Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

[1] Tenuit consuetudo, quae cotidie magis inualescit, ut praeceptoribus eloquentiae, Latinis quidem semper, sed etiam Graecis interim, discipuli serius quam ratio postulat traderentur. Eius rei duplex causa est, quod et rhetores utique nostri suas partis omiserunt et grammatici alienas

[1] A custom has prevailed, which grows stronger every day, that students are handed over to preceptors of eloquence—indeed to Latin ones always, but also to Greek ones meanwhile—later than reason demands. Of this matter there is a double cause: both our rhetors have certainly omitted their own parts, and the grammarians have taken up others’.

[2] occupauerunt. Nam et illi declamare modo et scientiam declamandi ac facultatem tradere officii sui ducunt idque intra deliberatiuas iudicialisque materias (nam cetera ut professione sua minora despiciunt), et hi non satis credunt excepisse quae relicta erant (quo nomine gratia quoque iis habenda est), sed ad prosopopoeias usque [ad suasorias], in

[2] they have occupied. For both those men reckon it the office of their duty only to declaim and to hand down the science and the faculty of declaiming, and that within deliberative and judicial matters (for they despise the rest as inferior to their profession), and these do not think it enough to have taken up what had been left (on which account thanks also are due to them), but even up to prosopopoeias [to suasories], into

[3] quibus onus dicendi uel maximum est, inrumpunt. Hinc ergo accidit ut quae alterius artis prima erant opera facta sint alterius nouissima, et aetas altioribus iam disciplinis debita in schola minore subsidat ac rhetoricen apud grammaticos exerceat. Ita, quod est maxime ridiculum, non ante ad declamandi magistrum mittendus uidetur puer quam declamare sciat.

[3] into which they intrude, wherein the burden of speaking is even the greatest. Hence it happens that what were the first works of one art have become the very last of another, and the age already owed to higher disciplines sinks down in the lesser school and practices rhetoric with the grammarians. Thus, what is most ridiculous, it seems that a boy must not be sent to a master of declamation before he already knows how to declaim.

[4] Nos suum cuique professioni modum demus: et grammatice, quam in Latinum transferentes litteraturam uocauerunt, fines suos norit, praesertim tantum ab hac appellationis suae paupertate, intra quam primi illi constitere, prouecta; nam tenuis a fonte adsumptis historicorum criticorumque uiribus pleno iam satis alueo fluit, cum praeter rationem recte loquendi non parum alioqui copiosam prope

[4] Let us assign to each profession its proper measure: and let grammar, which, translating into Latin, they called literature, know its own bounds, especially as it has advanced so far beyond that poverty of its appellation within which those first men took their stand; for, slender at the source, having assumed the forces of historians and critics, it now flows in a channel already sufficiently full, since, besides the doctrine of speaking correctly—otherwise by no means scant—it nearly

[5] omnium maximarum artium scientiam amplexa sit: et rhetorice, cui nomen uis eloquendi dedit, officia sua non detrectet nec occupari gaudeat pertinentem ad se laborem: quae, dum opere cedit, iam paene possessione depulsa est.

[5] it has embraced the knowledge of all the greatest arts: and rhetoric, to which the force of eloquence gave its name, should not decline its own offices nor rejoice that the labor pertinent to itself is being preempted: which, while it yields in the work, has now almost been driven from possession.

[6] Neque infitiabor aliquem ex his qui grammaticen profiteantur eo usque scientiae progredi posse ut ad haec quoque tradenda sufficiat. Sed cum id aget, rhetoris officio fungetur, non suo.

[6] Nor will I deny that someone from among those who profess grammar can advance in knowledge to such a point that he is sufficient for handing down these things as well. But when he does that, he will perform the rhetor’s office, not his own.

[7] Nos porro quaerimus quando iis quae rhetorice praecipit percipiendis puer maturus esse uideatur: in quo quidem non id est aestimandum, cuius quisque sit aetatis, sed quantum in studiis iam effecerit. Et ne diutius disseram quando sit rhetori tradendus, sic optime finiri credo: cum poterit. Sed

[7] We, furthermore, inquire when a boy may seem mature for perceiving those things which rhetoric prescribes: in which, indeed, it is not to be estimated of what age each one is, but how much he has already accomplished in studies. And, lest I speak at greater length about when he should be handed over to the rhetor, I think it is best to be concluded thus: when he shall be able. But

[8] hoc ipsum ex superiore pendet quaestione. Nam si grammatices munus usque ad suasorias prorogatur, tardius rhetore opus est: si rhetor prima officia operis sui non recusat, a narrationibus statim et laudandi uituperandique opusculis cura

[8] this very point depends on the preceding question. For if the office of grammar is prolonged even up to suasoriae, the rhetor is needed later: if the rhetor does not refuse the first duties of his work, immediately from narrations and the little opuscules of praising and blaming the care

[9] eius desideratur. An ignoramus antiquis hoc fuisse ad augendam eloquentiam genus exercitationis, ut thesis dicerent et communes locos et cetera citra complexum rerum personarumque quibus uerae fictaeque controuersiae continentur? Ex quo palam est quam turpiter deserat eam partem rhetorices

[9] the care of it is required. Or do we not know that among the ancients this was a kind of exercise for augmenting eloquence, that they would deliver theses and commonplaces and the rest without the embrace of facts and persons, within which true and fictitious controversies are contained? From which it is clear how disgracefully he abandons that part of rhetoric

[10] institutio quam et primam habuit et diu solam. Quid autem est ex his de quibus supra dixi quod non cum in alia quae sunt rhetorum propria, tum certe in illud iudiciale causae genus incidat? An non in foro narrandum est? Qua

[10] the instruction which it both had first and for a long time alone. But what is there out of those things about which I spoke above that does not fall, both among the other matters that are proper to rhetors and surely into that judicial kind of cause? Is it not in the forum that narration is to be made? By what

[11] in parte nescio an sit uel plurimum. Non laus ac uituperatio certaminibus illis frequenter inseritur? Non communes loci, siue qui sunt in uitia derecti, quales legimus a Cicerone compositos, seu quibus quaestiones generaliter tractantur, quales sunt editi a Quinto quoque Hortensio, ut 'sitne paruis argumentis credendum' et 'pro testibus' et 'in testes', in mediis

[11] in that part it has perhaps very much, if not the most. Is not praise and blame frequently inserted into those contests? Are not commonplaces, whether those directed against vices, such as we read composed by Cicero, or those by which questions are handled generally, such as have been published by Quintus Hortensius also, as ‘whether small arguments are to be believed’ and ‘for the witnesses’ and ‘against the witnesses’, in the midst

[12] litium medullis uersantur? Arma sunt haec quodam modo praeparanda semper, ut iis cum res poscet utaris. Quae qui pertinere ad orationem non putabit, is ne statuam quidem inchoari credet cum eius membra fundentur. Neque hanc, ut aliqui putabunt, festinationem meam sic quisquam calumnietur tamquam eum qui sit rhetori traditus abducendum

[12] do they not revolve in the very marrows of lawsuits? These are arms that must in a certain way always be prepared, so that you may use them when the matter will demand. Whoever will not think that these pertain to oration will not even believe that a statue is being begun when its limbs are being cast. Nor let anyone, as some will think, thus calumniate this my hastening, as though the one who has been handed over to the rhetor ought to be led away

[13] protinus a grammaticis putem. Dabuntur illis tum quoque tempora sua, neque erit uerendum ne binis praeceptoribus oneretur puer. Non enim crescet, sed diuidetur qui sub uno miscebatur labor, et erit sui quisque operis magister utilior: quod adhuc optinent Graeci, a Latinis omissum est, et fieri uidetur excusate, quia sunt qui labori isti successerint.

[13] that I should at once think him to be withdrawn from the grammarians. Times of their own will be given to them then as well, nor will there be need to fear lest the boy be burdened with two preceptors. For the labor that was being mingled under one will not increase, but will be divided, and each will be a more useful master of his own work: which the Greeks still maintain; by the Latins it has been omitted, and it seems to be done with excuse, because there are those who have succeeded to that labor.

II. De moribus et officiis praeceptoris.

2. On the mores and duties of the preceptor.

[1] Ergo cum ad eas in studiis uires peruenerit puer ut quae prima esse praecepta rhetorum diximus mente consequi possit, tradendus eius artis magistris erit. Quorum in primis

[1] Therefore, when the boy shall have come in his studies to such strength that he can with his mind grasp those things which we have said are the first precepts of the rhetoricians, he must be handed over to the masters of that art. Of whom, in the first place,

[2] inspici mores oportebit: quod ego non idcirco potissimum in hac parte tractare sum adgressus quia non in ceteris quoque doctoribus idem hoc examinandum quam diligentissime putem, sicut testatus sum libro priore, sed quod magis necessariam

[2] the morals ought to be inspected: which I have not for that reason undertaken to treat most especially in this part because I do not think that in the other instructors also this same matter ought to be examined most diligently, as I have attested in the prior book, but because it is more necessary

[3] eius rei mentionem facit aetas ipsa discentium. Nam et adulti fere pueri ad hos praeceptores transferuntur et apud eos iuuenes etiam facti perseuerant, ideoque maior adhibenda tum cura est, ut et teneriores annos ab iniuria sanctitas docentis custodiat et ferociores a licentia grauitas deterreat.

[3] The very age of the learners makes mention of that matter. For nearly full-grown boys are transferred to these preceptors and with them they even persevere after they have become young men, and therefore greater care must then be applied, so that both the sanctity of the teacher may guard the more tender years from injury and his gravity may deter the more high-spirited from licence.

[4] Neque uero sat est summam praestare abstinentiam, nisi disciplinae seueritate conuenientium quoque ad se mores adstrinxerit.

[4] Nor indeed is it enough to exhibit the utmost abstinence, unless by the severity of discipline he has also constrained to himself the mores of those who resort to him.

Sumat igitur ante omnia parentis erga discipulos suos animum, ac succedere se in eorum locum a quibus sibi liberi

Let him, therefore, before all things, assume the spirit of a parent toward his disciples, and consider that he succeeds into the place of those by whom the children have been entrusted to him

[5] tradantur existimet. Ipse nec habeat uitia nec ferat. Non austeritas eius tristis, non dissoluta sit comitas, ne inde odium, hinc contemptus oriatur. Plurimus ei de honesto ac bono sermo sit: nam quo saepius monuerit, hoc rarius castigabit; minime iracundus, nec tamen eorum quae emendanda erunt dissimulator, simplex in docendo, patiens laboris, adsiduus

[5] let him deem that they are entrusted to him. He himself should neither have vices nor bear them. Let not his austerity be gloomy, nor his comity dissolute, lest from that hatred, from this contempt arise. Let there be very much discourse for him about the honorable and the good: for the more often he has admonished, the more rarely will he chastise; least irascible, and yet not a dissimulator of those things which will have to be amended, straightforward in teaching, patient of labor, assiduous

[6] potius quam inmodicus. Interrogantibus libenter respondeat, non interrogantes percontetur ultro. In laudandis discipulorum dictionibus nec malignus nec effusus, quia

[6] rather than immoderate. To those asking let him answer gladly; let him not interrogate those not asking of his own accord. In praising the students’ speeches let him be neither malign nor effusive, because

[7] res altera taedium laboris, altera securitatem parit. In emendando quae corrigenda erunt non acerbus minimeque conementumeliosus; nam id quidem multos a propo studendi

[7] the one thing begets tedium of labor, the other begets security. In emending what will have to be corrected let him not be harsh and by no means contumelious; for that indeed has driven many from the set purpose of studying

[8] fugat, quod quidam sic obiurgant quasi oderint. Ipse aliquid, immo multa cotidie dicat quae secum auditores referant. Licet enim satis exemplorum ad imitandum ex lectione suppeditet, tamen uiua illa, ut dicitur, uox alit plenius, praesupcipueque praeceptoris quem discipuli, si modo recte sunt instituti, et amant et uerentur.

[8] it drives away, because certain men objurgate as if they hated. Let him himself say something—nay, many things—daily, which the auditors may carry away with them. For although reading supplies enough examples for imitation, nevertheless that living, as it is said, voice nourishes more fully, and especially the preceptor’s, whom the disciples, if only they have been rightly instituted, both love and revere.

Vix autem dici potest quanto libentius imitemur eos quibus fauemus.

It can hardly be said how much more willingly we imitate those whom we favor.

[9] Minime uero permittenda pueris, ut fit apud plerosque, adsurgendi exultandique in laudando licentia: quin etiam iuuenum modicum esse, cum audient, testimonium debet. Ita fiet ut ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat, atque

[9] By no means, indeed, is the license of rising and exulting in praising to be permitted to boys, as happens among the majority: nay rather, even the testimony of young men, when they are hearing, ought to be moderate. Thus it will come about that the disciple will hang upon the judgment of the preceptor, and

[10] id se dixisse recte quod ab eo probabitur credat. Illa uero uitiosissima, quae iam humanitas uocatur, inuicem qualiacumque laudandi cum est indecora et theatralis et seuere institutis scholis aliena, tum studiorum perniciosissima hostis: superuacua enim uidentur cura ac labor parata quidquid

[10] let him believe that he has spoken rightly only that which will be approved by him. But that most vicious thing, which is now called “humanity,” the mutual praising of whatever things—while it is indecorous and theatrical and alien to schools instituted with strictness—is also the most pernicious enemy of studies: for care and labor seem superfluous, since whatever is prepared [for them] is praised.

[11] effuderint laude. Vultum igitur praeceptoris intueri tam qui audiunt debent quam ipse qui dicit: ita enim probanda atque improbanda discernent; sic stilo facultas conprotinget,

[11] with praise ready for whatever they shall have poured out. Therefore both those who listen and he who speaks himself ought to behold the teacher’s countenance: for thus they will discern what is to be approved and disapproved; thus will ability be advanced by the pen,

[12] auditione iudicium. At nunc proni atque succincti ad omnem clausulam non exsurgunt modo uerum etiam excurrunt et cum indecora exultatione conclamant. Id mutuum est et ibi declamationis fortuna.

[12] judgment by audition. But now, leaning forward and girded (succinct), at every clause they not only rise up but even rush out, and with indecorous exultation cry out together. That is mutual, and there is the fortune of declamation.

Hinc tumor et uana de se persuasio usque adeo ut illo condiscipulorum tumultu inflati, si parum a praeceptore laudentur, ipsi de illo male sentiant.

Hence swelling and a vain persuasion about themselves, to such an extent that, inflated by that tumult of their condisciples, if they are too little praised by the preceptor, they themselves think ill of him.

[13] Sed se quoque praeceptores intente ac modeste audiri uelint: non enim iudicio discipulorum dicere debet magister, sed discipulus magistri. Quin, si fieri potest, intendendus animus in hoc quoque, ut perspiciat quae quisque et quo modo laudet, et placere quae bene dicet non suo magis quam eorum nomine delectetur qui recte iudicabunt.

[13] But let preceptors also wish to be heard intently and modestly: for it is not by the judgment of the disciples that the master ought to speak, but the disciple by the master’s. Nay rather, if it can be done, the mind is to be directed to this as well, to perceive both what each person praises and in what manner; and let him take delight that the things he will say well are pleasing, not more in his own name than in that of those who will judge rightly.

[14] Pueros adulescentibus permixtos sedere non placet mihi. Nam etiamsi uir talis qualem esse oportet studiis moribusque praepositum modestam habere potest etiam iuuentutem, tamen uel infirmitas a robustioribus separanda est, et carendum non solum crimine turpitudinis uerum etiam suspicione.

[14] It does not please me that boys sit intermingled with adolescents. For even if the man placed over studies and morals, such as he ought to be, can keep even the youth modest, nevertheless infirmity ought to be separated from the more robust, and one must avoid not only the crime of turpitude but even the suspicion.

[15] Haec notanda breuiter existimaui. Nam ut absit ab ultimis uitiis ipse ac schola ne praecipiendum quidem credo. Ac si quis est qui flagitia manifesta in eligendo filii praeceptore non uitet, iam hinc sciat cetera quoque, quae ad utilitatem iuuentutis componere conamur, esse sibi hac parte omissa superiuuenuacua.

[15] I have judged these things to be briefly noted. For that he himself and the school be far removed from the utmost vices, I do not even think needs to be prescribed. And if there is anyone who does not avoid manifest flagitious acts in choosing a preceptor for his son, let him from this already know that the other things also, which we strive to compose for the utility of the youth, with this part omitted, will be for him superfluous.

III. An protinus praeceptore optimo sit utendum.

3. Whether one should at once employ the best preceptor.

[1] Ne illorum quidem persuasio silentio transeunda est, qui, etiam cum idoneos rhetori pueros putauerunt, non tamen continuo tradendos eminentissimo credunt, sed apud minores aliquamdiu detinent, tamquam instituendis artibus magis sit apta mediocritas praeceptoris cum ad intellectum atque imitationem facilior, tum ad suscipiendas elementorum

[1] Not even the persuasion of those is to be passed over in silence, who, even when they have considered boys fit for a rhetor, nevertheless do not believe they should straightway be entrusted to the most eminent, but keep them for some time with lesser teachers, on the ground that for the instituting of the arts the mediocrity of the preceptor is more apt—both as easier for understanding and imitation, and for taking up the elements

[2] molestias minus superba. Qua in re mihi non arbitror diu laborandum ut ostendam quanto sit melius optimis inbui, quanta in eluendis quae semel insederint uitiis difficultas consequatur, cum geminatum onus succedentis premat, et

[2] the annoyances of the elements less overbearing. In this matter I do not think I must labor long to show how much better it is to be imbued by the best, how great a difficulty follows in washing out the vices which have once settled in, since a twofold burden presses the successor, and

[3] quidem dedocendi grauius ac prius quam docendi: propter quod Timotheum clarum in arte tibiarum ferunt duplices ab iis quos alius instituisset solitum exigere mercedes quam si rudes traderentur. Error tamen est in re duplex: unus, quod interim sufficere illos minores existimant et bono sane stomacho

[3] indeed the un-teaching is more weighty and prior than the teaching: on account of which they report that Timotheus, famous in the art of the pipes, was accustomed to demand double fees from those whom another had trained, than if raw novices were handed over. The error, however, in the matter is twofold: one, that meanwhile they think those lesser men suffice, and, to be sure, with very good stomach (indignation)

[4] contenti sunt: quae quamquam est ipsa reprensione digna securitas, tamen esset utcumque tolerabilis si eius modi praeceptores minus docerent, non peius; alter ille etiam frequentior, quod eos qui ampliorem dicendi facultatem sint consecuti non putant ad minora descendere, idque interim fieri quia fastidiant praestare hanc inferioribus curam, interim

[4] they are content: which security, although itself worthy of reprehension, would nevertheless be tolerable somehow if preceptors of that sort taught less, not worse; the other error, even more frequent, is this: that they do not think those who have attained a more ample faculty of speaking will descend to lesser matters, and that this sometimes happens because they disdain to furnish this care to their inferiors, sometimes

[5] quia omnino non possint. Ego porro eum qui nolit in numero praecipientium non habeo, posse autem maxime, si uelit, optimum quemque contendo: primum quod eum qui eloquentia ceteris praestet illa quoque per quae ad eloquentiam peruenitur diligentissime percepisse credibile est,

[5] because they absolutely cannot. I, moreover, do not count one who is unwilling in the number of preceptors, but I contend that the best men are most capable, if they are willing: first, because it is credible that he who excels the rest in eloquence has also most diligently perceived those things by which one attains to eloquence,

[6] deinde quia plurimum in praecipiendo ualet ratio, quae doctissimo cuique plenissima est, postremo quia nemo sic in maioribus eminet ut eum minora deficiant: nisi forte Iouem quidem Phidias optime fecit, illa autem quae in ornamentum operis eius accedunt alius melius elaborasset, aut orator loqui nesciet aut leuiores morbos curare non poterit praestantissimus medicus.

