Martin of Braga: De ira

[1] Dum simul positi dudum mutuae conlationis adloquio frueremur, illud inter cetera tuae a me diligentia caritatis elicuit, ut de passibilitate irae vel qualitatis eius effectibus brevi tibi aliqua libello digererem. Parui protinus libens, paucisque haec tuo studio de fugienda ira, saltem si id non eveniat, de lenienda disserui. Quidam ex sapientibus iram dixerunt brevem esse insaniam.

[1] While at the same time we had for a while enjoyed the mutual colloquy of exchange, that thing among other proofs of your diligence of charity drew forth from me that I should in a short little book set forth for you something concerning the passibility of anger or concerning its quality and effects. I at once obeyed gladly, and in a few words, for your zeal, I treated matters of fleeing anger, or at least, if that be not possible, of softening it. Some of the wise have called anger a brief madness.

Aeque enim sui est impotens, obliviscitur honestatem, affectuum immemor, rationi consiliisque praeclusa, dum vanis agitata causis, ad considerationem iustitiae inhabilis, et ruinae fit simul, superque id quod oppresserit frangitur.

For equally powerless over himself, he forgets honesty, is unmindful of his affections, shut off from reason and counsels; while stirred by vain causes, unfit for the consideration of justice, he becomes at once a ruin, and moreover is broken by that which has overwhelmed him.

De habitu irae.

ON THE HABIT OF ANGER.

[2] Habitus audax, et minax vultus, tristis frons, et torvus intuitus, faciei aut pallor aut rubor, aestuat ab imis praecordiis sanguis, et colore verso torva ex pulcherrimis foedavit, flagrant et micant oculi, tremunt labra, comprimuntur dentes, crebro et vehementius acto suspirio quatitur pectus, gemitus anxius, et paulo explanato sono sermo est praeceps, rabida vocis eruptio colla distendit, inquietae manus, saepiusque compulsi coactus digitorum, dentes strident, citatus gradus, pulsataque pedibus humus, artus trepidi, et instabili fluctuatione totum concitum corpus, magnas ex se proferens minas, ‚ horribilis ira depravat se atque intumescit, ita ut nescias utrum magis detestabile sit vitium an deforme. Qualem putas intus esse animum, cuius extra imago tam foeda est? Cetera vitia absconduntur et in abdito refugiunt; ira se prodit et in facie exit, quantoque maior est, tanto et manifestius exardescit.

[2] A bold bearing, and a threatening face, a sad brow, and a fierce gaze; the complexion either pale or flushed; the blood boils from the lowest heart-chambers, and with the color turned the fierce visage has disfigured the most beautiful; the eyes blaze and glisten, the lips tremble, the teeth are clenched, the breast is shaken often and more violently by a driven sigh, an anxious groan, and speech, when slightly drawn out, is headlong; a raging outburst of the voice distends the neck, the hands are restless, more often driven to compulsive movements of the fingers, the teeth grate, the step is hurried, the ground is beaten with the feet, the limbs tremble, and the whole body is stirred with an unstable fluctuation, uttering great threats from itself — horrible anger corrupts and swells itself, so that you do not know whether the vice is more to be detested or more deformed. What sort of mind do you think it is inwardly, whose outward image is so foul? Other vices hide and flee into secret places; anger betrays itself and comes forth in the face, and the greater it is, the more plainly it flares up.

Nihil ergo minus quam irasci prudentem decet.

Nothing, therefore, is less fitting for a prudent man than to be angry.

De effectibus irae.

On the effects of anger.

[3] Ira omnia ex optimo et iustissimo in contrarium mutat. Quemcumque obtinuerit, nullius eum meminisse officii sinit. Da eam patri, inimicus est.

[3] Anger turns everything from the best and most just into the contrary. Whomever it has seized, it allows him to remember no duty. Give it to a father, it is an enemy.

Da filio, parricida est. Da matri, noverca est. Da civi, hostis est.

Give it to the son, he is a parricide. Give it to the mother, she is a stepmother. Give it to the fellow-citizen, he is an enemy.

