Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 20.3.0. Quae res pignori vel hypothecae datae olbigari non possunt.
20.2.0. In what cases a pledge or hypothec is tacitly contracted.
Dig. 20.3.0. Which things, given in pledge or hypothec, cannot be obligated.
Dig. 20.6.0. Quibus modis pignus vel hypotheca solvitur.
20.5.0. On the sale of pledges and mortgages.
Dig. 20.6.0. By what means a pledge or mortgage is extinguished.
Conventio generalis in pignore dando bonorum vel postea quaesitorum recepta est: in speciem autem alienae rei collata conventione, si non fuit ei qui pignus dabat debita, postea debitori dominio quaesito difficilius creditori, qui non ignoravit alienum, utilis actio dabitur, sed facilior erit possidenti retentio.
A general convention, in giving a pledge, of goods either present or later acquired has been accepted; but in the case where the agreement was conferred upon a specific thing belonging to another, if it was not due to him who was giving the pledge, then after the debtor has acquired dominion a useful action will be granted to the creditor, who did not ignore that it was alien, with greater difficulty; but retention will be easier for the possessor.
Cum praedium pignori daretur, nominatim, ut fructus quoque pignori essent, convenit. eos consumptos bona fide emptor utili serviana restituere non cogetur: pignoris etenim causam nec usucapione peremi placuit, quoniam quaestio pignoris ab intentione dominii separatur: quod in fructibus dissimile est, qui numquam debitoris fuerunt.
When a praedium was given in pledge, it was expressly agreed that the fruits also should be in pledge. A purchaser in good faith will not be compelled by the useful Servian action to restore those fruits that have been consumed; for it has been decided that the cause of the pledge is not destroyed even by usucapion, since the question of pledge is separated from the claim (intentio) of ownership—something dissimilar in the case of fruits, which were never the debtor’s.
Pacto placuit, ut ad diem usuris non solutis fructus hypothecarum usuris compensarentur fini legitimae usurae. quamvis exordio minores in stipulatum venerint, non esse tamen irritam conventionem placuit, cum ad diem minore faenore non soluto legitimae maiores usurae stipulanti recte promitti potuerunt.
By pact it was decided that, on the due date, if the interest is not paid, the fruits of the hypothecs are to be set off against the interest up to the limit of lawful interest. Although at the outset lesser interest came into stipulation, nevertheless it was decided that the convention is not void, since on the due date, the lesser interest not having been paid, greater interest—within the lawful limit—could rightly be promised to the stipulator.
Cum praedium uxor viro donasset idque praedium vir pignori dedisset, post divortium mulier possessionem praedii sui reciperavit et idem praedium ob debitum viri pignori dedit. in ea dumtaxat pecunia recte pignus a muliere contractum apparuit, quam offerre viro debuit meliore praedio facto, scilicet si maiores sumptus quam fructus fuissent, quos vir ex praedio percepit: etenim in ea quantitate proprium mulier negotium gessisse, non alienum suscepisse videtur.
When the wife had donated a praedium (estate) to her husband and the husband had given that praedium in pledge, after the divorce the woman recovered possession of her own praedium and gave the same praedium in pledge on account of the husband’s debt. The pledge contracted by the woman was rightly held only to the amount of that money which she ought to have offered to the husband, the praedium having been made better, namely if the expenses were greater than the fruits which the husband took from the praedium: for to that extent the woman seems to have managed her own business, not to have undertaken another’s.
Si superatus sit debitor, qui rem suam vindicabat, quod suam non probaret, aeque servanda erit creditori actio serviana probanti res in bonis eo tempore, quo pignus contrahebatur, illius fuisse. sed et si victus sit debitor vindicans hereditatem, iudex actionis servianae neglecta de hereditate dicta sententia pignoris causam inspicere debebit. atquin aliud in legatis et libertatibus dictum est, cum secundum eum, qui legitimam hereditatem vindicabat, sententia dicta est.
If the debtor, who was vindicating his own property, has been defeated because he did not prove it to be his own, the Servian action is likewise to be maintained for the creditor, upon his proving that the things were in the debtor’s goods at the time when the pledge was being contracted. But also, if the debtor vindicating an inheritance has been defeated, the judge of the Servian action, the sentence pronounced concerning the inheritance being disregarded, ought to inspect the cause of the pledge. But yet a different rule has been stated in the case of legacies and manumissions, when judgment has been given in favor of him who was vindicating the legitimate inheritance.
Per iniuriam victus apud iudicium rem quam petierat postea pignori obligavit: non plus habere creditor potest, quam habet qui pignus dedit. ergo summovebitur rei iudicatae exceptione, tametsi maxime nullam propriam qui vicit actionem exercere possit: non enim quid ille non habuit, sed quid in ea re quae pignori data est debitor habuerit, considerandum est.
Having been defeated at judgment through injury, he afterward bound by pledge the thing which he had claimed: a creditor cannot have more than he who gave the pledge has. Therefore he will be repelled by the exception of res judicata, although in the highest degree the one who won can exercise no proper action; for what must be considered is not what that man did not have, but what the debtor had in the thing which was given in pledge.
Contrahitur hypotheca per pactum conventum, cum quis paciscatur, ut res eius propter aliquam obligationem sint hypothecae nomine obligatae: nec ad rem pertinet, quibus fit verbis, sicuti est et in his obligationibus quae consensu contrahuntur. et ideo et sine scriptura si convenit ut hypotheca sit et probari poterit, res obligata erit de qua conveniunt. fiunt enim de his scripturae, ut quod actum est per eas facilius probari poterit: et sine his autem valet quod actum est, si habeat probationem: sicut et nuptiae sunt, licet testationes in scriptis habitae non sunt.
A hypothec is contracted by an agreed pact, when someone makes a pact that his property, on account of some obligation, be bound under the name of hypothec; nor does it pertain to the matter with what words it is effected, just as is the case also in those obligations which are contracted by consent. And therefore, even without a writing, if it is agreed that there be a hypothec and it can be proved, the property about which they agree will be bound. For writings are made about these things, so that what has been done may through them be more easily proved; and even without these, what has been done is valid, if it has probation: just as marriages exist, although attestations have not been had in writings.
Res hypothecae dari posse sciendum est pro quacumque obligatione, sive mutua pecunia datur sive dos, sive emptio vel venditio contrahatur vel etiam locatio conductio vel mandatum, et sive pura est obligatio vel in diem vel sub condicione, et sive in praesenti contractu sive etiam praecedat: sed et futurae obligationis nomine dari possunt: sed et non solvendae omnis pecuniae causa, verum etiam de parte eius: et vel pro civili obligatione vel honoraria vel tantum naturali. sed et in condicionali obligatione non alias obligantur, nisi condicio exstiterit.
It should be known that property can be given in hypothec for any kind of obligation, whether money is given by way of a mutuum or a dowry, whether a purchase or a sale is contracted, or even lease and hire or mandate; and whether the obligation is pure, or to a day, or under a condition; and whether it is constituted in the present contract or even precedes it: and indeed they can be given in the name of a future obligation as well; and not only for the sake of paying the whole sum of money, but also a part of it; and whether for a civil obligation or a praetorian (honorary) one or only a natural one. But also, in a conditional obligation they are not otherwise bound, unless the condition has arisen.
Obligatione generali rerum, quas quis habuit habiturusve sit, ea non continebuntur, quae verisimile est quemquam specialiter obligaturum non fuisse. ut puta supellex, item vestis relinquenda est debitori, et ex mancipiis quae in eo usu habebit, ut certum sit eum pignori daturum non fuisse. proinde de ministeriis eius perquam ei necessariis vel quae ad affectionem eius pertineant.
In a general obligation of things which someone has had or will have, those are not contained which it is likely a person would not have specially obligated; for example, household furniture, likewise clothing is to be left to the debtor, and, from the slaves, those which he keeps for that use, so that it is certain he would not have given them in pledge. Accordingly, the same [is to be said] about his attendants very necessary to him, or those which pertain to his affection.
Si debitor res suas duobus simul pignori obligaverit ita, ut utrique in solidum obligatae essent, singuli in solidum adversus extraneos serviana utentur: inter ipsos autem si quaestio moveatur, possidentis meliorem esse condicionem: dabitur enim possidenti haec exceptio: " si non convenit, ut eadem res mihi quoque pignori esset. si autem id actum fuerit, ut pro partibus res obligarentur, utilem actionem competere et inter ipsos et adversus extraneos, per quam dimidiam partis possessionem adprehendant singuli.
If a debtor has pledged his goods to two persons at once in such a way that to each they were obligated in solidum, each individually will employ the Servian action in solidum against outsiders: but between themselves, if a question is raised, the condition of the possessor is better; for to the possessor this exception will be given: " if it was not agreed that the same thing was also to be in pledge to me. But if it was transacted that the thing be obligated pro parte (for shares), a useful action lies both between themselves and against outsiders, by which each may take possession of a half share.
Si antixrysis facta sit et in fundum aut in aedes aliquis inducatur, eo usque retinet possessionem pignoris loco, donec illi pecunia solvatur, cum in usuras fructus percipiat aut locando aut ipse percipiendo habitandoque: itaque si amiserit possessionem, solet in factum actione uti.
If antichresis has been made and someone is introduced into a landed estate or into a house, he retains possession in the place of a pledge until money is paid to him, since he takes the fruits toward interest either by leasing it out or by himself taking them and dwelling there: and so, if he has lost possession, he is wont to use an action in factum.
Usus fructus an possit pignori hypothecaeve dari, quaesitum est, sive dominus proprietatis convenerit sive ille qui solum usum fructum habet. et scribit papinianus libro undecimo responsorum tuendum creditorem et si velit cum creditore proprietarius agere " non esse ei ius uti frui invito se", tali exceptione eum praetor tuebitur: " si non inter creditorem et eum ad quem usus fructus pertinet convenerit, ut usus fructus pignori sit": nam et cum emptorem usus fructus tuetur praetor, cur non et creditorem tuebitur? eadem ratione et debitori obicietur exceptio.
It has been asked whether a usufruct can be given in pledge or hypothec, whether the owner of the property has agreed, or he who has only the usufruct. And Papinian writes in the eleventh book of the Replies that the creditor must be protected; and if the proprietor wishes to bring an action against the creditor “that he has no right to use or enjoy against my will,” the praetor will protect him by such an exception: “if it has not been agreed between the creditor and him to whom the usufruct pertains that the usufruct be in pledge.” For since the praetor protects the purchaser of a usufruct, why should he not also protect the creditor? By the same reasoning the exception will be opposed to the debtor as well.
Sed an viae itineris actus aquae ductus pignoris conventio locum habeat videndum esse pomponius ait, ut talis pactio fiat, ut, quamdiu pecunia soluta non sit, eis servitutibus creditor utatur ( scilicet si vicinum fundum habeat) et, si intra diem certum pecunia soluta non sit, vendere eas vicino liceat: quae sententia propter utilitatem contrahentium admittenda est.
But whether a convention of pledge has place for the servitudes of way, of passage, of drive, and of aqueduct, Pomponius says must be examined, to the effect that such a pact be made, that, so long as the money has not been paid, the creditor use those servitudes ( scilicet if he has a neighboring estate), and, if within a certain day the money is not paid, it be permitted to sell them to the neighbor: which opinion, on account of the utility of the contracting parties, is to be admitted.
Cum pignori rem pigneratam accipi posse placuerit, quatenus utraque pecunia debetur, pignus secundo creditori tenetur et tam exceptio quam actio utilis ei danda est: quod si dominus solverit pecuniam, pignus quoque peremitur. sed potest dubitari, numquid creditori nummorum solutorum nomine utilis actio danda sit an non: quid enim, si res soluta fuerit? et verum est, quod pomponius libro septimo ad edictum scribit, si quidem pecuniam debet is, cuius nomen pignori datum est, exacta ea creditorem secum pensaturum: si vero corpus is debuerit et solverit, pignoris loco futurum apud secundum creditorem.
