Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 5.4.0. Si pars hereditatis petatur.
5.3.0. On the petition of the inheritance.
Dig. 5.4.0. If a part of the inheritance be sought.
5.6.0. On the fideicommissary petition of an inheritance.
Consensisse autem videntur, qui sciant se non esse subiectos iurisdictioni eius et in eum consentiant. ceterum si putent eius iurisdictionem esse, non erit eius iurisdictio: error enim litigatorum, ut iulianus quoque libro primo digestorum scribit, non habet consensum. aut si putaverunt alium esse praetorem pro alio, aeque error non dedit iurisdictionem.
Those are deemed to have consented who know that they are not subject to his jurisdiction and consent to him. But if they think that it is his jurisdiction, his jurisdiction will not exist: for the error of litigants, as Julianus also writes in the first book of the Digest, does not amount to consent. Or if they supposed one man to be praetor in place of another, likewise error did not grant jurisdiction.
Convenire autem utrum inter privatos sufficit an vero etiam ipsius praetoris consensus necessarius est? lex iulia iudiciorum ait " quo minus inter privatos conveniat": sufficit ergo privatorum consensus. proinde si privati consentiant, praetor autem ignoret consentire et putet suam iurisdictionem, an legi satisfactum sit, videndum est: et puto posse defendi eius esse iurisdictionem.
But as to whether an agreement between private parties suffices, or indeed the consent of the praetor himself is also necessary? The Julian Law on judgments says, “that nothing prevent its being agreed between private persons”: therefore the consent of private parties suffices. Accordingly, if the private parties consent, but the praetor is unaware that they consent and thinks it to be his jurisdiction, it must be considered whether the law has been satisfied; and I think it can be defended that it is his jurisdiction.
Legatis in eo quod ante legationem contraxerunt, item his qui testimonii causa evocati sunt vel si qui iudicandi causa arcessiti sunt vel in provinciam destinati, revocandi domum suam ius datur. eo quoque qui ipse provocavit non imponitur necessitas intra tempora provocationis exercendae romae vel alio loco ubi provocatio exercetur aliis pulsantibus respondere: nam celsus huic etiam domus revocationem dandam ait, quoniam ob aliam causam venerit: haec celsi sententia et rationabilis est. nam et divus pius plotio celsiano rescripsit eum, qui tutelae reddendae causa romam erat a se evocatus, alterius tutelae causa, cuius causa non erat evocatus, non debere compelli iudicium suscipere.
To legates, with respect to what they contracted before their legation, likewise to those who have been summoned for the sake of testimony, or if any have been called for the sake of judging, or assigned to a province, the right is given of being recalled to their own home. To him also who himself has appealed, no necessity is imposed, within the times for exercising the appeal at Rome or in another place where the appeal is exercised, to answer others pressing claims against him: for Celsus says that to this man also a recall home is to be given, since he has come for another cause; this opinion of Celsus is reasonable as well. For the deified Pius also wrote back to Plotius Celsianus that the man who had been summoned by him to Rome for the purpose of rendering accounts of a guardianship ought not to be compelled, for the sake of another guardianship for whose sake he had not been summoned, to undertake a proceeding.
Omnes autem isti domum revocant, si non ibi contraxerunt, ubi conveniuntur. ceterum si contraxerunt ibi, revocandi ius non habent: exceptis legatis, qui licet ibi contraxerunt, dummodo ante legationem contraxerunt, non compelluntur se romae defendere, quamdiu legationis causa hic demorantur. quod et iulianus scribit et divus pius rescripsit.
All these persons, however, claim to be recalled home, if they did not contract there where they are convened; but if they contracted there, they have no right to be recalled: except for legates, who, although they contracted there, provided that they contracted before the legation, are not compelled to defend themselves at Rome, so long as they remain here for the sake of the legation. Which both Julian writes and the deified Pius has issued by rescript.
Item si extra provinciam suam contraxerunt, licet non in italia, quaestionis est, an romae conveniri possint. et Marcellus in eo solo privilegio eos uti domum revocandi, quod in civitate sua vel certe intra provinciam contraxerunt: quod est verum. sed et si agant, compelluntur se adversus omnes defendere: non tamen si iniuriam suam persequantur vel furtum vel damnum quod nunc passi sunt: alioquin, ut et iulianus eleganter ait, aut impune contumeliis et damnis adficientur aut erit in potestate cuiusque pulsando eos subicere ipsos iurisdictioni, dum se vindicant.
Likewise, if they have contracted outside their own province, although not in Italy, it is a question whether they can be convened at Rome. And Marcellus holds that they enjoy that one privilege alone of being called back home, namely when they contracted in their own city or at least within the province: which is true. But also, if they bring an action, they are compelled to defend themselves against all: not, however, if they are pursuing their own injury, or theft, or damage which they have now suffered: otherwise, as Julian elegantly says, either they will be afflicted with contumelies and damages with impunity, or it will be in anyone’s power, by assailing them, to subject them themselves to jurisdiction while they are vindicating themselves.
Sed si dubitetur, utrum in ea quis causa sit, ut domum revocare possit, nec ne, ipse praetor debet causa cognita statuere. quod si constiterit in ea eum esse causa, ut domum revocet, debebit cavere in iudicio sisti, statuente praetore in quem diem promittat. sed utrum nuda cautione an satisdato, Marcellus dubitat: mihi videtur sola promissione, quod et mela scribit: alioquin compelletur iudicium accipere quam invenire eos qui satis pro eo dent.
But if there is doubt whether someone is in such a case that he can be called back home or not, the praetor himself ought, once the cause has been examined, to determine it. And if it is established that he is in such a case as to be recalled home, he ought to give security to appear in court, the praetor setting the day on which he is to promise. But whether by a bare cautio or by a surety being given, Marcellus is in doubt: to me it seems by promise alone, as Mela also writes; otherwise he will be compelled to accept a trial rather than to find those who will give surety for him.
Si quis ex aliena iurisdictione ad praetorem vocetur, debet venire, ut et pomponius et vindius scripserunt: praetoris est enim aestimare, an sua sit iurisdictio, vocati autem non contemnere auctoritatem praetoris: nam et legati ceterique qui revocandi domum ius habent in ea sunt causa, ut in ius vocati veniant privilegia sua allegaturi.
If someone from a foreign jurisdiction is summoned to the praetor, he ought to come, as both Pomponius and Vindius have written: for it pertains to the praetor to determine whether the jurisdiction is his own, and the person summoned ought not to scorn the praetor’s authority; for even envoys and others who have the right of being recalled home are in such a position that, when summoned into court, they should come, to allege their privileges.
Destitisse is ^ ^ videtur non qui distulit, sed qui liti renuntiavit in totum: desistere enim est de negotio abstinere, quod calumniandi animo instituerat. plane si quis cognita rei veritate suum negotium deseruerit nolens in lite improba perseverare, quam calumniae causa non instituerat, is destitisse non videtur.
He seems ^ ^ to have desisted, not he who deferred, but he who renounced the lawsuit entirely: for to desist is to abstain from the business which he had instituted with a spirit of calumniating. Plainly, if someone, the truth of the matter having been learned, were to abandon his own case, unwilling to persevere in a dishonest suit which he had not instituted for the sake of calumny, he does not seem to have desisted.
Non autem omnes iudices dari possunt ab his qui iudicis dandi ius habent: quidam enim lege impediuntur ne iudices sint, quidam natura, quidam moribus. natura, ut surdus mutus: et perpetuo furiosus et impubes, quia iudicio carent. lege impeditur, qui senatu motus est.
Not, however, can all judges be appointed by those who have the right of appointing a judge: for some are impeded by law from being judges, some by nature, some by morals. By nature, as a deaf-mute: and one perpetually insane and one underage (pre-pubescent), because they lack judgment. By law, one is impeded who has been removed from the Senate.
In tribus istis iudiciis familiae erciscundae, communi dividundo et finium regundorum quaeritur quis actor intellegatur, quia par causa omnium videtur. sed magis placuit eum videri actorem qui ad iudicium provocasset.
In these three actions—familiae erciscundae, communi dividundo, and finium regundorum—it is inquired who is to be understood as the plaintiff, since the cause of all seems equal; but it has been the more approved view that he is to be regarded as plaintiff who has called the matter into judgment (i.e., into court).
Iudex tunc litem suam facere intellegitur, cum dolo malo in fraudem legis sententiam dixerit ( dolo malo autem videtur hoc facere, si evidens arguatur eius vel gratia vel inimicitia vel etiam sordes), ut veram aestimationem litis praestare cogatur.
A judge is then understood to make the suit his own, when, with dolus malus, in fraud of the law he has pronounced a sentence (and he is deemed to do this with dolus malus, if he is clearly charged with his favor or enmity or even sordid bribery), so that he is compelled to render the true valuation of the suit.
Si longius spatium intercessurum erit, quo minus iudex datus operam possit dare, mutari eum iubet praetor: hoc est si forte occupatio aliqua iudicem non patiatur operam iudicio dare, incidente infirmitate vel necessaria profectione vel rei suae familiaris periculo.
If a longer interval is going to intervene, whereby the appointed judge cannot give attention, the praetor orders him to be changed; that is, if perchance some occupation does not allow the judge to give attention to the proceeding, with infirmity supervening, or a necessary departure, or danger to his own family estate.
Si filius familias ex aliqua noxa, ex qua patri actio competit, velit experiri, ita demum permittimus ei agere, si non sit qui patris nomine agat. nam et iuliano placet, si filius familias legationis vel studiorum gratia aberit et vel furtum vel damnum iniuria passus sit: posse eum utili iudicio agere, ne dum pater exspectatur impunita sint maleficia, quia pater venturus non est vel dum venit, se subtrahit is qui noxam commisit. unde ego semper probavi, ut, si res non ex maleficio veniat, sed ex contractu, debeat filius agere utili iudicio, forte depositum repetens vel mandati agens vel pecuniam quam credidit petens, si forte pater in provincia sit, ipse autem forte romae vel studiorum causa vel alia iusta ex causa agat: ne, si ei non dederimus actionem, futurum sit, ut impune fraudem patiatur et egestate romae laboret viaticulo suo non recepto, quod ad sumptum pater ei destinaverat.
If a son under family power, from some delict for which an action lies to the father, wishes to bring suit, we permit him to act only if there is no one to act in the father’s name. For Julianus also approves that, if a filius familias is away on an embassy or for the sake of studies and has suffered either theft or wrongful damage, he can sue by a useful action (actio utilis), lest, while the father is awaited, the misdeeds go unpunished, because either the father is not going to come, or while he is coming, the one who committed the delict withdraws himself. Whence I have always approved that, if the matter does not arise from a maleficium but from a contract, the son ought to sue by a useful action—perhaps reclaiming a deposit (depositum), or suing on mandate, or seeking the money he lent—if perhaps the father is in a province, but he himself is at Rome, whether for the sake of studies or on some other just cause; lest, if we do not give him the action, it will come about that he suffers fraud with impunity and struggles in want at Rome, his travel-money (viaticum) not recovered, which the father had assigned to him for expenses.
Si quis tutelam vel curam vel negotia vel argentariam vel quid aliud, unde obligatio oritur, certo loci administravit: etsi ibi domicilium non habuit, ibi se debebit defendere et, si non defendat neque ibi domicilium habeat, bona possideri patietur.
If anyone has administered a tutelage or a curatorship or business affairs or banking, or anything else whence an obligation arises, in a certain place: even if he did not have his domicile there, he must defend himself there; and, if he does not defend and does not have domicile there, he will suffer his goods to be taken into possession.
Proinde et si merces vendidit certo loci vel disposuit vel comparavit: videtur, nisi alio loci ut defenderet convenit, ibidem se defendere. numquid dicimus eum, qui a mercatore quid comparavit advena, vel ei vendidit quem scit inde confestim profecturum, non oportet ibi bona possideri, sed domicilium sequi eius? at si quis ab eo qui tabernam vel officinam certo loci conductam habuit, in ea causa est ut illic conveniatur: quod magis habet rationem.
Accordingly, even if he sold merchandise at a fixed place, or deposited it, or acquired it, he is deemed, unless it was agreed to make his defense at another place, to make his defense there in the same place. Are we to say that one who, as a stranger, bought something from a merchant, or sold to a man whom he knows will set out from there immediately, that the goods ought not to be possessed there, but rather to follow his domicile? But if someone dealt with one who had a shop or a workshop leased at a fixed place, he is in such a case as to be convened there: which has the stronger rationale.
for when one comes in such a way as to depart at once, he buys as if from a wayfarer, or from one who was being ferried across, or from one who is parapleus (a coasting sailor): it is most harsh that, in as many places as a person sailing or making a journey has been carried, in so many places he must defend himself. but if he has made a stand somewhere, I do not say by the right of domicile, but he has rented a little shop, a booth, a granary, a storeroom, a workshop, and there sold off goods and did business: he ought to defend himself in that place.
Si debitori meo velim actionem edere, probandum erit, si fateatur se debere paratumque dicat solvere, audiendum eum, dandumque diem cum competenti cautela ad solvendam pecuniam: neque enim magnum damnum est in mora modici temporis. modicum autem tempus hic intellegendum est, quod post condemnationem reis indultum est.
If I should wish to bring an action against my debtor, it must be recognized that, if he admits that he owes and says he is prepared to pay, he should be heard, and a day should be given, with appropriate security, for paying the money: for there is no great damage in the delay of a modest period of time. And the modest time is here to be understood as that which is granted to defendants after condemnation.
Sed si postulatur in rem actio adversus legatum, numquid danda sit, quoniam ex praesenti possessione haec actio est? cassius respondit sic servandum, ut si subducatur ministerium ei, non sit concedenda actio, si vero ex multis servis de uno agatur, non sit inhibenda: iulianus sine distinctione denegandam actionem: merito: ideo enim non datur actio, ne ab officio suscepto legationis avocetur.
But if an action in rem is requested against a legate, should it perhaps be granted, since this action is from present possession? Cassius answered it should be observed thus: that if his service is withdrawn from him, the action is not to be conceded; but if, out of many slaves, the dispute is about one, it is not to be hindered. Julianus says the action is to be denied without distinction—rightly: for the action is not given, lest he be called away from the office of the legation undertaken.
Si legationis tempore quis servum vel aliam rem emerit aut ex alia causa possidere coeperit, non inique cogetur eius nomine iudicium accipere: aliter enim potestas dabitur legatis sub hac specie res alienas domum auferendi.
If during the time of a legation someone should buy a slave or some other thing, or should begin to possess it from another cause, he will not unjustly be compelled to accept an action in its name; for otherwise power would be given to legates, under this pretext, of carrying home other people’s property.
De eo autem qui adiit hereditatem cassius scribit, quamvis romae adierit hereditatem, non competere in eum actionem, ne impediatur legatio, et hoc verum est. sed nec legatariis datur actio, sed nisi satisdet, mittuntur in possessionem rerum hereditariarum: quod et in hereditariis creditoribus dicendum est.
concerning him, moreover, who has entered upon an inheritance, cassius writes that, although he has entered upon the inheritance at rome, no action lies against him, lest the legation be impeded; and this is true. but neither is an action given to legatees; rather, unless he furnishes security, they are sent into possession of the hereditary goods: which is to be said also in regard to hereditary creditors.
Sed et si restituatur ei hereditas ex trebelliano, actio in eum non dabitur, sive sponte sive coactus heres eam adierit: commodius enim est reddi quidem ei hereditatem, perinde autem habendum, ac si ipse adisset hereditatem.
But also, if the inheritance is restored to him under the Trebellianum, an action will not be granted against him, whether the heir has entered upon it of his own accord or under compulsion: for it is more convenient that the inheritance indeed be returned to him, but that it be regarded just the same as if he himself had entered upon the inheritance.
Si pater familias mortuus esset relicto uno filio et uxore praegnate, non recte filius a debitoribus partem dimidiam crediti petere potest, quamvis postea unus filius natus sit, quia poterant plures nasci: cum per rerum naturam certum fuerit unum nasci. sed sabinus cassius partem quartam peti debuisse, quia incertum esset an tres nascerentur: nec rerum naturam intuendam, in qua omnia certa essent, cum futura utique fierent, sed nostram inscientiam aspici debere.
If a paterfamilias had died, with one son left and a pregnant wife, the son cannot rightly demand from the debtors a half share of the credit, although afterwards one son was born, because more could have been born: although by the nature of things it was certain that one would be born. But Sabinus and Cassius held that a fourth part ought to be demanded, because it was uncertain whether three would be born: nor should the nature of things be looked to, in which all things would be certain, since the future would in any case come to pass, but rather our ignorance ought to be regarded.
Si iudex, cui certa tempora praestita erant, decesserit et alius in locum eius datus fuerit, tanta ex integro tempora in persona eius praestituta intellegemus, quamvis magistratus nominatim hoc in sequentis datione non expresserit: ita tamen ut legitimum tempus non excedat.
If a judge, to whom certain periods had been prescribed, has died and another has been appointed in his place, we shall understand that equal periods are prescribed anew (de novo) in his person, although the magistrate did not expressly state this in the appointment of the successor: provided, however, that the lawful time is not exceeded.
Non quemadmodum fideiussoris obligatio in pendenti potest esse et vel in futurum concipi, ita iudicium in pendenti potest esse vel de his rebus quae postea in obligationem adventurae sunt. nam neminem puto dubitaturum, quin fideiussor ante obligationem rei accipi possit: iudicium vero, antequam aliquid debeatur, non posse.
Not as with the obligation of a surety, which can be pending and even be conceived for the future, so a judicial proceeding can be pending or concern those matters which are afterwards going to come into the obligation. For I think no one would doubt that a surety may be accepted before the obligation of the thing; but that a judicial proceeding, before anything is owed, cannot be.
Interdum ex iustis causis et ex certis personis sustinendae sunt cognitiones: veluti si instrumenta litis apud eos esse dicantur qui rei publicae causa aberunt: idque divi fratres in haec verba rescripserunt. humanum est propter fortuitos casus dilationem accipi, veluti quod pater litigator filium vel filiam vel uxor virum vel filius parentem amiserit, et in similibus causis cognitionem ad aliquem modum sustineri.
Sometimes, for just causes and on account of certain persons, hearings are to be held in abeyance: for example, if the instruments of the suit are said to be with those who have been absent for the sake of the commonwealth; and the deified brothers issued a rescript in these words. It is human, on account of fortuitous chances, to accept a postponement—for example, because a father who is a litigant has lost a son or a daughter, or a wife her husband, or a son a parent—and in similar cases the hearing is to be held off to some extent.
