Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 11.3.0. De servo corrupto.
11.2.0. On the matters for which one goes to the same judge.
Dig. 11.3.0. On the corruption of a slave.
Dig. 11.6.0. Si mensor falsum modum dixerit.
11.5.0. On gamblers (dice-players).
Dig. 11.6.0. If a measurer has declared a false measure.
11.8.0. On bringing in a corpse and on constructing a sepulcher.
Totiens heres in iure interrogandus est, qua ex parte heres sit, quotiens adversus eum actio instituitur et dubitat actor, qua ex parte is, cum quo agere velit, heres sit. est autem interrogatio tunc necessaria, cum in personam sit actio et ita, si certum petetur, ne, dum ignoret actor, qua ex parte adversarius defuncto heres exstiterit, interdum plus petendo aliquid damni sentiat.
So often must an heir be interrogated in court as to in what share he is heir, as often as an action is instituted against him and the plaintiff is in doubt in what share the person whom he wishes to sue is heir. The interrogation is necessary when the action is in personam, that is, if a determinate thing is being sought, lest, while the plaintiff is ignorant of the share in which the adversary has become heir to the deceased, he should sometimes, by demanding more, suffer some loss.
Interrogatoriis autem actionibus hodie non utimur, quia nemo cogitur ante iudicium de suo iure aliquid respondere, ideoque minus frequentantur et in desuetudinem abierunt. sed tantummodo ad probationes litigatoribus sufficiunt ea, quae ab adversa parte expressa fuerint apud iudices vel in hereditatibus vel in aliis rebus, quae in causis vertuntur.
But we do not use interrogatory actions today, because no one is compelled, before judgment, to answer anything concerning his own right; and therefore they are less resorted to and have passed into desuetude. But only for purposes of proof do those things suffice to litigants which shall have been elicited from the adverse party before the judges, whether in inheritances or in other matters which are in controversy in causes.
Quod ait praetor: " qui in iure interrogatus responderit" sic accipiendum est apud magistratus populi romani vel praesides provinciarum vel alios iudices: ius enim eum solum locum esse, ubi iuris dicendi vel iudicandi gratia consistat, vel si domi vel itinere hoc agat.
What the praetor says: " qui in iure interrogatus responderit" is to be taken thus: before the magistrates of the Roman people or the governors of the provinces or other judges; for "ius" is that place alone where, for the sake of speaking the law or judging, one is in session, even if he does this at home or on a journey.
Interdum interrogatus quis, an heres sit, non cogitur respondere, ut puta si controversiam hereditatis ab alio patiatur: et ita divus hadrianus constituit, ne aut negando se heredem praeiudicet sibi aut dicendo heredem illigetur etiam ablata sibi hereditate.
sometimes, when someone is asked whether he is heir, he is not compelled to answer, for instance if he is undergoing a controversy of the inheritance at another’s hands: and thus the deified hadrian decreed, lest either by denying himself to be heir he prejudicate himself, or by saying he is heir he be bound, even with the inheritance taken from him.
Celsus libro quinto digestorum scribit: si defensor in iudicio interrogatus, an is quem defendit heres vel quota ex parte sit, falso responderit, ipse quidem defensor adversario tenebitur, ipsi autem quem defendit nullum facit praeiudicium. veram itaque esse celsi sententiam dubium non est. an ergo non videatur defendere, si non responderit, videndum: quod utique consequens erit dicere, quia non plene defendit.
Celsus writes in the fifth book of the Digest: if a defender, when questioned in court whether the one whom he defends is an heir and to what share, should answer falsely, the defender himself will be held liable to the adversary, but he causes no prejudice to the very person whom he defends. Therefore that Celsus’s opinion is true is not doubtful. Whether, then, he should seem not to be defending, if he does not answer, must be considered: and it will indeed be consequent to say this, because he does not defend fully.
Qui interrogatus heredem se responderit nec adiecerit ex qua parte, ex asse respondisse dicendum est, nisi forte ita interrogetur, an ex dimidia parte heres sit, et responderit " heres sum": hic enim magis eum puto ad interrogatum respondisse.
He who, when interrogated, has responded that he is heir and has not added from what part, is to be said to have answered for the whole share, unless perhaps he is thus asked whether he is heir from a half share, and he replied “I am heir”: for here I rather think that he answered to what was asked.
Illud quaeritur, an quis cogatur respondere, utrum ex testamento heres sit, et utrum suo nomine ei quaesita sit hereditas an per eos quos suo iuri subiectos habet vel per eum cui heres extitit. summatim igitur praetor cognoscere debebit, cum quaeratur, an quis respondere debeat quo iure heres sit, ut, si valde interesse compererit, plenius responderi iubeat. quae optinere debent non solum in heredibus sed etiam in honorariis successoribus.
The question is raised whether someone is compelled to answer whether he is heir from a testament, and whether the inheritance has been acquired for him in his own name or through those whom he has under his own legal power, or through him whose heir he has become. Therefore the praetor ought to inquire summarily, when it is asked whether someone ought to answer by what law he is heir, so that, if he discovers that it greatly matters, he may order a fuller answer to be given. These rules ought to obtain not only in heirs but also in honorary successors.
Non alienum est eum, a quo damni infecti stipulari velimus, interrogare in iure, an aedes eius vel locus sit, ex quo damnum timeatur, et pro qua parte, ut, si neget suum praedium esse nec caveat damni infecti, aut cedere aut, resistendum putaverit, quasi dolo versatus tradere compellatur.
It is not out of place to interrogate in iure the person from whom we wish to stipulate for damnum infectum, whether the edifice of his or a locus is that from which damage is feared, and for what part; so that, if he denies that it is his praedium and does not give caution for damnum infectum, whether he chooses to cede or—if he deems it should be resisted—he may be compelled to deliver, as one who has acted in dolus.
Si, cum esset quis ex semisse heres, dixerit se ex quadrante, mendacii hanc poenam feret, quod in solidum convenitur: non enim debuit mentiri, dum se minoris portionis heredem adseverat. interdum tamen iusta ratione potest opinari esse heredem ex minore parte: quid enim, si nescit sibi partem adcrevisse vel ex incerta parte fuit institutus? cur ei responsum noceat?
If, when someone was heir from a half, he says that he is from a quarter, he will bear this penalty for mendacity, that he is sued for the whole: for he ought not to have lied, while asserting himself heir of a smaller portion. Sometimes, however, with just reason he can suppose that he is heir from a smaller part: for what if he does not know that a share has accrued to him, or he was instituted from an uncertain part? Why should his answer harm him?
Qui tacuit quoque apud praetorem, in ea causa est, ut instituta actione in solidum conveniatur, quasi negaverit se heredem esse. nam qui omnino non respondit, contumax est: contumaciae autem poenam hanc ferre debet, ut in solidum conveniatur, quemadmodum si negasset, quia praetorem contemnere videtur.
He who likewise kept silent before the praetor is in the position that, once the action has been instituted, he is proceeded against for the whole, as if he had denied that he is heir. For he who did not respond at all is contumacious; and he ought to bear this penalty of contumacy, that he is proceeded against for the whole, just as if he had denied it, because he appears to contemn the praetor.
Ex causa succurri ei, qui interrogatus respondit, non dubitamus: nam et si quis interrogatus, an patri heres esset, responderit, mox prolato testamento inventus sit exheredatus, aequissimum est succurri ei: et ita celsus scribit, hic quidem et alia ratione, quod ea quae postea emergunt auxilio indigent: quid enim si occultae tabulae et remotae postea prolatae sunt? cur noceat ei, qui id responderit, quod in praesentiarum videbatur? idem dico et si qui heredem se responderit, mox falsum vel inofficiosum vel irritum testamentum fuerit pronuntiatum: non enim improbe respondit, sed scriptura ductus.
We do not doubt that, for cause, relief should be afforded to one who, when questioned, gave an answer: for even if someone, being asked whether he was heir to his father, answered that he was, and soon, when the will was produced, was found to have been disinherited, it is most equitable to give him relief; and thus Celsus writes, here indeed also for another reason, namely that things which emerge afterward stand in need of aid: for what if concealed and put-away testamentary tablets are later brought forth? why should it harm him who answered what seemed to be the case at the present time? I say the same also if someone answered that he was the heir, and soon the testament was pronounced false or undutiful or void: for he did not answer improperly, but was led by the writing.
Qui interrogatus responderit, sic tenetur quasi ex contractu obligatus pro quo pulsabitur, dum ab adversario interrogatur: sed et si a praetore fuerit interrogatus, nihil facit praetoris auctoritas, sed ipsius responsum sive mendacium.
He who, when interrogated, has responded, is thus held as if bound as from a contract, for which he will be sued, provided that he is interrogated by the adversary; but even if he has been interrogated by the praetor, the praetor’s authority avails nothing, but rather his own response—or his mendacity.
