was resolved that no one should enunciate the matter about which they had handled, before it had been decreed, the mother of the boy Papirius, who had been in the curia with his parent, questioned her son what the Fathers had done in the senate.

6 Puer respondit tacendum esse neque id dici licere.

6 The boy responded that it must be kept silent and that it was not permitted to be said.

7 Mulier fit audiendi cupidior; secretum rei et silentium pueri animum eius ad inquirendum everberat: quaerit igitur compressius violentiusque.

7 The woman becomes more desirous of hearing; the secrecy of the matter and the boy’s silence whip her mind on to inquire: therefore she questions more pressingly and more violently.

8 Tum puer matre urgente lepidi atque festivi mendacii consilium capit. Actum in senatu dixit, utrum videretur utilius exque republica esse, unusne ut duas uxores haberet, an ut una apud duos nupta esset.

8 Then the boy, with his mother pressing, adopts the plan of a witty and facetious lie. He said that it had been debated in the senate, whether it seemed more useful and expedient for the republic, that one man should have two wives, or that one woman should be married to two men.

9 Hoc illa ubi audivit, animus compavescit, domo trepidans egreditur ad ceteras matronas.

9 When she heard this, her mind quails with fear, in trepidation she goes out from the house to the other matrons.

10 Pervenit ad senatum postridie matrum familias caterva; lacrimantes atque obsecrantes orant, una potius ut duobus nupta fieret, quam ut uni duae.

10 On the next day there comes to the senate a crowd of matrons of families; weeping and beseeching they entreat, that one woman rather be wed to two men than that two women to one man.

11 Senatores ingredientes in curiam, quae illa mulierum intemperies et quid sibi postulatio istaec vellet, mirabantur.

11 The senators, entering the curia, marveled at that intemperance of the women and what this request meant.

12 Puer Papirius in medium curiae progressus, quid mater audire institisset, quid ipse matri dixisset, rem, sicut fuerat, denarrat.

12 The boy Papirius, having advanced into the middle of the curia, recounts the matter, just as it had been: what his mother had set herself to hear, and what he himself had said to his mother.

13 Senatus fidem atque ingenium pueri exosculatur, consultum facit, uti posthac pueri cum patribus in curiam ne introeant, praeter ille unus Papirius, atque puero postea cognomentum honoris gratia inditum "Praetextatus" ob tacendi loquendique in aetate praetextae prudentiam.

13 The Senate covered with kisses the boy’s faith and inborn character, made a decree that henceforth boys should not enter the curia with their fathers, except that one Papirius; and to the boy afterward a cognomen, for the sake of honor, was conferred, "Praetextatus," on account of his prudence in keeping silence and in speaking in the praetexta age.

XXIV. Tria epigrammata trium veterum poetarum, Naevii, Plauti, Pacuvii, quae facta ab ipsis sepulcris eorum incisa sunt.

24. Three epigrams of three ancient poets, Naevius, Plautus, Pacuvius, which, made by themselves, were incised upon their sepulchres.

1 Trium poetarum inlustrium epigrammata, Cn. Naevii, Plauti, M. Pacuvii, quae ipsi fecerunt et incidenda sepulcro suo reliquerunt, nobilitatis eorum gratia et venustatis scribenda in his commentariis esse duxi.

1 The epigrams of three illustrious poets, Cn. Naevius, Plautus, and M. Pacuvius, which they themselves composed and left to be incised upon their own tombs, I have deemed should be written in these commentaries for the sake of their nobility and charm.

2 Epigramma Naevi plenum superbiae Campanae, quod testimonium iustum esse potuisset, nisi ab ipso dictum esset:

2 The epigram of Naevius, full of Campanian pride, which could have been a just testimony, if it had not been spoken by himself:

inmortales mortales si foret fas flere,
fierent divae Camenae Naevium poetam.
itaque postquam est Orcho traditus thesauro,
obliti sunt Romae loquier lingua Latina.

if it were right by divine law for immortals to weep for mortals,
the divine Camenae would weep for the poet naevius.
and so, after he was delivered to Orcus’s treasury,
in Rome they forgot to speak the Latin language.