When it has been approved that a thing already pledged may be accepted in pledge, insofar as both sums are owed, the pledge is held for the second creditor, and both an exception and a useful action are to be granted to him: but if the owner shall have paid the money, the pledge also is extinguished. But it can be doubted whether a useful action ought to be given to the creditor under the title of the moneys paid or not: for what, if the thing has been performed? And true is what Pomponius writes in the seventh book on the Edict: if indeed the one whose claim (nomen) was given in pledge owes money, once it has been exacted, the creditor will settle accounts with him; but if he owed a corporeal thing and has performed, it will stand in the place of the pledge with the second creditor.
Etiamsi creditor iudicatum debitorem fecerit, hypotheca manet obligata, quia suas condiciones habet hypothecaria actio, id est si soluta est pecunia aut satisfactum est, quibus cessantibus tenet. et si cum defensore in personam egero, licet is mihi satisdederit et damnatus sit, aeque hypotheca manet obligata. multo magis ergo si in personam actum sit sive cum reo sive cum fideiussore sive cum utrisque pro parte, licet damnati sint, hypotheca manet obligata nec per hoc videtur satisfactum creditori, quod habet iudicati actionem.
Even if the creditor has made the debtor a judgment-debtor, the hypothec remains bound, because the hypothecary action has its own conditions—that is, it holds unless the money has been paid or satisfaction rendered. And even if I have proceeded in personam against a defender, although he has given me security and has been condemned, likewise the hypothec remains bound. Much more, therefore, if an in personam action has been brought either against the defendant or against the surety or against both for a part, although they have been condemned, the hypothec remains bound; nor by this is the creditor deemed to have been satisfied merely because he has the action on the judgment.
Si sub condicione debiti nomine obligata sit hypotheca, dicendum est ante condicionem non recte agi, cum nihil interim debeatur: sed si sub condicione debiti condicio venerit, rursus agere poterit. sed si praesens sit debitum, hypotheca vero sub condicione, et agatur ante condicionem hypothecaria, verum quidem est pecuniam solutam non esse, sed auferri hypothecam iniquum est: ideoque arbitrio iudicis cautiones interponendae sunt " si condicio exstiterit nec pecunia solvatur, restitui hypothecam, si in rerum natura sit. "
If a hypothec be obligated under a condition in the name of a debt, it must be said that before the condition it is not proper to sue, since meanwhile nothing is owed: but if the condition of the debt should come, he will be able to sue again. But if the debt is present, while the hypothec is under a condition, and a hypothecary action is brought before the condition, it is true indeed that the money has not been paid, but it is inequitable for the hypothec to be taken away: and therefore, at the judge’s discretion, security-stipulations are to be interposed " if the condition should arise and the money be not paid, the hypothec to be restored, if it is in existence. "
Et quae nondum sunt, futura tamen sunt, hypothecae dari possunt, ut fructus pendentes, partus ancillae, fetus pecorum et ea quae nascuntur sint hypothecae obligata: idque servandum est, sive dominus fundi convenerit aut de usu fructu aut de his quae nascuntur sive is, qui usum fructum habet, sicut iulianus scribit.
And those things which are not yet in being but will be in the future can be given in hypothec, such as pending fruits, the offspring of a female slave, the young of livestock, and that which comes into being is held bound by the hypothec: and this must be observed, whether the owner of the estate has agreed either about the usufruct or about the things that are born, or the one who has the usufruct, as julian writes.
Quod dicitur creditorem probare debere, cum conveniebat, rem in bonis debitoris fuisse, ad eam conventionem pertinet, quae specialiter facta est, non ad illam, quae cottidie inseri solet cautionibus, ut specialiter rebus hypothecae nomine datis cetera etiam bona teneantur debitoris, quae nunc habet et quae postea adquisierit, perinde atque si specialiter hae res fuissent obligatae.
What is said—that the creditor ought to prove that, when it was agreed, the thing was in the debtor’s assets—pertains to that agreement which was made specifically, not to that clause which is accustomed to be inserted routinely in cautiones, to the effect that, upon certain things being specifically given under the name of hypothec, the other goods of the debtor also are held, both those which he now has and those which he will acquire thereafter, just as if these items had been specifically obligated.
Qui res suas iam obligaverint et alii secundo obligant creditori, ut effugiant periculum, quod solent pati qui saepius easdem res obligant, praedicere solent alii nulli rem obligatam esse quam forte lucio titio, ut in id quod excedit priorem obligationem res sit obligata, ut sit pignori hypothecaeve id quod pluris est: aut solidum, cum primo debito liberata res fuerit? de quo videndum est, utrum hoc ita se habeat, si et conveniat, an et si simpliciter convenerit de eo quod excedit ut sit hypothecae? et solida res inesse conventioni videtur, cum a primo creditore fuerit liberata, an adhuc pars?
Those who have already obligated their property and then a second time obligate it to another creditor, in order to escape the peril which those are wont to suffer who more often obligate the same things, are accustomed to declare to the latter that the thing is obligated to no one except perhaps to Lucius Titius, so that, as to that which exceeds the prior obligation, the thing be obligated—so that what is of greater value be for pledge or hypothec: or the whole, when the thing shall have been freed from the first debt? On which point it must be considered, whether this holds thus if it is expressly agreed, or even if it has been agreed simply that, as to what exceeds, it be subject to hypothec? And does the whole thing seem to be included in the agreement, when it shall have been freed from the first creditor, or still only a part?
Si nesciente domino res eius hypothecae data sit, deinde postea dominus ratum habuerit, dicendum est hoc ipsum, quod ratum habet, voluisse eum retro recurrere ratihabitionem ad illud tempus, quo convenit. voluntas autem fere eorum demum servabitur, qui et pignori dare possunt.
If, the owner being unaware, his property has been given to hypothec, and then afterward the owner has held it ratified, it must be said that by this very thing which he ratifies he wished the ratihabition to run back retroactively to that time at which it was agreed. However, the will is for the most part observed only of those who also can give to pledge.
Si res hypothecae data postea mutata fuerit, aeque hypothecaria actio competit, veluti de domo data hypothecae et horto facta: item si de loco convenit et domus facta sit: item de loco dato, deinde vineis in eo positis.
If a thing given in hypothec is afterwards altered, the hypothecary action equally lies; for example, where a house was given in hypothec and it has been made into a garden; likewise, if agreement was made about a site and a house has been made; likewise, where a site was given and thereafter vineyards have been planted in it.
In vindicatione pignoris quaeritur, an rem, de qua actum est, possideat is cum quo actum est. nam si non possideat nec dolo fecerit quo minus possideat, absolvi debet: si vero possideat et aut pecuniam solvat aut rem restituat, aeque absolvendus est: si vero neutrum horum faciat, condemnatio sequetur. sed si velit restituere nec possit ( forte quod res abest et longe est vel in provinciis), solet cautionibus res explicari: nam si caveret se restituturum, absolvitur.
In the vindication of a pledge it is asked whether the person against whom the action has been brought possesses the thing about which the action has been brought. For if he does not possess it and has not by dolus brought it about that he should not possess it, he ought to be absolved; but if he does possess it and either pays the money or restores the thing, he is likewise to be absolved; if, however, he does neither of these, condemnation will follow. But if he wishes to restore and cannot (perhaps because the thing is absent and far away or in the provinces), the matter is usually settled by cautions (securities): for if he should give a caution that he will restore, he is absolved.
but if indeed he ceased to possess through fraud, yet, having endeavored with utmost effort, cannot restore the thing itself, he will be condemned in as much as the plaintiff shall have sworn in the suit, as in the other real actions: for if he were condemned in as much as would be owed, what good would an action in rem be, since by proceeding in personam he would obtain the same?
Interdum etiam de fructibus arbitrari debet iudex, ut, ex quo lis inchoata sit, ex eo tempore etiam fructibus condemnet. quid enim si minoris sit praedium, quam debetur? nam de antecedentibus fructibus nihil potest pronuntiare, nisi exstent et res non sufficit.
Sometimes the judge ought also to assess concerning the fruits, so that, from the time the suit was initiated, from that time he also condemns for the fruits. For what if the estate is of lesser value than is owed? For as to antecedent fruits he can pronounce nothing, unless they are extant and the thing does not suffice.
Si pluris condemnatus sit debitor non restituendo pignus, quam computatio sortis et usurarum faciebat, an, si tantum solverit, quantum debebat, exoneretur hypotheca? quod ego quantum quidem ad suptilitatem legis et auctoritatem sententiae non probo: semel enim causa transire videtur ad condemnationem et inde pecunia deberi: sed humanius est non amplius eum, quam quod re vera debet, dando hypothecam liberare.
If the debtor has been condemned in a greater sum for not restoring the pledge than the computation of principal and interests made, then, if he pays only as much as he owed, is the hypothec exonerated? Which, so far as concerns the subtlety of the law and the authority of the judgment, I do not approve: for once the cause seems to pass into condemnation and from that money is owed. But it is more humane that he should not need, by paying more than what he truly owes, to liberate the hypothec.
Si duo pariter de hypotheca paciscantur, in quantum quisque obligatam hypothecam habeat, utrum pro quantitate debiti an pro partibus dimidiis, quaeritur. et magis est, ut pro quantitate debiti pignus habeant obligatum. sed uterque, si cum possessore agat, quemadmodum?
If two together stipulate concerning a hypothec, the question arises to what extent each has the hypothec obligated—whether in proportion to the amount of the debt or by half shares. And the sounder view is that they have the pledge obligated in proportion to the amount of the debt. But if each proceeds against the possessor, how then?
whether each for a part, or for the whole, as if the thing were obligated to both in solidum? This is what must be said, if on the same day the pledge was given to each separately; but if to this one and to that one at the same time, if this was agreed, each will rightly sue in solidum; if not, each for his share.
Potest ita fieri pignoris datio hypothecaeve, ut, si intra certum tempus non sit soluta pecunia, iure emptoris possideat rem iusto pretio tunc aestimandam: hoc enim casu videtur quodammodo condicionalis esse venditio. et ita divus severus et antoninus rescripserunt.
It is possible for the giving of a pledge or of a hypothec to be made thus: that, if within a certain time the money is not paid, he may possess the thing with the right of a buyer, to be appraised then at a just price; for in this case the sale is seen to be, in a certain manner, conditional. And so the deified Severus and Antoninus issued a rescript.
Si res pignerata non restituatur, lis adversus possessorem erit aestimanda, sed utique aliter adversus ipsum debitorem, aliter adversus quemvis possessorem: nam adversus debitorem non pluris quam quanti debet, quia non pluris interest, adversus ceteros possessores etiam pluris, et quod amplius debito consecutus creditor fuerit, restituere debet debitori pigneraticia actione.
If the pledged thing is not restored, the lawsuit against the possessor is to be assessed, but in any case one way against the debtor himself, another way against any possessor: for against the debtor, not for more than the amount he owes, because it is of no greater interest; against the other possessors, even for more; and whatever beyond the debt the creditor shall have obtained, he ought to restore to the debtor by the pigneratician action.
Fideiussor impetravit a potestate, ut et ante quam solveret pignora ipse possideat quasi satisfacturus creditoribus, nec satisfecit: modo heres debitoris paratus est solvere creditoribus: quaero, an pignora fideiussor restituere cogendus sit. modestinus respondit cogendum esse.
A surety obtained from the authority that even before he paid he himself might possess the pledges, as if about to satisfy the creditors, and he did not satisfy them: now the heir of the debtor is prepared to pay the creditors: I ask whether the surety is to be compelled to restore the pledges. Modestinus replied that he must be compelled.