Celsus scribit licere responsi paenitere, si nulla captio ex eius paenitentia sit actoris: quod verissimum mihi videtur, maxime si quis postea plenius instructus quid faciat, instrumentis vel epistulis amicorum iuris sui edoctus.
Celsus writes that it is permitted to repent of a response, if no prejudice to the plaintiff arises from that repentance: which seems to me most true, especially if someone is afterwards more fully instructed as to what he should do, being taught of his right by instruments or by the epistles of friends.
Si filius, qui abstinuit se paterna hereditate, in iure interrogatus responderit se heredem esse, tenebitur: nam ita respondendo pro herede gessisse videtur. sin autem filius, qui se abstinuit, interrogatus tacuerit, succurrendum est ei: quia hunc qui abstinuit praetor non habet heredis loco.
If a son who has abstained from the paternal inheritance, when questioned in court, has answered that he is heir, he will be held: for by answering thus he appears to have acted as heir. But if the son who has abstained, when questioned, has kept silent, he must be given relief: because the praetor does not have one who has abstained in the place of an heir.
Confessionibus falsis respondentes ita obligantur, si eius nomine, de quo quis interrogatus sit, cum aliquo sit actio, quia quae cum alio actio esset, si dominus esset, in nosmet confessione nostra conferimus. et si eum, qui in potestate patris esset, respondissem filium meum esse, ita me obligari, si aetas eius pateretur, ut filius meus esse possit, quia falsae confessiones naturalibus convenire deberent. propter quae fiat, ut patris familias nomine respondendo non obliger.
Those answering with false confessions are thus obligated, if in the name of the one about whom one has been questioned there is an action with someone; for whatever action there would be with another, if he were the owner, we transfer onto ourselves by our own confession. And if I had replied that one who was in the power of a father was my son, I am thus bound, if his age would permit that he could be my son, because false confessions ought to agree with natural possibilities. For which reason it comes about that, by answering in the name of a paterfamilias, I am not bound.
Si is, cuius nomine noxae iudicium acceptum est, manente iudicio liber iudicatus est, reus absolvi debet, nec quicquam interrogatio in iure facta proderit, quia eius personae, cuius nomine quis cum alio actionem habet, obligationem transferre potest in eum, qui in iure suum esse confitetur, velut alienum servum suum esse confitendo: liberi autem hominis nomine quia cum alio actio non est, ne per interrogationem quidem aut confessionem transferri poterit. quo casu eveniet, ut non recte hominis liberi nomine actum sit cum eo qui confessus est.
If the one in whose name a noxal action has been accepted, while the suit remains pending, has been adjudged free, the defendant ought to be absolved, nor will the interrogation made in iure be of any avail, because one can transfer the obligation of that person in whose name someone has an action with another onto him who in iure confesses it to be his own, as by confessing that another’s slave is his own; but in the name of a free man, since there is no action with another, neither by interrogation nor by confession can it be transferred. In which case it will come about that it has not been rightly proceeded in the name of a free man against him who confessed.
Si servus non sit unius, sed plurium et omnes mentiti sunt eum in sua potestate non esse vel quidam ex illis, aut dolo fecerunt quo minus sit in potestate, unusquisque illorum tenebitur in solidum, quemadmodum tenerentur, si haberent in potestate: is vero, qui nihil dolo fecerit quo minus in potestate haberet, vel non negavit, non tenebitur.
If a slave belongs not to one but to several, and all of them lied that he was not in their power—or certain of them did so—or they acted by fraud so that he was not in their power, each one of them shall be held in solidum, just as they would be held if they had him in their power; but the one who did nothing by fraud to prevent having him in his power, or did not deny it, shall not be held.
Qui ex parte dimidia heres erat cum absentem coheredem suum defendere vellet, ut satisdationis onus evitare possit, respondit se solum heredem esse et condemnatus est: quaerebat actor, cum ipse solvendo non esset, an rescisso superiore iudicio in eum, qui re vera heres erat, actio dari deberet. proculus respondit rescisso iudicio posse agi, idque est verum.
He who was heir as to a half share, when he wished to defend his absent coheir so that he might avoid the burden of giving surety, answered that he was the sole heir and was condemned. The plaintiff was asking, since he himself was not solvent, whether, the prior judgment having been rescinded, an action ought to be granted against him who was in truth the heir. Proculus answered that, the judgment rescinded, suit can be brought, and that is true.
Qui servum alienum responderit suum esse, si noxali iudicio conventus sit, dominum liberat: aliter atque si quis confessus sit se occidisse servum quem alius occidit, vel si quis responderit se heredem: nam his casibus non liberatur qui fecit vel qui heres est. nec haec inter se contraria sunt: nam superiore casu ex persona servi duo tenentur, sicut in servo communi dicimus, ubi altero convento alter quoque liberatur: at is qui confitetur se occidisse vel vulnerasse suo nomine tenetur, nec debet impunitum esse delictum eius qui fecit propter eum qui respondit: nisi quasi defensor eius qui admisit vel heredis litem subiit hoc genere: tunc enim in factum exceptione data summovendus est actor, quia ille negotiorum gestorum vel mandati actione recepturus est quod praestitit: idem est in eo, qui mandatu heredis heredem se esse respondit vel cum eum alias defendere vellet.
One who has answered that another’s slave is his own, if he is sued by a noxal judgment, frees the owner: otherwise than if someone has confessed that he killed a slave whom another in fact killed, or if someone has answered that he is the heir; for in these cases he who did the deed or who is the heir is not freed. Nor are these things mutually contrary: for in the former case, from the person of the slave two are held liable, just as we say in the case of a common slave, where, when one is sued, the other also is released; but he who confesses that he killed or wounded is held in his own name, and the delict of the one who did it ought not to go unpunished on account of the one who answered—unless he, as a defender of the one who committed it or of the heir, undertook the suit in this way: for then, with an exception in factum given, the plaintiff must be repelled, because by an action of negotiorum gestorum or of mandate he will recover what he has paid. The same holds for one who, at the mandate of the heir, answered that he was the heir, or when he otherwise wished to defend him.
In iure interrogatus, an fundum possideat, quaero an respondere cogendus sit et quota ex parte fundum possideat. respondi: iavolenus scribit possessorem fundi cogi debere respondere, quota ex parte fundum possideat, ut si minore ex parte possidere se dicat, in aliam partem, quae non defenderetur, in possessionem actor mittatur.
questioned in court whether he possesses the estate, I ask whether he is to be compelled to answer and what share of the estate he possesses. I answered: Iavolenus writes that the possessor of the estate ought to be compelled to answer what share of the estate he possesses, so that, if he says he possesses a smaller share, into the other part, which would not be defended, the plaintiff (actor) may be sent into possession.
Idem et si damni infecti caveamus: nam et hic respondere debet, quota ex parte eius sit praedium, ut ad eam partem stipulationem accomodemus: poena autem non repromittentis haec est, ut in possessionem eamus, et ideo eo pertinet scire an possideat.
The same likewise if we take security for damage not yet done: for here too he ought to respond what fraction of the estate is his, so that we may accommodate the stipulation to that part; but the penalty for one who does not repromise is this, that we go into possession, and therefore it pertains to know whether he is in possession.
Procuratore caesaris ob debitum fiscale interrogante unus ex filiis, qui nec bonorum possessionem acceperat nec heres erat, respondit se heredem esse: an quasi interrogatoria creditoribus ceteris teneatur? respondit ab his, qui in iure non interrogassent, ex responso suo conveniri non posse.
When the procurator of the Caesar, on account of a fiscal debt, was questioning, one of the sons—who had neither accepted the possession of the goods nor was heir—answered that he was heir. Is he held, as if by interrogatories, to the other creditors? He responded that by those who had not questioned him in court (in iure), he could not be proceeded against on the basis of his answer.
Si inter plures familiae erciscundae agetur et inter eosdem communi dividundo aut finium regundorum, eundem iudicem sumendum: praeterea, quo facilius coire coheredes vel socii possunt, in eundem locum omnium praesentiam fieri oportet.
If among several there is an action for partition of an inheritance, and among the same persons for division of common property or for regulating boundaries, the same judge must be appointed; moreover, in order that the coheirs or partners may more easily come together, all are to be convened in the same place.
Ait praetor: " qui servum servam alienum alienam recepisse persuasisseve quid ei dicetur dolo malo, quo eum eam deteriorem faceret, in eum quanti ea res erit in duplum iudicium dabo. "
The praetor says: " whoever shall be said to have received another’s male or female slave, or to have persuaded him/her, or to have said anything to him/her with fraudulent intent, with a view to making him/her worse, against him I will grant an action for double the amount of what that matter will be worth. "
Qui bona fide servum emit, hoc edicto non tenebitur, quia nec ipse poterit servi corrupti agere, quia nihil eius interest servum non corrumpi: et sane, si quis hoc admiserit, eveniet, ut duobus actio servi corrupti competat, quod est absurdum. sed nec eum, cui bona fide homo liber servit, hanc actionem posse exercere opinamur.
