Descartes: MEDITATIONES

1. Claudam nunc oculos, aures obturabo, avocabo omnes sensus, imagines etiam rerum corporalium omnes vel ex cogitatione meâ delebo, vel certe, quia hoc fieri vix potest, illas ut inanes & falsas nihili pendam, meque solum alloquendo & penitius inspiciendo, meipsum paulatim mihi magis notum & familiarem reddere conabor. Ego sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans, pauca intelligens, multa ignorans, volens, nolens, imaginans etiam & sentiens; ut enim ante animadverti, quamvis illa quae sentio vel imaginor extra me fortasse nihil sint, illos tamen cogitandi modos, quos sensus & imaginationes

1. I shall now close my eyes, stop my ears, call away all my senses; I shall even blot out from my thinking all the images of bodily things, or at least, because this can scarcely be done, I shall value them as empty & false, and, by addressing myself alone & by inspecting myself more inwardly, I shall try gradually to render myself more known & familiar to myself. I am a thinking thing, that is, doubting, affirming, denying, understanding a few, ignorant of many, willing, unwilling, imagining also & sensing; for, as I noted before, although those things which I sense or imagine perhaps are nothing outside me, nevertheless those modes of thinking, which the senses & imaginations

[35] appello, quatenus cogitandi quidam modi tantùm sunt, in me esse sum certus.

[35] I call them thus, insofar as they are only certain modes of thinking; I am certain that they are in me.

2. Atque his paucis omnia recensui quae vere scio, vel saltem quae me scire hactenus animadverti. Nunc circumspiciam diligentiùs an forte adhuc apud me alia sint ad quae nondum respexi. Sum certus me esse rem cogitantem.

2. And with these few things I have reviewed everything that I truly know, or at least what
I have thus far observed that I know. Now I will look around more diligently whether
perhaps there are still other things in me to which I have not yet turned my attention. I am certain that I am a
thinking thing.

Nunquid ergo etiam scio quid requiratur ut de aliquâ re sim certus? Nempe in hac primâ cognitione nihil aliud est, quàm clara quaedam & distincta perceptio ejus quòd affirmo; quae sane non sufficeret ad me certum de rei veritate reddendum, si posset unquam contingere, ut aliquid, quòd ita clare & distincte perciperem, falsum esset; ac proinde jam videor pro regulâ generali posse statuere, illud omne esse verum, quòd valde clare & distincte percipio.

Do I then also know what is required in order that I be certain about any thing? Namely, in this first cognition there is nothing else than a certain clear & distinct perception of that which I affirm; which indeed would not suffice to render me certain concerning the truth of the thing, if it could ever happen that something which I perceived thus clearly & distinctly were false; and accordingly I now seem able to set down as a general rule, that everything which I perceive very clearly & distinctly is true.

3. Verumtamen multa prius ut omnino certa & manifesta admisi, quae tamen postea dubia esse deprehendi. Qualia ergo ista fuere? Nempe terra, coelum, sydera & caetera omnia quae sensibus usurpabam.

3. Nevertheless, I formerly admitted many things as altogether certain & manifest, which yet afterwards I discovered to be doubtful. What then were these? Namely, the earth, the heaven, the stars, & all the rest which I made use of by the senses.

Quid autem de illis clare percipiebam? Nempe ipsas talium rerum ideas, sive cogitationes, menti meae obversari. Sed ne nunc quidem illas ideas in me esse inficior.

But what, however, did I clearly perceive about
those? Namely, the very ideas of such things, or cogitations,
to present themselves to my mind. But not even now do I deny that those ideas are in me.

Aliud autem quiddam erat quòd affirmabam, quòdque etiam ob consuetudinem credendi clare me percipere arbitrabar, quòd tamen revera non percipiebam: nempe res quasdam extra me esse, a quibus ideae istae procedebant, & quibus omnino similes erant. Atque hoc erat, in quo vel fallebar, vel certe, si verum judicabam, id non ex vi meae perceptionis contingebat.

There was, however, something else that I was affirming, and which also, on account of the custom of believing, I supposed I clearly perceived, which nevertheless I did not in reality perceive: namely, that certain things existed outside me, from which those ideas proceeded, and to which they were altogether similar. And this was the point in which I was either being deceived, or certainly, if I judged it true, it did not follow from the force of my perception.

4. Quid verò? Cùm circa res Arithmeticas vel Geome

4. But what then? When concerning Arithmetic or Geome

[36]tricas aliquid valde simplex & facile considerabam, ut quòd duo & tria simul juncta sint quinque, vel similia, nunquid saltem illa satis perspicue intuebar, ut vera esse affirmarem? Equidem non aliam ob causam de iis dubitandum esse postea judicavi, quàm quia veniebat in mentem forte aliquem Deum talem mihi naturam indere potuisse, ut etiam circa illa deciperer, quae manifestissima viderentur. Sed quoties haec praeconcepta de summâ Dei potentiâ opinio mihi occurrit, non possum non fateri, siquidem velit, facile illi esse efficere ut errem, etiam in iis quae me puto mentis oculis quàm evidentissime intueri.

[36]when I was considering something very simple and easy in arithmetical or geometrical matters, as that two and three joined together are five, or the like, did I at least contemplate those things sufficiently clearly to affirm that they were true? Indeed I afterward judged that there was no other cause for doubting about these than that it came into my mind that perhaps some God could have endowed me with such a nature that I might be deceived even about those things which would seem most manifest. But as often as this preconceived opinion about the supreme power of God occurs to me, I cannot but confess that, if he should will it, it is easy for him to bring it about that I err, even in those things which I think I behold with the eyes of the mind most evidently.

Quoties verò ad ipsas res, quas valde clare percipere arbitror, me converto, tam plane ab illis persuadeor, ut sponte erumpam in has voces: fallat me quisquis potest, nunquam tamen efficiet ut nihil sim, quandiu me aliquid esse cogitabo; vel ut aliquando verum sit me nunquam fuisse, cùm jam verum sit me esse; vel forte etiam ut duo & tria simul juncta plura vel pauciora sint quàm quinque, vel similia, in quibus scilicet repugnantiam agnosco manifestam. Et certe cùm nullam occasionem habeam existimandi aliquem Deum esse deceptorem, nec quidem adhuc satis sciam utrùm sit aliquis Deus, valde tenuis &, ut ita loquar, Metaphysica dubitandi ratio est, quae tantùm ex eâ opinione dependet. Ut autem etiam illa tollatur, quamprimum occurret occasio, examinare debeo an sit Deus, &, si sit, an possit esse deceptor; hac enim re ignoratâ, non videor de ullâ aliâ plane certus esse unquam posse.

