Seneca: DE BENEFICIIS

[1] Inspiciamus, Liberalis uirorum optime, id quod ex priori parte adhuc superest, quemadmodum dandum sit beneficium; cuius rei expeditissimam uideor monstraturus uiam: sic demus, quomodo uellemus accipere. Ante omnia libenter, cito, sine ulla dubitatione; ingratum est beneficium, quod diu inter dantis manus haesit, quod quis aegre dimittere uisus est et sic dare, tamquam sibi eriperet. Etiam si quid interuenit morae, euitemus omni modo, ne deliberasse uideamur; proximus est a negante, qui dubitauit, nullamque iniit gratiam.

[1] Let us examine, Liberalis, best of men, that which from
the former part still remains: in what way a benefit should be given;
in which matter I seem about to show the most expeditious
way: thus let us give, as we would wish to receive. Before all things, willingly, quickly, without any hesitation; an ungrateful
benefit is that which stuck long in the giver’s hands,
which one seemed to release with difficulty and thus to
give, as though he were snatching it from himself. Even if any delay has intervened,
let us in every way avoid seeming to have deliberated;
he who has doubted is next to one refusing, and he has entered into no
gratitude.

Nam cum in beneficio iucundissima sit tribuentis uoluntas, quia nolentem se tribuisse ipsa cunctatione testatus est, non dedit sed aduersus ducentem male retinuit; multi autem sunt, quos liberales facit frontis infirmitas. Gratissima sunt beneficia parata, facilia, occurrentia, ubi nulla mora fuit nisi in accipientis uerecundia. Optimum est antecedere desiderium cuiusque, proximum sequi; illud melius, occupare ante quam rogemur, quia, cum homini probo ad rogandum os concurrat et subfundatur rubor, qui hoc tormentum remittit, multiplicat munus suum.

For since in a benefit the most delightful thing is the will of the giver, because by his very hesitation he has borne witness that he bestowed it unwillingly, he did not give but, against one drawing him on, held back badly; and there are many whom weakness of brow—bashfulness—makes liberal. Most welcome are benefits that are prepared, easy, forthcoming, where there was no delay except in the recipient’s modesty. It is best to anticipate each person’s desire, next-best to follow it; better is to forestall before we are asked, because, when for a man of probity the mouth runs together for asking and a blush is suffused, he who remits this torment multiplies his gift.

Non tulit gratis, qui, cum rogasset, accepit, quoniam quidem, ut maioribus nostris grauissimis uiris uisum est, nulla res carius constat, quam quae precibus empta est. Vota homines parcius facerent, si palam facienda essent; adeo etiam deos, quibus honestissime supplicamus, tacite malumus et intra nosmet ipsos precari.

He did not get it gratis, he who, when he had asked, received it, since indeed, as it seemed to our ancestors, most grave men, nothing costs more dearly than that which has been bought with prayers. Vows men would make more sparingly, if they had to be made openly; so much so that we even prefer, to the gods to whom we most honorably supplicate, to pray tacitly and within our very selves.

[2] Molestum uerbum est, onerosum, demisso uoltu dicendum, rogo. Huius facienda est gratia amico et quemcumque amicum sis promerendo facturus; properet licet, sero beneficium dedit, qui roganti dedit. Ideo diuinanda cuiusque uoluntas et, cum intellecta est, necessitate grauissima rogandi liberanda est; illud beneficium iucundum uicturum in animo scias, quod obuiam uenit.

[2] It is a troublesome word, onerous, to be spoken with a downcast countenance: “I ask.” The favor of this is to be done to a friend and to whomever you are going to make a friend by meriting him; let him hasten as he will, he gave the benefit late who gave to one asking. Therefore each person’s will must be divined, and, when it has been understood, he must be freed from the most grievous necessity of asking; know that that benefit is pleasant and will live in the mind, which came to meet one.

Si non contigit praeuenire, plura rogantis uerba intercidamus; ne rogati uideamur sed certiores facti, statim promittamus facturosque nos, etiam ante quam interpellemur, ipsa festinatione adprobemus. Quemadmodum in aegris opportunitas cibi salutaris est et aqua tempestiue data remedii locum optinuit, ita, quamuis leue et uolgare beneficium est, si praesto fuit, si proximam quamque horam non perdidit, multum sibi adicit gratiamque pretiosi sed lenti et diu cogitati muneris uincit. Qui tam parate facit, non est dubium, quin libenter faciat; itaque laetus facit et induit sibi animi sui uoltum.

If it has not fallen to us to anticipate, let us cut short the petitioner’s many words; so that we may seem not to have been asked but made more certain, let us at once promise, and, that we will act, let us by our very haste give proof even before we are interpellated. Just as for the sick the timeliness of food is health-giving and water given in due season has obtained the place of a remedy, so, however light and common the benefaction is, if it has been at hand, if it has lost no next hour, it adds much to itself and beats the favor of a gift that is precious but slow and long cogitated. He who does it so readily—there is no doubt that he does it willingly; and so he does it gladly and puts on the countenance of his own spirit.

[3] Ingentia quorundam beneficia silentium aut loquendi tarditas imitata grauitatem et tristitiam corrupit, cum promitterent uoltu negantium; quanto melius adicere bona uerba rebus bonis et praedicatione humana benignaque conmendare, quae praestes! Vt ille se castiget, quod tardior in rogando fuit, adicias licet familiarem querellam: 'Irascor tibi, quod, cum aliquid desiderasses, non olim scire me uoluisti, quod tam diligenter rogasti, quod quemquam adhibuisti. Ego uero gratulor mihi, quod experiri animum meum libuit; postea, quidquid desiderabis, tuo iure exiges; semel rusticitati tuae ignoscitur.' Sic efficies, ut animum tuum pluris aestimet quam illud, quidquid est, ad quod petendum uenerat.

[3] The immense benefactions of certain persons have been spoiled by silence or by a slowness of speaking that imitated gravity and sadness, since they were promising with the countenance of refusers; how much better to add good words to good things and to commend by humane and benign proclamation what you provide! So that he may chastise himself because he was slower in asking, you may add, if you please, a familiar complaint: 'I am angry with you, because, when you had desired something, you did not want me to know long ago; because you asked so diligently; because you brought in someone else. But I for my part congratulate myself that it pleased me to put my spirit to the test; afterward, whatever you desire, you will exact by your own right; once, your rusticity is pardoned.' Thus you will bring it about that he values your spirit more highly than that—whatever it is—for the sake of which he had come to petition.

Tunc est summa uirtus tribuentis, tunc benignitas, ubi ille, qui discessit, dicet sibi: 'Magnum hodie lucrum feci; malo, quod illum talem inueni, quam si multiplicatum hoc ad me, de quo loquebar, alia uia peruenisset; huic eius animo numquam parem gratiam referam.'

Then is the supreme virtue of the bestower, then benignity, when he who has departed will say to himself: 'Great lucre have I made today; I prefer that I found such a man, rather than if this thing, of which I was speaking, had come to me by another way multiplied; to this spirit of his I shall never render equal gratitude.'

[4] At plerique sunt, qui beneficia asperitate uerborum et supercilio in odium adducunt eo sermone usi, ea superbia, ut inpetrasse paeniteat. Aliae deinde post rem promissam secuntur morae; nihil autem est acerbius, quam ubi quoque, inpetrasti, rogandum est. Repraesentanda sunt beneficia, quae a quibusdam accipere difficilius est quam inpetrare.

[4] But very many are those who bring benefits into hatred by the asperity of words and by superciliousness, using such a manner of speech, such haughtiness, that one repents of having obtained them. Other delays then follow after the thing has been promised; and nothing is more bitter than when even, you have obtained, must be asked for. Benefits must be rendered at once, which from some people it is more difficult to receive than to obtain.

Hic rogandus est, ut admoneat, ille, ut consummet; sic unum munus per multorum manus teritur, ex quo gratiae minimum apud promittentem remanet, quia auctori detrahit, quisquis post illum rogandus est. Hoc itaque curae hebebis, si grate aestimari, quae praestabis, uoles, ut beneficia tua inlibata, ut integra ad eos, quibus promissa sunt, perueniant, sine ulla, quod aiunt, deductione. Nemo illa intercipiat, nemo detineat; nemo in eo, quod daturus es, gratiam suam facere potest, ut non tuam minuat.

This man must be asked, that he may remind; that one, that he may complete; thus a single gift is worn away through the hands of many, whence the least share of thanks remains with the promiser, because he detracts from the author, whoever must be asked after him. Therefore you will keep this as a concern, if you wish the things you render to be gratefully esteemed, that your benefits may come to those to whom they were promised unblemished, intact, without any, as they say, deduction. Let no one intercept them, let no one detain them; no one can make his own credit in that which you are going to give without diminishing yours.

[5] Nihil aeque amarum quam diu pendere; aequiore quidam animo ferunt praecidi spem suam quam trahi. Plerisque autem hoc uitium est ambitione praua differendi promissa, ne minor sit rogantium turba, quales regiae potentiae ministri sunt, quos delectat superbiae suae longum spectaculum, minusque se iudicant posse, nisi diu multumque singulis, quid possint, ostenderint. Nihil confestim, nihil semel faciunt; iniuriae illorum praecipites, lenta beneficia sunt. Quare uerissimum existima, quod ille comicus dixit:

[5] Nothing is equally bitter as to hang long in suspense; with a more even mind some endure that their hope be cut off rather than drawn out. For most, however, there is this vice, from perverse ambition, of deferring promises, lest the crowd of petitioners be smaller, such as are the ministers of royal power, whom the long spectacle of their own superbia delights, and they judge themselves to have less power unless they have shown to each, long and much, what they can do. They do nothing immediately, nothing in one go; their injuries are precipitate, their benefits slow. Wherefore deem most true what that comic poet said:

Quid? tu non intellegis
tantum te gratiae demere, quantum morae adicis?

What? Do you not understand
that you take away as much of the gratitude owed you as you add of delay?

Inde illae uoces, quas ingenuus dolor exprimit: 'Fac, si quid facis' et: 'Nihil tanti est; malo mihi iam neges.' Vbi in taedium adductus animus incipit beneficium odisse, dum expectat, potest ob id gratus esse? Quemadmodum acerbissima crudelitas est, quae trahit poenam, et misericordiae genus est cito occidere, quia tormentum ultimum finem sui secum adfert, quod antecedit tempus, maxima uenturi supplicii pars est, ita maior est muneris gratia, quo minus diu pependit. Est enim etiam bonarum rerum sollicita expectatio, et cum plurima beneficia remedium alicuius rei adferant, qui aut diutius torqueri patitur, quem protinus potest liberare, aut tardius gaudere, beneficio suo manus adfert.

From this come those utterances which ingenuous grief squeezes out: 'Do it, if you do anything,' and: 'Nothing is worth so much; I would rather you deny me now.' When the mind, brought into tedium, begins to hate the benefaction while it waits, can it on that account be grateful? Just as the most bitter cruelty is that which drags out the punishment, and it is a kind of mercy to kill quickly, because the ultimate torment brings its own end with it, whereas the time that precedes is the greatest part of the punishment to come, so the gratitude for a gift is greater, the less long it has hung in suspense. For there is anxious expectation even of good things; and since very many benefits bring a remedy for some trouble, he who either suffers one to be tortured longer, whom he can free forthwith, or to rejoice later, lays hands on him by his very benefit.