[6] then next, because in instructing reason (ratio) avails most, which is fullest in each most learned man; lastly, because no one so stands out in greater matters that lesser ones fail him: unless perhaps Phidias indeed made Jupiter best, but someone else would have elaborated better those things which are added for the ornament of his work; or else the orator will not know how to speak, or the most outstanding physician will not be able to cure lighter maladies.

[7] Quid ergo? non est quaedam eloquentia maior quam ut eam intellectu consequi puerilis infirmitas possit? Ego uero confiteor: sed hunc disertum praeceptorem prudentem quoque et non ignarum docendi esse oportebit, summittentem se ad mensuram discentis, ut uelocissimus quoque, si forte iter cum paruolo faciat, det manum et gradum suum

[7] What then? Is there not a certain eloquence greater than that the puerile infirmity can attain to it by understanding? I truly confess it: but this eloquent preceptor must also be prudent and not ignorant of teaching, lowering himself to the measure of the learner, so that even the most swift, if perchance he makes a journey with a little one, gives his hand and his step

[8] minuat nec procedat ultra quam comes possit. Quid si plerumque accidit ut faciliora sint ad intellegendum et lucidiora multo quae a doctissimo quoque dicuntur? Nam et prima est eloquentiae uirtus perspicuitas, et, quo quis ingenio minus ualet, hoc se magis attollere et dilatare conatur, ut statura

[8] let him lessen his pace and not proceed farther than his companion is able. What if it very often happens that the things said by even the most learned are easier for understanding and much more lucid? For the first virtue of eloquence is perspicuity, and the less one avails in natural ingenium, by so much the more he strives to exalt and dilate himself, as by stature

[9] breues in digitos eriguntur et plura infirmi minantur. Nam tumidos et corruptos et tinnulos et quocumque alio cacozeliae genere peccantes certum habeo non uirium sed infirmitatis uitio laborare, ut corpora non robore sed ualetudine inflantur, et recto itinere lassi plerumque deuertunt. Erit ergo etiam obscurior quo quisque deterior.

[9] the short raise themselves onto their toes, and the weak menace more. For I hold it certain that those who sin by being tumid and corrupt and tinnulous, and by whatever other kind of cacozealy, suffer not from a fault of strength but of weakness, as bodies are inflated not by robustness but by ill-health, and the weary for the most part turn aside from the straight road. Therefore he will also be the more obscure, the worse he is.

[10] Non excidit mihi scripsisse me in libro priore, cum potiorem in scholis eruditionem esse quam domi dicerem, libentius se prima studia tenerosque profectus ad imitationem condiscipulorum, quae facilior esset, erigere: quod a quibusdam sic accipi potest tamquam haec quam nunc tueor sententia

[10] It does not slip from me that I wrote in the previous book, when I was saying that erudition in the schools is preferable to that at home, that the first studies and tender progresses more willingly raise themselves to the imitation of fellow-disciples, which would be easier: which can by some be taken as though this opinion which I now uphold

[11] priori diuersa sit. Id a me procul aberit; namque ea causa uel maxima est cur optimo cuique praeceptori sit tradendus puer, quod apud eum discipuli quoque melius instituti aut dicent quod inutile non sit imitari, aut, si quid errauerint, statim corrigentur: at indoctus ille etiam probabit fortasse

[11] should be different from the former. That will be far from me; for this is a reason, even the greatest, why a boy should be handed over to the best possible preceptor, because with him the pupils too, better instructed, will either say what is not unprofitable to imitate, or, if they have erred in anything, will at once be corrected: but that unlearned man will perhaps even approve

[12] uitiosa et placere audientibus iudicio suo coget. Sit ergo tam eloquentia quam moribus praestantissimus qui ad Phoenicis Homerici exemplum dicere ac facere doceat.

[12] and he will even approve defective things and by his own judgment will compel them to please the hearers. Let him, therefore, be most preeminent both in eloquence and in morals who teaches to speak and to do after the example of the Homeric Phoenix.

IV. De primis apud rhetorem exercitationibus.

4. On the first exercises with the rhetor.

[1] Hinc iam quas primas in docendo partis rhetorum putem tradere incipiam, dilata parumper illa quae sola uulgo uocatur arte rhetorica: ac mihi oportunus maxime uidetur ingressus ab eo cuius aliquid simile apud grammaticos puer didicerit.

[1] From here now I shall begin to deliver what I think are the first parts of the rhetors in teaching, that matter being deferred for a little which alone is popularly called the art of rhetoric; and the ingress seems to me most opportune from that of which the boy has learned something similar among the grammarians.

[2] Et quia narrationum, excepta qua in causis utimur, tris accepimus species, fabulam, quae uersatur in tragoediis atque carminibus non a ueritate modo sed etiam a forma ueritatis remota, argumentum, quod falsum sed uero simile comoediae fingunt, historiam, in qua est gestae rei expositio, grammaticis autem poeticas dedimus: apud rhetorem

[2] And because, of narrations—excepting that which we use in causes—we have received three species: the fabula, which is employed in tragedies and songs, removed not only from truth but even from the form of truth; the argument, which comedies fashion as false but verisimilar; the history, in which there is an exposition of a deed done; to the grammarians, however, we have assigned the poetic ones: with the rhetor

[3] initium sit historica, tanto robustior quanto uerior. Sed narrandi quidem quae nobis optima ratio uideatur tum demonstrabimus cum de iudiciali parte dicemus: interim admonere illud sat est, ut sit ea neque arida prorsus atque ieiuna (nam quid opus erat tantum studiis laboris inpendere si res nudas atque inornatas indicare satis uideretur?), neque rursus sinuosa et arcessitis descriptionibus, in quas plerique

[3] let the beginning be historical, so much the more robust as it is truer. But indeed the method of narrating which seems to us best we will demonstrate then, when we speak about the judicial part: meanwhile it is enough to admonish this, that it be neither altogether arid and jejune (for what need was there to expend so much labors of study if it seemed sufficient to indicate things naked and unadorned?), nor again sinuous and with far-fetched descriptions, into which most people

[4] imitatione poeticae licentiae ducuntur, lasciuiat. Vitium utrumque, peius tamen illud quod ex inopia quam quod ex copia uenit. Nam in pueris oratio perfecta nec exigi nec sperari potest: melior autem indoles laeta generosique conatus et

[4] being led by imitation of poetic license, it runs riot. Both are a vice, yet worse is that which comes from poverty than that which comes from abundance. For in boys a perfected oration can neither be demanded nor hoped for: better, rather, is a glad indole and generous endeavors and

[5] uel plura iusto concipiens interim spiritus. Nec umquam me in his discentis annis offendat si quid superfuerit. Quin ipsis doctoribus hoc esse curae uelim, ut teneras adhuc mentes more nutricum mollius alant, et satiari uelut quodam iucundioris disciplinae lacte patiantur. Erit illud plenius interim

[5] or the spirit meanwhile conceiving even more than what is just. Nor let it ever offend me in these years of learning if anything should be superfluous. Nay rather, I would wish this to be a care for the very doctors themselves: that they nourish minds still tender more softly, in the manner of nurses, and allow them to be satisfied, as it were, with a certain milk of a more pleasant discipline. That will be fuller for the present

[6] corpus, quod mox adulta aetas adstringat. Hinc spes roboris: maciem namque et infirmitatem in posterum minari solet protinus omnibus membris expressus infans. Audeat haec aetas plura et inueniat et inuentis gaudeat, sint licet illa non satis sicca interim ac seuera. Facile remedium est ubertatis,

[6] a body, which adult age will soon tighten. Hence a hope of robustness: for leanness and infirmity are wont to menace for the future, the infant at once expressed in all its limbs. Let this age dare more and both discover and rejoice in its discoveries, though these be meanwhile not sufficiently dry and severe. There is an easy remedy for uberty,

[7] sterilia nullo labore uincuntur. Illa mihi in pueris natura minimum spei dederit in qua ingenium iudicio praesumitur. Materiam esse primum uolo uel abundantiorem atque ultra quam oporteat fusam. Multum inde decoquent anni, multum ratio limabit, aliquid uelut usu ipso deteretur, sit modo unde excidi possit et quod exculpi; erit autem, si non ab initio tenuem nimium laminam duxerimus et quam caelatura

[7] sterility is overcome by no labor. That nature in boys has given me the least hope in which judgment is presumed ahead of genius. I want there to be material at first—even more abundant and poured forth beyond what is fitting. Much of it the years will decoct; much will reason file down; something will, as it were, be worn away by use itself; only let there be that from which something can be cut out and what can be sculpted; and there will be, if from the beginning we have not drawn too thin a lamina, and one which the caelature

[8] altior rumpat. Quod me de his aetatibus sentire minus mirabitur qui apud Ciceronem legerit: 'uolo enim se efferat in adulescente fecunditas'.

[8] a deeper chasing would rupture it. He will be less surprised that I feel this about these ages who has read in Cicero: 'for I want fecundity to carry itself forth in the adolescent'.

Quapropter in primis euitandus, et in pueris praecipue, magister aridus, non minus quam teneris adhuc plantis siccum

Wherefore, in the first place to be avoided, and in boys especially, is an arid teacher, no less than dryness for plants still tender.

[9] et sine umore ullo solum. Inde fiunt humiles statim et uelut terram spectantes, qui nihil supra cotidianum sermonem attollere audeant. Macies illis pro sanitate et iudicii loco infirmitas est, et, dum satis putant uitio carere, in id ipsum incidunt uitium, quod uirtutibus carent.

[9] and soil without any moisture at all. Thence they at once become lowly and, as it were, gazing at the earth, who dare to raise nothing above quotidian sermon. Leanness is to them in place of health, and infirmity in the place of judgment; and, while they think it enough to be free from vice, they fall into that very vice: that they are lacking in virtues.

Quare mihi ne maturitas quidem ipsa festinet nec musta in lacu statim austera sint: sic et annos ferent et uetustate proficient.

Wherefore, let not even maturity itself hasten for me, nor let the must in the vat be immediately austere: thus they will both bear the years and profit by age.

[10] Ne illud quidem quod admoneamus indignum est, ingenia puerorum nimia interim emendationis seueritate deficere; nam et desperant et dolent et nouissime oderunt et, quod

[10] Nor is this even unworthy to be admonished: the ingenia of boys sometimes fail through an excessive severity of emendation; for they both despair and grieve and, last of all, hate, and, what

[11] maxime nocet, dum omnia timent nihil conantur. Quod etiam rusticis notum est, qui frondibus teneris non putant adhibendam esse falcem, quia reformidare ferrum uidentur

[11] What harms most is that, while they fear everything, they attempt nothing. Which is also known to rustics, who think the sickle ought not to be applied to tender fronds, because they seem to shrink from the iron.

[12] et nondum cicatricem pati posse. Iucundus ergo tum maxime debet esse praeceptor, ut remedia, quae alioqui natura sunt aspera, molli manu leniantur: laudare aliqua, ferre quaedam, mutare etiam reddita cur id fiat ratione, inluminare interponendo aliquid sui. Nonnumquam hoc quoque erit utile, totas ipsum dictare materias, quas et imitetur puer et interim

[12] and not yet able to endure a scar. Therefore the preceptor ought then most of all to be pleasant, so that the remedies, which otherwise by nature are harsh, may be softened with a soft hand: to praise some things, to bear with certain things, to even modify them, with the reason rendered why this is done, to illuminate by interposing something of his own. Sometimes this too will be useful, to dictate entire themes himself, which the boy both may imitate and meanwhile

[13] tamquam suas amet: at si tam neglegens ei stilus fuerit ut emendationem non recipiat, expertus sum prodesse quotiens eandem materiam rursus a me retractatam scribere de integro iuberem: posse enim eum adhuc melius:

[13] that he love them as though his own: but if his style be so negligent that it does not receive emendation, I have found it to be of profit whenever I ordered him to write afresh the same material, taken up again by me: for he can do it better still:

[14] quatenus nullo magis studia quam spe gaudent. Aliter autem alia aetas emendanda est, et pro modo uirium et exigendum et corrigendum opus. Solebam ego dicere pueris aliquid ausis licentius aut laetius laudare illud me adhuc, uenturum tempus quo idem non permitterem: ita et ingenio gaudebant et iudicio non fallebantur.

[14] insofar as studies take delight in nothing more than hope. But a different age must be emended otherwise, and the work must be both exacted and corrected according to the measure of the powers. I used to say to boys who had ventured something somewhat more licentiously or more gaily that I, for the present, praised it; a time would come when I would not permit the same: thus they rejoiced in their natural ingenium and were not deceived as to my judgment.

[15] Sed ut eo reuertar unde sum egressus: narrationes stilo componi quanta maxima possit adhibita diligentia uolo. Nam ut primo, cum sermo instituitur, dicere quae audierint utile est pueris ad loquendi facultatem, ideoque et retro agere expositionem et a media in utramque partem discurrere sane merito cogantur, sed ad gremium praeceptoris et dum non possunt et dum res ac uerba conectere incipiunt, ut protinus memoriam firment: ita cum iam formam rectae atque emendatae orationis accipient, extemporalis garrulitas nec expectata cogitatio et uix surgendi

[15] But so that I may return to that from which I set out: I want narrations to be composed with the stylus, with the greatest diligence that can be applied. For just as at first, when discourse is being instituted, it is useful for boys, for the faculty of speaking, to say what they have heard, and therefore they are quite rightly compelled both to carry the exposition backward and to run from the middle in either direction, yet at the preceptor’s lap both while they cannot and while they begin to connect things and words, so that they may at once strengthen memory: thus, when they will now receive the form of correct and emended oration, extemporaneous garrulity and thought not waited for and scarcely of rising

[16] mora circulatoriae uere iactationis est. Hinc parentium imperitorum inane gaudium, ipsis uero contemptus operis et inuerecunda frons et consuetudo pessime dicendi et malorum exercitatio et, quae magnos quoque profectus frequenter

[16] is a delay of mountebank-like, truly, vaunting. Hence the inane joy of inexpert parents, but for the boys themselves contempt of the work, and a shameless brow, and a consuetude of speaking very badly, and an exercise of evils, and—things which even great progresses frequently

[17] perdidit, adrogans de se persuasio innascitur. Erit suum parandae facilitati tempus, nec a nobis neglegenter locus iste transibitur. Interim satis est si puer omni cura et summo, quantum illa aetas capit, labore aliquid probabile scripserit: in hoc adsuescat, huius sibi rei naturam faciat.

[17] has ruined, an arrogant self-persuasion is begotten. There will be its own time for preparing facility, nor will this topic be passed over negligently by us. Meanwhile it is enough if the boy, with every care and with the utmost, so far as that age holds, labor, shall have written something plausible: to this let him become accustomed; let him make the nature of this thing his own.

Ille demum in id quod quaerimus aut ei proximum poterit euadere qui ante discet recte dicere quam cito.

He at last will be able to attain to that which we seek, or to something proximate to it, who will learn to speak rightly before he learns to speak quickly.

[18] Narrationibus non inutiliter subiungitur opus destruendi confirmandique eas, quodanaskeye et kataskeye uocatur. Id porro non tantum in fabulosis et carmine traditis fieri potest, uerum etiam in ipsis annalium monumentis: ut, si quaeratur 'an sit credibile super caput Valeri pugnantis sedisse coruum, qui os oculosque hostis Galli rostro atque alis euerberaret', sit in utramque partem ingens ad dicendum

[18] To narrations there is not unprofitably subjoined the work of demolishing and of confirming them, which is calledanaskeye and kataskeye. Moreover, this can be done not only in fabulous matters and those transmitted in song, but even in the very monuments of the annals: as, if it be asked, 'whether it is credible that, upon the head of Valerius as he fought, a raven sat, which with beak and wings beat the mouth and eyes of the Gallic foe,' there will be for either side immense scope for speaking.

[19] materia: aut de serpente, quo Scipio traditur genitus, et lupa Romuli et Egeria Numae; nam Graecis historiis plerumque poeticae similis licentia est. Saepe etiam quaeri solet de tempore, de loco, quo gesta res dicitur, nonnumquam de persona quoque, sicut Liuius frequentissime dubitat et alii ab aliis historici dissentiunt.

[19] material: either about the serpent by which Scipio is handed down to have been begotten, and the she-wolf of Romulus and Egeria of Numa; for in Greek histories there is for the most part a license similar to the poetical. Often too it is usual to inquire about the time, about the place where the deed is said to have been done, sometimes also about the person, just as Livy very frequently is in doubt, and historians disagree one with another.

[20] Inde paulatim ad maiora tendere incipiet, laudare claros uiros et uituperare improbos: quod non simplicis utilitatis opus est. Namque et ingenium exercetur multiplici uariaque materia et animus contemplatione recti prauique formatur, et multa inde cognitio rerum uenit exemplisque, quae sunt in omni genere causarum potentissima, iam tum

[20] Thence gradually he will begin to tend toward greater things, to praise illustrious men and to vituperate the wicked: which is not a work of simple utility. For both the natural talent is exercised by manifold and various material, and the mind is shaped by the contemplation of the right and the wrong, and much knowledge of things comes from that, and by examples, which in every kind of causes are most powerful, even then

[21] instruit cum res poscet usurum. Hinc illa quoque exercitatio subit comparationis, uter melior uterue deterior: quae quamquam uersatur in ratione simili, tamen et duplicat materiam et uirtutum uitiorumque non tantum naturam sed etiam modum tractat. Verum de ordine laudis contraque, quoniam tertia haec rhetorices pars est, praecipiemus suo tempore.

[21] it already then equips the one who will use them when the case demands. From this there also arises that exercise of comparison— which of the two is better and which worse— which, although it is engaged in a similar rationale, nevertheless both doubles the material and treats not only the nature of virtues and vices but also their mode. But concerning the order of praise and the contrary, since this is the third part of rhetoric, we shall give precepts in its own time.