Yet whenever I turn to the very things which I judge I perceive very clearly, I am so plainly persuaded by them that I spontaneously burst forth into these words: let whoever can deceive me do so; nevertheless he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I think that I am something; nor that it should ever be true that I never was, when it is now true that I am; nor perchance that two and three joined together are more or fewer than five, or the like, in which, namely, I acknowledge a manifest contradiction. And certainly, since I have no occasion for supposing that any God is a deceiver, nor indeed do I yet sufficiently know whether there is any God, the reason for doubting is very slight and, so to speak, metaphysical, which depends only on that opinion. But in order that even this may be removed, as soon as the occasion occurs I must examine whether God exists, and, if he does, whether he can be a deceiver; for with this matter unknown, I do not seem able ever to be plainly certain about anything else.

5. Nunc autem ordo videtur exigere, ut prius omnes

5. Now, however, order seems to require that first all

[37] meas cogitationes in certa genera distribuam, & in quibusnam ex illis veritas aut falsitas proprie consistat, inquiram. Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit ideae nomen: ut cùm hominem, vel Chimaeram, vel Coelum, vel Angelum, vel Deum cogito. Aliae verò alias quasdam practerea formas habent: ut, cùm volo, cùm timeo, cùm affirmo, cùm nego, semper quidem aliquam rem ut subjectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quàm istius rei similitudinem cogitatione complector; & ex his aliae voluntates, sive affectus, aliae autem judicia appellantur.

[37] I will distribute my thoughts into definite kinds, & I will inquire in which of these truth or falsity properly consists. Some of these are, as it were, images of things, to which alone the name of idea properly belongs: as when I think a man, or a Chimaera, or Heaven, or an Angel, or God. Others, however, have, besides, certain other forms: as, when I will, when I fear, when I affirm, when I deny, I always indeed apprehend some thing as the subject of my thought, but I also embrace in thought something more than the likeness of that thing; & of these some are called volitions, or affections, others however are called judgments.

6. Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solae in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsae proprie esse non possunt; nam sive capram, sive chimaeram imaginer, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quàm alteram. Nulla etiam in ipsâ voluntate, vel affectibus, falsitas est timenda; nam, quamvis prava, quamvis etiam ea quae nusquam sunt, possim optare, non tamen ideo non verum est illa me optare. Ac proinde sola supersunt judicia, in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar.

6. Now as regards ideas, if they are considered solely in themselves, and I refer them to nothing else, they cannot properly be false; for whether I imagine a she-goat or a chimaera, it is no less true that I imagine the one than the other. Neither in the will itself, nor in the affections, is falsity to be feared; for although I can desire depraved things, and even those which are nowhere, nevertheless it is not for that reason untrue that I desire them. And accordingly only judgments remain, in which I must beware lest I be deceived.

Praecipuus autem error & frequentissimus qui possit in illis reperiri, consistit in eo quòd ideas, quae in me sunt, judicem rebus quibusdam extra me positis similes esse sive conformes; nam profecto, si tantùm ideas ipsas ut cogitationis meae quosdam modos considerarem, nec ad quidquam aliud referrem, vix mihi ullam errandi materiam dare possent.

The principal error and
the most frequent that can be found in them consists in this: that
I judge the ideas which are in me to be similar
or conformable to certain things placed outside me; for indeed, if I were only
to consider the ideas themselves as certain modes of my thought, and refer them to nothing else, scarcely
could they furnish me any matter for erring.

7. Ex his autem ideis aliae innatae, aliae adventitiae,

7. Of these ideas, moreover, some are innate, others adventitious,

[38] aliae a me ipso factae mihi videntur: nam quòd intelligam quid sit res, quid sit veritas, quid sit cogitatio, hacc non aliunde habere videor quàm ab ipsâmet meâ naturâ; quòd autem nunc strepitum audiam, solem videam, ignem sentiam, a rebus quibusdam extra me positis procedere hactenus judicavi; ac denique Syrenes, Hippogryphes, & similia, a me ipso finguntur. Vel forte etiam omnes esse adventitias possum putare, vel omnes innatas, vel omnes factas: nondum enim veram illarum originem clare perspexi.

[38] others seem to me to have been made by myself: for that I understand what a thing is, what truth is, what thought is, these I seem to have from my very nature itself; but that I now hear a noise, see the sun, feel the fire, I have hitherto judged to proceed from certain things placed outside me; and finally, Sirens, Hippogriffs, & the like are feigned by myself. Or perhaps I can even suppose that all are adventitious, or all innate, or all made: for I have not yet clearly perceived their true origin.

8. Sed hîc praecipue de iis est quaerendum, quas tanquam a rebus extra me existentibus desumptas considero, quaenam me moveat ratio ut illas istis rebus similes esse existimem. Nempe ita videor doctus a naturâ. Et praeterea experior illas non a meâ voluntate nec proinde a me ipso pendere; saepe enim vel invito obversantur: ut jam, sive velim, sive nolim, sentio calorem, & ideo puto sensum illum, sive ideam caloris, a re a me diversâ, nempe ab ignis cui assideo calore, mihi advenire. Nihilque magis obvium est, quàm ut luc judicem istam rem suam similitudinem potius quàm aliud quid in me immittere.

8. But here one must inquire chiefly about those which I consider as though taken from things existing outside me, what reason moves me to think that they are similar to those things. Indeed, thus I seem to have been taught by nature. And besides, I experience that they do not depend on my will and therefore not on myself; for they often present themselves even when I am unwilling: as now, whether I wish it or do not wish it, I feel heat, & therefore I suppose that that sensation, or the idea of heat, comes to me from a thing different from me, namely from the heat of the fire beside which I sit. And nothing is more obvious than that I clearly judge that this thing sends into me its own similitude rather than something else.

9. Quae rationes, an satis firmae sint, jam videbo. Cùm hîc dico me ita doctum esse a naturâ, intelligo tantùm spontaneo quòdam impetu me ferri ad hoc credendum, non lumine aliquo naturali mihi ostendi esse verum. Quae duo multum discrepant; nam quaecumque lumine naturali mihi ostenduntur, ut quòd ex eo quòd dubitem, sequatur me esse, & similia, nullo modo dubia esse possunt, quia nulla alia facultas esse potest, cui aeque fidam ac lumini isti, quaeque illa

9. Whether these reasons are sufficiently firm, I will now see. When here I say that I have been thus taught by nature, I mean only that I am borne by a certain spontaneous impulse to believe this, not that by some natural light it has been shown to me to be true. These two differ greatly; for whatever things are shown to me by the natural light, such as that from the fact that I doubt, it follows that I am, & the like, can in no way be doubtful, because there can be no other faculty which I should trust equally with that light, nor any that

[39] non vera esse possit docere; sed quantum ad impetus naturales, jam saepe olim judicavi me ab illis in deteriorem partem fuisse impulsum, cùm de bono eligendo ageretur, nec video cur iisdem in ullâ aliâ re magis fidam.