Omnis benignitas properat, et proprium est libenter facientis cito facere; qui tarde et diem de die extrahens profuit, non ex animo fecit. Ita duas res maximas perdidit, et tempus et argumentum amicae uoluntatis; tarde uelle nolentis est.

Every benignity hastens, and it is proper to one doing gladly to do quickly; he who has benefited slowly, and drawing it out day by day, did not do it from the heart. Thus he has lost two very great things, both time and the argument of friendly will; to will late is of one unwilling.

[6] In omni negotio, Liberalis, non minima portio est, quomodo quidque aut dicatur aut fiat. Multum celeritas adiecit, multum abstulit mora. Sicut in telis eadem ferri uis est, sed infinitum interest, utrum excusso lacerto torqueantur an remissa manu effluant, gladius idem et stringit et transforat, quam presso articulo uenerit, refert, idem est, quod datur, sed interest, quomodo detur.

[6] In every undertaking, Liberalis, no small portion is how each thing either is said or is done. Much celerity has added, much delay has taken away. Just as in missiles there is the same force of the steel, but it makes an infinite difference whether they are hurled with the arm brandished or slip forth from a relaxed hand, the same sword both just grazes and transfixes; it matters with how pressed a knuckle it has come; so it is the same thing that is given, but it makes a difference how it is given.

Quam dulce, quam pretiosum est, si gratias sibi agi non est passus, qui dedit, si dedisse, dum dat, oblitus est! Nam corripere eum, cui cum maxime aliquid praestes, dementia est et inserere contumeliam meritis. Itaque non sunt exasperanda beneficia nec quicquam illis triste miscendum.

How sweet, how precious it is, if he who gave has not allowed thanks to be rendered to himself, if, while he gives, he has forgotten that he has given! For to chide a man upon whom you are at that very moment bestowing something is insanity, and to insert contumely into merits. Therefore benefactions are not to be exasperated, nor is anything grim to be mixed in with them.

Etiam si quid erit, de quo uelis admonere, aliud tempus eligito.

Even if there will be anything concerning which you wish to admonish, another time choose.

[7] Fabius Verrucosus beneficium ab homine duro aspere datum panem lapidosum uocabat, quem esurienti accipere necessarium sit, esse acerbum. Ti. Caesar rogatus a Nepote Mario praetorio, ut aeri alieno eius succurreret, edere illum sibi nomina creditorum iussit; hoc non est donare sed creditores conuocare. Cum edita essent, scripsit Nepoti iussisse se pecuniam solui adiecta contumeliosa admonitione; effecit, ut Nepos nec aes alienum haberet nec beneficium: liberauit illum a creditoribus, sibi non obligauit.

[7] Fabius Verrucosus called a benefaction harshly given by a hard man “stony bread,” which, though it is necessary for a hungry man to accept, is bitter. Tiberius Caesar, asked by Nepos Marius, of praetorian rank, to come to the aid of his indebtedness, ordered him to publish to him the names of his creditors; this is not to donate but to convene the creditors. When they had been produced, he wrote to Nepos that he had ordered the money to be paid, with a contumelious admonition appended; he brought it about that Nepos had neither debt nor a benefaction: he freed him from his creditors; he did not oblige him to himself.

Aliquid Tiberius secutus est; puto, noluit plures esse, qui idem rogaturi concurrerent. Ista fortasse efficax ratio fuerit ad hominum inprobas cupiditates pudore reprimendas, beneficium uero danti tota alia sequenda est uia. Omni genere, quod des, quo sit acceptatius, adornandum est; hoc uero non est beneficium dare, deprehendere est.

Tiberius followed something; I think he did not wish there to be more who would run together to ask the same thing. That perhaps would have been an efficacious method for the shameless cupidities of men to be repressed by shame, but for one giving a benefit an entirely different way is to be followed. In every kind, what you give, so that it may be more acceptable, must be adorned; but this is not to give a benefit, it is to apprehend.

[8] Et ut in transitu de hac quoque parte dicam, quid sentiam, ne principi quidem satis decorum est donare ignominiae causa. 'Tamen' inquit 'effugere Tiberius ne hoc quidem modo, quod uitabat, potuit; nam aliquot postea, qui idem rogarent, inuenti sunt, quos omnes iussit reddere in senatu aeris alieni causas, et ita illis certas summas dedit.' Non est illud liberalitas, censura est; auxilium est, principale tributum est: beneficium non est, cuius sine rubore meminisse non possum. Ad iudicem missus sum; ut inpetrarem, causam dixi.

[8] And so, in passing, to say also on this part what I think, it is not sufficiently decorous even for an emperor to give a gift for the sake of ignominy. 'Yet,' he says, 'Tiberius could not escape even in this way what he was avoiding; for afterwards several were found who asked the same, all of whom he ordered to render in the senate the causes of their indebtedness, and thus he gave them fixed sums.' That is not liberality, it is censure; it is aid, it is an imperial tribute: it is not a benefit, the memory of which I cannot recall without blushing. I was sent to a judge; in order to obtain it, I pleaded a case.

[9] Praecipiunt itaque omnes auctores sapientiae quaedam beneficia palam danda, quaedam secreto: palam, quae consequi gloriosum, ut militaria dona, ut honores et quidquid aliud notitia pulchrius fit; rursus, quae non producunt nec honestiorem faciunt, sed succurrunt infirmitati, egestati, ignominiae, tacite danda sunt, ut nota sint solis, quibus prosunt.

[9] Therefore all authors of wisdom prescribe that certain benefactions are to be given openly, certain in secret: openly, those whose attainment is glorious—such as military gifts, honors, and whatever else becomes fairer by being in notice; conversely, those which do not bring one forward nor make one more honorable, but come to the aid of weakness, poverty, disgrace, are to be given silently, so that they may be known only to those whom they benefit.

[10] Interdum etiam ipse, qui iuuatur, fallendus est, ut habeat nec, a quo acceperit, sciat. Arcesilan aiunt amico pauperi et paupertatem suam dissimulanti, aegro autem et ne hoc quidem confitenti deesse sibi in sumptum ad necessarios usus, clam succurrendum iudicasse; puluino eius ignorantis sacculum subiecit, ut homo inutiliter uerecundus, quod desiderabat, inueniret potius quam acciperet. 'Quid ergo?

[10] At times even the very one who is helped must be deceived, so that he may have it and not know from whom he received it. They say that Arcesilaus, for a friend who was poor and disguised his poverty, and, moreover, being sick and not admitting even this—that he lacked funds for expense to necessary uses—judged that succor should be given secretly; he slipped a little purse under his cushion without his knowing it, so that the man, bashful to no purpose, might find rather than receive what he desired. 'What then?

ille nesciet, a quo acceperit?' Primum nesciat, si hoc ipsum beneficii pars est; deinde multa alia faciam, multa tribuam, per quae intellegat et illius auctorem; denique ille nesciet accepisse se, ego sciam me dedisse. 'Parum est' inquis. Parum, si fenerare cogitas; sed si dare, quo genere accipienti maxime profuturum erit, dabis.

He will not know from whom
he has received it?' First, let him not know, if this very thing is part of the benefit;
then I will do many other things, I will bestow many things, by
which he may understand, and who its author is; finally, he will not know
that he has received, I shall know that I have given. 'It is too little,' you say. Too little, if you are thinking to lend at interest; but if to give, in what
manner it will be most profitable to the recipient, you will give.

Contentus eris te teste; alioqui non bene facere delectat sed uideri bene fecisse. 'Volo utique sciat.' Debitorem quaeris. 'Volo utique sciat.' Quid?

You will be content with yourself as witness; otherwise it is not to do good that delights,
but to seem to have done good. 'I surely want him to know.' You are seeking a debtor.
'I surely want him to know.' What?

si illi utilius est nescire, si honestius, si gratius, non in aliam partem abibis? 'Volo sciat.' Ita tu hominem non seruabis in tenebris? Non nego, quotiens patitur res, respiciendum gaudium ex accipientis uoluntate; sin adiuuari illum et oportet et pudet, si, quod praestamus, offendit, nisi absconditur, beneficium in acta non mitto.

if for him it is more utile not to know, if more honest, if more gratifying, will you not go over to the other course? “I want him to know.” So you will not preserve the man in darkness? I do not deny that, whenever the matter permits, one must have regard to the joy in accordance with the recipient’s will; but if it both is right that he be aided and he is ashamed, if what we render gives offense unless it is concealed, I do not enter the benefit in the public records.

Quidni? ego illi non sum indicaturus me dedisse, cum inter prima praecepta ac maxime necessaria sit, ne umquam exprobrem, immo ne admoneam quidem. Haec enim beneficii inter duos lex est: alter statim obliuisci debet dati, alter accepti numquam.

Why not? I for my part am not going to inform him that I have given, since among the first and most necessary precepts is this: that I should never reproach, nay, not even remind. For this is the law of a benefaction between two: the one ought at once to forget what was given, the other never [to forget] what was received.

[11] Lacerat animum et premit frequens meritorum conmemoratio. Libet exclamare, quod ille triumuirali proscriptione seruatus a quodam Caesaris amico exclamauit, cum superbiam eius ferre non posset: 'Redde me Caesari!' Quousque dices: 'Ego te seruaui, ego eripui morti'? istud, si meo arbitrio memini, uita est, si tuo, mors est; nihil tibi debeo, si me seruasti, ut haberes, quem ostenderes. Quousque me circumducis?

[11] Frequent commemoration of merits lacerates the mind and presses it. It is tempting to exclaim what that man, saved in the triumviral proscription by a certain friend of Caesar, exclaimed, when he could not bear his arrogance: 'Give me back to Caesar!' How long will you say: 'I saved you, I snatched you from death'? That, if I remember it at my own discretion, is life; if at yours, it is death; I owe you nothing, if you saved me so that you might have someone to display. How long will you parade me around?

quousque obliuisci fortunae meae non sinis? semel in triumpho ductus essem. Non est dicendum, quid tribuerimus: qui admonet, repetit; non est instandum, non est memoria renouanda, nisi ut aliud dando prioris admoneas.

How long will you not allow me to forget my fortune? I would have been led in
a triumph once. It is not to be said what we have bestowed:
he who reminds, demands it back; one must not insist,
the memory must not be renewed, except that by giving something else you
remind of the former.

Ne aliis quidem narrare debemus; qui dedit beneficium, taceat, narret, qui accepit. Dicetur enim, quod illi ubique iactanti beneficium suum: 'Non negabis' inquit 'te recepisse'; et cum respondisset: 'Quando?' 'Saepe quidem' inquit 'et multis locis, id est, quotiens et ubicumque narrasti.' Quid opus est eloqui, quid alienum occupare officium? est, qui istud facere honestius possit, quo narrante et hoc laudabitur, quod ipse non narras.

We ought not even to tell it to others; let him who gave a benefit be silent, let him tell it who received it. For this will be said to the man everywhere vaunting his own benefit: “You will not deny,” he says, “that you received it”; and when he has answered, “When?” “Often indeed,” he says, “and in many places—that is, as often and wherever you recounted it.” What need is there to speak it out, why seize another’s office? There is one who can do that more honorably; with him telling it, even this will be praised: that you yourself do not tell it.