3 Epigramma Plauti, quod dubitassemus, an Plauti foret, nisi a M. Varrone positum esset in libro de poetis primo:

3 The epigram of Plautus, which we would have doubted whether it were Plautus’s, had it not been placed by M. Varro in the first book On Poets:

postquam est mortem aptus Plautus, Comoedia luget,
scaena est deserta, dein Risus, Ludus Iocusque
et Numeri innumeri simul omnes conlacrimarunt.

after Plautus was consigned to death, Comedy mourns,
the stage is deserted; then Laughter, Play, and Jest
and innumerable Numbers all together wept.

4 Epigramma Pacuvii verecundissimum et purissimum dignumque eius elegantissima gravitate: adulescens, tam etsi properas, hoc te saxulum rogat ut se aspicias, deinde, quod scriptum est, legas.

4 Epigram of Pacuvius, most modest and most pure, and worthy of his most elegant gravitas: adolescent, even if you hurry, this little stone asks you to look at it, then read what is written.

Hic sunt poetae Pacuvi Marci sita
ossa. Hoc volebam, nescius ne esses. Vale.

Here are laid
the bones of the poet Marcus Pacuvius. This I wished, lest you be unaware. Farewell.

XXV. Quibus verbis M. Varro indutias definierit; quaesitumque inibi curiosius, quaenam ratio sit vocabuli indutiarum.

25. By what words M. Varro defined a truce; and, therein, it was more curiously inquired what the rationale of the word ‘indutiae’ is.

1 Duobus modis M. Varro in libro humanarum, qui est de bello et pace, "indutiae" quid sint, definit. "Indutiae sunt" inquit "pax castrensis paucorum dierum";

1 In two ways M. Varro, in the book of Human Affairs, which is on war and peace, defines what “indutiae” are. “Indutiae are,” he says, “a camp-peace of a few days.”

2 item alio in loco: "indutiae sunt" inquit "belli feriae".

2 likewise in another place: "truces are" he says "the holy-days of war".

3 Sed lepidae magis atque iucundae brevitatis utraque definitio quam plana aut proba esse videtur.

3 But each definition seems to be of a more charming and jocund brevity than to be plain or approved.

4 Nam neque pax est indutiae—bellum enim manet, pugna cessat -, neque in solis castris neque "paucorum" tantum "dierum" indutiae sunt.

4 For neither is an armistice peace—for war remains, combat ceases -, nor are armistices only in the camps nor only "of a few" "days".

5 Quid enim dicemus, si indutiis mensium aliquot factis in oppida castris concedatur?

5 What, indeed, shall we say, if, truces of several months having been made, it is granted to the camps to withdraw into towns?

6 nonne tum quoque indutiae sunt? aut rursus quid esse id dicemus, quod in primo annalium Quadrigarii scriptum est, C. Pontium Samnitem a dictatore Romano sex horarum indutias postulasse, si indutiae "paucorum" tantum "dierum" appellandae sunt?

6 are there not truces then too? or again what shall we say that thing is which is written in the first book of the Annals of Quadrigarius, that Gaius Pontius the Samnite asked from the Roman dictator a truce of six hours, if truces are to be called only "a few" "days"?

7 "belli" autem "ferias" festive magis dixit quam aperte atque definite.

7 "holidays of war," however, he said more festively than openly and definitively.

8 Graeci autem significantius consignatiusque cessationem istam pugnae pacticiam ekecheirian dixerunt exempta littera una sonitus vastioris et subdita lenioris.

8 The Greeks, however, more significantly and more signally, called that pactitious cessation of battle ekecheirian, with one letter of a harsher sound removed and a gentler one inserted.

9 Nam quod eo tempore non pugnetur et manus cohibeantur, ekecheirian appellarunt.

9 For the fact that at that time no fighting takes place and hands are restrained, they called it ekecheiria.

10 Sed profecto non id fuit Varroni negotium, ut indutias superstitiose definiret et legibus rationibusque omnibus definitionum inserviret.