He who buys a slave in good faith will not be held by this edict, because he himself will not be able to bring the action for a corrupted slave, since it is of no interest to him that the slave not be corrupted; and indeed, if someone were to allow this, it would come about that the action for a corrupted slave would belong to two persons, which is absurd. Nor do we think that he to whom a free man serves in good faith can exercise this action.
Persuadere autem est plus quam compelli atque cogi sibi parere. sed persuadere twn meswn estin, nam et bonum consilium quis dando potest suadere et malum: et ideo praetor adiecit " dolo malo, quo eum deteriorem faceret": neque enim delinquit, nisi qui tale aliquid servo persuadet, ex quo eum faciat deteriorem. qui igitur servum sollicitat ad aliquid vel faciendum vel cogitandum improbe, hic videtur hoc edicto notari.
To persuade, moreover, is more than to compel and to coerce someone to obey oneself. But to persuade is among the things in between, for by giving counsel one can urge both good and bad; and therefore the praetor added " by malicious fraud, whereby he might make him worse": for indeed no one commits a delict, except the one who persuades a slave to such a thing from which he makes him worse. Therefore, he who solicits a slave to something, either to do or to contrive something basely, seems by this edict to be marked.
Sed utrum ita demum tenetur, si bonae frugi servum perpulit ad delinquendum, an vero et si malum hortatus est vel malo monstravit, quemadmodum faceret? et est verius etiam si malo monstravit, in quem modum delinqueret, teneri eum. immo et si erat servus omnimodo fugiturus vel furtum facturus, hic vero laudator huius propositi extitit, tenetur: non enim oportet laudando augeri malitiam.
But is he held liable only if he drove a slave of good character to commit a delinquency, or even if he urged a bad one, or showed to a bad one how he should do it? And it is more correct that even if he showed to a bad slave in what manner he was to offend, he is held. Nay rather, even if the slave was in any case going to run away or to commit theft, and this man appeared as the praiser of this plan, he is liable: for it is not proper that malice be increased by praising.
Is quoque deteriorem facit, qui servo persuadet, ut iniuriam faceret vel furtum vel fugeret vel alienum servum ut sollicitaret vel ut peculium intricaret, aut amator existeret vel erro vel malis artibus esset deditus vel in spectaculis nimius vel seditiosus: vel si actori suasit verbis sive pretio, ut rationes dominicas intercideret adulteraret vel etiam ut rationem sibi commissam turbaret:
He too makes him worse who persuades a slave to commit an injury or a theft or to flee, or to solicit another’s slave, or to entangle his peculium; or to become a lover, or a vagrant, or to be given over to evil arts, or excessive in spectacles, or seditious: or if he persuaded the steward by words or by a price (a bribe), to cut off the master’s accounts, to adulterate them, or even to disturb the account entrusted to himself:
Unde quaeritur, si quis servo alieno suaserit in tectum ascendere vel in puteum descendere et ille parens ascenderit vel descenderit et ceciderit crusque vel quid aliud fregerit vel perierit, an teneatur: et si quidem sine dolo malo fecerit, non tenetur, si dolo malo, tenebitur.
Whence the question is asked, if someone should advise another’s slave to ascend onto the roof or to descend into a well, and he, obeying, ascended or descended and fell and broke his leg or something else, or perished, whether he is to be held liable: and if indeed he did it without malicious deceit (dolus malus), he is not liable; if with malicious deceit, he will be liable.
Doli verbum etiam ad eum qui recepit referendum est, ut non alius teneatur, nisi qui dolo malo recepit: ceterum si quis, ut domino custodiret, recepit vel humanitate vel misericordia ductus vel alia probata atque iusta ratione, non tenebitur.
The term of deceit is also to be referred to the one who received, so that no one else is held liable, except the one who received with malicious deceit; but if someone received, in order to guard it for the owner, moved by humanity or mercy or by another approved and just reason, he will not be held liable.
Si quis servum communem meum et suum corruperit, apud iulianum libro nono digestorum quaeritur, an hac actione teneri possit, et ait teneri eum socio: praeterea poterit et communi dividundo et pro socio, si socii sint, teneri, ut iulianus ait. sed cur deteriorem facit iulianus condicionem socii, si cum socio agat, quam si cum extraneo agit? nam qui cum extraneo agit, sive recepit sive corruperit agere potest, qui cum socio, sine alternatione, id est si corrupit.
If someone has corrupted a slave common to me and to himself, it is inquired in Julianus, in the ninth book of the Digest, whether he can be held by this action; and he says that he is held to his partner. Moreover, he can also be held by communi dividundo and by pro socio, if they are partners, as Julianus says. But why does Julianus make the partner’s position worse if he brings suit against a partner than if he brings suit against a stranger? For he who proceeds against a stranger can sue whether he received or corrupted; he who proceeds against a partner, without the alternative—that is, only if he corrupted.
Si in servo ego habeam usum fructum, tu proprietatem, si quidem a me sit deterior factus, poteris mecum experiri, si tu id feceris, ego agere utili actione possum; ad omnes enim corruptelas haec actio pertinet et interesse fructuarii videtur bonae frugi servum esse, in quo usum fructum habet. et si forte alius eum receperit vel corruperit, utilis actio fructuario competit.
If I have a usufruct in a slave and you the ownership, then if he has been made the worse by me, you can sue me; if you have done that, I can proceed by a useful action. For this action pertains to all corruptions, and it appears to be in the interest of the usufructuary that the slave, in whom he has the usufruct, be of good thrift and character. And if perchance someone else has harbored or corrupted him, a useful action lies for the usufructuary.
Sed quaestionis est, aestimatio utrum eius dumtaxat fieri debeat, quod servus in corpore vel in animo damni senserit, hoc est quanto vilior servus factus sit, an vero et ceterorum. et neratius ait tanti condemnandum corruptorem, quanti servus ob id, quod subpertus sit, minoris sit.
But it is a matter of question whether the estimation ought to be made only of that damage which the slave has sensed in body or in mind, that is, by how much the slave has been made cheaper, or indeed also of the rest. And neratius says that the corrupter is to be condemned for as much as the slave, on account of his having been tampered with, is worth less.
In hoc iudicium etiam rerum aestimatio venit, quas secum servus abstulit, quia omne damnum duplatur, neque intererit, ad eum perlatae fuerint res an ad alium sive etiam consumptae sint: etenim iustius est eum teneri, qui princeps fuerit delicti, quam eum quaeri, ad quem res perlatae sunt.
In this judgment there also comes the valuation of the things which the slave carried off with him, because all damage is doubled, nor will it matter whether the things have been conveyed to him or to another, or even have been consumed: for indeed it is more just that he be held liable who was the principal of the delict, than that search be made for him to whom the things were conveyed.
Quamvis autem rerum subtractarum nomine servi corrupti competat actio, tamen et furti agere possumus, ope enim consilio sollicitatoris videntur res abesse: nec sufficiet alterutra actione egisse, quia altera alteram non minuit. idem et in eo, qui servum recepit et celavit et deteriorem fecit, iulianus scribit: sunt enim diversa maleficia furis et eius qui deteriorem servum facit: hoc amplius et condictionis nomine tenebitur. quamvis enim condictione hominem, poenam autem furti actione consecutus sit, tamen et quod interest debebit consequi actione servi corrupti,
Although, moreover, under the title of things subtracted an action for a corrupted slave lies, nevertheless we can also proceed by theft; for by the aid and counsel of the solicitor/enticer the things appear to be absent: nor will it suffice to have proceeded by either action, because the one does not diminish the other. Julian writes the same also in the case of one who received a slave and concealed him and made him worse: for the malefactions of a thief and of him who makes a slave worse are different: besides this, he will also be held under the name of condiction. For although by condiction he has obtained the man, and by the action of theft the penalty, nevertheless he ought also to obtain what is of interest (the damages) by the action for a corrupted slave,
De filio filiave familias corruptis huic edicto locus non est, quia servi corrupti constituta actio est, qui in patrimonio nostro esset, et pauperiorem se factum esse dominus probare potest dignitate et fama domus integra manente: sed utilis competit officio iudicis aestimanda, quoniam interest nostra animum liberorum nostrorum non corrumpi.
As to a son or daughter under family power having been corrupted, this edict has no place, because for a corrupted slave there is an established action, since he would be in our patrimony, and the master can prove that he has been made poorer, the dignity and fame of the house remaining intact; but a useful action lies, to be assessed according to the office of the judge, since it is our interest that the minds of our children not be corrupted.