Da regi, tyrannus est. Ita nec in proeliis utilis invenitur, quia in temeritatem prona est, et pericula dum inferre vult, non cavet; venitque in aliam potestatem, dum non est in sua. Ira ex proprio libito iudicat, audire non vult, nec patrocinio relinquit locum.

Give it to a king, he is a tyrant. Thus he is found useful in battles not at all, because he is prone to rashness, and while he wishes to inflict dangers he takes no precautions; and he falls into another’s power while he is not in his own. Anger judges from its own will, will not hear, nor leaves any place for advocacy.

Iudicium suum eripi sibi, etiam si pravum sit, non sinit. Amat et tuetur errorem suum, nec vult argui, etiam si oculis manifesta veritas ingeratur. Honestior illi in male coeptis pertinacia quam correctio aestimatur.

He does not permit his judgment to be wrested from him, even if it is perverse. He loves and defends his error, and will not be argued with, even if truth manifest to the eyes is thrust upon him. To him pertinacity in ill-begun undertakings is esteemed more honorable than correction.

Quamvis enim vanae illam concitaverint res, perseverare vult, ne videatur sine causa coepisse. Et quod est iniquius, dum retinetur, fit pertinacior et augescit, quasi hoc ipsum graviter irasci iustae irae sit argumentum. Quod si quantum minatur, tantum valuerit, ob hoc ipsum quia terribilis est, amplius est invisa.

For although vain affairs have stirred her, she wills to persevere, lest she seem to have begun without cause. And that which is more unjust, while it is retained, becomes more pertinacious and increases, as if this very thing — to be severely angry — were a proof of righteous anger. But if it has had force only to the extent that it threatens, then for this very reason, because it is terrible, it is the more hated.

Si vero sine viribus est, contemptui est magis exposita, derisumque non effugit. Sed periculosius est timeri, tutius despici. Omnes alias passiones ira sibi subditas facit, nullaque est ambitio animi in quam non ira dominetur.

But if it lacks strength, it is the more exposed to contempt, and it does not escape being derided. Yet it is more perilous to be feared, safer to be despised. He makes all other passions subject to anger, and there is no ambition of the mind in which anger does not dominate.

Denique avaritiam, pessimum malum minimeque flexibile, ira calcat. Quotiens siquidem iratus animus opes suas adactus spargit? Quotiens magna aestimata pretio insignia proicit?

Finally, anger tramples avarice, the worst and least flexible evil. How often, when stirred, does an irate mind, driven on, scatter its riches? How often does it cast away distinctions esteemed at the greatest price?

Irae violentia repentina et universa est. Non paulatim procedit, sed dum incipit tota est, nec aliorum vitiorum more sollicitat animos, sed abducit. Cetera vitia inliciunt, ira vero, ut solent flumina procellaeque, praecipitat, nullaque magis urget, sive valet superba, sive frustratur insana.

The violence of anger is sudden and universal. It does not advance little by little, but when it begins it is whole, nor does it, like the manner of other vices, entice minds, but it drags them away. Other vices lure, but anger, like rivers and storms, casts down, and none presses more fiercely, whether proud it prevails or mad it is frustrated.

Alia vitia a ratione, ira autem a sanitate desciscit, nam nec repulsa in taedium agitur sui, sed ubi adversarius subtrahitur, morsus suos in semetipsam convertit. Cetera vitia singulos quosque corripiunt, ira autem interdum multos publice invadit. Nam numquam populus universus simul fornicandi cupiditate succensus est; nec in lucrum pecuniae spem suam tota simul civitas misit; nec honoris ambitio gregatim cunctos, sed viritim singulos, occupat.

Other vices part from reason, but wrath deserts soundness; for it is not driven into weariness of itself by repulse, but when the adversary is withdrawn it turns its bites upon itself. The other vices chastise each individual one by one, but anger at times invades many publicly. For never has an entire people at once been kindled with the desire of fornication; nor has an entire city at one time laid its hope in the gain of money; nor does ambition for honor seize all en masse, but man by man, individually, it occupies.

At vero in iram uno saepe agmine curritur catervatim.