[22] Communes loci (de iis loquor quibus citra personas in ipsa uitia moris est perorare, ut in adulterum, aleatorem, petulantem) ex mediis sunt iudiciis et, si reum adicias, accusapetutiones: quamquam hi quoque ab illo generali tractatu ad quasdam deduci species solent, ut si ponatur adulter caecus, aleator pauper, petulans senex. Habent autem nonnumquam

[22] Common places (I speak of those in which, without persons, it is the custom to perorate against the vices themselves, as against the adulterer, the gambler, the petulant) are from middle judgments and, if you add a defendant, accusations: although these too are wont to be drawn down from that general treatment into certain species, as if the adulterer be posited blind, the gambler poor, the petulant an old man. They have, however, sometimes

[23] etiam defensionem; nam et pro luxuria et pro amore dicimus, et leno interim parasitusque defenditur sic ut non homini patrocinemur sed crimini.

[23] they even have a defense; for we plead on behalf of luxury and on behalf of love, and the pander and the parasite are sometimes defended in such a way that we are advocates not for the person but for the crime.

[24] Thesis autem quae sumuntur ex rerum comparatione (ut 'rusticane uita an urbana potior', 'iuris periti an militaris uiri laus maior') mire sunt ad exercitationem dicendi speciosae atque uberes, quae uel ad suadendi officium uel etiam ad iudiciorum disceptationem iuuant plurimum: nam posterior ex praedictis locus in causa Murenae copiosissime a

[24] Theses, however, which are taken from the comparison of things (as, 'whether a rustic life or an urban is preferable,' 'whether the praise of a jurist or of a military man is greater') are wonderfully showy and rich for the exercise of speaking, and they help very much either for the office of suasion or even for the disceptation of trials: for the latter of the aforesaid topics, in the case of Murena, was handled most copiously by

[25] Cicerone tractatur. Sunt et illae paene totae ad deliberatiuum pertinentes genus: 'ducendane uxor', 'petendine sint magistratus'; namque et hae personis modo adiectis suasoriae erunt.

[25] it is handled by Cicero. There are also those almost wholly pertaining to the deliberative genus: 'is a wife to be taken in marriage', 'should magistracies be sought'; for these too, with persons merely added, will be suasories.

[26] Solebant praeceptores mei neque inutili et nobis etiam iucundo genere exercitationis praeparare nos coniecturalibus causis cum quaerere atque exequi iuberent 'cur armata apud Lacedaemonios Venus' et 'quid ita crederetur Cupido puer atque uolucer et sagittis ac face armatus' et similia, in quibus scrutabamur uoluntatem, cuius in controuersiis frequens quaestio est: quod genus chriae uideri potest.

[26] My preceptors used to prepare us for conjectural causes by a kind of exercise not useless and even pleasant to us, when they would bid us to inquire and work out 'why Venus is armed among the Lacedaemonians' and 'why it was thus believed that Cupid is a boy and winged and armed with arrows and a torch,' and the like, in which we scrutinized the intention—a question frequent in controversies: which kind can be thought that of the chria.

[27] Nam locos quidem, quales sunt de testibus 'semperne his credendum' et de argumentis 'an habenda etiam paruis fides', adeo manifestum est ad forensis actiones pertinere ut quidam neque ignobiles in officiis ciuilibus scriptos eos memoriquiaeque diligentissime mandatos in promptu habuerint, ut, quotiens esset occasio, extemporales eorum dictiones his

[27] For the topics, indeed, such as those about witnesses, 'should these always be believed,' and about arguments, 'whether credence is to be given even to small ones,' are so manifestly pertinent to forensic actions that certain men, by no means ignoble in civil offices, have had them written out and very diligently committed to memory and kept ready to hand, so that, whenever there was an occasion, their extemporaneous speeches with these

[28] uelut emblematis exornarentur: quo quidem (neque enim eius rei iudicium differre sustineo) summam uidebantur mihi infirmitatem de se confiteri. Nam quid hi possint in causis, quarum uaria et noua semper est facies, proprium inuenire, quo modo propositis ex parte aduersa respondere, altercationibus uelociter occurrere, testem rogare, qui etiam in iis quae sunt communia et in plurimis causis tractantur uulgatissimos sensus uerbis nisi tanto ante praeparatis prosequi

[28] as if they were adorned with emblems: by which indeed (for I do not endure to defer a judgment on that matter) they seemed to me to confess the utmost infirmity about themselves. For what can these men do in causes, whose face is always varied and new, to find what is proper, how to respond to the propositions set forth by the opposing side, to meet altercations swiftly, to interrogate a witness, who even in those things which are common and are handled in very many causes cannot pursue in words the most commonplace sentiments unless prepared so long beforehand

[29] nequeant? Nec uero his, cum eadem iudiciis pluribus dicunt, aut fastidium moueant uelut frigidi et repositi cibi aut pudorem deprensa totiens audientium memoria infelix supellex, quae sicut apud pauperes ambitiosos pluribus et

[29] are they not able? Nor indeed do these men, when they say the same things in several trials, either arouse distaste like frigid and stored-away food, or shame, when their unlucky stock of furnishings is so often caught out by the memory of the hearers, which, just as among ambitious poor men, for more and

[30] diuersis officiis conteratur: cum eo quidem, quod uix ullus est tam communis locus qui possit cohaerere cum causa nisi aliquo propriae quaestionis uinculo copulatus, appareatque

[30] is worn down by many and diverse offices: with this, indeed, that scarcely any commonplace is so common as to be able to cohere with the cause unless coupled by some bond of the proper question, and it would appear

[31] eum non tam insertum quam adplicitum, uel quod dissimilis est ceteris, uel quod plerumque adsumi etiam parum apte solet, non quia desideratur, sed quia paratus est, ut quidam sententiarum gratia uerbosissimos locos arcessunt, cum ex

[31] it is not so much inserted as appended, either because it is dissimilar to the rest, or because it is very often wont to be taken up even rather inaptly, not because it is desired, but because it is ready, just as certain people, for the sake of maxims (sentences), fetch the most verbose passages, when from

[32] locis debeat nasci sententia: ita sunt autem speciosa haec et utilia si oriuntur ex causa; ceterum quamlibet pulchra elocutio, nisi ad uictoriam tendit, utique superuacua, sed interim etiam contraria est. Verum hactenus euagari satis fuerit.

[32] the sententia ought to be born from the loci: moreover, these things are specious and useful if they arise from the cause; otherwise, however beautiful the elocution, unless it tends toward victory, it is certainly superfluous, but meanwhile even contrary. But let it have been enough to wander thus far.

[33] Legum laus ac uituperatio iam maiores ac prope summis operibus suffecturas uires desiderant: quae quidem suasoriis an controuersiis magis accommodata sit exercitatio consuetudine et iure ciuitatium differt. Apud Graecos enim lator earum ad iudicem uocabatur, Romanis pro contione suadere ac dissuadere moris fuit; utroque autem modo pauca de his et fere certa dicuntur: nam et genera sunt tria sacri,

[33] The praise and the vituperation of laws now demand greater powers and almost such as would suffice for the highest works: and as to whether this exercise is more accommodated to suasories or to controversies differs by the custom and the law of the states. For among the Greeks the proposer of them was summoned to the judge, among the Romans it was the custom to persuade and dissuade before the contio; and in either mode few and almost fixed things are said about these: for the kinds are three, of the sacred,

[34] publici, priuati iuris. Quae diuisio ad laudem magis spectat, si quis eam per gradus augeat, quod lex, quod publica, quod ad religionem deum comparata sit. Ea quidem de quibus

[34] of public and private right. Which division looks more toward praise, if someone should augment it by degrees: that it is a law, that it is public, that it has been composed with reference to the religion of the gods. Those indeed about which

[35] quaeri solet communia omnibus. Aut enim de iure dubitari potest eius qui rogat, ut de P. Clodi, qui non rite creatus tribunus arguebatur: aut de ipsius rogationis, quod est uarium, siue non trino forte nundino promulgata siue non idoneo die siue contra intercessionem uel auspicia aliudue quid quod legitimis obstet dicitur lata esse uel ferri, siue alicui manentium

[35] things that are usually asked are common to all. For either there can be doubt about the right of him who proposes, as in the case of P. Clodius, who was being charged with not having been duly created tribune; or about the rogation itself—which is various—whether, perhaps, it was not promulgated on three nundinae, or not on a suitable day, or contrary to an intercession or the auspices, or some other thing which stands in the way of the lawful requirements, it is said to have been passed or to be being brought; or to any one of those remaining

[36] legum repugnare. Sed haec ad illas primas exercitamanentiones non pertinent: nam sunt eae citra complexum personarum temporum causarum. Reliqua eadem fere uero

[36] to be repugnant to the laws. But these do not pertain to those first exercises: for they are outside the encompassing of persons, times, and causes. The rest are nearly the same, indeed

[37] fictoque certamine huius modi tractantur: nam uitium aut in uerbis aut in rebus est. In uerbis quaeritur satis significent an sit in iis aliquid ambiguum: in rebus, an lex sibi ipsa consentiat, an in praeteritum ferri debeat, an in singulos homines. Maxime uero commune est quaerere an sit honesta,

[37] and they are handled with a feigned contest of this kind: for the defect is either in the words or in the matters. In the words it is asked whether they signify sufficiently, or whether there is something ambiguous in them; in the matters, whether the law agrees with itself, whether it ought to be carried into the past, whether upon individual persons. But most commonly, indeed, it is a common question whether it is honorable,

[38] an utilis. Nec ignoro plures fieri a plerisque partes, sed nos iustum pium religiosum ceteraque his similia honesto complectimur. Iusti tamen species non simpliciter excuti solet. Aut enim de re ipsa quaeritur, ut dignane poena uel praemio sit, aut de modo praemii poenaeue, qui tam maior quam

[38] or useful. Nor am I unaware that more parts are made by most people, but we include the just, the pious, the religious, and other things similar to these under the honorable. Yet the species of the just is not wont to be examined simply. For either the inquiry is about the thing itself, whether it is worthy of punishment or reward, or about the measure of the reward or the punishment, which may be as much greater as

[39] minor culpari potest. Vtilitas quoque interim natura discernitur, interim tempore. Quaedam an optineri possint ambigi solet.

[39] the lesser can be blamed. Utility too is sometimes distinguished by nature, sometimes by time. Certain things are wont to be debated whether they can be obtained.

Ne illud quidem ignorare oportet, leges aliquando totas, aliquando ex parte reprendi solere, cum exaliemplum rei utriusque nobis claris orationibus praebeatur.

Nor ought we to be ignorant of this either, that laws are accustomed sometimes to be reprehended in their entirety, sometimes in part, since an example of each matter is afforded to us by illustrious orations.

[40] Nec me fallit eas quoque leges esse quae non in perpetuum rogentur, sed de honoribus aut imperiis, qualis Manilia fuit, de qua Ciceronis oratio est. Sed de his nihil hoc loco praecipi potest: constant enim propria rerum de quibus agitur, non communi, qualitate.

[40] Nor does it escape me that there are also those laws which are not proposed in perpetuity, but concern honors or commands, such as the Manilian (law) was, about which is the oration of Cicero. But about these nothing can be prescribed in this place: for they are determined by the proper quality of the matters being dealt with, not by a common one.

[41] His fere ueteres facultatem dicendi exercuerunt, adsumpta tamen a dialecticis argumentandi ratione. Nam fictas ad imitationem fori consiliorumque materias apud Graecos dicere circa Demetrium Phalerea institutum fere constat.

[41] In these, for the most part, the ancients exercised the faculty of speaking, though with the method of argumentation taken from the dialecticians. For it is generally agreed that the practice among the Greeks of speaking on fictitious themes, in imitation of the forum and of councils, was instituted around Demetrius of Phalerum.

[42] An ab ipso id genus exercitationis sit inuentum, ut alio quoque libro sum confessus, parum comperi: sed ne ii quidem qui hoc fortissime adfirmant ullo satis idoneo auctore nituntur. Latinos uero dicendi praeceptores extremis L. Crassi temporibus coepisse Cicero auctor est: quorum insignis maxime Plotius fuit.

[42] Whether that kind of exercise was invented by him himself, as I have confessed in another book as well, I have scarcely discovered; but not even those who most stoutly affirm this rely on any sufficiently suitable authority. Cicero is an authority that Latin preceptors of speaking began in the latest times of L. Crassus, among whom Plotius was most distinguished.

V. De lectione oratorum et historicorum apud rhetorem.

5. On the reading of orators and historians with the rhetor.

[1] Sed de ratione declamandi post paulo: interim, quia prima rhetorices rudimenta tractamus, non omittendum uidetur id quoque, ut moneam quantum sit conlaturus ad profectum discentium rhetor si, quem ad modum a grammaticis exigitur poetarum enarratio, ita ipse quoque hisgramtoriae atque etiam magis orationum lectione susceptos a se discipulos instruxerit. Quod nos in paucis, quorum id aetas exigebat et parentes utile esse crediderant, seruauimus:

[1] But about the method of declaiming a little later: meanwhile, since we are handling the first rudiments of rhetoric, it seems not to be omitted also to warn how much the rhetor will contribute to the progress of learners if, just as from grammarians the expounding of poets is required, so he too shall have instructed the pupils taken up by him by the reading of histories, and even more of speeches. This we have observed in the case of a few, whose age required it and whose parents had believed it to be useful:

[2] ceterum sentientibus iam tum optima duae res impedimento fuerunt, quod et longa consuetudo aliter docendi fecerat legem, et robusti fere iuuenes nec hunc laborem desiderantes

[2] However, for those already then discerning the best, two things were an impediment: both the long consuetude of teaching otherwise had made a law, and the youths, for the most part robust, were not desiring this labor.

[3] exemplum nostrum sequebantur. Nec tamen, etiam si quid noui uel sero inuenissem, praecipere in posterum puderet: nunc uero scio id fieri apud Graecos, sed magis per adiutores, quia non uidentur tempora suffectura si legentibus singulis

[3] they were following our example. Nor yet, even if I had discovered something new, even belatedly, would I be ashamed to prescribe it for the future: now indeed I know that this is done among the Greeks, but rather through adjutors, because the time does not seem likely to suffice if for individual readers

[4] praeire semper ipsi uelint. Et hercule praelectio quae in hoc adhibetur, ut facile atque distincte pueri scripta oculis sequantur, etiam illa quae uim cuiusque uerbi, si quod minus usitatum incidat, docet, multum infra rhetoris officium

[4] they would always wish to go before in person. And, by Hercules, the prelection which is employed for this purpose, so that the boys may follow the writings easily and distinctly with their eyes, and even that which teaches the force of each word, if some less usual one should occur, is far beneath the rhetor’s office.

[5] existimanda est. At demonstrare uirtutes uel, si quando ita incidat, uitia, id professionis eius atque promissi quo se magistrum eloquentiae pollicetur maxime proprium est, eo quidem ualidius quod non utique hunc laborem docentium postulo, ut ad gremium reuocatis cuius quisque eorum uelit

[5] is to be esteemed. But to demonstrate virtues, or, if ever it so occurs, vices—this is most proper to his profession and to the pledge by which he proffers himself a master of eloquence, indeed all the more forceful because I by no means demand this toil of the teachers, namely, that, having called back to the bosom whichever of them each wishes

[6] libri lectione deseruiant. Nam mihi cum facilius, tum etiam multo uidetur magis utile facto silentio unum aliquem (quod ipsum imperari per uices optimum est) constituere lectorem,

[6] to attend by the reading of a book. For to me it seems not only easier, but also much more useful, with silence enforced, to appoint some one person (and this very thing is best commanded by turns) as reader,

[7] ut protinus pronuntiationi quoque adsuescant: tum exposita causa in quam scripta legetur oratio (nam sic clarius quae dicentur intellegi poterunt), nihil otiosum pati quodque in inuentione quodque in elocutione adnotandum erit: quae in prohoemio conciliandi iudicis ratio, quae narrandi lux breuitas fides, quod aliquando consilium et quam occulta callidibreuitas

[7] so that they may at once also grow accustomed to pronuntiation (delivery): then, the cause having been set forth, with reference to which the written oration will be read (for thus what will be said can be understood more clearly), to allow nothing idle, and whatever in invention and whatever in elocution will have to be noted: what method in the proem for conciliating the judge, what light, brevity, and credibility in the narration, what plan at times, and how hidden a crafty brevity.

[8] (namque ea sola in hoc ars est, quae intellegi nisi ab artifice non possit): quanta deinceps in diuidendo prudentia, quam subtilis et crebra argumentatio, quibus uiribus inspiret, qua iucunditate permulceat, quanta in maledictis asperitas, in iocis urbanitas, ut denique dominetur in adfectibus atque in pectora inrumpat animumque iudicum

[8] (for indeed that alone in this is art, which cannot be understood except by an artificer): how much thereafter in dividing there is prudence, how subtle and frequent the argumentation, with what forces it inspires, with what pleasantness it soothes, how great the harshness in maledictions, the urbanity in jests, how finally it may dominate in the affections and burst into the breasts and the very mind of the judges

[9] similem iis quae dicit efficiat; tum, in ratione eloquendi, quod uerbum proprium ornatum sublime, ubi amplificatio laudanda, quae uirtus ei contraria, quid speciose tralatum, quae figura uerborum, quae leuis et quadrata, uirilis tamen compositio.

[9] let him make the mind of the judges similar to the things he says; then, in the rationale of eloquence, what word is proper, what ornate, what sublime; where amplification is to be praised; what virtue is contrary to it; what is splendidly transferred; what figure of words; what composition is light and square, yet manly.

[10] Ne id quidem inutile, etiam corruptas aliquando et uitiosas orationes, quas tamen plerique iudiciorum prauitate mirentur, legi palam, ostendique in his quam multa inpropria obscura tumida humilia sordida lasciua effeminata sint: quae non laudantur modo a plerisque, sed, quod est peius,

[10] Not even that is un-useful: that even corrupted and vicious orations, which nevertheless most people admire through the perversity of judgments, be read openly, and that in these it be shown how many things are improper, obscure, tumid, low, sordid, lascivious, effeminate: which are not only lauded by most, but, what is worse,

[11] propter hoc ipsum quod sunt praua laudantur. Nam sermo rectus et secundum naturam enuntiatus nihil habere ex ingenio uidetur; illa uero quae utcumque deflexa sunt taminquam exquisitiora miramur non aliter quam distortis et quocumque modo prodigiosis corporibus apud quosdam maius est pretium quam iis quae nihil ex communis habitus

[11] on account of this very fact, that they are perverse, they are praised. For straight discourse and enunciated according to nature seems to have nothing from genius; but those which are deflected in whatever way we admire as if more exquisite, not otherwise than that for distorted and in whatever way prodigious bodies, among certain people, the price is greater than for those which have nothing of the common build

[12] bonis perdiderunt, atque etiam qui specie capiuntur uulsis leuatisque et inustas comas acu comentibus et non suo colore nitidis plus esse formae putant quam possit tribuere incorrupta natura, ut pulchritudo corporis uenire uideatur ex malis morum.

[12] they have lost the benefits of the good, and even those who are captivated by mere appearance—having hairs plucked and smoothed, arranging with a needle their locks singed, and gleaming with a color not their own—think there is more of form than uncorrupted nature can bestow, so that the beauty of the body seems to come from the evils of morals.