Quod legatur, si quidem per personalem actionem exigetur, ibi dari debet ubi est, nisi si dolo malo heredis subductum fuerit: tunc enim ibi dari debet ubi petitur. praeterea quod pondere aut numero aut mensura continetur, ibi dari debet ubi petitur, nisi si adiectum fuerit " centum modios ex illo horreo" aut " vini amphoras ex illo dolio". si autem per in rem actionem legatum petetur, etiam ibi peti debet ubi res est. et si mobilis sit res, ad exhibendum agi cum herede poterit, ut exhibeat rem: sic enim vindicari a legatario poterit.
What is legated, if indeed it is exacted through a personal action, ought to be given where it is, unless it has been withdrawn by the heir’s dolus malus: for then it ought to be given where it is demanded. moreover, what is contained by weight or number or measure ought to be given where it is demanded, unless it has been added “one hundred modii from that granary” or “amphoras of wine from that cask.” but if the legacy is sought through an in rem action, it must also be sought where the thing is. and if the thing is movable, an action ad exhibendum may be brought against the heir, that he exhibit the thing: for thus it can be vindicated by the legatee.
Cum furiosus iudex addicitur, non ideo minus iudicium erit, quod hodie non potest iudicare: ut scilicet suae mentis effectus quod sententiae dixerit, ratum sit: neque enim in addicendo praesentia vel scientia iudicis necessaria est.
When an insane judge is assigned, the judgment will not on that account be any the less because today he cannot judge: namely, that what he shall have pronounced as a sentence, as the effect of his own mind, is ratified; for in appointing, the presence or the knowledge of the judge is not necessary.
Non idcirco iudicis officium impeditur, quod quidam ex tutoribus post litem adversus omnes inchoatam rei publicae causa abesse coeperunt, cum praesentium et eorum qui non defenduntur administratio discerni et aestimari possit.
Not on that account is the judge’s office impeded, because some of the tutors, after the suit had been initiated against all, began to be absent for the sake of the commonwealth, since the administration with respect to those present and to those who are not defended can be distinguished and assessed.
Pars litterarum divi hadriani: tous arxontas en hw arxousin eniautw myte eisienai dikyn idian myte diwkontwn myte feugontwn, myte peri hwn epitropoi y kouratores eien krinetwsan. epeidan de ecyky hy arxy, kai autois pros tous feugontas kai tois feugousi pros autous eisagwgimous einai tas dikas.
Part of the letters of the deified Hadrian: that the magistrates, in the year in which they hold office, are neither to enter a private action, neither as plaintiffs nor as defendants, nor to judge matters concerning those for whom they are guardians or curators. But when the magistracy has run its course, suits are admissible both by them against the defendants and by the defendants against them.
Venditor ab emptore denuntiatus, ut eum evictionis nomine defenderet, dicit se privilegium habere sui iudicis: quaeritur, an possit litem ab eo iudice, apud quem res inter petitorem et emptorem coepta est, ad suum iudicem revocare. paulus respondit venditorem emptoris iudicem sequi solere.
The seller, having been notified by the buyer to defend him under the title of eviction, says that he has the privilege of his own judge: the question is asked whether he can recall the suit from that judge with whom the matter between the claimant and the buyer was begun to his own judge. paulus answered that the seller is wont to follow the buyer’s judge.
Si fideicommissum ab aliquo petatur isque dicat alibi esse maiorem partem hereditatis, non erit ad praestationem compellendus: et ita multis constitutionibus cavetur, ut ibi petatur fideicommissum, ubi maior pars hereditatis est: nisi si probetur eo loco voluisse testatorem fideicommissum praestari, ubi petitur.
If a fideicommissum is sought from someone and he says that the greater part of the inheritance is elsewhere, he shall not be compelled to make performance: and thus it is provided by many constitutions that the fideicommissum be sought where the greater part of the inheritance is: unless it is proved that the testator wished the fideicommissum to be performed in the place where it is sought.
Tractatum est de aere alieno: si in ea provincia, ubi fideicommissum petitur, plus esset aeris alieni, an quasi maior pars alibi esset, praescriptio locum haberet. sed et hic placuit nihil facere aeris alieni nomen, cum non loci sit aes alienum, sed universarum facultatium: aes enim alienum patrimonium totum imminuere constitit, non certi loci facultates. quid tamen si forte certis oneribus destinatum sit id patrimonium, ut puta alimentis praestandis quae romae praestari pater familias iusserat, vel tributis vel quibusdam aliis inexcusabilibus oneribus, an possit praescriptio locum habere?
It has been treated about debt (aes alienum): if in the province where the fideicommissum is sought there were more debt, whether, as if the greater part were elsewhere, the praescriptio would have place. But even here it was resolved that the designation “debt” should count for nothing, since debt is not of a place, but of the total means: for it is established that debt diminishes the entire patrimony, not the means of a certain place. What, however, if by chance that patrimony has been destined for certain burdens, for instance for furnishing alimenta which the paterfamilias had ordered to be furnished at Rome, or for tributes or certain other inexcusable burdens—whether the praescriptio can have place?
Si libertis suis tesseras frumentarias emi voluerit, quamvis maior pars hereditatis in provincia sit, tamen romae debere fideicommissum solvi dicendum est, cum apparet id testatorem sensisse ex genere comparationis.
If he should have wished frumentary tesserae to be bought for his freedmen, although the greater part of the inheritance is in the province, nevertheless it must be said that the fideicommissum ought to be discharged at Rome, since it appears that the testator intended this from the kind of purchase.
Sed et si proponas quibusdam clarissimis viris argenti vel auri pondo relicta et sit sufficiens ad huiusmodi fideicommissa romae patrimonium: licet maior pars totius patrimonii in provincia sit, dici oportet romae esse praestandum: nec enim verisimile est testatorem, qui honorem habitum voluit his quibus reliquit tam modica fideicommissa, in provincia praestari voluisse.
But also, if you suppose that to certain men of senatorial rank there have been left a weight of silver or of gold, and that the patrimony at Rome is sufficient for fideicommissa of this kind: although the greater part of the whole patrimony is in the province, it must be said that performance is to be made at Rome; for it is not likely that the testator—who wished an honor to be had for those to whom he left such modest fideicommissa—wished it to be rendered in a province.
Sed si non fideicommissum petatur eo loci, sed fideicommisso satis, videndum est, an haec praescriptio locum habeat: et non puto habere, quin immo, et si nihil sit eo loci, attamen iubendum satisdare. quid enim veretur, cum, si satis non dederit, mittatur adversarius in possessionem fideicommissi servandi causa?
But if the fideicommissum is not being claimed in that place, but rather surety for the fideicommissum, it must be considered whether this prescription has place; and I do not think it has—nay rather, even if there is nothing in that place, nevertheless he ought to be ordered to give surety. For what does he fear, since, if he does not give surety, the adversary is sent into possession for the sake of preserving the fideicommissum?
Vix certis ex causis adversus dominos servis consistere permissum est: id est si qui suppressas tabulas testamenti dicant, in quibus libertatem sibi relictam adseverant. item artioris annonae populi romani, census etiam et falsae monetae criminis reos dominos detegere servis permissum est. praeterea fideicommissam libertatem ab his petent: sed et si qui suis nummis redemptos se et non manumissos contra placiti fidem adseverent.
Only for certain causes has it been permitted for slaves to bring proceedings against their masters: that is, if any say that the testamentary tablets have been suppressed, in which they aver that liberty was left to them. Likewise, it is permitted for slaves to reveal their masters as defendants in the charge of a tighter grain-supply for the Roman people, and also in the census and in the crime of false coinage. Furthermore, they will seek fideicommissary liberty from them: and also if any aver, contrary to the faith of the pact, that they were redeemed with their own money and not manumitted.
Also, one who has been ordered to be free, if he shall have rendered accounts, will rightly seek an arbiter against the master for the accounts to be examined. And likewise, if someone has chosen the good-faith of some person, that he be redeemed with that person’s money and, these paid, be manumitted, and that person says he is unwilling to accept the money offered, authority has been granted to the slave to bring to light the good-faith obligation of the contract.
Tam ex contractibus quam ex delictis in filium familias competit actio: sed mortuo filio post litis contestationem transfertur iudicium in patrem dumtaxat de peculio et quod in rem eius versum est. certe si quasi procurator alicuius filius familias iudicium acceperit, mortuo eo in eum quem defenderit transactio vel iudicati datur.
As much from contracts as from delicts an action lies against a son-in-power; but if the son has died after the litis contestatio, the suit is transferred to the father only with respect to the peculium and to what has been turned to his account. Certainly, if a son-in-power, as a sort of procurator of someone, has accepted the suit, then upon his death an action on the compromise (transactio) or on the judgment (iudicati) is given against the person whom he defended.
Solemus quidem dicere id venire in iudicium, de quo actum est inter litigantes: sed celsus ait periculose esse ex persona rei hoc metiri, qui semper ne condemnetur hoc dicet non convenisse. quid ergo? melius est dicere id venire in iudicium non de quo actum est ut veniret, sed id non venire, de quo nominatim actum est ne veniret.
We are indeed accustomed to say that that comes into judgment, about which there has been agreement between the litigants: but Celsus says it is perilous to measure this from the person of the defendant, who will always, so as not to be condemned, say that there was no agreement. What then? It is better to say that that comes into judgment not on account of its having been agreed that it should come, but that that does not come, about which it has been expressly agreed that it should not come.
Exigere dotem mulier debet illic, ubi maritus domicilium habuit, non ubi instrumentum dotale conscriptum est: nec enim id genus contractus est, ut et eum locum spectari oporteat, in quo instrumentum dotis factum est, quam eum, in cuius domicilium et ipsa mulier per condicionem matrimonii erat reditura.
A woman ought to exact the dowry there where the husband had his domicile, not where the dotal instrument was drawn up; for it is not that kind of contract, such that the place in which the instrument of dowry was made ought to be considered rather than that to whose domicile the woman herself, by the condition of marriage, was to return.
Qui se dicit suis nummis redemptum, si hoc probaverit, exinde liber erit ex quo redemptus est, quia constitutio non liberum pronuntiari praecipit, sed restitui ei libertatem iubet. proinde compellendus erit manumittere eum qui se suis nummis redemit. sed et si latitet, exempla senatus consultorum ad fideicommissam libertatem pertinentium debere induci oportet.
He who says that he has been redeemed with his own coins, if he proves this, will thence be free from the time at which he was redeemed, because the constitution does not command that he be pronounced free, but orders that liberty be restored to him. Accordingly, the owner will be compelled to manumit him who redeemed himself with his own coins. But even if he is in hiding, the precedents of the senatus consulta pertaining to fideicommissary liberty ought to be brought in.
Nonnumquam autem hoc edictum post tot numero edicta quae praecesserint datur, nonnumquam post unum vel alterum, nonnumquam statim, quod appellatur unum pro omnibus. hoc autem aestimare oportet eum qui ius dixit et pro condicione causae vel personae vel temporis ita ordinem edictorum vel compendium moderari.
Sometimes, however, this edict is issued after so many edicts in number as have preceded, sometimes after one or two, sometimes immediately, which is called “one for all.” This, moreover, ought to be assessed by him who has declared the law, and, according to the condition of the case or of the person or of the time, to regulate accordingly the order of the edicts or the compendium.
Et post edictum peremptorium impetratum, cum dies eius supervenerit, tunc absens citari debet: et sive responderit sive non responderit, agetur causa et pronuntiabitur, non utique secundum praesentem, sed interdum vel absens, si bonam causam habuit, vincet.
And after the peremptory edict has been obtained, when its day has arrived, then the absentee ought to be cited; and whether he has answered or has not answered, the case will be proceeded with and judgment will be pronounced, not necessarily in favor of the one present, but sometimes even the absentee, if he had a good cause, will prevail.
Cum absentem defendere vellem, iudicium mortuo iam eo accepi et condemnatus solvi: quaesitum est an heres liberaretur, item quae actio mihi adversus eum competeret. respondi iudicium, quod iam mortuo debitore per defensorem eius accipitur, nullum esse et ideo heredem non liberari: defensorem autem, si ex causa iudicati solverit, repetere quidem non posse, negotiorum tamen gestorum ei actionem competere adversus heredem: qui sane exceptione doli mali tueri se possit, si ab actore conveniatur.
When I wished to defend an absent person, I accepted the suit after he had already died and, having been condemned, I paid: it was asked whether the heir would be released, and likewise what action would be competent to me against him. I answered that a suit which, after the debtor has already died, is taken up through his defender is null, and therefore the heir is not released; however, that the defender, if he has paid by reason of the judgment, indeed cannot recover, yet the action for the management of affairs is competent to him against the heir; who, to be sure, can protect himself by the exception of fraud, if he is sued by the plaintiff.
Si praetor iusserit eum a quo debitum petebatur adesse et ordine edictorum peracto pronuntiaverit absentem debere, non utique iudex, qui de iudicato cognoscit, debet de praetoris sententia cognoscere: alioquin lusoria erunt huiusmodi edicta et decreta praetorum. Marcellus notat: si per dolum sciens falso aliquid allegavit et hoc modo consecutum eum sententiam praetoris liquido fuerit adprobatum, existimo debere iudicem querellam rei admittere. paulus notat: si autem morbo impeditus aut rei publicae causa avocatus adesse non potuit reus, puto vel actionem iudicati eo casu in eum denegandam vel exsequi praetorem ita iudicatum non debere.
If the praetor has ordered the one from whom the debt was sought to be present, and, the order of the edicts having been completed, has pronounced that, being absent, he owes, by no means ought the judge who takes cognizance of the adjudged matter to take cognizance of the praetor’s sentence; otherwise edicts and decrees of praetors of this sort will be a mere game. Marcellus notes: if by fraud, knowingly, he alleged something false, and it has been clearly proved that in this way he procured the praetor’s sentence, I consider the judge ought to admit the defendant’s complaint. paulus notes: but if the defendant could not be present, impeded by illness or called away on public business, I think either the action on the judgment in that case ought to be denied against him, or the praetor ought not to execute a judgment so rendered.
Proponebatur ex his iudicibus, qui in eandem rem dati essent, nonullos causa audita excusatos esse inque eorum locum alios esse sumptos, et quaerebatur, singulorum iudicum mutatio eandem rem an aliud iudicium fecisset. respondi, non modo si unus aut alter, sed et si omnes iudices mutati essent, tamen et rem eandem et iudicium idem quod antea fuisset permanere: neque in hoc solum evenire, ut partibus commutatis eadem res esse existimaretur, sed et in multis ceteris rebus: nam et legionem eandem haberi, ex qua multi decessissent, quorum in locum alii subiecti essent: et populum eundem hoc tempore putari qui abhinc centum annis fuissent, cum ex illis nemo nunc viveret: itemque navem, si adeo saepe refecta esset, ut nulla tabula eadem permaneret quae non nova fuisset, nihilo minus eandem navem esse existimari. quod si quis putaret partibus commutatis aliam rem fieri, fore ut ex eius ratione nos ipsi non idem essemus qui abhinc anno fuissemus, propterea quod, ut philosophi dicerent, ex quibus particulis minimis constiteremus, hae cottidie ex nostro corpore decederent aliaeque extrinsecus in earum locum accederent.
It was put forward that, of those judges who had been assigned to the same matter, some, after the cause had been heard, had been excused and others taken in their place, and it was asked whether the replacement of individual judges made the same matter or a different trial. I replied that not only if one or another, but even if all the judges had been changed, nevertheless both the same matter and the same trial as had existed before would remain; and that this happens not only in this case, that with the parts changed the same thing is judged to exist, but also in many other things: for a legion is held to be the same, from which many had departed and others had been substituted in their place; and the people is thought at this time to be the same as had existed a hundred years ago, although of those no one now lives; likewise a ship, if it had been so often repaired that no plank remained the same which was not new, is nonetheless considered the same ship. And if someone should think that, with the parts changed, a different thing is made, it will follow that by his reasoning we ourselves are not the same as we were a year ago, because, as the philosophers say, the very smallest particles of which we consist depart daily from our body and others from outside come into their place.
Iudicibus de iure dubitantibus praesides respondere solent: de facto consulentibus non debent praesides consilium impertire, verum iubere eos prout religio suggerit sententiam proferre: haec enim res nonnumquam infamat et materiam gratiae vel ambitionis tribuit.
Governors are accustomed to respond to judges who are doubting about the law; but when they consult about the fact, governors ought not to impart counsel, rather to order them to deliver sentence as conscience suggests: for this thing sometimes brings ill-repute and supplies matter for favor or for ambition.
Sciendum est frequentes esse inofficiosi querellas: omnibus enim tam parentibus quam liberis de inofficioso licet disputare. cognati enim proprii qui sunt ultra fratrem melius facerent, si se sumptibus inanibus non vexarent, cum optinere spem non haberent.
It should be known that inofficious complaints are frequent: for it is permitted to all, both parents and children, to dispute about the inofficiousness. For proper cognates who are beyond the brother would do better if they did not vex themselves with inane expenses, since they have no hope of prevailing.
Hoc colore inofficioso testamento agitur, quasi non sanae mentis fuerunt, ut testamentum ordinarent. et hoc dicitur non quasi vere furiosus vel demens testatus sit, sed recte quidem fecit testamentum, sed non ex officio pietatis: nam si vere furiosus esset vel demens, nullum est testamentum.
Under this color the action of an undutiful testament is brought, as though they were not of sound mind to order a testament. And this is said not as if a truly insane or demented person had made testament, but that indeed he made the testament rightly, yet not in accord with the duty of pietas; for if he were truly insane or demented, the testament is null.
Nam et his, qui non ex masculis descendunt, facultas est agendi, cum et de matris testamento agant et optinere adsidue soleant. huius autem verbi " de inofficioso" vis illa ut dixi est docere immerentem se et ideo indigne praeteritum vel etiam exheredatione summotum: resque illo colore defenditur apud iudicem, ut videatur ille quasi non sanae mentis fuisse, cum testamentum inique ordinaret.
For even those who do not descend from males have the faculty of bringing the action, since they also litigate about the mother’s testament and are wont continually to obtain. But the force of this phrase " de inofficioso," as I said, is to show that one is without demerit and therefore was unworthily passed over or even removed by exheredation; and the matter is defended under that color before the judge, so that he may seem as if he had not been of sound mind when he arranged the testament iniquitously.
Postumus inofficiosum testamentum potest dicere eorum, quibus suus heres vel legitimus potuisset fieri, si in utero fuerit mortis eorum tempore: sed et cognatorum, quia et horum ab intestato potuit bonorum possessionem accipere. quid ergo? eis imputatur, cur intestati non decesserant?