But indeed into anger one often rushes in a single column, in crowds.

[4] In iram primum est non irasci; secundum cito desinere; tertium alienae quoque irae mederi. Primum est ergo ne incidamus in iram. Quod si acciderit, secundum remedium est ne in ira peccemus.

[4] Concerning anger, first: not to become angry; secondly: to cease quickly; third: to heal even another’s anger. Therefore the first is that we do not fall into anger. But if this should happen, the second remedy is that we do not sin in anger.

Nam sicut in corporum cura alia de conservanda sanitate, alia de restituenda praecepta sunt, alia de medendis morbo correptis; ita aliud est iram cohibere ne insurgat, aliud compescere iam erectam. Sicut enim pars superior et propinqua sideribus nec in nubem constringitur nec in turbinem vertitur, inferiora vero saepius fulminantur; eodem modo sublimis animus quietus semper et in statione tranquilla locatus, omnia infra se premens quibus ira contrahitur, modestus ac venerabilis invenitur. Animus autem qui in negotia multa discurrit et varia tentat, in multis incidit querelis.

For just as in the care of bodies some precepts are about preserving health, others about restoring it, and others about healing those seized by disease; so one thing is to restrain anger so that it does not arise, another to curb it once it has been raised. For just as the upper and nearer parts to the stars are neither bound into a cloud nor turned into a whirlwind, while the lower parts are more often struck by lightning; in the same way a high mind, calm and always placed in a tranquil station, pressing down everything beneath it by which anger is contracted, is found modest and venerable. But a mind that runs about in many affairs and tries various things falls into many quarrels.

Alius spem eius fallit, alius differt, alius intercipit, atque ita omnium rerum existit impatiens, et ex levissimis iratur causis, nunc personae, nunc negotio, nunc tempori, nunc loco, nunc sibi. Ut ergo quietus sit animus, non est multarum rerum actu lassandus, nec magnarum et supra vires appetitarum. Facile est enim levia aptare cervicibus et in utramlibet partem sine lapsu transferre.

Another frustrates his hope, another postpones it, another intercepts it, and thus he becomes impatient of all things, and is angered from the most trivial causes—now at a person, now at an affair, now at the time, now at the place, now at himself. Therefore, that the mind be quiet, it must not be wearied by the doing of many things, nor covet great matters beyond its strength. For it is easy to fit light matters upon the necks and to shift them to either side without falling.

[5] Contra primas ergo causas irae pugnandum est. Causa autem irae opinio est iniuriae, cui non facile est credendum. Nec apertis quidem manifestisque coniectationibus statim est accedendum, quia interdum falsa veri speciem ferunt.

[5] Therefore the first causes of anger must be fought against. The cause of anger, however, is the opinion of an injury, which is not easily to be believed. Nor even from open and manifest conjectures is one to proceed at once, for sometimes false things bear the guise (species) of truth.

Differendum semper est tempus. Dilatus dies aperiet veritatem. Non facile aures criminantibus pateant.

Time is always to be deferred. A delayed day will disclose the truth. Ears should not readily be open to those who accuse.

Sed hoc humanae naturae vitium suspectum notumque sit nobis, quod ea quae inviti audimus facile credimus et irascimur. Multi enim suspicionibus impelluntur, et ex vultu risuque alieno peiora interpretati innocentibus irascuntur. Plurimum mali credulitas facit.

But let this vice of human nature be suspected and known to us: that those things which we hear unwillingly we easily believe and grow angry. For many are impelled by suspicions, and, having interpreted worse from another’s face and smile, they become angry with the innocent. Credulity does very much harm.

Quamobrem saepe nec audiendum quidem est, atque ex animo tollenda suspicio. Numquam argumentatio deest, et coniecturae irritamenta fallacia. Simplicitate et benigna rerum aestimatione opus est uti.

Wherefore often it ought not even to be heard, and suspicion must be removed from the mind. Argumentation is never lacking, and conjectures are fallacious temptations. One must make use of simplicity and a benign estimation of things.