Si servus communis meus et tuus proprium meum servum corruperit, sabinus non posse agi cum socio, perinde atque si proprius meus servus corrupisset conservum. item si servus communis extraneum corruperit, videndum est, utrum cum duobus agi debeat an et cum singulis exemplo ceterarum noxarum: et magis est, ut unusquisque in solidum teneatur, altero autem solvente alterum liberari.
If a slave held in common by me and you has corrupted my own slave, Sabinus says that it is not possible to proceed by the action against a partner, just as if my own slave had corrupted a fellow‑slave. Likewise, if the common slave has corrupted an outsider, it must be considered whether suit ought to be brought against both, or also against each individually, on the model of the other noxal liabilities; and the sounder view is that each is liable in solidum (for the whole), but when the one pays, the other is released.
Item non solum si mihi damnum dederit consilio tuo, sed etiam si extraneo, eo quoque nomine mihi teneris, quod ego lege aquilia obnoxius sim: aut si ex conducto teneor alicui, quod ei servum locavi et propter te deterior factus sit, teneberis et hoc nomine, et si qua talia sint.
Likewise, not only if he has given me damage by your counsel, but even if to an outsider, you are also bound to me on that ground, because I am liable under the Aquilian law; or if I am held ex conducto to someone, because I leased him a slave and on account of you he has been made worse, you will be held on this ground too, and if there are any such things.
Interdum tamen et inutilis sit, ut non expediat talem servum habere. utrum ergo et pretium cogitur dare sollicitator et servum dominus lucrifacit, an vero cogi debet dominus restituere servum et pretium servi accipere? et verius est electionem domino dari, sive servum detinere cupit et damnum, quanti deterior servus factus est, in duplum accipere, vel servo restituto, si copiam huius rei habeat, pretium consequi, quod si non habeat, pretium quidem simili modo accipere, cedere autem sollicitatori periculo eius de dominio servi actionibus.
Sometimes, however, he may also be useless, so that it is not expedient to have such a slave. whether therefore the enticer is compelled to give the price and the owner makes a profit from the slave, or indeed the owner ought to be compelled to restore the slave and receive the price of the slave? and the truer view is that the choice is given to the owner, whether he wishes to detain the slave and receive in double the damage, to the amount by which the slave has been made worse, or, the slave having been restored, if he has the means for this, to obtain the price; but if he does not have it, to receive the price indeed in like manner, but to cede to the enticer the risk of him, together with the actions arising from the ownership of the slave.
What is said, however, about restitution of the man applies when the case concerns a living man. But what if the action is brought after he has been manumitted? He will not easily be heard before the judge by saying that he manumitted him for this reason—that he had not wished to have him at home—so that he may have both the price and the freedman.
Dominus servum dispensatorem manumisit, postea rationes ab eo accepit et cum eis non constaret, comperit apud quandam mulierculam pecuniam eum consumpsisse: quaerebatur, possetne agere servi corrupti cum ea muliere, cum is servus iam liber esset. respondi posse, sed etiam furti de pecuniis quas servus ad eam detulisset.
The master manumitted a slave who was a steward; afterwards he received accounts from him, and since they did not tally, he discovered that he had spent money with a certain woman. It was asked whether he could bring the action for a corrupted slave against that woman, since that slave was now free. I replied that he could, and also an action of theft regarding the monies which the slave had carried to her.
Senatus censuit, ne fugitivi admittantur in saltus neque protegantur a vilicis vel procuratoribus possessorum et multam statuit: his autem, qui intra viginti dies fugitivos vel dominis reddidissent vel apud magistratus exhibuissent, veniam in ante actum dedit: sed et deinceps eodem senatus consulto impunitas datur ei, qui intra praestituta tempora, quam repperit fugitivos in agro suo, domino vel magistratibus tradiderit.
The senate decreed that fugitives are not to be admitted into forest‑pastures nor protected by the stewards or procurators of landholders, and it set a fine: moreover, it granted pardon for what had been done previously to those who within twenty days had either returned the fugitives to their owners or produced them before the magistrates; but also thereafter, by that same senatorial decree, impunity is given to one who, within the prescribed time from when he discovered the fugitives on his land, shall have handed them over to the owner or to the magistrates.
Hoc autem senatus consultum aditum etiam dedit militi vel pagano ad investigandum fugitivum in praedia senatorum vel paganorum ( cui rei etiam lex fabia prospexerat et senatus consultum modesto consule factum), ut fugitivos inquirere volentibus litterae ad magistratus dentur, multa etiam centum solidorum in magistratus statuta, si litteris acceptis inquirentes non adiuvent. sed et in eum, qui quaeri apud se prohibuit, eadem poena statuta. est etiam generalis epistula divorum marci et commodi, qua declaratur et praesides et magistratus et milites stationarios dominum adiuvare debere inquirendis fugitivis, et ut inventos redderent, et ut hi, apud quos delitescant, puniantur, si crimine contingantur.
This senatorial decree moreover gave access even to a soldier or a civilian to investigate a fugitive on the estates of senators or civilians (a matter for which the Lex Fabia had also provided, and a senatorial decree made with Modestus as consul), to the effect that letters be given to the magistrates for those wishing to inquire after fugitives, and a fine of one hundred solidi was set upon magistrates if, after receiving the letters, they do not assist the inquirers. But the same penalty is also set upon the one who has forbidden a search to be conducted at his premises. There is also a general letter of the deified Marcus and Commodus, by which it is declared that governors, magistrates, and stationarii soldiers ought to aid the master in searching for fugitives, and to return those found, and that those with whom they lie hidden are to be punished, if they are implicated by the charge.
Eorumque nomina et notae et cuius se quis esse dicat ad magistratus deferantur, ut facilius adgnosci et percipi fugitivi possint ( notae autem verbo etiam cicatrices continentur): idem iuris est, si haec in scriptis publice vel in aedes proponas.
And their names and marks, and to whom each declares himself to belong, shall be reported to the magistrates, so that fugitives may be more easily recognized and apprehended ( notae, moreover, by the word, also include scars): the same law applies if you post these in writings publicly or in buildings.
Divus pius rescripsit eum, qui fugitivum vult requirere in praediis alienis, posse adire praesidem litteras ei daturum et, si ita res exegerit, apparitorem quoque, ut ei permittatur ingredi et inquirere, et poenam eundem praesidem in eum constituere, qui inquiri non permiserit. sed et divus marcus oratione, quam in senatu recitavit, facultatem dedit ingrediendi tam caesaris quam senatorum et paganorum praedia volentibus fugitivos inquirere scrutarique cubilia atque vestigia occultantium.
The deified Pius wrote back in a rescript that one who wishes to seek a fugitive on another’s estates can approach the governor, who will give him letters and, if the matter so requires, an apparitor as well, so that he may be permitted to enter and inquire; and that the same governor should set a penalty upon the one who has not permitted the inquiry. But the deified Marcus also, by a speech which he recited in the senate, granted the faculty of entering the estates of Caesar, of senators, and of private persons (pagani) to those willing to search for fugitives and to scrutinize the lairs and the tracks of those concealing them.
Si in harenam fugitivus servus se dederit, ne isto quidem periculo, discriminis vitae tantum, sibi irrogato potestatem domini evitare poterit: nam divus pius rescripsit omnimodo eos dominis suis reddere sive ante pugnam ad bestias sive post pugnam, quoniam interdum aut pecunia interversa aut commisso aliquo maiore maleficio ad fugiendam inquisitionem vel iustitiam animadversionis in harenam se dare mallent. reddi ergo eos oportet.
If a fugitive slave has given himself into the arena, not even by this danger—only a peril of life—self‑inflicted, will he be able to evade the power of the master: for the deified Pius issued a rescript that in every way they are to be returned to their masters, whether before the bout with the beasts or after the bout, since sometimes, either with money misappropriated or with some greater malefaction committed, to avoid inquisition or the justice of animadversion they would prefer to give themselves to the arena. Therefore they ought to be returned.
Praetor ait: " si quis eum, apud quem alea lusum esse dicetur, verberaverit damnumve ei dederit sive quid eo tempore dolo eius subtractum est, iudicium non dabo. in eum, qui aleae ludendae causa vim intulerit, uti quaeque res erit, animadvertam. "
The praetor says: " if anyone shall have beaten the one at whose place it will be said that dice were played, or has inflicted loss upon him, or if anything at that time was removed by his fraud, I will not grant an action. against the one who, for the sake of playing at dice, has employed force, as the matter shall be, I will take punitive notice. "
Item notandum, quod susceptorem verberatum quidem et damnum passum ubicumque et quandocumque non vindicat: verum furtum factum domi et eo tempore quo alea ludebatur, licet lusor non fuerit qui quid eorum fecerit, impune fit. domum autem pro habitatione et domicilio nos accipere debere certum est.