A posthumous child can allege an undutiful testament against those to whom he could have become a suus heir or a lawful heir, if he was in the womb at the time of their death; and likewise against cognates, because from these too he could have received possession of the estate from intestacy. What then? Is it imputed to them that they did not die intestate?
but this no one can obtain before a judge: for he is not interdicted from testamentary capacity. This, plainly, he can impute to him—why he did not write him as heir: for a written heir could be sent into possession by the clause concerning sending into possession on account of the womb; likewise, once born, he would hold according to the tablets. In a similar way I say that he too, who, after the mother’s testament was made, was extracted with the belly cut open, can complain.
Si quis instituta accusatione inofficiosi decesserit, an ad heredem suum querellam transferat? papinianus respondit, quod et quibusdam rescriptis significatur, si post adgnitam bonorum possessionem decesserit, esse successionem accusationis. et si non sit petita bonorum possessio, iam tamen coepta controversia vel praeparata, vel si cum venit ad movendam inofficiosi querellam decessit, puto ad heredem transire.
If someone, after an accusation of inofficiousness has been instituted, has died, does he transfer the complaint to his heir? Papinian answered—which is also indicated by certain rescripts—that, if he has died after the possession of the estate (bonorum possessio) has been acknowledged, there is a succession to the accusation. And even if the possession of the estate has not been sought, nevertheless if the controversy has already been begun or prepared, or if he died when it came to setting in motion the complaint of inofficiousness, I think it passes to the heir.
Quemadmodum praeparasse litem quis videatur, ut possit transmittere actionem, videamus. et ponamus in potestate fuisse eum, ut neque bonorum possessio ei necessaria et aditio hereditatis supervacua sit: is si comminatus tantum accusationem fuerit vel usque ad denuntiationem vel libelli dationem praecesserit, ad heredem suum accusationem transmittet: idque divus pius de libelli datione et denuntiatione rescripsit. quid ergo si in potestate non fuerit, an ad heredem actionem transmittat ? et recte videtur litem praeparasse, si ea fecerit quorum supra mentionem habuimus.
In what manner someone may be seen to have prepared a suit, so that he can transmit the action, let us see. And let us suppose that he was in potestas, such that bonorum possessio is not necessary for him and the entry upon the inheritance (aditio hereditatis) is superfluous: if he shall only have threatened the accusation, or has gone as far as denunciation or the giving of a libellus, he will transmit the accusation to his heir; and the deified Pius has rescripted about the giving of the libellus and the denunciation. What then if he was not in potestas—does he transmit the action to the heir? And he is rightly seen to have prepared the suit, if he has done those things of which we have made mention above.
Papinianus libro quinto quaestionum recte scribit inofficiosi querellam patrem filii sui nomine instituere non posse invito eo: ipsius enim iniuria est. sequenti loco scribit, si filius post adgnitam litis ordinandae gratia bonorum possessionem decesserit, finitam esse inofficiosi querellam, quae non patri, sed nomine dabatur filii.
Papinian, in the fifth book of the Questions, rightly writes that a father cannot institute the complaint of inofficiousness in his son’s name, the son being unwilling; for the injury is his own. In the following passage he writes that, if the son, after the bonorum possessio has been acknowledged for the purpose of ordering the suit, has died, the complaint of inofficiousness is ended, which was granted not to the father, but in the name of the son.
Si quis in militia fecerit testamentum et intra annum post militiam decesserit, dubito an, quia ad hoc usque temporis iure militari testamentum eius valet, querella inofficiosi cesset: et potest dici querellam inofficiosi cessare.
If someone has made a testament while in military service and dies within a year after the service, I am in doubt whether, because his testament is valid by military law up to this span of time, the complaint of an undutiful will ceases; and it can be said that the complaint of an undutiful will does cease.
Sed nec impuberis filii mater inofficiosum testamentum dicit, quia pater ei hoc fecit ( et ita papinianus respondit): nec patris frater, quia filii testamentum est: ergo nec frater impuberis, si patris non dixit. sed si in patris obtentum est, nec hoc valebit: nisi si pro parte patris rescissum est: tunc enim pupillare valet.
But neither does the mother of a prepubescent son bring the complaint of an inofficious will, because the father did this for him (and so Papinian replied); nor the father’s brother, because it is the son’s testament: therefore neither the brother of the prepubescent, if he has not brought it in the father’s right. But if success has been obtained in the father’s case, neither will this be valid, unless it has been rescinded as to the father’s share: for then the pupillary will is valid.
Quoniam autem quarta debitae portionis sufficit ad excludendam querellam, videndum erit an exheredatus partem faciat qui non queritur: ut puta sumus duo filii exheredati. et utique faciet, ut papinianus respondit, et si dicam inofficiosum, non totam hereditatem debeo, sed dimidiam petere. proinde si sint ex duobus filiis nepotes, ex uno plures, tres puta, ex uno unus: unicum sescuncia, unum ex illis semuncia querella excludit.
Since, however, a fourth of the owed portion suffices to exclude the complaint, it must be considered whether a disinherited person who does not complain is counted in computing the share: for instance, suppose we are two sons disinherited. And assuredly he is counted, as Papinian responded; and if I bring the undutifulness action, I ought to seek not the whole inheritance, but a half. Accordingly, if from two sons there are grandsons—several from one, say three, and from the other one: for the single one a sescuncia (1/8) excludes the complaint; for one of those three a semuncia (1/24) excludes the complaint.
Quarta autem accipietur scilicet deducto aere alieno et funeris impensa: sed an et libertates quartam minuant, videndum est. et numquid minuant? nam si, cum quis ex asse heres institutus est, ideo non potest dicere inofficiosum, quia habet falcidiam, falcidia autem libertates non minuit: potest dici deductis libertatibus quartam ineundam.
The fourth, moreover, will be taken, namely with the debt (aer alienus) and the funeral expense deducted: but whether manumissions (libertates) also diminish the fourth is to be considered. And do they diminish it? For if, when someone has been instituted heir to the whole (ex asse), for that reason he cannot say the will is undutiful, because he has the Falcidian fourth; yet the Falcidian does not diminish manumissions: it can be said that, the manumissions having been deducted, the fourth is to be entered upon.
since therefore it is agreed that the fourth be diminished by manumissions, it will come about that he who has only slaves in his patrimony, by granting them liberty, excludes the querella of inofficiousness; unless perhaps this son, if he was not in potestas, though instituted heir by his father, with good cause omits the inheritance and, transmitting it to the substitute, will institute the querella inofficiosi; or he will have the inheritance ab intestato without the penalty of the edict.
Si condicioni parere testator heredem iussit in persona filii vel alterius qui eandem querellam movere potest et sciens is accepit, videndum, ne ab inofficiosi querella excludatur: adgnovit enim iudicium. idem est et si legatarius ei vel statuliber dedit. et potest dici excludi eum, maxime si heredem ei iusserat dare: ceterum si legatarium, numquid semel natam inofficiosi querellam non peremat legatarii oblatio?
If the testator ordered the heir to comply with a condition in the person of the son or of another who can move the same complaint, and that person knowingly accepted, it should be considered whether he is not excluded from the complaint of undutifulness: for he has acknowledged the action. The same holds also if a legatee or a statuliber gave to him. And it can be said that he is excluded, especially if he had ordered the heir to give to him; but if he had ordered a legatee, would the legatee’s tender not annihilate the complaint of undutifulness once arisen?
Why, then, did we speak absolutely with respect to the heir? Because before the inheritance is entered upon, the complaint does not even arise. I think the event is to be followed in this matter, that, if perchance before the action is set in motion a tender be made to him of that which was left, as if in accordance with the will of the testator, upon that being tendered it should seem that satisfaction has been made to him.
Unde si quis fuit institutus forte ex semisse, cum ei sextans ex substantia testatoris deberetur, et rogatus esset post certum temporis restituere hereditatem, merito dicendum est nullum iudicium movere, cum debitam portionem et eius fructus habere possit: fructus enim solere in falcidiam imputari non est incognitum. ergo et si ab initio ex semisse heres institutus rogetur post decennium restituere hereditatem, nihil habet quod queratur, quoniam facile potest debitam portionem eiusque fructus medio tempore cogere.
Whence, if someone was instituted perchance for a half-share, while a sextans from the testator’s estate was owed to him, and he had been asked to restore the inheritance after a certain period of time, it is rightly to be said that he should bring no action, since he can have the portion owed and its fruits: for it is not unknown that fruits are wont to be imputed to the Falcidian allowance. Therefore also, if from the outset an heir instituted for a half-share is asked to restore the inheritance after ten years, he has nothing about which to complain, since he can easily exact the portion owed and its fruits in the intervening time.
Meminisse autem oportebit eum, qui testamentum inofficiosum improbe dixit et non optinuit, id quod in testamento accepit perdere et id fisco vindicari quasi indigno ablatum. sed ei demum aufertur quod testamento datum est, qui usque ad sententiam iudicum lite improba perseveraverit: ceterum si ante sententiam destitit vel decessit, non ei aufertur quod datum est: proinde et si absente eo secundum praesentem pronuntietur, potest dici conservandum ei quod accepit. eo autem solo carere quis debet, cuius emolumentum ad eum pertinet: ceterum si id rogatus fuit restituere, non debet iniuria fieri.
It ought, however, to be remembered that he who has improperly alleged a will to be inofficious and has not prevailed loses that which he received under the testament, and that is vindicated to the fisc as if taken away from one unworthy. But that which was given by the testament is taken away only from him who has persevered with a malicious suit up to the judges’ sentence; otherwise, if before sentence he desisted or died, that which was given is not taken from him: accordingly, even if, he being absent, judgment is pronounced in favor of the one present, it can be said that what he received is to be preserved to him. Moreover, one ought to be deprived only of that of which the emolument pertains to him; but if he was requested to restore it, no injury ought to be done.
Si quis impubes adrogatus sit ex his personis, quae et citra adoptionem et emancipationem queri de inofficioso possunt, hunc puto removendum a querella, cum habeat quartam ex constitutione divi pii. quod si egit nec optinuit, an quartam perdat? et puto aut non admittendum ad inofficiosum, aut si admittatur, etsi non optinuerit, quartam ei quasi aes alienum concedendam.
If some minor has been arrogated from among those persons who even without adoption and emancipation can complain of an inofficious (will), I think he should be removed from the complaint, since he has a fourth under the constitution of the deified Pius. But if he has brought the action and has not prevailed, does he lose the fourth? And I think either he should not be admitted to the inofficious action, or, if he is admitted, even if he has not prevailed, the fourth should be granted to him as though it were a debt.
Si ex causa de inofficiosi cognoverit iudex et pronuntiaverit contra testamentum nec fuerit provocatum, ipso iure rescissum est: et suus heres erit secundum quem iudicatum est et bonorum possessor, si hoc se contendit: et libertates ipso iure non valent: nec legata debentur, sed soluta repetuntur aut ab eo qui solvit, aut ab eo qui optinuit et haec utili actione repetuntur. fere autem si ante controversiam motam soluta sunt, qui optinuit repetit: et ita divus hadrianus et divus pius rescripserunt.
If in a case on an undutiful (inofficious) will the judge has taken cognizance and has pronounced against the testament, and no appeal has been taken, it is rescinded by operation of law: and the proper heir will be the one in whose favor it has been adjudged, and he will be possessor of the goods, if he asserts this: and grants of freedom (liberties) are invalid by operation of law: nor are legacies owed, but what has been paid is reclaimed either by the one who paid or by the one who prevailed, and these are reclaimed by a useful action. Generally, however, if they were paid before the controversy was set in motion, he who prevailed reclaims: and thus the deified Hadrian and the deified Pius rescripted.
Si pars iudicantium de inofficioso testamento contra testamentum, pars secundum id sententiam dederit, quod interdum fieri solet, humanius erit sequi eius partis sententiam quae secundum testamentum spectavit: nisi si aperte iudices inique secundum scriptum heredem pronuntiasse apparebit.
If part of the judges, in a case on an inofficious testament, has given sentence against the testament, and part has given sentence in accordance with it—which sometimes is wont to happen—it will be more humane to follow the sentence of that party which regarded the testament: unless it shall appear that the judges have openly pronounced unjustly in favor of the written heir.
Nihil interest sibi relictum legatum filius exheredatus adgnoverit an filio servove relictum consecutus sit: utrubique enim praescriptione submovebitur. quin etiam si idem institutum servum priusquam adire hereditatem iuberet manumiserit, ut ille suo arbitrio adeat hereditatem, idque fraudulento consilio fecerit, summovebitur ab actione.
It makes no difference whether a disinherited son has acknowledged a legacy left to himself, or has obtained one left to his son or to his slave: in both cases he will be removed by praescription. Nay more, if the same person has manumitted a slave who was instituted (as heir) before ordering him to enter upon the inheritance, so that he may enter upon the inheritance at his own discretion, and has done this with fraudulent design, he will be put out of court from the action.
Si cum filius ademptum legatum instituerit petere, summotus repetat inofficiosi querellam, praescriptione removendus non est: quamvis enim agendo testamentum comprobaverit, tamen est aliquid, quod testatoris vitio reputetur, ut merito repellendus non sit.
If, when a son has instituted an action to seek a legacy that has been taken away, and, being dismissed, he renews the complaint of an undutiful will (querella inofficiosi), he is not to be removed by a plea of prescription: for although by suing he has approved the testament, nevertheless there is something to be reckoned to the testator’s fault, so that he ought not rightly to be repelled.
Titia filiam heredem instituit, filio legatum dedit: eodem testamento ita cavit: " ea omnia quae supra dari fieri iussi, ea dari fieri volo ab omni herede bonorumve possessore qui mihi erit etiam iure intestato: item quae dari iussero, ea uti dentur fiantque, fidei eius committo. " quaesitum est, si soror centumvirali iudicio optinuerit, an fideicommissa ex capite supra scripto debeantur. respondi: si hoc quaeratur, an iure eorum, quos quis sibi ab intestato heredes bonorumve possessores successuros credat, fidei committere possit, respondi posse.
Titia appointed her daughter as heir, she gave a legacy to her son: in the same testament she thus provided: " all those things which I have ordered above to be given and done, those I wish to be given and done by any heir or possessor of the goods who shall be mine even by the law of intestacy: likewise, the things which I shall have ordered to be given, that they be given and be done, I commit to his good faith. " It was asked, if the sister has prevailed in the centumviral judgment, whether the fideicommissa are owed under the head written above. I answered: if this is the question, whether one can commit to good faith by the right of those whom one believes will succeed to him as heirs or possessors of the goods ab intestato, I answered that he can.
Pater filium emancipavit et nepotem ex eo retinuit: emancipatus suscepto postea filio, duobus exheredatis patre praeterito vita decessit. in quaestione de inofficiosi testamenti praecedente causa filiorum patris intentio adhuc pendet. quod si contra filios iudicetur, pater ad querellam vocatur et suam intentionem implere potest.
A father emancipated his son and retained the grandson from him; the emancipated son, after later acknowledging a son, died, with two disinherited and the father passed over. In the question concerning an inofficious testament, with the cause of the sons taking precedence, the father’s claim still remains pending. But if judgment is given against the sons, the father is called to the querella and can fulfill his own claim.
Filius, qui de inofficiosi actione adversus duos heredes expertus diversas sententias iudicum tulit et unum vicit, ab altero superatus est, et debitores convenire et ipse a creditoribus conveniri pro parte potest et corpora vindicare et hereditatem dividere: verum enim est familiae erciscundae iudicium competere, quia credimus eum legitimum heredem pro parte esse factum: et ideo pars hereditatis in testamento remansit, nec absurdum videtur pro parte intestatum videri.
The son, who, in a proceeding of inofficiousness against two heirs, having tried the case, carried divergent judgments of the judges and conquered one but was overcome by the other, can both sue debtors and himself be sued by creditors for his share, and vindicate corporeal things and divide the inheritance; for it is true that the action for partition of the family property is available, because we believe that he has been made a legitimate heir for a share; and therefore a part of the inheritance remained under the testament, nor does it seem absurd that it appear intestate as to a part.
Contra tabulas filii possessionem iure manumissionis pater accepit et bonorum possessionem adeptus est: postea filia defuncti, quam ipse exheredaverat, quaestionem inofficiosi testamenti recte pertulit: possessio, quam pater accepit, ad irritum reccidit: nam priore iudicio de iure patris, non de iure testamenti quaesitum est: et ideo universam hereditatem filiae cum fructibus restitui necesse est.
Against the son’s will the father received possession by the right of manumission and obtained possession of the goods; afterward the deceased’s daughter, whom he himself had disinherited, rightly brought the complaint of an inofficious testament; the possession which the father had received fell to nullity, for in the earlier judgment the inquiry was about the father’s right, not about the right of the testament; and therefore the whole inheritance must be restored to the daughter together with the fruits.
Qui repudiantis animo non venit ad accusationem inofficiosi testamenti, partem non facit his qui eandem querellam movere volunt. unde si de inofficioso testamento patris alter ex liberis exheredatis ageret, quia rescisso testamento alter quoque ad successionem ab intestato vocatur, et ideo universam hereditatem non recte vindicasset: hic si optinuerit, uteretur rei iudicatae auctoritate, quasi centumviri hunc solum filium in rebus humanis esse nunc, cum facerent intestatum, crediderint.
He who does not come to the accusation of an inofficious testament with a repudier’s intention does not create a share for those who wish to set the same complaint in motion. Whence, if, concerning the inofficious testament of a father, one of the disinherited children were to sue, since, the testament having been rescinded, the other also is called to succession ab intestato, and for that reason he would not rightly have claimed the entire inheritance: if this man should prevail, he would use the authority of res judicata, as if the centumvirs, when they were making it intestate, had believed that this son alone now existed among the living.
Cum contra testamentum ut inofficiosum iudicatur, testamenti factionem habuisse defunctus non creditur. non idem probandum est, si herede non respondente secundum praesentem iudicatum sit: hoc enim casu non creditur ius ex sententia iudicis fieri: et ideo libertates competunt et legata petuntur.
When a will is adjudged as undutiful (inofficious), the deceased is not believed to have had testamentary capacity. The same need not be proved if, the heir not answering, judgment has been given for the party present: for in this case it is not believed that the right is made by the judge’s sentence; and therefore manumissions are competent and legacies are demanded.
Mater decedens extraneum ex dodrante heredem instituit, filiam unam ex quadrante, alteram praeteriit: haec de inofficioso egit et optinuit. quaero, scriptae filiae quomodo succurrendum sit. respondi: filia praeterita id vindicare debet, quod intestata matre habitura esset: itaque dici potest eam quae omissa est etiam, si totam hereditatem ab intestato petat et optineat, solam habituram universam successionem, quemadmodum si altera omisisset legitimam hereditatem.