Ingratum me iudicas, si istud te tacente nemo sciturus est. Quod adeo non est conmittendum, ut etiam, si quis coram nobis narrabit, respondendum sit: 'Dignissimus quidem ille est maioribus beneficiis, sed ego magis uelle me scio omnia illi praestare quam adhuc praestitisse'; et haec ipsa non uerniliter nec ea figura, qua quidam reiciunt, quae magis ad se uolunt adtrahere. Deinde adicienda omnis humanitas.

You judge me ungrateful, if, with you keeping silent, no one would be going to know that. This is so far from being to be permitted that even, if someone relates it in our presence, the reply should be: 'That man indeed is most worthy of greater benefactions, but I know that I am more willing to furnish everything to him than to have furnished up to now'; and even these very words, not in a servile manner nor in that figure with which certain men reject things which they wish rather to draw to themselves. Then every courtesy is to be added.

Perdet agricola, quod sparsit, si labores suos destituit in semine; multa cura sata perducuntur ad segetem; nihil in fructum peruenit, quod non a primo usque ad extremum aequalis cultura prosequitur. Eadem beneficiorum condicio est. Numquid ulla maiora possunt esse, quam quae in liberos patres conferunt?

The farmer will lose what he has scattered, if he abandons his labors at the sowing; by much care the sowings are brought to the standing crop; nothing comes into fruit that an even cultivation does not attend from the first to the last. The condition of benefactions is the same. Can there be any greater than those which fathers confer upon their children?

haec tamen inrita sunt, si in infantia deserantur, nisi longa pietas munus suum nutrit. Eadem ceterorum beneficiorum condicio est: nisi illa adiuueris, perdes; parum est dedisse, fouenda sunt. Si gratos uis habere, quos obligas, non tantum des oportet beneficia, sed ames.

these, however, are nullified if they are deserted in infancy, unless long piety nourishes its gift. The same is the condition of the rest of benefactions: unless you aid them, you will lose them; it is too little to have given— they must be fostered. If you wish to have those whom you oblige be grateful, you ought not only to give benefactions, but to love them.

Praecipue, ut dixi, parcamus auribus; admonitio taedium facit, exprobratio odium. Nihil aeque in beneficio dando uitandum est quam superbia. Quid opus adrogantia uoltus, quid tumore uerborum?

Especially, as I said, let us spare ears; admonition makes tedium, reproach makes odium. Nothing is equally to be avoided in giving a benefit as superbia. What need is there of the arrogance of the visage, what of the swelling of words?

ipsa res te extollit. Detrahenda est inanis iactatio; res loquentur nobis tacentibus. Non tantum ingratum, sed inuisum est beneficium superbe datum.

itself
the thing extols you. Empty vaunting must be taken down; deeds
will speak while we are silent. Not only ungrateful,
but hateful is a benefaction given haughtily.

[12] C. Caesar dedit uitam Pompeio Penno, si dat, qui non aufert; deinde absoluto et agenti gratias porrexit osculandum sinistrum pedem. Qui excusant et negant id insolentiae causa factum, aiunt socculum auratum, immo aureum, margaritis distinctum ostendere eum uoluisse. Ita prorsus: quid hic contumeliosum est, si uir consularis aurum et margaritas osculatus est alioquin nullam partem in corpore eius electurus, quam purius oscularetur?

[12] C. Caesar gave life to Pompeius Pennus—if he gives who does not take away; then, when he had been acquitted and was giving thanks, he held out
his left foot to be kissed. Those who excuse it and deny
that this was done for the sake of insolence say that he wished to display a gilded slipper—nay, a golden one—studded with pearls.
Yes, precisely: what here is contumelious, if
a consular man kissed gold and pearls—otherwise about to choose no part on his body which
he might kiss more purely?

Homo natus in hoc, ut mores liberae ciuitatis Persica seruitute mutaret, parum iudicauit, si senator, senex, summis usus honoribus in conspectu principum supplex sibi eo more iacuisset, quo hostes uicti hostibus iacuere; inuenit aliquid infra genua, quo libertatem detruderet. Non hoc est rem publicam calcare, et quidem, licet id aliquis non putet ad rem pertinere, sinistro pede? Parum enim foede furioseque insolens fuerat, qui de capite consularis uiri soccatus audiebat, nisi in os senatoris ingessisset imperator epigros suos.

A man born for this, to change the customs of a free commonwealth into Persian servitude, judged it too little,
if a senator, an old man, having enjoyed the highest honors, had lain as a suppliant to him in the sight of the princes in the same manner in which conquered enemies have lain to their enemies; he found something below
the knees, by which he might shove liberty down. Is this not to trample the republic, and indeed—though someone might think that not to pertain to the matter—with the left foot? For he had been too little foully
and frenziedly insolent, who, slippered, was hearing a capital case of a consular man, unless the emperor had thrust his slippers into a senator’s mouth.

[13] O superbia, magnae fortunae stultissimum malum! ut a te nihil accipere iuuat! ut omne beneficium in iniuriam conuertis!

[13] O pride, the most foolish evil of great fortune! how it delights me to receive nothing from you! how you convert every benefit into injury!

ut te omnia dedecent! quoque altius te subleuasti, hoc depressior es ostendisque tibi non datum adgnoscere ista bona, quibus tantum inflaris; quidquid das, corrumpis. Libet itaque interrogare, quid se tanto opere resupinet, quid uoltum habitumque oris peruertat, ut malit personam habere quam faciem?

how everything is unseemly for you! the higher
you have raised yourself, by so much the more depressed you are, and you show that it has not been
granted to you to recognize those goods by which you are so inflated;
whatever you give, you corrupt. It is pleasing, therefore, to ask,
what so greatly flings itself backward, what perverts the countenance and the habit
of the face, that one prefers to have a mask rather than a face?

Iucunda sunt, quae humana fronte, certe leni placidaque tribuuntur, quae cum daret mihi superior, non exultauit supra me, sed quam potuit benignissimus fuit descenditque in aequum et detraxit muneri suo pompam, si obseruauit idoneum tempus, ut in occasione potius quam in necessitate succurreret. Vno modo istis persuadebimus, ne beneficia sua insolentia perdant, si ostenderimus non ideo uideri maiora, quod tumultuosius data sunt; ne ipsos quidem ob id cuiquam posse maiores uideri; uanam esse superbiae magnitudinem et quae in odium etiam amanda perducat.

Pleasant are those things which are bestowed with a human brow, at any rate gentle and placid, which, when a superior gave them to me, did not exult over me, but was as benign as he could be, and descended to the level and stripped his gift of pomp, if he observed the suitable time, so that he might come to help at an occasion rather than under necessity. In one way we shall persuade such men not to lose their benefactions through insolence, if we show that they do not on that account seem greater because they were given more tumultuously; nor indeed on that account can they themselves seem greater to anyone; that the magnitude of pride is vain, and is such as to lead even things to be loved into hatred.

[14] Sunt quaedam nocitura inpetrantibus, quae non dare sed negare beneficium est; aestimabimus itaque utilitatem potius quam uoluntatem petentium. Saepe enim noxia concupiscimus, nec dispicere, quam perniciosa sint, licet, quia iudicium interpellat adfectus; sed cum subsedit cupiditas, cum inpetus ille flagrantis animi, qui consilium fugat, cecidit, detestamur perniciosos malorum munerum auctores. Vt frigidam aegris negamus et lugentibus ac sibi iratis ferrum, ut amentibus, quidquid contra se usurus ardor petit, sic omnium, quae nocitura sunt, inpense ac submisse, non numquam etiam miserabiliter rogantibus perseuerabimus non dare.

[14] There are certain things that will be noxious to those who obtain them, such that not to give but to refuse is a benefaction; we shall therefore evaluate the utility rather than the will of the petitioners. Often indeed we desire noxious things, nor is it permitted to discern how pernicious they are, because affection interrupts judgment; but when cupidity has subsided, when that impetus of a blazing spirit, which puts counsel to flight, has fallen, we detest the pernicious authors of evil gifts. As we deny cold water to the sick and the iron to mourners and to those angry at themselves, as to the demented, whatever an ardor, about to use it against themselves, asks for, so, in the case of all things that will harm, even to those begging earnestly and submissively, sometimes even pitiably, we shall persevere in not giving.

Cum initia beneficiorum suorum spectare tum etiam exitus decet et ea dare, quae non tantum accipere, sed etiam accepisse delectet. Multi sunt, qui dicant: 'Scio hoc illi non profuturum, sed quid faciam? rogat, resistere precibus eius non possum; uiderit: de se, non de me queretur.' Falsum est: immo de te et merito quidem; cum ad mentem bonam redierit, cum accessio illa, quae animum inflammabat, remiserit, quidni eum oderit, a quo in damnum ac periculum suum adiutus est?

It befits one to look not only to the beginnings of one’s benefactions but also to their outcomes, and to give those things which it is a delight not only to receive but even to have received. There are many who say: ‘I know this will not be profitable to him, but what am I to do? he asks; I cannot resist his entreaties; let him see to it: he will complain about himself, not about me.’ That is false: rather, about you—and deservedly at that; when he has returned to a good mind, when that accession which was inflaming his spirit has subsided, why should he not hate the man by whom he was aided to his own damage and peril?

Exorari in perniciem rogantium saeua bonitas est. Quemadmodum pulcherrimum opus est etiam inuitos nolentesque seruare, ita rogantibus pestifera largiri blandum et adfabile odium est. Beneficium demus, quod in usu magis ac magis placeat, quod numquam in malum uertat.

To be prevailed upon into the ruin of the petitioners is savage benevolence. Just as it is the most beautiful work to save even the unwilling and those not wishing, so to lavish pestiferous things upon those who beg is a coaxing and affable hatred. Let us give a benefaction which in use pleases more and more, which never turns into evil.

Pecuniam non dabo, quam numeraturum adulterae sciam, nec in societate turpis facti aut consilii inueniar; si potero, reuocabo, si minus, non adiuuabo scelus. Siue illum ira, quo non debebit, inpellet, siue ambitionis calor abducet a tutis, in nullum malum uires a <me> sumere ipsas patiar nec conmittam, ut possit quandoque dicere: 'Ille amando me occidit.' Saepe nihil interest inter amicorum munera et hostium uota; quidquid illi accidere optant, in id horum intempestiua indulgentia inpellit atque instruit. Quid autem turpius quam quod euenit frequentissime, ut nihil intersit inter odium et beneficium?

I will not give money which I know he will count out to an adulteress, nor will I be found in the partnership of a base deed or counsel; if I can, I will call him back; if not, I will not aid the crime. Whether anger shall drive him where he ought not, or the heat of ambition shall lead him away from safe things, I will not allow him to take strength itself from me for any evil, nor will I permit it to come to pass that he can someday say: “He, by loving me, killed me.” Often there is no difference between the gifts of friends and the vows of enemies; whatever they wish to befall him, into that the untimely indulgence of these pushes and equips him. And what is more disgraceful than what happens most frequently, that there is no difference between hatred and a benefaction?

[15] Numquam in turpitudinem nostram reditura tribuamus. Cum summa amicitiae sit amicum sibi aequare, utrique simul consulendum est: dabo egenti, sed ut ipse non egeam; succurram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream, nisi si futurus ero magni hominis aut magnae rei merces. Nullum beneficium dabo, quod turpiter peterem.