[39] cannot teach that they are not true; but as far as natural impulses are concerned, I have often long ago judged that I was impelled by them into the worse part, when it was a matter of choosing the good, nor do I see why I should trust the same more in any other matter.

10. Deinde, quamvis ideae illae a voluntate meâ non pendeant, non ideo constat ipsas a rebus extra me positis necessario procedere. Ut enim impetus illi, de quibus mox loquebar, quamvis in me sint, a voluntate tamen meâ diversi esse videntur, ita forte etiam aliqua alia est in me facultas, nondum mihi satis cognita, istarum idearum effectrix, ut hactenus semper visum est illas, dum somnio, absque ullâ rerum externarum ope, in me formari.

10. Then, although those ideas do not depend on my will, it is not on that account certain that they proceed necessarily from things placed outside me. For just as those impulses, about which I was just speaking, although they are in me, from my will nevertheless seem to be distinct, so perhaps there is also some other faculty in me, not yet sufficiently known to me, the efficient cause of those ideas, as thus far it has always seemed that they, while I dream, without any aid of external things, are formed in me.

11. Ac denique, quamvis a rebus a me diversis procederent, non inde sequitur illas rebus istis similes esse debere. Quinimo in multis saepe magnum discrimen videor deprehendisse: ut, exempli causâ, duas diversas solis ideas apud me invenio, unam tanquam a sensibus haustam, & quae maxime inter illas quas adventitias existimo est recensenda, per quam mihi valde parvus apparet, aliam verò ex rationibus Astronomiae desumptam, hoc est ex notionibus quibusdam mihi innatis elicitam, vel quocumque alio modo a me factam, per quam aliquoties major quàm terra exhibetur; utraque profecto similis eidem soli extra me existenti esse non potest, & ratio persuadet illam ei maxime esse dissimilem, quae quàm proxime ab ipso videtur emanasse .

11. And finally, although they might proceed from things different from me, not therefore does it follow that they must be similar to those things. Nay rather, in many matters I often seem to have detected a great difference: as, for example, I find two distinct ideas of the sun in me, one as if drawn from the senses, & which is to be reckoned most of all among those which I consider adventitious, through which it appears to me very small; the other indeed taken from the principles of Astronomy, that is, elicited from certain notions innate to me, or fashioned by me in whatever other way by me, through which at times it is exhibited as greater than the earth; both, assuredly, cannot be similar to the same sun existing outside me, & reason persuades that that one is most unlike to it, which seems to have emanated as nearly as possible from it itself .

12. Quae omnia satis demonstrant me non hactenus ex

12. All these things sufficiently demonstrate that I have not hitherto from

[40] certo judicio, sed tantùm ex caeco aliquo impulsu, credidisse res quasdam a me diversas existere, quae ideas sive imagines suas per organa sensuum, vel quolibet alio pacto, mihi immittant.

[40] not by sure judgment, but only by some blind impulse, I had believed that certain things
different from me exist, which send their ideas or images into me through the organs of the senses,
or by whatever other method.

13. Sed alia quaedam adhuc via mihi occurrit ad inquirendum an res aliquae, ex iis quarum ideae in me sunt, extra me existant. Nempe, quatenus ideae istae cogitandi quidam modi tantùm sunt, non agnosco ullam inter ipsas inaequalitatem, & omnes a me eodem modo procedere videntur; sed, quatenus una unam rem, alia aliam repraesentat, patet easdem esse ab invicem valde diversas. Nam proculdubio illae quae substantias mihi exhibent, majus aliquid sunt, atque, ut ita loquar, plus realitatis objectivae in se continent, quàm illae quae tantùm modos, sive accidentia, repraesentant; & rursus illa per quam summum aliquem Deum, aeternum, infinitum, omniscium, omnipotentem, rerumque omnium, quae praeter ipsum sunt, creatorem intelligo, plus profecto realitatis objectivae in se habet, quàm illae per quas finitae substantiae exhibentur.

13. But another certain way still occurs to me for inquiring whether
certain things, of those whose ideas are in me, exist outside me. Namely, insofar as
these ideas are only certain modes of thinking, I acknowledge no
inequality among them, & all seem to proceed from me in the same way;
but, insofar as one represents one thing, another another, it is clear that they are
very different from one another. For without doubt those which exhibit substances to me,
are something greater, and, so to speak, contain more objective reality in
themselves than those which represent only modes, or accidents,
represent; & again that by which I understand some highest God, eternal,
infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and the creator of all things which are besides himself,
does indeed have more objective reality in itself,
than those by which finite substances are exhibited.

14. Jam verò lumine naturali manifestum est tantumdem ad minimum esse debere in causâ efficiente & totali, quantum in ejusdem causae effectu. Nam, quaeso, undenam posset assumere realitatem suam effectus, nisi a causâ? Et quomodo illam ei causa dare posset, nisi etiam haberet? Hinc autem sequitur, nec posse aliquid a nihilo fieri, nec etiam id quod magis perfectum est, hoc est quod plus realitatis in se con

14. Now indeed by the natural light it is manifest that at the minimum just as much must be in the efficient & total cause as in the effect of the same cause. For, I ask, whence could the effect assume its reality, unless from the cause? And how could the cause give it to it, unless it also had it? Hence it follows that nothing can be made from nothing, nor even that which is more perfect, that is, which has more reality in itself con

[41]tinet, ab eo quod minus. Atque hoc non modo perspicue verum est de iis effectibus, quorum realitas est actualis sive formalis, sed etiam de ideis, in quibus consideratur tantùm realitas objectiva. Hoc est, non modo non potest, exempli causâ, aliquis lapis, qui prius non fuit, nunc incipere esse, nisi producatur ab aliquâ re in quâ totum illud sit vel formaliter vel eminenter, quod ponitur in lapide; nec potest calor in subjectum quod priùs non calebat induci, nisi a re quae sit ordinis saltem aeque perfecti atque est calor, & sic de caeteris; sed praeterea etiam non potest in me esse idea caloris, vel lapidis, nisi in me posita sit ab aliquâ causâ, in quâ tantumdem ad minimum sit realitatis quantum esse in calore vel lapide concipio.

