Aquinas: De Ente et Essentia

Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, secundum Philosophum in I Caeli et Mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in principio suae Metaphysicae, ideo ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam dicendum est quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur et quomodo in diversis inveniatur et quomodo se habeat ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et differentiam.

Because a small error in the beginning is great in the end, according to the Philosopher in 1 On the Heavens and the World, and since being (ens) and essence (essentia) are what are conceived by the intellect first, as Avicenna says at the beginning of his Metaphysics, therefore, lest it happen that one err from ignorance of them, for the opening up of the difficulty concerning these things it must be said what is signified by the name of essence and of being, and how they are found in diverse things, and how they stand in relation to the logical intentions, namely genus, species, and difference.

[I]. Quia vero ex compositis simplicium cognitionem accipere debemus et ex posterioribus in priora devenire, ut, a facilioribus incipientes, convenientior fiat disciplina, ideo ex significatione entis ad significationem essentiae procedendum est. Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V Metaphysicae Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat.

[1]. Because, indeed, from composites we ought to take the cognition of simples, and from posterior things to come into the prior, so that, beginning from the easier, the discipline may be made more suitable, therefore from the signification of being one must proceed to the signification of essence. It should therefore be known that, just as in the 5 Metaphysics the Philosopher says, being in itself is said in a twofold way: in one way, that which is divided by the ten genera; in another way, that which signifies the truth of propositions. The difference of these, moreover, is that in the second way everything can be called being of which an affirmative proposition can be formed, even if that thing posits nothing in reality.

Per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi et quod caecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit. Unde primo modo caecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia.

In which mode privations and negations are called beings; for we say that affirmation is opposed to negation and that blindness is in the eye. But in the first mode nothing can be called a being except what posits something in reality. Whence in the first mode blindness and things of this sort are not beings.

Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis.

Therefore the name of essence is not taken from being said in the second way, for certain things are called beings in this way which do not have an essence, as is evident in privations; but essence is taken from being said in the first way. Whence the Commentator in the same place says that being said in the first way is that which signifies the essence of a thing. And because, as has been said, being said in this way is divided by the ten genera, it is necessary that essence signify something common to all natures, through which diverse beings are placed in diverse genera and species, just as humanity is the essence of man, and so with the others.

Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentiae a Philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II Metaphysicae suae.

And because that by which a thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is that which is signified through the definition indicating what the thing is, hence it is that the name of essence is by the Philosophers changed into the name of quiddity. And this is what the Philosopher frequently names the what-it-was-to-be, that is, that by which something has being-as-a-what. It is also called form, inasmuch as by form is signified the certitude of each thing, as Avicenna says in Book 2 of his Metaphysics.

Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in libro De Duabus Naturis assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam. Et sic etiam Philosophus dicit in V Metaphysicae quod omnis substantia est natura.

This also is called by another name, nature, taking nature according to the first mode of those four which Boethius assigns in the book On Two Natures, namely, that nature is said to be everything that can in any way be grasped by the intellect. For a thing is not intelligible except through its definition and its essence. And thus also the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5 that every substance is nature.

Tamen nomen naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur. Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.

Nevertheless, the name of nature, taken in this way, seems to signify the essence of a thing, insofar as it has an order to the thing’s proper operation, since no thing is deprived of its proper operation. But the name of quiddity is taken from this, that it is signified through the definition. And essence is so called according as through it and in it a being has existence.

[II]. Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de substantiis et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo et secundum quid. Substantiarum vero quaedam sunt simplices et quaedam compositae, et in utrisque est essentia, sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius habent. Sunt enim causa eorum quae composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex, quae deus est.

[2]. But because being is said absolutely and primarily of substances, and secondarily and, as it were, in a certain respect of accidents, hence it is that essence is properly and truly in substances, but in accidents it is in a certain manner and in a certain respect. Of substances, indeed, some are simple and some composite, and in both there is essence, but in simples in a truer and more noble mode, according as they also have being more nobly. For they are the cause of those things that are composite—at least the first simple substance, which is God.

Sed quia illarum substantiarum essentiae sunt nobis magis occultae, ideo ab essentiis substantiarum compositarum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribus convenientior fiat disciplina. In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur.

But because the essences of those substances are more hidden from us, therefore one must begin from the essences of composite substances, so that from the easier the discipline may become more fitting. In composite substances, therefore, form and matter are known, as in man, soul and body. Yet it cannot be said that only one of them is said to be the essence.

Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia rei planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est et in specie ordinatur vel genere. Sed materia neque cognitionis principium est, neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est. Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur.

For it is plain that matter alone is not the essence of the thing, because a thing through its essence is both knowable and is set in a species or a genus. But matter is neither a principle of cognition, nor according to it is anything determined to genus or species, but according to that by which something is in act (in actuality). Nor can even form alone be said to be the essence of a composite substance, although certain people try to assert this.

Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud, quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent. Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substantiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, quae perfectam essentiam non habent.

For from these things which have been said it is evident that essence is that which is signified by the definition of the thing. But the definition of natural substances contains not only form but also matter; for otherwise natural and mathematical definitions would not differ. Nor can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural substance as something added to its essence or as a being outside its essence, because this mode of definition is proper to accidents, which do not have a perfect essence.

Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehendit materiam et formam. Non autem potest dici quod essentia significet relationem, quae est inter materiam et formam vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de necessitate esset accidens et extraneum a re nec per eam res cognosceretur, quae omnia essentiae conveniunt.

Whence it is necessary that in their definition they receive a subject, which is outside their genus. It is therefore clear that essence comprehends matter and form. Nor can it be said that essence signifies the relation which is between matter and form, or something superadded to them, because this would of necessity be an accident and extraneous to the thing, nor would the thing be known through it—whereas the contrary of all these belongs to essence.

Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid.

For through form, which is the act of matter, matter is made a being in act and a “this something.” Whence that which supervenes does not give to matter an actual being simply, but an actual being of such a sort, just as accidents also do, as whiteness makes a thing actually white. Hence also, when such a form is acquired, it is not said to be generated simply, but in a certain respect.

Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiae in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est. Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in commento praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod ousia significat compositum. Oousia enim apud graecos idem est quod essentia apud nos, ut ipsemet dicit in libro de duabus naturis.

It remains, therefore, that the name of essence in composite substances signifies that which is composed out of matter and form. And consonant with this is the word of Boethius in the commentary on the Categories, where he says that ousia signifies the composite. For ousia among the Greeks is the same as essence among us, as he himself says in the book On the Two Natures.

Avicenna etiam dicit quod quiditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio formae et materiae. Commentator etiam dicit super VII Metaphysicae: natura quam habent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est compositum ex materia et forma. Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi.

Avicenna also says that the quiddity of composite substances is the very composition of form and matter. The Commentator also says on Metaphysics 7: the nature which the species have in generable things is a certain medium, that is, a composite from matter and form. Reason also concurs with this, because the being of a composite substance is not only of the form nor only of the matter, but of the composite itself.

Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa. Sic enim in aliis videmus, quae ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res non denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione calidi digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit causa dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui calidum et humidum complectitur.

Moreover, essence is that according to which a thing is said to be. Whence it must be that the essence, by which a thing is denominated a being, is not only form nor only matter, but both, although the being (esse) of such a thing is in its way caused by the form alone. For thus we see in other things that are constituted from several principles, that a thing is not denominated from one of those principles only, but from that which embraces both, as is evident in flavors, because sweetness is caused from the action of the hot digesting the moist; and although in this way heat is the cause of sweetness, nevertheless a body is not denominated sweet from the heat, but from the flavor which embraces the hot and the moist.

Sed quia individuationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, quae materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non universalis. Ex quo sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata.

But because the principle of individuation is matter, from this it may perhaps seem to follow that the essence, which in itself embraces matter and form together, is only particular and not universal. Whence it would follow that universals would not have a definition, if essence is that which is signified by the definition. And therefore it must be known that matter, not taken in just any way, is the principle of individuation, but only designated matter.

Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Socratis, si Socrates diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata; non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt materia hominis non signata.