[13] Neque solum haec ipse debebit docere praeceptor, sed frequenter interrogare et iudicium discipulorum experiri. Sic audientibus securitas aberit nec quae dicentur superfluent aures: simul ad id perducentur quod ex hoc quaeritur, ut inueniant ipsi et intellegant. Nam quid aliud agimus docendo

[13] And not only must the preceptor himself teach these things, but he should frequently ask questions and test the judgment of the pupils. Thus for the hearers complacency will be absent, nor will the things that are said flow past the ears; at the same time they will be led through to that which is sought from this, that they themselves may find and understand. For what else do we do by teaching

[14] eos quam ne semper docendi sint? Hoc diligentiae genus ausim dicere plus conlaturum discentibus quam omnes omnium artes, quae iuuant sine dubio multum, sed latiore quadam comprensione per omnes quidem species rerum

[14] them than that they should not have to be taught forever? This kind of diligence I would dare to say will contribute more to learners than all the arts of all men, which help without doubt much, but with a certain broader comprehension through all indeed the species of things

[15] cotidie paene nascentium ire qui possunt? Sicut de re militari quamquam sunt tradita quaedam praecepta communia, magis tamen proderit scire qua ducum quisque ratione in quali re tempore loco sit sapienter usus aut contra: nam in omnibus fere minus ualent praecepta quam experimenta.

[15] who can go through the things almost daily being born? Just as in military affairs, although certain common precepts have been handed down, yet it will be more profitable to know by what rationale each of the leaders, in what matter, time, and place, has used wisely—or the contrary: for in almost all things precepts are less strong than experience.

[16] An uero declamabit quidem praeceptor ut sit exemplo suis auditoribus: non plus contulerint lecti Cicero aut Demosthenes? Corrigetur palam si quid in declamando discipulus errauerit: non potentius erit emendare orationem, quin immo etiam iucundius? Aliena enim uitia reprendi quisque

[16] Or indeed will the preceptor declaim so as to be an example to his auditors: will not Cicero or Demosthenes, when read, have contributed more? He will be corrected openly if in declaiming the disciple has erred: will it not be more potent to emend a speech, nay rather even more pleasant? For each one prefers that others’ faults be reproved

[17] mauult quam sua. Nec deerant plura quae dicerem: sed neminem haec utilitas fugit, atque utinam tam non pigeat facere istud quam non displicebit.

[17] each person prefers that others’ vices be reprehended rather than his own. Nor were there lacking more things that I could say: but this utility escapes no one, and would that it were as little irksome to do that as it will not displease.

[18] Quod si potuerit optineri, non ita difficilis supererit quaestio, qui legendi sint incipientibus. Nam quidam illos minores, quia facilior eorum intellectus uidebatur, probauerunt, alii floridius genus, ut ad alenda primarum aetatium ingenia

[18] But if this can be obtained, a not-so-difficult question will remain, namely, which are to be read by beginners. For certain people approved those minor authors, because their understanding seemed easier; others, a more florid genre, in order to nourish the native talents of the earliest ages.

[19] magis accommodatum. Ego optimos quidem et statim et semper, sed tamen eorum candidissimum quemque et maxime expositum uelim, ut Liuium a pueris magis quam Sallustium (et hic historiae maior est auctor, ad quem tamen

[19] more accommodated. I, for my part, would indeed want the best both immediately and always, yet of them each the most candid and the most clearly set forth, as Livy for boys rather than Sallust (and he is a greater author of history, to whom however

[20] intellegendum iam profectu opus sit). Cicero, ut mihi quidem uidetur, et iucundus incipientibus quoque et apertus est satis, nec prodesse tantum sed etiam amari potest: tum, quem ad modum Liuius praecipit, ut quisque erit Ciceroni simillimus.

[20] (that now there is need of progress for him to be understood). Cicero, as indeed it seems to me, is both pleasant even to beginners and clear enough, and he can not only profit but also be loved: then, in the manner that Livius prescribes, let each be most similar to Cicero.

[21] Duo autem genera maxime cauenda pueris puto: unum, ne quis eos antiquitatis nimius admirator in Gracchorum Catonisque et aliorum similium lectione durescere uelit; fient enim horridi atque ieiuni: nam neque uim eorum adhuc intellectu consequentur et elocutione, quae tum sine dubio erat optima, sed nostris temporibus aliena est, contenti, quod est pessimum, similes sibi magnis uiris uidebuntur.

[21] But I think two kinds are especially to be guarded against for boys: one, lest some too-zealous admirer of antiquity should wish them to harden in the reading of the Gracchi and of Cato and of others like them; for they will become horrid and jejune: for they will not yet attain the force of those writers by intellect, and, as for the elocution which then without doubt was the best, yet in our times is alien, being content—which is the worst—that they seem to themselves similar to great men.

[22] Alterum, quod huic diuersum est, ne recentis huius lasciuiae flosculis capti uoluptate praua deleniantur, ut praedulce illud genus et puerilibus ingeniis hoc gratius quo propius est

[22] The other, which is contrary to this, is that they not, captured by the little blossoms of this recent lasciviousness, be beguiled by a depraved pleasure; since that over-sweet kind is the more pleasing to puerile wits the nearer it is.

[23] adament. Firmis autem iudiciis iamque extra periculum positis suaserim et antiquos legere (ex quibus si adsumatur solida ac uirilis ingenii uis deterso rudis saeculi squalore, tum noster hic cultus clarius enitescet) et nouos, quibus et

[23] they become enamored. But with judgments firm and now set beyond danger, I would advise to read both the ancients (from whom, if the solid and virile force of genius be taken, with the squalor of the rude age wiped away, then this our cultivation will shine more clearly) and the moderns, in whom also

[24] ipsis multa uirtus adest: neque enim nos tarditatis natura damnauit, sed dicendi mutauimus genus et ultra nobis quam oportebat indulsimus: ita non tam ingenio illi nos superarunt quam proposito. Multa ergo licebit eligere, sed curandum

[24] to them themselves much virtue is present: for nature has not condemned us to tardity, but we have changed the kind of speaking and have indulged ourselves beyond what was fitting: thus they have surpassed us not so much in natural talent as in purpose. Much, therefore, it will be permitted to choose, but care must be taken

[25] erit ne iis quibus permixta sunt inquinentur. Quosdam uero etiam quos totos imitari oporteat et fuisse nuper et nunc esse quidni libenter non concesserim modo uerum etiam contenderim?

[25] care will have to be taken lest they be tainted by those with whom they are commingled. As for certain men indeed whom one ought to imitate entire, that there have been such recently and that there are such now—why should I not gladly not only concede this but even contend for it?

[26] Sed hi qui sint non cuiuscumque est pronuntiare. Tutius circa priores uel erratur, ideoque hanc nouorum distuli lectionem, ne imitatio iudicium antecederet.

[26] But to pronounce who these are is not for just anyone. It is safer even to err around the earlier [writers], and therefore I have deferred this lection/reading of the new ones, lest imitation should antecede judgment.

VI. De divisione et parenchiresi.

6. On division and parenchiresis.

[1] Fuit etiam in hoc diuersum praecipientium propositum, quod eorum quidam materias quas discipulis ad dicendum dabant, non contenti diuisione derigere, latius dicendo prosequebantur, nec solum probationibus implebant sed etiam

[1] There was also in this a diverse purpose of the preceptors, in that certain of them, the subjects which they gave to their pupils for speaking, not content to direct by a division, pursued more broadly by speaking, and not only filled them with probations (proofs) but also

[2] adfectibus: alii, cum primas modo lineas duxissent, post declamationes quid omisisset quisque tractabant, quosdam uero locos non minore cura quam cum ad dicendum ipsi surgerent excolebant. Vtile utrumque, et ideo neutrum ab altero separo; sed si facere tantum alterum necesse sit, plus proderit demonstrasse rectam protinus uiam quam reuocare

[2] with affections: others, when they had only drawn the first lines, after the declamations would discuss what each had omitted, and they would polish certain passages with no less care than when they themselves rose to speak. Useful is both, and therefore I separate neither from the other; but if it is necessary to do only the one, it will profit more to have demonstrated the straight way forthwith than to recall

[3] ab errore iam lapsos: primum quia emendationem auribus modo accipiunt, diuisionem uero ad cogitationem etiam et stilum perferunt; deinde quod libentius praecipientem audiunt quam reprehendentem. Si qui uero paulo sunt uiuaciores, in his praesertim moribus, etiam irascuntur admonitioni

[3] from error when they have already slipped: first, because they receive the emendation only with their ears, but they carry the division over also to thought and to the stylus; then, because they more gladly listen to one instructing than to one reproaching. If any, however, are a little more vivacious, especially in these mores, they even grow angry at admonition

[4] et taciti repugnant. Neque ideo tamen minus uitia aperte coarguenda sunt: habenda enim ratio ceterorum, qui recta esse quae praeceptor non emendauerit credent. Vtraque autem ratio miscenda est et ita tractanda ut ipsae res postulabunt.

[4] and they resist in silence. Yet for that reason vices are not to be any the less openly arraigned: for consideration must be had of the rest, who will believe those things to be right which the preceptor has not emended. Moreover, both methods must be mingled and handled as the matters themselves will demand.

[5] Namque incipientibus danda erit uelut praeformata materia secundum cuiusque uires. At cum satis composuisse se ad exemplum uidebuntur, breuia quaedam demonstranda uestigia, quae persecuti iam suis uiribus sine adminiculo

[5] For to beginners there must be given, as it were, pre-formed material, according to each one’s powers. But when they shall seem to have composed themselves sufficiently to the exemplar, certain brief vestiges are to be shown, which, having pursued them, now by their own powers without assistance

[6] progredi possint. Nonnumquam credi sibi ipsos oportebit, ne mala consuetudine semper alienum laborem sequendi nihil per se conari et quaerere sciant. Quodsi satis prudenter dicenda uiderint, iam prope consummata fuerit praecipientis opera: si quid errauerint adhuc, erunt ad ducem reducendi.

[6] they may be able to advance. Sometimes it will be fitting that they themselves be trusted, lest by the bad custom of always following another’s labor they know to attempt and to seek nothing on their own. But if they shall have judged what is to be said with sufficient prudence, the work of the preceptor will already have been nearly consummated: if they shall still have erred in anything, they must be brought back to a guide.

[7] Cui rei simile quiddam facientes aues cernimus, quae teneris infirmisque fetibus cibos ore suo conlatos partiuntur: at cum uisi sunt adulti, paulum egredi nidis et circumuolare sedem illam praecedentes ipsae docent: tum expertas uires libero caelo suaeque ipsorum fiduciae permittunt.

[7] Doing something similar in this matter, we perceive birds, which allot to their tender and weak offspring the foods brought together in their own beak: but when they have been seen to be adult, the birds themselves, going ahead, teach them to go out a little from the nests and to fly around that abode: then they entrust their tried strength to the open sky and to their own self-confidence.

VII. De ediscendo.

7. On memorization.

[1] Illud ex consuetudine mutandum prorsus existimo in iis de quibus nunc disserimus aetatibus, ne omnia quae scripserint ediscant et certa, ut moris est, die dicant: quod quidem maxime patres exigunt, atque ita demum studere liberos suos si quam frequentissime declamauerint credunt,

[1] I consider that this must be changed altogether from the consuetude in those ages about which we are now disserting: that they not learn by heart all the things which they have written and, on a fixed day, as is the custom, speak them: which indeed fathers especially exact, and they believe their sons then and only then to be studying, if they have declaimed as very frequently as possible,

[2] cum profectus praecipue diligentia constet. Nam ut scribere pueros plurimumque esse in hoc opere plane uelim, sic ediscere electos ex orationibus uel historiis alioue quo genere dignorum ea cura uoluminum locos multo magis suadeam.

[2] since progress consists especially in diligence. For just as I would plainly wish boys to write, and to be very much engaged in this exercise, so I would much more urge that they learn by heart passages selected from orations or histories, or from whatever other genre of volumes deserving of that care.

[3] Nam et exercebitur acrius memoria aliena complectendo quam sua, et qui erunt in difficiliore huius laboris genere uersati sine molestia quae ipsi composuerint iam familiaria animo suo adfigent, et adsuescent optimis, semperque habebunt intra se quod imitentur, et iam non sentientes formam orationis illam quam mente penitus acceperint expriment.

[3] For memory will be exercised more keenly by embracing what is another’s than its own; and those who have been versed in the more difficult kind of this labor will, without trouble, affix to their mind what they themselves have composed, now already familiar; and they will grow accustomed to the best, and will always have within themselves something to imitate; and, now not even sensing it, they will express that form of oration which they have received deeply in mind.

[4] Abundabunt autem copia uerborum optimorum et compositione ac figuris iam non quaesitis sed sponte et ex reposito uelut thesauro se offerentibus. Accedit his et iucunda in sermone bene a quoque dictorum relatio et in causis utilis. Nam et plus auctoritatis adferunt ea quae non praesentis gratia litis sunt comparata, et laudem saepe maiorem quam si

[4] There will, moreover, be an abundance of excellent words, and composition and figures not now sought out but offering themselves of their own accord and from what is laid up, as from a thesaurus. To these there is added also the agreeable recounting in discourse of things well said by each, and it is useful in causes. For those things which have not been prepared for the sake of the present litigation bring more authority, and often greater praise than if

[5] nostra sint conciliant. Aliquando tamen permittendum quae ipsi scripserint dicere, ut laboris sui fructum etiam ex illa quae maxime petitur laude plurium capiant. Verum id quoque tum fieri oportebit cum aliquid commodius elimauerint, ut eo uelut praemio studii sui donentur ac se meruisse ut dicerent gaudeant.

[5] they win what is ours. At times, however, it should be permitted to speak what they themselves have written, so that they may reap the fruit of their labor also from that praise of the many which is most sought. But this too ought to be done when they have polished something more suitably, so that by it they may be, as it were, rewarded for their study and may rejoice that they have earned the right to speak.

VIII. An secundum sui quisque ingenii naturam docendus est.

8. Whether each person is to be taught according to the nature of his own genius.

[1] Virtus praeceptoris haberi solet, nec inmerito, diligenter in iis quos erudiendos susceperit notare discrimina indiligengeniorum, et quo quemque natura maxime ferat scire. Nam est in hoc incredibilis quaedam uarietas, nec pauciores animorum

[1] The virtue of the preceptor is wont to be held, nor undeservedly, to note diligently, in those whom he has undertaken to educate, the distinctions of talents, and to know whither each one is most borne by nature. For in this there is a certain incredible variety, and no fewer of spirits

[2] paene quam corporum formae. Quod intellegi etiam ex ipsis oratoribus potest, qui tantum inter se distant genere dicendi ut nemo sit alteri similis, quamuis plurimi se ad

[2] almost as many as the forms of bodies. Which can be understood even from the orators themselves, who are so distant from one another in the genus of speaking that no one is similar to another, although very many set themselves to

[3] eorum quos probabant imitationem composuerint. Vtile deinde plerisque uisum est ita quemque instituere ut propria naturae bona doctrina fouerent, et in id potissimum ingenia quo tenderent adiuuarentur: ut si quis palaestrae peritus, cum in aliquod plenum pueris gymnasium uenerit, expertus eorum omni modo corpus animumque discernat cui quisque

[3] of those whom they approved they have set themselves to imitation. Useful then it seemed to many to train each person thus, that by doctrine they might foster the proper goods of nature, and that talents be most especially assisted toward that to which they were tending: as if someone skilled in the palaestra, when he has come into some gymnasium full of boys, being experienced would in every way distinguish, in respect of body and mind, for which each

[4] certamini praeparandus sit, ita praeceptorem eloquentiae, cum sagaciter fuerit intuitus cuius ingenium presso limatoque genere dicendi, cuius acri graui dulci aspero nitido urbano maxime gaudeat, ita se commodaturum singulis ut

[4] just as he ought to be prepared for the contest, so the preceptor of eloquence, when he has sagaciously observed whose talent takes its greatest delight in a close-pressed and polished manner of speaking, whose in an acute, grave, dulcet, rough, nitid, urbane style, will so accommodate himself to individuals that

[5] in eo quo quisque eminet prouehatur, quod et adiuta cura natura magis eualescat et qui in diuersa ducatur neque in iis quibus minus aptus est satis possit efficere et ea in quae

[5] in that wherein each is eminent let him be brought forward, because nature aided by care grows more robust, and he who is led into diverse things can neither sufficiently effect in those for which he is less apt, and those into which

[6] natus uidetur deserendo faciat infirmiora. Quod mihi (libera enim uel contra receptas persuasiones rationem sequenti sententia est) in parte uerum uidetur: nam proprietates insengeniorum

[6] by deserting the things for which he seems to be born, he makes them more infirm. Which seems to me (for the opinion that follows reason is free even against received persuasions) to be true in part: for the properties of talents

[7] dispicere prorsus necessarium est. In his quoque certum studiorum facere dilectum nemo dissuaserit. Namque erit alius historiae magis idoneus, alius compositus ad carmen, alius utilis studio iuris, ut nonnulli rus fortasse mittendi: sic discernet haec dicendi magister quomodo palaestricus ille cursorem faciet aut pugilem aut luctatorem aliudue quid

[7] to discern is altogether necessary. In these matters too no one will dissuade making a definite selection of studies. For one will be more apt for history, another composed for song/poetry, another useful for the study of law, and some perhaps are to be sent to the countryside: thus the master of speaking will distinguish these, just as that palaestric trainer will make a runner or a boxer or a wrestler, or something else.

[8] ex iis quae sunt sacrorum certaminum. Verum ei qui foro destinabitur non in unam partem aliquam sed in omnia quae sunt eius operis, etiam si qua difficiliora discenti uidebuntur, elaborandum est; nam et omnino superuacua erat doctrina

[8] from those things which are of the sacred contests. But for him who will be destined for the forum, it must be worked at not in some one part but in all the things which belong to that task, even if certain things will seem more difficult to the learner; for otherwise doctrine would have been altogether superfluous.

[9] si natura sufficeret. An si quis ingenio corruptus ac tumidus, ut plerique sunt, inciderit, in hoc eum ire patiemur? Aridum atque ieiunum non alemus et quasi uestiemus? Nam si quaedam detrahere necessarium est, cur non sit adicere

[9] if nature were sufficient. Or if someone, corrupted and tumid in his genius, as most are, should fall into this, shall we suffer him to go on in it? Shall we not nourish the arid and the jejune and, as it were, clothe it? For if it is necessary to subtract certain things, why should it not be [necessary] to add

[10] concessum? Neque ego contra naturam pugno: non enim deserendum id bonum, si quod ingenitum est, existimo, sed

[10] conceded? Nor do I fight against nature: for I do not think that that good, if it is ingenerate, should be deserted, but

[11] augendum, addendumque quod cessat. An uero clarissimus ille praeceptor Isocrates, quem non magis libri bene dixisse quam discipuli bene docuisse testantur, cum de Ephoro atque Theopompo sic iudicaret ut alteri frenis, alteri calcaribus opus esse diceret, aut in illo lentiore tarditatem aut in illo paene praecipiti concitationem adiuuandam docendo existimauit, cum alterum alterius natura miscendum arbitraretur?