[41]tains, by that which is less. And this is not only clearly true of those effects, whose reality is actual or formal, but also of ideas, in which only objective reality is considered. That is, not only cannot, for example, some stone which previously was not now begin to be, unless it be produced by some thing in which all that is either formally or eminently present which is posited in the stone; nor can heat be induced into a subject which previously was not hot, unless by a thing which is of an order at least equally perfect as heat is, and so for the rest; but moreover it also cannot there be in me an idea of heat, or of a stone, unless it be placed in me by some cause, in which there is at least as much reality as I conceive to be in heat or in a stone.

Nam quamvis ista causa nihil de suâ realitate actuali sive formali in meam ideam transfundat, non ideo putandum est illam minus realem esse debere, sed talem esse naturam ipsius ideae, ut nullam aliam ex se realitatem formalem exigat, praeter illam quam mutuatur a cogitatione meâ, cujus est modus. Quòd autem haec idea realitatem objectivam hanc vel illam contineat potius quàm aliam, hoc profectò habere debet ab aliquâ causâ in quâ tantumdem sit ad minimum realitatis formalis quantum ipsa continet objectivae. Si enim ponamus aliquid in ideâ reperiri, quod non fuerit in ejus causâ, hoc igitur habet a nihilo; atqui quantumvis imperfectus sit iste essendi modus, quo res est objective in intellectu per ideam, non tamen profectò plane nihil est, nec proinde a nihilo esse potest.

For although that cause transfuses nothing of its actual or formal reality into my idea, it must not for that reason be thought to be less real, but such is the nature of the idea itself that it demands no other formal reality from itself, beyond that which it borrows from my cogitation, of which it is a mode. But that this idea contains this or that objective reality rather than another, this indeed it must have from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as it contains of objective. For if we suppose that something is found in the idea which was not in its cause, then it has this from nothing; but although this mode of being, by which a thing is objectively in the intellect through the idea, is however imperfect, nevertheless it is not indeed plainly nothing, and therefore cannot be from nothing.

15. Nec etiam debeo suspicari, cùm realitas quam considero in meis ideis sit tantùm objectiva, non opus

15. Nor ought I even to suspect, since the reality which I consider in my ideas is only objective, that there is no need

[42] esse ut eadem realitas sit formaliter in causis istarum idearum, sed sufficere, si sit in iis etiam objective. Nam quemadmodum iste modus essendi objectivus competit ideis ex ipsarum naturâ, ita modus essendi formalis competit idearum causis, saltem primis & praecipuis, ex earum naturâ. Et quamvis forte una idea ex aliâ nasci possit, non tamen hîc datur progressus in infinitum, sed tandem ad aliquam primam debet deveniri, cujus causa sit in star archetypi, in quo omnis realitas formaliter contineatur, quae est in ideâ tantùm objective. Adeo ut lumine naturali mihi sit perspicuum ideas in me esse veluti quasdam imagines, quae possunt quidem facile deficere a perfectione rerum a quibus sunt desumptae, non autem quicquam majus aut perfectius continere.

[42] that the same reality be formally in the causes of those ideas, but that it suffice if it be in them also objectively. For just as this objective mode of being befits ideas from their own nature, so the formal mode of being befits the causes of ideas, at least the first and chief ones, from their nature. And although perhaps one idea can arise from another, nevertheless there is not here granted a progress into infinity, but at length one must come to some first, whose cause is in the likeness of an archetype, in which all reality is contained formally, which is in the idea only objectively. Thus by natural light it is clear to me that the ideas in me are as it were certain images, which indeed can easily fall short of the perfection of the things from which they are taken, but cannot contain anything greater or more perfect.

16. Atque haec omnia, quò diutius & curiosius examino, tantò clarius & distinctius vera esse cognosco. Sed quid tandem ex his concludam? Nempe si realitas objectiva alicujus ex meis ideis sit tanta ut certus sim eandem nec formaliter nec eminenter in me esse, nec promde me ipsum elus ideae causam esse posse, hinc necessario sequi, non me solum esse in mundo, sed aliquam aliam rem, quae istius ideae est causa, etiam existere.

16. And all these things, the longer & the more carefully I examine them,
by so much the more clearly & distinctly do I know them to be true. But what at last
shall I conclude from these? Namely, if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is
so great that I am certain that the same is neither formally nor eminently in me, and
therefore that I myself cannot be the cause of that idea, from this it necessarily follows,
not that I alone am in the world, but that some other thing, which is the cause of that idea,
also exists.

Si verò nulla talis in me idea reperiatur, nullum plane habebo argumentum quod me de alicujus rei a me diversae existentiâ certum reddat; omnia enim diligentissime circumspexi, & nullum aliud potui hactenus reperire.

But if indeed no such idea is found in me, I shall have plainly no argument that would render me certain of the existence of anything distinct from me; for I have surveyed everything most diligently, and have hitherto been able to discover no other.

17. Ex his autem meis ideis, practer illam quae me ipsum mihi exhibet, de quâ hîc nulla difficultas esse

17. From these my ideas, however, besides that one which presents myself to me, about which here there is no difficulty

[43] potest, alia est quae Deum, aliae quae res corporeas & inanimes, aliae quae Angelos, aliae quae animalia, ac denique aliae quae alios homines meî similes repraesentant.

[43] can be, another is that which
represents God, others which represent corporeal and inanimate things, others which represent Angels, others
which represent animals, and finally others which represent other men similar to myself.

18. Et quantum ad ideas quae alios homines, vel animalia, vel Angelos exhibent, facile intelligo illas ex iis quas habeo meî ipsius & rerum corporalium & Dei posse componi, quamvis nulli praeter me homines, nec animalia, nec Angeli, in mundo essent.

18. And as for the ideas which exhibit other men, or animals, or Angels, I easily understand that they can be composed from those which I have of myself & of corporeal things & of God, even if no men besides me, nor animals, nor Angels, existed in the world.