And I call signate matter that which is considered under determinate dimensions. This matter, however, is not posited in the definition of man, insofar as he is man, but it would be posited in the definition of Socrates, if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, non-signate matter is posited; for in the definition of man there is not posited this bone and this flesh, but bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-signate matter of man.

[III]. Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde Commentator dicit super VII Metaphysicae: Socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius. Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma rei sumitur.

[3]. Thus it is evident that the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ except according to the designated and the non-designated. Wherefore the Commentator says on Metaphysics 7: "Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity." Thus likewise the essence of the genus and of the species differ according to the designated and the non-designated, although the mode of designation is different in each case, because the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions, whereas the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference, which is taken from the form of the thing.

Haec autem determinatio vel designatio, quae est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei exsistens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in genere ut non determinatum. Si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur de eo, cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur. Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus.

Moreover, this determination or designation which is in the species with respect to the genus is not by means of something existing in the essence of the species which is in no way in the essence of the genus; rather, whatever is in the species is also in the genus as undetermined. For if animal were not the whole that man is, but a part of it, it would not be predicated of him, since no integral part is predicated of its whole. But how this comes about can be seen if one examines how body differs, insofar as it is posited as a part of animal and insofar as it is posited as a genus.

Non enim potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars integralis. Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis.

For it cannot be a genus in the mode in which it is an integral part. Therefore this name which is “body” can be taken in multiple ways. For “body,” insofar as it is in the genus of substance, is so called from the fact that it has such a nature that three dimensions can be designated in it; for the very three designated dimensions themselves are the “body” which is in the genus of quantity.

Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talem formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter significationem corporis sic dicti.

It happens, moreover, in things, that what has one perfection also reaches to a further perfection, as is clear in man, who has both a sensitive nature and, further, an intellective one. Likewise, even over and above this perfection, which is to have such a form that in it three dimensions can be designated, another perfection can be adjoined, such as life or something of this sort. Therefore this name body can signify a certain thing which has such a form, from which there follows in it the designability of three dimensions, with precision—namely, that from that form no ulterior perfection follows; but if anything else is superadded, it is beyond the signification of body so called.

Et hoc modo corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis, quia sic anima erit praeter id quod significatum est nomine corporis et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur animal. Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur.

And in this way body will be an integral and material part of the animal, because thus the soul will be besides what is signified by the name “body” and will be supervening upon the body itself, so that from these two, namely soul and body, as from parts, the animal will be constituted. This name body can also be taken in such a way as to signify a certain thing that has such a form, from which three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever that form may be, whether from it some further perfection can arise or not. And in this way body will be the genus of animal, because in the animal there is nothing to be taken that is not implicitly contained in body.

Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius. Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem.

For the soul is not another form than that by which, in that thing, three dimensions could be designated; and therefore, when it was said that a body is that which has such a form, from which three dimensions can be designated in it, what was understood was: whatever the form might be, whether animality or lapideity or whatever other. And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, inasmuch as body is its genus. And such is also the habitude of animal to man.

Si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam, quae habet talem perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens cum praecisione alterius perfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad animal per modum partis et non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod significat rem quandam, ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sit anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et rationalis simul. Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie, non enim significat tantum materiam; similiter etiam differentia significat totum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum, et etiam species. Sed tamen diversimode, quia genus significat totum ut quaedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine determinatione propriae formae.

For if “animal” were to name only a certain thing which has such a perfection that it can sense and be moved by a principle existing in it, with the precision (exclusion) of any other perfection, then whatever other ulterior perfection should supervene would relate to the animal by the mode of a part and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and thus “animal” would not be a genus. But it is a genus insofar as it signifies a certain thing, from whose form sense and motion can arise, whatever that form may be, whether it be a sensitive soul only or sensitive and rational together. Thus, therefore, genus signifies indeterminately the whole of what is in the species, for it does not signify only the matter; similarly the differentia also signifies the whole and does not signify only the form; and the definition also signifies the whole, and the species as well. Yet, nevertheless, in different ways, because genus signifies the whole as a certain denomination determining that which is material in the thing without the determination of the proper form.

Unde genus sumitur ex materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; quae quidem perfectio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem. Differentia vero e converso est sicut quaedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta praeter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. Unde dicit Avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum.

Whence genus is taken from matter, although it is not matter, as is evident in that a body is so called from the fact that it has such a perfection that three dimensions can be designated in it; which perfection indeed stands materially in relation to a further perfection. Difference, on the contrary, is like a certain denomination taken from form determinately, apart from the requirement that determinate matter be of its first intellection, as is clear when one says “ensouled,” namely, that which has a soul; for it is not determined what it is, whether a body or something else. Whence Avicenna says that genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as a being outside the essence, just as also the subject belongs to the intellection of passions.

Et ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit Philosophus in III Metaphysicae et in IV Topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de passione. Sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, quam designat nomen generis, et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentiae. Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum.

And therefore the genus also is not predicated of the differentia, speaking per se, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 3 and in Topics 4, unless perhaps as a subject is predicated of a passion. But the definition or the species comprehends both, namely the determinate matter, which the name of the genus designates, and the determinate form, which the name of the differentia designates. From this the reason is clear why genus, species, and differentia stand proportionally to matter, form, and the composite in nature, although they are not the same as those: for neither is the genus matter, but taken from matter as signifying the whole; nor is the differentia form, but taken from form as signifying the whole.

Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale et non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex anima enim et corpore dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam res tertia constituta, quae neutra illarum est. Homo enim neque est anima neque corpus.

Hence we say that man is a rational animal, and not from animal and rational, as we say that he is from soul and body. For from soul and body man is said to be, as from two things a certain third thing constituted, which is neither of them. For man is neither soul nor body.

Sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialis formae, exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis. Intellectus autem huius differentiae rationalis consistit in determinatione formae specialis.

But if man is said in some way to be from animal and rational, it will not be as a third thing from two things, but as a third intellect from two intellects. For the intellect of “animal” is without the determination of the specific form, expressing the nature of the thing from that which is material with respect to the ultimate perfection. But the intellect of this difference “rational” consists in the determination of the specific form.

Ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit praedicationem earum rerum, ex quibus constituitur, ita nec intellectus recipit praedicationem eorum intellectuum, ex quibus constituitur. Non enim dicimus quod diffinitio sit genus aut differentia.

From these two intellects is constituted the intellect of the species or of the definition. And therefore, just as a thing constituted from certain things does not receive the predication of the things from which it is constituted, so neither does an intellect receive the predication of those intellects from which it is constituted. For we do not say that a definition is a genus or a difference.

Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet ut diversarum specierum, quarum est idem genus, sit una essentia, quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit, non autem ita, quod illud quod significatur per genus sit una natura numero in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia, quae sit differentia determinans ipsum, sicut forma determinat materiam, quae est una numero, sed quia genus significat aliquam formam, non tamen determinate hanc vel illam, quam determinate differentia exprimit, quae non est alia quam illa, quae indeterminate significabatur per genus. Et ideo dicit Commentator in XI Metaphysicae quod materia prima dicitur una per remotionem omnium formarum, sed genus dicitur unum per communitatem formae significatae. Unde patet quod per additionem differentiae remota illa indeterminatione, quae erat causa unitatis generis, remanent species per essentiam diversae.

Although indeed the genus signifies the whole essence of the species, nevertheless it does not follow that of diverse species whose genus is the same there is one essence; for the unity of the genus proceeds from indetermination or indifference itself—not in such a way that that which is signified by the genus is one nature in number in diverse species, upon which there would supervene some other thing that is the differentia determining it, as form determines matter, which is one in number—but rather because the genus signifies some form, yet not determinately this one or that one, which the differentia expresses determinately, and which is not other than that which was signified indeterminately by the genus. And therefore the Commentator says in Metaphysics 11 that prime matter is said to be one by the removal of all forms, but the genus is said to be one by the community of the signified form. Whence it is evident that, by the addition of the differentia, with that indetermination removed which was the cause of the unity of the genus, the species remain diverse by essence.

Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura generis respectu speciei, inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, prout praedicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id quod est species, secundum quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte. Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur nomine hominis, unde homo de Socrate praedicatur. Si autem significetur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, quae est principium individuationis, sic se habebit per modum partis.

And because, as has been said, the nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the individual just as the nature of the genus is with respect to the species, hence it is that, just as that which is the genus, insofar as it was predicated of the species, implied in its signification, although indistinctly, the whole that is determinate in the species, so also that which is the species, insofar as it is predicated of the individual, must signify the whole of that which is essentially in the individual, albeit indistinctly. And in this way the essence of the species is signified by the name “man,” whence “man” is predicated of Socrates. But if the nature of the species is signified with the precise exclusion of designated matter, which is the principle of individuation, then it will comport itself in the mode of a part.

Et hoc modo significatur nomine humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id unde homo est homo. Materia autem designata non est id unde homo est homo; et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat tantum ea, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a significatione eius excluditur vel praeciditur materia designata.

And in this way it is signified by the name “humanity”; for “humanity” signifies that whereby man is man. But designated matter is not that whereby man is man; and thus in no way is it contained among those things from which man has that he is man. Since therefore humanity, in its intellection, includes only those things from which man has that he is man, it is clear that designated matter is excluded or cut off from its signification.

Et quia pars non praedicatur de toto, inde est quod humanitas nec de homine nec de Socrate praedicatur. Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas compositi non est ipsum compositum, cuius est quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiditas sit composita, sicut humanitas, licet sit composita, non est homo, immo oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod est materia designata. Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio speciei respectu generis est per formam, designatio autem individui respectu speciei est per materiam, ideo oportet ut nomen significans id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum praecisione formae determinatae perficientis speciem significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis.

And because a part is not predicated of the whole, from this it follows that humanity is not predicated either of man or of Socrates. Whence Avicenna says that the quiddity of the composite is not the composite itself, whose quiddity it is, although the quiddity itself is composite; just as humanity, although it is composite, is not man; rather, it must be received in something which is designated matter. But because, as has been said, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through form, whereas the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter, therefore it must be that a name signifying that whence the nature of the genus is taken, with the exclusion (precision) of the determinate form perfecting the species, signifies the material part of the whole, just as body is the material part of man.

Nomen autem significans id, unde sumitur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari. Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designationem materiae, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis.

But a name signifying that whence the nature of the species is taken, with the precision (cutting-off) of designated matter, signifies the formal part. And therefore humanity is signified as a certain form, and it is said to be the form of the whole, not indeed as though superadded to the essential parts, namely to form and matter, as the form of a house is superadded to its integral parts, but rather it is a form which is the whole, namely encompassing both form and matter, yet with the precision of those things by which matter is by nature apt to be designated. Thus, then, it is clear that the essence of man is signified by this name man and by this name humanity, but in different ways, as has been said, because this name man signifies it as a whole, inasmuch as it does not cut off the designation of matter, but implicitly contains it and indistinctly, just as it has been said that the genus contains the difference; and therefore this name man is predicated of individuals.

Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et praecidit omnem designationem. Unde de individuis hominis non praedicatur. Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est Socrates.

But this name “humanity” signifies it as a part, because it contains in its signification only that which is of man insofar as he is man, and it cuts off every designation. Whence it is not predicated of the individuals of man. And on account of this, too, the name of essence is sometimes found predicated in the thing; for we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and sometimes it is denied, just as we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.

[IV]. Viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae in substantiis compositis videndum est quomodo se habeat ad rationem generis, speciei et differentiae. Quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei vel differentiae, praedicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, conveniat essentiae secundum quod per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis. Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia, sed differentiae principium; et eadem ratione humanitas non est species nec animalitas genus.

[4]. Having therefore seen what is signified by the name “essence” in composite substances, it must be seen how it stands with respect to the ratio of genus, species, and difference. Now because that to which the ratio of genus or of species or of difference is fitting is predicated of this designated singular, it is impossible that a universal ratio, namely of genus or of species, should belong to essence insofar as it is signified under the mode of a part, as by the name “humanity” or “animality.” And therefore Avicenna says that “rationality” is not a difference, but the principle of the difference; and by the same reasoning “humanity” is not a species nor “animality” a genus.

Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod est quaedam res exsistens extra singularia, ut Platonici ponebant, quia sic genus et species non praedicarentur de hoc individuo; non enim potest dici quod Socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatum est; nec iterum illud separatum proficeret in cognitionem huius singularis. Et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in individuo est. Natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius.

Similarly, it cannot be said that the notion of genus or of species befits the essence insofar as it is a certain thing existing outside singulars, as the Platonists posited; for thus genus and species would not be predicated of this individual: it cannot be said that Socrates is that which is separated from him; nor again would that separated thing advance to the cognition of this singular. And therefore it remains that the notion of genus or of species befits the essence insofar as it is signified by the mode of a whole, as by the name of man or of animal, inasmuch as it implicitly and indistinctly contains the whole of that which is in the individual. Now the nature or essence thus taken can be considered in a twofold way: in one way, according to its proper notion, and this is its absolute consideration.

Et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi. Unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. Verbi gratia, homini in eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt.

And in this way nothing is true of it except what befits it insofar as it is of this kind. Whence whatever of other things may be attributed to it, the attribution is false. For example, to man, in so far as he is man, there befits the rational and the animal and the other things that fall within his definition.

Album vero aut nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo. Unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere. Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate.

White, however, or black, or whatever of this kind, which is not of the rationale of humanity, does not belong to man in that he is man. Hence, if it be asked whether this nature, considered thus, can be said to be one or many, neither is to be granted, because both are outside the intellect of humanity and both can befall it. For if plurality were of its intellect, it could never be one, although nevertheless it is one insofar as it is in Socrates.

Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem Socratis et platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari. Alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo, et sic de ipsa aliquid praedicatur per accidens ratione eius, in quo est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus, quia Socrates est albus, quamvis hoc non conveniat homini in eo quod homo. Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia.

Similarly, if unity were of its notion, then it would be one and the same for Socrates and for Plato, nor could it be pluralized in many. In another way it is considered according to the being which it has in this one or in that one, and thus something is predicated of it per accidens by reason of that in which it is, as when it is said that man is white because Socrates is white, although this does not befit man insofar as he is man. This nature, however, has a twofold being: one in singulars and another in the soul, and according to each the said nature is followed by accidents.

Et in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, nunquam esset extra hoc singulare. Similiter etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari, nunquam esset in eo. Sed verum est dicere quod homo non in quantum est homo habet quod sit in hoc singulari vel in illo aut in anima.

And in singulars it also has a manifold being according to the diversity of the singulars, and yet to the nature itself, according to its first consideration, namely absolute, none of these beings is due. For it is false to say that the essence of man, insofar as such, has being in this singular; for if being in this singular befitted man insofar as he is man, he would never be outside this singular. Likewise also, if it befitted man insofar as he is man not to be in this singular, he would never be in it. But it is true to say that man, not insofar as he is man, has it that he is in this singular or in that one, or in the soul.

Ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum. Et haec natura sic considerata est quae praedicatur de individuis omnibus. Non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas.

Therefore it is clear that the nature of man, considered absolutely, abstracts from any being, yet in such a way that there is no excision of any of them. And this nature, considered thus, is what is predicated of all individuals. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the notion (ratio) of the universal belongs to the nature so taken, because unity and community are of the notion of the universal.

Naturae autem humanae neutrum horum convenit secundum suam absolutam considerationem. Si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitas inveniretur communitas. Et hoc falsum est, quia in Socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in eo est individuatum.

But to human nature, neither of these belongs according to its absolute consideration. For if community were of the intellect (concept) of man, then wherever humanity were found, community would be found. And this is false, because in Socrates no community at all is found, but whatever is in him is individuated.

similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem, ut sit unum quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio universalis exigit. Relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu. Ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus, et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua, quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines.

likewise also it cannot be said that the notion of genus or of species befalls human nature according to the being which it has in individuals, because in individuals human nature is not found according to unity, so that it be one something common to all, which the notion of the universal demands. It remains therefore that the notion of species befalls human nature according to that being which it has in the intellect. For human nature itself in the intellect has a being abstracted from all individuating factors, and therefore it has a uniform notion toward all individuals which are outside the soul, insofar as it is equally a likeness of all and leads into the cognition of all insofar as they are men.