Pater seio emancipato filio facile persuasit, ut, quia mutuam quantitatem acciperet a septicio creditore, chirographum perscriberet sua manu filius eius, quod ipse impeditus esset scribere, sub commemoratione domus ad filium pertinentis pignori dandae: quaerebatur, an seius inter cetera bona etiam hanc domum iure optimo possidere possit, cum patris se hereditate abstinuerit, nec metuiri ex hoc solo, quod mandante patre manu sua perscripsit instrumentum chirographi, cum neque consensum suum accomodaverat patri aut signo suo aut alia scriptura. modestinus respondit: cum sua manu pignori domum suam futuram seius scripserat, consensum ei obligationi dedisse manifestum est.
The father easily persuaded Seius, his emancipated son, that, because he was receiving a sum by way of mutuum from the creditor Septicius, his son should write out in his own hand a chirograph, since he himself was impeded from writing, with a mention that a house belonging to the son was to be given in pledge: it was asked whether Seius could possess this house, among his other goods, by the best right, since he had abstained from his father’s inheritance, and that he need not fear from this alone, that at his father’s mandate he wrote out with his own hand the instrument of the chirograph, since he had not accommodated his consent to his father either by his seal or by another writing. Modestinus replied: since Seius had written in his own hand that his house would be for pledge, it is manifest that he gave consent to that obligation.
Lucius titius praedia et mancipia quae in praediis erant obligavit: heres eius praediis inter se divisis illis mancipiis defunctis alia substituerunt: creditor postea praedia cum mancipiis distraxit. quaeritur, an ipsa mancipia, quae sunt modo in praediis constituta, hoc est in hypothecis, emptor vindicare recte possit. modestinus respondit, si neque pignerata sunt ipsa mancipia neque ex pigneratis ancillis nata, minime creditoribus obligata esse.
Lucius Titius encumbered the estates and the slaves that were on the estates: his heir, after the estates had been divided among themselves, the former slaves having died, put others in their place: later the creditor sold the estates together with the slaves. It is asked whether the buyer can rightly vindicate the slaves themselves, which are now situated on the estates, that is, in hypothecs. Modestinus responded that, if neither the slaves themselves were pledged nor born from pledged handmaids, they are by no means obligated to the creditors.
Servum, quem quis pignori dederat, ex levissima offensa vinxit, mox solvit, et quia debito non satisfaciebat, creditor minoris servum vendidit: an aliqua actio creditori in debitorem constituenda sit, quia crediti ipsius actio non sufficit ad id quod deest persequendum? quid si eum interfecisset aut eluscasset? ubi quidem interfecisset, ad exhibendum tenetur: ubi autem eluscasset, quasi damni iniuriae dabimus actionem ad quantum interest, quod debilitando aut vinciendo persecutionem pignoris exinanierit.
A slave whom someone had given in pledge, he bound on account of a very slight offense, soon released him, and because he was not satisfying the debt, the creditor sold the slave for a lesser price: whether some action ought to be established for the creditor against the debtor, because the action for the credit itself does not suffice to pursue what is lacking? What if he had killed him or had put out his eye? Where indeed he had killed, he is liable to the actio ad exhibendum; but where he had put out his eye, we will grant an action as for wrongful damage (damnum iniuria datum) to the extent of the interest, because by debilitating or by binding he has exhausted the pursuit of the pledge.
let us suppose that there is no action in the name of the credit, because perhaps the cause had fallen: I do not deem the matter unworthy of the praetor’s animadversion and aid. ulpian notes: if he bound him in order to harm the creditor, he will be held liable; if one deserving it, he will not be held liable.
Si legati condicionalis relicti filio familias pater ab herede rem propriam eius pignori accepit et mortuo patre vel emancipato filio condicio legati exstiterit, incipit filio legatum deberi et neque pater potest pignus vindicare neque filius, qui nunc habere coepisset actionem nec ex praecedente tempore potest quicquam iuris habere in pignore, sicut in fideiussore dicitur.
If, in the case of a conditional legacy left to a filiusfamilias, the father has received from the heir that son’s own property as a pledge, and after the father’s death or the son’s emancipation the condition of the legacy is fulfilled, the legacy begins to be owed to the son; and neither can the father vindicate the pledge, nor can the son—who would only now have begun to have an action—have any right in the pledge from the preceding time, as is said in regard to a surety.
Si mancipia in causam pignoris ceciderunt, ea quoque, quae ex his nata sunt, eodem iure habenda sunt. quod tamen diximus etiam adgnata teneri, sive specialiter de his convenerit sive non, ita procedit, si dominium eorum ad eum pervenit qui obligavit vel heredem eius: ceterum si apud alium dominum pepererint, non erunt obligata.
If slaves have fallen under a pledge, those also who are born from them are to be held under the same right. What, however, we have said—that even those born subsequently are bound, whether it has been specially agreed concerning them or not—holds thus, if dominion over them has come to the one who pledged them or to his heir; but if they have given birth under another owner, they will not be encumbered.
Domus pignori data exusta est eamque aream emit lucius titius et exstruxit: quaesitum est de iure pignoris. paulus respondit pignoris persecutionem perseverare et ideo ius soli superficiem secutam videri, id est cum iure pignoris: sed bona fide possessores non aliter cogendos creditoribus aedificium restituere, quam sumptus in exstructione erogatos, quatenus pretiosior res facta est, reciperent.
The house given in pledge was burned down, and Lucius Titius bought that plot and built upon it: a question was raised concerning the right of pledge. Paulus replied that the pursuit of the pledge persists, and therefore the right of the soil is seen to have been followed by the superstructure, that is, together with the right of pledge: but possessors in good faith are not to be compelled to restore the building to the creditors otherwise than that they recover the expenses disbursed in the construction, insofar as the thing has been made more valuable.
Lex vectigali fundo dicta erat, ut, si post certum temporis vectigal solutum non esset, is fundus ad dominum redeat: postea is fundus a possessore pignori datus est: quaesitum est, an recte pignori datus est. respondit, si pecunia intercessit, pignus esse.
A statute had been laid down for a vectigal estate, that, if after a fixed time the vectigal were not paid, that estate should revert to the owner: afterward that estate was given in pledge by the possessor: it was asked whether it was rightly given in pledge. He answered, if money intervened, it is a pledge.
Item quaesiit, si, cum in exsolutione vectigalis tam debitor quam creditor cessassent et propterea pronuntiatum esset fundum secundum legem domini esse, cuius potior causa esset. respondit, si ut proponeretur vectigali non soluto iure suo dominus usus esset, etiam pignoris ius evanuisse.
He also asked, if, when in the discharge of the rent both debtor and creditor had been remiss, and for that reason it had been pronounced that the farm was the owner’s according to the owner’s law, whose claim was the stronger. He replied that, if, as proposed, with the rent not paid the owner had exercised his right, the right of pledge too had vanished.
Debitor pactus est, ut quaecumque in praedia pignori data inducta invecta importata ibi nata paratave essent, pignori essent: eorum praediorum pars sine colonis fuit eaque actori suo colenda debitor ita tradidit adsignatis et servis culturae necessariis: quaeritur, an et stichus vilicus et ceteri servi ad culturam missi et stichi vicarii obligati essent. respondit eos dumtaxat, qui hoc animo a domino inducti essent, ut ibi perpetuo essent, non temporis causa accomodarentur, obligatos.
The debtor stipulated that whatever had been brought into, carried into, imported, born there, or prepared on the estates given in pledge, should be in pledge: a part of those estates was without tenant-farmers, and the debtor thus delivered it to his own steward to be cultivated, with the slaves necessary for cultivation assigned: it is asked whether both stichus the bailiff (vilicus) and the other slaves sent for cultivation, and the sub-slaves (vicarii) of stichus, were bound. He replied that only those were bound who had been brought by the master with this intention, that they should be there permanently, and not accommodated for a temporary purpose.
Cum tabernam debitor creditori pignori dederit, quaesitum est, utrum eo facto nihil egerit an tabernae appellatione merces, quae in ea erant, obligasse videatur? et si eas merces per tempora distraxerit et alias comparaverit easque in eam tabernam intulerit et decesserit, an omnia quae ibi deprehenduntur creditor hypothecaria actione petere possit, cum et mercium species mutatae sint et res aliae illatae? respondit: ea, quae mortis tempore debitoris in taberna inventa sunt, pignori obligata esse videntur.
When a debtor has given a shop to a creditor in pledge, the question was asked whether by that act he has done nothing, or whether by the appellation “shop” he is to be seen to have obligated the merchandise which was in it. And if he has, from time to time, sold off those wares and bought others and brought them into that shop, and has died, can the creditor by hypothecary action claim all the things that are found there, since both the species of the merchandise have been changed and other things brought in? He answered: those things which at the time of the debtor’s death are found in the shop are seen to be bound in pledge.
Idem quaesiit, cum epistula talis emissa sit: " daneisamenos para sou dynaria pentakosia parekalesa se my bebaiwtyn all' hupovykyn par' emou labein: oidas gar akribws, hoti kai hy taberna kai ohi douloi mou oudeni katexontai y soi kai hws eusxymoni anvrwpw episteusas": an pignus contractum sit an vero ea epistula nullius momenti sit, cum sine die et consule sit. respondit, cum convenisse de pignoribus videtur, non idcirco obligationem pignorum cessare, quod dies et consules additi vel tabulae signatae non sint.
The same man asked, when a letter of such sort had been sent out: “Having borrowed from you five hundred (500) denarii, I requested you to receive from me not a surety but a hypothec: for you know exactly that both the tavern and my slaves are encumbered to no one, and that, as to a respectable man, you have trusted [me].” whether a pledge had been contracted, or rather that letter is of no effect, since it is without day and consul. He responded: since it seems that there was agreement concerning pledges, the obligation of the pledges does not on that account cease because the day and the consuls have not been added, or because the tablets have not been sealed.
Creditor pignori accepit a debitore quidquid in bonis habet habiturusve esset: quaesitum est, an corpora pecuniae, quam idem debitor ab alio mutuam accepit, cum in bonis eius facta sint, obligata creditori pignoris esse coeperint. respondit coepisse.
A creditor received in pledge from the debtor whatever he has in his estate or would have: it was asked whether the corporeal sums of money which the same debtor received as a loan from another, when they have entered his estate, have begun to be bound to the pledge-creditor. He answered: they have begun.
Stabula quae non sunt in continentibus aedificiis quorum praediorum ea numero habenda sint, dubitari potest. et quidem urbanorum sine dubio non sunt, cum a ceteris aedificiis separata sint: quod ad causam tamen talis taciti pignoris pertinet, non multum ab urbanis praediis differunt.
As to stables which are not within the contiguous buildings, it can be doubted to the account of which estates they are to be reckoned. And indeed they are without doubt not of urban estates, since they are separated from the other buildings; yet, as regards the matter of such a tacit pledge, they do not differ much from urban estates.
Si quis fideiubeat, cum res illius a debitore pro quo fideiussit pignori data sit, bellissime intellegitur hoc ipso, quod fideiubeat, quodammodo mandare res suas esse obligatas. sane si postea sint eius res hypothecae datae, non erunt obligatae.
If someone becomes surety, when his property has been given in pledge by the debtor for whom he stood surety, it is very plainly understood that by this very fact, that he becomes surety, he in a certain manner mandates that his own things are obligated. Indeed, if afterward his things have been given in hypothec, they will not be bound.
Licet in praediis urbanis tacite solet conventum accipi, ut perinde teneantur invecta et illata, ac si specialiter convenisset, certe libertati huiusmodi pignus non officit idque et pomponius probat: ait enim manumissioni non officere ob habitationem obligatum.