[15] Let us never grant things that will return to our turpitude. Since the summit of friendship is to make a friend equal to oneself, both must be considered at the same time: I will give to the needy, but so that I myself do not need; I will succor one who is perishing, but so that I myself do not perish, unless I am to be the ransom of a great man or a great cause. I will give no benefit that I would shamefully solicit.

Nec exiguum dilatabo nec magna pro paruis accipi patiar; nam ut qui, quod <dedit>, inputat, gratiam destruit, ita qui, quantum det, ostendit, munus suum conmendat, non exprobrat. Respiciendae sunt cuique facultates suae uiresque, ne aut plus praestemus, quam possumus, aut minus. Aestimanda est eius persona, cui damus; quaedam enim minora sunt, quam ut exire a magnis uiris debeant, quaedam accipiente maiora sunt.

Nor will I amplify a small thing, nor will I allow great things to be received in exchange for small ones; for just as he who charges to account what he has given destroys gratitude, so he who shows how much he gives commends, not upbraids, his own gift. One’s own resources and strengths must be looked to, lest we either furnish more than we can, or less. The person of the one to whom we give must be appraised; for certain things are too minor to go forth from great men, and certain things are greater than the recipient.

Vtriusque itaque personam confer et ipsum inter illas, quod donabis, examina, numquid aut danti graue sit aut parum, numquid rursus, qui accepturus est, aut fastidiat aut non capiat.

Therefore compare the person of each, and between them examine the very thing itself which you will give, whether it be either grave to the giver or too little, whether again the one who is to accept it either be fastidious or
cannot take it.

[16] Vrbem cuidam Alexander donabat, uesanus et qui nihil animo nisi grande conciperet. Cum ille, cui donabatur, se ipse mensus tanti muneris inuidiam refugisset dicens non conuenire fortunae suae: 'Non quaero' inquit, 'quid te accipere deceat, sed quid me dare.' Animosa uox uidetur et regia, cum sit stultissima. Nihil enim per se quemquam decet; refert, qui det, cui, quando, quare, ubi, et cetera, sine quibus facti ratio non constabit.

[16] Alexander was bestowing a city upon a certain man, mad and one who conceived in his mind nothing except the grand. When he, to whom it was being given, having measured himself, had shunned the envy of so great a gift, saying that it did not befit his fortune: 'I do not inquire,' he said, 'what it befits you to receive, but what it befits me to give.' It seems a spirited and regal utterance, though it is most foolish. For nothing is fitting to anyone in itself; it matters who gives, to whom, when, why, where, and the rest, without which the rationale of the deed will not stand.

Tumidissimum animal! si illum accipere hoc non decet, nec te dare; habetur personarum ac dignitatium portio et, cum sit ubique uirtus modus, aeque peccat, quod excedit, quam quod deficit. Liceat istud sane tibi et te in tantum fortuna sustulerit, ut congiaria tua urbes sint (quas quanto maioris animi fuit non capere quam spargere!): est tamen aliquis minor, quam <ut> in sinu eius condenda sit ciuitas.

Most tumid creature! If it is not fitting for him to receive this, neither is it for you to give; account is taken of persons and of dignities, and, since measure is everywhere a virtue, that which exceeds sins equally as that which is deficient. Grant that this be permitted to you, and that Fortune has uplifted you to such a degree that your congiaries are cities (which it was of how much greater spirit not to take than to scatter!): there is, however, someone smaller, than <ut> a city should be founded in his lap.

[17] Ab Antigono Cynicus petit talentum: respondit plus esse, quam quod Cynicus petere deberet; repulsus petit denarium: respondit minus esse, quam quod regem deceret dare. 'Turpissima eiusmodi cauillatio est: inuenit, quomodo neutrum daret. In denario regem, in talento Cynicum respexit, cum posset et denarium tamquam Cynico dare et talentum tamquam rex.

[17] From Antigonus a Cynic asks a talent: he replied that it was more than a Cynic ought to ask; rebuffed, he asks for a denarius: he replied that it was less than what it would befit a king to give. 'Most disgraceful is a cavillation of this sort: he found how to give neither. In the denarius he had regard to the king, in the talent to the Cynic, whereas he could have given both a denarius as to a Cynic and a talent as a king.

Vt sit aliquid maius, quam quod Cynicus accipiat, nihil tam exiguum est, quod non honeste regis humanitas tribuat.' Si me interrogas, probo; est enim intolerabilis res poscere nummos et contemnere. Indixisti pecuniae odium; hoc professus es, hanc personam induisti: agenda est. Iniquissimum est te pecuniam sub gloria egestatis adquirere.

Granted that there is something greater than what a Cynic should accept, nothing is so meager that the king’s humanity does not honorably bestow it. If you ask me, I approve; for it is an intolerable thing to ask for coins and yet despise them. You have proclaimed a hatred of money; this you have professed, you have put on this persona: it must be acted out. It is most iniquitous for you to acquire money under the glory of destitution.

Adspicienda ergo non minus sua cuique persona est quam eius, de quo iuuando quis cogitat. Volo Chrysippi nostri uti similitudine de pilae lusu, quam cadere non est dubium aut mittentis uitio aut excipientis; tum cursum suum seruat, ubi inter manus utriusque apte ab utroque et iactata et excepta uersatur. Necesse est autem lusor bonus aliter illam conlusori longo, aliter breui mittat.

Therefore, one’s own persona must be considered no less than that of the person whom one thinks of aiding. I wish to use our Chrysippus’s similitude from the play of the ball: that it falls, there is no doubt, either by the fault of the sender or of the receiver; then it keeps its course when, between the hands of both, being aptly by each both thrown and caught, it is bandied about. Moreover, it is necessary that a good player send it one way to a tall fellow-player, another way to a short one.

Eadem beneficii ratio est: nisi utrique personae, dantis et accipientis, aptatur, nec ab hoc exibit nec ad illum perueniet, ut debet. Si cum exercitato et docto negotium est, audacius pilam mittemus; utcumque enim uenerit, manus illam expedita et agilis repercutiet; si cum tirone et indocto, non tam rigide nec tam excusse sed languidius et in ipsam eius derigentes manum remisse occurremus. Idem faciendum est in beneficiis: quosdam doceamus et satis iudicemus, si conantur, si audent, si uolunt.

The same principle of a benefit holds: unless it is fitted to both persons, the giver and the receiver, it will neither go out from this one nor come to that one as it ought. If we have to do with one practiced and learned, we shall send the ball more boldly; however it may come, a ready and agile hand will strike it back; if with a tyro and unlearned, not so stiffly nor so sharply thrown, but more languidly, and aiming it at his very hand, we shall meet him in a relaxed manner. The same must be done in benefits: let us teach some, and judge it enough if they try, if they dare, if they are willing.

Facimus autem plerumque ingratos et, ut sint, fauemus, tamquam ita demum magna sint beneficia nostra, si gratia illis referri non potuit; ut malignis lusoribus propositum est conlusorem traducere, cum damno scilicet ipsius lusus, qui non potest, nisi consentitur, extendi. Multi sunt tam prauae naturae, ut malint perdere, quae praestiterunt, quam uideri recepisse, superbi et inputatores; quanto melius quantoque humanius id agere, ut illis quoque partes suae constent, et fauere, ut gratia sibi referri possit, benigne omnia interpretari, gratias agentem non aliter, quam si referat, audire, praebere se facilem ad hoc, ut, quem obligauit, etiam exolui uelit! Male audire solet fenerator, si acerbe exigit, aeque, si in recipiendo tardus ac difficilis moras quaerit.

Yet we for the most part make men ungrateful and even favor their being so, as though our benefactions were great only then, if gratitude could not be returned for them; just as for malicious players the purpose is to expose the fellow-player, with the loss, of course, of the game itself, which cannot be extended unless there is consent. Many are of so depraved a nature that they prefer to lose what they have rendered rather than seem to have received it back—proud and imputers; how much better and how much more humane to act so that their parts too may stand firm, and to favor it, so that gratitude can be returned to oneself, to interpret all things benignly, to listen to one giving thanks no otherwise than if he were repaying, to present oneself easy for this, to wish that the one whom he has obligated be even released! A usurer is wont to be ill-spoken of if he exacts harshly; equally, if in receiving he is slow and difficult, he seeks delays.

Beneficium tam recipiendum est quam non exigendum. Optimus ille, qui facile dedit, numquam exegit, reddi gauisus est, bona fide, quid praestitisset, oblitus, qui accipientis animo recepit.

A benefit is as much to be received
as not to be exacted. He is best who easily
gave, never exacted, rejoiced to have it repaid, in good faith
forgot what he had rendered, who received it in the recipient’s mind.

[18] Quidam non tantum dant beneficia superbe, sed etiam accipiunt, quod non est conmittendum; iam enim transeamus ad alteram partem tractaturi, quomodo se gerere homines in accipiendis beneficiis debeant. Quodcumque ex duobus constat officium, tantundem ab utroque exigit: qualis pater esse debeat, cum inspexeris, scies non minus operis illic superesse, ut dispicias, qualem esse oporteat filium; sunt aliquae partes mariti, sed non minores uxoris. In uicem ista, quantum exigunt, praestant et parem desiderant regulam, quae, ut ait Hecaton, difficilis est; omne enim honestum in arduo est, etiam quod uicinum honesto est; non enim tantum fieri debet, sed ratione fieri.

[18] Some not only give benefits arrogantly, but also accept them so—which is not to be committed; now indeed let us pass over to the other part, intending to treat how men ought to conduct themselves in accepting benefits. Whatever duty consists of two parties demands just as much from each: when you have inspected what sort a father ought to be, you will know that no less work remains there, to look into what sort it is proper the son should be; there are certain roles of the husband, but no lesser of the wife. These things, in turn, render as much as they exact and desire an equal rule, which, as Hecaton says, is difficult; for every honorable thing is on the steep, even that which is neighboring to the honorable; for it must not only be done, but be done with reason.

Hac duce per totam uitam eundum est, minima maximaque ex huius consilio gerenda; quomodo haec suaserit, dandum. Haec autem hoc primum censebit non ab omnibus accipiendum. A quibus ergo accipiemus?

With this as guide one must go through the whole life, and the least and the greatest are to be conducted by this one’s counsel; as this shall have advised, it must be given. This, moreover, will judge first of all that it is not to be accepted from everyone. From whom, then, shall we accept?

Vt breuiter tibi respondeam: ab his, quibus dedissemus. Videamus, num etiam maiore dilectu quaerendus sit, cui debeamus, quam cui praestemus. Nam ut non sequantur ulla incommoda (secuntur autem plurima), graue tamen tormentum est debere, cui nolis; contra iucundissimum ab eo accepisse beneficium, quem amare etiam post iniuriam possis, ubi amicitiam alioqui iucundam causa fecit et iustam.

To answer you briefly: from those to whom we would have given. Let us see whether he, to whom we should be indebted, ought to be sought with even greater selection than he to whom we should bestow. For even if no inconveniences should follow (yet very many do follow), it is nevertheless a heavy torment to owe to one whom you would not wish; by contrast, it is most delightful to have received a benefit from one whom you could love even after an injury, where the cause has made a friendship, otherwise pleasant, also just.