Et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omnia individua intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. Unde dicit Commentator in principio de anima quod intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. Hoc etiam Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphysica.

And from this—that it has such a relation to all individuals—the intellect hits upon the notion of species and attributes it to that nature. Whence the Commentator says at the beginning of On the Soul that the intellect is that which makes universality in things. This Avicenna also says in his Metaphysics.

Et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extra animam, quia est una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo est quaedam species intellecta particularis. Et ideo patet defectus Commentatoris in III de anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formae intellectae unitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere, quia non est universalitas illius formae secundum hoc esse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum, sicut etiam, si esset una statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse singulare et proprium secundum quod esset in hac materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundum quod esset commune repraesentativum plurium. Et quia naturae humanae secundum suam absolutam considerationem convenit quod praedicetur de Socrate, et ratio speciei non convenit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem, sed est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non praedicatur de Socrate, ut dicatur: Socrates est species, quod de necessitate accideret, si ratio speciei conveniret homini secundum esse, quod habet in Socrate vel secundum suam considerationem absolutam, scilicet in quantum est homo.

And although this understood nature has the rationale of the universal insofar as it is compared to things outside the soul, because it is one likeness of all, nevertheless, insofar as it has being in this intellect or in that one, it is a certain understood particular species. And therefore the defect of the Commentator in On the Soul, 3, is evident, who wished, from the universality of the understood form, to conclude the unity of the intellect in all human beings; because the universality of that form is not according to that being which it has in the intellect, but according as it is referred to things as the likeness of things—just as also, if there were one bodily statue representing many men, it is clear that that image or species of the statue would have singular and proper being insofar as it were in this matter, but would have the rationale of commonality insofar as it were a common representative of many. And because it befits human nature, according to its absolute consideration, to be predicated of Socrates, and the rationale of species does not befit it according to its absolute consideration, but belongs among the accidentals which follow upon it according to the being which it has in the intellect, therefore the name “species” is not predicated of Socrates, so that one would say: Socrates is a species—which would of necessity ensue, if the rationale of species befitted man according to the being which it has in Socrates, or according to its absolute consideration, namely insofar as he is a man.

Quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum est homo praedicatur de Socrate. Et tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. Praedicatio enim est quiddam, quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatem eorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur.

For whatever befits man insofar as he is man is predicated of Socrates. And yet to be predicated per se befits the genus, since it is posited in its definition. For predication is a certain thing that is completed by the action of the intellect composing and dividing, having as its foundation in the thing itself the unity of those of which one is said of the other.

Unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis, quae est genus, quae similiter per actum intellectus completur. Nihilominus tamen id, cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit, componens illud cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud, cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal. Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei non est de his, quae conveniunt ei secundum suam absolutam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur ipsam secundum esse, quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo, sed est de accidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi ratio generis vel differentiae.

Whence the rationale of predicability can be enclosed within the rationale of this intention, which is genus, which likewise is completed by an act of the intellect. Nevertheless, that to which the intellect attributes the intention of predicability, composing it with another, is not the very intention of genus, but rather that to which the intellect attributes the intention of genus, such as what is signified by this name “animal.” Thus, therefore, it is clear how essence or nature stands to the rationale of species, because the rationale of species is not among those things that befit it according to its absolute consideration, nor is it among the accidents which follow it according to the being that it has outside the soul, as whiteness and blackness; but it is among the accidents which follow it according to the being that it has in the intellect, and in this mode the rationale of genus or of difference likewise befits it.

[V]. Nunc restat videre per quem modum sit essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, intelligentia et causa prima. Quamvis autem simplicitatem causae primae omnes concedant, tamen compositionem formae et materiae quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias et in animam, cuius positionis auctor videtur fuisse Avicebron, auctor libri Fontis Vitae. Hoc autem dictis philosophorum communiter repugnat, qui eas substantias a materia separatas nominant et absque omni materia esse probant.

[5]. Now it remains to see by what mode the essence is in separated substances, namely in the soul, intelligence, and the first cause. Although, moreover, all concede the simplicity of the first cause, nevertheless certain people strive to introduce a composition of form and matter into the intelligences and into the soul, of which position the author seems to have been Avicebron, the author of the book Fountain of Life. But this is commonly repugnant to the dicta of the philosophers, who name those substances as separated from matter and prove that they exist without any matter.

Cuius demonstratio potissima est ex virtute intelligendi, quae in eis est. Videmus enim formas non esse intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a materia et a condicionibus eius; nec efficiuntur intelligibiles in actu, nisi per virtutem substantiae intelligentis secundum quod recipiuntur in ea et secundum quod aguntur per eam. Unde oportet quod in qualibet substantia intelligente sit omnino immunitas a materia, ita quod neque habeat materiam partem sui neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia, ut est de formis materialibus.

Whose most potent demonstration is from the virtue of understanding which is in them. For we see that forms are not intelligible in act except insofar as they are separated from matter and from its conditions; nor are they made intelligible in act, except by the power of the intelligent substance, insofar as they are received in it and insofar as they are brought into act by it. Whence it is necessary that in every intelligent substance there be an altogether immunity from matter, such that it neither have matter as a part of itself nor be like a form impressed in matter, as is the case with material forms.

Nec potest aliquis dicere quod intelligibilitatem non impediat materia quaelibet, sed materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset ratione materiae corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur corporalis nisi secundum quod stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, scilicet impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali. Et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma corporalis actu intelligibilis est, sicut et aliae formae, secundum quod a materia abstrahitur.

Nor can anyone say that intelligibility is not impeded by just any matter, but only by corporeal matter. For if this were so by reason of corporeal matter alone, since matter is not called corporeal except insofar as it stands under a corporeal form, then it would follow that matter would have this—namely, to impede intelligibility—from the corporeal form. But this cannot be, because the corporeal form itself is actually intelligible, just as the other forms are, insofar as it is abstracted from matter.

Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus, sed est ibi compositio formae et esse. Unde in commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse, et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quiditate vel natura simplici. Et quomodo hoc sit planum est videre.

Whence in the soul or in the intelligence there is in no way a composition from matter and form, such that essence be taken in them in the same manner as in corporeal substances; rather, there is there a composition of form and being (esse). Whence, in the commentary on the 9th proposition of the Book of Causes, it is said that intelligence is one having form and being; and there “form” is taken for the very quiddity or simple nature. And how this is, is plain to see.

Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse alterius, illud quod habet rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma dat esse materiae. Et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma.

For whatever things are thus disposed toward one another that the one is the cause of the being of the other, that which has the rationale of a cause can have being without the other, but not conversely. Such, moreover, is found to be the habitude of matter and form, because form gives being to matter. And therefore it is impossible for matter to be without some form.

Tamen non est impossibile esse aliquam formam sine materia. Forma enim non habet in eo quod est forma dependentiam ad materiam, sed si inveniantur aliquae formae, quae non possunt esse nisi in materia, hoc accidit eis secundum quod sunt distantes a primo principio, quod est actus primus et purus. Unde illae formae, quae sunt propinquissimae primo principio, sunt formae per se sine materia subsistentes (non enim forma secundum totum genus suum materia indiget, ut dictum est) et huiusmodi formae sunt intelligentiae.

Nevertheless, it is not impossible for there to be some form without matter. For form, in that it is form, does not have dependence upon matter; but if certain forms are found which cannot be except in matter, this happens to them insofar as they are distant from the First Principle, which is first and pure act. Hence those forms which are nearest to the First Principle are forms subsisting per se without matter (for form, according to its whole genus, does not need matter, as has been said); and forms of this kind are intelligences.