Although in urban estates it is usually accepted by tacit convention that things brought in and carried in are held in like manner as if it had been specially agreed, certainly a pledge of this kind does not prejudice liberty; and Pomponius also approves this: for he says that being obligated on account of habitation does not hinder manumission.
Est differentia obligatorum propter pensionem et eorum, quae ex conventione manifestari pignoris nomine tenentur, quod manumittere mancipia obligata pignori non possumus, inhabitantes autem manumittimus, scilicet antequam pensionis nomine percludamur: tunc enim pignoris nomine retenta mancipia non liberabimus: et derisus nerva iuris consultus, qui per fenestram monstraverat servos detentos ob pensionem liberari posse.
There is a difference between things obligated on account of pension (rent) and those which, made explicit by convention, are held under the name of pledge, in that we cannot manumit slaves bound in pledge, but we do manumit those residing with us, namely before we are precluded by a claim of pension (rent): for then slaves retained under the name of pledge we shall not set free; and the jurist Nerva was ridiculed, who had shown through a window that slaves detained on account of pension (rent) could be freed.
Tutoris heres cum herede pupilli transactione facta, cum ex ea maiorem partem solvisset, in residuam quantitatem pignus obligavit: quaesitum est, an in veterem contractum iure res obligata esset. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur obligatam esse.
The heir of the guardian, after a settlement had been made with the heir of the ward, since he had paid the greater part thereof, bound a pledge for the remaining amount: it was asked whether the thing was, by law, bound under the former contract. He replied that, according to the matters proposed, it was bound.
Si filius familias pro alio rem peculiarem obligaverit vel servus, dicendum est eam non teneri, licet liberam peculii sui administrationem habeant: sicut nec donare eis conceditur: non enim usquequaque habent liberam administrationem. facti tamen est quaestio, si quaeratur, quousque eis permissum videatur peculium administrare.
If a son in paternal power obligates a peculial thing on behalf of another, or a slave does so, it must be said that that thing is not bound, although they have free administration of their peculium; just as it is not granted to them to donate: for they do not have free administration in every respect. It is, however, a question of fact, if it be inquired, how far they appear to have been permitted to administer the peculium.
Eam rem, quam quis emere non potest, quia commercium eius non est, iure pignoris accipere non potest, ut divus pius claudio saturnino rescripsit. quid ergo, si praedium quis litigiosum pignori acceperit, an exceptione summovendus sit? et octavenus putabat etiam in pignoribus locum habere exceptionem: quod ait scaevola libro tertio variarum quaestionum procedere, ut in rebus mobilibus exceptio locum habeat.
He cannot lawfully receive by way of pledge that thing which someone cannot buy, because it is not in commerce, as the deified Pius wrote back to Claudius Saturninus. What then, if someone has taken a litigious estate as a pledge—should he be removed by an exception? And Octavenus thought that even in pledges the exception has a place: which Scaevola says proceeds in the third book of Various Questions, namely, that in movable things the exception has a place.
Si alius pro muliere quae intercessit dederit hypothecam, aut pro filio familias cui contra senatus consultum creditum est, an his succurritur, quaeritur. et in eo quidem, qui pro muliere obligavit rem suam, facilius dicetur succurri ei, sicuti fideiussori huius mulieris eadem datur exceptio. sed et in eo, qui pro filio familias rem obligavit, eadem dicenda erunt, quae tractantur et in fideiussore eius.
If someone else has given a hypothec on behalf of a woman who interceded, or on behalf of a filius familias to whom credit was extended contrary to the senatus consultum, the question is whether relief is afforded to them. And, in the case of the person who pledged his property for the woman, it will more easily be said that he is afforded succor, just as the same exception is granted to the surety (fideiussor) of this woman. But also, in the case of the person who encumbered his property for a filius familias, the same things are to be said as are treated of with respect to his surety (fideiussor).
Aristo neratio prisco scripsit: etiamsi ita contractum sit, ut antecedens dimitteretur, non aliter in ius pignoris succedet, nisi convenerit, ut sibi eadem res esset obligata: neque enim in ius primi succedere debet, qui ipse nihil convenit de pignore: quo casu emptoris causa melior efficietur. denique si antiquior creditor de pignore vendendo cum debitore pactum interposuit, posterior autem creditor de distrahendo omisit non per oblivionem, sed cum hoc ageretur, ne posset vendere, videamus, an dici possit huc usque transire ad eum ius prioris, ut distrahere pignus huic liceat. quod admittendum existimo: saepe enim quod quis ex sua persona non habet, hoc per extraneum habere potest.
Aristo wrote to Neratius Priscus: even if the contract has been made in such a way that the predecessor is dismissed, he will not otherwise succeed into the right of the pledge, unless it has been agreed that the same thing be obligated to him; for he ought not to succeed into the right of the first, who himself agreed nothing about the pledge; in which case the buyer’s position will be made the better. Finally, if the earlier creditor has interposed a pact with the debtor about selling the pledge, but the later creditor omitted a clause about distracting (selling) not out of forgetfulness, but when this was being arranged, so that he would not be able to sell, let us see whether it can be said that to this extent the right of the prior passes to him, that it be permitted to this one to distract the pledge. I consider this should be admitted: for often what someone does not have in his own person, he can have through an outsider.
Titius cum mutuam pecuniam accipere vellet a maevio, cavit ei et quasdam res hypothecae nomine dare destinavit: deinde postquam quasdam ex his rebus vendidisset, accepit pecuniam: quaesitum est, an et prius res venditae creditori tenerentur. respondit, cum in potestate fuerit debitoris post cautionem interpositam pecuniam non accipere, eo tempore pignoris obligationem contractam videri, quo pecunia numerata est, et ideo inspiciendum, quas res in bonis debitor numeratae pecuniae tempore habuerit.
Titius, when he wished to receive money as a loan (mutuum) from maevio, gave him a caution and intended to give certain things under the name of hypothec: then, after he had sold some of these things, he received the money: the question was asked whether the things previously sold also were held to the creditor. respondit, since it was within the debtor’s power, after the caution had been interposed, not to receive the money, the obligation of pledge is seen to have been contracted at the time when the money was counted out, and therefore one must inspect what things the debtor had among his goods at the time the money was counted out.
Qui dotem pro muliere promisit, pignus sive hypothecam de restituenda sibi dote accepit: subsecuta deinde pro parte numeratione maritus eandem rem pignori alii dedit: mox residuae quantitatis numeratio impleta est: quaerebatur de pignore. cum ex causa promissionis ad universae quantitatis exsolutionem qui dotem promisit compellitur, non utique solutionem observanda sunt tempora, sed dies contractae obligationis. nec probe dici in potestate eius esse, ne pecuniam residuam redderet, ut minus dotata mulier esse videatur.
He who promised a dowry on behalf of a woman received a pledge or hypothec for the dowry to be restored to himself. Then, after payment had followed in part, the husband gave the same thing as a pledge to another; soon the payment of the remaining amount was completed: the question was raised about the pledge. Since by reason of the promise he who promised the dowry is compelled to discharge the entire amount, it is not the times of payment that must be observed, but the day on which the obligation was contracted. Nor can it properly be said to be within his power not to pay over the remaining money, so that the woman may appear to be less-dowered.
Qui generaliter bona debitoris pignori accepit eo potior est, cui postea praedium ex his bonis datur, quamvis ex ceteris pecuniam suam redigere possit. quod si ea conventio prioris fuit, ut ita demum cetera bona pignori haberentur, si pecunia de his, quae generaliter accepit, servari non potuisset, deficiente secunda conventione secundus creditor in pignore postea dato non tam potior quam solus invenietur.
He who has accepted the debtor’s goods generally in pledge is thereby superior to him to whom afterward a praedium from these goods is given, although he can recover his money out of the rest. But if this was the agreement of the first, that only then should the other goods be held in pledge, if the money could not be preserved from those which he had accepted generally, that latter arrangement failing, the second creditor, in respect of the pledge later given, will be found not so much superior as alone.
Cum ex causa mandati praedium titio, cui negotium fuerat gestum, deberetur, priusquam ei possessio traderetur, id pignori dedit: post traditam possessionem idem praedium alii denuo pignori dedit. prioris causam esse potiorem apparuit, si non creditor secundus pretium ei qui negotium gesserat solvisset: verum in ea quantitate, quam solvisset eiusque usuris potiorem fore constaret, nisi forte prior ei pecuniam offerat: quod si debitor aliunde pecuniam solvisset, priorem praeferendum.
When by reason of a mandate the estate was owed to Titius, for whom the business had been transacted, before possession was delivered to him he gave it in pledge; after possession had been delivered, he gave the same estate again in pledge to another. It appeared that the claim of the first cause was the stronger, unless the second creditor had paid the price to him who had conducted the business; yet it would be established that, to the extent which he had paid, and with its interest, he would be stronger, unless perhaps the former should tender him the money; but if the debtor had paid the money from elsewhere, the former is to be preferred.
Post divisionem regionibus factam inter fratres convenit, ut, si frater agri portionem pro indiviso pignori datam a creditore suo non liberasset, ex divisione quaesitae partis partem dimidiam alter distraheret. pignus intellegi contractum existimavi, sed priorem secundo non esse potiorem, quoniam secundum pignus ad eam partem directum videbatur, quam ultra partem suam frater non consentiente socio non potuit obligare.
After the division by parcels was made among the brothers, it was agreed that, if a brother had not freed from his creditor a portion of land given in pledge while pro indiviso, the other might alienate one half of the share acquired from the division. I have considered that the pignus is understood as contracted; but the prior is not preferable to the second, since the second pledge seemed directed to that share, beyond his own share the brother could not obligate without the associate’s consent.
Si debitor, antequam a priore creditore pignus liberaret, idem illud ob pecuniam creditam alii pignori dedisset et, antequam utrique creditori solveret debitum, rem aliam priori creditori vendiderat creditumque pensaverit cum pretio rei venditae, dicendum est perinde haberi debere, ac si priori creditori pecunia soluta esset: nec enim interesse, solverit an pensaverit: et ideo posterioris creditoris causa est potior.
If a debtor, before he had freed the pledge from the prior creditor, had given that same thing in pledge to another for money lent, and, before he had paid the debt to each creditor, had sold another thing to the prior creditor and had set off the loan with the price of the thing sold, it must be said that the matter ought to be regarded just as if money had been paid to the prior creditor: for it does not make a difference whether he paid or set off; and therefore the cause of the later creditor is stronger.
Idemque est, si ex nummis pupilli fuerit res comparata. quare si duorum pupillorum nummis fuerit res comparata, ambo in pignus concurrent pro his portionibus, quae in pretium rei fuerint expensae. quod si res non in totum ex nummis cuiusdam comparata est, erit concursus utriusque creditoris, id est et antiquioris et eius cuius nummis comparata est.
The same holds if a thing has been acquired from the ward’s moneys. Wherefore, if a thing has been acquired with the moneys of two wards, both will concur in the pledge for those portions which have been expended toward the price of the thing. But if the thing has not been in its entirety acquired from the moneys of some person, there will be a concurrence of both creditors, that is, both of the prior one and of the one from whose moneys it was acquired.
Si tibi quae habiturus sum obligaverim et titio specialiter fundum, si in dominium meum pervenerit, mox dominium eius adquisiero, putat Marcellus concurrere utrumque creditorem et in pignore: non enim multum facit, quod de suo nummos debitor dederit, quippe cum res ex nummis pigneratis empta non sit pignerata ob hoc solum, quod pecunia pignerata erat.
If I have obligated to you what I am going to have, and to Titius specifically a farm, then if it shall come into my ownership, as soon as I have acquired its ownership, Marcellus thinks that both creditors concur, and in the pledge: for it does not much matter that the debtor paid the price with his own money, since a thing bought with pledged coins is not pledged for this reason alone, that the money was pledged.