The mother, at her decease, instituted a stranger as heir as to three-quarters, one daughter as to one-quarter, and passed over the other: this latter brought the action de inofficioso and prevailed. I ask in what way relief should be afforded to the daughter who was written in. I answered: the pretermitted daughter ought to vindicate that which she would have had with the mother intestate: accordingly it can be said that she who was omitted, even if she should seek and obtain the whole inheritance ab intestato, will alone have the entire succession, just as if the other had omitted the legitimate inheritance.
but it is not to be admitted that she be heard against her sister by bringing suit on the undutifulness; moreover, it must be said that she who has acceded under the testament is not similar to one who has omitted it: and therefore from the outsider a half-share must be vindicated, and it must be maintained that the whole half-share is to be taken away, as if the entire half pertained to her. According to which, the testament is not invalidated in its entirety, but becomes intestate as to a part, although her last judgment is condemned as if of a madwoman. However, if anyone should think that, with the daughter prevailing, the whole testament is invalidated, it must be said that even the instituted heir can enter upon the inheritance ab intestato: for she who has entered under the testament, which she thinks to be valid, does not seem to repudiate the legitimate inheritance, which indeed she does not know is being offered to her; since even those who know their right, choosing that which they think to belong to them, do not lose it.
which occurs in the case of a patron who, moved by a false opinion, embraced the deceased’s lawsuit: for he is not regarded as having repudiated the possession of goods against the will. From which it appears that it is not correct to vindicate the whole inheritance as having been passed over, since, with the testament rescinded, even the instituted woman retains an unimpaired right of entering upon the inheritance.
Qui de inofficioso vult dicere, licet negetur filius, carbonianam bonorum possessionem non debet accipere ( totiens enim ea indulgenda est, quotiens, si vere filius esset, heres esset aut bonorum possessor, ut interim et possideat et alatur et actionibus praeiudicium non patiatur: qui vero de inofficioso dicit, nec actiones movere debet nec aliam ullam quam hereditatis petitionem exercere nec ali), ne umquam melioris sit condicionis, quam si confitetur adversarius.
He who wishes to speak about an inofficious will, even if it is denied that he is a son, ought not to accept the Carbonian possession of the goods ( for that is to be indulged as often as, if he were truly a son, he would be heir or bonorum possessor, so that in the meantime he both may possess and be maintained and not suffer prejudice from actions: but he who speaks of the inofficious will ought neither to set actions in motion nor to exercise any other than the petition of the inheritance nor anything else), lest he ever be in a better condition than if the adversary confesses.
Eum, qui inofficiosi testamenti querellam instituit et fraude heredis scripti, quasi tertiam partem hereditatis tacite rogatus esset ei restituere, reliquit eam actionem, non videri deseruisse querellam et ideo non prohiberi eum repetere inchoatam actionem.
He who has instituted the complaint of an undutiful testament and, through the fraud of the instituted heir, as if he had been tacitly requested to restore to him a third part of the inheritance, has abandoned that action, is not deemed to have deserted the complaint and therefore is not prohibited from resuming the inchoate action.
Item quaesitum est, an heres audiendus est, ante de inofficiosi querellam actam desiderans restitui sibi ea quae solvit. respondit ei, qui sciens indebitum fideicommissum solvit, nullam repetitionem ex ea causa competere.
Likewise it was asked whether the heir must be heard, before an action on the inofficious complaint has been brought, when he desires to have restored to himself the things he paid. He responded that one who knowingly paid an undue fideicommissum has no repetition (recovery) available on that ground.
Idem respondit, evicta hereditate per inofficiosi querellam ab eo qui heres institutus esset, perinde omnia observari oportere, ac si hereditas adita non fuisset: et ideo et petitionem integram debiti heredi instituto adversus eum qui superavit competere et compensationem debiti.
He likewise responded, that, the inheritance having been evicted through a complaint of inofficiousness from the one who had been instituted heir, all things ought to be observed just as if the inheritance had not been entered upon: and therefore both the full claim for the debt is available to the instituted heir against the one who has prevailed, and the set-off (compensation) of the debt.
Filius non impeditur, quo minus inofficiosum testamentum matris accusaret, si pater eius legatum ex testamento matris accipiet vel adisset hereditatem, quamquam in eius esset potestate: nec prohiberi patrem dixi iure filii accusare: nam indignatio filii est.
A son is not impeded from accusing his mother’s testament as undutiful, if his father should receive a legacy from the mother’s testament or should have entered upon the inheritance, although he was under his power; nor have I said that the father is prohibited from accusing by the right of the son: for the indignation is the son’s.
Et quaerebatur, si non optinuisset in accusando, an quod patri datum est publicaretur? quoniam alii commodum victoriae parat et in hac causa nihil ex officio patris, sed totum de meritis filii agitur. et inclinandum est non perdere patrem sibi datum, si secundum testamentum pronuntiatum fuisset.
And it was asked, if he had not prevailed in accusing, whether that which was given to the father would be confiscated to the state; since he prepares the advantage of victory for another, and in this cause nothing is from the father’s office, but the whole is dealt with on the merits of the son. And we should incline not to let him lose the father given to him, if judgment had been pronounced according to the testament.
Multo magis si mihi legatum testator dedit, cuius de inofficioso testamento filius agens decessit me herede relicto, egoque hereditariam causam peregi et victus sum: id quod mihi eo testamento relictum est, non perdam: utique si iam defunctus agere coeperat.
Much more so if the testator gave me a legacy, whose son, prosecuting concerning an inofficious testament, died with me left as heir, and I conducted the hereditary cause and was defeated: that which was left to me by that testament I shall not lose: especially if the deceased had already begun to act.
Item si adrogavi eum, qui instituerat litem de inofficioso testamento eius qui mihi legatum dedit, litemque peregero nomine filii nec optinuero: perdere me legatum non oportet, quia non sum indignus, ut auferatur mihi a fisco id quod derelictum est: cum non proprio nomine, sed iure cuiusdam successionis egi.
Likewise, if I have adrogated him who had instituted a lawsuit concerning the inofficious testament of the one who gave me a legacy, and I have prosecuted the suit in the name of the son and have not prevailed: I ought not to lose the legacy, because I am not so unworthy as to have what has been left taken from me by the fisc; since I acted not in my own name, but by the right of a certain succession.
Si ponas filium emancipatum praeteritum et ex eo nepotem in potestate retentum heredem institutum esse: filius potest contra filium suum, testatoris nepotem petere bonorum possessionem, queri autem de inofficioso testamento non poterit. quod si exheredatus sit filius emancipatus, poterit queri et ita iungetur filio suo et simul cum eo hereditatem optinebit.
If you suppose that an emancipated son has been passed over, and that from him a grandson, retained in (the testator’s) power, has been instituted heir: the son can seek possession of the goods against his own son, the testator’s grandson; but he will not be able to complain of an inofficious testament. But if the emancipated son has been disinherited, he will be able to complain, and thus he will be joined to his son and together with him will obtain the inheritance.
Si hereditatem ab heredibus institutis exheredati emerunt vel res singulas scientes eos heredes esse: aut conduxerunt praedia aliudve quid simile fecerunt: vel solverunt heredi quod testatori debebant: iudicium defuncti adgnoscere videntur et a querella excluduntur.
If those disinherited purchased the inheritance from the instituted heirs or individual items, knowing them to be heirs: or leased the estates or did anything else similar: or paid to the heir what they owed to the testator: they are seen to acknowledge the judgment of the deceased and are excluded from the complaint.
Circa inofficiosi querellam evenire plerumque adsolet, ut in una atque eadem causa diversae sententiae proferantur. quid enim si fratre agente heredes scripti diversi iuris fuerunt? quod si fuerit, pro parte testatus, pro parte intestatus decessisse videbitur.
Around the complaint of inofficiousness it for the most part is wont to occur that, in one and the same case, diverse judgments are brought forward. For what if, with the brother acting, the heirs instituted were of different law? If this should be so, he will be seen to have died testate as to a part, intestate as to a part.
Si non mortis causa fuerit donatum, sed inter vivos, hac tamen contemplatione, ut in quartam habeatur: potest dici inofficiosi querellam cessare, si quartam in donatione habet aut, si minus habeat, quod deest viri boni arbitratu repleatur: aut certe conferri oportere id quod donatum est.
If it was not donated in contemplation of death, but inter vivos, yet with this contemplation, that it be accounted toward the fourth: it can be said that the complaint of inofficiousness ceases, if he has the fourth in the donation; or, if he have less, that what is lacking be replenished by the arbitration of a good man; or certainly that what was donated ought to be brought into collation.
Si quis, cum non possit de inofficioso queri, ad querellam admissus pro parte rescindere testamentum temptet et unum sibi heredem eligat, contra quem inofficiosi querellam instituat, dicendum est, quia testamentum pro parte valet et praecedentes eum personae exclusae sunt, cum effectu eum querellam instituisse.
If someone, though he cannot complain on the ground of inofficiousness, having been admitted to the complaint, attempts to rescind the testament in part and to choose for himself one heir, against whom he institutes the complaint of inofficiousness, it must be said that the testament is valid in part and that the persons preceding him are excluded, since he has instituted the complaint with effect.
Si sub hac condicione fuerit heres institutus " si stichum manumiserit " et manumisisset, et posteaquam manumisit inofficiosum vel iniustum testamentum pronuntietur: aequum est huic quoque succurri, ut servi pretium a manumisso accipiat, ne frustra servum perdat.
If under this condition an heir has been instituted, " if he shall manumit Stichus ", and he has manumitted, and after he manumitted the testament is pronounced undutiful or unjust: it is equitable that succor be afforded to this one also, that he receive the slave’s price from the manumitted man, lest he lose the slave in vain.
De inofficioso testamento nepos contra patruum suum vel alium scriptum heredem pro portione egerat et optinuerat, sed scriptus heres appellaverat: placuit interim propter inopiam pupilli alimenta pro modo facultatium, quae per inofficiosi testamenti accusationem pro parte ei vindicabantur, decerni eaque adversarium ei subministrare necesse habere usque ad finem litis.
Concerning an inofficious testament: a grandson had brought suit against his paternal uncle or another instituted heir for his portion and had prevailed, but the instituted heir had appealed; it was decided meanwhile, on account of the poverty of the ward, that maintenance (alimenta), in proportion to the means which were being vindicated to him in part through the accusation of an inofficious testament, be decreed, and that the adversary be obliged to supply them to him until the end of the litigation.
Cum mater militem filium falso audisset decessisse et testamento heredes alios instituisset, divus hadrianus decrevit hereditatem ad filium pertinere ita, ut libertates et legata praestentur. hic illud adnotatum quod de libertatibus et legatis adicitur: nam cum inofficiosum testamentum arguitur, nihil ex eo testamento valet.
When a mother had falsely heard that her soldier son had died and had in her testament appointed other heirs, the deified Hadrian decreed that the inheritance pertains to the son, on condition that manumissions and legacies be performed. Here the following was annotated—namely, that which is added concerning manumissions and legacies: for when an inofficious (undutiful) testament is impugned, nothing from that testament is valid.
Si suspecta collusio sit legatariis inter scriptos heredes et eum qui de inofficioso testamento agit: adesse etiam legatarios et voluntatem defuncti tueri constitutum est, eisdemque permissum est etiam appellare, si contra testamentum pronuntiatum fuerit.
If collusion is suspected by the legatees between the instituted heirs and the one who brings an action on an inofficious testament: it has been established that the legatees also be present and defend the will of the deceased, and to the same it has been permitted also to appeal, if a pronouncement has been made against the testament.
Quamvis instituta inofficiosi testamenti accusatione res transactione decisa sit, tamen testamentum in suo iure manet: et ideo datae in eo libertates atque legata, usque quo falcidia permittit, suam habent potestatem.
Although, even when an accusation of an inofficious testament has been instituted and the matter has been decided by settlement, nevertheless the testament remains in its own right; and therefore the grants of freedom and the legacies given in it have their own force, in so far as the Falcidia permits.
Si legatario heres extiterit exheredatus petieritque legatum, videbimus an sit summovendus ab hac accusatione: certum est enim iudicium defuncti et rursus nihil ei ex testamento relictum verum est. tutius tamen fecerit, si se abstinuerit a petitione legati.
If for the legatee he has turned out heir, and the disinherited has sought the legacy, we shall consider whether he ought to be removed from this accusation: for the judgment of the deceased is certain, and again it is true that nothing has been left to him from the testament. He will, however, have acted more safely if he has abstained from the petition for the legacy.
Veluti si eam personam, quae in nostra potestate sit, institutam iusserimus adire hereditatem: sed et si titio, qui seio heres extitit, nos heredes facti sumus, sicuti titii hereditatem nostram esse intendere possumus, ita et seii) vel ab intestato ( forte quod sui heredes defuncto sumus, vel adgnati, vel quod manumisimus defunctum, quodve parens noster manumiserit). novo iure fiunt heredes omnes qui ex senatus consultis aut ex constitutionibus ad hereditatem vocantur.
For example, if a person who is in our power, having been instituted, we have ordered to enter upon the inheritance: but also if we have been made heirs to Titius, who turned out heir to Seius, just as we can maintain that Titius’s inheritance is ours, so also Seius’s) either ab intestato ( perhaps because we are the deceased’s sui heredes, or agnates, or because we manumitted the deceased, or our parent manumitted him). By the new law all become heirs who are called to an inheritance by senatorial decrees or by constitutions.
Divus pius rescripsit prohibendum possessorem hereditatis, de qua controversia erit, antequam lis inchoaretur, aliquid ex ea distrahere: nisi maluerit pro omni quantitate hereditatis vel rerum eius restitutione satisdare: causa autem cognita, etsi non talis data sit satisdatio, sed solita cautio, etiam post litem coeptam deminutionem se concessurum praetor edixit, ne in totum deminutio impedita in aliquo etiam utilitates alias impediat. ut puta si ad funus sit aliquid necessarium: nam funeris gratia deminutionem permittit. item si futurum est, ut, nisi pecunia intra diem solvatur, pignus distrahatur.
The deified Pius rescripted that the possessor of an inheritance, about which there will be a controversy, must be prohibited, before the suit is initiated, from selling off anything from it: unless he should prefer to give security for the whole amount of the inheritance or for the restitution of its things. But, the case having been examined, even if such security has not been given, but the customary caution, the praetor edicted that he would grant diminution even after the suit has begun, lest the being impeded of diminution entirely should in some respect also impede other utilities. For instance, if something is necessary for a funeral: for the sake of the funeral he permits diminution. Likewise, if it is going to be that, unless money is paid within the day, a pledge is sold off.
Divus hadrianus trebio sergiano rescripsit, ut aelius asiaticus daret satis de hereditate quae ab eo petitur, et sic falsum dicat: hoc ideo, quia sustinetur hereditatis petitionis iudicium, donec falsi causa agatur.
The deified Hadrian wrote back by rescript to Trebius Sergianus that Aelius Asiaticus should give security concerning the inheritance which is claimed from him, and thus should plead falsum; this for the reason that the judgment in the petition of inheritance is held in suspense until the cause of falsum is litigated.
Si testamentum falsum esse dicatur et ex eo legatum petatur, vel praestandum est oblata cautione vel quaerendum an debeatur, etsi testamentum falsum esse dicatur. ei tamen qui falsi accusat, si suscepta cognitio est, non est dandum.
If a testament is said to be false and a legacy is demanded from it, either it must be furnished upon caution (security) being tendered, or there must be an inquiry whether it is owed, even if the testament is said to be false. Yet to him who prosecutes a charge of forgery, if a cognition (investigation) has been undertaken, it is not to be given.
Si quis libertatem ex testamento sibi competisse dicat, non debebit iudex de libertate sententiam dicere, ne praeiudicium de testamento cognituro faciat: et ita senatus censuit: sed et divus traianus rescripsit differendum de libertate iudicium, donec de inofficioso iudicium aut inducatur aut finem accipiat.
If anyone says that liberty has accrued to him from a testament, the judge ought not to pronounce sentence concerning liberty, lest he create a prejudice regarding the testament that is to be examined: and thus the senate decreed: and the deified Trajan also issued a rescript that the judgment concerning liberty should be deferred, until the action on the inofficious testament either is brought or comes to an end.
Ita demum autem sustinentur liberalia iudicia, si iam de inofficioso iudicium contestatum est: ceterum si non contestetur, non exspectantur liberalia iudicia: et ita divus pius rescripsit. nam cum quidam licinnianus de statu suo quaestionem patiebatur et, ne maturius pronuntiaretur de condicione sua, nolebat ad liberale iudicium ire, dicens suscepturum se de inofficioso testamento iudicium et petiturum hereditatem, quia libertatem et hereditatem ex testamento sibi defendebat: divus pius ait, si quidem possessor esset hereditatis licinnianus, facilius audiendum, quoniam esset hereditatis nomine iudicium suscepturus et erat in arbitrio eius, qui se dominum esse dicit, agere de inofficioso testamento iudicium. nunc vero sub obtentu iudicii de inofficioso testamento ab ipso licinniano non suscepti per quinquennium non debere moram fieri servituti.
Only then, however, are liberty actions sustained if already a suit on an inofficious testament has been formally entered; but if it is not entered, liberty actions are not awaited: and thus the deified Pius rescripted. For when a certain Licinnianus was undergoing inquiry concerning his status and, lest a pronouncement be made too early about his condition, was unwilling to go to a liberty action, saying that he would undertake a suit on an inofficious testament and would seek the inheritance, because he was defending for himself liberty and the inheritance from the testament: the deified Pius said that, if indeed Licinnianus were the possessor of the inheritance, he should be heard more readily, since he would be about to undertake a suit in the name of the inheritance, and it was in the discretion of him who says that he is the owner to bring an action concerning an inofficious testament. But as it is, under the pretext of a suit on an inofficious testament not undertaken by Licinnianus himself, a delay ought not to be made to servitude for a five-year period.
he plainly granted that it should be assessed summarily by the judge whether perhaps in good faith a suit concerning the testament is being invoked; and if he detects this, a moderate time is to be prescribed, within which, if it has not been contested, let him order the judge in the liberty case to discharge his proper functions.
Quotiens autem quis patitur controversiam libertatis et hereditatis, sed se non ex testamento liberum dicit, sed alias vel a vivo testatore manumissum, non debere impediri liberalem causam, licet iudicium de testamento moveri speretur, divus pius rescripsit: adiecit plane in rescripto, dummodo praedicatur iudici liberalis causae, ne ullum adminiculum libertatis ex testamento admittat.