Et ideo non oportet ut essentiae vel quiditates harum substantiarum sint aliud quam ipsa forma. In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae et substantiae simplicis quod essentia substantiae compositae non est tantum forma, sed complectitur formam et materiam, essentia autem substantiae simplicis est forma tantum. Et ex hoc causantur duae aliae differentiae: una est quod essentia substantiae compositae potest significari ut totum vel ut pars, quod accidit propter materiae designationem, ut dictum est.

And therefore it is not necessary that the essences or quiddities of these substances be anything other than the form itself. Thus, then, the essence of a composite substance and of a simple substance differs in this: that the essence of a composite substance is not only form, but encompasses form and matter, whereas the essence of a simple substance is form only. And from this two other differences are caused: one is that the essence of a composite substance can be signified as a whole or as a part, which happens on account of the designation of matter, as has been said.

Et ideo non quolibet modo praedicatur essentia rei compositae de ipsa re composita; non enim potest dici quod homo sit quiditas sua. Sed essentia rei simplicis, quae est sua forma, non potest significari nisi ut totum, cum nihil sit ibi praeter formam quasi formam recipiens; et ideo quocumque modo sumatur essentia substantiae simplicis de ea praedicatur. Unde Avicenna dicit quod quiditas simplicis est ipsummet simplex, quia non est aliquid aliud recipiens ipsam.

And therefore the essence of a composite thing is not predicated of the composite thing in just any manner; for it cannot be said that man is his quiddity. But the essence of a simple thing, which is its form, cannot be signified except as a whole, since there is nothing there besides form, as if there were something receiving form; and therefore in whatever way the essence of a simple substance be taken, it is predicated of it. Whence Avicenna says that the quiddity of the simple is the very simple itself, because there is not some other thing receiving it.

Secunda differentia est quod essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod recipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numero. Sed cum essentia simplicis non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse talis multiplicatio; et ideo oportet ut non inveniantur in illis substantiis plura individua eiusdem speciei, sed quot sunt ibi individua, tot sunt ibi species, ut Avicenna expresse dicit. Huiusmodi ergo substantiae quamvis sint formae tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentiae.

The second difference is that the essences of composite things, from the fact that they are received in designated matter, are multiplied according to its division; whence it happens that some are the same in species and different in number. But since the essence of a simple thing is not received in matter, such a multiplication cannot be there; and therefore it must be that in those substances there are not found several individuals of the same species, but as many individuals as there are there, so many species are there, as Avicenna expressly says. Therefore substances of this sort, although they are forms only without matter, nevertheless in them there is not an all-around simplicity nor are they pure act, but they have a commixture of potency.

Et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quiditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quiditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura.

And this is thus evident. For whatever is not of the intellection of the essence or quiddity is something supervening from outside and making a composition with the essence, because no essence can be understood without those things which are parts of the essence. But every essence or quiddity can be understood without this, that anything be understood of its being; for I can understand what a man or a phoenix is and yet be ignorant whether it has existence in the nature of things.

Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse; et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima, quia impossibile est, ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentiae, sicut multiplicatur natura generis in species, vel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diversis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in diversis individuis, vel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam calor separatus, esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione. si autem ponatur aliqua res, quae sit esse tantum, ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentiae, quia iam non esset esse tantum, sed esse et praeter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem materiae, quia iam esset esse non subsistens sed materiale. Unde relinquitur quod talis res, quae sit suum esse, non potest esse nisi una.

Therefore it is clear that being (esse) is other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there be some thing whose quiddity is its very being; and this thing cannot be anything but one and first, because it is impossible that a plurification of anything occur except by the addition of some difference, as the nature of a genus is multiplied into species, or by the fact that form is received in diverse matters, as the nature of a species is multiplied in diverse individuals, or by the fact that one is absolute and another received in something, just as, if there were a certain separated heat, it would be other than non-separated heat by its very separation. But if there be posited some thing which is being only, such that being itself is subsistent, this being will not receive the addition of a difference, because then it would no longer be being only, but being and, besides this, some form; and much less would it receive the addition of matter, because then it would be being not-subsistent but material. Whence it remains that such a thing, which is its own being, cannot be anything but one.

Unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re praeter eam aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas vel natura seu forma sua. Unde oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam; et ideo dictum est quod intelligentia est forma et esse. Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex principiis naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine, vel advenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis.

Whence it is necessary that in any other thing besides it, its being be one thing and its quiddity or nature or its form be another. Whence it is necessary that in intelligences there be being in addition to form; and therefore it has been said that an intelligence is form and being. Now everything that befits something is either caused from the principles of its nature, as the risible in man, or it comes from some extrinsic principle, as light in the air from the influence of the sun.

Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quiditate rei (dico sicut a causa efficiente) quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne, quod est per aliud, reducitur ad illud quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res, quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus, eo quod ipsa est esse tantum.

But it cannot be that being itself is caused by the very form or quidditas of the thing (I say as by an efficient cause), because thus some thing would be the cause of itself, and some thing would produce itself into being—which is impossible. Therefore it is necessary that every such thing, whose being is other than its nature, should have its being from another. And because everything that is through another is reduced to that which is through itself as to a first cause, it is necessary that there be some thing which is the cause of being to all things, for the reason that it is being only.

Alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res, quae non est esse tantum, habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse et quod esse habet a primo ente, quod est esse tantum. Et hoc est causa prima, quae deus est.

Otherwise there would be a going into the infinite in causes, since every thing which is not being only has a cause of its being, as has been said. It is clear, therefore, that intelligence is form and being, and that it has being from the first being, which is being only. And this is the first cause, which is God.

Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc quod receptum est in eo est actus eius. Oportet ergo quod ipsa quiditas vel forma, quae est intelligentia, sit in potentia respectu esse, quod a deo recipit; et illud esse receptum est per modum actus. Et ita invenitur potentia et actus in intelligentiis, non tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce.

Now every thing that receives something from another is in potency with respect to that, and that which has been received in it is its act. Therefore it is necessary that the very quiddity or form, which is an intelligence, be in potency with respect to being (esse), which it receives from God; and that received being is in the mode of act. And thus potency and act are found in intelligences, yet not form and matter except equivocally.

Unde etiam pati, recipere, subiectum esse et omnia huiusmodi, quae videntur rebus ratione materiae convenire, aequivoce conveniunt substantiis intellectualibus et corporalibus, ut in III de anima Commentator dicit. Et quia, ut dictum est, intelligentiae quiditas est ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quiditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa, et esse suum receptum a deo est id, quo subsistit in rerum natura. Et propter hoc a quibusdam dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae componi ex quo est et quod est vel ex quod est et esse, ut Boethius dicit.

Whence also to suffer, to receive, to be a subject, and all things of this sort, which seem to befit things by reason of matter, befit intellectual and bodily substances equivocally, as the Commentator says in 3 On the Soul. And because, as has been said, the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself, therefore its quiddity or essence is the very what-it-is itself, and its esse received from God is that by which it subsists in the nature of things. And on account of this, such substances are said by some to be composed of that-by-which it is and that-which it is, or of that-which it is and esse, as Boethius says.

Et quia in intelligentiis ponitur potentia et actus, non erit difficile invenire multitudinem intelligentiarum; quod esset impossibile, si nulla potentia in eis esset. Unde Commentator dicit in III de anima quod, si natura intellectus possibilis esset ignorata, non possemus invenire multitudinem in substantiis separatis. Est ergo distinctio earum ad invicem secundum gradum potentiae et actus, ita quod intelligentia superior, quae magis propinqua est primo, habet plus de actu et minus de potentia, et sic de aliis.

And because in intelligences potency and act are posited, it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences; which would be impossible if no potency were in them. Whence the Commentator says in On the Soul 3 that, if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown, we could not find multitude in separated substances. Therefore their distinction from one another is according to the grade of potency and act, such that the higher intelligence, which is nearer to the First, has more of act and less of potency, and so with the others.