Nihil credere oportet, nisi quod manifeste incurrit in oculos, et quotiens suspicio apparet in animo, credulitas obiurgetur. Haec enim obiurgatio consuetudinem non facile credendi efficiet. Si non vis in iram incidere, ne fueris curiosus.

One ought to believe nothing except that which manifestly strikes the eyes, and whenever suspicion appears in the mind, credulity should be rebuked. For this rebuke will not easily create a habit of believing. If you do not wish to fall into anger, be not curious.

Qui inquirit quid de se dictum sit, et malignos sermones, etiam si secreto dicti sunt, eruit, ipse se inquietat. Dum enim prepetrantur, ad hoc perducuntur, ut videantur iniuriae. Sed in ea perpetratione alia defendenda sunt, alia donanda, alia deridenda, atque ita his modis praevenienda est ira.

He who inquires what has been said of himself, and roots out malicious speeches, even if they were spoken in secret, disturbs himself. For while they are being perpetrated they are brought to this end, that injuries may seem to have been done. But in that perpetration some things must be defended, others conceded, others derided, and thus by these methods anger must be prevented.

Multas iniurias transit prudens et plerasque non accipit, quia aut eas nescit aut, si scierit, in ludum eas iocumque convertit. Nam si quereletur, aut falsa suspicando aut levia adgravando, non ira ad illum, sed ipse venit ad iram, quae numquam arcessenda est, sed etiam cum inrepserit refutanda. Magni animi est despicere iniurias.

The prudent man endures many injuries and accepts most of them not, because either he does not know them or, if he knows them, he turns them into sport or jest. For if he were to complain, either by suspecting falsehoods or by exaggerating trifles, it is not anger that is brought upon him, but he himself comes to anger, which is never to be summoned, and even when it has crept in must be refuted. It is of great spirit to despise injuries.

Nam multi leves iniurias in se demisere, dum vindicant. Potius est non agnovisse quam ignovisse iniuriam. Enimvero ille magnus est et nobilis, qui more magnae ferae latratus minutorum canum securus exaudit.

For many have brought slight injuries upon themselves while they take vengeance. It is better to have not perceived than to have pardoned an injury. Indeed he is great and noble who, in the manner of a great wild beast, calmly hears the barking of little dogs.

Satius siquidem est dissimulare iniuriam quam ulcisci. Potentiorum vero iniuriae non tantum patientia, sed etiam hilari vultu ferendae sunt. Facient iterum, si te passum et se fecisse crediderint.

For indeed it is better to dissimulate an injury than to avenge it. The injuries of the more powerful, however, must be borne not only with patience but even with a cheerful countenance. They will do it again if they believe that you have borne it and that they themselves committed it.

Adeo ergo iniuriam saepe vindicare non expedit, ut nec fateri quidem expediat. Abstinendum itaque ab ira est, sive superior sit, qui lacessit, sive par, sive inferior. Cum superiore contendere furiosum est; cum pari anceps; cum inferiore iam sordidum.

So then it is often not expedient to avenge an injury to such a degree that it is not even expedient to confess it. Therefore one must abstain from anger, whether he who provokes is superior, or equal, or inferior. To contend with a superior is mad; with an equal, precarious; with an inferior, now sordid.

[6] Ex his autem quae solent offendere, alia renuntiantur nobis, alia ipsi audimus, alia et videmus. De his ergo quae narrantur, cito non debent credi, quia alii mentiuntur, ut decipiant; alii mentiri non existimant, quia et ipsi decepti sunt. Alius criminatione gratiam captat, et ut videatur loqui, fingit iniuriam.

[6] From those things, however, which are wont to offend, some are reported to us, others we hear ourselves, others we even see. Therefore concerning those things which are narrated, they ought not to be believed quickly, for some lie in order to deceive; others do not reckon that they lie, because they themselves have been deceived. One gains favor by accusation, and so that he may seem to speak, he feigns an injury.

Est etiam aliquis qui hoc occulte loquitur et maligne, ut amicitias dirimat coherentes, aut certe ut suum apud te insimulet inimicum. Dicitur aliquis de te male locutus? Cogita an prior hoc feceris.