Likewise it is to be noted, that it does not vindicate the stakeholder who has been beaten and has suffered damage, wherever and whenever; but a theft committed at home and at the time when dice were being played, although it was not a player who did any of those things, is done with impunity. And as to “home,” it is certain that we ought to take it as habitation and domicile.
Quod autem praetor negat se furti actionem daturum, videamus utrum ad poenalem actionem solam pertineat an et si ad exhibendum velit agere vel vindicare vel condicere. et est relatum apud pomponium solummodo poenalem actionem denegatam, quod non puto verum: praetor enim simpliciter ait " si quid subtractum erit, iudicium non dabo. "
But as to the praetor’s saying that he will not grant the action for theft, let us see whether this pertains only to the penal action, or also if one should wish to proceed for production (ad exhibendum) or to vindicate or to bring a condiction. And it is reported by Pomponius that only the penal action was denied, which I do not think true: for the praetor simply says, " si quid subtracted will be, i will not give an action. "
Si servus vel filius familias victus fuerit, patri vel domino competit repetitio. item si servus acceperit pecuniam, dabitur in dominum de peculio actio, non noxalis, quia ex negotio gesto agitur: sed non amplius cogendus est praestare, quam id quod ex ea re in peculio sit.
If a slave or a son of the household has been defeated, repetition is available to the father or to the master. Likewise, if a slave has received money, an action de peculio will be given against the master, not a noxal one, because the case is proceeded with ex negotio gesto; but he is not compelled to make good more than that which, from that matter, is in the peculium.
Adversus mensorem agrorum praetor in factum actionem proposuit. a quo falli nos non oportet: nam interest nostra, ne fallamur in modi renuntiatione, si forte vel de finibus contentio sit vel emptor scire velit vel venditor, cuius modi ager veneat. ideo autem hanc actionem proposuit, quia non crediderunt veteres inter talem personam locationem et conductionem esse, sed magis operam beneficii loco praeberi et id quod datur ei, ad remunerandum dari et inde honorarium appellari: si autem ex locato conducto fuerit actum, dicendum erit nec tenere intentionem.
Against the land surveyor the praetor has proposed an action in factum. We ought not to be deceived by him: for it is in our interest not to be deceived in the reporting of the measures, if by chance there is either a dispute about boundaries or a buyer wishes to know, or a seller, at what measure a field is being sold. He has proposed this action for this reason, because the ancients did not believe that between such a person and the other party there was a locatio conductio, but rather that the service was furnished in the nature of a beneficium, and that what is given to him is given to remunerate him and is therefore called an honorarium: but if action has been brought ex locato conducto, it must be said that the intentio does not hold.
Haec actio dolum malum dumtaxat exigit: visum est enim satis abundeque coerceri mensorem, si dolus malus solus conveniatur eius hominis, qui civiliter obligatus non est. proinde si imperite versatus est, sibi imputare debet qui eum adhibuit: sed et si neglegenter, aeque mensor securus erit: lata culpa plane dolo comparabitur. sed et si mercedem accepit, non omnem culpam eum praestare propter verba edicti: utique enim scit praetor et mercede eos intervenire.
This action exacts only malicious fraud: for it seemed that the measurer was sufficiently and abundantly coerced if malicious fraud alone were the ground on which that man is proceeded against who is not civilly obligated. Accordingly, if he has conducted himself unskillfully, he who employed him ought to impute it to himself; but even if negligently, the measurer likewise will be secure: gross fault, clearly, will be equated with fraud. And even if he has received a fee, he does not answer for every fault on account of the terms of the edict: for of course the praetor knows that they intervene also for pay.
Sed si ego tibi, cum esses mensor, mandaverim, ut mensuram agri ageres et tu id titio delegaveris et ille dolo malo quid in ea re fecerit, tu teneberis, quia dolo malo versatus es, qui tali homini credidisti.
But if I, when you were a surveyor, have given you a mandate to carry out the measurement of a field, and you have delegated it to Titius, and he has done anything in that matter with malicious fraud, you will be held liable, because you have dealt with malicious fraud, in that you trusted such a man.
Pomponius tamen scribit, si emptor plus dederit venditori propter renuntiationem, quia condicere potest quod plus dedit, agi cum mensore non posse: nihil enim emptoris interesse, cum possit condicere: nisi solvendo venditor non fuit: tunc enim mensor tenebitur.
Pomponius, however, writes that, if the buyer has given more to the seller on account of the renunciation, since he can bring a condictio for what he gave in excess, an action cannot be brought against the measurer: for nothing is of concern to the buyer, since he can bring a condictio: unless the seller was not solvent: for then the measurer will be held liable.
Idem pomponius scribit, si propter iudicium adhibitus mensor fraudaverit me in renuntiatione, teneri eum, si ob hoc de iudicio minus tuli: plane si a iudice adhibitus contra me renuntiaverit dolo malo, dubitat, an teneri mihi debeat? quod magis admittit.
The same Pomponius writes that, if a surveyor, brought in on account of the trial, has defrauded me in the report, he is held liable, if on this account I have carried off less from the judgment; plainly, if, having been brought in by the judge, he has reported against me with malicious fraud, he hesitates whether he ought to be held liable to me—which he is more inclined to admit.
Si mensor non falsum modum renuntiaverit, sed traxerit renuntiationem et ob hoc evenerit ut venditor liberetur, qui adsignaturum se modum intra certum diem promisit, haec actio locum non habet: sed nec dari utilem debere pomponius ait. erit ergo ad actionem de dolo decurrendum.
If the surveyor has not reported a false measure, but has dragged out the report, and on this account it has come about that the seller—who promised that he would assign the measure within a fixed day—is released, this action has no place; nor, Pomponius says, ought a useful action to be granted. Therefore one must resort to the action for fraud.
Si, cum falsus modus renuntiatus esset, emptor cum venditore ex empto egisset, agere poterit etiam cum mensore: sed si nihil eius interest, condemnari mensorem non oportet. quod si non de toto modo qui deerat cum venditore egerit, sed de minore, consequenter scribit pomponius de residuo cum mensore agi posse.
If, when a false measure had been announced, the buyer has sued the seller by an action ex empto, he will also be able to sue the measurer; but if it is of no interest to him, the measurer ought not to be condemned. And if he has not sued the seller for the whole measure that was lacking, but for a lesser amount, consequently Pomponius writes that one can proceed against the measurer for the residue.
Qui mortuum in locum alienum intulit vel inferre curavit, tenebitur in factum actione. " in locum alterius" accipere debemus sive in agro sive in aedificio. sed hic sermo domino dat actionem, non bonae fidei possessori: nam cum dicat " in locum alterius", apparet de domino eum sentire, id est eo cuius locus est.
He who has brought a corpse into another’s place or has taken care to have it brought in will be held by an actio in factum. " in locum alterius" we ought to understand whether in a field or in a building. But this phrasing gives the action to the owner, not to the good‑faith possessor: for since it says " in locum alterius", it appears that he has in mind the owner, that is, the one whose place it is.
but also the usufructuary will be held liable to the owner of the property for the act of bringing it in. Whether a partner too is bound, if he brought it in with his partner unaware, can be debated; however, it is more correct that he can be proceeded against by the action for partitioning an inheritance (familiae erciscundae) or for partitioning common property (communi dividundo).
Si usum fructum quis habeat, religiosum locum non facit. sed et si alius proprietatem. alius usum fructum habuit, non faciet locum religiosum nec proprietarius, nisi forte ipsum qui usum fructum legaverit intulerit, cum in alium locum inferri tam oportune non posset: et ita iulianus scribit.
If someone has a usufruct, he does not make a place religious. But also, if one had the ownership and another the usufruct, neither will make the place religious, nor will the proprietor—unless perhaps he has brought in the very person who had bequeathed the usufruct, since it could not be borne into another place so suitably; and thus Julian writes.
Locum qui servit nemo religiosum facit, nisi consentiat is cui servitus debetur. sed si non minus commode per alium locum servitute uti potest, non videtur servitutis impediendae causa id fieri, et ideo religiosus fit: et sane habet hoc rationem.
A place that is servient no one makes religious, unless the one to whom the servitude is owed consents. But if he can use the servitude no less conveniently through another place, it does not seem that this is done for the sake of impeding the servitude, and therefore it becomes religious; and indeed this has its rationale.