Et hoc completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus. Unde intellectus possibilis eius se habet ad formas intelligibiles sicut materia prima, quae tenet ultimum gradum in esse sensibili, ad formas sensibiles, ut Commentator in III de anima dicit. Et ideo Philosophus comparat eam tabulae, in qua nihil est scriptum.

And this is completed in the human soul, which holds the last grade among intellectual substances. Hence its possible intellect stands to intelligible forms as prime matter, which holds the last grade in sensible being, stands to sensible forms, as the Commentator says in 3 On the Soul. And therefore the Philosopher compares it to a tablet on which nothing is written.

Et propter hoc quod inter alias substantias intellectuales plus habet de potentia, ideo efficitur in tantum propinqua rebus materialibus, ut res materialis trahatur ad participandum esse suum, ita scilicet quod ex anima et corpore resultat unum esse in uno composito, quamvis illud esse, prout est animae, non sit dependens a corpore. Et ideo post istam formam, quae est anima, inveniuntur aliae formae plus de potentia habentes et magis propinquae materiae in tantum quod esse earum sine materia non est. In quibus etiam invenitur ordo et gradus usque ad primas formas elementorum, quae sunt propinquissimae materiae.

And because among the other intellectual substances it has more of potency, therefore it becomes so near to material things that the material thing is drawn to participate in its being—namely, such that from soul and body there results one being in one composite—although that being, insofar as it is the soul’s, is not dependent on the body. And therefore after this form, which is the soul, there are found other forms having more of potency and more near to matter, to such an extent that their being is not without matter. In these, too, there is found an order and a grade up to the first forms of the elements, which are nearest to matter.

Unde nec aliquam operationem habent nisi secundum exigentiam qualitatum activarum et passivarum et aliarum, quibus materia ad formam disponitur.

Whence neither do they have any operation except according to the exigency of active and passive qualities, and of the others, by which matter is disposed toward form.

[VI]. His igitur visis patet quomodo essentia in diversis invenitur. Invenitur enim triplex modus habendi essentiam in substantiis. Aliquid enim est, sicut deus, cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius.

[6]. Therefore, with these things seen, it is evident how essence is found in diverse things. A threefold mode of having essence is found in substances. For there is something, like God, whose essence is his very own being; and therefore some philosophers are found saying that God does not have quiddity or essence, because his essence is not other than his being.

Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis, quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis. Nec oportet, si dicimus quod deus est esse tantum, ut in illorum errorem incidamus, qui deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale, quo quaelibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse, quod deus est, huius condicionis est, ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit; unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse.

And from this it follows that he himself is not in a genus, because everything that is in a genus must have a quidditas besides its being, since the quidditas or nature of a genus or species is not distinguished according to the account of the nature in those of which it is the genus or species, but being is diverse in diverse things. Nor is it necessary, if we say that god is being only, that we fall into the error of those who said that god is that universal being by which any thing is formally. For this being which god is is of this condition, that no addition can be made to it; whence, by its very purity, it is being distinct from all other being.

Propter quod in commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod individuatio primae causae, quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse autem commune sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo praecisionem additionis; quia si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse, in quo super esse aliquid adderetur. Similiter etiam, quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates, immo habet omnes perfectiones, quae sunt in omnibus generibus.

For which reason, in the commentary on Proposition 9 of the Book of Causes it is said that the individuation of the First Cause, which is being only, is through its pure goodness. But common being, just as in its intellection it does not include any addition, so neither does it include in its intellection the praecision (cutting-off) of addition; because if this were so, nothing could be understood to be, in which something would be added over being. Likewise also, although it is being only, it does not follow that the remaining perfections and nobilities are lacking to it; rather, it has all the perfections that are in all genera.

Propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut Philosophus et Commentator in V Metaphysicae dicunt. Sed habet eas modo excellentiori omnibus rebus, quia in eo unum sunt, sed in aliis diversitatem habent. Et hoc est, quia omnes illae perfectiones conveniunt sibi secundum esse suum simplex; sicut si aliquis per unam qualitatem posset efficere operationes omnium qualitatum, in illa una qualitate omnes qualitates haberet, ita deus in ipso esse suo omnes perfectiones habet.

For which reason it is called perfect simply, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say in Metaphysics 5. But he has them in a more excellent mode than all things, because in him they are one, whereas in others they have diversity. And this is because all those perfections agree to him according to his simple being; just as if someone by one quality could effect the operations of all the qualities, in that one quality he would have all the qualities, so God in his very being has all perfections.

Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia. Unde esse earum non est absolutum, sed receptum et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis, sed natura vel quiditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia. Et ideo dicitur in libro de causis quod intelligentiae sunt infinitae inferius et finitae superius.

In the second mode, essence is found in created intellectual substances, in which their being is other than their essence, although the essence is without matter. Whence their being is not absolute, but received, and therefore limited and finite according to the capacity of the receiving nature, but their nature or quiddity is absolute, not received in any matter. And therefore it is said in the Book of Causes that the intelligences are infinite below and finite above.

Sunt enim finitae quantum ad esse suum, quod a superiori recipiunt, non tamen finiuntur inferius, quia earum formae non limitantur ad capacitatem alicuius materiae recipientis eas. Et ideo in talibus substantiis non invenitur multitudo individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima humana propter corpus, cui unitur. Et licet individuatio eius ex corpore occasionaliter dependeat quantum ad sui inchoationem, quia non acquiritur sibi esse individuatum nisi in corpore, cuius est actus, non tamen oportet ut subtracto corpore individuatio pereat, quia cum habeat esse absolutum, ex quo acquisitum est sibi esse individuatum ex hoc quod facta est forma huius corporis, illud esse semper remanet individuatum.

For they are finite with respect to their being, which they receive from what is superior; yet they are not bounded below, because their forms are not limited by the capacity of any matter receiving them. And therefore in such substances a multitude of individuals in one species is not found, as was said, except in the human soul on account of the body to which it is united. And although its individuation depends on the body occasionally with respect to its inchoation, since an individuated being is not acquired for it except in the body, of which it is the act, nevertheless it is not necessary that, with the body subtracted, individuation perish; for, since it has an absolute being, from the fact that an individuated being was acquired for it when it became the form of this body, that being always remains individuated.

Et ideo dicit Avicenna quod individuatio animarum vel multiplicatio dependet ex corpore quantum ad sui principium, sed non quantum ad sui finem. Et quia in istis substantiis quiditas non est idem quod esse, ideo sunt ordinabiles in praedicamento, et propter hoc invenitur in eis genus et species et differentia, quamvis earum differentiae propriae nobis occultae sint. In rebus enim sensibilibus etiam ipsae differentiae essentiales ignotae sunt, unde significantur per differentias accidentales, quae ex essentialibus oriuntur, sicut causa significatur per suum effectum, sicut bipes ponitur differentia hominis.

And therefore Avicenna says that the individuation of souls, or their multiplication, depends on the body with respect to their principle, but not with respect to their end. And because in these substances quiddity is not the same as being (esse), therefore they are orderable in a predicament, and on this account genus and species and differentia are found in them, although their proper differences are hidden from us. For even in sensible things the essential differences themselves are unknown; hence they are signified by accidental differences, which arise from the essential ones, just as a cause is signified by its effect, as two-footed is posited as the differentia of man.

Accidentia autem propria substantiarum immaterialium nobis ignota sunt; unde differentiae earum nec per se nec per accidentales differentias a nobis significari possunt. Hoc tamen sciendum est quod non eodem modo sumitur genus et differentia in illis substantiis et in substantiis sensibilibus, quia in sensibilibus genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale in ipsa. Unde dicit Avicenna in principio libri sui de anima quod forma in rebus compositis ex materia et forma est differentia simplex eius, quod constituitur ex illa, non autem ita quod ipsa forma sit differentia, sed quia est principium differentiae, ut idem dicit in sua Metaphysica.

Now the accidents proper to immaterial substances are unknown to us; hence their differences can be signified by us neither per se nor through accidental differences. This, however, must be known: that genus and difference are not taken in the same way in those substances as in sensible substances, because in sensible things the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing, but the difference from that which is formal in it. Whence Avicenna says at the beginning of his book On the Soul that the form, in things composite of matter and form, is the simple difference of that which is constituted from it—not, however, as though the form itself were the difference, but because it is the principle of the difference, as the same man says in his Metaphysics.