There is also someone who speaks this secretly and malignly, to sever friendships that cohere, or at least to insinuate to you that his enemy is yours. Is someone said to have spoken ill of you? Reflect whether you did this first.

Cogita de quam multis ipse loquaris. Cogita non facere aliquos iniuriam, sed reponere: aliquos etiam pro nobis facere: alios adversus nos, sed coactos: alios et ignorantes: eos autem qui volentes scientesque faciunt, non ipsam iuiuriam appetere, sed aut dulcedine urbanitatis prolapsos, aut fecerunt aliquid, non ut nobis obessent, sed quia aliter consequi quae volebant non poterunt. At in his quae ipse audiendo aut videndo cognoscis, naturam voluntatemque discuties facientis, peccantisque animum perpensabis: voluerit an inciderit; deceptus sit an coactus.

Consider how many people you yourself speak of. Think that some you do not injure but restore; some even act on our behalf; others against us, but compelled; others out of ignorance; but those who willingly and knowingly do the deed, do not seek the very injury itself, but have either slipped by the sweetness of urbanity, or have done something not to harm us but because otherwise they could not obtain what they wished. Yet in those things which you learn by hearing or seeing, examine the nature and the will of the doer, and weigh the mind of the sinner: whether he willed it or fell into it; whether he was deceived or coerced.

Puerum excuset aetas, quia nescit an peccet; extraneum libertas; domesticum familiaritas. Si primum offendit, cogita quamdiu placuerit. Si saepe, fer quod saepe tulisti.

Age excuses a boy, because he does not know whether he sins; freedom excuses a stranger; familiarity excuses a domestic. If he offends for the first time, consider how long he has pleased you. If often, endure what you have often borne.

Iussus est, necessitate fecit. Quare succenseas? Quod si iniuriam recipis, non est iniuria, quod superius feceris pati.

He was ordered; he acted from necessity. Why should you be angry? But if you receive an injury, it is no injury to endure what you yourself have done before.

Iudex est? Si nocentem punit, cede iustitiae. Amicus est?

Is he a judge? If he punishes the guilty, yield to justice. Is he a friend?

Fecit quod noluit. Inimicus est? Fecit quod debuit.

He did what he did not wish. Is he an enemy? He did what he owed (ought to do).

Pater est? Cogita quia tantum profuit, ut illi etiam iniuriam facere fas sit. Mutum animal est?

Is he a father? Consider that he has profited so much that it is lawful for him even to do injury. Is he a mute animal?

Ipsum, si irasceris, imitaris. Postremo si bonus vir est qui iniuriam fecit, noli credere; si malus, noli imitari. Prudentiori cede, stulto remitte.

You imitate the very man when you grow angry. Finally, if the man who did the injustice is a good man, do not believe it; if he is bad, do not imitate him. Yield to the more prudent, forgive the foolish.

Regis quisque intra se animum habet, ut licentiam sibi in alios dari velit, in se nolit. Qui ergo semper futurum aliquod quod se offendat existimat, minime cum acciderit, irascetur.

Every king carries within himself a mind such that he wishes license to be granted to him toward others, but not toward himself. Therefore he who always expects some future thing that will offend him will, when it actually happens, be the least angry.

[7] Quin illud valde in haec illiberale et foedum, cum minimis sordidisque animus exacerbatur in rebus. Si parum agilis fuerit puer, si tepidior aqua poturo porrigitur, si turbatus torus, aut mensa neglectius posita, si musca parum curiose fugata, si manibus servi neglegentius clavis elapsa, ‚ cum hoc non in tuam contumeliam fecit, nec sic ut te offenderet fecit, innocentibus parce. Saepe etiam quam stulte his rebus irascimur, quae iram nostram nec meruerunt, nec sentiunt.

[7] Indeed that is very illiberal and foul in these matters, when the mind is exasperated by the smallest and most sordid things. If the boy has been rather slow, if somewhat tepid water is presented to drink, if the couch is disordered, or the table set more negligently, if a fly is driven off with too little care, if by the negligent hands of a servant a key slips — when he did this not to your contumely, nor in such a way as to offend you, spare the innocent. Often too how foolishly we are angered by these things, which neither merited nor perceive our ire.