[11] to be augmented, and what is lacking to be added. Or indeed did that most illustrious preceptor Isocrates—whom not so much his books testify to have spoken well as his disciples to have taught well—when he judged thus concerning Ephorus and Theopompus, that the one had need of reins, the other of spurs, think that slowness in the slower one, or in the almost headlong one impetuosity, was to be aided by teaching, when he thought the nature of the one ought to be mingled with that of the other?

[12] Inbecillis tamen ingeniis sane sic obsequendum sit ut tantum in id quo uocat natura ducantur; ita enim quod solum possunt melius efficient. Si uero liberalior materia contigerit et in qua merito ad spem oratoris simus adgressi,

[12] Nevertheless, to feeble talents one should indeed comply thus, that they be led only into that to which nature calls; for thus they will better effect that which alone they can. But if a more liberal material should befall, and one in which we have with good right addressed ourselves to the hope of an orator,

[13] nulla dicendi uirtus omittenda est. Nam licet sit aliquam in partem pronior, ut necesse est, ceteris tamen non repugnabit, atque ea cura paria faciet iis in quibus eminebat, sicut ille, ne ab eodem exemplo recedamus, exercendi corpora peritus non, si docendum pancratiasten susceperit, pugno ferire uel calce tantum aut nexus modo atque in iis certos aliquos docebit, sed omnia quae sunt eius certaminis. Erit qui ex iis aliqua non possit: in id maxime quod poterit incumbet.

[13] no virtue of speaking should be omitted. For although he may be somewhat more inclined in one direction, as is necessary, yet he will not be at odds with the rest, and diligence will make them equal to those in which he was preeminent, just as that man—so as not to depart from the same example—an expert in exercising bodies, if he should undertake to teach a pancratiast, will not teach him only to strike with fist or with kick, or only grapplings and certain particular ones among them, but all the things that belong to that contest. There will be someone who cannot do some of these: upon that especially which he can, he will apply himself.

[14] Nam sunt haec duo uitanda prorsus: unum, ne temptes quod effici non possit, alterum, ne ab eo quod quis optime facit in aliud cui minus est idoneus transferas. At si fuerit qui docebitur ille, quem adulescentes senem uidimus, Nicostratus, omnibus in eo docendi partibus similiter utetur, efficietque illum, qualis hic fuit, luctando pugnandoque, quorum utroque certamine isdem diebus coronabatur, inuictum.

[14] For there are these two things to be avoided absolutely: one, that you not attempt what cannot be effected; the other, that you not transfer from that which someone does best to another thing for which he is less idoneous. But if the one to be taught be such as that Nicostratus—whom, when we were adolescents, we saw as an old man—he will employ upon him all the parts of teaching alike, and will make him, such as this man was, unconquered by wrestling and by fighting, in both of which contests he used to be crowned on the same days.

[15] Et quanto id magis oratoris futuri magistro prouidendum erit! Non enim satis est dicere presse tantum aut subtiliter aut aspere, non magis quam phonasco acutis tantum aut mediis aut grauibus sonis aut horum etiam particulis excellere. Nam sicut cithara, ita oratio perfecta non est nisi ab imo ad summum omnibus intenta neruis consentiat.

[15] And how much more must this be provided for by the master of the future orator! For it is not enough to speak only compactly, or subtly, or harshly, no more than for a phonascus to excel only in high or middle or low tones, or even in particles of these. For just as with the cithara, so speech is not perfect unless, with all its strings stretched from the lowest to the highest, it harmonizes in concert.

IX. De officio discipulorum.

9. On the duty of pupils.

[1] Plura de officiis docentium locutus discipulos id unum interim moneo, ut praeceptores suos non minus quam ipsa studia ament et parentes esse non quidem corporum, sed

[1] Having spoken further about the duties of those teaching, I meanwhile admonish the pupils of this one thing: that they should love their preceptors no less than the studies themselves, and that they are parents not indeed of bodies, but

[2] mentium credant. Multum haec pietas conferet studio; nam ita et libenter audient et dictis credent et esse similes concupiscent, in ipsos denique coetus scholarum laeti alacres conuenient, emendati non irascentur, laudati gaudebunt, ut

[2] believe them to be parents of minds. This piety will contribute much to study; for thus they will both gladly listen and believe the sayings, and will desire to be like them, they will come together into the very assemblies of the schools cheerful and eager, when corrected they will not be angry, when praised they will rejoice, so that

[3] sint carissimi studio merebuntur. Nam ut illorum officium est docere, sic horum praebere se dociles: alioqui neutrum sine altero sufficit; et sicut hominis ortus ex utroque gignentium confertur, et frustra sparseris semina nisi illa praegignenmollitus fouerit sulcus, ita eloquentia coalescere nequit nisi sociata tradentis accipientisque concordia.

[3] they will by their zeal merit to be most dear. For as it is the duty of the former to teach, so it is of the latter to present themselves docile: otherwise neither suffices without the other; and just as a human’s birth is conferred from both of the begetters, and you will have scattered seeds in vain unless the furrow, softened beforehand, has cherished them, so eloquence cannot coalesce unless by the associated concord of the one handing down and the one receiving.

X. De utilitate et ratione declamandi.

10. On the utility and rationale of declaiming.

[1] In his primis operibus, quae non ipsa parua sunt sed maiorum quasi membra atque partes, bene instituto ac satis exercitato iam fere tempus adpetet adgrediendi suasorias iudicialesque materias: quarum antequam uiam ingredior, pauca mihi de ipsa declamandi ratione dicenda sunt, quae quidem ut ex omnibus nouissime inuenta, ita multo est

[1] In these first works, which are not themselves small but, as it were, the limbs and parts of greater ones, the well-instructed and sufficiently exercised student will by now almost be reaching the time for tackling suasorial and judicial subjects: before I enter upon the path of these, a few things must be said by me about the very method of declaiming, which indeed, as having been most recently invented of all, is by much

[2] utilissima. Nam et cuncta illa de quibus diximus in se fere continet et ueritati proximam imaginem reddit, ideoque ita est celebrata ut plerisque uideretur ad formandam eloquentiam uel sola sufficere. Neque enim uirtus ulla perpetuae dumtaxat orationis reperiri potest quae non sit cum hac

[2] most useful. For it both contains almost all those things about which we have spoken and renders a likeness nearest to truth, and therefore it has been so celebrated that to very many it seemed to suffice, even by itself, for the forming of eloquence. For no virtue of continuous discourse, at least, can be found which is not with this

[3] dicendi meditatione communis. Eo quidem res ista culpa docentium reccidit ut inter praecipuas quae corrumperent eloquentiam causas licentia atque inscitia declamantium

[3] common through the practice of speaking. This matter indeed, by the fault of the teachers, has fallen to such a pass that among the chief causes which were corrupting eloquence were the license and the ignorance of the declaimers

[4] fuerit: sed eo quod natura bonum est bene uti licet. Sint ergo et ipsae materiae quae fingentur quam simillimae ueritati, et declamatio, in quantum maxime potest, imitetur eas

[4] it has been so: but it is permitted to use well that which is by nature good. Let therefore even the very materials that will be feigned be as similar as possible to truth, and let declamation, in so far as it can most, imitate them

[5] actiones in quarum exercitationem reperta est. Nam magos et pestilentiam et responsa et saeuiores tragicis nouercas aliaque magis adhuc fabulosa frustra inter sponsiones et interdicta quaeremus. Quid ergo? numquam haec supra fidem et poetica, ut uere dixerim, themata iuuenibus tractare permittamus, ut expatientur et gaudeant materia et quasi in

[5] actions for the exercise of which it was devised. For magi and pestilence and responses, and stepmothers more savage than those of tragedy, and other things yet more fabulous, we shall seek in vain among sponsiones and interdicts. What then? Shall we never permit youths to handle these themes beyond belief and, to speak truly, poetic, so that they may expatiate and take delight in the material, and as if in

[6] corpus eant? Erat optimum, sed certe sint grandia et tumida, non stulta etiam et acrioribus oculis intuenti ridicula, ut, si iam cedendum est, impleat se declamator aliquando, dum sciat, ut quadrupedes, cum uiridi pabulo distentae sunt, sanguinis detractione curantur et sic ad cibos uiribus consersanuandis idoneos redeunt, ita sibi quoque tenuandas adipes, et quidquid umoris corrupti contraxerit emittendum si esse

[6] go into a body? That would be best, but at any rate let them be grand and tumid, not stupid and, to eyes looking more sharply, ridiculous, so that, if now one must yield, the declaimer may at some time fill himself up—provided he knows that, just as quadrupeds, when they are distended with verdant fodder, are cured by a detraction of blood and thus return to foods suitable for restoring their strength, so he too must have his adipose thinned, and whatever corrupted humor he has accumulated must be let out, if there be any.

[7] sanus ac robustus uolet. Alioqui tumor ille inanis primo cuiuscumque ueri operis conatu deprehendetur. Totum autem declamandi opus qui diuersum omni modo a forensibus causis existimant, hi profecto ne rationem quidem qua

[7] he will wish to be sound and robust. Otherwise that empty swelling will be detected at the first attempt of any true work. But those who reckon the whole task of declaiming to be in every way different from forensic causes, these assuredly not even the rationale by which

[8] ista exercitatio inuenta sit peruident; nam si foro non praeparat, aut scaenicae ostentationi aut furiosae uociferationi simillimum est. Quid enim attinet iudicem praeparare qui nullus est, narrare quod omnes sciant falsum, probationes adhibere causae de qua nemo sit pronuntiaturus? Et haec quidem otiosa tantum: adfici uero et ira uel luctu permoueri cuius est lubidrii nisi quibusdam pugnae simulacris ad uerum

[8] they clearly perceive for what purpose that exercise was invented; for if it does not prepare for the forum, it is most like either stage ostentation or frenzied vociferation. For what is the point to prepare a judge who does not exist, to narrate what all know to be false, to apply proofs to a case about which no one is going to pronounce judgment? And these things indeed are idle only: but to be affected and to be moved with anger or with grief—whose wantonness is this, unless for certain simulacra of battle toward the real [thing]?

[9] discrimen aciemque iustam consuescimus! Nihil ergo inter forense genus dicendi atque hoc declamatorium intererit? Si profectus gratia dicimus, nihil. Vtinamque adici ad consuetudinem posset ut nominibus uteremur et perplexae magis et longioris aliquando actus controuersiae fingerentur et uerba in usu cotidiano posita minus timeremus et iocos inserere moris esset: quae nos, quamlibet per alia in scholis

[9] we grow accustomed to the real crisis and a just battle-line! Will there therefore be nothing between the forensic kind of speaking and this declamatory? If we speak for the sake of progress, nothing. And would that it could be added to the consuetude that we should use names, and that controversies more perplexed and sometimes of longer action be feigned, and that we should fear less words set in everyday use, and that it be a custom to insert jests: which things we, however much through other means in the schools

[10] exercitati simus, tirones in foro inueniunt. Si uero in ostentationem comparetur declamatio, sane paulum aliquid inostenclinare

[10] however trained we may be, they find us tyros in the forum. If, indeed, the declamation is prepared for ostentation, it may assuredly incline a little toward ostentation.

[11] ad uoluptatem audientium debemus. Nam et iis actionibus quae in aliqua sine dubio ueritate uersantur, sed sunt ad popularem aptatae delectationem, quales legimus panegyricos totumque hoc demonstratiuum genus, permittitur adhibere plus cultus, omnemque artem, quae latere plerumque in iudiciis debet, non confiteri modo sed ostentare

[11] we ought to incline toward the pleasure of the hearers. For even in those actions which without doubt are engaged with some truth, but are adapted to popular delectation—such as we read panegyrics and this whole demonstrative genus—it is permitted to apply more cultivation, and all the art which for the most part ought to lie hidden in the courts, not only to confess but to make ostentation of.

[12] etiam hominibus in hoc aduocatis. Quare declamatio, quoniam est iudiciorum consiliorumque imago, similis esse debet ueritati, quoniam autem aliquid in se habetepideiktikon,

[12] even to men called in for this purpose. Therefore declamation, since it is an image of trials and counsels, ought to be similar to truth; but since it has something of theepideictic in itself,

[13] nonnihil sibi nitoris adsumere. Quod faciunt actores comici, qui neque ita prorsus ut nos uulgo loquimur pronuntiant, quod esset sine arte, neque procul tamen a natura recedunt, quo uitio periret imitatio, sed morem communis

[13] to assume for itself not a little polish. This is what comic actors do, who neither deliver quite exactly as we commonly speak in the crowd—which would be without art—nor yet depart far from nature, by which fault imitation would perish, but follow the manner of common usage.

[14] huius sermonis decore quodam scaenico exornant. Sic quoque aliqua nos incommoda ex iis quas finxerimus materiis consequentur, in eo praecipue quod multa in iis relincuntur incerta, quae sumimus ut uidetur, aetates facultates liberi parentes, urbium ipsarum uires iura mores, alia his similia:

[14] they adorn this discourse with a certain scenic decor. Thus also some inconveniences will follow us from the materials which we have fashioned, especially in that many things in them are left uncertain, which we assume as it seems: ages, resources, children, parents, the powers, rights, customs of the cities themselves, other things similar to these:

[15] quin aliquando etiam argumenta ex ipsis positionum uitiis ducimus. Sed haec suo quoque loco. Quamuis enim omne propositum operis a nobis destinati eo spectet ut orator instituatur, tamen, ne quid studiosi requirant, etiam si quid erit quod ad scholas proprie pertineat in transitu non omittemus.

[15] indeed, sometimes we even derive arguments from the very faults of the positions. But these also in their own place. For although the whole purpose of the work planned by us looks to this, that the orator be trained, nevertheless, lest the studious lack anything, even if there will be something which properly pertains to the schools, we shall not omit it in passing.

XI. An artis necessaria cognitio.

11. Whether knowledge of the art is necessary.

[1] Iam hinc ergo nobis inchoanda est ea pars artis ex qua capere initium solent qui priora omiserunt: quamquam uideo quosdam in ipso statim limine obstaturos mihi, qui nihil egere eius modi praeceptis eloquentiam putent, sed natura sua et uulgari modo scholarum exercitatione contenti rideant etiam diligentiam nostram exemplo magni quoque nominis professorum, quorum aliquis, ut opinor, interrogatus quid essetschema et noema, nescire se quidem, sed si ad rem

[1] Now from this point, therefore, that part of the art must be begun by us, from which those who have omitted the former matters are wont to take their beginning: although I see certain people ready to block me straight at the very threshold, who think that eloquence has no need of precepts of this sort, but, content with their own nature and with the vulgar manner of school exercises, even laugh at our diligence, citing the example too of professors of great name, one of whom, as I suppose, when asked what aschema and a noema were, declared that he, for his part, did not know, but if it was to the point—

[2] pertineret esse in sua declamatione respondit. Alius percontanti Theodoreus an Apollodoreus esset, 'ego' inquit 'parpermularius'. Nec sane potuit urbanius ex confessione inscitiae suae elabi. Porro hi, quia et beneficio ingenii praestantes sunt habiti et multa etiam memoria digna exclamauerunt, plurimos habent similes neglegentiae suae, paucissimos naturae.

[2] he replied that, if it pertained to the point, it was present in his own declamation. Another, when asked whether he was a Theodorean or an Apollodorean, said, 'I,' quoth he, 'am a small-shield man.' Nor indeed could he have slipped away more urbanely by a confession of his ignorance. Moreover, these men, because by the benefit of their genius they have been held outstanding and have also uttered many things worthy of memory, have very many imitators of their negligence, very few of their nature.

[3] Igitur impetu dicere se et uiribus uti gloriantur: neque enim opus esse probatione aut dispositione in rebus fictis, sed, cuius rei gratia plenum sit auditorium, sententiis grandibus,

[3] Therefore they boast that they speak by impetus and employ strength: for there is no need of proof or disposition in fictitious matters, but, for the sake of which the auditorium is full, with grand sentences,

[4] quarum optima quaeque a periculo petatur. Quin etiam in cogitando nulla ratione adhibita aut tectum intuentes magnum aliquid quod ultro se offerat pluribus saepe diebus expectant, aut murmure incerto uelut classico instincti concitatissimum corporis motum non enuntiandis sed quaerendis

[4] the best of which are sought from peril. Indeed, even in cogitating with no method applied, they either, gazing at the ceiling, wait for many days for something great that will of its own accord offer itself, or, at an uncertain murmur, as if instigated by a clarion, they whip up the most impetuous movement of the body, not for enunciating but for seeking.

[5] uerbis accommodant. Nonnulli certa sibi initia priusquam sensum inuenerint destinant, quibus aliquid diserti subiungendum sit: eaque diu secum ipsi clareque meditati desperata conectendi facultate deserunt et ad alia deinceps atque inde alia non minus communia ac nota deuertunt.

[5] they accommodate to words. Some destine for themselves certain beginnings before they have found a sense, to which something eloquent is to be subjoined: and these, long and clearly meditated by themselves, the faculty of connecting despaired of, they abandon, and they turn aside to other things in sequence and from there to others no less common and well-known.

[6] Qui plurimum uidentur habere rationis non in causas tamen laborem suum sed in locos intendunt, atque in iis non corpori prospiciunt, sed abrupta quaedam, ut forte ad manum

[6] Those who seem to have the most reason, however, direct their labor not to the causes but to the loci, and in these they do not provide for the body, but certain abrupt things, just as happen to be at hand

[7] uenere, iaculantur. Vnde fit ut dissoluta et ex diuersis congesta oratio cohaerere non possit, similisque sit commentariis puerorum in quos ea quae aliis declamantibus laudata sunt regerunt. Magnas tamen sententias et res bonas (ita enim gloriari solent) elidunt: nam et barbari et serui, et, si hoc sat est, nulla est ratio dicendi.

[7] they have come, they hurl them. Whence it comes about that a discourse, dissolute and heaped together from disparate things, cannot cohere, and is like the notebooks of boys into which they copy those things which, when others are declaiming, have been praised. Yet they knock out great sententiae and good points (for so they are wont to boast): for both barbarians and slaves do this, and, if this is enough, there is no art of speaking.