10 But assuredly it was not Varro’s business to define a truce superstitiously and to all the laws and reasons of definitions to be subservient.

11 Satis enim visum est eiusmodi facere demonstrationem, quod genus Graeci typois magis et hypograpsas quam horismous vocant.

11 For it has seemed sufficient to make a demonstration of this kind, which sort the Greeks call typoi and hypographs rather than horismoi.

12 "Indutiarum" autem vocabulum qua sit ratione factum, iam diu est, cum quaerimus.

12 The vocable "Indutiarum," however—by what rationale it is fashioned—we have been inquiring about for a long time.

13 Sed ex multis, quae vel audimus vel legimus, probabilius id, quod dicam, videtur.

13 But from the many things which we either hear or read, what I shall say seems more probable.

14 "Indutias" sic dictas arbitramur, quasi tu dicas "inde uti iam".

14 We reckon "Indutias" to be so called thus, as if you were to say "from there to use now".

15 Pactum indutiarum eiusmodi est, ut in diem certum non pugnetur nihilque incommodetur, sed ex eo die postea uti iam omnia belli iure agantur.

15 The pact of a truce is of such a kind, that until a fixed day there be no fighting and nothing be incommoded, but from that day thereafter, that already all things are conducted by the right of war.

16 Quod igitur dies certus praefinitur pactumque fit, ut ante eum diem ne pugnetur atque is dies ubi venit "inde uti iam" pugnetur, idcirco ex his, quibus dixi, vocibus, quasi per quendam coitum et copulam nomen indutiarum conexum est.

16 Therefore, since a fixed day is predefined and a pact is made, that before that day there be no fighting, and when that day comes, "inde uti iam" there be fighting, for that reason from these words, which I have said, as if through a certain coition and copula, the name of truces has been conjoined.

17 Aurelius autem Opilius in primo librorum, quos Musarum inscripsit, "indutiae" inquit "dicuntur, cum hostes inter sese utrimque utroque alteri ad alteros inpune et sine pugna ineunt; inde adeo" inquit "nomen factum videtur, quasi initiae, hoc est initus atque introitus."

17 But Aurelius Opilius, in the first of the books which he inscribed “Musarum,” says: “indutiae are said to be, when enemies among themselves, on both sides, each to the others, go with impunity and without fighting; from that, indeed,” he says, “the name seems to have been made, as if from initiae, that is, an entering and an entrance.”

18 Hoc ab Aurelio scriptum propterea non praeterii, ne cui harum noctium aemulo eo tantum nomine elegantius id videretur, tamquam id nos originem verbi requirentes fugisset.

18 This, written by Aurelius, I did not pass over for this reason, lest to someone, a rival of these Nights, it might seem more elegant on that ground alone, as though this had escaped us while we were inquiring into the origin of the word.

XXVI. Quem in modum mihi Taurus philosophus responderit percontanti, an sapiens irasceretur.

26. In what manner the philosopher Taurus answered me, as I was inquiring, whether the wise man would grow angry.

1 Interrogavi in diatriba Taurum, an sapiens irasceretur.

1 I asked Taurus in a diatribe whether a wise man would grow angry.

2 Dabat enim saepe post cotidianas lectiones quaerendi, quod quis vellet, potestatem.

2 For he often gave, after the quotidian lectures, the power to inquire about whatever anyone wished.

3 Is cum graviter, copiose de morbo affectuve irae disseruisset, quae et in veterum libris et in ipsius commentariis exposita sunt, convertit ad me, qui interrogaveram, et: "haec ego" inquit "super irascendo sentio; sed, quid et Plutarchus noster,

3 He, when he had gravely and copiously discoursed about the disease or affection of anger, which both in the books of the ancients and in his own commentaries are set forth, turned to me, who had asked, and: "this I" he says "think concerning getting angry; but, what also our Plutarch,

4 vir doctissimus ac prudentissimus, senserit, non ab re est, ut id quoque audias.