Ecquid hac insania dementius, quam bilem in homines collectam, in rebus effundere? Aeger et infelicis valetudinis animus est, quem talium rerum levis aura conturbat. Ubi enim et animum simul et corpus voluptates corruperint, nihil est tolerabile, non quia illa dura, sed quia qui patitur mollis est.

Is there anything more demented than this madness, to pour forth bile collected against people into affairs? It is the mind of a sick and unhappy health which a light breeze of such things disturbs. For when pleasures have corrupted both mind and body together, nothing is tolerable — not because those things are harsh, but because he who suffers is weak.

Nulla itaque res magis iracundiam alit, quam intemperans et impatiens luxus. Dure ergo tractandus est animus, ut ictum non sentiat nisi gravem. Ad coercionem autem errantium irato castigatore non opus est.

Nothing therefore so nourishes anger as intemperate and impatient luxury. The mind must therefore be handled harshly, so that it feels a blow only when it is heavy. For the correction of the erring, however, an angry chastiser is not necessary.

Nam cum ira delictum animae sit, non oportet peccantem peccato corrigere. Quod si tantum irascatur sapiens quantum scelerum indignitas exigit, non irascendum illi, sed insaniendum est. Furta, fraudes, infitiationes, et si quae sunt alia, omnia ista tam propitius aspicit sapiens quam medicus aegros suos.

For since anger is an offense of the soul, it is not fitting to correct a sinner by sin. But if the wise man is angry only as much as the unworthiness of crimes requires, he ought not to be called angry, but to be judged insane. Thefts, frauds, denials, and whatever else there are, all these the wise man regards as leniently as a physician regards his patients.

Numquam itaque iracundia admittenda est, aliquando simulanda. Si segnes audientium animi concitandi sint, aliquando incutiendus est his metus, apud quos non proficit ratio.

Never, therefore, is anger to be admitted; it must at times be feigned. If the sluggish minds of hearers are to be stirred, fear must sometimes be instilled in those among whom reason does not prevail.

Quomodo leniatur ira.

How anger may be softened.

[8] Haec dicta sunt, ne veniat quis in iram. Quod si iam ira proruperit, maximum illi remedium est morae dilatio. Hoc primum petatur, non ut ignoscat, sed ut iudicet.

[8] These things are spoken so that no one may come into anger. But if anger has already burst forth, the greatest remedy for it is a prolongation of delay. Let this first be sought, not that he may forgive, but that he may judge.

Si expectaveris, desinet; nec universam illam tentaveris tollere, quia graves habet impetus primos. Tota vincitur, si partibus capiatur; donec quod ex eius imperio erat agendum, ipsi potius iubeamus. Agendum est ergo ut primus eius fervor relanguescat, et caligo quae premit mentem aliquantulum tenuetur.

If you will wait, it will cease; nor should you attempt to remove that whole passion at once, for its first impulses are violent. It is wholly overcome if it is taken by parts; until that which must be done by its command has been done, let us rather order it to act. Therefore one must act so that its first heat may slacken, and the gloom that presses the mind may be somewhat loosened.

Pugnet autem unusquisque secum, ut si vincere iram non potest, vel celare meminerit. Si exitus illi non datur, signa eius obrui possunt, sed cum magna hoc molestia fit. Cupit enim exilire ira et incendere oculos faciemque mutare, et si paululum illi extra nos eminere licuerit, supra nos est, ut in imo pectoris recessu condatur, feraturque, non ferat.

Let each one struggle with himself, so that if he cannot conquer anger, he at least remember to conceal it. If an outlet is not given to it, its signs can be suppressed, but this is done with great distress. For anger desires to leap out, to set the eyes on fire and to change the face; and if it is permitted to protrude a little beyond us, it is above us, so that it is lodged in the deepest recess of the breast, and is carried — or else it does not bear.