As often as someone undergoes a controversy of liberty and inheritance, but says that he is free not from the testament, but otherwise, or manumitted by the testator while alive, the deified Pius issued a rescript that the liberal cause ought not to be impeded, although it is expected that a suit about the testament will be set in motion; he added plainly in the rescript, provided that it is declared to the judge of the liberal cause, that he admit no support for liberty from the testament.
Pro herede possidet, qui putat se heredem esse. sed an et is, qui scit se heredem non esse, pro herede possideat, quaeritur: et arrianus libro secundo de interdictis putat teneri, quo iure nos uti proculus scribit. sed enim et bonorum possessor pro herede videtur possidere.
He possesses as heir who thinks himself to be heir. But whether even he who knows himself not to be heir possesses as heir is asked; and Arrianus, in the second book On Interdicts, thinks that this is held, and Proculus writes that we make use of this law. But indeed the possessor of the estate (bonorum possessor) also seems to possess as heir.
Omnibus etiam titulis hic pro possessore haeret et quasi iniunctus est. denique et pro emptore titulo haeret: nam si a furioso emero sciens, pro possessore possideo. item in titulo pro donato quaeritur, an quis pro possessore possideat, ut puta uxor vel maritus: et placet nobis iuliani sententia pro possessore possidere eum, et ideo petitione hereditatis tenebitur.
Under all titles as well, here he is bound as for the possessor and, as it were, is joined. Finally, he is also bound under the title as purchaser: for if I knowingly buy from a madman, I possess as a possessor. Likewise, under the title as donee it is asked whether someone possesses as a possessor, for example a wife or a husband: and we approve Julian’s opinion that he possesses as a possessor, and therefore he will be liable to a petition for the inheritance.
likewise, the title on account of dowry admits possession as for a possessor, for instance, if from a minor under twelve years, married to me, I knowingly received something as if dowry. And if a legacy has been paid to me from a false cause, I, knowing this, will of course possess as for a possessor.
Neratius libro sexto membranarum scribit ab herede peti hereditatem posse, etiam si ignoret pro herede vel pro possessore defunctum possedisse. idem esse libro septimo ait etiam si putavit heres eas res ex hac hereditate esse quae sibi delata est.
Neratius, in the sixth book of the Membranae, writes that the inheritance can be sought from the heir, even if he is unaware that the deceased had possessed as heir or as possessor. He says it is the same in the seventh book, even if the heir supposed that those things belonged to this inheritance which has devolved upon him.
Quid si quis hereditatem emerit, an utilis in eum petitio hereditatis deberet dari, ne singulis iudiciis vexaretur? venditorem enim teneri certum est: sed finge non extare venditorem vel modico vendidisse et bonae fidei possessorem fuisse: an porrigi manus ad emptorem debeant? et putat gaius cassius dandam utilem actionem.
What if someone has purchased an inheritance: should a useful petition of inheritance be granted against him, so that one not be harassed by individual lawsuits? For it is certain that the seller is held liable; but suppose the seller is not in existence, or sold for a small price, and has been a possessor in good faith: should a hand be stretched out to the buyer? And Gaius Cassius thinks that a useful action ought to be given.
Idem erit dicendum et si parvo pretio iussus vendere heres titio hereditatem vendidit: nam putat dicendum papinianus adversus fideicommissarium dari actionem: ab herede enim peti non expedit perexiguum pretium habente.
The same will have to be said also if, having been ordered to sell for a small price, the heir sold the inheritance to Titius: for Papinian thinks one should say that an action is granted against the fideicommissary: for it is not expedient that it be sought from the heir, who has only a very paltry price.
Sed et si retenta certa quantitate restituere rogatus sit, idem erit dicendum. plane si accepta certa quantitate restituere rogatus est, non putat papinianus ab herede petendam hereditatem, quoniam pro herede, quod condicionis implendae gratia accepit, non possidetur. sed sabinus in statulibero contra: et id verius est, quia pecunia hereditaria est.
But also if he has been asked to restore, a certain quantity being retained, the same is to be said. Clearly, if, a certain quantity having been received, he was asked to restore, Papinian does not think the inheritance should be sought from the heir, since what he received for the sake of fulfilling the condition is not possessed as heir. But Sabinus says the contrary in the case of a statuliber; and that is truer, because the money is hereditary.
Si quis sciens alienam emit hereditatem, quasi pro possessore possidet: et sic peti ab eo hereditatm quidam putant. quam sententiam non puto veram: nemo enim praedo est qui pretium numeravit: sed ut emptor universitatis utili tenetur.
If someone knowingly buys another’s inheritance, he possesses as if in place of a possessor: and thus some think the inheritance can be claimed from him. Which opinion I do not think true: for no one is a robber who has paid the price: but as the purchaser of the universitas he is held by a useful action.
Apud Marcellum libro quarto digestorum relatum est, si mulier hereditatem in dotem dedit, maritum pro dote quidem possidere hereditatem, sed petitione hereditatis utili teneri: sed et ipsam mulierem directa teneri Marcellus scribit, maxime si iam factum divortium est.
It is reported by Marcellus in the fourth book of the Digests that, if a woman has given an inheritance as dowry, the husband indeed may possess the inheritance by way of dowry, but is liable under a useful petition for the inheritance; and Marcellus writes that the woman herself is liable under a direct action, especially if a divorce has already been effected.
Heredem autem etiam earum rerum nomine, quas defunctus pro emptore possedit, hereditatis petitione teneri constat, quasi pro herede possideat: quamvis etiam earum rerum nomine, quas pro herede vel pro possessore defunctus possedit, utique teneatur.
Moreover, it is established that the heir is held by the petition of inheritance even in respect of those things which the deceased possessed pro emptore (as purchaser), as if he possessed pro herede (as heir); although, to be sure, he is likewise held in respect of those things which the deceased possessed pro herede or pro possessore (as possessor).
Si quis absentis nomine possideat hereditatem, cum sit incertum an ille ratum habeat, puto absentis nomine petendam hereditatem, ipsius vero nequaquam, quia non videtur pro herede vel pro possessore possidere, qui contemplatione alterius possidet: nisi forte quis dixerit, cum ratum non habet, iam procuratorem quasi praedonem esse: tunc enim suo nomine teneri potest.
If someone possesses an inheritance in the name of an absentee, since it is uncertain whether that man will have it ratified, I think the inheritance must be sued for in the absentee’s name, but by himself by no means; for he who possesses in contemplation of another does not seem to possess as heir or as possessor: unless perhaps someone should say that, since he does not have ratification, the procurator is already as if a plunderer; then indeed he can be held in his own name.
Non solum autem ab eo peti hereditas potest, qui corpus hereditarium possidet, sed et si nihil. et videndum, si non possidens optulerit tamen se petitioni, an teneatur. et celsus libro quarto digestorum scribit ex dolo eum teneri: dolo enim facere eum qui se offert petitioni.
Not only, moreover, can the inheritance be sought from him who possesses the hereditary corpus, but also from one who possesses nothing. And it must be considered whether, if a non-possessor nevertheless has offered himself to the petition, he is bound. And Celsus, in the fourth book of the Digest, writes that he is held on account of dolus; for he acts with dolus who offers himself to the petition.
Item si quis dolo fecerit, quo minus possideat, hereditatis petitione tenebitur. sed si alius nanctus possessionem, quam ego dolo malo amiseram, paratus sit iudicium pati, Marcellus libro quarto digestorum tractat, ne forte evanescat adversus eum qui desiit litis aestimatio: et magis evanescere ait, nisi petentis interest: certe, inquit, si rem paratus sit restituere, indubitatum erit evanescere. sed si is qui dolo desiit ante conveniatur, eum qui possidet non liberabit.
Likewise, if someone by dolus has acted so that he not possess, he will be held by a petition for the inheritance. But if another, having got possession which I had lost by dolus malus, is prepared to undergo the judgment, Marcellus in the fourth book of the Digesta treats the point, lest perhaps the valuation of the suit (litis aestimatio) vanish as against him who has ceased [to possess]; and he says it rather does vanish, unless it is to the petitioner’s interest; certainly, he says, if he is prepared to restore the thing, it will be undoubted that it vanishes. But if he who by dolus ceased [to possess] is first sued, he will not free the one who possesses.
Quod si in diem sit debitor vel sub condicione, a quo petita est hereditas, non debere eum damnari. rei plane iudicatae tempus spectandum esse secundum octaveni sententiam, ut apud pomponium scriptum est, an dies venerit: quod et in stipulatione condicionali erit dicendum. si autem non venerit, cavere officio iudicis debeat de restituendo hoc debito, cum dies venerit vel condicio extiterit.
But if the person from whom the inheritance is claimed is a debtor to a day certain or under a condition, he ought not to be condemned. Plainly, for res judicata the time must be regarded, according to the opinion of Octavenus, as is written by Pomponius, whether the day has come; and the same must be said in a conditional stipulation. But if it has not come, he ought, by the judge’s office, to give security for restoring this debt when the day comes or the condition has arisen.
Non solum autem a debitore defuncti, sed etiam a debitore hereditario peti hereditas potest: denique ab eo, qui negotia hereditaria gessit, et celso et iuliano videtur peti hereditatem posse, sed si heredis negotium gessit, nequaquam: ab heredis enim debitore peti hereditas non potest.
Not only from the debtor of the deceased, but also from the debtor of the inheritance the inheritance can be claimed: finally, from him who has managed the hereditary business, it seems to both Celsus and Julian that the inheritance can be claimed; but if he has managed the business of the heir, by no means: for the inheritance cannot be claimed from the debtor of the heir.
Iulianus scribit, si is, qui pro herede possidebat, vi fuerit deiectus, peti ab eo hereditatem posse quasi a iuris possessore, quia habet interdictum unde vi, quo victus cedere debet: sed et eum qui deiecit petitione hereditatis teneri, quia res hereditarias pro possessore possidet.
Julian writes that, if he who was possessing as heir (pro herede) has been ejected by force, the inheritance can be demanded from him as from a possessor by right, because he has the interdict “unde vi,” which, if defeated, he ought to cede; but also the one who ejected him is held by the petition of the inheritance (hereditatis petitio), because he possesses the hereditary things as a possessor.
Idem scribit patronum hereditatem petere non posse ab eo, cui libertus in fraudem alienavit, quia calvisiana actione ei tenetur: patroni enim iste debitor est, non hereditarius. ergo nec ab eo, cui mortis causa donatum est, peti hereditas potest.
He likewise writes that a patron cannot seek the inheritance from the one to whom the freedman alienated it in fraud, because he is liable to him by the Calvisian action: for that man is the patron’s debtor, not the heir. Therefore the inheritance cannot be sought even from the one to whom a gift in contemplation of death (donatio mortis causa) was made.
Sed et si pretia rerum, quas distraxit, ex causa fideicommissi solvit, peti hereditatem ab eo posse, quia repetere potest. sed his casibus actiones suas dumtaxat eum praestaturum, cum et res exstant et potest petitor etiam per in rem actionem eas vindicare.
But also, if he has paid, on account of the fideicommissum, the prices of the things which he sold off, the inheritance can be sought from him, because he can recover. But in these cases he will furnish only his actions, since the things are extant and the claimant can also vindicate them by an in rem action.
Quod si possessor hereditatis ob id, quod ex testamento heredem se esse putaret, legatorum nomine de suo solvit, si quis ab intestato eam hereditatem evincat, licet damnum videtur esse possessoris, quod sibi non prospexerit stipulatione " evicta hereditate legata reddi", attamen quia fieri potest, ut eo tempore solverit legata, quo adhuc nulla controversia mota sit, et ob id nullam interposuerit cautionem, placet in eo casu evicta hereditate dandam ei esse repetitionem. sed cum cessante cautione repetitio datur, periculum est, ne propter inopiam eius, cui solutum est legatum, nihil repeti possit, et ideo secundum senatus consulti sententiam subveniendum ei est, ut ipse quidem ex retentione rerum hereditariarum sibi satisfaciat, cedat autem actionibus petitori, ut suo periculo eas exerceat.
But if the possessor of an inheritance, because he thought from the testament that he was the heir, paid out of his own funds, under the title of legacies, and someone evicts that inheritance as heir ab intestato, although the loss seems to be the possessor’s—because he did not provide for himself by a stipulation “ evicta hereditate legata reddi” (“with the inheritance evicted, the legacies to be returned”)—nevertheless, since it can happen that he paid the legacies at a time when as yet no controversy had been stirred, and on that account interposed no caution (security), it is approved that in that case, the inheritance having been evicted, repetition (recovery) be granted to him. But since, with the caution absent, repetition is given, there is a danger that, on account of the poverty of the one to whom the legacy was paid, nothing may be recovered; and therefore, according to the tenor of the senatorial decree (senatus consultum), he must be aided, to the effect that he may satisfy himself by retention of the hereditary things, but cede his actions to the petitioner, so that he may exercise them at his own risk.
Item videndum, si possessor hereditatis venditione per argentarium facta pecuniam apud eum perdiderit, an petitione hereditatis teneatur, quia nihil habet nec consequi potest. sed labeo putat eum teneri, quia suo periculo male argentario credidit: sed octavenus ait nihil eum praeter actiones praestaturum, ob has igitur actiones petitione hereditatis teneri. mihi autem in eo, qui mala fide possedit, labeonis sententia placet: in altero vero, qui bona fide possessor est, octaveni sententia sequenda esse videtur.
Likewise it must be considered, if the possessor of an inheritance, a sale having been effected through a banker, has lost the money with him, whether he is held by a petition of the inheritance, because he has nothing and cannot recover it. But labeo thinks that he is liable, because at his own peril he trusted a bad banker; but octavenus says that he will furnish nothing except the actions, and therefore on account of these actions he is to be held by a petition of the inheritance. To me, however, in the case of one who possessed in bad faith, the opinion of labeo is pleasing; but in the other case, of one who is a good-faith possessor, the opinion of octavenus seems to be to be followed.
Si quis, cum peteretur ab eo hereditas, neque rei neque iuris velut possessor erat, verum postea aliquid adeptus est, an petitione hereditatis videatur teneri? et celsus libro quarto digestorum recte scribit hunc condemnandum, licet initio nihil possedit.
If someone, when the inheritance was being sought from him, was as a possessor neither of the thing nor of the right, but afterward acquired something, is he to be seen as held by the petition for inheritance? And Celsus, in the fourth book of the Digesta, rightly writes that this man must be condemned, although at the beginning he possessed nothing.
Et non tantum hereditaria corpora, sed et quae non sunt hereditaria, quorum tamen periculum ad heredem pertinet: ut res pignori datae defuncto vel commodatae depositaeve. et quidem rei pignori datae etiam specialis petitio est, ut et hereditatis petitione contineatur, sicut illae quarum nomine publiciana competit. sed licet earum nomine, quae commodatae vel depositae sunt, nulla sit facile actio, quia tamen periculum earum ad nos pertinet, aequum est eas restitui.
And not only hereditary corporeal things, but also those which are not hereditary, the risk of which nevertheless pertains to the heir: such as things given in pledge by the deceased, or loaned for use or deposited. And indeed for a thing given in pledge there is even a special petition, so that it is also included by the petition of the inheritance, just as those on whose name the Publician action lies. But although in respect of those which are loaned for use or deposited there is no easy action, yet since their risk pertains to us, it is equitable that they be restored.
Veniunt et hae res in hereditatis petitionem, in quibus possessor retentionem habuit, non etiam petitionem: veluti si iuraverat defunctus petitoris rem non esse et decesserit, debent hae quoque restitui. immo et si possessor sua culpa eas amiserit, tenebitur hoc nomine. idemque erit et in praedone, licet hic propter culpam non teneatur: quia nec hic debet has res retinere.
These things also come into the claim of inheritance, in which the possessor had retention, but not also petition: for example, if the deceased had sworn that the thing was not the petitioner’s and then passed away, these too must be restored. Indeed, even if the possessor has lost them through his own fault, he will be held liable under this head. And the same will be the case with a marauder, although he is not held on account of fault: for he too ought not to retain these things.
Item veniunt in hereditatem etiam ea, quae hereditatis causa comparata sunt, ut puta mancipia pecoraque et si qua alia, quae necessario hereditati sunt comparata. et si quidem pecunia hereditaria sint comparata, sine dubio venient: si vero non pecunia hereditaria, videndum erit: et puto etiam haec venire, si magna utilitas hereditatis versetur, pretium scilicet restituturo herede.
Likewise there come into the inheritance also those things that have been acquired for the sake of the inheritance, for instance slaves and livestock and whatever other things have been necessarily procured for the inheritance. And if they have been acquired with hereditary money, without doubt they will come; but if not with hereditary money, it will have to be considered: and I think that even these come, if a great advantage of the inheritance is involved, the heir, namely, to restore the price.
Sed non omnia, quae ex hereditaria pecunia comparata sunt, in hereditatis petitionem veniunt. denique scribit iulianus libro sexto digestorum, si possessor ex pecunia hereditaria hominem emerit et ab eo petatur hereditas, ita venire in hereditatis petitionem, si hereditatis interfuit eum emi: at si sui causa emit, pretium venire.
But not all things that have been acquired out of hereditary money come into the petition of the inheritance. Finally, Julian writes in the sixth book of the Digesta, that if a possessor has bought a person with hereditary money and the inheritance is sought from him, the person comes into the petition of the inheritance, if it was to the inheritance’s interest that he be bought; but if he bought for his own sake, the price comes.
Item non solum ea quae mortis tempore fuerunt, sed si qua postea augmenta hereditati accesserunt, venire in hereditatis petitionem: nam hereditas et augmentum recipit et deminutionem. sed ea, quae post aditam hereditatem accedunt, si quidem ex ipsa hereditate, puto hereditati accedere: si extrinsecus, non, quia personae possessoris accedunt. fructus autem omnes augent hereditatem, sive ante aditam sive post aditam hereditatem accesserint.
Likewise, not only the things which were at the time of death, but also any augmentations which afterwards have accrued to the inheritance, come into the petition for the inheritance: for the inheritance admits both augmentation and diminution. But those things which, after the inheritance has been entered, are added—if indeed from the inheritance itself, I think they accrue to the inheritance; if from outside, they do not, because they accrue to the person of the possessor. However, all fruits augment the inheritance, whether they have accrued before the inheritance was entered or after it was entered.