Scriptus heres prius quam hereditatem adeat patrem familias mortuum inferendo locum facit religiosum, nec quis putet hoc ipso pro herede eum gerere: finge enim adhuc eum deliberare de adeunda hereditate. ego etiam si non heres eum intulerit, sed quivis alius herede cessante vel absente vel verente ne pro herede gerere videatur, tamen locum religiosum facere puto: plerumque enim defuncti ante sepeliuntur, quam quis heres eis existet. sed tunc locus fit religiosus, cum defuncti fuit: naturaliter enim videtur ad mortuum pertinere locus in quem infertur, praesertim si in eum locum inferatur, in quem ipse destinavit: usque adeo, ut etiamsi in legatum locum sit illatus ab herede, illatione tamen testatoris fit religiosus, si modo in alium locum tam oportune inferri non potuit.
A named heir, before he accedes to the inheritance, by carrying in the dead paterfamilias makes the place “religious”; nor should anyone think that by this very act he is conducting himself as heir—imagine, in fact, that he is still deliberating about acceding to the inheritance. I, moreover, even if it is not the heir who has carried him in, but anyone else, with the heir standing aside or absent or fearing lest he seem to act as heir, nevertheless judge that he makes the place religious: for for the most part the deceased are buried before anyone exists as heir to them. But then the place becomes religious when it belonged to the deceased: for naturally the place into which the dead man is brought in seems to pertain to the dead man, especially if he is brought into that place which he himself destined—to such a degree that even if he has been brought into a place bequeathed as a legacy by the heir, nevertheless by the interment of the testator it becomes religious, provided only that he could not have been brought so suitably into another place.
Vel quod pater familias iure hereditario adquisiit. sed in utroque heredibus quidem ceterisque successoribus qualescumque fuerint licet sepeliri et mortuum inferre, etiamsi ex minima parte heredes ex testamento vel ab intestato sint, licet non consentiant alii. liberis autem cuiuscumque sexus vel gradus etiam filiis familiae et emancipatis idem ius concessum est, sive extiterint heredes sive sese abstineant.
Or what the paterfamilias acquired by hereditary right. But in both cases, to the heirs and the other successors, whatever they may be, it is permitted to bury and to carry in the dead, even if they are heirs for the least share, by testament or from intestacy, even if the others do not consent. Moreover, to the children, of whatever sex or degree, even to sons under paternal power and to emancipated ones, the same right has been granted, whether they have become heirs or abstain.
As for the disinherited, however, unless the testator, moved by just hatred, has specifically forbidden them, it is permitted, for the sake of humanity, that they be buried, but it is not permitted that they inter others, except their own posterity. Freedmen, however, will be able neither to be buried nor to inter others, unless they have become heirs to their patron, although some have inscribed that they have made a monument for themselves and their freedmen: and thus Papinian responded, and the same has very often been established.
Ossa quae ab alio illata sunt vel corpus an liceat domino loci effodere vel eruere sine decreto pontificum seu iussu principis, quaestionis est: et ait labeo exspectandum vel permissum pontificale seu iussionem principis, alioquin iniuriarum fore actionem adversus eum qui eiecit.
Whether it is lawful for the owner of the place to dig up or unearth bones which have been brought in by another, or a body, without a decree of the pontiffs or an order of the prince, is a matter of question: and Labeo says one must await either a pontifical permission or an order of the prince; otherwise there will be an action for injuries against him who cast it out.
Liberum est ei qui prohibetur mortuum ossave mortui inferre aut statim interdicto uti, quo prohibetur ei vis fieri, aut alio inferre et postea in factum agere: per quam consequetur actor, quanti eius interfuerit prohibitum non esse, in quam computationem cadit loci empti pretium aut conducti merces, item sui loci pretium, quem quis, nisi coactus est, religiosum facturus non esset. unde miror, quare constare videatur neque heredi neque in heredem dandam hanc actionem: nam ut apparet, pecuniariae quantitatis ratio in eam deducitur: certe perpetuo ea inter ipsos competit.
It is open to him who is prevented from bringing in a dead person or the bones of a dead person either immediately to use the interdict by which violence is prohibited from being done to him, or to take them elsewhere and afterwards bring an action in factum; by which the plaintiff will obtain as much as it was in his interest that he not have been prevented—into which computation fall the price of a place purchased or the rent of one hired, likewise the price of his own place, which a person would not have made religious unless compelled. Whence I wonder why it seems settled that this action is given neither to the heir nor against the heir: for, as is apparent, an account of a pecuniary amount is brought into it; certainly it lies perpetually between the parties themselves.
Si venditor fundi exceperit locum sepulchri ad hoc, ut ipse posterique eius illo inferrentur, si via uti prohibeatur, ut mortuum suum inferret, agere potest: videtur enim etiam hoc exceptum inter ementem et vendentem, ut ei per fundum sepulturae causa ire liceret.
If the vendor of an estate has excepted a place of sepulcher for this purpose, that he himself and his posterity be interred there, then if he is prohibited from using a way so as to carry in his dead, he can bring an action; for it seems that this too was excepted between the buyer and the seller, namely that it be permitted to him to go through the estate for the sake of burial.
Si quis sepulchrum habeat, viam autem ad sepulchrum non habeat et a vicino ire prohibeatur, imperator antoninus cum patre rescripsit iter ad sepulchrum peti precario et concedi solere, ut quotiens non debetur, impetretur ab eo, qui fundum adiunctum habeat. non tamen hoc rescriptum, quod impetrandi dat facultatem, etiam actionem civilem inducit, sed extra ordinem interpelletur praeses et iam compellere debet iusto pretio iter ei praestari, ita tamen, ut iudex etiam de opportunitate loci prospiciat, ne vicinus magnum patiatur detrimentum.
If someone has a tomb, but does not have a way to the tomb and is forbidden by a neighbor to go, the Emperor Antoninus with his father rescripted that a route to the tomb is accustomed to be requested by way of favor (precario) and to be granted, so that whenever it is not owed, it be obtained from the one who has the adjoining estate (fundus). Nevertheless, this rescript, which gives the faculty of obtaining, does not also introduce a civil action; rather, the governor (praeses) is to be appealed to extra ordinem, and he ought now to compel that a way be furnished to him for a just price—yet in such a way that the judge also look to the opportuneness of the place, lest the neighbor suffer great detriment.
Funus autem eum facere oportet, quem decedens elegit: sed si non ille fecit, nullam esse huius rei poenam, nisi aliquid pro hoc emolumentum ei relictum est: tunc enim, si non paruerit voluntati defuncti, ab hoc repellitur. sin autem de hac re defunctus non cavit, nec ulli delegatum id munus est, scriptos heredes ea res contingit: si nemo scriptus est, legitimos vel cognatos: quosque suo ordine quo succedunt.
Moreover, the funeral ought to be carried out by the one whom the deceased, at his death, selected; but if that person did not do it, there is no penalty in this matter, unless some emolument was left to him for this purpose: for then, if he has not obeyed the will of the deceased, he is repelled from it. But if the deceased did not make provision about this matter, nor was that duty delegated to anyone, the matter falls to the named heirs; if no one is named, to the legitimate heirs or the cognates, and these in the order in which they succeed.
Praetor vel magistratus municipalis ad funus sumptum decernere debet, si quidem est pecunia in hereditate, ex pecunia: si non est, distrahere debet ea, quae tempore peritura sunt, quorum retentio onerat hereditatem: si minus, si quid auri argentique fuerit, distrahi aut pignerari iubebit, ut pecunia expediatur:
The praetor or the municipal magistrate ought to decree the expense for the funeral, if indeed there is money in the inheritance, from the money: if there is not, he ought to sell off those things which will perish with time, the retention of which burdens the inheritance: if not enough, if there is any gold and silver, he will order it to be sold or pledged, so that money may be procured:
Si colonus vel inquilinus sit is qui mortuus est nec sit unde funeretur, ex invectis illatis eum funerandum pomponius scribit et si quid superfluum remanserit, hoc pro debita pensione teneri. sed et si res legatae sint a testatore de cuius funere agitur nec sit unde funeretur, ad eas quoque manus mittere oportet: satius est enim de suo testatorem funerari, quam aliquos legata consequi. sed si adita fuerit postea hereditas, res emptori auferenda non est, quia bonae fidei possessor est et dominium habet, qui auctore iudice comparavit.
If the one who has died was a colonus or an inquilinus and there is no means from which he may be buried, Pomponius writes that he is to be funerated from the goods brought in (invecta et illata), and if any surplus shall remain, this is held for the due pension (rent). But also, if things have been bequeathed by the testator whose funeral is in question and there is no means from which he may be buried, one ought to lay hands upon those as well: for it is preferable that the testator be buried out of his own property than that some persons obtain the legacies. But if afterwards the inheritance shall have been entered upon, the property is not to be taken from the buyer, because he is a possessor in good faith and has dominion (ownership), he who acquired it by the judge’s authority.
Si cui funeris sui curam testator mandaverit et ille accepta pecunia funus non duxerit, de dolo actionem in eum dandam mela scripsit: credo tamen et extra ordinem eum a praetore compellendum funus ducere.