In contrarium ergo omnia eius flectantur indicia, vultus remittatur, vox lenior, gradusque sit lentior, et ita paulatim cum exterioribus interiora formantur. Sicque fit ut etsi aliquis iram tuam intellegat, tamen sentiat nemo. Faciunt ergo nos moderatiores respectus nostri, si consulamus nos.

On the contrary, therefore, let all the signs of it be turned the other way: let the countenance be relaxed, the voice gentler, and the step slower, and so little by little the inner things are formed together with the outward. Thus it happens that although someone may perceive your anger, yet no one feels it. Therefore our respects (or self‑regard) make us more moderate, if we consult ourselves.

Num tale aliquid et ipsi aliquando commisimus? Num sic erravimus? Expeditne nobis in aliis illa damnare quae effugere ipsi nequivimus?

Have we ever ourselves committed such a thing? Have we thus erred? Is it fitting for us to condemn in others those very things which we ourselves could not escape?

Faciet etiam nos mitiores, si cogitemus quid nobis ille cui irascimur aliquando profuerit; et sic praesens offensa prioribus meritis redimatur. Illud quoque occurrat, quantum nobis commendationis adlatura sit fama clementiae, quam multos amicos venia fecerit utiles. Nihil gloriosius quam iram amicitia commutare.

It will also make us gentler, if we consider what that one, at whom we are angry, has at times benefited us; and thus the present offense is redeemed by former merits. Let it also occur to you how much praise a reputation for clemency will bring, how pardon has made many friends useful. Nothing more glorious than to change anger into friendship.

Irascitur aliquis? Tu contra beneficiis provoca. Cadit statim simultas ab alterutra parte deserta; nisi paria non pugnant.

Does anyone grow angry? You, on the contrary, provoke him with benefits. Straightaway the mutual spite falls away, one side being left deserted by the other; for unless they are equal, they do not fight.

Quod si utrimque certaverit, ira concurritur. Ille est fortior, qui prior retulit pedem. Victus est saepe qui vicit.

But if it has contended on both sides, anger collides. He is the stronger who first drew back his foot. Often he who has won is defeated.

Percussit te? Recede; nam referiendo et occasionem dabis saepius feriendi et excusationem; postremo cum volueris reverti, non poteris.

Has he struck you? Withdraw; for by striking back you will both give the occasion to be struck more often and an excuse; finally, when you wish to return, you will not be able.

[9] Qui irascitur iniurianti se, vitium vitio opponit. Numque non insanire videtur, si quis mulam calcibus petat, aut canem a quo morsus est lancinet? "Sed ista," inquis, "peccare se nesciunt." Eodem loco est quisquis consilio caret.

[9] He who becomes angry at the one injuring him opposes vice with vice. And does he not seem to be insane, if someone strikes a mule with his heels, or attacks the dog by which he was bitten? "But those things," you say, "do not know that they sin." He who lacks counsel is in the same place.

Quid enim refert an alia mutis dissimilia habeat, si hoc simile habet, quod omni peccato muta defendit. Eo nos loco constituamus, quo ille est cui irascimur. Nostram esse causam illius adfingamus, nam facit nos iracundos iniqua nostra aestimatio, quia ea quae volumus facere nolumus pati.

For what difference does it make if he has other dissimilarities from the mute, if he has this likeness, which defends the mute from every sin? Let us set ourselves in the place in which he is, at whom we are angry. Let us ascribe his cause to be our own, for our unjust estimation makes us irate, because we do not wish to endure those things which we wish to do.

Memento etiam quia sapientissimi quique viri multa delinquunt. Quod si etiam prudentissimi viri peccant, cuius error causam non habet ignoscendi? Nemo est tam timidus offensarum qui non illas dum vitat admittat.

Remember also that the most sapient men commit many offences. And if even the most prudent men sin, whose error will lack a cause for pardon? There is no one so timid of offences who, while avoiding them, does not nevertheless admit them.

Aequiore ergo animo fert se contemni, cuicumque venit in mentem nullam esse tantam potentiam in qua non incurrat iniuria. Demus spatium peccanti, quo possit considerare quod fecerit, et ipse se castigabit. "Quid ergo," inquis, "impune ille erit?" Puta velle te, nam non erit; quia non magis gravius adficitur quam qui ad supplicium poenitentiae datur.