Illud uero homini uerecundo et probo miserrimum est, si eum amare oportet, quem non iuuat. Totiens admoneam necesse est non loqui me de sapientibus, quos, quidquid oportet, et iuuat, qui animum in potestate habent et legem sibi, quam uolunt, dicunt, quam dixerunt, seruant, sed de inperfectis hominibus honestam uiam sequi uolentibus, quorum adfectus saepe contumaciter parent. Itaque eligendum est, a quo beneficium accipiam; et quidem diligentius quaerendus beneficii quam pecuniae creditor.

That indeed is most wretched for a modest and upright man, if he must love someone whom it does not delight him to love. I must so often remind you that I am not speaking about the wise, to whom whatever is fitting also pleases, who have their mind in their own power and declare for themselves the law they wish, and observe the law they have declared, but about imperfect men who wish to follow the honorable way, whose affections often obey with defiance. Therefore one must choose from whom to receive a beneficium; and indeed a creditor of a beneficium is to be sought more carefully than a creditor of money.

Huic enim reddendum est, quantum accepi, et, si reddidi, solutus sum ac liber; at illi et plus soluendum est, et nihilo minus etiam relata gratia cohaeremus; debeo enim, cum reddidi, rursus incipere, manetque amicitia; <et ut in amicitiam> non reciperem indignum, sic ne in beneficiorum quidem sacratissimum ius, ex quo amicitia oritur. 'Non semper' inquit 'mihi licet dicere: nolo; aliquando beneficium accipiendum est et inuito. Dat tyrannus crudelis et iracundus, qui munus suum fastidire te iniuriam iudicaturus est: non accipiam?

For to this man I must render as much as I received, and, if I have repaid, I am released and free; but to that other I must pay even more, and nonetheless, even with gratitude returned, we still remain bound together; for when I have repaid, I ought to begin again, and friendship remains; <and just as into friendship> I would not receive an unworthy man, so neither into the most sacrosanct right of benefits, from which friendship arises. ‘Not always,’ he says, ‘is it permitted me to say: I am unwilling; sometimes a benefit must be accepted even by one unwilling. A cruel and irascible tyrant gives, who will judge it an injury that you disdain his gift: shall I not accept it?

eodem loco latronem pone, piratam, regem animum latronis ac piratae habentem. Quid faciam? parum dignus est, cui debeam?' Cum eligendum dico, cui debeas, uim maiorem et metum excipio, quibus adhibitis electio perit.

in the same place set a brigand, a pirate, a king having the animus of a brigand and pirate. What am I to do? Is he too little worthy, to whom I should owe?' When I say one must choose to whom you should owe, I make an exception for force majeure and fear, with which applied, choice perishes.

Si liberum est tibi, si arbitrii tui est, utrum uelis an non, id apud te ipse perpendes; si necessitas tollit arbitrium, scies te non accipere, sed parere. Nemo id accipiendo obligatur, quod illi repudiare non licuit; si uis scire, an uelim, effice, ut possim nolle. 'Vitam tamen tibi dedit.' Non refert, quid sit, quod datur, nisi a uolente, nisi uolenti datur; si seruasti me, non ideo seruator es. Venenum aliquando pro remedio fuit; non ideo numeratur inter salubria.

If it is free to you, if it is of your own arbitrament, whether you wish or not, you yourself will weigh that with yourself; if necessity takes away arbitrament, you will know that you are not receiving, but obeying. No one is obligated by receiving that which it was not permitted him to repudiate; if you wish to know whether I wish it, bring it about that I can be unwilling. 'Nevertheless he gave you life.' It does not matter what the thing is that is given, unless it is given by one willing, unless it is given to one willing; if you have saved me, for that reason you are not a savior. Poison has sometimes been in place of a remedy; for that reason it is not numbered among the salubrious.

Quaedam prosunt nec obligant: tuber quidam tyranni gladio diuisit, qui ad occidendum eum uenerat; non ideo illi tyrannus gratias egit, quod rem, quam medicorum manus reformidauerant nocendo sanauit.

Certain things are beneficial
and do not oblige: a certain man split the tyrant’s tumor with his sword—who
had come to kill him; not on that account did the tyrant
give him thanks, because the thing which the hands of physicians had shrunk from
he healed by harming.

[19] Vides non esse magnum in ipsa re momentum, quoniam non uidetur dedisse beneficium, qui a malo animo profuit; casus enim beneficium est, hominis iniuria. Leonem in amphitheatro spectauimus, qui unum e bestiariis agnitum, cum quondam eius fuisset magister, protexit ab inpetu bestiarum; num ergo beneficium est ferae auxilium? minime, quia nec uoluit facere nec faciendi animo fecit.

[19] You see that there is not great weight in the thing itself, since he does not seem to have given a benefit, who has been of service with an evil mind; for it is chance that is the benefit, the man’s deed an injury. We saw in the amphitheater a lion who, recognizing one of the beast-fighters, since once upon a time he had been his trainer, protected him from the onrush of the beasts; is then the aid of a wild beast a benefit? By no means, because it neither wished to do it nor did it with the intention of doing it.

Quo loco feram posui, tyrannum pone: et hic uitam dedit et illa, nec hic nec illa beneficium. Quia non est beneficium accipere cogi, non est beneficium debere, cui nolis. Ante des oportet mihi arbitrium mei, deinde beneficium.

In the place where I set the wild beast, set the tyrant: both this one and that one gave life, and neither this nor that is a benefaction. Because it is not a benefaction to be compelled to receive; it is not a benefaction to owe to one to whom you are unwilling. First you must give to me the arbitrament of myself, then the benefaction.

[20] Disputari de M. Bruto solet, an debuerit accipere ab diuo Iulio uitam, cum occidendum eum iudicaret. Quam rationem in occidendo secutus sit, alias tractabimus; mihi enim, cum uir magnus in aliis fuerit, in hac re uidetur uehementer errasse nec ex institutione Stoica se egisse; qui aut regis nomen extimuit, cum optimus ciuitatis status sub rege iusto sit, aut ibi sperauit libertatem futuram, ubi tam magnum praemium erat et imperandi et seruiendi, aut existimauit ciuitatem in priorem formam posse reuocari amissis pristinis moribus futuramque ibi aequalitatem ciuilis iuris et staturas suo loco leges, ubi uiderat tot milia hominum pugnantia, non an seruirent, sed utri. Quanta uero illum aut rerum naturae aut urbis suae tenuit obliuio, qui uno interempto defuturum credidit alium, qui idem uellet, cum Tarquinius esset inuentus post tot reges ferro ac fulminibus occisos!

[20] It is wont to be disputed about M. Brutus, whether he ought to have accepted life from the Divine Julius, when he judged that he must be killed. What reasoning he followed in the killing we will treat elsewhere; for to me, although he was a great man in other matters, in this affair he seems to have erred vehemently and not to have acted according to Stoic institution: he either dreaded the name of king, whereas the best status of the city is under a just king, or he hoped that there would be liberty there where so great a prize existed both of commanding and of serving, or he thought that the state could be called back into its former form, after its ancestral morals had been lost, and that there would be there an equality of civil law and that the laws would stand in their place, where he had seen so many thousands of men fighting, not whether they should serve, but to which. And how great a forgetfulness of either the nature of things or of his own city held him, who, with one man slain, believed that another would be lacking who would want the same, when a Tarquin was found after so many kings had been cut down by sword and thunderbolts!

Sed uitam accipere debuit, ob hoc tamen <non> habere illum parentis loco, quia in ius dandi beneficii iniuria uenerat; non enim seruauit is, qui non interfecit, nec beneficium dedit, sed missionem.

But he ought to accept life, yet for this reason <not> to have him in the place of a parent, because he had come into the right of giving a benefit by injury; for he did not preserve, who did not kill, nor did he give a benefit, but a remission.

[21] Illud magis uenire in aliquam disputationem potest, quid faciendum sit captiuo, cui redemptionis pretium homo prostituti corporis et infamis ore promittit. Patiar me ab inpuro seruari? seruatus deinde quam illi gratiam referam?

[21] That rather can come into some disputation: what is to be done with a captive, to whom the price of redemption is promised by a man of a prostituted body and infamous mouth. Shall I permit myself to be preserved by an impure man? Then, once preserved, what gratitude shall I repay to him?

uiuam cum obsceno? non uiuam cum redemptore? Quid ergo placeat, dicam: etiam a tali accipiam pecuniam, quam pro capite dependam, accipiam autem tamquam creditum, non tamquam beneficium; soluam illi pecuniam et, si occasio fuerit seruandi periclitantem, seruabo; in amicitiam, quae similes iungit, non descendam, nec seruatoris illum loco numerabo sed feneratoris, cui sciam reddendum, quod accepi.

Shall I live with an obscene man? Shall I not live with
a redeemer? So what should be acceptable, I will say: even from such a one
I will accept money, which I will pay for my head as ransom; I will accept it,
however, as a loan, not as a benefaction;
I will pay him the money, and, if there is an occasion to save
him when he is in peril, I will save him; into friendship, which joins like to like,
I will not descend, nor will I count him in the place of a savior but
of a moneylender, to whom I know that what I received must be returned.

Est aliquis dignus, a quo beneficium accipiam, sed danti nociturum est; ideo non accipiam, quia ille paratus est mihi cum incommodo aut etiam periculo suo prodesse. Defensurus est me reum, sed illo patrocinio regem sibi facturus inimicum; inimicus sum, si, cum ille pro me periclitari uelit, ego, quod facilius est, non facio, ut sine illo pericliter. Ineptum et friuolum hoc Hecaton ponit exemplum Arcesilai, quem ait a filio familiae adlatam pecuniam non accepisse, ne ille patrem sordidum offenderet; quid fecit laude dignum, quod furtum non recepit, quod maluit non accipere quam reddere?

There is someone worthy, from whom I may receive a benefaction, but it would be harmful to the giver; therefore I will not receive it, because he is prepared to benefit me with his own inconvenience or even peril. He will defend me, the accused, but by that advocacy he will make the king an enemy to himself; I am an enemy, if, when he wishes to imperil himself for me, I do not do what is easier, namely, to imperil myself without him. Inept and frivolous—this example Hecaton sets forth of Arcesilaus, whom he says did not accept money brought by a son of the household, lest that man offend his mean father; what did he do worthy of praise, that he did not receive theft, that he preferred not to take rather than to give back?

Quae est enim alienam rem non accipere moderatio? Si exemplo magni animi opus est, utamur Graecini Iulii, uiri egregii, quem C. Caesar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior uir erat, quam esse quemquam tyranno expedit. Is cum ab amicis conferentibus ad inpensam ludorum pecunias acciperet, magnam pecuniam a Fabio Persico missam non accepit et obiurgantibus iis, qui non aestimant mittentes, sed missa, quod repudiasset: 'Ego' inquit 'ab eo beneficium accipiam, a quo propinationem accepturus non sum?' Cum illi Rebilus consularis, homo eiusdem infamiae, maiorem summam misisset instaretque, ut accipi iuberet: 'Rogo' inquit 'ignoscas; et a Persico non accepi.' Vtrum hoc munera accipere est an senatum legere?

For what moderation is there, then, in not accepting another man’s property? If we need an example of great spirit, let us use Julius Graecinus, an outstanding man, whom Gaius Caesar killed for this one reason: that he was a better man than it is expedient for any tyrant that anyone be. When he was receiving monies from friends contributing to the expense of the games, he did not accept a large sum sent by Fabius Persicus; and when those who evaluate not the senders but the things sent were scolding him because he had refused it, he said: “Shall I receive a benefit from one from whom I would not accept a propination (a toast)?” When Rebilus, a consular, a man of the same infamy, had sent him a greater sum and was pressing that he order it to be accepted, he said: “I beg you, pardon me; I did not accept from Persicus either.” Is this to accept gifts, or to choose a senate?