Et dicitur talis differentia esse differentia simplex, quia sumitur ab eo quod est pars quiditatis rei, scilicet a forma. Cum autem substantiae immateriales sint simplices quiditates, non potest in eis differentia sumi ab eo quod est pars quiditatis, sed a tota quiditate; et ideo in principio de anima dicit Avicenna quod differentiam simplicem non habent nisi species, quarum essentiae sunt compositae ex materia et forma. Similiter etiam in eis ex tota essentia sumitur genus, modo tamen differenti.

And such a difference is said to be a simple difference, because it is taken from that which is a part of the quiddity of the thing, namely from the form. But since immaterial substances are simple quiddities, in them a difference cannot be taken from that which is a part of the quiddity, but from the whole quiddity; and therefore, at the beginning of On the soul, Avicenna says that only species, whose essences are composed of matter and form, have a simple difference. Likewise, in their case the genus, too, is taken from the whole essence, yet in a different mode.

Una enim substantia separata convenit cum alia in immaterialitate et differunt ab invicem in gradu perfectionis secundum recessum a potentialitate et accessum ad actum purum. Et ideo ab eo quod consequitur illas in quantum sunt immateriales sumitur in eis genus, sicut est intellectualitas vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ab eo autem quod consequitur in eis gradum perfectionis sumitur in eis differentia, nobis tamen ignota.

For one separated substance agrees with another in immateriality, and they differ from one another in degree of perfection, according to the recession from potentiality and the access to pure act. And therefore, from that which follows upon them insofar as they are immaterial, the genus is taken in them—such as intellectuality or something of this sort. But from that which follows upon the degree of perfection in them, the differentia is taken—yet this is unknown to us.

Nec oportet has differentias esse accidentales, quia sunt secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem, quae non diversificant speciem. Gradus enim perfectionis in recipiendo eandem formam non diversificat speciem, sicut albius et minus album in participando eiusdem rationis albedinem. Sed diversus gradus perfectionis in ipsis formis vel naturis participatis speciem diversificat, sicut natura procedit per gradus de plantis ad animalia per quaedam, quae sunt media inter animalia et plantas, secundum Philosophum in VII de animalibus.

Nor ought these differences to be accidental, because they are according to greater and lesser perfection, which do not diversify the species. For a degree of perfection in receiving the same form does not diversify the species, just as the whiter and the less white, in partaking the whiteness of the same ratio, do not. But a different degree of perfection in the very forms or natures participated diversifies the species, just as nature proceeds by degrees from plants to animals through certain things which are middle between animals and plants, according to the Philosopher in Book 7 of On Animals.

Nec iterum est necessarium, ut divisio intellectualium substantiarum sit semper per duas differentias veras, quia hoc est impossibile in omnibus rebus accidere, ut Philosophus dicit in XI de animalibus. Tertio modo invenitur essentia in substantiis compositis ex materia et forma, in quibus et esse est receptum et finitum, propter hoc quod ab alio esse habent, et iterum natura vel quiditas earum est recepta in materia signata. Et ideo sunt finitae et superius et inferius, et in eis iam propter divisionem materiae signatae possibilis est multiplicatio individuorum in una specie.

Nor again is it necessary that the division of intellectual substances be always by two true differences, because this is impossible to occur in all things, as the Philosopher says in book 11 of On Animals. In a third way essence is found in substances composed out of matter and form, in which both being is received and is finite, because they have being from another; and again their nature or quiddity is received in designated matter. And therefore they are finite both above and below, and in them now, on account of the division of designated matter, the multiplication of individuals within one species is possible.

Et in his qualiter se habet essentia ad intentiones logicas, supra dictum est.

And in these, how essence is related to logical intentions has been said above.

[VII]. Nunc restat videre quomodo sit essentia in accidentibus. Qualiter enim sit in omnibus substantiis, dictum est. Et quia, ut dictum est, essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur, oportet ut eo modo habeant essentiam quo habent diffinitionem.

[7]. Now it remains to see how essence is in accidents. For how it is in all substances has been said. And because, as has been said, essence is that which is signified through the definition, it is necessary that they have essence in the way in which they have a definition.

Diffinitionem autem habent incompletam, quia non possunt diffiniri, nisi ponatur subiectum in eorum diffinitione. Et hoc ideo est, quia non habent per se esse, absolutum a subiecto, sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale, quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale, quando accidens subiecto advenit. Et ideo etiam nec forma substantialis completam essentiam habet nec materia, quia etiam in diffinitione formae substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud, cuius est forma; et ita diffinitio eius est per additionem alicuius, quod est extra genus eius, sicut et diffinitio formae accidentalis.

However, they have an incomplete definition, because they cannot be defined unless the subject is posited in their definition. And this is for the reason that they do not have per se being, absolute from the subject, but just as from form and matter there is left/resultant substantial being when they are composed, so from the accident and the subject there is left/resultant accidental being when the accident comes to the subject. And therefore neither the substantial form nor matter has a complete essence, because even in the definition of the substantial form it is necessary that that be posited of which it is the form; and thus its definition is by the addition of something that is outside its genus, just as is the definition of the accidental form.

Unde et in diffinitione animae ponitur corpus a naturali, qui considerat animam solum in quantum est forma physici corporis. Sed tamen inter formas substantiales et accidentales tantum interest, quia sicut forma substantialis non habet per se esse absolutum sine eo cui advenit, ita nec illud cui advenit, scilicet materia. Et ideo ex coniunctione utriusque relinquitur illud esse, in quo res per se subsistit, et ex eis efficitur unum per se; propter quod ex coniunctione eorum relinquitur essentia quaedam.

Whence also in the definition of the soul the body is set down by the natural philosopher, who considers the soul only insofar as it is the form of a physical body. Yet there is so great a difference between substantial and accidental forms, because just as a substantial form does not have per se being, absolute, without that to which it comes, so neither does that to which it comes, namely matter. And therefore from the conjunction of both there results that being in which the thing subsists per se, and from them there is made one per se; on account of which from their conjunction there results a certain essence.

Unde forma, quamvis in se considerata non habeat completam rationem essentiae, tamen est pars essentiae completae. Sed illud, cui advenit accidens, est ens in se completum, subsistens in suo esse. Quod quidem esse naturaliter praecedit accidens quod supervenit.

Whence the form, although considered in itself it does not have the complete notion of essence, yet is a part of a complete essence. But that to which an accident comes is a being complete in itself, subsisting in its being. And this being by nature precedes the accident that supervenes.

Et ideo accidens superveniens ex coniunctione sui cum eo cui advenit non causat illud esse, in quo res subsistit, per quod res est ens per se, sed causat quoddam esse secundum, sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse, sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo. Unde ex accidente et subiecto non efficitur unum per se, sed unum per accidens. Et ideo ex eorum coniunctione non resultat essentia quaedam, sicut ex coniunctione formae ad materiam.

And therefore an accident, supervening from its conjunction with that to which it comes, does not cause that being in which the thing subsists, by which the thing is an ens per se, but it causes a certain second being, without which the subsisting thing can be understood to be, just as the first can be understood without the second. Whence from an accident and a subject there is not made a one per se, but a one per accidens. And therefore from their conjunction there does not result a certain essence, as from the conjunction of form to matter.

Propter quod accidens neque rationem completae essentiae habet neque pars essentiae completae est, sed sicut est ens secundum quid, ita et essentiam secundum quid habet. Sed quia illud, quod dicitur maxime et verissime in quolibet genere, est causa eorum quae sunt post in illo genere, sicut ignis qui est in fine caliditatis est causa caloris in rebus calidis, ut in II Metaphysicae dicitur, ideo substantia quae est primum in genere entis, verissime et maxime essentiam habens, oportet quod sit causa accidentium, quae secundario et quasi secundum quid rationem entis participant. Quod tamen diversimode contingit.