He therefore endures to be contemned with a more equable spirit, for to whomsoever it comes into mind that there is no power so great in which he does not incur injury. Let us give the peccant man space, in which he may consider what he has done, and he himself will chastise himself. "What then," you ask, "will he be unpunished?" Suppose that you wish it — for he will not be; because he is no more grievously afflicted than one who is given to the punishment of penitence.

Respiciendum est deinde ad condicionem rerum humanarum, ut omnium accidentium aequi iudices simus. Iniquus est autem qui commune vitium singulis obicit. Omnes inconsulti atque improvidi sumus, omnes incerti, queruli, ambitiosi.

One must next consider the condition of human affairs, so that we may be fair judges of all accidents. For unjust is he who objects a common vice to individuals. We are all unskilled and improvident, all uncertain, querulous, ambitious.

Quid levioribus verbis publicum malum abscondo? Omnes mali sumus. Quidquid in alio deprehenditur, id unusquisque in sinu suo inveniet.

Why do I hide a public evil with gentler words? We are all wicked. Whatever is discovered in another, each man will find in his own breast.

Mali vivimus inter malos.

We live among the wicked.

[10] Nunc iam tertio in loco videamus quomodo alienam iram leniamus. Nec enim sani tantum esse volumus, sed sanare. Primam ergo iram alterius non audebimus nostra ratione mulcere.

[10] Now, in the third place, let us see how we may soothe another’s anger. For we wish not only to be healthy, but to heal. Therefore we will not dare to soften another’s first anger by our reason.

Surda est enim, et amens. Dabimus illi spatium; nam remedia medicorum, non in accessibus infirmitatum, sed in remissionibus prosunt. Quod si tumentes oculos quis tentet inungere, rigentem magis vim incitat commovenda.

For she is deaf and mad. We will give her space; for the remedies of physicians avail not in the onsets of diseases but in their remissions. For if anyone tries to anoint swollen eyes, attempting to stir what is rigid only inflames its force the more.

Sapiens furenti amico omnia ultionis instrumenta occultius removebit, ipseque iracundiam simulabit, ut tamquam auditor doloris et comes plus auctoritatis in consiliis habeat. Moras nectet, et dum maiorem poenam quaerat, praesentem interim differet, et omni arte furori requiem dabit. Quod si tu potentior es, aut pudorem illi cui vix resistis aut metum incuties.

The wise man will more secretly remove from a raging friend all the instruments of vengeance, and will himself feign anger, so that, as it were a hearer of grief and a companion, he may have greater authority in counsel. He will weave delays, and while he seeks a greater punishment he will meanwhile defer the present one, and by every art will give respite to the furor. But if you are more powerful, you will either instill shame in him whom you scarcely can resist, or you will put fear into him.

Alteri dices, "Indignor nimis, et non invenio dolendi modum, sed expectandum est tempus: dabit poenas. Serva istud animo tuo, et pro mora, cum poteris, reddes." Alteri dices: "Vide ne iracundia tua voluptati sit inimicis." Alteri: "Vide ne magnitudo animi tui et creditum apud plerosque decidat robur." Ita enim abscondet et medicus ferramentum, ut aeger dolorem, dum non sperat, ferat. Nam quaedam non nisi decepta sanantur.

To one you will say, "I am too indignant, and I find no measure for grieving, but time must be waited for: it will exact punishments. Keep this in your mind, and for the delay, when you are able, you will repay." To another you will say: "See that your anger not be a pleasure to your enemies." To another: "See that the magnitude of your spirit and the credit you have among most do not lose their strength." For thus even the physician will hide his instrument, so that the sick man, while he does not expect it, may endure the pain. For some things are healed only when deceived.

Castigare autem irascentem, et ultro irasci, incitare est. Itaque vario modo ira sananda est.

Moreover, to chastise an angry person is to incite him to anger in return. Therefore anger must be healed in various ways.