XII. Quare ineruditi ingeniosiores vulgo habebantur.

12. Why the unlearned were commonly held to be more ingenious.

[1] Ne hoc quidem negauerim, sequi plerumque hanc opinionem, ut fortius dicere uideantur indocti, primum uitio male iudicantium, qui maiorem habere uim credunt ea quae non habent artem, ut effringere quam aperire, rumpere quam

[1] Nor would I deny this either, that for the most part this opinion follows: that the unlearned seem to speak more forcefully, primarily through the fault of those who judge ill, who believe that things which do not have art have greater force, as to break open rather than to open, to burst rather than

[2] soluere, trahere quam ducere putant robustius. Nam et gladiator qui armorum inscius in rixam ruit et luctator qui totius corporis nisu in id quod semel inuasit incumbit fortior ab his uocatur, cum interim et hic frequenter suis uiribus ipse prosternitur et illum uehementis impetus excipit aduersarii

[2] to loosen, to drag rather than to lead they think more robust. For even the gladiator who, unskilled in arms, rushes into a brawl, and the wrestler who, with the striving of his whole body, bears down upon that which he has once seized, is called stronger by them, while meanwhile this one is frequently overthrown by his own forces, and that one is caught by the vehement impetus of the adversary.

[3] mollis articulus. Sed sunt in hac parte quae imperitos etiam naturaliter fallant; nam et diuisio, cum plurimum ualeat in causis, speciem uirium minuit, et rudia politis

[3] a pliant joint. But there are in this sphere things which naturally deceive even the unskilled; for division, although it has very great power in causes, diminishes the appearance of strength, and rough things by polished ones

[4] maiora et sparsa compositis numerosiora creduntur. Est praeterea quaedam uirtutum uitiorumque uicinia, qua maledicus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effusus pro copioso accipitur. Maledicit autem ineruditus apertius et saepius uel cum periculo suscepti litigatoris, frequenter etiam suo.

[4] Greater and scattered things are believed more “numerous” than composed ones. Moreover, there is a certain vicinity of virtues and vices, whereby the maledicent is taken for the free(-spoken), the temerarious for the brave, the effusive for the copious. But the unlearned reviles more openly and more often, even with danger to the litigant he has undertaken, frequently also to his own.

[5] Adfert et ista res opinionem, quia libentissime homines audiunt ea quae dicere ipsi noluissent. Illud quoque alterum quod est in elocutione ipsa periculum minus uitat, conaturque perdite, unde euenit nonnumquam ut aliquid grande inueniat qui semper quaerit quod nimium est: uerum id et raro prouenit et cetera uitia non pensat.

[5] This too brings repute, because people most gladly listen to the things which they themselves would not have wished to say. There is also that second point, that in the elocution itself one shuns peril less, and attempts recklessly; whence it sometimes happens that he who always seeks what is excessive discovers something grand: but this both rarely proves out and does not counterbalance the other vices.

[6] Propter hoc quoque interdum uidentur indocti copiam habere maiorem, quod dicunt omnia, doctis est et electio et modus. His accedit quod a cura docendi quod intenderint recedunt: itaque illud quaestionum et argumentorum apud corrupta iudicia frigus euitant, nihilque aliud quam quod uel prauis uoluptatibus aures adsistentium permulceat

[6] For this reason too, at times the unlearned seem to have greater copiousness, because they say everything; for the learned there is both selection and measure. To this is added that, from the care of teaching, they withdraw from what they had intended: and so they avoid that chill of questions and arguments before corrupt judgments, and nothing other than what may caress the ears of the bystanders even with depraved pleasures

[7] quaerunt. Sententiae quoque ipsae, quas solas petunt, magis eminent cum omnia circa illas sordida et abiecta sunt, ut lumina non inter umbras, quem ad modum Cicero dicit, sed plane in tenebris clariora sunt. Itaque ingeniosi uocentur, ut libet, dum tamen constet contumeliose sic laudari disertum.

[7] they seek. The very sentences themselves, which alone they pursue, stand out more when all things around them are sordid and abject, so that lights, not among shadows, as Cicero says, but plainly in the darkness, are clearer. And so let them be called ingenious, as one pleases, provided, however, that it be agreed that the eloquent man is thus praised contumeliously.

[8] Nihilo minus confitendum est etiam detrahere doctrinam aliquid, ut limam rudibus et cotes hebetibus et uino uetustatem, sed uitia detrahit, atque eo solo minus est quod litterae perpolierunt quo melius.

[8] Nonetheless it must be confessed that doctrine also detracts something, as a file from the rude, and whetstones from the dull, and age from wine; but it removes vices, and it is only the less by just so much as letters have polished it—for the better.

[9] Verum hi pronuntiatione quoque famam dicendi fortius quaerunt; nam et clamant ubique et omnia leuata, ut ipsi uocant, manu emugiunt, multo discursu anhelitu, iactatione

[9] But these men, even by delivery, seek the fame of speaking more forcibly; for they both shout everywhere and wring everything out with the “raised” hand, as they themselves call it, with much running about, panting, and flaunting

[10] gestus, motu capitis furentes. Iam collidere manus, terrae pedem incutere, femur pectus frontem caedere, mire ad pullatum circulum facit: cum ille eruditus, ut in oratione multa summittere uariare disponere, ita etiam in pronuntiando suum cuique eorum quae dicet colori accommodare actum sciat, et, si quid sit perpetua obseruatione dignum, modestus

[10] in their gestures, raging with movement of the head. Now to collide the hands, to drive the foot into the earth, to beat the thigh, the chest, the forehead, wonderfully makes for a black-cloaked ring: whereas the erudite man, as in oration he knows how to lower many things, to vary, to dispose, so also in pronuntiation he knows how to accommodate the act to the color proper to each of the things he will say, and, if anything is worthy of perpetual observance, [he is] modest.

[11] et esse et uideri malit. At illi hanc uim appellant quae est potius uiolentia: cum interim non actores modo aliquos inuenias sed, quod est turpius, praeceptores etiam qui, breuem dicendi exercitationem consecuti, omissa ratione ut tulit impetus passim tumultuentur, eosque qui plus honoris litteris tribuerunt ineptos et ieiunos et tepidos et infirmos, ut quodque

[11] and he prefers both to be and to seem so. But those men call this “force,” which is rather violence: meanwhile you find not only some actors but, what is more shameful, even preceptors who, having attained a brief exercise of speaking, with reason omitted, as impulse has borne them, tumultuate everywhere, and they label those who have bestowed more honor upon letters inept and jejune and tepid and infirm, as each one

[12] uerbum contumeliosissimum occurrit, appellent. Verum illis quidem gratulemur sine labore, sine ratione, sine disciplina disertis: nos, quando et praecipiendi munus iam pridem deprecati sumus et in foro quoque dicendi, quia honestissimum finem putabamus desinere dum desideraremur, inquirendo scribendoque talia consolemur otium nostrum quae futura usui bonae mentis iuuenibus arbitramur, nobis certe sunt uoluptati.

[12] and, as whatever most contumelious word occurs, they call them by it. But let us indeed congratulate those who are eloquent without labor, without reason, without discipline: we, since we long ago pleaded off both the duty of giving precepts and also of speaking in the forum—because we thought it the most honorable end to cease while we were still desired—let us console our leisure by inquiring and by writing such things as we judge will be of use to young men of good mind; to us, assuredly, they are a pleasure.

XIII. Quis modus in arte.

13. What is the measure in the art.

[1] Nemo autem a me exigat id praeceptorum genus quod est a plerisque scriptoribus artium traditum, ut quasi quasdam leges inmutabili necessitate constrictas studiosis dicendi feram: utique prohoemium et id quale, proxima huic narratio, quae lex deinde narrandi, propositio post hanc uel, ut quibusdam placuit, excursio, tum certus ordo quaestionum, ceteraque quae, uelut si aliter facere fas non sit, quidam

[1] Let no one, however, demand from me that kind of precepts which has been handed down by most writers of the arts, that I should bear to students of speaking, as it were, certain laws bound by immutable necessity: namely, the prohoemium and of what sort it should be, next to this the narratio, then what rule of narrating, the propositio after this or, as it has pleased some, the excursio, then a fixed order of questions, and the rest, which, as if it were not lawful to do otherwise, certain persons

[2] tamquam iussi secuntur. Erat enim rhetorice res prorsus facilis ac parua si uno et breui praescripto contineretur: sed mutantur pleraque causis temporibus occasione necessitate. Atque ideo res in oratore praecipua consilium est, quia uarie

[2] they follow as if commanded. For rhetoric would be an entirely easy and small affair if it were contained within a single and brief prescription; but most things are changed by causes, times, occasion, necessity. And therefore the principal thing in an orator is counsel, because things vary

[3] et ad rerum momenta conuertitur. Quid si enim praecipias imperatori, quotiens aciem instruet derigat frontem, cornua utrimque promoueat, equites pro cornibus locet? Erit haec quidem rectissima fortasse ratio quotiens licebit, sed mutabitur natura loci, si mons occurret, si flumen obstabit, collimutabus

[3] and it is turned according to the moments of things. For what if you should prescribe to a commander that, whenever he arrays the battle line, he should straighten the front, advance the horns on both sides, place the horsemen before the horns? This indeed will perhaps be the most correct plan whenever it will be permitted, but the nature of the place will be changed, if a mountain runs up, if a river will obstruct, a hill will alter it.

[4] siluis asperitate alia prohibebitur. Mutabit hostium genus, mutabit praesentis condicio discriminis: nunc acie derecta, nunc cuneis, nunc auxiliis, nunc legione pugnabitur, nonnumquam terga etiam dedisse simulata fuga proderit.

[4] he will be hindered by forests, by some other asperity. The kind of enemies will change, the condition of the present crisis will change: now it will be fought with a drawn-up battle line, now with wedges, now with auxiliaries, now with a legion; sometimes even to have given one’s backs in a feigned flight will be advantageous.

[5] Ita prohoemium necessarium an superuacuum, breue an longius, ad iudicem omni sermone derecto an aliquando auerso per aliquam figuram dicendum sit, constricta an latius fusa narratio, continua an diuisa, recta an ordine permutato,

[5] Thus whether the proem be necessary or superfluous, brief or longer, whether one ought to speak to the judge with the whole discourse directed straight at him or sometimes turned aside through some figure, a narration constricted or more broadly diffused, continuous or divided, straight or with the order permuted,

[6] causae docebunt, itemque de quaestionum ordine, cum in eadem controuersia aliud alii parti prius quaeri frequenter expediat. Neque enim rogationibus plebisue scitis sancta sunt ista praecepta, sed hoc quidquid est utilitas excogitauit.

[6] the cases will instruct, and likewise concerning the order of the questions, since in the same controversy it is frequently expedient that for one party or the other one thing rather than another be asked first. For these precepts are not sanctioned by bills or by plebiscites, but utility, whatever it is, has devised this.

[7] Non negabo autem sic utile esse plerumque, alioqui nec scriberem. Verum si eadem illa nobis aliud suadebit utilitas,

[7] I will not deny, however, that thus it is useful for the most part; otherwise I would not even be writing. But if that same utility will advise us something else,

[8] hanc relictis magistrorum auctoritatibus sequemur. Equidem id maxime praecipiam ac 'repetens iterumque iterumque monebo': res duas in omni actu spectet orator, quid deceat, quid expediat. Expedit autem saepe mutare ex illo constituto traditoque ordine aliqua, et interim decet, ut in statuis

[8] abandoning the authorities of the teachers, we shall follow this. Indeed I will chiefly prescribe this and, 'repeating again and again I will warn': let the orator in every act look to two things—what is decorous, what is expedient. Now it is often expedient to change certain things from that constituted and handed‑down order, and at times it is seemly, as in statues

[9] atque picturis uidemus uariari habitus uultus status; nam recti quidem corporis uel minima gratia est: nempe enim aduersa sit facies et demissa bracchia et iuncti pedes et a summis ad ima rigens opus. Flexus ille et, ut sic dixerim, motus dat actum quendam et adfectum: ideo nec ad unum

[9] and in paintings we see the habits, visages, and stances varied; for a straight body has the very least grace: to wit, the face would be straight-on, the arms let down, the feet joined, and the work rigid from top to bottom. That flexion and, so to speak, motion gives a certain act and affect: therefore neither to one

[10] modum formatae manus et in uultu mille species; cursum habent quaedam et impetum, sedent alia uel incumbunt, nuda haec, illa uelata sunt, quaedam mixta ex utroque. Quid tam distortum et elaboratum quam est ille discobolos Myronis? Si quis tamen ut parum rectum improbet opus, nonne ab intellectu artis afuerit, in qua uel praecipue laudabilis

[10] the hands are formed in various modes and in the face a thousand appearances; some have a course and an impetus, others sit or lean, these are naked, those are veiled, some are mixed from both. What is so contorted and elaborated as that Discobolus of Myron? If, however, someone should disapprove the work as too little straight, would he not be far from an understanding of the art, in which he is even especially laudable

[11] est ipsa illa nouitas ac difficultas? Quam quidem gralaudatiam et delectationem adferunt figurae, quaeque in sensibus quaeque in uerbis sunt. Mutant enim aliquid a recto, atque hanc prae se uirtutem ferunt, quod a consuetudine uulgari

[11] is that very novelty and difficulty itself? How much indeed grace and delectation the figures bring, both those which are in the senses and those which are in words. For they alter something from the straight, and they carry this virtue before them, that they depart from vulgar consuetude

[12] recesserunt. Habet in pictura speciem tota facies: Apelles tamen imaginem Antigoni latere tantum altero ostendit, ut amissi oculi deformitas lateret. Quid? non in oratione operienda sunt quaedam, siue ostendi non debent siue exprimi

[12] they have receded. In painting the whole face has an appearance: yet Apelles showed the image of Antigonus only from one side, so that the deformity of the lost eye might lie hidden. What? are there not certain things in oratory that must be veiled, whether they ought not to be shown or to be expressed?

[13] pro dignitate non possunt? Vt fecit Timanthes, opinor, Cythnius in ea tabula qua Coloten Teium uicit. Nam cum in Iphigeniae immolatione pinxisset tristem Calchantem, tristiorem Vlixem, addidisset Menelao quem summum poterat ars efficere maerorem: consumptis adfectibus non reperiens quo digne modo patris uultum posset exprimere, uelauit eius caput et suo cuique animo dedit aestimandum.

[13] or cannot be expressed in proportion to their dignity? As Timanthes did, I suppose, the Cythnian, in that panel-painting by which he defeated Colotes the Teian. For when, at the immolation of Iphigenia, he had painted Calchas sad, Ulysses sadder, had added in Menelaus the utmost mourning which art could effect: with the affections consumed, not finding in what worthy manner he might express the father’s face, he veiled his head and gave it to each one’s own mind for appraisal.

[14] Nonne huic simile est illud Sallustianum: 'nam de Carthagine tacere satius puto quam parum dicere'? Propter quae mihi semper moris fuit quam minime alligare me ad praecepta quaekatholika uocitant, id est, ut dicamus quo modo possumus, uniuersalia uel perpetualia; raro enim reperitur hoc genus, ut non labefactari parte aliqua et subrui possit.

[14] Is not that Sallustian line similar to this: 'for about Carthage I think it better to be silent than to say too little'? On account of which it has always been my custom to bind myself as little as possible to the precepts which they callkatholika, that is, that we should say, in whatever way we can, universal or perpetual things; for this kind is rarely found, such that it cannot be made to totter in some part and be overthrown.

[15] Sed de his plenius suo quidque loco tractabimus: interim nolo se iuuenes satis instructos si quem ex iis qui breues plerumque circumferuntur artis libellum edidicerint et uelut decretis technicorum tutos putent. Multo labore, adsiduo studio, uaria exercitatione, plurimis experimentis, altissima

[15] But about these matters we shall treat each more fully in its own place: meanwhile I do not wish young men to think themselves sufficiently equipped if they have learned by heart some little book of the art from those brief ones that are for the most part circulated, and to deem themselves safe, as it were, by the decrees of the technical writers. With much labor, assiduous study, varied exercise, very many experiments, the most lofty

[16] prudentia, praesentissimo consilio constat ars dicendi. Sed adiuuatur his quoque, si tamen rectam uiam, non unam orbitam monstrent: qua declinare qui crediderit nefas, patiatur necesse est illam per funes ingredientium tarditatem. Itaque et stratum militari labore iter saepe deserimus compendio ducti, et si rectum limitem rupti torrentibus pontes inciderint circumire cogemur, et si ianua tenebitur incendio

[16] by prudence and by the most present counsel the art of speaking consists. But it is aided by these as well, provided they show a straight way, not a single rut: from which to deviate whoever shall deem it a sacrilege must needs endure that slowness of those who walk along ropes. And so too we often abandon the road paved by military labor, led by a shortcut; and if on the straight boundary-path the bridges broken by torrents have collapsed, we shall be compelled to go around; and if the doorway is held by a conflagration

[17] per parietem exibimus. Late fusum opus est et multiplex et prope cotidie nouum et de quo numquam dicta erunt omnia. Quae sint tamen tradita, quid ex his optimum, et si qua mutari adici detrahi melius uidebitur, dicere experiar.

[17] we shall go out through the wall. It is a work widely spread and multiplex and almost daily new, and about which never will all things be said. What things, nevertheless, have been tradited, what of these is best, and if anything shall seem better to be altered, added, or detracted, I shall attempt to say.

XIV. Divisio totius operis.

14. Division of the whole work.

[1] Rhetoricen in Latinum transferentes tum oratoriam, tum oratricem nominauerunt. Quos equidem non fraudauerim debita laude quod copiam Romani sermonis augere temptarint: sed non omnia nos ducentes ex Graeco secuntur, sicut ne illos quidem quotiens utique suis uerbis signare

[1] Translating Rhetoric into Latin, they have named it both oratorial and oratress. Whom indeed I would not deprive of due praise, because they have tried to augment the copiousness of the Roman speech; but they do not in all things follow us, we deriving from the Greek, just as neither do we them, whenever in any case to designate with our own words

[2] nostra uoluerunt. Et haec interpretatio non minus dura est quam illa Plauti 'essentia' et 'queentia', sed ne propria quidem; nam oratoria sic effertur ut elocutoria, oratrix ut elocutrix, illa autem de qua loquimur rhetorice talis est qualis eloquentia. Nec dubie apud Graecos quoque duplicem

[2] ... they wished by our own. And this interpretation is no less harsh than that of Plautus, “essentia” and “queentia,” but not even proper; for oratoria is rendered just as elocutoria, oratrix as elocutrix, but that which we are speaking about, rhetorice, is such as eloquence. Nor, doubtless, among the Greeks too a double...

[3] intellectum habet; namque uno modo fit adpositum ars rhetorica, ut nauis piratica, altero nomen rei, qualis est philosophia, amicitia. Nos ipsam nunc uolumus significare subphilostantiam, ut grammatice litteratura est, non litteratrix quem ad modum oratrix, nec litteratoria quem ad modum oratoria:

[3] it has a meaning; for in one way an apposition is made, “rhetorical art,” as “piratical ship,” in another, the name of the thing, such as philosophy, friendship. We now wish to signify the substance itself, as grammatice is litteratura, not “litteratrix” in the manner of “oratrix,” nor “litteratoria” in the manner of “oratoria”:

[4] uerum id in rhetorice non fit. Ne pugnemus igitur, cum praesertim plurimis alioqui Graecis sit utendum; nam certe et philosophos et musicos et geometras dicam nec uim adferam nominibus his indecora in Latinum sermonem mutatione: denique cum M. Tullius etiam ipsis librorum quos hac de re primum scripserat titulis Graeco nomine utatur, profecto non est uerendum ne temere uideamur oratori maximo de nomine artis suae credidisse.