Qui balneum ex calendis proximis conduxerat, pactus erat, ut homo eros pignori locatori esset, donec mercedes solverentur: idem ante calendas iulias eundem erotem alii ob pecuniam creditam pignori dedit. consultus, an adversus hunc creditorem petentem erotem locatorem praetor tueri deberet, respondit debere: licet enim eo tempore homo pignori datus esset, quo nondum quicquam pro conductione deberetur, quoniam tamen iam tunc in ea causa eros esse coepisset, ut invito locatore ius pignoris in eo solvi non posset, potiorem eius causam habendam.
He who had leased the bathhouse from the next Kalends had stipulated that the man, the eros, should be in pledge to the locator until the rents were paid: the same man, before the Kalends of July, gave the same eros in pledge to another for money lent. When consulted whether the praetor ought to protect the locator against this creditor seeking the eros, he replied that he ought: for although at that time the man was given in pledge when nothing was yet owed for the lease, nevertheless, since already then the eros had begun to be in such a condition that, without the locator’s consent, the right of pledge in him could not be dissolved, the locator’s cause must be held the superior.
Sed et si heres ob ea legata, quae sub condicione data erant, de pignore rei suae convenisset et postea eadem ipsa pignora ob pecuniam creditam pignori dedit ac post condicio legatorum exstitit, hic quoque tuendum eum, cui prius pignus datum esset, existimavit.
But also, if the heir, on account of those legacies which had been given under a condition, had come to an agreement about a pledge of his own property, and afterwards gave those very same pledges in pledge for money lent, and after that the condition of the legacies arose, he likewise considered that the one to whom the pledge had earlier been given must be protected.
Titia praedium alienum titio pignori dedit, post maevio: deinde domina eius pignoris facta marito suo in dotem aestimatum dedit. si titio soluta sit pecunia, non ideo magis maevii pignus convalescere placebat. tunc enim priore dimisso sequentis confirmatur pignus, cum res in bonis debitoris inveniatur: in proposito autem maritus emptoris loco est: atque ideo, quia neque tunc cum maevio obligaretur neque cum titio solveretur in bonis mulieris fuerit, nullum tempus inveniri quo pignus maevii convalescere possit.
Titia gave another’s estate as a pledge to Titius, afterward to Maevius; then, having become owner of that pledged thing, she gave it, appraised, to her husband as dowry. If the money was paid to Titius, it was not for that reason judged that Maevius’s pledge thereby gained validity. For then—the prior pledge being released—the pledge of the subsequent is confirmed when the thing is found among the debtor’s assets; but in the case proposed the husband is in the position of a purchaser. And therefore, because neither when it was obligated to Maevius nor when it was paid off to Titius was it in the woman’s assets, no time can be found at which Maevius’s pledge can acquire force.
Potior est in pignore, qui prius credidit pecuniam et accepit hypothecam, quamvis cum alio ante convenerat, ut, si ab eo pecuniam acceperit, sit res obligata, licet ab hoc postea accepit: poterat enim, licet ante convenit, non accipere ab eo pecuniam.
He has priority in the pledge who first lent the money and received a hypothec, although there had previously been an agreement with another that, if money should be received from him, the thing would be obligated, even if it was afterwards received from this man: for he could, although he had agreed beforehand, choose not to receive the money from him.
Videamus, an idem dicendum sit, si sub condicione stipulatione facta hypotheca data sit, qua pendente alius credidit pure et accepit eandem hypothecam, tunc deinde prioris stipulationis exsistat condicio, ut potior sit qui postea credidisset. sed vereor, num hic aliud sit dicendum: cum enim semel condicio exstitit, perinde habetur, ac si illo tempore, quo stipulatio interposita est, sine condicione facta esset. quod et melius est.
Let us see whether the same ought to be said, if a hypothec has been given upon a stipulation made under a condition; while that condition is pending, another lends purely and receives the same hypothec; then afterward the condition of the prior stipulation comes to pass, with the result that the one who lent later would be the stronger. But I fear that something else should be said here: for once the condition has come to pass, it is treated just as if at the time when the stipulation was interposed it had been made without a condition; and that is the better view.
Si colonus convenit, ut inducta in fundum illata ibi nata pignori essent, et antequam inducat, alii rem hypothecae nomine obligaverit, tunc deinde eam in fundum induxerit, potior erit, qui specialiter pure accepit, quia non ex conventione priori obligatur, sed ex eo quod inducta res est, quod posterius factum est.
If a colonus agrees that things introduced into the fundus and those born there are to be in pledge, and before he introduces it he has bound the thing to another under the name of hypothec, then thereafter he brings it into the fundus, the one who has received it specifically and purely will be superior, because it is not bound by the prior agreement, but by the fact that the thing has been brought in, which was done later.
Si de futura re convenerit, ut hypothecae sit, sicuti est de partu, hoc quaeritur, an ancilla conventionis tempore in bonis fuit debitoris: et in fructibus, si convenit ut sint pignori, aeque quaeritur, an fundus vel ius utendi fruendi conventionis tempore fuerit debitoris.
If it has been agreed concerning a future thing that it shall be subject to hypothec, as in the case of offspring, the question is whether the slave-girl was in the debtor’s assets at the time of the agreement; and as to fruits, if it is agreed that they be in pledge, likewise it is asked whether the estate (fundus) or the right of use and enjoyment (usufruct) was the debtor’s at the time of the agreement.
Si paratus est posterior creditor priori creditori solvere quod ei debetur, videndum est, an competat ei hypothecaria actio nolente priore creditore pecuniam accipere. et dicimus priori creditori inutilem esse actionem, cum per eum fiat, ne ei pecunia solvatur.
If a later creditor is ready to pay the earlier creditor what is owed to him, it must be considered whether the hypothecary action is available to him, the earlier creditor being unwilling to accept the money. And we say that the action is useless to the earlier creditor, since it is through him that it comes about that the money is not paid to him.
Creditor qui prior hypothecam accepit sive possideat eam et alius vindicet hypothecaria actione, exceptio priori utilis est " si non mihi ante pignori hypothecaeve nomine sit res obligata": sive alio possidente prior creditor vindicet hypothecaria actione et ille excipiat " si non convenit, ut sibi res sit obligata", hic in modum supra relatum replicabit. sed si cum alio possessore creditor secundus agat, recte aget et adiudicari ei poterit hypotheca, ut tamen prior cum eo agendo auferat ei rem.
The creditor who first received a hypothec, whether he possess it and another vindicates it by a hypothecary action, an exception is available to the prior: "if the thing was not previously obligated to me by way of pledge or hypothec"; or, if another is in possession and the prior creditor vindicates by a hypothecary action, and that man excepts, "if it was not agreed that the thing be bound to him," here he will replicate in the manner related above. But if the second creditor brings suit against another possessor, he proceeds rightly, and the hypothec can be adjudged to him—provided, however, that the prior, by bringing an action against him, may take the thing away from him.
Si quoniam non restituebat rem pigneratam possessor condemnatus ex praefatis modis litis aestimationem exsolverit, an perinde secundo creditori teneatur, ac si soluta sit pecunia priori creditori, quaeritur. et recte puto hoc admittendum esse.
If, because he did not restore the pledged thing, the possessor who was condemned has paid the valuation of the suit in the aforesaid modes, the question is whether he is held to the second creditor in the same way as if the money had been paid to the prior creditor. And I think it is right that this be admitted.
Si primus, qui sine hypotheca credidit, post secundum, qui utrumque fecit, ipse hypothecam accepit, sine dubio posterior in hypotheca est: unde si in diem de hypotheca convenit, dubium non est, quin potior sit, licet ante diem cum alio creditore pure de eadem re convenit.
If the first, who gave credit without a hypothec, after the second, who did both, himself received a hypothec, he is without doubt later in the hypothec; whence, if one agreed for a hypothec to take effect on a fixed day (in diem), there is no doubt that he is the superior, although before the day he concluded a pure agreement with another creditor concerning the same thing.
Si tecum de hypotheca paciscatur debitor, deinde idem cum alio tua voluntate, secundus potior erit: pecunia autem soluta secundo an rursus teneatur tibi, recte quaeritur. erit autem facti quaestio agitanda, quid inter eos actum sit, utrum, ut discedatur ab hypotheca in totum, prior concessit creditor alii obligari hypothecam, an ut ordo servetur et prior creditor secundo loco constituatur.
If the debtor makes a pact with you concerning a hypothec, and thereafter the same man, with your will, [contracts] with another, the second will be the stronger; but when the money has been paid to the second, it is rightly asked whether it is again bound to you. There will, however, be a question of fact to be litigated—what was transacted among them: whether, in order that there be a complete departure from the hypothec, the prior creditor conceded that the hypothec be obligated to another, or whether the order be preserved and the prior creditor be constituted in the second place.
Papinianus libro undecimo respondit, si prior creditor postea novatione facta eadem pignora cum aliis accepit, in suum locum eum succedere: sed si secundus non offerat pecuniam, posse priorem vendere, ut primam tantum pecuniam expensam ferat, non etiam quam postea credidit, et quod superfluum ex anteriore credito accepit, hoc secundo restituat.
Papinian, in book 11, answered that, if the prior creditor later, a novation having been made, received the same pledges together with others, he succeeds to his own place; but if the second does not tender the money, the first can sell, so that he carries as expended only the first sum of money, not also what he later lent, and whatever surplus he received from the earlier credit, he shall restore this to the second.
Sciendum est secundo creditori rem teneri etiam invito debitore tam in suum debitum quam in primi creditoris et in usuras suas et quas primo creditori solvit: sed tamen usurarum, quas creditori primo solvit, usuras non consequetur: non enim negotium alterius gessit, sed magis suum. et ita papinianus libro tertio responsorum scripsit, et verum est.
It must be known that the thing is held liable to the second creditor, even with the debtor unwilling, both for his own debt and for that of the first creditor, and for his own interest and for that which he paid to the first creditor: but nevertheless he will not obtain interest on the interest which he paid to the first creditor: for he did not transact another’s business, but rather his own. And thus Papinian wrote in the third book of his Responses, and it is true.
A titio mutuatus pactus est cum illo, ut ei praedium suum pignori hypothecaeve esset: deinde mutuatus est pecuniam a maevio et pactus est cum eo, ut, si titio desierit praedium teneri, ei teneatur: tertius deinde aliquis dat mutuam pecuniam tibi, ut titio solveres, et paciscitur tecum, ut idem praedium ei pignori hypothecaeve sit et locum eius subeat: num hic medius tertio potior est, qui pactus est, ut titio soluta pecunia impleatur condicio, et tertius de sua neglegentia queri debeat? sed tamen et hic tertius creditor secundo praeferendus est.
Having borrowed from Titius, he made a pact with him that his praedium should be in pledge or hypothec to him: then he borrowed money from Maevius and agreed with him that, if the praedium should cease to be held to Titius, it be held to him: thereafter some third person gives you money on mutuum, so that you might pay Titius, and makes terms with you that the same praedium be in pledge or hypothec to him and that he succeed to his position: is this middle one stronger than the third—the one who bargained that, once the money was paid to Titius, the condition would be fulfilled—and must the third complain of his own negligence? but nevertheless even this third creditor is to be preferred to the second.
Si tertius creditor pignora sua distrahi permittit ad hoc, ut priori pecunia soluta in aliud pignus priori succedat, successurum eum papinianus libro undecimo responsorum scripsit. et omnino secundus creditor nihil aliud iuris habet, nisi ut solvat priori et loco eius succedat.
If a third creditor allows his pledges to be sold for this purpose, that, with the prior’s money paid, he may succeed the prior in another pledge, Papinian wrote in the eleventh book of the Responsa that he will succeed. And in general the second creditor has no other right, except to pay the prior and to succeed in his place.