4 a most learned and most prudent man, has thought; it is not out of place that you also hear that.

5 Plutarchus" inquit "servo suo, nequam homini et contumaci, sed libris disputationibusque philosophiae aures inbutas habenti, tunicam detrahi ob nescio quod delictum caedique eum loro iussit.

5 "Plutarch," he said, "ordered that his slave—a good-for-nothing and contumacious man, yet having ears imbued by books and the disputations of philosophy—have his tunic stripped off on account of I know not what offense, and that he be beaten with a thong."

6 Coeperat verberari et obloquebatur non meruisse, ut vapulet; nihil mali, nihil sceleris admisisse.

6 He had begun to be beaten and was protesting that he had not merited to be flogged; that he had committed nothing evil, nothing criminal.

7 Postremo vociferari inter vapulandum incipit neque iam querimonias aut gemitus eiulatusque facere, sed verba seria et obiurgatoria: non ita esse Plutarchum, ut philosophum deceret; irasci turpe esse; saepe eum de malo irae dissertavisse, librum quoque peri aorgesias pulcherrimum conscripsisse; his omnibus, quae in eo libro scripta sint, nequaquam convenire, quod provolutus effususque in iram plurimis se plagis multaret.

7 At last, in the midst of being beaten he begins to shout, and now no longer to make complaints or groans and wailings, but serious and scolding words: that Plutarch was not as it would befit a philosopher; that to grow angry is disgraceful; that he had often discoursed on the evil of anger, and had even composed a most beautiful book Peri Aorgesias; that all these things, which are written in that book, in no way agree with the fact that, cast headlong and poured out into anger, he was punishing himself with very many blows.

8 Tum Plutarchus lente et leniter: "quid autem," inquit "verbero, nunc ego tibi irasci videor? ex vultune meo an ex voce an ex colore an etiam ex verbis correptum esse me ira intellegis? mihi quidem neque oculi, opinor, truces sunt neque os turbidum, neque inmaniter clamo neque in spumam ruboremve effervesco neque pudenda dico aut paenitenda neque omnino trepido ira et gestio.

8 Then Plutarch, slowly and gently: "Well then," he says, "you whipping-post, do I now seem to you to be angry? From my countenance, or from my voice, or from my color, or even from my words, do you understand that I have been seized by anger? For my eyes, I suppose, are not truculent, nor is my face turbid; nor do I shout monstrously, nor do I effervesce into foam or redness; nor do I say things shameful or to-be-repented, nor at all do I tremble with anger and go into transports."

9 Haec enim omnia, si ignoras, signa esse irarum solent." Et simul ad eum, qui caedebat, conversus: "interim," inquit "dum ego atque hic disputamus, tu hoc age"."

9 For all these things, if you do not know, are usually signs of anger." And at the same time, turning to the one who was beating: "In the meantime," he said, "while I and this man are debating, you do this".

10 Summa autem totius sententiae Tauri haec fuit: Non idem esse existimavit aorgesian et analgesian aliudque esse non iracundum animum, aliud analgeton et anaistheton, id est hebetem ac stupentem.

10 But the sum of Taurus’s whole opinion was this: he judged aorgesia and analgesia not to be the same, and that a non-irascible mind is one thing, while an analgeton and anaistheton—that is, dull and stupefied—is another.

11 Nam sicut aliorum omnium, quos Latini philosophi "affectus" vel "affectiones", Graeci pathe appellant, ita huius quoque motus animi, qui, cum est ulciscendi causa saevior, "ira" dicitur, non privationem esse utilem censuit, quam Graeci steresin dicunt, sed mediocritatem, quam metrioteta illi appellant.

11 For just as of all the others, which the Latin philosophers call "affectus" or "affectiones," the Greeks call pathe, so also of this movement of the mind, which, when it is more savage for the sake of avenging, is called "ira," he judged not a privation to be useful, which the Greeks call steresin, but moderation, which they call metrioteta.