[4] but that is not done in rhetoric. Let us not, then, contend, since especially we must in any case use very many Greek terms; for surely I will say both philosophers and musicians and geometers, nor will I bring force upon these names by an indecorous change into the Latin speech: finally, since M. Tullius even in the very titles of the books which he first had written on this matter uses the Greek name, assuredly there is no need to fear that we may seem rashly to have trusted the greatest orator concerning the name of his art.

[5] Igitur rhetorice (iam enim sine metu cauillationis utemur hac appellatione) sic, ut opinor, optime diuidetur ut de arte, de artifice, de opere dicamus. Ars erit quae disciplina percipi debet: ea est bene dicendi scientia. Artifex est qui percepit hanc artem: id est orator, cuius est summa bene dicere.

[5] Therefore rhetoric (for now we will use this appellation without fear of cavillation) will, as I suppose, be best divided so that we speak about the art, the artificer, and the work. The art will be the discipline that ought to be apprehended: it is the science of speaking well. The artificer is he who has apprehended this art: that is, the orator, whose supreme task is to speak well.

Opus, quod efficitur ab artifice: id est bona oratio. Haec omnia rursus diducuntur in species: sed illa sequentia suo loco, nunc quae de prima parte tractanda sunt ordiar.

The work, which is effected by the artificer: that is, a good oration. All these are in turn separated into species: but those things that follow in their proper place—now I shall begin what must be treated concerning the first part.

XV. Quid sit rhetorice et quis eius finis.

15. What rhetoric is and what its end is.

[1] Ante omnia, quid sit rhetorice. Quae finitur quidem uarie, sed quaestionem habet duplicem: aut enim de qualitate ipsius rei aut de comprensione uerborum dissensio est. Prima atque praecipua opinionum circa hoc differentia, quod alii malos quoque uiros posse oratores dici putant, alii, quorum nos sententiae accedimus, nomen hoc artemque de

[1] Before all things, what rhetoric is. Which is defined indeed variously, but it has a twofold question: for either there is dissension about the quality of the thing itself, or about the comprehension of the words. The first and principal difference of opinions about this is that some think that even bad men can be called orators, others, to whose opinion we accede, the name and the art of

[2] qua loquimur bonis demum tribui uolunt. Eorum autem qui dicendi facultatem a maiore ac magis expetenda uitae laude secernunt, quidam rhetoricen uim tantum, quidam scientiam sed non uirtutem, quidam usum, quidam artem quidem sed a scientia et uirtute diiunctam, quidam etiam prauitatem

[2] that by which we speak they wish to be attributed to good men alone. But of those who separate the faculty of speaking from the greater and more to-be-sought praise of life, some make rhetoric only a force, some a science but not a virtue, some a use, some indeed an art but disjoined from science and virtue, some even a pravity.

[3] quandam artis, id estkakotekhnian, nominauerunt. Hi fere aut in persuadendo aut in dicendo apte ad persuadendum positum orandi munus sunt arbitrati: id enim fieri potest ab eo quoque qui uir bonus non sit. Est igitur frequentissimus finis: 'rhetoricen esse uim persuadendi'. Quod ego uim appello, plerique potestatem, nonnulli facultatem uocant: quae res ne quid adferat ambiguitatis, uim dico

[3] some even named a certain pravity of art, that iskakotekhnian. These men for the most part judged the office of speaking to be placed either in persuading, or in speaking aptly for persuading: for that can be done by one who is not a good man. Therefore the most frequent definition is: 'rhetoric is the force of persuading.' What I call force, most call power, some call capacity: and, lest this matter bring any ambiguity, I say force

[4]dynamin. Haec opinio originem ab Isocrate, si tamen re uera ars quae circumfertur eius est, duxit. Qui cum longe sit a uoluntate infamantium oratoris officia, finem artis temere comprendit dicens esse rhetoricen persuadendi opificem, id est peithois demiourgon: neque enim mihi permiserim eadem uti declinatione qua Ennius M. Cethegum 'suadae

[4]dynamin. This opinion has derived its origin from Isocrates, if indeed in truth the art which is circulated is his. He, although he is far from the intention of those defaming the duties of the orator, rashly defined the end of the art, saying that rhetoric is a craftsman of persuading, that is, peithois demiourgon: nor indeed would I allow myself to use the same declension as Ennius for M. Cethegus, 'suadae

[5] medullam' uocat. Apud Platonem quoque Gorgias in libro qui nomine eius inscriptus est idem fere dicit, sed hanc Plato illius opinionem uult accipi, non suam. Cicero pluribus locis scripsit officium oratoris esse dicere adposite ad persuadendum,

[5] he calls him 'the marrow'. In Plato too, Gorgias, in the book which is inscribed with his name, says nearly the same; but Plato wants this to be received as that man’s opinion, not his own. Cicero in several places wrote that the office of the orator is to speak appositely to persuade,

[6] in rhetoricis etiam, quos sine dubio ipse non probat, finem facit persuadere. Verum et pecunia persuadet et gratia et auctoritas dicentis et dignitas, postremo aspectus etiam ipse sine uoce, quo uel recordatio meritorum cuiusque uel facies aliqua miserabilis uel formae pulchritudo sententiam

[6] in the Rhetoricians also, whom without a doubt he himself does not approve, he makes the end to be to persuade. But both money persuades and favor and the authority of the speaker and dignity, finally even the very aspect itself without a voice, by which either the recollection of each one’s merits or some miserable countenance or the pulchritude of form influences the judgment

[7] dictat. Nam et Manium Aquilium defendens Antonius, cum scissa ueste cicatrices quas is pro patria pectore aduerso suscepisset ostendit, non orationis habuit fiduciam, sed oculis populi Romani uim attulit: quem illo ipso aspectu maxime motum in hoc, ut absolueret reum, creditum est.

[7] dictates. For Antony too, while defending Manius Aquilius, when, with his garment torn, he showed the scars which he had received for the fatherland with breast to the foe, did not have confidence in oration, but brought force to bear upon the eyes of the Roman People: who by that very sight was believed to have been moved most to this, that he acquit the defendant.

[8] Seruium quidem Galbam miseratione sola, qua non suos modo liberos paruolos in contione produxerat, sed Galli etiam Sulpici filium suis ipse manibus circumtulerat, elapsum esse cum aliorum monumentis, tum Catonis oratione

[8] Servius Galba indeed is believed to have escaped by commiseration alone—by which he had not only brought forward his own wee children in the assembly, but had even himself carried around, in his own hands, the son of Gallus Sulpicius—both by the monuments of others and by Cato’s oration.

[9] testatum est. Et Phrynen non Hyperidis actione quamquam admirabili, sed conspectu corporis, quod illa speciosissimum alioqui diducta nudauerat tunica, putant periculo liberatam. Quae si omnia persuadent, non est hic de quo locuti

[9] it has been attested. And they think that Phryne was liberated from peril not by Hyperides’ action, although admirable, but by the sight of her body, which, otherwise most beautiful, she had laid bare by drawing apart her tunic. If all these things persuade, this is not the one about whom we have spoken.

[10] sumus idoneus finis. Ideoque diligentiores sunt uisi sibi qui, cum de rhetorice idem sentirent, existimarunt eam uim dicendo persuadendi. Quem finem Gorgias in eodem de quo supra diximus libro uelut coactus a Socrate facit; a quo non dissentit Theodectes, siue ipsius id opus est quod de rhetorice nomine eius inscribitur, siue, ut creditum est, Aristorhetelis: in quo est finem esse rhetorices: 'ducere homines

[10] ... we have spoken, a suitable end. And therefore those seemed to themselves more diligent who, while they felt the same about rhetoric, judged it to be a force of persuading by speaking. Which end Gorgias, in the same book about which we said above, as if compelled by Socrates, posits; from whom Theodectes does not dissent, whether that work is his which on rhetoric is inscribed under his name, or, as is believed, Aristotle’s: in which it is [stated] that the end of rhetoric is: 'to lead men

[11] dicendo in id quod actor uelit'. Sed ne hoc quidem satis est comprehensum: persuadent enim dicendo uel ducunt in id quod uolunt alii quoque, ut meretrices adulatores corruptores. At contra non persuadet semper orator, ut interim non sit proprius hic finis eius, interim sit communis cum iis

[11] by speaking into that which the advocate may wish'. But not even this has been sufficiently defined: for others also persuade by speaking, or lead into what they want—such as courtesans, adulators, corruptors. But conversely the orator does not always persuade, so that for the time being this is not his proper end; for the time being it is common with those

[12] qui ab oratore procul absunt. Atqui non multum ab hoc fine abest Apollodorus dicens iudicialis orationis primum et super omnia esse persuadere iudici et sententiam eius ducere in id quod uelit. Nam et ipse oratorem fortunae subicit, ut, si non

[12] who are far from the orator. And yet Apollodorus is not far from this end, saying that the first thing in judicial oration, and above all, is to persuade the judge and to lead his sentence/judgment into that which he wills. For he too subjects the orator to Fortune, so that, if not

[13] persuaserit, nomen suum retinere non possit. Quidam recesserunt ab euentu, sicut Aristoteles dicit: 'rhetorice est uis inueniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia'. Qui finis et illud uitium de quo supra diximus habet, et insuper quod nihil nisi inuentionem complectitur, quae sine elocutione non est

[13] if he has not persuaded, he cannot retain his name. Some have withdrawn from the outcome, as Aristotle says: 'rhetoric is the force of discovering all the persuadable things in speech.' This end both has that defect which we mentioned above, and moreover that it embraces nothing except invention, which is not without elocution.

[14] oratio. Hermagorae, qui finem eius esse ait persuasibiliter dicere, et aliis qui eandem sententiam, non isdem tantum uerbis explicant ac finem esse demonstrant dicere quae oporteat omnia ad persuadendum, satis responsum est cum

[14] oration. To Hermagoras, who says that its end is to speak persuasively, and to others who unfold the same opinion—not in the same words only—and demonstrate that the end is to say whatever must be said, all for persuading, a sufficient answer has been given since

[15] persuadere non tantum oratoris esse conuicimus. Addita sunt his alia uarie. Quidam enim circa res omnes, quidam circa ciuiles modo uersari rhetoricen putauerunt: quorum uerius utrum sit, in eo loco qui huius quaestionis proprius est dicam.

[15] we have proved that persuading is not only the orator’s business. Other points have been added to these in various ways. For some have thought that rhetoric is engaged about all things, others that it is concerned only with civil matters: which of these is truer, I will say in the place that is proper to this question.

[16] Omnia subiecisse oratori uidetur Aristoteles cum dixit uim esse uidendi quid in quaque re possit esse persuasibile, et Iatrocles, qui non quidem adicit 'in quaque re', sed nihil excipiendo idem ostendit: uim enim uocat inueniendi quod sit in oratione persuasibile. Qui fines et ipsi solam complectuntur inuentionem. Quod uitium fugiens Eudorus uim putat inueniendi et eloquendi cum ornatu credibilia in omni

[16] Aristotle seems to have subjected all things to the orator when he said the power is that of seeing what in each matter may be persuasive, and Iatrocles, who indeed does not add 'in each matter,' but by excepting nothing shows the same: for he calls it the power of discovering what in oration is persuasive. Which definitions likewise embrace invention alone. Avoiding which fault, Eudorus thinks the power to be of finding and of speaking with adornment credible things in every

[17] oratione. Sed cum eodem modo credibilia quo persuasibilia etiam non orator inueniat, adiciendo 'in omni oratione' magis quam superiores concedit scelera quoque suadentibus pulcherrimae

[17] oration. But since in the same way credible things as persuasible things even a non-orator finds, by adding 'in every oration' he concedes more than his predecessors, that crimes too are most beautiful to those persuading.

[18] rei nomen. Gorgias apud Platonem suadendi se artificem in iudiciis et aliis coetibus esse ait, de iustis quoque et iniustis tractare: cui Socrates persuadendi, non docendi

[18] the name of the matter. Gorgias in Plato says that he is an artificer of persuading in courts and other assemblies, and that he also treats of the just and the unjust: to whom Socrates assigns persuading, not teaching

[19] concedit facultatem. Qui uero non omnia subiciebant oratori, sollicitius ac uerbosius, ut necesse erat, adhibuerunt discrimina, quorum fuit Ariston, Critolai Peripatetici discipulus, cuius hic finis est: 'scientia uidendi et agendi in quaediscistionibus

[19] he concedes the faculty. But those who did not subject everything to the orator, more solicitously and more verbosely, as was necessary, applied distinctions, among whom was Ariston, a disciple of Critolaus the Peripatetic, whose definition is this: 'the science of seeing and doing in inquiries'

[20] ciuilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis'. Hic scientiam, quia Peripateticus est, non ut Stoici uirtutis loco ponit: popularem autem comprendendo persuasionem etiam contumeliosus est aduersus artem orandi, quam nihil putat doctis persuasuram. Illud de omnibus qui circa ciuiles demum quaestiones oratorem iudicant uersari dictum sit, excludi ab iis plurima oratoris officia, illam certe laudatiuam

[20] 'the science of seeing and doing in civil inquiries through oration of popular persuasion.' He, since he is a Peripatetic, does not, as the Stoics, place science in the place of virtue; moreover, by comprehending popular persuasion he is even contumelious toward the art of oratory, which he thinks will persuade the learned not at all. Let this be said about all who judge that the orator is occupied only around civil questions: that by them very many offices of the orator are excluded, certainly that laudatory one

[21] totam, quae est rhetorices pars tertia. Cautius Theodorus Gadareus, ut iam ad eos ueniamus qui artem quidem esse eam, sed non uirtutem putauerunt. Ita enim dicit, ut ipsis eorum uerbis utar qui haec ex Graeco transtulerunt: 'ars inuentrix et iudicatrix et enuntiatrix, decente ornatu secundum mensionem, eius quod in quoque potest sumi persuasisecunbile,

[21] the whole of it, which is the third part of rhetoric. More cautiously Theodorus of Gadara, so that we may now come to those who thought it indeed to be an art, but not a virtue. For thus he says, to use the very words of those who translated these things from Greek: 'an art inventive and judicative and enunciative, with seemly ornament according to measure, of that which in each case can be taken as conducive-to-persuasion,'

[22] in materia ciuili'. Itemque Cornelius Celsus, qui finem rhetorices ait 'dicere persuasibiliter in dubia ciuili materia'. Quibus sunt non dissimiles qui ab aliis traduntur, qualis est ille: 'uis uidendi et eloquendi de rebus ciuilibus subiectis sibi cum quadam persuasione et quodam corporis habitu et

[22] in civil matter'. Likewise Cornelius Celsus, who says the end of rhetoric is 'to speak persuasively in doubtful civil matter'. Not unlike these are those who are handed down by others, such as this one: 'a force of seeing and of speaking about civil things subjected to itself, with a certain persuasion and a certain bodily habit and

[23] eorum quae dicet pronuntiatione'. Mille alia, sed aut eadem aut ex isdem composita, quibus item cum de materia rhetorices dicendum erit respondebimus. Quidam eam neque uim neque scientiam neque artem putauerunt, sed Critolaus usum dicendi (nam hoctribe significat), Athenaeus fallendi

[23] 'by the delivery of the things which he will say.' A thousand others, but either the same or compounded from the same, to which likewise we shall reply when there will have to be speech about the material of rhetoric. Certain persons thought it neither a force nor a science nor an art, but Critolaus [defined it as] the practice of speaking (for this is whattribe signifies), Athenaeus [defined it as] the practice of deceiving.

[24] artem.

[24] the art.

Plerique autem, dum pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contenti neque hoc totum neque alia eius uolumina euoluunt, in maximum errorem inciderunt, creduntque eum in hac esse opinione, ut rhetoricen non artem sed 'peritiam quandam gratiae ac uoluptatis'

Most, however, while content to read a few things from Plato’s Gorgias, ineptly excerpted by earlier writers, and while they do not peruse this whole work nor his other volumes, have fallen into a very great error, and they believe him to be of this opinion, that rhetoric is not an art but 'a certain expertise of grace and pleasure'

[25] existimet, et alio loco 'ciuilitatis particulae simulacrum et quartam partem adulationis', quod duas partes ciuilitatis corpori adsignet, medicinam et quam interpretantur exercitatricem, duas animo, legalem atque iustitiam, adulationem autem medicinae uocet cocorum artificium, exercitaadulatricis mangonum, qui colorem fuco et uerum robur inani sagina mentiantur, legalis cauillatricem, iustitiae rhetoricen.

[25] he thinks, and elsewhere “a simulacrum of a particle of civilitas and a fourth part of adulation,” because he assigns two parts of civilitas to the body—medicine and what they interpret as the trainer (gymnastic)—two to the soul—the legal (art) and justice; and he calls the adulation answering to medicine the craft of cooks, that of the trainer the craft of slave-dealers, who counterfeit complexion with rouge and true vigor with empty stuffing, that of the legal (art) the caviller, and that of justice, rhetoric.