19. Quantum autem ad ideas rerum corporalium, nihil in illis occurrit, quod sit tantum ut non videatur a me ipso potuisse proficisci; nam si penitiùs inspiciam, & singulas examinem eo modo quo heri examinavi ideam cerae, animadverto perpauca tantùm esse quae in illis clare & distincte percipio: nempe magnitudinem, sive extensionem in longum, latum, & profundum; figuram, quae ex terminatione istius extensionis exsurgit; situm, quem diversa figurata inter se obtinent; & motum, sive mutationem istius sitûs; quibus addi possunt substantia, duratio, & numerus: caetera autem, ut lumen & colores, soni, odores, sapores, calor & frigus, aliacque tactiles qualitates, nonnisi valde confuse & obscure a me cogitantur, adeo ut etiam ignorem an sint verae, vel falsae, hoc est, an ideae, quas de illis habeo, sint rerum quarundam ideae, an non rerum. Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictam, sive formalem, nonnisi in judiciis posse reperiri paulo ante notaverim, est tamen profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis, cùm non rem tanquam rem repraesentant: ita, exempli causâ, ideae quas habeo caloris & frigoris, tam parum clarae

19. As for the ideas of corporeal things, nothing occurs in them that is so great as not to seem able to have proceeded from me myself; for if I look more inwardly, and examine each one in the manner in which yesterday I examined the idea of the wax, I observe that there are only very few things in them which I perceive clearly & distinctly: namely magnitude, or extension in length, breadth, & depth; figure, which arises from the termination of that extension; position, which the various figures obtain among themselves; & motion, or the mutation of that position; to which there can be added substance, duration, & number: but the rest, such as light & colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat & cold, and other tactile qualities, are thought by me only very confusedly & obscurely, to such a degree that I even do not know whether they are true or false, that is, whether the ideas which I have of them are ideas of certain things, or of nothing. For although I noted a little before that falsity properly so called, or formal, can be found only in judgments, yet there is indeed a certain other material falsity in ideas, when they represent a non-thing as if a thing: thus, for example, the ideas which I have of heat & of cold are so little clear

[44] & distinctae sunt, ut ab iis discere non possim, an frigus sit tantùm privatio caloris, vel calor privatio frigoris, vel utrumque sit realis qualitas, vel neutrum. Et quia nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt, siquidem verum sit frigus nihil aliud esse quàm privationem caloris, idea quae mihi illud tanquam reale quid & positivum repraesentat, non immerito falsa dicetur, & sic de cacteris.

[44] so little clear & distinct are they, that from them I cannot learn whether cold is only a privation of heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether both are a real quality, or neither. And because no ideas can be except as of things, if indeed it is true that cold is nothing other than the privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real & positive will not undeservedly be called false, & so with the rest.

20. Quibus profecto non est necesse ut aliquem authorem a me diversum assignem; nam, si quidem sint falsae, hoc est nullas res repraesentent, lumine naturali notum mihi est illas a nihilo procedere, hoc est, non aliam ob causam in me esse quàm quia deest aliquid naturae meae, nec est plane perfecta; si autem sint verae, quia tamen tam parum realitatis mihi exhibent, ut ne quidem illud a non re possim distinguere, non video cur a me ipso esse non possint.

20. For these, assuredly, I have no need to assign some author different from myself; for if indeed they are false, that is, represent no things, by the natural light it is known to me that they proceed from nothing, that is, are in me for no other cause than that something is lacking to my nature, nor is it wholly perfect; but if they are true, because nevertheless they exhibit to me so little reality that I cannot even distinguish it from non-being, I do not see why they could not be from myself.

21. Ex iis verò quae in ideis rerum corporalium clara & distincta sunt, quaedam ab ideâ meî ipsius videor mutuari potuisse, nempe substantiam, durationem, numerum, & si quae alia sint ejusmodi; nam cùm cogito lapidem esse substantiam, sive esse rem quae per se apta est existere, itemque me esse substantiam, quamvis concipiam me esse rem cogitantem & non extensam, lapidem verò esse rem extensam & non cogitantem, ac proinde maxima inter utrumque conceptum sit diversitas, in ratione tamen substantiae videntur convenire; itemque, cùm percipio me nunc esse, & priùs etiam aliquamdiu fuisse recordor, cùmque varias habeo cogitationes quarum numerum intelligo, acquiro

21. From those things indeed which in the ideas of corporeal things are clear & distinct, certain ones I seem to have been able to borrow from the idea of myself, namely substance, duration, number, & if there are any others of that sort; for when I think that a stone is a substance, that is, a thing which by itself is apt to exist, and likewise that I am a substance, although I conceive myself to be a thinking thing and not extended, but the stone to be an extended thing and not thinking, and therefore the greatest diversity is between the two concepts, yet in the account of substance they seem to agree; likewise, when I perceive that I now exist, and earlier too I recall that I existed for some time, and when I have various thoughts the number of which I understand, I acquire

[45] ideas durationis & numeri, quas deinde ad quascunque alias res possum transferre. Caetera autem omnia ex quibus rerum corporearum ideae conflantur, nempe extensio, figura, situs, & motus, in me quidem, cùm nihil aliud sim quàm res cogitans, formaliter non continentur; sed quia sunt tantùm modi quidam substantiae, ego autem substantia, videntur in me contineri posse eminenter.

[45] ideas of duration & number, which I can then transfer to any other things whatsoever. But all the other things out of which the ideas of corporeal things are compounded, namely extension, figure, situation, & motion, are not contained in me formally, since I am nothing else than a thinking thing; but because they are only certain modes of substance, whereas I am a substance, they seem able to be contained in me eminently.

22. Itaque sola restat idea Dei, in quâ considerandum est an aliquid sit quod a me ipso non potuerit proficisci. Dei nomine intelligo substantiam quandam infinitam, independentem, summe intelligentem, summe potentem, & a quâ tum ego ipse, tum aliud omne, si quid aliud extat, quodcumque extat, est creatum. Quae sane omnia talia sunt ut, quo diligentius attendo, tanto minus a me solo profecta esse posse videantur.

22. Therefore the idea of God alone remains, in which it is to be considered whether there is anything that could not have proceeded from myself. By the name “God” I understand a certain substance infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, & from which both I myself and every other thing—if any other exists, whatever exists—has been created. All of which are indeed such that, the more carefully I attend, the less they seem able to have proceeded from me alone.

Ideoque ex antedictis, Deum necessario existere, est concludendum.

Therefore, from the aforesaid, it must be concluded that God necessarily exists.

23. Nam quamvis substantiae quidem idea in me sit ex hoc ipso quòd sim substantia, non tamen idcirco esset idea substantiae infinitae, cùm sim finitus, nisi ab aliquâ substantiâ, quae revera esset infinita, procederet.

23. For although indeed the idea of substance is in me from this very fact that I am a substance, nevertheless it would not for that reason be the idea of infinite substance, since I am finite, unless it proceeded from some substance which truly was infinite.

24. Nec putare debeo me non percipere infinitum per veram ideam, sed tantùm per negationem finiti, ut percipio quietem & tenebras per negationem motûs & lucis; nam contrà manifeste intelligo plus realitatis esse in substantiâ infinitâ quàm in finitâ, ac proinde priorem quodammodo in me esse perceptionem infiniti quàm finiti, hoc est Dei quàm meî ipsius. Quâ enim ratione intelligerem me dubitare, me

24. Nor ought I to think that I do not perceive the infinite through a true idea, but only through the negation of the finite, as I perceive rest & darkness through the negation of motion & light; for on the contrary I manifestly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite, and hence that in a certain way the perception of the infinite is prior in me to that of the finite, that is, of God than of myself. For by what reasoning would I understand myself to doubt, myself

[46] cupere, hoc est, aliquid mihi deesse, & me non esse omnino perfectum, si nulla idea entis perfectioris in me esset, ex cujus comparatione defectus meos agnoscerem?