Cum praediximus omnes hereditarias actiones in hereditatis petitionem venire, quaeritur, utrum cum sua natura veniant an contra. ut puta est quaedam actio, quae infitiatione crescit: utrum cum suo incremento an vero in simplum venit, ut legis aquiliae? et iulianus libro sexto digestorum scribit simplum soluturum.
Since we have previously said that all hereditary actions come into the petition of the inheritance, the question arises whether they come with their own nature or the contrary. For example, there is a certain action which increases upon denial: does it come with its own increment, or indeed does it come for the simple, as under the Lex Aquilia? And Julian, in the sixth book of the Digests, writes that the simple will be paid.
Idem recte ait, si noxali iudicio condemnatus sit possessor defuncto, non posse eum dedentem noxae officio iudicis liberari: quia tamdiu quis habet noxae dedendae facultatem, quamdiu iudicati conveniatur, post susceptum iudicium non potest noxae dedendo se liberare: suscepit autem per petitionem hereditatis.
The same rightly says that, if in a noxal action the possessor, the owner being deceased, has been condemned, he cannot, by making a noxal surrender, be released by the judge’s office: because one has the faculty of making a noxal surrender only so long as he is proceeded against under the actio iudicati; after the suit has been undertaken he cannot free himself by making a noxal surrender: he undertook it, moreover, through the action for inheritance (hereditatis petitio).
Praeter haec multa repperimus tractata et de petitione hereditatis, de distractis rebus hereditariis, de dolo praeterito et de fructibus. de quibus cum forma senatus consulto sit data, optimum est ipsius senatus consulti interpretationem facere verbis eius relatis. " pridie idus martias quintus iulius balbus et publius iuventius celsus titius aufidius oenus severianus consules verba fecerunt de his, quae imperator caesar traiani parthici filius divi nervae nepos hadrianus augustus imperator maximusque princeps proposuit quinto nonas martias quae proximae fuerunt libello complexus esset, quid fieri placeat, de qua re ita censuerunt.
Besides these things, we have found many matters treated also about the petition of inheritance, about the hereditary things that have been alienated, about past fraud, and about fruits. Concerning which, since a form was given by a senatus consultum, it is best to make an interpretation of the senatus consultum itself with its words set out. "On the day before the Ides of March Quintus Julius Balbus and Publius Juventius Celsus Titius Aufidius Oenus Severianus, consuls, delivered words about those things which the emperor Caesar, son of Trajan Parthicus, grandson of the deified Nerva, Hadrian Augustus, emperor and greatest princeps, had proposed, on the fifth day before the Nones of March, which were the next, having encompassed in a little book what he wished to be done, concerning which matter they thus decreed.
Cum, antequam partes caducae ex bonis rustici fisco peterentur, hi, qui se heredes esse existimant, hereditatem distraxerint, placere redactae ex pretio rerum venditarum pecuniae usuras non esse exigendas idemque in similibus causis servandum.
When, before the caducary shares from a farmer’s goods are claimed by the Fisc, those who suppose themselves to be heirs have liquidated the inheritance, it is held that interest is not to be exacted on the money realized from the price of the things sold, and the same is to be observed in similar cases.
Item placere, a quibus hereditas petita fuisset, si adversus eos iudicatum esset, pretia, quae ad eos rerum ex hereditate venditarum pervenissent, etsi eae ante petitam hereditatem deperissent deminutiaeve fuissent, restituere debere.
Likewise it is held that those from whom the inheritance had been sought, if judgment had been rendered against them, must restore the prices which had come to them from things of the inheritance that had been sold, even if those things had perished or had been diminished before the inheritance was claimed.
Item eos qui bona invasissent, cum scirent ad se non pertinere, etiamsi ante litem contestatam fecerint, quo minus possiderent, perinde condemnandos, quasi possiderent: eos autem, qui iustas causas habuissent, quare bona ad se pertinere existimassent, usque eo dumtaxat, quo locupletiores ex ea re facti essent.
Likewise, those who had seized goods, when they knew that they did not pertain to themselves, even if before the litis contestatio they had acted to prevent their possessing, are to be condemned in the same way as if they possessed; but those who had had just causes for thinking that the goods pertained to themselves, only up to the point to which they were enriched from that matter.
Petitam autem fisco hereditatem ex eo tempore existimandum esse, quo primum scierit quisque eam a se peti, id est cum primum aut denuntiatum esset ei aut litteris vel edicto evocatus esset. censuerunt". aptanda est igitur nobis singulis verbis senatus consulti congruens interpretatio.
But the inheritance sought by the fisc is to be considered as sought from that time at which each person first knew that it was being sought from him, that is, when first either it had been notified to him or he had been summoned by letters or by an edict. they decreed". Therefore a congruent interpretation, fitted to each several word of the senatus-consultum, must be adapted by us.
Ait senatus: " cum antequam partes caducae fisco peterentur". hoc evenerat, ut partes caducae fisco peterentur: sed et si ex asse fiat, senatus consultum locum habebit: idem, et si vacantia bona fisco vindicentur vel si ex alia quacumque causa bona ad eum pervenerunt, senatus consultum hoc locum habebit:
The senate says: " since before the caducary shares were being sought for the fisc." This had come about, that caducary shares were being sought for the fisc: but even if it be in full, the senatorial decree will have effect: the same, even if ownerless goods are claimed by the fisc, or if from any other cause whatsoever goods have come to it, this senatorial decree will have effect:
" petitam autem hereditatem" et cetera: id est ex quo quis scit a se peti: nam ubi scit, incipit esse malae fidei possessor. " id est cum primum aut denuntiatum esset": quid ergo si scit quidem, nemo autem ei denuntiavit, an incipiat usuras debere pecuniae redactae? et puto debere: coepit enim malae fidei possessor esse.
" the inheritance 'having been claimed,'" and so forth: that is, from the time when someone knows it is being demanded from him; for when he knows, he begins to be a possessor in bad faith. " that is, when first either notice had been given": what then if he does know, yet no one has given him notice—does he begin to owe interest on the money realized? and I think he does owe it; for he has begun to be a possessor in bad faith.
but let us suppose that notice has been given, yet he does not know, because it was not to himself, but to his procurator that notice was given: the senate requires that notice be given to himself, and therefore it will not prejudice him, unless perhaps the one to whom notice was given has apprised him, but not if he was able to apprise and did not. as to by whom notice was given the senate does not require: whoever therefore it was who gave the notice, it will prejudice.
Haec adversus bonae fidei possessores, nam ita senatus locutus est: " eos qui se heredes existimassent". ceterum si quis sciens ad se hereditatem non pertinere distraxit, sine dubio non pretia rerum, sed ipsae res veniunt in petitionem hereditatis et fructus earum. sed imperator severus epistula ad celerem idem videtur fecisse et in malae fidei possessoribus: atquin senatus de his est locutus qui se heredes existimant. nisi forte ad eas res referemus, quas distrahi expedierat, quae onerabant magis hereditatem quam fructui erant: ut sit in arbitrio petitoris, qualem computationem faciat adversus malae fidei possessorem, utrum ipsius rei et fructuum an pretii et usurarum post motam controversiam.
These things are against possessors in good faith, for thus the senate has spoken: "those who had supposed themselves heirs." Moreover, if anyone, knowing that the inheritance did not pertain to himself, alienated it, without doubt not the prices of the things, but the things themselves come into the petition for the inheritance, and their fruits. But the emperor Severus, by a letter to Celer, seems to have done the same also as to possessors in bad faith; and yet the senate spoke about those who suppose themselves heirs. Unless perhaps we refer this to those things whose alienation was expedient—things which burdened the inheritance more than they contributed to its fruits—so that it is in the claimant’s discretion what computation he makes against the possessor in bad faith, whether of the thing itself and the fruits, or of the price and the interest after the controversy has been set in motion.
Quid si post petitam hereditatem res distraxerit ? hic ipsae res venient fructusque earum. sed si forte tales fuerunt, quae vel steriles erant vel tempore periturae, et hae distractae sunt vero pretio, fortassis possit petitor eligere, ut sibi pretia et usurae praestentur.
What if, after the inheritance has been claimed, he has alienated the things ? here the things themselves will be recoverable, and the fruits of them. But if by chance they were such as were either sterile or destined to perish with time, and these have been alienated for a true price, perhaps the claimant can choose that the prices and interest be rendered to him.
Ait senatus: " placere, a quibus petita hereditas fuisset, si adversus eos iudicatum esset, pretia, quae ad eos rerum ex hereditate venditarum pervenissent, etsi ante petitam hereditatem deperissent deminutaeve essent, restituere debere. " bonae fidei possessor si vendiderit res hereditarias, sive exegit pretium sive non, quia habet actionem, debebit pretium praestare: sed ubi habet actionem, sufficiet eum actiones praestare.
The Senate says: "it is resolved that those from whom the inheritance had been sought, if judgment had been given against them, must restore the prices which had come to them from things sold out of the estate, even if they had perished or been diminished before the inheritance was claimed." A possessor in good faith, if he has sold hereditary things, whether he has exacted the price or not, since he has an action, will be bound to furnish the price; but where he has an action, it will suffice for him to furnish the actions.
Sed si vendidit et evicta re restituit quod accepit, non videbitur ad eum pervenisse: quamquam possit dici nec ab initio pretium venire, quia non fuit res hereditaria quae distracta est: sed etsi senatus rerum ex hereditate distractarum, non hereditariarum fecit mentionem, restitui tamen non debet, quia nihil apud eum remanet. nam et iulianus libro sexto digestorum scribit quod indebitum exegit restituere eum non debere nec imputaturum quod non debitum solvit.
But if he sold and, the thing having been evicted, restored what he had received, it will not be seen to have come to him; although it can be said that from the outset the price does not come, because the thing that was sold off was not an hereditary thing. But even if the senate made mention of things alienated out of the inheritance, not of non-hereditary things, nevertheless it ought not to be restored, because nothing remains with him. For Julian also, in the sixth book of the Digest, writes that, if an undue payment has been exacted, he ought not to restore, nor will it be imputed to him that he paid what was not owed.
Restituere autem pretia debebit possessor, etsi deperditae sunt res vel deminutae. sed utrum ita demum restituat, si bonae fidei possessor est, an et si malae fidei? et si quidem res apud emptorem exstent nec deperditae nec deminutae sunt, sine dubio ipsas res debet praestare malae fidei possessor aut, si recipere eas ab emptore nullo modo possit, tantum quantum in litem esset iuratum.
However, the possessor will be bound to restore the prices, even if the things have been lost or diminished. But is it only then that he restores, if he is a possessor in good faith, or also if in bad faith? And if indeed the things are extant with the purchaser and are neither lost nor diminished, without doubt the possessor in bad faith ought to furnish the things themselves; or, if he can by no means recover them from the purchaser, then as much as would have been sworn into the action.
Si et rem et pretium habeat bonae fidei possessor, puta quod eandem redemerit: an audiendus sit, si velit rem dare, non pretium? in praedone dicimus electionem esse debere actoris: an hic magis possessor audiendus sit, si velit rem tradere licet deteriorem factam, non petitor, si pretium desideret, quod inverecundum sit tale desiderium: an vero, quia ex re hereditaria locupletior sit, et id quod amplius habet ex pretio restituere debeat, videndum. nam et in oratione divi hadriani ita est: " dispicite, patres conscripti, numquid sit aequius possessorem non facere lucrum et pretium, quod ex aliena re perceperit, reddere, quia potest existimari in locum hereditariae rei venditae pretium eius successisse et quodammodo ipsum hereditarium factum.
If a good-faith possessor should have both the thing and the price—for instance, because he bought back the same—should he be heard if he is willing to give the thing, not the price? In the case of a robber we say the choice ought to belong to the plaintiff; or here rather should the possessor be heard, if he wishes to deliver the thing, although made worse, and not the claimant, if he desires the price, because such a desire is shameless? Or indeed, because he is made wealthier from the hereditary property, it must be considered whether he ought to restore that which he has in excess from the price. For also in the speech of the deified Hadrian it is thus: "Consider, Conscript Fathers, whether it is more equitable that the possessor not make a profit and return the price which he has received from another’s thing, because it can be thought that in the place of the hereditary thing sold its price has succeeded and in a certain manner it has itself been made hereditary."
Utrum autem omne pretium restituere debebit bonae fidei possessor an vero ita demum, si factus sit locupletior, videndum: finge pretium acceptum vel perdidisse vel consumpsisse vel donasse. et verbum quidem pervenisse ambiguum est, solumne hoc contineret, quod prima ratione fuerit, an vero et id quod durat. et puto sequentem clausulam senatus consulti, etsi haec sit ambigua, ut ita demum competat, si factus sit locupletior.
Whether, moreover, a possessor in good faith ought to restore the whole price, or rather only then, if he has become wealthier, must be considered: imagine that he has either lost, or consumed, or donated the price received. And indeed the word “pervenisse” (“to have come [to him]”) is ambiguous—whether it would include only that which was in the first reckoning, or also that which endures. And I think the following clause of the senatus consultum, although this is ambiguous, applies only in such case, if he has become wealthier.
Item si rem distraxit et ex pretio aliam rem comparavit, veniet pretium in petitionem hereditatis, non res quam in patrimonium suum convertit. sed si res minoris valet quam comparata est, hactenus locupletior factus videbitur, quatenus res valet: quemadmodum si consumpsisset, in totum locupletior factus non videbitur.
Likewise, if he sold the thing and from the price acquired another thing, the price will enter into the claim for the inheritance, not the thing which he converted into his patrimony. But if the thing is of less value than it was purchased for, he will be deemed enriched only to this extent, insofar as the thing is worth: just as, if he had consumed it, he will not be considered enriched at all.
Quod ait senatus: " eos qui bona invasissent, quae scirent ad se non pertinere, etiam si ante litem contestatam fecerint quo minus possiderent, perinde condemnandos quasi possiderent", ita intellegendum est, ut et dolus praeteritus in petitionem hereditatis deduceretur: sed et culpa. et ideo ab eo qui ab alio non exegit vel a semet ipso, si tempore esset liberatus, peti hereditatem posse: hoc utique si exigere potuit.
What the senate says: "those who had invaded goods which they knew did not pertain to themselves, even if before the suit was joined they did something to prevent their possessing, are to be condemned just as if they did possess," is to be understood thus: that prior fraud (dolus) is also brought into the petition of inheritance; and likewise fault (culpa). And therefore the inheritance can be sought from one who did not exact from another or from himself, if by lapse of time he was discharged—of course, only if he was able to exact.
De eo autem loquitur senatus, qui ab initio mente praedonis res hereditarias adprehendit. quod si ab initio quidem iustam causam habuit adipiscendae possessionis, postea vero conscius ad se nihil hereditatem pertinere praedonio more versari coepit, nihil senatus loqui videtur: puto tamen et ad eum mentem senatus consulti pertinere: parvi etenim refert, ab initio quis dolose in hereditate sit versatus an postea hoc facere coepit.
But the senate speaks about the person who from the beginning seized the hereditary property with a robber’s intent. But if from the beginning he indeed had a just cause for acquiring possession, yet afterwards, being conscious that the inheritance in no way pertains to him, he began to conduct himself in predatory fashion, the senate seems to say nothing: nevertheless, I think that the mind (purport) of the senatus consultum also pertains to him; for it matters little whether one dealt fraudulently with the estate from the beginning or began to do this later.
Scire ad se non pertinere utrum is tantummodo videatur, qui factum scit, an et is qui in iure erravit? putavit enim recte factum testamentum, cum inutile erat: vel cum eum alius praecederet adgnatus, sibi potius deferri. et non puto hunc esse praedonem qui dolo caret, quamvis in iure erret.
He should know that it does not pertain to him whether only he seems to be such who knows the fact, or also he who has erred in law; for he supposed a testament had been rightly made, when it was void; or that, although another agnate preceded him, it was being conferred on himself rather. And I do not think this man a plunderer, who is free of dolus, although he errs in law.
" si ante litem contestatam", inquit, " fecerit": hoc ideo adiectum, quoniam post litem contestatam omnes incipiunt malae fidei possessores esse, quin immo post controversiam motam. quamquam enim litis contestatae mentio fiat in senatus consulto, tamen et post motam controversiam omnes possessores pares fiunt et quasi praedones tenentur. et hoc iure hodie utimur: coepit enim scire rem ad se non pertinentem possidere se is qui interpellatur.
" if before the suit has been contested," he says, " he has done it": this was added for this reason, since after the suit has been contested all begin to be possessors in bad faith—indeed, even after a controversy has been set in motion. Although mention of a contested suit is made in the senatus-consultum, nevertheless even after a controversy has been stirred all possessors become equal and are held as if brigands. And we use this law today: for he who is interpellated begins to know that he is possessing a thing not pertaining to himself.
" perinde", inquit, " condemnandos quasi possiderent": merito: nam is qui dolo fecit quo minus possideret, ut possessor condemnatur. accipies, sive dolo desierit possidere sive dolo possessionem noluerit admittere. sive autem ab alio res possideatur sive in totum non extet, locum habebit haec clausula.
" perinde," he says, "to be condemned as if they were possessing": rightly; for he who by deceit did that whereby he failed to possess is condemned as a possessor. You will take it thus, whether he has ceased to possess through deceit or has been unwilling through deceit to admit possession. And whether the thing is possessed by another or does not exist at all, this clause will have application.
Consuluit senatus bonae fidei possessoribus, ne in totum damno adficiantur, sed in id dumtaxat teneantur, in quo locupletiores facti sunt. quemcumque igitur sumptum fecerint ex hereditate, si quid dilapidaverunt perdiderunt, dum re sua se abuti putant, non praestabunt. nec si donaverint, locupletiores facti videbuntur, quamvis ad remunerandum sibi aliquem naturaliter obligaverunt.
The senate took thought for possessors in good faith, lest they be affected with loss in full, but that they be held only to the extent in which they have been made richer. Accordingly, whatever expenditure they have made from the inheritance, if they have dilapidated or lost anything, while thinking that they were using up their own property, they will not have to make it good. Nor, if they have made a gift, will they be deemed to have been made richer, although they have naturally obligated someone to remunerate them.
Adeo autem qui locupletior factus non est non tenetur, ut si quis putans se ex asse heredem partem dimidiam hereditatis sine dolo malo consumpserit, Marcellus libro quarto digestorum tractat, num non teneatur, quasi id quod erogaverit ex eo fuerit, quod ad eum non pertinebat, sed ad coheredes: nam et si is qui heres non erat totum, quidquid apud se fuit, consumpsisset, sine dubio non tenetur, quasi locupletior non factus. sed in proposita quaestione tribus visionibus relatis, una prima: deinde alia posse dici totum quod superest restituere eum debere, quasi suam partem consumpserit: tertia utrique quod consumptum est decedere: ait utique nonnihil restituendum, de illo dubitat, utrum totum an partem restituendam dicat: puto tamen residuum integrum non esse restituendum, sed partem eius dimidiam.