If the testator has entrusted to someone the care of his own funeral and he, after receiving the money, has not conducted the funeral, Mela wrote that an action for dolus (deceit) is to be granted against him; nevertheless I believe that he should also be compelled by the praetor, out of the ordinary course (extra ordinem), to conduct the funeral.
Funeris causa sumptus factus videtur is demum, qui ideo fuit ut funus ducatur, sine quo funus duci non possit, ut puta si quid impensum est in elationem mortui: sed et si quid in locum fuerit erogatum, in quem mortuus inferretur, funeris causa videri impensum labeo scribit, quia necessario locus paratur, in quo corpus conditur.
An expense is deemed to have been made for the sake of the funeral only if it was incurred so that the funeral might be conducted, without which the funeral cannot be conducted—for instance, if anything is expended on the bearing-out (elatio) of the deceased: but also, if anything has been disbursed for the place into which the dead person is to be borne/interred, Labeo writes that it is to be regarded as expenditure for the sake of the funeral, because a place is necessarily prepared in which the body is entombed.
Impensa peregre mortui quae facta est ut corpus perferretur, funeris est, licet nondum homo funeretur: idemque et si quid ad corpus custodiendum vel etiam commendandum factum sit, vel si quid in marmor vel vestem collocandam.
The expense incurred abroad for the deceased, which was made so that the body might be conveyed, is of the funeral, although the man has not yet been buried; and the same [applies] also if anything has been done for the body’s custody or even for its commendation (commitment to care), or if anything [was spent] for marble or for clothing to be set in place.
Haec actio quae funeraria dicitur ex bono et aequo oritur: continet autem funeris causa tantum impensam, non etiam ceterorum sumptuum. aequum autem accipitur ex dignitate eius qui funeratus est, ex causa, ex tempore et ex bona fide, ut neque plus imputetur sumptus nomine quam factum est neque tantum quantum factum est, si immodice factum est: deberet enim haberi ratio facultatium eius, in quem factum est, et ipsius rei, quae ultra modum sine causa consumitur. quid ergo si ex voluntate testatoris impensum est?
This action, which is called funerary, arises from what is good and equitable: it contains only the expenditure for the sake of the funeral, not also the other expenses. The equitable measure is taken from the dignity of the one who has been buried, from the cause, from the time, and from good faith, so that neither more be imputed under the name of expense than was actually done, nor as much as was done, if it was done immoderately: for consideration ought to be had of the means of the person for whom it was done, and of the thing itself, which beyond measure is consumed without cause. What then if it was expended by the will of the testator?
Sed interdum is, qui sumptum in funus fecit, sumptum non recipit, si pietatis gratia fecit, non hoc animo quasi recepturus sumptum quem fecit: et ita imperator noster rescripsit. igitur aestimandum erit arbitro et perpendendum, quo animo sumptus factus sit, utrum negotium quis vel defuncti vel heredis gerit vel ipsius humanitatis, an vero misericordiae vel pietati tribuens vel affectioni. potest tamen distingui et misericordiae modus, ut in hoc fuerit misericors vel pius qui funeravit, ut eum sepeliret, ne insepultus iaceret, non etiam ut suo sumptu fecerit: quod si iudici liqueat, non debet eum qui convenitur absolvere: quis enim sine pietatis intentione alienum cadaver funerat?
But sometimes he who has made expense for a funeral does not recover the expense, if he did it for the sake of piety, not with this mind as if he were going to recover the expense which he made: and so our emperor issued a rescript. Therefore it will have to be assessed by the arbiter and weighed with what intention the expense was made—whether one is conducting the business of the deceased or of the heir or of humanity itself, or indeed attributing it to mercy or to piety or to affection. Yet even the measure of mercy can be distinguished, namely that he who provided the funeral was merciful or pious in this respect: that he should bury him, lest he lie unburied, but not also that he should do it at his own expense; and if this is clear to the judge, he ought not to absolve the one who is sued. For who buries another’s corpse without an intention of piety?
Plerique filii cum parentes suos funerant, vel alii qui heredes fieri possunt, licet ex hoc ipso neque pro herede gestio neque aditio praesumitur, tamen ne vel miscuisse se necessarii vel ceteri pro herede gessisse videantur. solent testari pietatis gratia facere se sepulturam. quod si supervacuo fuerit factum, ad illud se munire videntur, ne miscuisse se credantur, ad illud non, ut sumptum consequantur: quippe protestantur pietatis gratia id se facere.
Most sons, when they bury their parents, or others who can become heirs, although from this act itself neither pro herede gestio nor aditio is presumed, nevertheless, lest the necessarii seem to have mingled themselves, or the others to have acted pro herede, are wont, by grace of pietas, to attest that they are performing the burial. And if it has been done superfluously, they seem to fortify themselves for this—that they not be believed to have mingled themselves; but not for this—that they might recover the expense: for they protest that they do it for the sake of pietas.
Fortassis quis possit dicere interdum partem sumptus facti posse reciperari, ut quis pro parte quasi negotium gerens, pro parte pietatis gratia id faciat: quod est verius: partem igitur sumptus consequetur, quem non donandi animo fecit.
Perhaps someone could say that sometimes a part of the expense incurred can be recovered, in that one does it partly as though managing a business (negotium gerens), partly for the sake of piety: which is truer: therefore he will obtain the part of the expense which he did not incur with a donating intention.
Iudicem, qui de ea aequitate cognoscit, interdum sumptum omnino non debere admittere modicum factum, si forte in contumeliam defuncti hominis locupletis modicus factus sit: nam non debet huius rationem habere, cum contumeliam defuncto fecisse videatur ita eum funerando.
A judge who has cognizance of the equity in this matter ought sometimes not at all to admit an expense, though made modest, if perchance a modest outlay has been made to the contumely of a defunct opulent man: for he ought not to have regard to this, since he appears to have inflicted contumely upon the defunct by burying him in such a way.
Si quis, dum se heredem putat, patrem familias funeraverit, funeraria actione uti non poterit, quia non hoc animo fecit, quasi alienum negotium gerens: et ita trebatius et proculus putat. puto tamen et ei ex causa dandam actionem funerariam.
If someone, while he supposes himself to be the heir, has buried the paterfamilias, he will not be able to use the funeral action, because he did not do this with the intention as though managing another’s business: and so Trebatius and Proculus think. I nevertheless think that even to him, on this ground, the funeral action ought to be granted.
Labeo ait, quotiens quis aliam actionem habet de funeris impensa consequenda, funeraria eum agere non posse: et ideo si familiae erciscundae agere possit, funeraria non acturum: plane si iam familiae erciscundae iudicio actum sit, posse agi.
Labeo says that, whenever someone has another action for obtaining recovery of funeral expense, he cannot bring the funerary action; and therefore, if he is able to sue by the action for partition of the family estate (familiae erciscundae), he will not bring the funerary action: plainly, if the matter has already been dealt with in a familiae erciscundae judgment, it can be brought.
Idem labeo ait, si prohibente herede funeraveris testatorem, ex causa competere tibi funerariam: quid enim si filium testatoris heres eius prohibuit? huic contradici potest: " ergo pietatis gratia funerasti". sed pone me testatum: habiturum me funerariam actionem: de suo enim expedit mortuos funerari. et quid si testator quidem funus mihi mandavit, heres prohibet, ego tamen nihilo minus funeravi?
The same Labeo says that, if you have buried the testator while the heir forbids, the funerary action lies to you on that ground: for what if the heir forbade the testator’s son? To this it can be objected: " ergo you buried for the sake of piety." But suppose me to have made a will: I will have the funerary action; for it is expedient that the dead be buried at his (the heir’s) own expense. And what if indeed the testator entrusted the funeral to me, the heir forbids, yet I nonetheless buried none the less?
Qui mandatu alterius funeravit, non habet funerariam actionem, sed is scilicet, qui mandavit funerandum sive solvit ei cui mandavit sive debet. quod si pupillus mandavit sine tutore auctore, utilem funerariam dandam adversus heredem ei qui impendit: lucrari enim heredem iniquum est. si autem pupillus funus ad se pertinens sine tutoris auctoritate mandavit, dandam in eum actionem arbitror, si et heres extitit ei qui funeratus est solvendoque hereditas est.
He who, by another’s mandate, has buried, does not have the funerary action, but rather the one, namely, who mandated the funeral—whether he has paid the person to whom he gave the mandate, or still owes. But if a ward (pupillus) mandated it without his tutor’s authorization, a useful funerary action should be granted against the heir to the one who expended the outlay; for it is inequitable that the heir should profit. If, however, a ward mandated a funeral pertaining to himself without the tutor’s authority, I judge that an action should be given against him, provided he also became the heir of the one who was buried and the inheritance is solvent.