[46] to desire, that is, that something is lacking to me, & me not to be altogether perfect—how could I, if there were no idea of a more perfect being in me, from whose comparison I would acknowledge my defects?

25. Nec dici potest hanc forte ideam Dei materialiter falsam esse, ideoque a nihilo esse posse, ut paulo ante de ideis caloris & frigoris, & similium, animadverti; nam contrà, cùm maxime clara & distincta sit, & plus realitatis objectivae quàm ulla alia contineat, nulla est per se magis vera, nec in quâ minor falsitatis suspicio reperiatur. Est, inquam, haec idea entis summe perfecti & infiniti maxime vera; nam quamvis forte fingi possit tale ens non existere, non tamen fingi potest ejus ideam nihil reale mihi exhibere, ut de ideâ frigoris ante dixi. Est etiam maxime clara & distincta; nam quidquid clare & distincte percipio, quod est reale & verum, & quod perfectionem aliquam importat, totum in eâ continetur.

25. Nor can it be said that perhaps this idea of God is materially false, and therefore could be from nothing, as I observed a little before concerning the ideas of heat & cold, & the like; for on the contrary, since it is most clear & distinct, and contains more objective reality than any other, none is of itself more true, nor is there found in it a lesser suspicion of falsity. This idea, I say, of a being supremely perfect & infinite is most true; for although perhaps it can be feigned that such a being does not exist, nevertheless it cannot be feigned that its idea presents to me nothing real, as I said before about the idea of cold. It is also most clear & distinct; for whatever I clearly & distinctly perceive that is real & true, and that imports some perfection, is all contained in it.

Nec obstat quod non comprehendam infinitum, vel quod alia innumera in Deo sint, quae nec comprehendere, nec forte etiam attingere cogitatione, ullo modo possum; est enim de ratione infiniti, ut a me, qui sum finitus, non comprehendatur; & sufficit me hoc ipsum intelligere, ac judicare, illa omnia quae clare percipio, & perfectionem aliquam importare scio, atque etiam forte alia innumera quae ignoro, vel formaliter vel eminenter in Deo esse, ut idea quam de illo habeo sit omnium quae in me sunt maxime vera, & maxime clara & distincta.

Nor is it an obstacle that I do not comprehend
the infinite, or that there are innumerable other things in God which I can in no way either comprehend, or
perhaps even attain in thought; for it belongs to the very notion
of the infinite that it not be comprehended by me, who am finite; and it suffices for me
to understand this very thing and to judge that all those things which I clearly perceive and
know to import some perfection, and also perhaps innumerable others which
I am ignorant of, are in God either formally or eminently, so that the idea which I have of him
is, of all those that are in me, the most true, and the most clear and distinct.

26. Sed forte majus aliquid sum quàm ipse intelligam, omnesque illae perfectiones quas Deo tribuo, potentiâ quodammodo in me sunt, etiamsi nondum sese exe

26. But perhaps I am something greater than I myself understand, and all those perfections which I attribute to God are, in a certain way, in me in potency, even if not yet ...

[47]rant, neque ad actum reducantur. Experior enim jam cognitionem meam paulatim augeri; nec video quid obstet quominus ita magis & magis augeatur in infinitum, nec etiam cur, cognitione sic auctâ, non possim ejus ope reliquas omnes Dei perfectiones adipisci; nec denique cur potentia ad istas perfectiones, si jam in me est, non sufficiat ad illarum ideam producendam.

[47]... nor be reduced to act. For I already experience my cognition to be gradually increasing; nor do I see what prevents it from being thus more & more increased into infinity, nor yet why, with cognition thus augmented, I could not by its aid acquire all the remaining perfections of God; nor finally why the power toward those perfections, if already in me, should not suffice for producing their idea.

27. Imo nihil horum esse potest. Nam primo, ut verum sit cognitionem meam gradatim augeri, & multa in me esse potentiâ quae actu nondum sunt, nihil tamen horum ad ideam Dei pertinet, in quâ nempe nihil omnino est potentiale; namque hoc ipsum, gradatim augeri, certissimum est imperfectionis argumentum. Praeterea, etiamsi cognitio mea semper magis & magis augeatur, nihilominus intelligo nunquam illam idcirco fore actu infinitam, quia nunquam eo devenietur, ut majoris adhuc incrementi non sit capax; Deum autem ita judico esse actu infinitum, ut nihil ejus perfectioni addi possit.

27. Nay, none of these can be. For first, though it be true that my cognition is increased by degrees, & that many things are in me in potency which are not yet in act, nevertheless none of these pertains to the idea of God, in which, namely, there is absolutely nothing potential; for this very thing, to be increased by degrees, is a most certain argument of imperfection. Moreover, even if my cognition were always to be increased more & more, nonetheless I understand that it will never on that account be actually infinite, because it will never come to the point that it is not capable of still greater increment; but I judge God to be actually infinite in such a way that nothing can be added to His perfection.

Ac denique percipio esse objectivum ideae non a solo esse potentiali, quod proprie loquendo nihil est, sed tantummodo ab actuali sive formali posse produci.

And finally I perceive that the objective being of the idea can be produced not from potential being alone—which, properly speaking, is nothing—but only from actual, that is, formal being.

28. Neque profecto quicquam est in his omnibus, quod diligenter attendenti non sit lumine naturali manifestum; sed quia, cùm minus attendo, & rerum sensibilium imagines mentis aciem excaecant, non ita facile recordor cur idea entis me perfectioris necessariò ab ente aliquo procedat quod sit revera perfectius, ulte

28. Nor indeed is there anything in all these things which, to one attending carefully, is not manifest by the natural light; but because, when I attend less, & the images of sensible things blind the keenness of the mind, I do not so easily recall why the idea of a being more perfect than myself must necessarily proceed from some being which is truly more perfect, furth

[48]rius quaerere libet an ego ipse habens illam ideam esse possem, si tale ens nullum existeret.

[48] Further, I am minded to inquire whether I myself, having that idea, could exist, if no such being existed.

29. Nempe a quo essem? A me scilicet, vel a parentibus, vel ab aliis quibuslibet Deo minus perfectis; nihil enim ipso perfectius, nec etiam aeque perfectum, cogitari aut fingi potest.

29. Indeed, from whom would I be? From myself, of course, or from my parents, or from any others whatsoever less perfect than God; for nothing more perfect than him, nor even equally perfect, can be thought or imagined.