[22] Cum accipiendum iudicauerimus, hilares accipiamus profitentes gaudium, et id danti manifestum sit, ut fructum praesentem capiat; iusta enim causa laetitiae est laetum amicum uidere, iustior fecisse; quam grate ad nos peruenisse indicemus effusis adfectibus, quos non ipso tantum audiente sed ubique testemur. Qui grate beneficium accipit, primam eius pensionem soluit.

[22] When we have judged that it should be received, let us receive cheerfully,
professing joy, and let this be manifest to the giver, so that
he may take present fruit; for a just cause of joy
is to see a glad friend, a more just one, to have made him so; let us indicate how gratefully
it has come to us by effusive affections, which
we attest not only with him himself as hearer but everywhere. He who
gratefully receives a benefit pays its first installment.

[23] Sunt quidam, qui nolint nisi secreto accipere; testem beneficii et conscium uitant; quos scias licet male cogitare. Quomodo danti in tantum producenda notitia est muneris sui, in quantum delectatura est, cui datur, ita accipienti adhibenda contio est; quod pudet debere, ne acceperis. Quidam furtiue gratias agunt et in angulo et ad aurem; non est ista uerecundia, sed infitiandi genus; ingratus est, qui remotis arbitris agit gratias.

[23] There are some who are unwilling to receive except in secret; they avoid a witness of the benefaction and one privy to it; such men, you may know, are thinking ill. Just as for the giver the notice of his gift is to be prolonged only so far as it will delight the one to whom it is given, so for the recipient an audience is to be admitted; what it shames you to owe, do not accept. Some give thanks furtively, both in a corner and into the ear; that is not modesty, but a kind of denial; ungrateful is he who gives thanks with the witnesses removed.

Quidam nolunt nomina secum fieri nec interponi pararios nec signatores aduocari, <uix> chirographum dare; idem faciunt, qui dant operam, ut beneficium in ipsos conlatum quam ignotissimum sit. Verentur palam ferre, ut sua potius uirtute quam alieno adiutorio consecuti dicantur; rariores in eorum officiis sunt, quibus uitam aut dignitatem debent, et, dum opinionem clientium timent, grauiorem subeunt ingratorum.

Some do not want names to be drawn up with them, nor intermediaries to be interposed, nor signatories to be called in, they scarcely will give a chirograph; the same do their utmost that the benefit conferred upon them be as unknown as possible. They fear to bear it openly, so that they may be said to have achieved it by their own virtue rather than by another’s aid; they are the rarer in their offices toward those to whom they owe life or dignity, and, while they fear the appearance of being clients, they undergo the graver one of being ungrateful.

[24 Alii pessime locuntur de optime meritis. Tutius est quosdam offendere quam demeruisse; argumentum enim nihil debentium odio quaerunt; atqui nihil magis praestandum est, quam ut memoria nobis meritorum haereat, quae subinde reficienda est, quia nec referre potest gratiam, nisi qui meminit, <et>, qui meminit,> eam refert. Nec delicate accipiendum est nec submisse et humiliter; nam qui neclegens est in accipiendo, cum omne beneficium recens pateat, quid faciat, cum prima eius uoluptas refrixit?

[24 Others speak very badly about those who have deserved optimally. It is safer to offend certain people than to have obliged them; for they seek, from hatred, an argument of owing nothing; and yet nothing is more to be provided than that the memory of merits cling to us, which must be refreshed from time to time, because he cannot repay gratitude, unless he remembers, <and>, he who remembers,> repays it. Nor must one receive a benefit delicately nor submissively and humbly; for he who is negligent in receiving, when every benefit, being fresh, lies open, what will he do when its first pleasure has cooled?

Alius accipit fastidiose, tamquam qui dicat: 'Non quidem mihi opus est, sed quia tam ualde uis, faciam tibi mei potestatem'; alius supine, ut dubium praestanti relinquat, an senserit; alius uix labra diduxit et ingratior, quam si tacuisset, fuit. Loquendum est pro magnitudine rei inpensius et illa adicienda: 'Plures, quam putas, obligasti' (nemo enim non gaudet beneficium suum latius patere); 'nescis, quid mihi praestiteris, sed scire te oportet, quanto plus sit, quam existimas' (statim gratus est, qui se onerat); 'numquam tibi referre gratiam potero; illud certe non desinam ubique confiteri me referre non posse.'

Another receives fastidiously, as if one who says: 'I do not indeed have need, but because you so very much wish, I will put myself in your power'; another, supinely, so that he leaves it doubtful to the bestower whether he has perceived it; another scarcely parted his lips and was more ungrateful than if he had been silent. One must speak, in proportion to the magnitude of the matter, more earnestly, and these things are to be added: 'You have obligated more persons than you suppose' (for no one fails to rejoice that his beneficence extends more widely); 'you do not know what you have rendered to me, but it behooves you to know how much more it is than you estimate' (he is at once grateful who burdens himself); 'never shall I be able to return gratitude to you; this certainly I shall not cease everywhere to confess: that I am not able to repay.'

[25] Nullo magis Caesarem Augustum demeruit et ad alia inpetranda facilem sibi reddidit Furnius, quam quod, cum patri Antonianas partes secuto ueniam inpetrasset, dixit: 'Hanc unam, Caesar, habeo iniuriam tuam: effecisti, ut et uiuerem et morerer ingratus.' Quid est tam grati animi, quam nullo modo sibi satis facere, quam ne ad spem quidem exaequandi umquam beneficii accedere? His atque eiusmodi uocibus id agamus, ut uoluntas nostra non lateat, sed aperiatur et luceat. Verba cessent licet: si, quemadmodum debemus, adfecti sumus, conscientia eminebit in uoltu.

[25] By nothing did Furnius more oblige Caesar Augustus and make him easy to himself for obtaining other things than by this: when he had obtained pardon for his father, who had followed the Antonian party, he said: 'This one injury, Caesar, I have from you: you have brought it about that I both live and die ungrateful.' What is so of a grateful spirit as never in any way to make satisfaction to itself, as not even to approach the hope of ever equaling the benefaction? By these and suchlike words let us aim that our will not lie hidden, but be opened and shine. Let words cease, if you please: if we are affected as we ought, conscience will stand out in the countenance.

Qui gratus futurus est, statim, dum accipit, de reddendo cogitet. Chrysippus quidem ait illum uelut in certamen cursus conpositum et carceribus inclusum opperiri debere tempus suum, ad quod uelut dato signo prosiliat; et quidem magna illi contentione opus est, magna celeritate, ut consequatur antecedentem.

He who is going to be grateful should, immediately while he receives, think about repaying. Chrysippus indeed says that he ought to await his time as though set in a contest of running and enclosed in the starting-gates, at which, as at a given signal, he may leap forth; and indeed he has need of great contention and great celerity, to overtake the one ahead.

[26] Videndum est nunc, quid maxime faciat ingratos. Facit aut nimius sui suspectus et insitum mortalitati uitium se suaque mirandi aut auiditas aut inuidia. Incipiamus a primo.

[26] We must now see what most makes people ungrateful. It is either an excessive suspiciousness on one’s own part, and the vice inborn to mortality of marveling at oneself and one’s own things, or avidity, or envy. Let us begin with the first.

Nemo non benignus est sui iudex; inde est, ut omnia meruisse se existimet et in solutum accipiat nec satis suo pretio se aestimatum putet. 'Hoc mihi dedit, sed quam sero, sed post quot labores? quanto consequi plura potuissem, si illum aut illum ita me colere maluissem?

Everyone is a kindly judge of himself; hence it is, that he thinks he has merited all things and accepts it as in full discharge, nor does he think himself estimated at his proper price. “He gave this to me, but how late, but after how many labors? how much more could I have secured, if I had preferred this man or that to court me thus?”

non hoc speraueram; in turbam coniectus sum; tam exiguo dignum

I had not hoped for this; I was thrown into the crowd; deemed worthy of so little.

[27] me iudicauit? honestius praeteriri fuit.' Cn. Lentulus augur, diuitiarum maximum exemplum, ante quam illum libertini pauperem facerent, hic, qui quater miliens sestertium suum uidit (proprie dixi; nihil enim amplius quam uidit), ingenii fuit sterilis, tam pusilli quam animi. Cum esset auarissimus, nummos citius emittebat quam uerba: tanta illi inopia erat sermonis.

[27] ‘He judged me? It would have been more honorable to be passed over.’ Cn. Lentulus, augur, the greatest exemplar of riches, before his freedmen made him poor—this man, who looked upon his 4,000,000 sesterces (I have spoken precisely; for he did nothing more than look at them)—was barren of talent, as paltry in spirit. Although he was most avaricious, he sent out coins faster than words: so great was his poverty of speech.

Hic cum omnia incrementa sua diuo Augusto deberet, ad quem adtulerat paupertatem sub onere nobilitatis laborantem, princeps iam ciuitatis et pecunia et gratia subinde <de> Augusto solebat queri dicens a studiis se abductum; nihil tantum in se congestum esse, quantum perdidisset relicta eloquentia. At illi inter alia hoc quoque diuus Augustus praestiterat, quod illum derisu et labore inrito liberauerat. Non patitur auiditas quemquam esse gratum; numquam enim inprobae spei, quod datur, satis est, et maiora cupimus, quo maiora uenerunt, multoque concitatior est auaritia in magnarum opum congestu conlocata, ut flammae infinito acrior uis est, quo ex maiore incendio emicuit.

Here, although he owed all his increments to the deified Augustus—to whom he had brought his poverty struggling under the burden of nobility—now, a leader of the state and in both money and favor, he was wont repeatedly to complain about Augustus, saying that he had been abducted from his studies; that nothing had been heaped upon him as great as what he had lost with eloquence left behind. Yet to him, among other things, the deified Augustus had also rendered this: that he had freed him from derision and from unavailing toil. Avidity does not allow anyone to be grateful; for to shameless hope, what is given is never enough, and we desire greater things in proportion as greater things have come; and avarice is much more stirred when it is placed upon a congest of great wealth, just as the force of a flame is immeasurably sharper, the more it has flashed forth from a greater conflagration.

Aeque ambitio non patitur quemquam in ea mensura honorum conquiescere, quae quondam eius fuit inpudens uotum: nemo agit de tribunatu gratias, sed queritur, quod non est ad praeturam usque perductus; nec haec grata est, si deest consulatus; ne hic quidem satiat, si unus est. Vltra se cupiditas porrigit et felicitatem suam non intellegit, quia non, unde uenerit, respicit, sed quo tendat.

Likewise ambition does not allow anyone to rest in that measure of honors which once was his shameless vow: no one gives thanks for the tribunate, but complains that he has not been brought along as far as the praetorship; nor is this welcome if the consulship is lacking; not even this satisfies, if it is only one. Cupidity stretches beyond itself and does not understand its own felicity, because it does not look back to whence it has come, but to where it is tending.