Si priori hypotheca obligata sit, nihil vero de venditione convenerit, posterior vero de hypotheca vendenda convenerit, verius est priorem potiorem esse: nam et in pignore placet, si prior convenerit de pignore, licet posteriori res tradatur, adhuc potiorem esse priorem.
If it be encumbered by a prior hypothec, but nothing has been agreed about sale, while with the later it has been agreed that the hypothec be sold, the sounder view is that the prior is superior: for also in pledge it is held that, if agreement was first made concerning the pledge, although the thing be delivered to the later, still the prior is superior.
Insulam tibi vendidi et dixi prioris anni pensionem mihi, sequentium tibi accessuram pignorumque ab inquilino datorum ius utrumque secuturum. nerva proculus, nisi ad utramque pensionem pignora sufficerent, ius omnium pignorum primum ad me pertinere, quia nihil aperte dictum esset, an communiter ex omnibus pignoribus summa pro rata servetur: si quid superesset, ad te. paulus: facti quaestio est, sed verisimile est id actum, ut primam quamque pensionem pignorum causa sequatur.
I sold you a tenement and said that the pension of the prior year would be mine, that of the following years would accrue to you, and that the right in the pledges given by the inquilinus would follow both. Nerva and Proculus [raise the question], unless the pledges were sufficient for each pension, whether the right in all the pledges pertains to me first, because nothing had been said openly, or whether the sum is to be preserved pro rata in common out of all the pledges: if anything should remain over, to you. Paulus: it is a question of fact, but it is verisimilar that this was the act, that each earliest pension should be followed by the cause of the pledges.
Claudius felix eundem fundum tribus obligaverat, eutychianae primum, deinde turboni, tertio loco alii creditori: cum eutychiana de iure suo doceret, superata apud iudicem a tertio creditore non provocaverat: turbo apud alium iudicem victus appellaverat: quaerebatur, utrum tertius creditor etiam turbonem superare deberet, qui primam creditricem, an ea remota turbo tertium excluderet. plane cum tertius creditor primum de sua pecunia dimisit, in locum eius substituitur in ea quantitate, quam superiori exsolvit: fuerunt igitur qui dicerent hic quoque tertium creditorem potiorem esse debere. mihi nequaquam hoc iustum esse videbatur.
Claudius Felix had encumbered the same farm to three: first to Eutychiana, then to Turbo, in the third place to another creditor. When Eutychiana was asserting her right, she was defeated before the judge by the third creditor and did not appeal; Turbo, defeated before another judge, did appeal. The question was whether the third creditor ought also to prevail over Turbo (he who had prevailed over the first creditrix), or, with her removed, Turbo would exclude the third. Clearly, when the third creditor discharged the first out of his own money, he is substituted in her place to the extent of the amount that he paid to the prior; therefore there were those who said that here too the third creditor ought to be preferred. To me this seemed by no means just.
Suppose the first creditrix had in court proceeded against the third creditor and had been overcome by the third by exception or in some other way: can the third creditor, who defeated the first, use the exception of res judicata against Turbo, who had lent in the second place? Or conversely, if after the first judgment, in which the first creditrix was overcome by the third creditor, the second creditor has prevailed over the third, will he be able to use the exception of res judicata against the first creditrix? In no way, as I think.
Lucius titius pecuniam mutuam dedit sub usuris acceptis pignoribus, eidemque debitori maevius sub isdem pignoribus pecuniam dedit: quaero, an titius non tantum sortis et earum usurarum nomine, quae accesserunt antequam maevius crederet, sed etiam earum, quae postea accesserunt, potior esset. respondit lucium titium in omne quod ei debetur potiorem esse.
lucius titius gave money as a loan at interest, with pledges accepted, and to the same debtor maevius, under the same pledges, gave money: i ask whether titius would be preferable not only for the principal and for those interest charges which accrued before maevius lent, but also for those which afterward accrued. he responded that lucius titius is preferable for the whole of what is owed to him.
Mulier in dotem dedit marito praedium pignori obligatum et testamento maritum et liberos ex eo natos, item ex alio heredes instituit: creditor cum posset heredes convenire idoneos, ad fundum venit: quaero, an, si ei iustus possessor offerat, compellendus sit ius nominis cedere. respondi posse videri non iniustum postulare.
A woman, as a dowry, gave to her husband an estate encumbered by pledge, and by her testament she instituted as heirs her husband and the children born from him, likewise those by another; the creditor, although he could convene heirs who were adequate, came to the estate: I ask whether, if a just possessor (lawful possessor) should make him a tender, he ought to be compelled to cede the right of the claim (ius nominis). I replied that it could seem not unjust to demand.
Quaerebatur, si post primum contractum tuum, antequam aliam pecuniam tu crederes, eidem debitori seius credidisset quinquaginta et hyperocham huius rei, quae tibi pignori data esset, debitor obligasset, dehinc tu eidem debitori crederes forte quadraginta: quod plus est in pretio rei quam primo credidisti utrum seio ob quinquaginta an tibi in quadraginta cederet pignoris hyperocha. finge seium paratum esse offerre tibi summam primo ordine creditam. dixi consequens esse, ut seius, potior sit in eo quod amplius est in pignore, et oblata ab eo summa primo ordine credita usurarumque eius postponatur primus creditor in summam, quam postea eidem debitori credidit.
It was asked, if after your first contract, before you lent other money, seius had lent 50 to the same debtor, and the debtor had obligated the hyperocha of this thing which had been given to you in pledge, and thereafter you lent perhaps 40 to the same debtor: as to the amount which is more in the value of the thing than you first lent, whether the hyperocha of the pledge would go to seius on account of the 50, or to you for the 40. Suppose seius is prepared to offer you the sum first in rank credited. I said it follows that seius is superior in that which is more in the pledge, and, the sum first in rank credited offered by him together with its interest, the first creditor is postponed as to the sum which he afterwards lent to the same debtor.
Titius seiae ob summam, qua ex tutela ei condemnatus erat, obligavit pignori omnia bona sua quae habebat quaeque habiturus esset: postea mutuatus a fisco pecuniam pignori ei res suas omnes obligavit: et intulit seiae partem debiti et reliquam summam novatione facta eidem promisit, in qua obligatione similiter ut supra de pignore convenit. quaesitum est, an seia praeferenda sit fisco et in illis rebus, quas titius tempore prioris obligationis habuit, item in his rebus, quas post priorem obligationem adquisiit, donec universum debitum suum consequatur. respondit nihil proponi.
Titius, to Seia, on account of the sum for which he had been condemned to her from tutelage, pledged all his goods, those he had and those he would have: afterwards, having borrowed money from the fisc, he pledged to it all his goods: and he paid in to Seia a part of the debt and, a novation having been made, promised the remaining sum to the same, in which obligation likewise, as above, it was agreed concerning the pledge. It was asked whether Seia should be preferred to the fisc both in those things which Titius had at the time of the prior obligation, and likewise in those things which he acquired after the prior obligation, until she obtains her entire debt. He responded that nothing is presented.
Negotiatori marmorum creditur sub pignore lapidum, quorum pretia venditores ex pecunia creditoris acceperant: idem debitor conductor horreorum caesaris fuit, ob quorum pensiones aliquot annis non solutas procurator exactioni praepositus ad lapidum venditionem officium suum extendit: quaesitum est, an iure pignoris eos creditor retinere possit. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur posse.
Credit was given to a dealer in marbles under a pledge of the stones, the prices of which the sellers had received from the creditor’s money: the same debtor was a lessee of Caesar’s storehouses, and because the rents for them had not been paid for several years, the procurator set over the exaction extended his office to the sale of the stones: it was asked whether by the right of pledge the creditor could retain them. He replied that, according to the matters proposed, he could.
Creditor qui praedia pignori accepit et post alium creditorem, qui pignorum conventionem ad bona debitoris contulit, ipse quoque simile pactum bonorum ob alium aut eundem contractum interposuit, ante secundum creditorem dimissum nullo iure cetera bona titulo pignoris vendidit. sed ob eam rem in personam actio contra eum creditori, qui pignora sua requirit, non competit nec utilis danda est: nec furti rerum mobilium gratia recte convenietur, quia propriam causam ordinis errore ductus persecutus videtur, praesertim cum alter creditor furto possessionem, quae non fuit apud eum, non amiserit. ad exhibendum quoque frustra litem excipiet, quia neque possidet neque dolo fecit, ut desineret possidere.
A creditor who accepted landed estates as a pledge, and, after another creditor who had brought a convention of pledges upon the debtor’s goods, himself likewise interposed a similar pact over the goods on account of another or the same contract, before the second creditor was discharged, with no right sold the remaining goods under the title of pledge. But on that account an in personam action does not lie against him for the creditor who is reclaiming his pledges, nor should a useful action be granted; nor will he be rightly sued for theft of movable things, because he seems to have pursued his own cause, led by an error about order (priority), especially since the other creditor did not lose by theft a possession which was not with him. An action for production will also be brought against him in vain, because he neither possesses nor did he do it by deceit so that he ceased to possess.
Fideiussor conventus officio iudicis adsecutus est, ut emptionis titulo praedium creditori pignori datum susciperet: nihilo minus alteri creditori, qui postea sub eodem pignore contraxit, offerendae pecuniae, quam fideiussor dependit, cum usuris medii temporis facultas erit: nam huiusmodi venditio transferendi pignoris causa necessiatate iuris fieri solet.
A surety, having been sued, obtained by the office of the judge that, under the title of purchase, he should assume the estate that had been given to the creditor in pledge; nonetheless, to another creditor who later contracted under the same pledge, there will be the capacity to tender the money which the surety paid, with interest for the intervening time: for a sale of this kind is wont to be made by necessity of law for the purpose of transferring the pledge.
Si tamen debitor non interveniente creditore pignus vendiderit eiusque pretium priori creditori solverit, emptori poterit offerri quod ad alium creditorem de nummis eius pervenit et usurae medii temporis: nihil enim interest, debitor pignus datum vendidit an denuo pignori obliget.
If, however, the debtor, without the creditor intervening, has sold the pledge and has paid its price to the prior creditor, there may be set up against the buyer the amount which, out of his money, has reached another creditor, together with interest for the intervening time: for it makes no difference whether the debtor has sold the thing given in pledge or again repledges it.
Si creditor pignus vel hypothecam vendiderit hoc pacto, ut liceat sibi reddere pecuniam et pignus reciperare: an, si paratus sit debitor reddere pecuniam, consequi id possit? et iulianus libro undecimo digestorum scribit recte quidem distractum esse pignus, ceterum agi posse cum creditore, ut, si quas actiones habeat, eas cedat debitori. sed quod iulianus scribit in pignore, idem et circa hypothecam est.
If a creditor has sold a pledge or hypothec under this pact, that it be permitted to him to return the money and recover the pledge: then, if the debtor is ready to return the money, can he obtain that? And Julianus, in Book 11 of the Digest, writes that the pledge has indeed been rightly alienated, but that one can proceed against the creditor, so that, if he has any actions, he cede them to the debtor. But what Julianus writes regarding a pledge is the same also with respect to a hypothec.
Illud inspiciendum est, an liceat debitori, si hypotheca venierit, pecunia soluta eam reciperare. et si quidem ita venierit, ut, si intra certum tempus a debitore pecunia soluta fuerit, emptio rescindatur, intra illud tempus pecunia soluta recipit hypothecam: si vero tempus praeteriit aut si non eo pacto res venierit, non potest rescindi venditio, nisi minor sit annis viginti quinque debitor aut pupillus aut rei publicae causa absens vel in aliqua earum causarum erit, ex quibus edicto succurritur.