30. Atqui, si a me essem, nec dubitarem, nec optarem, nec omnino quicquam mihi deesset; omnes enim perfectiones quarum idea aliqua in me est, mihi dedissem, atque ita ipsemet Deus essem. Nec putare debeo illa forsan quae mihi desunt difficilius acquiri posse, quàm illa quae jam in me sunt; nam contrà, manifestum est longe difficilius fuisse me, hoc est rem sive substantiam cogitantem, ex nihilo emergere, quàm multarum rerum quas ignoro cognitiones, quae tantùm istius substantiae accidentia sunt, acquirere. Ac certe, si majus illud a me haberem, non mihi illa saltem, quae facilius haberi possunt, denegassem, sed neque etiam ulla alia ex iis, quae in ideâ Dei contineri percipio; quia nempe nulla difficiliora factu mihi videntur; si quae autem difficiliora factu essent, certe etiam mihi difficiliora viderentur, siquidem reliqua quae habeo, a me haberem, quoniam in illis potentiam meam terminari experirer.

30. But indeed, if I were from myself, I would neither doubt, nor desire, nor would anything at all be lacking to me; for all the perfections of which there is some idea in me, I would have given to myself, and thus I myself would be God. Nor ought I think that those, perhaps, which are lacking to me can be acquired with more difficulty than those which are already in me; for on the contrary, it is manifest that it was far more difficult that I— that is, a thing or thinking substance— should emerge from nothing, than to acquire cognitions of many things which I do not know, which are only accidents of this substance. And certainly, if I had that greater thing from myself, I would not have denied to myself at least those which can more easily be had, nor yet any others among those which I perceive to be contained in the idea of God; since indeed none seem to me more difficult to do; but if there were any more difficult to do, surely they too would seem more difficult to me, if indeed I had the rest that I have from myself, since in those I would experience my power to be terminated.

31. Neque vim harum rationum effugio, si supponam me forte semper fuisse ut nunc sum, tanquam si inde sequeretur, nullum existentiae meae authorem esse quaerendum. Quoniam enim omne tempus vitae in

31. Nor do I escape the force of these reasons, if I suppose that perchance I have always been as I now am, as though it would follow from this that no author of my existence is to be sought. For indeed all the time of life in

[49] partes innumeras dividi potest, quarum singulae a reliquis nullo modo dependent, ex eo quòd paulo ante fuerim, non sequitur me nunc debere esse, nisi aliqua causa me quasi rursus creet ad hoc momentum, hoc est me conservet. Perspicuum enim est attendenti ad temporis naturam, eâdem plane vi & actione opus esse ad rem quamlibet singulis momentis quibus durat conservandam, quâ opus esset ad eandem de novo creandam, si nondum existeret; adeo ut conservationem solâ ratione a creatione differre, sit etiam unum ex iis quae lumine naturali manifesta sunt.

[49] it can be divided into innumerable parts, of which each single one in no way depends on the rest; from the fact that I was a little before, it does not follow that I must now exist, unless some cause, as it were, create me again at this moment—that is, conserve me. For it is perspicuous to one attending to the nature of time that the same, plainly, force & action are required to conserve any thing at the single moments during which it endures as would be required to create the same anew, if it did not yet exist; so that conservation differs from creation by reason alone, which too is one of those things that are manifest by the natural light.

32. Itaque debeo nunc interrogare me ipsum, an habeam aliquam vim per quam possim efficere ut ego ille, qui jam sum, paulo post etiam sim futurus: nam, cùm nihil aliud sim quàm res cogitans, vel saltem cùm de eâ tantùm meî parte praecise nunc agam quae est res cogitans, si quae talis vis in me esset, ejus proculdubio conscius essem. Sed & nullam esse experior, & ex hoc ipso evidentissime cognosco me ab aliquo ente a me diverso pendere.

32. Therefore I ought now to ask myself whether I have any power by which I can effect that I, the very one who I now am, shall also be in the future a little later: for, since I am nothing else than a thinking thing, or at least since I am now dealing precisely with that part of myself only which is a thinking thing, if any such power were in me, I would without doubt be conscious of it. But & I experience that none exists, & from this very fact I most evidently know that I depend upon some entity different from me.

33. Forte verò illud ens non est Deus, sumque vel a parentibus productus, vel a quibuslibet aliis causis Deo minus perfectis. Imo, ut jam ante dixi, perspicuum est tantumdem ad minimum esse debere in causâ quantum est in effectu; & idcirco, cùm sim res cogitans, ideamque quandam Dei in me habens, qualiscunque tandem meî causa assignetur, illam etiam esse rem cogitantem, & omnium perfectionum, quas Deo tribuo, ideam habere fatendum est. Potestque de illâ rursus quaeri, an sit a se, vel ab aliâ. Nam si a se, patet ex dictis illam ipsam Deum esse, quia nempe,

33. Perhaps indeed that being is not God, and I am produced either by parents, or by any other causes less perfect than God. Nay rather, as I have already said, it is clear that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as there is in the effect; and therefore, since I am a thinking thing, and have in me a certain idea of God, whatever cause of me is ultimately assigned, it too must be a thinking thing, and must have the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God. And about it one can again inquire whether it is from itself, or from another. For if it is from itself, it is evident from what has been said that it is God himself, because namely,

[50] cùm vim habeat per se existendi, habet proculdubio etiam vim possidendi actu omnes perfectiones quarum ideam in se habet, hoc est omnes quas in Deo esse concipio. Si autem sit ab aliâ, rursus eodem modo de hac alterâ quaeretur, an sit a se, vel ab aliâ, donec tandem ad causam ultimam deveniatur, quae erit Deus.

[50] since it has the power of existing by itself, it undoubtedly has also the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has the idea within itself, that
is, all those which I conceive to be in God. But if it is from another, again
in the same way it will be asked of this other whether it is from itself or from another,
until at length one arrives at the ultimate cause, which will be God.

34. Satis enim apertum est nullum hîc dari posse progressum in infinitum, praesertim cùm non tantùm de causâ, quae me olim produxit, hîc agam, sed maxime etiam de illâ quae me tempore praesenti conservat.

34. For it is quite clear that no progress into infinity can be given here, especially since I am dealing not only with the cause which once produced me, but most of all also with that which preserves me at the present time.