[28] Omnibus his uehementius et inportunius malum est inuidia, quae nos inquietat, dum conparat: 'Hoc mihi praestitit, sed illi plus, sed illi maturius'; et deinde nullius causam agit, contra omnes sibi fauet. Quanto est simplicius, quanto prudentius beneficium acceptum augere, scire neminem tanti ab alio, quanti a se ipso aestimari! 'Plus accipere debui, sed illi facile non fuit plus dare; in multos diuidenda liberalitas erat; hoc initium est, boni consulamus et animum eius grate excipiendo euocemus; parum fecit, sed saepius faciet; illum mihi praetulit, et me multis; ille non est mihi par uirtutibus nec officiis, sed habuit suam Venerem; querendo non efficiam, ut maioribus dignus sim, sed ut datis indignus.

[28] More vehement and more importunate than all these is the evil of envy, which disquiets us while it compares: 'This he rendered to me, but to that man more, but to that man earlier'; and then it pleads the case of no one; it favors itself against all. How much simpler, how much more prudent to magnify the benefaction received, to know that no one is valued so highly by another as by himself! 'I ought to have received more, but for him it was not easy to give more; liberality had to be divided among many; this is a beginning; let us take it well and, by gratefully receiving it, let us call forth his spirit; he did too little, but he will do so more often; he preferred that man to me, and me to many; that man is not my equal in virtues nor in services, but he had his own Venus; by complaining I shall not bring it about that I am worthy of greater things, but that I am unworthy of the things given.

Plura illis hominibus turpissimis data sunt; quid ad rem? quam raro fortuna iudicat? Cottidie querimur malos esse felices; saepe, quae agellos pessimi cuiusque transierat, optimorum uirorum segetem grando percussit; fert sortem suam quisque ut in ceteris rebus ita in amicitiis.' Nullum est tam plenum beneficium, quod non uellicare malignitas possit, nullum tam angustum, quod non bonus interpres extendat.

More has been given to those most disgraceful men; what is that to the point? How rarely does Fortune judge? We complain daily that the wicked are fortunate; often the storm that had passed over the little fields of the worst of men has struck with hail the harvest of the best men; each one bears his own lot, as in other matters so in friendships. There is no benefit so full that malignity cannot pluck at it, none so narrow that a good interpreter cannot extend it.

Numquam deerunt causae querendi, si beneficia a deteriore parte spectaueris.

There will never be lacking causes for complaining, if you regard benefits from the worse side.

[29] Vide, quam iniqui sint diuinorum munerum aestimatores et quidem professi sapientiam: queruntur, quod non magnitudine corporum aequemus elephantos, uelocitate ceruos, leuitate aues, inpetu tauros, quod solida sit cutis beluis, decentior dammis, densior ursis, mollior fibris, quod sagacitate nos narium canes uincant, quod acie luminum aquilae, spatio aetatis corui, multa animalia nandi facilitate. Et cum quaedam ne coire quidem in idem natura patiatur, ut uelocitatem corporum et uires, ex diuersis ac dissidentibus bonis hominem non esse conpositum iniuriam uocant et neclegentes nostri deos, quod non bona ualetudo etiam uitiis inexpugnabilis data sit, quod non futuri scientia. Vix sibi temperant, quin eo usque inpudentiae prouehantur, ut naturam oderint, quod infra deos sumus, quod non in aequo illis stetimus.

[29]
See how iniquitous are the appraisers of divine gifts, and indeed men professing wisdom: they complain that we do not equal elephants in the magnitude of bodies, stags in velocity, birds in levity, bulls in impetus; that the skin (cutis) is solid in beasts, more becoming in hinds, denser in bears, softer than fibres; that in the sagacity of nostrils dogs surpass us, that eagles in the acumen of the eyes, ravens in the span of age, many animals in the facility of swimming. And whereas nature does not suffer certain things even to cohere in the same subject, such as the velocity of bodies and strength, they call it an injury that man is not composed out of diverse and dissentient goods, and they deem our gods negligent, because good health, inexpugnable even by vices, has not been given, because knowledge of the future has not been given. They scarcely restrain themselves from being carried to such a pitch of impudence as to hate nature, because we are beneath the gods, because we have not stood on equal footing with them.

Quanto satius est ad contemplationem tot tantorumque beneficiorum reuerti et agere gratias, quod nos in hoc pulcherrimo domicilio uoluerunt secundas sortiri, quod terrenis praefecerunt! Aliquis ea animalia conparat nobis, quorum potestas penes nos est? Quidquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit.

How much more satisfying it is to return to the contemplation
of so many and so great benefactions and to render thanks, that they willed us in this most beautiful domicile
to draw the second lot, that they set us over terrestrial things! Does anyone compare to us those animals, whose power
is in our hands? Whatever was denied to us could not
be given.

Proinde, quisquis es iniquus aestimator sortis humanae, cogita, quanta nobis tribuerit parens noster, quanto ualentiora animalia sub iugum miserimus, quanto uelociora consequamur, quam nihil sit mortale non sub ictu nostro positum. Tot uirtutes accepimus, tot artes, animum denique, cui nihil non eodem, quo intendit, momento peruium est, sideribus uelociorem, quorum post multa saecula futuros cursus antecedit; tantum deinde frugum, tantum opum, tantum rerum aliarum super alias aceruatarum. Circumeas licet cuncta et, quia nihil totum inuenies, quod esse te malles, ex omnibus singula excerpas, quae tibi dari uelles: bene aestimata naturae indulgentia confitearis necesse est in deliciis te illi fuisse.

Accordingly, whoever you are, inequitable assessor of the human lot, consider how much our Parent has bestowed on us: by how much stronger animals we have sent under the yoke, by how much swifter we overtake, how there is nothing mortal that is not set under our stroke. So many virtues we have received, so many arts, and, finally, a mind to which nothing is not passable in the very moment to which it intends—swifter than the stars, whose courses to come after many ages it anticipates; then so great an abundance of crops, so much opulence, so many other things piled up one upon another. You may go around all things, and, because you will find nothing complete that you would rather be, you may pick out from all things the several items you would wish to be granted to you: with Nature’s indulgence well appraised, you must confess that you have been her darling.

Ita est: carissimos nos habuerunt di inmortales habentque, et, qui maximus tribui honos potuit, ab ipsis proximos conlocauerunt. Magna accepimus, maiora non cepimus.

It is so: the immortal gods have held us most dear
and do hold us, and—what greatest honor could be bestowed—
they have placed us next to themselves. We have received great things;
greater we could not have contained.

[30] Haec, mi Liberalis, necessaria credidi, et quia loquendum aliquid de maximis beneficiis erat, cum de minutis loqueremur, et quia inde manat etiam in cetera huius detestabilis uitii audacia. Cui enim respondebit grate, quod munus existimabit aut magnum aut reddendum, qui summa beneficia spernit? cui salutem, cui spiritum debebit, qui uitam accepisse se a dis negat, quam cottidie ab illis petit?

[30]
These things, my Liberalis, I believed necessary, both because
something had to be spoken about the greatest benefits, while we were
speaking about the minute ones, and because from there there flows even into the rest
the audacity of this detestable vice. For he who spurns the highest benefits—
to whom will he respond gratefully, what gift will he deem either great or to be repaid?
to whom will he owe safety, to whom spirit, he who denies that he has received life from the gods,
which he asks from them every day?

Quicumque ergo gratos esse docet, et hominum causam agit et deorum, quibus nullius rei indigentibus, positis extra desiderium, referre nihilo minus gratiam possumus. Non est, quod quisquam excusationem mentis ingratae ab infirmitate atque inopia petat et dicat: 'Quid enim faciam et quomodo? quando superioribus dominisque rerum omnium gratiam referam?' Referre facile est, si auarus es, sine inpendio, si iners, <sine> opera.

Whoever therefore teaches men to be grateful, both pleads the cause of men and of the gods,
who, being in need of nothing, set beyond desire, we can nonetheless return gratitude to.
There is no ground for anyone to seek an excuse for an ungrateful mind from weakness and from want
and to say: 'What then shall I do, and how? when shall I return thanks to my superiors and the lords of all things?'
To return it is easy: if you are avaricious, without expenditure; if inert, <without> effort.

Eodem quidem momento, quo obligatus es, si uis, cum quolibet paria fecisti, quoniam, qui libenter beneficium accipit, reddidit.

At that very moment, in which you are obligated, if you wish, you have made yourself even with anyone, since he who willingly accepts a benefaction has repaid it.

[31] Hoc ex paradoxis Stoicae sectae minime mirabile, ut mea fert opinio, aut incredibile est eum, qui libenter accipit, beneficium reddidisse. Nam cum omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque, quantum uoluit; et cum pietas, fides, iustitia, omnis denique uirtus intra se perfecta sit, etiam si illi manum exerere non licuit, gratus quoque homo esse potest uoluntate. Quotiens, quod proposuit, quisque consequitur, capit operis sui fructum.

[31] This, from the paradoxes of the Stoic sect, is by no means marvelous, as my opinion holds, or incredible: that he who willingly receives has repaid the benefaction. For since we refer all things to the mind, each has done as much as he willed; and since piety, faith, justice, in short every virtue is perfect within itself, even if it was not permitted him to stretch out his hand, a man can also be grateful by will. As often as, what he has proposed, each attains, he takes the fruit of his work.

Qui beneficium dat, quid proponit? prodesse ei, cui dat, et uoluptati esse. Si, quod uoluit, effecit peruenitque ad me animus eius ac mutuo gaudio adfecit, tulit, quod petit.

He who gives a benefaction, what does he propose? To profit the one to whom he gives it, and to be a pleasure. If he has effected what he wished, and his animus has reached me and has affected me with mutual joy, he has carried off what he sought.

Non enim in uicem aliquid sibi reddi uoluit; aut non fuit beneficium, sed negotiatio. Bene nauigauit, qui quem destinauit portum tenuit; teli iactus certae manus peregit officium, si petita percussit; beneficium qui dat, uult excipi grate: habet, quod uoluit, si bene acceptum est. Sed sperauit emolumenti aliquid: non fuit hoc beneficium, cuius proprium est nihil de reditu cogitare.

For he did not wish something to be rendered back to himself in return; or else it was not a benefaction, but a negotiation. He sailed well, who reached the port he had designated; the cast of a missile by a sure hand has fulfilled its office, if it struck what was sought; he who gives a benefaction wants it to be received gratefully: he has what he wanted, if it has been well accepted. But he hoped for some emolument: this was not a benefaction, whose proper mark is to think nothing about return.

Quod accipiebam, eo animo accepi, quo dabatur: reddidi. Alioqui pessima optimae rei condicio est: ut gratus sim, ad fortunam mittor. Si illa inuita respondere non possum, sufficit animus animo.

What I was receiving,
I accepted with that spirit with which it was being given: I have repaid it. Otherwise the worst condition of the best thing is this:
that, in order to be grateful, I am sent to Fortune.
I am sent. If, she unwilling, I cannot respond, it suffices
spirit to spirit.

'Quid ergo? non, quidquid potuero, et faciam, ut reddam, et temporum rerumque occasionem sequar et inplere eius sinum cupiam, a quo aliquid accepi?' Sed malo loco beneficium est, nisi et excussis manibus esse grato licet.

'What then? shall I not, whatever I shall be able, also do, so that I may render back, and follow the occasion of times and things, and desire to fill his lap, from whom I received something?' But the benefit is in a bad position, unless it is permitted to be grateful even with hands shaken out.