In eum, ad quem dotis nomine quid pervenerit, dat praetor funerariam actionem: aequissimum enim visum est veteribus mulieres quasi de patrimoniis suis ita de dotibus funerari et eum, qui morte mulieris dotem lucratur, in funus conferre debere, sive pater mulieris est sive maritus.
Against him to whom anything has come in the name of dowry, the praetor gives a funerary action: for it seemed most equitable to the ancients that women be buried, as from their own patrimonies, so also from dowries, and that he who by the woman’s death profits from the dowry ought to contribute to the funeral, whether it be the woman’s father or her husband.
Neratius quaerit, si is, qui dotem dederat pro muliere, stipulatus est duas partes dotis reddi, tertiam apud maritum remanere, pactus sit, ne quid maritus in funus conferret, an funeraria maritus teneatur. et ait, si quidem ipse stipulator mulierem funeravit, locum esse pacto et inutilem ei funerariam fore: si vero alius funeravit, posse eum maritum convenire, quia pacto hoc publicum ius infringi non possit. quid tamen si quis dotem hac lege dederit pro muliere, ut ad ipsum rediret, si in matrimonio mortua esset, aut quoquo modo soluto matrimonio?
Neratius inquires: if the one who had given the dowry on behalf of the woman stipulated that two parts of the dowry be returned, a third remain with the husband, and made a pact that the husband should contribute nothing to the funeral, whether the husband is liable on the funerary claim. And he says that, if indeed the stipulator himself buried the woman, the pact has effect and the funerary claim would be useless to him; but if someone else buried her, he can proceed against the husband, because by this pact public law cannot be infringed. What, however, if someone gave the dowry under this proviso on behalf of the woman, that it should return to him if she died in marriage, or in whatever way the marriage were dissolved?
Quod si nulla dos esset, tunc omnem impensam patrem praestare debere atilicinus ait aut heredes eius mulieris, puta emancipatae. quod si neque heredes habeat neque pater solvendo sit, maritum in quantum facere potest pro hoc conveniri, ne iniuria eius videretur quondam uxorem eius insepultam relinqui.
But if there were no dowry, then Atilicinus says the father ought to provide the whole expense, or the heirs of that woman, for instance if she had been emancipated. But if she has neither heirs nor is her father solvent, the husband is to be convened for this to the extent that he is able, lest it should seem an affront to him that his former wife be left unburied.
Is qui filiam familias funeravit antequam dos patri reddatur, cum marito recte agit: reddita dote patrem obligatum habet. utique autem, si cum marito actum fuerit, is eo minus patri mulieris restituturus est.
He who has performed the funeral of a filia familias before the dowry is returned to the father rightly brings an action against the husband; once the dowry has been returned, he has the father bound. In any case, however, if action has been brought against the husband, he will be bound to restore so much the less to the woman’s father.
Funeris sumptus accipitur, quidquid corporis causa veluti unguentorum erogatum est, et pretium loci in quo defunctus humatus est, et si qua vectigalia sunt, vel sarcophagi et vectura: et quidquid corporis causa antequam sepeliatur consumptum est, funeris impensam esse existimo.
Funeral expenses are understood to include whatever has been disbursed for the sake of the body, as, for example, ointments, and the price of the place in which the deceased has been inhumed, and, if there are any dues, or the sarcophagus and the conveyance: and whatever for the sake of the body has been consumed before it is buried, I consider to be funeral expenditure.
Monumentum autem sepulchri id esse divus hadrianus rescripsit, quod monumenti, id est causa muniendi eius loci factum sit, in quo corpus impositum sit. itaque si amplum quid aedificari testator iusserit, veluti incircum porticationes, eos sumptus funeris causa non esse.
moreover, the deified hadrian by rescript declared that a monument of a sepulcher is that which has been made as a monument, that is, for the purpose of securing that place in which the body has been laid. and so, if the testator has ordered something ample to be built, for example encircling porticoes, those expenses are not for the sake of the funeral.
Divi fratres edicto admonuerunt, ne iustae sepulturae traditum, id est terra conditum corpus inquietetur: videtur autem terra conditum et si in arcula conditum hoc animo sit, ut non alibi transferatur. sed arculam ipsam, si res exigat, in locum commodiorem licere transferre non est denegandum.
The deified brothers, by an edict, admonished that a body consigned to lawful sepulture, that is, interred in the earth, not be disturbed: moreover, it is regarded as interred in earth even if it is placed in a small coffin, with this intention, that it not be transferred elsewhere. But permission to transfer the coffin itself, if the matter requires, into a more convenient place is not to be denied.
Si plures sint domini eius loci, ubi mortuus infertur, omnes consentire debent, cum extranei inferantur: nam ex ipsis dominis quemlibet recte ibi sepeliri constat etiam sine ceterorum consensu, maxime cum alius non sit locus in quo sepeliretur.
If there are several owners of the place where a dead person is brought in, all must consent when outsiders are interred: for as to the owners themselves, it is established that any one of them may rightly be buried there even without the consent of the others, especially when there is no other place in which he might be buried.
Sunt personae, quae, quamquam religiosum locum facere non possunt, interdicto tamen de mortuo inferendo utiliter agunt, ut puta dominus proprietatis, si in fundum, cuius fructus alienus est, mortuum inferat aut inferre velit: nam si intulerit, non faciet iustum sepulchrum, sed si prohibeatur, utiliter interdicto, qui de iure dominii quaeritur, aget. eademque sunt in socio, qui in fundum communem invito socio mortuum inferre vult. nam propter publicam utilitatem, ne insepulta cadavera iacerent, strictam rationem insuper habemus, quae nonnumquam in ambiguis religionum quaestionibus omitti solent: nam summam esse rationem, quae pro religione facit.
There are persons who, although they cannot make a place religious, nevertheless act to good effect by the interdict de mortuo inferendo, as, for instance, the owner of the property, if he brings, or wishes to bring, a dead person into a farm whose fruits are another’s: for if he does bring him in, he will not make a lawful tomb; but if he is prohibited, he will with effect proceed by the interdict in which inquiry is made concerning the right of ownership. And the same is true of a partner who wishes to bring a dead person into a common farm against his partner’s will. For on account of public utility, lest unburied corpses lie about, we moreover have regard to a strict rationale, which is sometimes accustomed to be omitted in ambiguous questions of religions; for the highest rationale is that which makes on behalf of religion.
Cum in diverisis locis sepultum est, uterque quidem locus religiosus non fit, quia una sepultura plura sepulchra efficere non potest: mihi autem videtur illum religiosum esse, ubi quod est principale conditum est, id est caput, cuius imago fit, inde cognoscimur. cum autem impetratur, ut reliquiae transferantur, desinit locus religiosus esse.
When it has been buried in diverse places, indeed neither place becomes religious, because a single sepulture cannot effect several sepulchres: however, it seems to me that that place is religious where that which is principal has been interred, that is, the head, of which an image is made, whence we are recognized. But when it is obtained that the relics be transferred, the place ceases to be religious.
Si plura praedia quis habuit et omnium usum fructum separatim legaverit, poterit in unum inferri et electio erit heredis et gratificationi locus: sed fructuario utilem actionem in heredem dandam ad id recipiendum, quod propter eam electionem minutus est usus fructus.
If someone had several estates and has bequeathed the usufruct of all separately, it can be brought together into one, and the election will be the heir’s, and there is room for gratification; but a useful action is to be given to the usufructuary against the heir to recover to the extent that the usufruct has been diminished on account of that election.
Item si mihi in fundum via debeatur, in quem fundum inferre volo, et via prohibear, hoc interdicto posse me experiri placuit, quia inferre prohibeor qui via uti prohibeor: idque erit probandum et si alia servitus debeatur.
Likewise, if a way to an estate is owed to me, into which estate I wish to carry in, and I am prohibited the way, it has been decided that I can proceed by this interdict, because I am prohibited from bringing in, I who am prohibited from using the way: and this must be proved even if another servitude is owed.
Aedificare videtur prohibere et qui prohibet eam materiam convehi, quae aedificio necessaria sit. proinde et si operi necessarios prohibuit quis venire, interdictum locum habet, et si machinam alligare quis prohibeat, si tamen eo loci prohibeat, qui servitutem debeat: ceterum si in meo solo velis machinam ponere, non tenebor interdicto, si iure te non patiar.
One is deemed to prohibit building also who prohibits the conveying of that material which is necessary for the building. Accordingly, if someone has prohibited those necessary to the work from coming, the interdict has a place; and likewise if someone forbids a machine to be fastened—provided, however, that he forbids it in a place which owes a servitude. But if you wish to place a machine on my own soil, I shall not be bound by the interdict, if by right I do not allow you.