35. Nec fingi potest plures forte causas partiales ad me efficiendum concurrisse, & ab unâ ideam unius ex perfectionibus quas Deo tribuo, ab aliâ ideam alterius me accepisse, adeo ut omnes quidem illae perfectiones alicubi in universo reperiantur, sed non omnes simul junctae in uno aliquo, qui sit Deus. Nam contrà, unitas, simplicitas, sive insepararibilitas eorum ommum quae in Deo sunt, una est ex praecipuis perfectionibus quas in eo esse intelligo. Nec certe istius omnium ejus perfectionum unitatis idea in me potuit poni ab ullâ causâ, a quâ etiam aliarum perfectionum ideas non habuerim: neque enim efficere potuit ut illas simul junctas & inseparabiles intelligerem, nisi simul effecerit ut quaenam illae essent agnoscerem.

35. Nor can it be imagined that perhaps several partial causes concurred to effect me, and that from one I received the idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God, from another the idea of another, so that indeed all those perfections might be found somewhere in the universe, but not all joined together at once in some one who is God. For on the contrary, the unity, simplicity, or inseparability of all the things that are in God is one of the principal perfections which I understand to be in him. Nor indeed could the idea in me of this unity of all his perfections have been put there by any cause from which I did not also have the ideas of the other perfections: for it could not have brought it about that I should understand them as joined together and inseparable, unless at the same time it had brought it about that I should recognize what they are.

36. Quantum denique ad parentes attinet, ut omnia vera sint quae de illis unquam putavi, non tamen profecto illi me conservant, nec etiam ullo modo me, quatenus sum res cogitans, effecerunt; sed tantùm dispositiones quasdam in eâ materiâ posuerunt, cui me, hoc est mentem, quam solam nunc pro me acci

36. Finally, as far as my parents are concerned, even if all the things are true that I ever thought about them, nevertheless assuredly they do not conserve me, nor did they in any way bring me about, insofar as I am a thinking thing; but they only set certain dispositions in that matter to which me, that is, the mind, which alone I now take as myself

[51]pio, inesse judicavi. Ac proinde hîc nulla de iis difficultas esse potest; sed omnino est concludendum, ex hoc solo quòd existam, quaedamque idea entis perfectissimi, hoc est Dei, in me sit, evidentissime demonstrari Deum etiam existere...

[51] I have judged to be present. And accordingly here no difficulty about them can exist; but it must be altogether concluded, from this alone that I exist, and that some idea of a most perfect being, that is, of God, is in me, that it is most evidently demonstrated that God also exists...

37. Superest tantùm ut examinem quâ ratione ideam istam a Deo accepi; neque enim illam sensibus hausi, nec unquam non expectanti mihi advenit, ut solent rerum sensibilium ideae, cùm istae res externis sensuum organis occurrunt, ve occurrere videntur; nec etiam a me efficta est, nam nihil ab illâ detrahere, nihil illi superaddere plane possum; ac proinde superest ut mihi sit innata, quemadmodum etiam mihi est innata idea meî ipsius.

37. It only remains that I examine by what rationale I received that idea from God; for I did not draw it from the senses, nor did it ever come to me unexpecting, as the ideas of sensible things are wont to do, when those things meet the external organs of the senses, or seem to meet them; nor was it fashioned by me, for I can plainly take nothing away from it, add nothing to it; and hence it remains that it is innate to me, just as the idea of myself also is innate to me.

38. Et sane non mirum est Deum, me creando, ideam illam mihi indidisse, ut esset tanquam nota artificis operi suo impressa; nec etiam opus est ut nota illa sit aliqua res ab opere ipso diversa. Sed ex hoc uno quòd Deus me creavit, valde credibile est me quodammodo ad imaginem & similitudinem ejus factum esse, illamque similitudinem, in quâ Dei idea continetur, a me percipi per eandem facultatem, per quam ego ipse a me percipior: hoc est, dum in meipsum mentis aciem converto, non modo intelligo me esse rem incompletam & ab alio dependentem, remque ad majora & majora sive meliora indefinite aspirantem; sed simul etiam intelligo illum, a quo pendeo, majora ista omnia non indefinite & potentiâ tantùm, sed reipsâ infinite in se habere, atque ita Deum esse. Totaque vis argumenti in eo est, quòd agnoscam fieri non posse

38. And truly it is not to be wondered at that God, in creating me, implanted that idea in me, so that it should be as it were the mark of the craftsman impressed upon his work; nor is there need that that mark be some thing different from the work itself. But from this alone, that God created me, it is highly credible that I was made in some manner to his image and likeness, and that that similitude, in which the idea of God is contained, is perceived by me through the same faculty by which I myself am perceived by me: that is, when I turn the gaze of my mind into myself, I not only understand that I am a thing incomplete and dependent on another, and a thing aspiring indefinitely to greater and greater, or better, things; but at the same time I also understand that he, on whom I depend, has all those greater things not indefinitely and only in potency, but in reality infinitely in himself, and thus is God. And the whole force of the argument is in this, that I recognize it cannot be

[52] ut existam talis naturae qualis sum, nempe ideam Dei in me habens, nisi revera Deus etiam existeret, Deus, inquam, ille idem cujus idea in me est, hoc est, habens omnes illas perfectiones, quas ego non comprehendere, sed quocunque modo attingere cogitatione possum, & nullis plane defectibus obnoxius. Ex quibus satis patet illum fallacem esse non posse; omnem enim fraudem & deceptionem a defectu aliquo pendere, lumine naturali manifestum est.

[52] that I should exist of such a nature as I am, namely having the idea of God in me, would not be possible unless truly God also existed, God, I say, that same one whose idea is in me, that is, having all those perfections which I cannot comprehend, but can in some way reach in thought, & plainly subject to no defects at all. From which it is sufficiently clear that he cannot be deceitful; for by the natural light it is manifest that every fraud & deception depends on some defect.

39. Sed priusquam hoc diligentius examinem, simulque in alias veritates quae inde colligi possunt inquiram, placet hîc aliquandiu in ipsius Dei contemplatione immorari, ejus attributa apud me expendere, & immensi hujus luminis pulchritudinem, quantum caligantis ingenii mei acies ferre poterit, intueri, admirari, adorare. Ut enim in hac solâ divinae majestatis contemplatione summam alterius vitae foelicitatem consistere fide credimus, ita etiam jam ex eâdem, licet multo minus perfectâ, maximam, cujus in hac vitâ capaces simus, voluptatem percipi posse experimur.

39. But before I examine this more diligently, and at the same time inquire into other truths which can be gathered from it, it pleases me here for a while to linger in the contemplation of God himself, to weigh his attributes with myself, & to behold, admire, and adore the beauty of this immense light, as far as the keenness of my clouded intellect can bear. For as by faith we believe that in this sole contemplation of the divine majesty the highest felicity of the other life consists, so also now from the same, although much less perfect, we experience that the greatest delight, of which we are capable in this life, can be perceived.