On account of which an accident neither has the notion of a complete essence nor is a part of a complete essence, but just as it is a being according to a certain respect, so too it has an essence according to a certain respect. But because that which is said most and most truly in any genus is the cause of those things which come after in that genus—just as fire, which is at the end of calidity, is the cause of heat in hot things, as is said in Metaphysics 2—therefore substance, which is first in the genus of being, most truly and most of all having essence, must be the cause of accidents, which share in the notion of being secondarily and, as it were, according to a certain respect. This, however, happens in diverse ways.

Quia enim partes substantiae sunt materia et forma, ideo quaedam accidentia principaliter consequuntur formam et quaedam materiam. Forma autem invenitur aliqua, cuius esse non dependet ad materiam, ut anima intellectualis; materia vero non habet esse nisi per formam. Unde in accidentibus, quae consequuntur formam, est aliquid, quod non habet communicationem cum materia, sicut est intelligere, quod non est per organum corporale, sicut probat Philosophus in III de anima.

Because the parts of substance are matter and form, therefore certain accidents principally follow upon the form and certain others upon matter. Now there is found some form whose being does not depend upon matter, as the intellectual soul; whereas matter does not have being except through form. Hence, among the accidents that follow the form there is something that has no communication with matter, such as understanding, which is not through a bodily organ, as the Philosopher proves in On the Soul 3.

Aliqua vero ex consequentibus formam sunt, quae habent communicationem cum materia, sicut sentire. Sed nullum accidens consequitur materiam sine communicatione formae. in his tamen accidentibus, quae materiam consequuntur, invenitur quaedam diversitas.

Some indeed of the things consequent upon form are such as have communication with matter, as sensing. But no accident follows upon matter without a communication of form. in these accidents, however, which follow upon matter, a certain diversity is found.

Quaedam enim accidentia consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet ad formam specialem, sicut masculinum et femininum in animalibus, quorum diversitas ad materiam reducitur, ut dicitur in X Metaphysicae. Unde remota forma animalis dicta accidentia non remanent nisi aequivoce. Quaedam vero consequuntur materiam secundum ordinem, quem habet ad formam generalem, et ideo remota forma speciali adhuc in ea remanent, sicut nigredo cutis est in aethiope ex mixtione elementorum et non ex ratione animae, et ideo post mortem in eis remanet.

For certain accidents follow matter according to the order which it has to the special form, as masculine and feminine in animals, whose diversity is reduced to matter, as is said in Metaphysics 10. Hence, with the animal form removed, the said accidents do not remain except equivocally. Certain others, however, follow matter according to the order which it has to the general form, and therefore, with the special form removed, they still remain in it, as the blackness of the skin is in the Ethiopian from a mixture of the elements and not from the rationale of the soul, and therefore after death it remains in them.

Et quia unaquaeque res individuatur ex materia et collocatur in genere vel specie per suam formam, ideo accidentia, quae consequuntur materiam, sunt accidentia individui, secundum quae etiam individua eiusdem speciei ad invicem differunt, accidentia vero, quae consequuntur formam, sunt propriae passiones vel generis vel speciei; unde inveniuntur in omnibus participantibus naturam generis vel speciei, sicut risibile consequitur in homine formam, quia risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione animae hominis. Sciendum etiam est quod accidentia aliquando ex principiis essentialibus causantur secundum actum perfectum, sicut calor in igne, qui semper est actu calidus; aliquando vero secundum aptitudinem tantum, sed complementum accidit ex agente exteriori, sicut diaphaneitas in aere, quae completur per corpus lucidum exterius. Et in talibus aptitudo est accidens inseparabile, sed complementum, quod advenit ex aliquo principio, quod est extra essentiam rei vel quod non intrat constitutionem rei, est separabile, sicut moveri et huiusmodi.

And because each thing is individuated by matter and placed in a genus or species by its form, therefore the accidents that follow matter are accidents of the individual, according to which also individuals of the same species differ from one another; but the accidents that follow form are the proper passions of either genus or species; hence they are found in all who participate in the nature of the genus or species, just as the risible (capacity for laughter) follows form in man, because laughter occurs from some apprehension of the soul of man. It must also be known that accidents are sometimes caused from essential principles according to perfect act, as heat in fire, which is always actually hot; but sometimes only according to aptitude, while the complement comes from an external agent, as diaphaneity in air, which is completed by an outer luminous body. And in such cases the aptitude is an inseparable accident, but the complement, which supervenes from some principle that is outside the essence of the thing or does not enter the constitution of the thing, is separable, as to be moved and the like.

Sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus alio modo sumitur genus, differentia et species quam in substantiis. Quia enim in substantiis ex forma substantiali et materia efficitur per se unum una quadam natura ex earum coniunctione resultante, quae proprie in praedicamento substantiae collocatur, ideo in substantiis nomina concreta, quae compositum significant, proprie in genere esse dicuntur sicut species vel genera, ut homo vel animal. Non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo in praedicamento nisi per reductionem, sicut principia in genere esse dicuntur.

It must also be known that in accidents genus, difference, and species are taken in another mode than in substances. For in substances, from substantial form and matter there is produced a per se one, a certain one nature resulting from their conjunction, which is properly placed in the predicament of substance; therefore in substances the concrete names, which signify the composite, are properly said to be in a genus as species or genera, as man or animal. But form or matter is not in a predicament in this way except by reduction, as principles are said to be in a genus.

Sed ex accidente et subiecto non fit unum per se. Unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctione aliqua natura, cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui. Unde nomina accidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica. Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum Philosophum IX Metaphysicae.

But from an accident and a subject there is not made one per se. Hence from their conjunction there does not result some nature to which the intention of genus or of species could be attributed. Therefore accidental names spoken concretely are not placed in the predicament as species or genera, like white or musical, except by reduction, but only insofar as they are signified in the abstract, like whiteness and music. And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, therefore in them the genus cannot be taken from matter and the differentia from form as in composite substances; rather it is necessary that the first genus be taken from the very mode of being, according to which being is predicated diversely, in order of prior and posterior, of the ten genera; as quantity is said from the fact that it is the measure of substance, and quality inasmuch as it is the disposition of substance, and so with the others according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9.

Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. Et quia propriae passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur.

But the differences in them are taken from the diversity of the principles from which they are caused. And because proper passions are caused from the proper principles of the subject, therefore the subject is placed in their definition in the place of the difference, if they are defined in the abstract, according as they are properly in the genus, as it is said that snubness is a curvature of the nose. But it would be the converse, if their definition were taken according as they are said concretively.

Sic enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum, in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus. Similiter etiam est, si unum accidens alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit Philosophus relationem in V Metaphysicae. Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum effectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur differentiae coloris, quae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo diversae species colorum causantur.

For thus the subject would be placed in their definition as a genus, because then they would be defined after the mode of composite substances, in which the rationale of the genus is taken from the matter, as we say that the snub-nosed is a curved nose. Similarly, too, it is the case if one accident is the principle of another accident, as the principle of relation is action and passion and quantity; and therefore according to these the Philosopher divides relation in Metaphysics 5. But because the proper principles of accidents are not always manifest, therefore sometimes we take the differences of accidents from their effects, as congregative and disgregative are called differences of color, which are caused from an abundance or paucity of light, from which diverse species of colors are caused.

CONCLUSIO:

CONCLUSION:

Sic ergo patet quomodo essentia est in substantiis et accidentibus et quomodo in substantiis compositis et simplicibus et qualiter in his omnibus intentiones universales logicae inveniuntur, excepto primo, quod est in fine simplicitatis, cui non convenit ratio generis vel speciei et per consequens nec diffinitio propter suam simplicitatem. In quo sit finis et consummatio huius sermonis. Amen.

Thus, then, it is evident how essence is in substances and accidents, and how in substances composite and simple, and in what manner in all these the universal intentions of logic are found—except the first, which is at the limit of simplicity, to which the notion of genus or species does not befit, and consequently neither a definition, on account of its simplicity. Herein is the end and consummation of this discourse. Amen.