One must examine whether it is permitted to the debtor, if the hypothec has been sold, to recover it upon payment of the money. And if indeed it has been sold on this condition, that, if within a certain time the money shall have been paid by the debtor, the purchase is rescinded, then within that time, upon payment of the money, he recovers the hypothec: but if the time has passed, or if the thing was not sold on that pact, the sale cannot be rescinded, unless the debtor is under 25 years, or a pupil (ward), or absent for the sake of the commonwealth, or is in one of those causes for which relief is afforded by the edict.
Quaeritur, si pactum sit a creditore, ne liceat debitori hypothecam vendere vel pignus, quid iuris sit, et an pactio nulla sit talis, quasi contra ius sit posita, ideoque veniri possit. et certum est nullam esse venditionem, ut pactioni stetur.
It is asked, if there is a pact by the creditor that it not be permitted to the debtor to sell the hypothec or the pledge, what the law is, and whether such a pact is null, as though it were set against the law, and therefore it could be sold. And it is certain that the sale is null, so that the pact is abided by.
Quaesitum est, si creditor ab emptore pignoris pretium servare non potuisset, an debitor liberatus esset. putavi, si nulla culpa imputari creditori possit, manere debitorem obligatum, quia ex necessitate facta venditio non liberat debitorem nisi pecunia percepta.
It was asked, if the creditor could not secure from the buyer of the pledge the price, whether the debtor was released. I thought that, if no fault can be imputed to the creditor, the debtor remains obligated, because a sale made from necessity does not liberate the debtor unless the money has been received.
Pomponius autem lectionum libro secundo ita scripsit: quod in pignoribus dandis adici solet, ut, quo minus pignus venisset, reliquum debitor redderet, supervacuum est, quia ipso iure ita se res habet etiam non adiecto eo.
Pomponius, however, in the second book of his Readings, wrote thus: what is usually added in the giving of pledges, that, in so far as the pledge should have sold for less, the debtor should render the remainder, is superfluous, because by the law itself the matter stands thus even without that being added.
Arbiter dividendae hereditatis cum corpora hereditaria divisisset, nomina quoque communium debitorum separatim singulis in solidum adsignavit: quaesitum est, an debitoris cessantibus pro solido pignus vendere quisque potest. respondi posse.
When an arbiter for dividing an inheritance had divided the hereditary corporeal assets, he also assigned the claims (nomina) against the common debtors separately to each heir in solidum: the question was asked whether, the debtor being in default, each one can sell the pledge for the whole. I replied that they can.
Si aliena res pignori data fuerit et creditor eam vendiderit, videamus, an pretium quod percepit creditor liberet debitorem personali actione pecuniae creditae. quod vere responderetur, si ea lege vendidit, ne evictionis nomine obligaretur, quia ex contractu et qualiquali obligatione a debitore interposita certe ex occasione eius redactum id pretium aequius proficeret debitori, quam creditoris lucro cederet. sed quantum ad creditorem debitor liberatur: quantum vero ad dominum rei, si necdum pignus evictum est, vel ad emptorem post evictionem ipsi debitor utili actione tenetur, ne ex aliena iactura sibi lucrum adquirat.
If another’s thing has been given in pledge and the creditor has sold it, let us see whether the price which the creditor received frees the debtor from the personal action of money lent. This would truly be answered, if he sold it under the term that he not be bound in the name of eviction; because from the contract and from whatever obligation interposed by the debtor, certainly on that occasion the price realized would more equitably accrue to the debtor than pass to the creditor’s profit. But, as far as concerns the creditor, the debtor is released; as far as concerns the owner of the thing, if the pledge has not yet been evicted, or as concerns the buyer after eviction, the debtor is held by a useful action in their favor, lest he acquire gain for himself from another’s loss.
for also, if, by chance seeking greater fruits from the possessor, the creditor has taken them, he must credit them all, by way of acceptance, toward the owed amount; and when, through the injustice of the judge, the creditor had taken from the owner a thing which had not been the debtor’s, as if it were obligated to himself, and it was asked whether, the debt having been paid, it ought to be restored to the debtor, our Scaevola approved that it must be restored. But if he did not sell in such a way that it is certain the price will in every event remain with him, but is obliged to restore it, I judge that meanwhile nothing can be sought from the debtor, but that his release be held in suspense; however, if, having been sued by the action ex empto, the creditor has made good to the buyer, he can pursue the debt from the debtor, because it has appeared that he was not released.
Arbitri dividundae hereditatis inter heredes cum corpora hereditaria divisissent, nomina quoque communium debitorum separatim diversa singulis in solidum adsignaverunt. quaesitum est an unusquisque eorum, debitore sibi addicto cessante in solutione, pro solido pignus sub eo nomine obligatum vendere possit. respondit potuisse.
Arbiters for dividing an inheritance, after they had divided the hereditary assets among the heirs, also assigned the claims of the common debtors separately, different ones to each, for the whole. It was asked whether each of them, when the debtor assigned to him failed in payment, could sell, for the whole, the pledge bound under that head. He answered that he could.
Debitoris absentis amicus negotia gessit et pignora citra emptionem pecunia sua liberavit: ius pristinum domino restitutum videtur. igitur qui negotium gessit, utilem servianam dari sibi non recte desiderabit: si tamen possideat, exceptione doli defenditur.
A friend of an absent debtor managed his affairs and redeemed the pledges, without purchase, with his own money: the prior right seems to have been restored to the owner. Therefore the one who managed the business will not rightly desire that a useful Servian action be granted to him: if, however, he should be in possession, he is defended by the defense of deceit.
Cum venditor numerata sibi parte pretii praedium quod venierat pignori accepisset ac postea residuum pretium emptori litteris ad eum missis donasset, eoque defuncto donationem quibusdam modis inutilem esse constabat. iure pignoris fiscum frustra petere praedium, qui successerat in locum venditoris, apparuit, cuius pignoris solutum esse pactum prima voluntate donationis constabat, quoniam inutilem pecuniae donationem lex facit, cui non est locus in pignore liberando.
When the seller, a portion of the price having been paid out to him, had taken in pledge the estate which he had sold, and afterward had donated the remaining price to the buyer by letters sent to him, and upon his death it was agreed that the donation was in certain ways ineffectual, it appeared that the fisc, which had succeeded to the place of the seller, was seeking the estate in vain by the right of pledge; for it was established that the pact of that pledge had been loosed by the original will of the donation, since the law makes a donation of money ineffectual—a rule which has no place in the releasing of the pledge.
Si res distracta fuerit sic, nisi intra certum diem meliorem condicionem invenisset, fueritque tradita et forte emptor, antequam melior condicio offeretur, hanc rem pignori dedisset, Marcellus libro quinto digestorum ait finiri pignus, si melior condicio fuerit allata, quamquam, ubi sic res distracta est, nisi emptori displicuisset, pignus finiri non putet.
If a thing has been sold thus, that unless within a fixed day he should have found a better condition, and it has been delivered, and perchance the buyer, before the better condition was offered, had given this thing in pledge, Marcellus in the fifth book of the Digest says the pledge is terminated if a better condition has been brought, although, where a thing is sold on such terms, unless it had displeased the buyer, he does not think the pledge is terminated.
Si in venditione pignoris consenserit creditor vel ut debitor hanc rem permutet vel donet vel in dotem det, dicendum erit pignus liberari, nisi salva causa pignoris sui consensit vel venditioni vel ceteris: nam solent multi salva causa pignoris sui consentire. sed si ipse vendiderit creditor, sic tamen venditionem fecit, ne discederet a pignore, nisi ei satisfiat, dicendum erit exceptionem ei non nocere. sed et si non concesserat pignus venumdari, sed ratam habuit venditionem, idem erit probandum.
If, in the sale of the pledge, the creditor consented either that the debtor permute this thing or donate it or give it into dowry, it must be said that the pledge is released, unless he consented to the sale or the other acts with the cause of his pledge preserved; for many are accustomed to consent with the cause of their pledge preserved. But if the creditor himself sold it, yet made the sale on this condition, that it not depart from the pledge unless he is satisfied, it must be said that the exception does not harm him. And even if he had not permitted the pledge to be sold, but ratified the sale, the same must be proved.
Solvitur hypotheca et si ab ea discedatur aut paciscatur creditor, ne pecuniam petat: nisi si quis dicat pactum interpositum esse, ut a persona non petatur. et quid si hoc actum sit, cum forte alius hypothecam possidebit? sed cum pactum conventum exceptionem perpetuam pariat, eadem et in hoc casu possunt dici, ut et ab hypotheca discedatur.
The hypothec is dissolved even if it be departed from, or the creditor makes a pact not to demand the money: unless someone should say that a pact was interposed that it not be sought from the person. And what if this has been done when perhaps another possesses the hypothec? But since a pact-convent produces a perpetual exception, the same can be said in this case as well, namely that there is also a withdrawal from the hypothec.
Si convenerit, ut pro hypotheca fideiussor daretur, et datus sit, satisfactum videbitur, ut hypotheca liberetur. aliud est, si ius obligationis vendiderit creditor et pecuniam acceperit: tunc enim manent omnes obligationes integrae, quia pretii loco id accipitur, non solutionis nomine.
If it has been agreed that, in place of the hypothec, a surety be given, and he has been given, it will be considered satisfaction, so that the hypothec is released. aliud est, if the creditor has sold the right of the obligation and has received the money: for then all the obligations remain intact, because that is received by way of price, not under the name of payment.
Qui paratus est solvere, merito pignus videtur liberasse: qui vero non solvere, sed satisfacere paratus est, in diversa causa est. ergo satisfecisse prodest, quia sibi imputare debet creditor, qui satisfactionem admisit vice solutionis: at qui non admittit satisfactionem, sed solutionem desiderat, culpandus non est.
He who is ready to pay is deservedly considered to have released the pledge; but he who is ready not to pay, but to satisfy, is in a different case. Therefore, to have satisfied is beneficial, because the creditor who admitted satisfaction in the stead of payment ought to impute it to himself; but he who does not admit satisfaction, but desires payment, is not to be blamed.
Si consensit venditioni creditor, liberatur hypotheca: sed in his pupilli consensus non debet aliter ratus haberi, quam si praesente tutore auctore consenserit aut etiam ipse tutor, scilicet si commodum aliquid vel satis ei fieri ex eo iudex aestimaverit.
If the creditor has consented to the sale, the hypothec is released: but in the case of pupils, the consent ought not to be held valid otherwise than if he has consented with the tutor present as authorizer, or even the tutor himself has, namely if the judge has assessed that some advantage or adequate satisfaction is made to him therefrom.
Illud tenendum est, si quis communis rei partem pro indiviso dederit hypothecae, divisione facta cum socio non utique eam partem creditori obligatam esse, quae ei obtingit qui pignori dedit, sed utriusque pars pro indiviso pro parte dimidia manebit obligata.
This must be held: if someone has given an undivided share of a common thing in hypothec, then, once division has been made with his associate, it is not necessarily only that part which falls to him who gave it in pledge that is bound to the creditor; rather, the share of each will remain bound, undivided, for a half part (a moiety).
Si procurator debitoris in rem suam sit, non puto dubitari debere, quin pactum noceat creditori. itemque si a parte creditoris procurator in rem suam exstiterit, paciscendo inutilem sibi faciet hypothecariam actionem, in tantum, ut putem recte dici et dominis litis hoc casu nocere hanc exceptionem.
If the procurator of the debtor is “in his own interest,” I do not think it ought to be doubted that the pact injures the creditor. Likewise, if on the creditor’s side a procurator “in his own interest” has arisen, by making an agreement he will render the hypothecary action useless to himself, to such an extent that I think it is rightly said that in this case this exception also harms the masters of the suit.
An pacisci possint filius familias et servus, ne res pignori sit, quam peculiariter hypothecam acceperint et habent liberam administrationem, videamus, an quemadmodum donare non possunt, ita nec pacisci ne pignori sit possint. sed dicendum est, ut concedere possint, scilicet si pretium pro pactione accipiant, quasi vendant.