Moreover, to such a degree is one who has not been made more opulent not held liable, that if someone, thinking himself heir for the whole (ex asse), has consumed a half part of the inheritance without malice, Marcellus, in the fourth book of the Digests, treats whether he is not bound, as if what he disbursed was from that which did not pertain to him, but to the coheirs: for even if one who was not an heir had consumed the whole of whatever he had in his possession, without doubt he is not liable, as not having been made more opulent. But in the proposed question, three views having been set out, one first: then another, that it can be said he ought to restore all that remains, as though he had consumed his own share; a third, that what has been consumed should be deducted from both shares: he says that at any rate something is to be restored; he is in doubt about this, whether he should say that the whole or a part must be restored: I nevertheless think that the entire residuum is not to be restored, but a half part of it.
Quod autem quis ex hereditate erogavit, utrum totum decedat an vero pro rata patrimonii eius? ut puta penum hereditarium ebibit: utrum totum hereditarii expensum feratur an aliquid et patrimonio eius? ut in id factus locupletior videatur, quod solebat ipse erogare ante delatam hereditatem: ut si quid lautius contemplatione hereditatis impendit, in hoc non videatur factus locupletior, in statutis vero suis sumptibus videatur factus locupletior: utique enim etsi non tam laute erogasset, aliquid tamen ad victum cottidianum erogasset.
But as to what someone erogated out of an inheritance, does the whole fall to be deducted, or rather pro rata to his patrimony? For instance, he drank up the hereditary store: is the entire amount to be carried as an expense of the inheritance, or is some part also to his patrimony, so that he appears to have been made richer to the extent of what he was accustomed himself to erogate before the inheritance was tendered? So that, if he spent more lavishly in contemplation of the inheritance, in this he is not seen to have been made richer, but in his settled expenses he is seen to have been made richer: for surely, even if he had not erogated so lavishly, nevertheless he would have erogated something for daily sustenance.
for the deified Marcus too, in the case of Pythodorus, who had been asked to restore what had remained to him from the inheritance, decreed that the things which had been alienated were neither for diminishing the fideicommissum nor had their price returned into the corpus of Pythodorus’s patrimony, and that the charge should fall both upon Pythodorus’s own patrimony and upon the inheritance, not upon the inheritance alone. and now therefore it will have to be considered whether the established expenses are to be charged to the inheritance by the example of the rescript of the deified Marcus, or to his patrimony alone; and the truer view is that those things which he would have expended even if he had not been heir should be charged to his own patrimony.
Item si rem distraxit bonae fidei possessor nec pretio factus sit locupletior, an singulas res, si nondum usucaptae sint, vindicare petitor ab emptore possit ? et si vindicet, an exceptione non repellatur " quod praeiudicium hereditati non fiat inter actorem et eum qui venum dedit " , quia non videtur venire in petitionem hereditatis pretium earum, quamquam victi emptores reversuri sunt ad eum qui distraxit ? et puto posse res vindicari, nisi emptores regressum ad bonae fidei possessorem habent.
Likewise, if a possessor in good faith has alienated the thing and has not been made wealthier by the price, can the claimant vindicate the individual items from the buyer, if they have not yet been usucapted ? And if he does vindicate, is he not repelled by an exception “ that no prejudice be done to the inheritance between the plaintiff and the one who sold ”, because the price of them does not seem to come into the petition of the inheritance, although the defeated buyers are going to return to him who alienated ? And I think the things can be vindicated, unless the buyers have a right of recourse against the good‑faith possessor.
Quid tamen si is qui vendidit paratus sit ita defendere hereditatem, ut perinde atque si possideret conveniatur? incipit exceptio locum habere ex persona emptorum. certe si minori pretio res venierint et pretium quodcumque illud actor sit consecutus, multo magis poterit dici exceptione eum summoveri.
But what if the one who sold is prepared thus to defend the inheritance, that he be proceeded against just as if he possessed? The exception begins to have place by reason of the person of the purchasers. Surely, if the things have been sold for a lower price and the plaintiff has obtained whatever that price was, much more can it be said that he is repelled by the exception.
for also, if the possessor pays to the claimant of the inheritance what he exacted from the debtors, Julian, in Book 4 of the Digests, writes that the debtors are discharged—whether the one who had exacted the debt from them was a possessor in good faith or a robber—and that by the law itself they are discharged.
Ancillarum etiam partus et partuum partus quamquam fructus esse non existimantur, quia non temere ancillae eius rei causa comparantur ut pariant, augent tamen hereditatem: quippe cum ea omnia fiunt hereditaria, dubium non est, quin ea possessor, si aut possideat aut post petitam hereditatem dolo malo fecit quo minus possideret, debeat restituere.
Even the offspring of female slaves, and the offspring of offspring, although they are not considered fruits—for female slaves are not ordinarily acquired for that purpose, namely, that they may bear—nevertheless augment the inheritance: since, when all those things become hereditary, there is no doubt that the possessor, if either he possesses them, or after the inheritance has been claimed has by malicious fraud caused it that he should not possess them, ought to restore them.
Iulianus scribit actorem eligere debere, utrum sortem tantum an et usuras velit cum periculo nominum agnoscere. atquin secundum hoc non observabimus quod senatus voluit, bonae fidei possessorem teneri quatenus locupletior sit: quid enim si pecuniam eligat actor, quae servari non potest? dicendum itaque est in bonae fidei possessore haec tantummodo eum praestare debere, id est vel sortem et usuras eius si et eas percepit, vel omnia cum eorum cessione in id facienda, quod ex his adhuc deberetur, periculo scilicet petitoris.
Julian writes that the actor ought to choose whether he wishes to acknowledge only the principal or also the interests, with the peril of the claims. But then, according to this, we shall not observe what the Senate intended, that a possessor in good faith be held liable insofar as he is enriched: for what if the actor chooses the money, which cannot be preserved? Therefore it must be said that, in the case of a possessor in good faith, he ought to render only these things, that is, either the principal and its interests, if he has also received them, or all the claims together with their cession, to be effected toward that amount which would still be owed from them, namely at the petitioner’s peril.
Si quid possessor solvit creditoribus, reputabit, quamquam ipso iure non liberaverit petitorem hereditatis: nam quod quis suo nomine solvit, non debitoris, debitorem non liberat. et ideo iulianus libro sexto digestorum scribit ita id imputaturum possessorem, si caverit se petitorem defensum iri. sed an et bonae fidei possessor debeat defendendum cavere, videndum erit, quia in eo quod solvit non videtur locupletior factus: nisi forte habeat condictionem et hoc nomine videtur locupletior, quia potest repetere: finge enim eum, dum se heredem putat, solvisse suo nomine.
If the possessor has paid something to the creditors, he will set it off, although by the law itself he has not freed the claimant of the inheritance: for what someone pays in his own name, and not in the debtor’s, does not free the debtor. And therefore Julian in the sixth book of the Digest writes that the possessor will impute it on this condition, if he has given security that the claimant will be defended. But whether even a possessor in good faith ought to give security for defense will have to be considered, because in that which he paid he does not seem to have been made more enriched: unless perhaps he has a condictio, and in this respect he seems enriched, because he can recover; for imagine him, while he thinks himself heir, to have paid in his own name.
Sed si ipsi aliquid praedoni debebatur, hoc deducere non debebit: maxime si id fuit debitum, quod natura debebatur. quid tamen si expediebat petitori id debitum esse dissolutum propter poenam vel aliam causam? potest dici ipsum sibi vel solvisse vel debuisse solvere.
But if he himself owed something to the robber, he ought not to deduct this: especially if it was a debt which was owed by nature. Yet what if it was expedient for the claimant that that debt be dissolved on account of a penalty or some other cause? It can be said that he either paid himself or ought to have paid himself.
Sicut autem sumptum quem fecit deducit, ita si facere debuit nec fecit, culpae huius reddat rationem, nisi bonae fidei possessor est: tunc enim, quia quasi suam rem neglexit, nulli querellae subiectus est ante petitam hereditatem: postea vero et ipse praedo est.
Just as, moreover, he deducts the expense which he has made, so, if he ought to have made it and did not, let him render an account of this fault, unless he is a possessor in good faith: for then, because he neglected the thing as if it were his own, he is subject to no complaint before the inheritance is claimed; but thereafter he too is a depredator.
Quod autem possessori solutum est an restituere debeat, videamus: et si bonae fidei possessor fuit sive non, debere restituere placet, et quidem si restituerit, ut cassius scribit et iulianus libro sexto, liberari ipso iure debitores.
But as to what has been paid to the possessor, let us see whether he ought to restore it: and whether he was a good‑faith possessor or not, it is held that he ought to restore; and indeed, if he has restored it, as Cassius writes and Julian in the sixth book, the debtors are released by the law itself.
Iulianus scribit, si hominem possessor distraxerit, si quidem non necessarium hereditati, petitione hereditatis pretium praestaturum: imputaretur enim ei, si non distraxisset: quod si necessarium hereditati, si quidem vivit, ipsum praestandum, si decesserit, fortassis nec pretium: sed non passurum iudicem qui cognoscit possessorem pretium lucrari scribit, et verius est.
Julian writes: if the possessor has alienated a man, if indeed he was not necessary to the inheritance, he will have to render the price in the action for recovery of the inheritance; for it would be imputed to him if he had not alienated. But if he was necessary to the inheritance, then, if he is alive, the man himself must be made good; if he has died, perhaps not even the price. Yet he writes that the judge who hears the case will not allow the possessor to profit by the price, and this is truer.
Si servus vel filius familias res hereditarias teneat, a patre dominove peti hereditas potest, si facultatem restituendarum rerum habet. certe si pretium rerum hereditariarum venditarum in peculio servi habeat, et iulianus existimat posse a domino quasi a iuris possessore hereditatem peti.
If a slave or a son under paternal power holds hereditary assets, the inheritance can be claimed from the father or the master, if he has the capacity for restitution of the things. Certainly, if the price of the hereditary things that were sold is in the slave’s peculium, Julian considers that the inheritance can be claimed from the master as if from a possessor by right.
Si a domino vel a patre, qui pretia possidet, hereditas petatur, an filio vel servo mortuo vel servo manumisso vel emancipato filio intra annum agi debeat? et an debitum sibi dominus vel pater deducere potest? iulianus verius esse ait, id quod proculus quoque respondit, perpetuo actionem dandam nec deduci oportere id quod ipsi debetur, quia non de peculio agatur, sed hereditas petatur.
If an inheritance is claimed from a master or from a father who possesses the proceeds (purchase-prices), whether must action be brought within a year in the case of a son or slave who has died, or a slave manumitted, or a son emancipated? and whether the master or father can deduct what is owed to himself? iulianus says that the truer view is, which proculus also answered, that an action should be granted perpetually, and that what is owed to himself ought not to be deducted, because the matter is not of the peculium, but an inheritance is being claimed.
These things are right, if the slave or the son under paternal power has the prices/proceeds. But if for that reason an inheritance is claimed from the master, because the slave was a debtor, it ought to be treated the same as if an action were being brought de peculio. mauricianus says the same must be said even if the money received from the price has been consumed by the slave or the son; but otherwise it can be satisfied out of his peculium.
Sed et a filio familias peti hereditatem posse non est dubium, quia restituendi facultatem habet, sicut ad exhibendum. multo magis dicimus posse peti hereditatem a filio familias, qui, cum pater familias esset et possideret hereditatem, adrogandum se praestavit.
But also that an inheritance can be claimed from a filius familias is not in doubt, because he has the faculty of restoring, just as in the action ad exhibendum. Much more do we say that an inheritance can be claimed from a filius familias who, when he was a pater familias and possessed the inheritance, presented himself for adrogation.
Si possessor hereditarium servum occiderit, id quoque in hereditatis petitione veniet: sed pomponius ait actorem debere eligere, utrum velit sibi eum condemnari, ut caveat se non acturum lege aquilia, an malit integram sibi esse actionem legis aquiliae omissa eius rei aestimatione a iudice. quae electio locum habet, si ante aditam hereditatem occisus sit servus: nam si postea, ipsius actio propria effecta est nec veniet in hereditatis petitionem.
If the possessor has killed a hereditary slave, that too will come within the claim for the inheritance: but Pomponius says the plaintiff ought to choose whether he wishes to have him condemned in his favor, on condition that he give security that he will not proceed under the Lex Aquilia, or whether he prefers that the action of the Lex Aquilia remain intact to himself, with the valuation of that matter omitted by the judge. This election has place if the slave was killed before the inheritance was entered upon; for if afterwards, the action has become his own proper one and will not come within the claim for the inheritance.
Si praedo dolo desisset possidere, res autem eo modo interierit, quo esset interitura et si eadem causa possessionis mansisset: quantum ad verba senatus consulti melior est causa praedonis quam bonae fidei possessoris, quia praedo, si dolo desierit possidere, ita condemnatur atque si possideret, nec adiectum esset, si res interierit. sed non est dubium, quin non debeat melioris esse condicionis quam bonae fidei possessor. itaque et si pluris venierit res, electio debebit esse actoris, ut pretium consequatur: alioquin lucretur aliquid praedo.
If a robber had ceased to possess by fraud, but the thing perished in such a manner as it would have perished even if the same cause of possession had continued: so far as the words of the senatus consultum go, the robber’s case is better than that of the good‑faith possessor, because the robber, if he has ceased to possess by fraud, is condemned as if he were possessing, and it was not added, “if the thing has perished.” But there is no doubt that he ought not to be in a better condition than a good‑faith possessor. And so, even if the thing has been sold for a higher price, the choice ought to be the plaintiff’s, so that he may obtain the price; otherwise the robber would profit something.
Plane in ceteris necessariis et utilibus impensis posse separari, ut bonae fidei quidem possessores has quoque imputent, praedo autem de se queri debeat, qui sciens in rem alienam impendit. sed benignius est in huius quoque persona haberi rationem impensarum ( non enim debet petitor ex aliena iactura lucrum facere) et id ipsum officio iudicis continebitur: nam nec exceptio doli mali desideratur. plane potest in eo differentia esse, ut bonae fidei quidem possessor omnimodo impensas deducat, licet res non exstet in quam fecit, sicut tutor vel curator consequuntur, praedo autem non aliter, quam si res melior sit.
Clearly, in other necessary and useful expenses a separation can be made, such that possessors in good faith may charge these as well, but the despoiler ought to complain of himself, who knowingly expended upon another’s property. But it is more benign to have regard to the expenses even in the case of this person too ( non indeed ought the claimant to make profit from another’s loss) and this very matter will be contained within the duty of the judge: for neither is an exception of malicious fraud required. Clearly there can be in this a difference, that a possessor in good faith deducts expenses in every way, although the thing in which he made them does not exist, just as a tutor or curator recovers; but the despoiler not otherwise than if the thing is better.
Utiles autem necessariaeque sunt veluti quae fiunt reficiendorum aedificorum gratia: aut in novelleta: aut cum servorum gratia litis aestimatio solvitur, cum id utilius sit quam ipsos dedi: denique alias complures eiusdem generis esse impensas manifestum est.
But useful and necessary are, for instance, those which are made for the sake of repairing buildings: or on new plantings: or when, for the sake of slaves, the assessment of the action (litis aestimatio) is paid, when that is more useful than to deliver them themselves: finally, it is manifest that there are several other expenses of the same kind.
Videamus tamen, ne et ad picturarum quoque et marmorum et ceterarum voluptariarum rerum impensas aeque proficiat nobis doli exceptio, si modo bonae fidei possessores simus: nam praedoni probe dicetur non debuisse in alienam rem supervacuas impensas facere: ut tamen potestas ei fieret tollendorum eorum, quae sine detrimento ipsius rei tolli possint.
Let us nevertheless consider, lest the defense of fraud likewise be effective against us also in regard to the expenses for paintings and marbles and other voluptuary things, provided only that we are possessors in good faith: for to a robber it will rightly be said that he ought not to have made superfluous expenses upon another’s property; yet that power be granted to him of removing those things which can be taken away without detriment to the thing itself.
Illud quoque quod in oratione divi hadriani est, ut post acceptum iudicium id actori praestetur, quod habiturus esset, si eo tempore quo petit restituta esset hereditas, interdum durum est. quid enim, si post litem contestatam mancipia aut iumenta aut pecora deperierint? damnari debebit secundum verba orationis, quia potuit petitor restituta hereditate distraxisse ea. et hoc iustum esse in specialibus petitionibus proculo placet: cassius contra sensit.
that provision also which is in the speech of the deified Hadrian, namely that after judgment has been received there be made good to the plaintiff what he would have had if, at the time when he sues, the inheritance had been restored, is sometimes harsh. for what, if after issue has been joined the slaves or draft animals or herds have perished? he will have to be condemned according to the words of the speech, because the claimant could have sold them if the inheritance had been restored. and Proculus thinks this is just in special claims; Cassius thought the contrary.
Si quo tempore conveniebatur possessor hereditatis, pauciores res possidebat, deinde aliarum quoque rerum possessionem adsumpsit, eas quoque victus restituere debebit, sive ante acceptum iudicium sive postea adquisierit possessionem. et si fideiussores, quos dederat, ad litem non sufficiant, iubere eum debebit proconsul ut idonee caveat. ex diverso quoque si pauciores postea possidebit, quam initio possidebat, si modo id sine dolo eius acciderit, absolvi debet quod ad eas res quas desiit possidere.
If at the time when the possessor of an inheritance was being sued he possessed fewer things, and thereafter he also assumed possession of other things, he too, if defeated, will be bound to restore them, whether he acquired the possession before the suit was accepted or afterwards. And if the sureties which he had given do not suffice for the lawsuit, the proconsul ought to order him to give adequate security. Conversely, if afterwards he possesses fewer than he possessed at the beginning, provided that this happened without his deceit, he ought to be absolved as to those things which he has ceased to possess.
Postquam legatum a te accepi, hereditatem peto. atilicinus quibusdam placuisse ait non aliter mihi adversus te dandam petitionem, quam si legatum redderem. videamus tamen, ne non aliter petitor hereditatis legatum restituere debeat, quam ut ei caveatur, si contra eum de hereditate iudicatum fuerit, reddi ei legatum: cum sit iniquum eo casu possessorem hereditatis legatum, quod solverit, retinere, et maxime si non per calumniam, sed per errorem hereditatem petierit adversarius: idque et laelius probat.