[32] 'Qui accepit' inquit 'beneficium, licet animo benignissimo acceperit, nondum consummauit officium suum; restat enim pars reddendi; sicut in lusu est aliquid pilam scite ac diligenter excipere, sed non dicitur bonus lusor, nisi qui apte et expedite remisit, quam acceperat.' Exemplum hoc dissimile est; quare? quia huius rei laus in corporis motu est et in agilitate, non in animo; explicari itaque totum debet, de quo oculis iudicatur. Nec tamen ideo non bonum lusorem dicam, qui pilam, ut oportebat, excepit, si per ipsum mora, quo minus remitteret, non fuit.

[32] 'He who has received,' he says, 'a benefit, even if with the most benign mind he has received it, has not yet consummated his duty; for a part of repaying remains; just as in play it is something to catch the ball skillfully and diligently, but he is not called a good player, unless he aptly and expeditiously sent back what he had received.' This example is dissimilar; why? because the praise of this matter is in the movement of the body and in agility, not in the mind; therefore the whole of that which is judged by the eyes ought to be unfolded. Nor, however, for that reason will I refuse to call him a good player, who the ball, as was fitting, caught, if the delay, which prevented him from sending it back, was not through himself.

'Sed quamuis' inquit 'arti ludentis nihil desit, quia partem quidem fecit, sed partem, quam non fecit, potest facere, lusus ipse inperfectus est, qui consummatur uicibus mittendi ac remittendi.' Nolo diutius hoc refellere; existimemus ita esse, desit aliquid lusui, non lusori; sic et in hoc, de quo disputamus, deest aliquid rei datae, cui par alia debetur, non animo, qui animum parem sibi nanctus est et, quantum in illo est, quod uoluit, effecit.

'But although,' he says, 'nothing is lacking to the art of the player, because he has indeed done a part, but the part which he has not done he can do, the game itself is imperfect, which is consummated by turns of sending and remitting.' I do not wish to refute this longer; let us suppose it to be so—let something be lacking to the game, not to the player; so also in this, about which we are disputing, something is lacking to the thing given, to which an equal counterpart is owed, not to the mind, which has found a mind equal to itself and, so far as is in that man, has effected what he wished.

[33] Beneficium mihi dedit, accepi non aliter, quam ipse accipi uoluit: iam habet, quod petit, et quod unum petit, ergo gratus sum. Post hoc usus mei restat et aliquod ex homine grato commodum; hoc non inperfecti officii reliqua pars est, sed perfecti accessio. Facit Phidias statuam; alius est fructus artis, alius artificii: artis est fecisse, quod uoluit, artificii fecisse cum fructu; perfecit opus suum Phidias, etiam si non uendidit.

[33] He gave me a benefaction; I received it no otherwise than he himself wished it to be received: now he has what he seeks, and the one thing he seeks; therefore I am grateful. After this, my use remains and some advantage from a grateful man; this is not the remaining part of an imperfect duty, but an accession of a perfect one. Phidias makes a statue; one thing is the fruit of art, another of craftsmanship: it is of art to have done what he wished, of craftsmanship to have done it with profit; Phidias perfected his work, even if he did not sell it.

Triplex illi fructus est operis sui: unus conscientiae; hunc absoluto opere percipit; alter famae; tertius utilitatis, quem adlatura est aut gratia aut uenditio aut aliqua commoditas. Sic beneficii fructus primus ille est conscientiae: hunc percipit, qui, quo uoluit, munus suum pertulit; secundus <et tertius> est et famae et eorum, quae praestari in uicem possunt. Itaque cum benigne acceptum est beneficium, qui dedit, gratiam quidem iam recepit, mercedem nondum; debeo itaque, quod extra beneficium est, ipsum quidem bene accipiendo persolui.

He has a triple fruit of his work: one of conscience; this he perceives when the work is complete; another of fame; a third of utility, which either favor or sale or some commodity will bring. Thus the first fruit of a beneficium is that of conscience: this he perceives who has carried his gift whither he wished; the second <and third> are both of fame and of those things which can be rendered in return. And so, when the beneficium has been kindly received, he who gave it has indeed already received gratitude, not yet recompense; I owe, therefore, that which is outside the beneficium—the beneficium itself I have indeed paid by receiving it well.

[34] 'Quid ergo?' inquit 'rettulit gratiam, qui nihil fecit?' Primum fecit: bono animo bonum optulit et, quod est amicitiae, ex aequo. Post deinde aliter beneficium, aliter creditum soluitur; non est, quod expectes, ut solutionem tibi ostendam; res inter animos geritur. Quod dico, non uidebitur durum, quamuis primo contra opinionem tuam pugnet, si te commodaueris mihi et cogitaueris plures esse res quam uerba.

[34] 'What then?' he says, 'has he returned gratitude, who did nothing?' First, he did do something: with good spirit he proffered a good, and—what belongs to friendship—on equal terms. Then next, a benefaction is discharged in one way, a loan in another; there is no reason for you to expect that I should show you the payment; the matter is conducted between souls. What I say will not seem harsh, although at first it fights against your opinion, if you will lend yourself to me and consider that there are more realities than words.

Ingens copia est rerum sine nomine, quas non propriis adpellationibus notamus, sed alienis commodatisque: pedem et nostrum dicimus et lecti et ueli et carminis, canem et uenaticum et marinum et sidus; quia non sufficimus, ut singulis singula adsignemus, quotiens opus est, mutuamur. Fortitudo est uirtus pericula iusta contemnens aut scientia periculorum repellendorum, excipiendorum, prouocandorum; dicimus tamen et gladiatorem fortem uirum et seruum nequam, quem in contemptum mortis temeritas inpulit. Parsimonia est scientia uitandi sumptus superuacuos aut ars re familiari moderate utendi; parcissimum tamen hominem uocamus pusilli animi et contracti, cum infinitum intersit inter modum et angustias.

There is a vast copiousness of things without a name, which we mark not by proper appellations but by alien and borrowed ones: we call “foot” both our own and that of a couch and of a sail and of a poem, “dog” both hunting and sea and a star; because we are not sufficient to assign to individuals their several terms whenever there is need, we borrow. Fortitude is the virtue contemning just perils, or the knowledge of repelling, meeting, and provoking perils; yet we call both a gladiator a brave man and a worthless slave, whom temerity has impelled into contempt of death. Parsimony is the knowledge of avoiding superfluous expenses, or the art of using the household estate moderately; yet we call “most sparing” a man of a small and contracted spirit, whereas there is an infinite difference between measure and narrowness.

Haec alia sunt natura, sed efficit inopia sermonis, ut et hunc et illum parcum uocemus, ut et ille fortis dicatur cum ratione fortuita despiciens et hic sine ratione in pericula excurrens. Sic beneficium est et actio, ut diximus, benefica et ipsum, quod datur per illam actionem, ut pecunia, ut domus, ut praetexta; unum utrique nomen est, uis quidem ac potestas longe alia.

These things are of a different nature, but the poverty of language brings it about that we call both this man and that one “parcus,” and that that man is said to be brave, who with reason despises fortuitous things, and this one, who without reason rushes out into dangers. Thus “benefit” is both the beneficent action, as we have said, and the very thing that is given through that action—such as money, a house, a praetexta; one and the same name belongs to both, but the force and the power are far different.

[35] Itaque adtende, iam intellegis nihil me, quod opinio tua refugiat, dicere: illi beneficio, quod actio perficit, relata gratia est, si illud beneuole excipimus; illud alterum, quod re continetur, nondum reddidimus, sed uolemus reddere. Voluntati uoluntate satis fecimus, rei rem debemus. Itaque, quamuis rettulisse illum gratiam dicamus, qui beneficium libenter accipit, iubemus tamen et simile aliquid ei, quod accepit, reddere.

[35] Therefore, pay attention, you already understand that I am saying nothing which your opinion shrinks from: for that benefit, which an action accomplishes, gratitude has been returned, if we receive it benevolently; that other thing, which is contained in the thing, we have not yet repaid, but we will wish to repay. We have satisfied will with will, to the thing we owe a thing. Therefore, although we say that he has rendered thanks who gladly accepts a benefit, we nevertheless bid him also to return something similar to that which he received.

A consuetudine quaedam, quae dicimus, abhorrent, deinde alia uia ad consuetudinem redeunt: negamus iniuriam accipere sapientem, tamen, qui illum pugno percusserit, iniuriarum damnabitur; negamus stulti quidquam esse, et tamen eum, qui rem aliquam stulto subripuit, furti condemnabimus; insanire omnes dicimus, nec omnes curamus elleboro; his ipsis, quos uocamus insanos, et suffragium et iuris dictionem conmittimus. Sic dicimus eum, qui beneficium bono animo accipit, gratiam rettulisse, nihilo minus illum in aere alieno relinquimus gratiam relaturum, etiam cum rettulit. Exhortatio est illa, non infitiatio <beneficii, ne> beneficia timeamus, ne ut intolerabili sarcina pressi deficiamus animo.

Certain things, which we say, are at variance with custom, then by another road return to custom: we deny that the wise man receives an injury, nevertheless he who has struck him with a fist will be condemned for injuries; we deny that anything is the fool’s, and yet him who has filched some property from a fool we will condemn for theft; we say that all are insane, nor do we treat all with hellebore; to these very persons whom we call insane we entrust both the vote and jurisdiction. Thus we say that he who accepts a benefaction with a good mind has returned gratitude, nonetheless we leave him in debt to return gratitude, even when he has returned it. That is an exhortation, not a denial <of the benefit, lest> we fear benefits, lest, pressed by an intolerable burden, we fail in spirit.

'Bona mihi donata sunt et fama defensa, detractae sordes, spiritus <seruatus> et libertas spiritu potior: et quomodo referre gratiam potero? quando ille ueniet dies, quo illi animum meum ostendam?' Hic ipse est, quo ille suum ostendit. Excipe beneficium, amplexare, gaude, non quod accipias, sed quod reddas debiturusque sis; non adibis tam magnae rei periculum, ut casus ingratum facere te possit.

'Good things have been given to me, and my fame defended, the stains stripped away,
my spirit preserved, and a liberty more powerful than breath:
and how shall I be able to render gratitude? when will that day come,
on which I may show him my mind?' This is the very day, on which he showed his own.
Receive the benefit,
embrace it, rejoice, not because you receive, but because you will owe to repay
and be a debtor; you will not enter the peril of so great a matter,
such that chance can make you ungrateful.

Nullas tibi proponam difficultates, ne despondeas animum, ne laborum ac longae seruitutis expectatione deficias; non differo te, de praesentibus fiat. Numquam eris gratus, nisi statim es. Quid ergo facies? non arma sumenda sunt: fortasse erunt; non maria emetienda: fortasse etiam uentis minantibus solues.

I will propose to you no difficulties, lest you despond in spirit, lest you faint under the expectation of labors and long servitude; I do not defer you—let it be done from present things. You will never be grateful, unless you are so immediately. What then will you do? Arms are not to be taken up: perhaps they will be; the seas are not to be traversed: perhaps you will even loose with the winds threatening.

Vis reddere beneficium? benigne accipe; rettulisti gratiam, non ut soluisse te putes, sed ut securior debeas.

Do you wish to return a benefit? Accept it kindly; you have returned gratitude, not so that you may think yourself to have paid it off,
but that you may owe the more securely.