Whether a son of the household and a slave can make a pact that a thing not be in pledge, which they have accepted as a hypothec to their peculium and over which they have free administration, let us see whether, just as they cannot donate, so likewise they cannot make a pact that it not be in pledge. But it must be said that they can concede, namely if they receive a price for the pact, as though they were selling.
Supervacuum est quaerere agrum specialiter hypothecae datum permissu creditoris venisse, si ipse debitor rem possideat: nisi quod potest fieri, ut debitor permissu creditoris vendiderit, deinde postea bona fide redemerit ab eodem vel ab alio, ad quem per successionem ea res pertinere coepisset, aut si ipse debitor emptori heres exstiterit: verumtamen cum pecunia soluta non sit, doli mali suspicio inerit translata ad praesens tempus, ut possit creditor replicationem doli mali obicere.
It is superfluous to inquire that a field specially given in hypothec was sold by the creditor’s permission, if the debtor himself possesses the thing: unless it can happen that the debtor, with the creditor’s permission, sold it, and then afterward in good faith redeemed it from that same person or from another to whom by succession that thing had begun to pertain, or if the debtor himself has turned out heir to the purchaser: nevertheless, since the money has not been paid, a suspicion of malicious deceit will be present, carried over to the present time, so that the creditor can oppose a replication for malicious deceit.
Illud videamus, si titius debitor voluntate creditoris sui vendiderit maevio vel ei, a quo maevius emerit, et postea maevius titio heres exstiterit et creditor ab eo petat, quid iuris sit. sed iniquum est auferri ei rem a creditore, qui non successionis iure, sed alio modo rem nactus est. potest tamen dici, cum titii dolus in re versaretur, ne creditor a possessore pecuniam recipiat, iniquissimum esse ludificari eum.
Let us consider this: if titius the debtor, with his creditor’s consent, has sold to maevius, or to him from whom maevius had purchased, and afterwards maevius has become heir to titius, and the creditor claims from him—what is the law? But it is inequitable that the thing be taken from him by the creditor, seeing that he obtained the thing not by the right of succession, but in another way. Yet it can be said, since the dolus of titius was involved in the matter, that it would be most inequitable for the creditor to be made sport of, to the effect that the creditor should not receive the money from the possessor.
Quod si is fundus a maevio alicui obligatus possideatur, cui nondum satisfactum erit, tunc rursus aequum erit excipi " si non voluntate creditoris veniit": licet enim dolus malus debitoris interveniat qui non solvit, tamen secundus creditor qui pignori accepit potior est.
But if that estate is held which has been encumbered by Maevius to someone, to whom satisfaction will not yet have been made, then again it will be equitable to make the exception, " si non voluntate creditoris veniit": for although malicious fraud of the debtor who does not pay intervenes, nevertheless the second creditor who received it in pledge has priority.
Si debitor vendiderit rem nec tradiderit, an non repellatur creditor, quasi adhuc res in bonis sit debitoris, an vero, cum teneatur ex empto, pignus exstinguatur? quod et magis est. sed quid si pretium venditor consecutus non sit nec paratus sit emptor dare?
If the debtor has sold the thing and has not delivered it, is the creditor not to be repelled, as though the thing were still in the debtor’s assets; or rather, since he is bound ex empto, is the pledge extinguished? which is also the stronger view. But what if the vendor has not obtained the price, nor is the buyer prepared to pay?
Sed si permiserit creditor vendere, debitor vero donaverit, an exceptione illum summoveat? an facti sit magis quaestio, numquid ideo veniri voluit, ut pretio accepto ipsi quoque res expediat? quo casu non nocebit consensus.
But if the creditor has permitted it to be sold, yet the debtor has made a donation, does he remove him by an exception? Or is it rather a question of fact, whether he therefore wanted it to be sold, so that, the price having been received, he might also settle the matter for himself? In which case the consent will not harm.
but if he has given it into dowry, he seems in this case to have sold rightly on account of the burdens of matrimony. on the contrary, if he permitted a donation and the debtor sold, the creditor will be repelled, unless someone should say that he therefore granted that it be donated, because the person to whom it was being given was a friend of the creditor.
Non videtur autem consensisse creditor, si sciente eo debitor rem vendiderit, cum ideo passus est veniri, quod sciebat ubique pignus sibi durare. sed si subscripserit forte in tabulis emptionis, consensisse videtur, nisi manifeste appareat deceptum esse. quod observari oportet et si sine scriptis consenserit.
However, the creditor does not seem to have consented if, with his knowledge, the debtor has sold the thing, since he therefore allowed it to be sold because he knew that his pledge endured everywhere. But if perhaps he has subscribed on the tablets of purchase, he is deemed to have consented, unless it manifestly appears that he was deceived. This is to be observed even if he consented without writings.
Si debitor forte concessa venditione desierit possidere et novus possessor vendiderit, an duret pignus, quasi personae permiserit creditor? quod et magis est: nam si novo possessori, non debitori a quo hypothecam accepit, concessit creditor vendere, dicendum est nocere ei exceptionem.
If perchance the debtor, with the sale having been conceded, has ceased to possess, and the new possessor has sold, does the pledge endure, as though the creditor had permitted the person? Which indeed is more correct: for if the creditor granted to the new possessor, not to the debtor from whom he received the hypothec, to sell, it must be said that the exception harms him.
Titius sempronio fundum pignori dedit et eundem fundum postea gaio seio pignori dedit, atque ita idem titius sempronio et gaio seio fundum eundem in assem vendidit, quibus pignori ante dederat in solidum singulis. quaero, an venditione interposita ius pignoris exstinctum sit ac per hoc ius solum emptionis apud ambos permanserit. modestinus respondit dominium ad eos de quibus quaeritur emptionis iure pertinere: cum consensum mutuo venditioni dedisse proponantur, invicem pigneraticiam actionem eos non habere.
Titius gave a farm to Sempronius in pledge, and later gave that same farm to Gaius Seius in pledge; and thus the same Titius sold that same farm outright to both Sempronius and Gaius Seius, to whom he had previously given it in pledge, each for the whole. I ask whether, the sale having been interposed, the right of pledge has been extinguished and, through this, only the right of purchase remained with both. Modestinus responded that ownership pertains to those in question by the law of purchase: since they are alleged to have given mutual consent to the sale, they do not have the pigneratician action against one another.
Titius seio pecuniam sub pignore fundi dederat: qui fundus cum esset rei publicae ante obligatus, secundus creditor pecuniam rei publicae eam solvit: sed maevius exstitit, qui dicebat ante rem publicam sibi fundum obligatum fuisse: inveniebatur autem maevius instrumento cautionis cum re publica facto a seio interfuisse et subscripsisse, quo caverat seius fundum nulli alii esse obligatum: quaero, an actio aliqua in rem maevio competere potest. modestinus respondit pignus, cui is de quo quaeritur consensit, minime eum retinere posse.
Titius had given Seius money under a pledge of an estate: and since that estate had previously been obligated to the commonwealth, the second creditor paid that money to the commonwealth; but Maevius appeared, who said that before the commonwealth the estate had been pledged to himself; however it was found that Maevius had been present at and had subscribed to the instrument of caution made by Seius with the commonwealth, in which Seius had warranted that the estate was obligated to no other: I ask whether any action in rem can be available to Maevius. Modestinus responded that the pledge, to which the person in question consented, he can by no means retain.
Voluntate creditoris pignus debitor vendidit et postea placuit inter eum et emptorem, ut a venditione discederent. ius pignorum salvum erit creditori: nam sicut debitori, ita et creditori pristinum ius restituitur, neque omni modo creditor pignus remittit, sed ita demum, si emptor rem retineat nec reddat venditori. et ideo si iudicio quoque accepto venditor absolutus sit vel quia non tradebat in id quod interest condemnatus, salvum fore pignus creditori dicendum est: haec enim accidere potuissent, etiamsi non voluntate creditoris vendidisset.
With the creditor’s will, the debtor sold the pledge, and afterwards it was agreed between him and the buyer that they should withdraw from the sale. the right of pledges will remain safe for the creditor: for just as to the debtor, so also to the creditor the pristine right is restored, nor is the creditor in every way deemed to remit the pledge, but only if the buyer retains the thing and does not return it to the seller. and therefore, even if, suit also having been brought, the seller be absolved, or, because he did not deliver, be condemned in the amount of the interest, it must be said that the pledge will remain safe for the creditor: for these things could have happened even if he had sold not with the creditor’s will.
Creditor quoque si pignus distraxit et ex venditione recessum fuerit vel homo redhibitus, dominium ad debitorem revertitur. idemque est in omnibus, quibus concessum est rem alienam vendere: non enim quia dominium transferunt, ideo ab emptore ius recipiunt: sed in pristinam causam res redit resoluta venditione.
Likewise, if a creditor has sold the pledge and there has been a rescission of the sale, or the slave has been redhibited, ownership reverts to the debtor. And the same is so in all cases where it is permitted to sell another’s property: for not because they transfer ownership do they therefore receive right from the buyer; rather, with the sale resolved, the thing returns to its former cause.
Postea defuncto lucio titio septicia filia abstinuit se hereditate paterna: quaero, an mater eius hypothecam persequi possit. paulus respondit pignoris quidem obligationem praediorum gaiam seiam, quae viro pro filia communi in dotem eadem danti consensit, cum communis filiae nomine darentur, remisisse videri, obligationem autem personalem perseverasse: sed adversus eam, quae patris hereditate se abstinuit, actionem non esse dandam.
afterwards, with Lucius Titius deceased, the daughter Septicia abstained from the paternal inheritance: I ask whether her mother can pursue the hypothec. paulus replied that the pledge-obligation of the estates seems to have been remitted by Gaia Seia, who consented to her husband’s giving the same as a dowry on behalf of their common daughter, when they were given in the name of the common daughter; but that the personal obligation persisted: yet that an action is not to be granted against her who abstained from her father’s inheritance.
Paulus respondit sempronium antiquiorem creditorem consentientem, cum debitor eandem rem tertio creditori obligaret, ius suum pignoris remisisse videri, non etiam tertium in locum eius successisse, et ideo medii creditoris meliorem causam effectam. idem observandum est et si res publica tertio loco crediderit.
Paulus responded that Sempronius, the more ancient (prior-ranking) creditor, consenting when the debtor obligated the same thing to a third creditor, is seen to have remitted his right of pledge, but not that the third also succeeded into his place; and therefore the intermediate creditor’s cause is made better. The same is to be observed even if the commonwealth has given credit in the third place.
Cum colono tibi convenit, ut invecta importata pignori essent, donec merces tibi soluta aut satisfactum esset: deinde mercedis nomine fideiussorem a colono accepisti. satisfactum tibi videri existimo et ideo illata pignori esse desisse.
When you and the tenant-farmer agreed that the things conveyed in and imported should be in pledge until the rent was paid to you or satisfaction had been made: then you accepted from the colonus, in the name of the rent, a fideiussor (surety). I consider that satisfaction is to be deemed to have been made to you, and therefore that the things brought in have ceased to be in pledge.
Primi creditoris, qui pignori praedia acceperat, et posterioris, cui quidam ex isdem fundis dati erant, ad eandem personam hereditas devenerat: debitor offerebat, quantum a posteriore creditore mutuatus fuerat. respondit cogendum accipere salvo iure pignoris prioris contractus.
The inheritance of the first creditor, who had received estates in pledge, and of the later creditor, to whom certain parcels from the same farms had been given, had devolved upon the same person: the debtor was offering as much as he had borrowed from the later creditor. He responded that he must be compelled to accept, with the right of pledge of the earlier contract preserved.