After I received the legacy from you, I claim the inheritance. Atilicinus says it pleased some that a petition should not be granted to me against you otherwise than if I were to return the legacy. Let us, however, consider whether the claimant of the inheritance ought to restore the legacy only on the condition that security be given to him that, if judgment on the inheritance is rendered against him, the legacy will be returned to him: since it is inequitable in that case for the possessor of the inheritance to retain the legacy which he has paid, and especially if the adversary sought the inheritance not through calumny, but through error: and Laelius approves this as well.
Qui se liti optulit, cum rem non possideret, condemnatur, nisi si evidentissimis probationibus possit ostendere actorem ab initio litis scire eum non possidere: quippe isto modo non est deceptus et qui se hereditatis petitioni optulit ex doli clausula tenetur: aestimari scilicet oportebit, quanti eius interfuit non decipi.
He who offered himself to the lawsuit, when he did not possess the thing, is condemned, unless he can by the most evident proofs show that the plaintiff, from the beginning of the suit, knew that he did not possess; for in that case he is not deceived, and he who offered himself to a petition of inheritance is held under the dolus-clause: it must, namely, be assessed how much it was in his interest not to be deceived.
Lucius titius cum in falsi testamenti propinqui accusatione non optinuerit, quaero, an de non iure facto nec signato testamento querella illi competere possit. respondit non ideo repelli ab intentione non iure facti testamenti, quod in falsi accusatione non optinuerit.
Since Lucius Titius did not prevail in an accusation of a forged will of a kinsman, I ask whether a complaint might be available to him concerning a will made not in law and not sealed. He replied that he is not for that reason to be repelled from the claim regarding a will made not in law, because he did not prevail in the accusation of forgery.
Si bonae fidei possessor hereditatis velit cum debitoribus hereditariis aut qui res hereditarias occupaverint consistere, audietur, utique si periculum erit, ne inter moras actiones intercidant. petitor autem hereditatis citra metum exceptionis in rem agere poterit: quid enim si possessor hereditatis neglegat? quid si nihil iuris habere se sciat?
If a good-faith possessor of the inheritance should wish to compound with the hereditary debtors or with those who have occupied hereditary property, he will be heard, especially if there will be danger lest, amid delays, the actions lapse. But the claimant of the inheritance will be able to sue in rem without fear of an exception: for what if the possessor of the inheritance is negligent? What if he knows that he has no right?
Si defuncto monumentum condicionis implendae gratia bonae fidei possessor fecerit, potest dici, quia voluntas defuncti vel in hoc servanda est, utique si probabilem modum faciendi monumenti sumptus, vel quantum testator iusserit, non excedat, eum, cui aufertur hereditas, impensas ratione doli exceptione aut retenturum aut actione negotiorum gestorum repetiturum, veluti hereditario negotio gesto: quamvis enim stricto iure nulla teneantur actione heredes ad monumentum faciendum, tamen principali vel pontificali auctoritate compelluntur ad obsequium supremae voluntatis.
If, for the sake of fulfilling a condition, a possessor in good faith has made a monument for the deceased, it can be said that the will of the deceased is to be observed even in this, particularly if he does not exceed a reasonable measure of the expense for making the monument, or the amount the testator ordered; that the one from whom the inheritance is being taken will either retain the expenses by reason of the exceptio doli, or will recover them by the actio negotiorum gestorum, as if hereditary business had been managed: for although by strict law the heirs are bound by no action to make a monument, nevertheless by imperial or pontifical authority they are compelled to the obedience of the supreme will.
Heres furiosi substituto vel sequentis gradus cognato fructus medii temporis, quibus per curatorem furiosus locupletior factus videtur, praestabit: exceptis videlicet impensis, quae circa eandem substantiam tam necessarie quam utiliter factae sunt. sed et si quid circa furiosum necessarie fuerit expensum, et hoc excipiatur, nisi alia sufficiens substantia est furioso, ex qua sustentari potest.
The heir of the insane man shall render to the substitute or to a cognate of the next degree the fruits of the intermediate time, by which through the curator the insane man appears to have been made more wealthy: the expenses, namely, are excepted, which have been made upon the same estate (substance) both necessarily and usefully. But also if anything has been necessarily expended with respect to the insane man, this too is excepted, unless there is other sufficient substance for the insane man, from which he can be sustained.
Cum praedia urbana et rustica neglegentia possessorum peiora sint facta, veluti quia vineae pomaria horti extra consuetudinem patris familias defuncti culta sunt: litis aestimationem earum rerum, quanto peiores sint factae, possessores pati debent.
When urban and rustic estates have been made worse through the negligence of the possessors, for instance because vineyards, orchards, and gardens have been cultivated contrary to the custom of the deceased paterfamilias: the possessors ought to undergo the valuation of the suit for those things, in proportion to how much worse they have been made.
Cum idem eandem hereditatem adversus duos defendit et secundum alterum ex his iudicatum est, quaeri solet, utrum perinde ei hereditatem restitui oporteat, atque oporteret, si adversus alium defensa non esset: ut scilicet si mox et secundum alium fuerit iudicatum, absolvatur is cum quo actum est, quia neque possideat neque dolo malo fecerit, quo minus possideret quod iudicio revictus restituerit: an quia possit et secundum alium iudicari, non aliter restituere debeat quam si cautum ei fuerit, quod adversus alium eandem hereditatem defendit. sed melius est officio iudicis cautione vel satisdatione victo mederi, cum et res salva sit ei, qui in exsecutione tardior venit adversus priorem victorem.
When the same person defends the same inheritance against two, and judgment has been given in favor of one of them, the question is usually raised whether the inheritance ought to be restored to him in like manner as it would have had to be if it had not been defended against the other: namely, so that if soon afterward judgment also is given in favor of the other, the one against whom the action was brought is acquitted, because he neither possesses nor has acted with malicious fraud to prevent possession of that which, having been overcome by the judgment, he restored; or whether, because it can also be judged in favor of the other, he ought not to restore otherwise than if security had been taken for him, in that he is defending the same inheritance against another. But it is better that, by the judge’s office, the defeated party be remedied by a caution or by suretyship, since the thing is kept safe also for him who comes later to execution against the earlier victor.
Filius a patre emancipatus secundum condicionem testamenti matris adiit hereditatem, quam pater, antequam filium emanciparet, possedit fructusque ex ea possedit, sed erogationem in honorem filii cum esset senator fecit ex ea. quaesitum est, cum paratus sit pater restituere hereditatem habita ratione eorum quae in eum erogavit, an filius nihilo minus perseverans petere hereditatem doli mali exceptione summoveri possit. respondi, et si non exciperetur, satis per officium iudicis consuli.
A son, emancipated by his father, according to the condition of his mother’s testament, entered upon the inheritance, which the father, before he emancipated the son, had possessed and had possessed the fruits of; but he made from it an erogation in honor of the son, since he was a senator. It was asked, since the father is prepared to restore the inheritance, account being taken of the things which he expended upon him, whether the son, nevertheless persevering in claiming the inheritance, can be removed by the exception of dolus malus (fraud). I answered: even if the exception were not pleaded, it would be sufficiently provided for through the office of the judge.
Qui hereditatem vel partem hereditatis petit, is non ex eo metitur quod possessor occupavit, sed ex suo iure: et ideo sive ex asse heres sit, totam hereditatem vindicabit, licet tu unam rem possideas, sive ex parte, partem, licet tu totam hereditatem possideas.
He who seeks an inheritance or a part of an inheritance measures not by what the possessor has occupied, but by his own right: and therefore, whether he is heir to the whole, he will vindicate the entire inheritance, although you possess a single thing; or, if he is heir to a part, he will vindicate the part, although you possess the whole inheritance.
Quin immo si duo possideant hereditatem et duo sint, qui ad se partes pertinere dicant, non singuli a singulis petere contenti esse debent, puta primus a primo vel secundus a secundo, sed ambo a primo et ambo a secundo: neque enim alter primi, alter secundi partem possidet, sed ambo utriusque pro herede. et si possessor et petitor possideant hereditatem, cum unusquisque eorum partem dimidiam hereditatis sibi adserat, invicem petere debebunt, ut partes rerum consequantur: aut si controversiam sibi non faciunt hereditatis, familiae herciscundae experiri eos oportebit.
Nay rather, if two possess an inheritance and there are two who say that shares pertain to themselves, they ought not to be content that individuals sue individuals, for example the first against the first or the second against the second, but both against the first possessor and both against the second: for it is not the case that one possesses the share of the first and the other that of the second, but both possess, as heir, of each. And if a possessor and a claimant possess the inheritance, since each of them asserts a half part of the inheritance for himself, they ought to sue one another in turn, so that they may obtain their shares of the property; or, if they do not raise a controversy between themselves about the inheritance, it will be proper for them to try the action for partitioning the family property (familiae herciscundae).
Si ego ex parte me dicam heredem, coheres autem meus possideat hereditatem cum extraneo, cum non plus coheres haberet sua parte, utrum a solo extraneo an vero et a coherede deberem petere hereditatem, quaeritur. et pegasus fertur existimasse a solo extraneo me petere debere eumque restituturum quidquid possidet, et fortassis hoc officio iudicis debeat fieri: ceterum ratio facit, ut a duobus petam hereditatem, hoc est et a coherede meo, et ille quoque dirigat actionem adversus exterum possessorem: sed pegasi sententia utilior est.
If I declare myself heir as to a part, but my coheir possesses the inheritance together with a stranger, since the coheir would not have more than his share, the question is whether I ought to claim the inheritance from the stranger alone, or indeed also from the coheir. And it is reported that Pegasus thought that I ought to claim it from the stranger alone, and that he would restore whatever he possesses; and perhaps this ought to be brought about by the officium of the judge. But reason dictates that I should claim the inheritance from two, that is, also from my coheir, and that he likewise should direct an action against the outside possessor; but Pegasus’s opinion is more useful.
Item si, cum me ex parte dimidia heredem dicerem, trientem hereditatis possiderem, deinde residuum sextantem velim persequi, qualiter agam videamus. et labeo scribit utique partem dimidiam me petere debere a singulis: sic fieri ut a singulis sextantem consequar, et habebo bessem: quod verum puto: sed ipse tenebor ad restitutionem sextantis ex triente quem possidebam. et ideo officio iudicis invicem compensatio erit admittenda eius quod possideo, si forte coheredes sint a quibus hereditatem peto.
Likewise, if, while I say that I am heir as to a half share, I possess a third of the inheritance, and then I wish to pursue the remaining sixth, let us see how I should proceed. And Labeo writes that in any case I ought to claim the half share from each individual: thus it comes about that from each I obtain a sixth, and I shall have two-thirds; which I think is true: but I myself shall be bound to the restitution of a sixth out of the third which I was possessing. And therefore, by the office of the judge, mutual compensation (set-off) must be admitted for that which I possess, if perchance there are coheirs from whom I seek the inheritance.
Interdum praetor incertae partis hereditatis petitionem indulget idoneis causis intervenientibus: ut puta est defuncti fratris filius, sunt et uxores defunctorum fratrum praegnates: quam partem fratris filius hereditatis vindicet incertum est, quia quot edantur fratrum defuncti filii incertum est. aequissimum igitur est incertae partis vindicationem ei concedi. non audenter itaque dicetur, ubicumque merito quis incertus est quam partem vindicet, debere ei incertae partis vindicationem concedi.
Sometimes the praetor grants a petition for an uncertain share of an inheritance when suitable causes intervene: for example, there is the son of a deceased brother, and the wives of the deceased brothers are pregnant; what share of the inheritance the brother’s son should vindicate is uncertain, because it is uncertain how many sons of the deceased brothers will be born. Therefore it is most equitable that the vindication of an uncertain share be conceded to him. Accordingly, it will not be said rashly that, wherever someone is with good reason uncertain what share he should vindicate, the vindication of an uncertain share ought to be granted to him.
Si ex pluribus, ad quos eadem hereditas pertinet, quidam adierint, quidam adhuc deliberent: eos qui adierint, si petant hereditatem, non maiorem partem petere debere, quam habituri essent ceteris adeuntibus: nec eis proderit, si ceteri non adierint. non adeuntibus autem ceteris poterunt tunc partes eorum petere, si modo ad eos pertinerent.
If from among several to whom the same inheritance pertains some have entered, and some are still deliberating: those who have entered, if they claim the inheritance, ought not to claim a greater share than they would have had with the others entering; nor will it profit them if the others have not entered. But with the others not entering, they can then claim their shares, provided only that they would pertain to them.
Antiqui libero ventri ita prospexerunt, ut in tempus nascendi omnia ei iura integra reservarent: sicut apparet in iure hereditatium, in quibus qui post eum gradum sunt adgnationis, quo est id quod in utero est, non admittuntur, dum incertum est, an nasci possit. ubi autem eodem gradu sunt ceteri quo et venter, tunc quae portio in suspenso esse debeat, quaesierunt ideo, quia non poterant scire, quot nasci possunt: ideo nam multa de huiusmodi re tam varia et incredibilia creduntur, ut fabulis adnumerentur. nam traditum est et quattuor pariter puellas a matre familias natas esse: alioquin tradidere non leves auctores quinquies quaternos enixam peloponensi, multas aegypti uno utero septenos.
The ancients made such provision for the free womb that, until the time of birth, they reserved for it all rights intact: as appears in the law of inheritances, in which those who are after that degree of agnation in which that which is in the womb stands are not admitted, while it is uncertain whether it can be born. But where the others are in the same degree as the womb, then they inquired what portion ought to be held in suspense, because they could not know how many might be born: for this reason many things of this sort are believed so various and incredible that they are reckoned among fables. For it is handed down that even four girls were born together to a materfamilias; moreover, not light authors have related that a Peloponnesian gave birth five times to four at a time, and that many women of Egypt bore seven at a time from one womb.
but also we have seen the Horatii, triplet brothers, girt as senators. and Laelius likewise writes that he saw in the palace a free woman, who had been conducted from Alexandria to be shown to Hadrian, with five children, of whom, he says, she was reported to have borne four at the same time, the fifth on the fortieth day thereafter. what is it, then?
the most prudent authors of law have followed a certain middle course, so as to consider what can happen not at all rarely, that is, since it could happen that triplets be born, they assigned a fourth part to the surviving son: for, as Theophrastus says, “for the once or twice, the lawgivers overstep.” and therefore even if she is going to bear one, he will be heir not from a half part, but meanwhile from a fourth:
Idem est in extraneo, si ex certa portione heres institutus sit, ex reliqua postumi. quod si forte ita institutio facta est: " quotcumque mihi nati erunt et lucius titius pro virilibus portionibus heredes mihi sunto", habebit haesitationem, numquid adire non possit, atque qui in testamento portionem suam nescit. sed utilius est posse eum adire qui nescit portionem, si cetera, quae oportet eum scire, non ignoret.
It is the same in the case of an extraneous person, if he has been instituted heir from a definite portion, and as to the remainder, the posthumous children. But if perchance the institution has been made thus: "however many will have been born to me and Lucius Titius, let them be my heirs by virile portions," there will be a hesitation whether perhaps he cannot enter on the inheritance, as one who in the testament does not know his portion. But it is more useful that he who does not know the portion be able to enter, if he does not ignore the other things which it is proper for him to know.
Sorori, quam coheredem fratribus quattuor in bonis matris esse placuit, quinta portio pro portionibus quae ad eos pertinuit cedet, ita ut singuli in quarta, quam antehac habere credebantur, non amplius ei quintam conferant.
To the sister, whom it was decided to be coheir with the four brothers in the mother’s estate, a fifth portion will cede, in proportion to the portions which pertained to them, such that each, out of the quarter which he was previously believed to have, shall contribute to her not more than a fifth.
Cum multi heredes instituti essent, ex his unus in asia erat: eius procurator venditionem fecit et pecuniam pro parte eius abstulerat: postea apparuerit eum qui in asia erat antea decessisse instituto ex parte dimidia herede procuratore suo et ex parte alio. quaesitum est, quemadmodum pecunia ex hereditate petenda esset. responsum est ab eo, qui procurator eius fuisset, totam hereditatem, quia ex hereditate ea pecunia fuisset quae ad procuratorem ex venditione pervenisset, petere eos oportere: et nihilo minus partem dimidiam hereditatis a coheredibus eius.
When many heirs had been instituted, one of them was in Asia: his procurator made a vendition and had taken the money for his share; afterwards it appeared that the one who was in Asia had previously died, having instituted as heir for a half-share his own procurator, and for the other share another. The question was asked how the money was to be sought as from the inheritance. It was answered that from him who had been his procurator they ought to claim the whole inheritance, because that money was from the inheritance which had come to the procurator from the vendition; and nonetheless the half-share of the inheritance from his coheirs.
that it would be thus, whether all that money remained in the hands of the one who had been the procurator, so that they should recover the whole from that same person through the judge, or whether he had returned a half-share to his coheir, that he himself be condemned for the half, and for the half his coheirs.
Cum heredis ex parte instituti filius, qui patrem suum ignorabat vivo testatore decessisse, partem hereditatis nomine patris ut absentis administraverit et pecunias distractis rebus acceperit, hereditas ab eo peti non potest, quia neque pro herede neque pro possessore pretia possidet, sed ut filius patris negotium curavit. negotiorum autem gestorum actio ceteris coheredibus, ad quos portio defuncti pertinet, dabitur. illud enim utique non est metuendum, ne etiam patris, a quo forte exheredatus est, teneatur heredibus, quasi negotia hereditaria gesserit, cum id quod administravit non fuerit paternae hereditatis.
When the son of an heir instituted as to a part, who did not know that his father had died while the testator was still alive, has administered a part of the inheritance in his father’s name as though he were absent and has received monies with the things sold, the inheritance cannot be claimed from him, because he holds the proceeds neither as heir nor as possessor, but, as a son, he took care of his father’s business. But an action for the management of affairs (negotiorum gestorum) will be given to the other coheirs, to whom the portion of the deceased belongs. For indeed there is no fear that he is also liable to the heirs of his father, by whom perhaps he was disinherited, as if he had transacted hereditary business, since what he administered was not of his father’s inheritance.
for even if an action for the management of affairs belongs to him in whose name it was received: it is equitable that to him in whose name it was received ^ ^ is ^ ^ received ^ ^ in another’s ^ ^ name ^ ^ it be restored. but in the case proposed, they were neither the father’s affairs, he who had ceased to exist, nor of the paternal succession, which were of another estate. but if this son has become heir to his father and raises the controversy that his father, after he became heir, met death, that inquiry arises, whether he seems to have changed for himself the cause of possession.