[26] Quae omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro dictaque a Socrate, cuius persona uidetur Plato significare quid sentiat: sed alii sunt eius sermones ad coarguendos qui contra disputant compositi, quoselegktikous uocant, alii ad praecipiendum,

[26] All which things indeed are written in this book and spoken by Socrates, in whose person Plato seems to signify what he thinks: but some of his discourses are composed for refuting those who argue against, which they callelegktikous, others for giving precepts,

[27] quidogmatikoi appellantur. Socrates autem seu Plato eam quidem quae tum exercebatur rhetoricen talem putat (nam et dicit his uerbis touton ton tropon, on hymeis politeyesthe), ueram autem et honestam intellegit; itaque disputatio illa contra Gorgian ita cluditur: oukoun anagke ton rhetotikon dikaion einai, ton de

[27] who are called thedogmatics. Socrates, however, or Plato, thinks that the rhetoric which was then being practiced is of such a sort (for he even says in these words, in the manner in which you conduct your public life), but he understands the true and honorable [rhetoric]; and so that disputation against Gorgias is closed thus: is it not then necessary that the practitioner of rhetoric be just, and the

[28]dikaion boulesthai dikaia pratiein. Ad quod ille quidem conticescit, sed sermonem suscipit Polus iuuenili calore inconsideratior, contra quem illa de simulacro et adulatione dicuntur. Tum Callicles adhuc concitatior, qui tamen ad hanc perducitur clausulam: ton mellonta orthos rhetorikon esethai, dikaion ara dei einai kai epistemona ton dikaion, ut appareat Platoni non rhetoricen uideri malum,

[28]that a just man should wish to do just things. At which he indeed falls silent, but Polus, more inconsiderate with juvenile heat, takes up the conversation, against whom those things about the simulacrum and adulation are said. Then Callicles, yet more agitated, who nevertheless is brought to this closing: that the one who is going to be a rhetor rightly must therefore be just and a knower of the just, so that it may appear to Plato that rhetoric does not seem an evil,

[29] sed eam ueram nisi iusto ac bono non contingere. Adhuc autem in Phaedro manifestius facit hanc artem consummari citra iustitiae quoque scientiam non posse: cui opinioni nos quoque accedimus. An aliter defensionem Socratis et eorum qui pro patria ceciderant laudem scripsisset? Quae certe

[29] but that the true form does not befall any save the just and the good. Moreover, in the Phaedrus he makes more plainly that this art cannot be consummated without knowledge of justice as well: to which opinion we also accede. Would he otherwise have written the defense of Socrates and the praise of those who had fallen for their fatherland? Which certainly

[30] sunt oratoris opera. Sed in illud hominum genus quod facilitate dicendi male utebatur inuectus est. Nam et Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem quam ei Lysias reo composuerat, et tum maxime scribere litigatoribus quae illi pro se ipsi dicerent erat moris, atque ita iuri quo non licebat pro

[30] are the works of the orator. But he inveighed against that class of men who were misusing facility of speaking. For Socrates too deemed dishonorable for himself the speech which Lysias had composed for him as a defendant, and just then it was especially the custom to write for litigants what they themselves would say on their own behalf, and thus to the law under which it was not permitted for

[31] altero agere fraus adhibebatur. Doctores quoque eius artis parum idonei Platoni uidebantur, qui rhetoricen a iustitia separarent et ueris credibilia praeferrent; nam id quoque

[31] to the law by which it was not permitted to plead on behalf of another, fraud was employed. The teachers also of that art seemed to Plato scarcely adequate, who would separate rhetoric from justice and prefer the credible to the true; for that also

[32] dicit in Phaedro. Consensisse autem illis superioribus uideri potest etiam Cornelius Celsus, cuius haec uerba sunt: 'orator simile tantum ueri petit', deinde paulo post: 'non enim bona conscientia sed uictoria litigantis est praemium': quae si uera essent, pessimorum hominum foret haec tam perniciosa nocentissimis moribus dare instrumenta et nequitiam praeceptis adiuuare. Sed illi rationem opinionis suae uiderint.

[32] he says in the Phaedrus. And it can seem that Cornelius Celsus also agreed with those aforementioned, whose words are these: 'the orator seeks only a likeness of the truth,' and then a little later: 'for the prize is not a good conscience, but the victory of the litigant.' Which things, if they were true, it would belong to the worst of men to give such pernicious instruments to the most harmful morals and to aid wickedness with precepts. But let them see to the rationale of their opinion.

[33] Nos autem ingressi formare perfectum oratorem, quem in primis esse uirum bonum uolumus, ad eos qui de hoc opere melius sentiunt reuertamur. Rhetoricen autem quidam eandem ciuilitatem esse iudicauerunt, Cicero scientiae ciuilis partem uocat (ciuilis autem scientia idem quod sapientia est), quidam eandem philosophiam, quorum est Isocrates.

[33] We, however, having entered upon the task of forming the perfect orator—whom above all we wish to be a good man—let us return to those who think better concerning this work. And some have judged rhetoric to be the same as civility; Cicero calls it a part of civil science (and civil science is the same as wisdom); some the same as philosophy, among whom is Isocrates.

[34] Huic eius substantiae maxime conueniet finitio rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam. Nam et orationis omnes uirtutes semel complectitur et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus. Idem ualet Chrysippi finis

[34] A definition will most suit this its substance: that rhetoric is the science of speaking well. For it both embraces at once all the virtues of speech and forthwith also the morals of the orator, since he cannot speak well unless he is good. The same holds for the end of Chrysippus.

[35] ille ductus a Cleanthe, 'scientia recte dicendi'. Sunt plures eiusdem, sed ad alias quaestiones magis pertinent. Idem sentiret finis hoc modo comprensus: 'persuadere quod oporteat',

[35] that one, derived from Cleanthes: 'the science of speaking rightly'. There are several others of the same kind, but they pertain rather to other questions. The same would be meant by the end, compressed in this way: 'to persuade what is proper',

[36] nisi quod artem ad exitum alligat. Bene Areus: 'dicere secundum uirtutem orationis'. Excludunt a rhetorice malos et illi qui scientiam ciuilium officiorum eam putauerunt, si scientiam uirtutem iudicant, sed anguste intra ciuiles quaestiones coercent. Albucius non obscurus professor atque aucquaestor scientiam bene dicendi esse consentit, sed exceptionibus peccat adiciendo 'circa ciuiles quaestiones et credibiliter':

[36] except that it binds the art to the outcome. Well said by Areus: 'to speak in accordance with the virtue of oration.' They also exclude the wicked from rhetoric, those who have thought it the science of civil offices, if they judge science to be virtue; but they confine it narrowly within civil questions. Albucius, a not obscure professor and quaestor, agrees that it is the science of speaking well, but he errs by exceptions in adding 'around civil questions and credibly':

[37] quarum iam utrique responsum est. Probabilis et illi uoluntatis qui recte sentire et dicere rhetorices putauerunt.

[37] of which now to both a reply has been made. Plausible too is that intention of those who have thought it to belong to rhetoric to think rightly and to speak.

Hi sunt fere fines maxime inlustres et de quibus praecipue disputatur. Nam omnis quidem persequi neque attinet neque possum, cum prauum quoddam, ut arbitror, studium circa scriptores artium extiterit nihil isdem uerbis quae prior aliquis occupasset finiendi: quae ambitio procul aberit a me.

These are in general the most illustrious boundaries, and those about which there is chiefly disputation. For to pursue all of them is neither pertinent nor can I, since a certain perverse zeal, as I judge, has arisen among the writers of the arts: of finishing nothing with the same words which some prior person had occupied; which ambition will be far from me.

[38] Dicam enim non utique quae inuenero, sed quae placebunt, sicut hoc: rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam, cum, reperto quod est optimum, qui quaerit aliud peius uelit. His adprobatis simul manifestum est illud quoque, quem finem uel quid summum et ultimum habeat rhetorice, quodtelos dicitur, ad quod omnis ars tendit: nam si est ipsa bene dicendi scientia, finis eius et summum est bene dicere.

[38] For I will say not necessarily what I have discovered, but what will be pleasing, as this: that rhetoric is the science of speaking well; since, once that which is best has been found, whoever seeks another wills something worse. These points being approved, at the same time that, too, is manifest—what end, or what the highest and ultimate, rhetoric has, which is calledtelos, toward which every art tends: for if it is itself the science of speaking well, its end and its highest is to speak well.

XVI. An utilis.

16. Whether it is useful.

[1] Sequitur quaestio an utilis rhetorice. Nam quidam uehementer in eam inuehi solent, et, quod sit indignissimum,

[1] There follows the question whether rhetoric is useful. For certain men are wont to inveigh vehemently against it, and—what is most unworthy—

[2] in accusationem orationis utuntur orandi uiribus: eloquentiam esse quae poenis eripiat scelestos, cuius fraude damneneloquentur interim boni, consilia ducantur in peius, nec seditiones modo turbaeque populares sed bella etiam inexpiabilia excitentur, cuius denique tum maximus sit usus cum pro falsis

[2] they use the forces of pleading in an accusation against oration: that there is an eloquence which snatches the wicked from penalties, by whose fraud the good meanwhile are condemned, counsels are conducted into a worse condition, and not only seditions and popular crowds but even inexpiable wars are stirred up, and finally that its greatest use is then when it is on behalf of falsehoods

[3] contra ueritatem ualet. Nam et Socrati obiciunt comici docere eum quo modo peiorem causam meliorem faciat, et

[3] it prevails against truth. For the comedians also object to Socrates that he teaches how to make the worse cause better, and

[4] contra Tisian et Gorgian similia dicit polliceri Plato. Et his adiciunt exempla Graecorum Romanorumque, et enumerant qui perniciosa non singulis tantum sed rebus etiam publicis usi eloquentia turbauerint ciuitatium status uel euerterint, eoque et Lacedaemoniorum ciuitate expulsam et Athenis quoque, ubi actor mouere adfectus uetabatur, uelut recisam

[4] likewise, against Tisias and Gorgias Plato says that similar things are being promised. And to these they add examples of Greeks and Romans, and they enumerate those who, having used eloquence for pernicious ends not only against individuals but even against public affairs, have disturbed the constitutions of commonwealths or even overturned them; and thus eloquence was expelled from the city of the Lacedaemonians and at Athens as well, where the actor was forbidden to move the affections, as it were cut off.

[5] orandi potestatem. Quo quidem modo nec duces erunt utiles nec magistratus nec medicina nec denique ipsa sapientia: nam et dux Flaminius et Gracchi Saturnini Glauciae magistratus, et in medicis uenena, et in iis qui philosophorum nomine male utuntur grauissima nonnumquam flagitia deprehensa

[5] the power of oratory. In this very way neither will leaders be useful, nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor, finally, sapience itself: for both a leader, Flaminius, and the magistracies of the Gracchi, Saturninus, and Glaucia, and, among physicians, poisons, and among those who misuse the name of philosophers, most grave flagitious crimes have sometimes been detected.

[6] sunt. Cibos aspernemur: attulerunt saepe ualetudedinis causas; numquam tecta subeamus: super habitantes aliquando procumbunt; non fabricetur militi gladius: potest uti eodem ferro latro. Quis nescit ignes aquas, sine quibus nulla sit uita, et, ne terrenis inmorer, solem lunamque praecipua siderum aliquando et nocere?

[6] they have been. Let us spurn foods: they have often brought causes of ill-health; let us never go under roofs: the upper parts sometimes collapse upon the inhabitants; let no sword be forged for the soldier: a robber can use the same iron. Who does not know that fires and waters, without which there is no life, and—not to linger on terrene things—the sun and the moon, the principal of the stars, sometimes also do harm?

[7] Num igitur negabitur deformem Pyrrhi pacem Caecus ille Appius dicendi uiribus diremisse? Aut non diuina M. Tulli eloquentia et contra leges agrarias popularis fuit et Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes, qui maximus

[7] Will it then be denied that that blind Appius dissolved the dishonorable peace with Pyrrhus by the powers of speaking? Or did not the divine eloquence of Marcus Tullius both prove “popular” even against the agrarian laws and shatter Catiline’s audacity and obtain supplications (public thanksgivings), he who was the greatest

[8] honor uictoribus bello ducibus datur, in toga meruit? Non perterritos militum animos frequenter a metu reuocat oratio et tot pugnandi pericula ineuntibus laudem uita potiorem esse persuadet? Neque uero me Lacedaemonii atque Athenienses magis mouerint quam populus Romanus, apud quem

[8] the greatest honor, which is given to leaders victorious in war, did he earn in the toga? Does not oratory frequently call back the terror‑stricken minds of the soldiers from fear and persuade those undertaking so many dangers of fighting that praise is preferable to life? Nor indeed will the Lacedaemonians and Athenians move me more than the Roman people, among whom

[9] summa semper oratoribus dignitas fuit. Equidem nec urbium conditores reor aliter effecturos fuisse ut uaga illa multitudo coiret in populos nisi docta uoce commota, nec legum repertores sine summa ui orandi consecutos ut se ipsi homines

[9] The highest dignity has always been for orators. Indeed, I do not think that the founders of cities would have otherwise brought it about that that wandering multitude came together into peoples, unless stirred by a learned voice, nor that the discoverers of laws, without the highest force of orating, achieved that men themselves

[10] ad seruitutem iuris adstringerent. Quin ipsa uitae praecepta, etiam si natura sunt honesta, plus tamen ad formandas mentes ualent quotiens pulchritudinem rerum claritas orationis inluminat. Quare, etiam si in utramque partem ualent arma facundiae, non est tamen aecum id haberi malum quo bene uti licet.

[10] to bind themselves to the servitude of law. Nay, the very precepts of life, even if by nature they are honorable, nevertheless prevail more for shaping minds whenever the clarity of oration illuminates the beauty of things. Wherefore, even if the arms of eloquence avail on either side, yet it is not equitable to hold as an evil that which it is permitted to use well.

[11] Verum haec apud eos forsitan quaerantur qui summam rhetorices ad persuadendi uim rettulerunt. Si uero est bene dicendi scientia, quem nos finem sequimur, ut sit orator in

[11] But perhaps these things are inquired among those who have referred the sum of rhetoric to the power of persuading. If, however, it is the science of speaking well, which end we pursue, that there be an orator in

[12] primis uir bonus, utilem certe esse eam confitendum est. Et hercule deus ille princeps, parens rerum fabricatorque mundi, nullo magis hominem separauit a ceteris, quae quidem

[12] first and foremost, a good man, it must certainly be confessed that this is useful. And, by Hercules, that god the prince, the parent of things and fabricator of the world, by nothing has he more separated the human being from the rest, which indeed

[13] mortalia essent, animalibus quam dicendi facultate. Nam corpora quidem magnitudine uiribus firmitate patientia uelocitate praestantiora in illis mutis uidemus, eadem minus egere adquisitae extrinsecus opis; nam et ingredi citius et

[13] than by the faculty of speaking did he separate man from the other animals, which indeed were mortal. For as to bodies, we see among those mute creatures that they are more outstanding in magnitude, in strengths, in firmness, in endurance, in speed, and that these same need less of aid acquired from without; for both to go more swiftly and

[14] pasci et tranare aquas citra docentem natura ipsa sciunt, et pleraque contra frigus ex suo corpore uestiuntur et arma iis ingenita quaedam et ex obuio fere uictus, circa quae omnia multus hominibus labor est. Rationem igitur nobis praecipuam dedit eiusque nos socios esse cum dis inmortalibus

[14] they know by nature itself to feed and to swim across waters without a teacher, and for the most part they are clothed against cold from their own body, and certain weapons are inborn to them, and their sustenance is for the most part from what lies to hand, around all of which there is much labor for humans. Therefore he gave to us reason as preeminent, and made us its partners together with the immortal gods.

[15] uoluit. Sed ipsa ratio neque tam nos iuuaret neque tam esset in nobis manifesta nisi quae concepissemus mente promere etiam loquendo possemus: quod magis deesse ceteris animalibus quam intellectum et cogitationem quandam uideanimus.

[15] he willed. But reason itself would neither aid us so much nor be so manifest in us, unless we were able to bring forth by speaking also the things that we had conceived in mind: this we seem to see is more lacking to the other animals than intellect and a certain cogitation.

[16] Nam et mollire cubilia et nidos texere et educare fetus et excludere, quin etiam reponere in hiemem alimenta, opera quaedam nobis inimitabilia, qualia sunt cerarum ac mellis, efficere nonnullius fortasse rationis est; sed, quia carent sermone quae id faciunt, muta atque inrationalia uocantur.

[16] For indeed to soften lairs and to weave nests and to rear the young and to hatch them, nay even to store away food for winter—to effect certain works inimitable by us, such as those of wax and of honey—is perhaps of some reason; but, because those that do this lack speech, they are called mute and irrational.

[17] Denique homines quibus negata uox est quantulum adiuuat animus ille caelestis? Quare si nihil a dis oratione melius accepimus, quid tam dignum cultu ac labore ducamus aut in quo malimus praestare hominibus quam quo ipsi homines

[17] Finally, how little does that celestial spirit aid humans to whom voice has been denied? Wherefore, if we have received nothing better from the gods than oratory, what shall we deem so worthy of cultivation and labor, or in what would we prefer to excel human beings, than by that by which men themselves

[18] ceteris animalibus praestant: eo quidem magis quod nulla in parte plenius labor gratiam refert? Id adeo manifestum erit si cogitauerimus unde et quo usque iam prouecta sit orandi

[18] that by which men themselves excel the other animals: all the more indeed because in no sphere does labor return gratitude more fully? This will be so manifest if we consider from where and how far the practice of oratory has already been carried forward.

[19] facultas: et adhuc augeri potest. Nam ut omittam defendere amicos, regere consiliis senatum, populum exercitum in quae uelit ducere, quam sit utile conueniatque bono uiro: nonne pulchrum uel hoc ipsum est, ex communi intellectu uerbisque quibus utuntur omnes tantum adsequi laudis et gloriae ut non loqui et orare, sed, quod Pericli contigit, fulgere ac tonare uidearis?XVII.

[19] the faculty; and it can still be augmented. For, to omit the defending of friends, to direct with counsels the Senate, to lead the people and the army whither he wills—how useful that is and how it befits a good man: is it not beautiful, even this very thing, from the common intellect and the words which all use, to achieve so much praise and glory that you seem not to speak and orate, but—what befell Pericles—to flash and to thunder?17.

An ars.

Or an art.

[1] Finis non erit si expatiari parte in hac et indulgere uoluptati uelim. Transeamus igitur ad eam quaestionem

[1] There will be no end if I should wish to expatiate in this part and to indulge in pleasure. Let us pass therefore to that question

[2] quae sequitur, an rhetorice ars sit. Quod quidem adeo ex iis qui praecepta dicendi tradiderunt nemo dubitauit ut etiam ipsis librorum titulis testatum sit scriptos eos de arte rhetorica, Cicero uero etiam quae rhetorice uocetur esse artificiosam eloquentiam dicat. Quod non oratores tantum uindicarunt, ut studiis aliquid suis praestitisse uideantur, sed cum iis philosophi et Stoici et Peripatetici plerique consentiunt.

[2] the question which follows, whether rhetoric is an art. Indeed, none of those who handed down the precepts of speaking doubted this, to such a degree that even by the very titles of their books it is attested that they wrote on the rhetorical art; Cicero, moreover, even says that what is called rhetorice is an artificial eloquence. This not only have the orators claimed, that they might seem to have provided something to their studies, but along with them most philosophers—both Stoics and Peripatetics—agree.

[3] Ac me dubitasse confiteor an hanc partem quaestionis tractandam putarem; nam quis est adeo non ab eruditione modo sed a sensu remotus hominis ut fabricandi quidem et texendi et luto uasa ducendi artem putet, rhetoricen autem maximum ac pulcherrimum, ut supra diximus, opus in tam

[3] And I confess that I doubted whether I should think this part of the question to be handled; for who is so removed not only from erudition but from the sense of a human being as to consider fabricating and weaving and drawing vases from clay to be an art, but rhetoric, the greatest and most beautiful, as we said above, work in so

[4] sublime fastigium existimet sine arte uenisse? Equidem illos qui contra disputauerunt non tam id sensisse quod dicerent quam exercere ingenia materiae difficultate credo uoluisse, sicut Polycraten, cum Busirim laudaret et Clytaemestram: quamquam is, quod his dissimile non esset, composuisse orationem quae est habita contra Socraten dicitur.

[4] would judge that to so sublime a pinnacle it has come without art? For my part, I believe that those who disputed on the contrary wished not so much to feel what they were saying as to exercise their ingenuity by the difficulty of the material, like Polycrates when he lauded Busiris and Clytaemnestra: although he, that it might not be dissimilar to these, is said to have composed the oration which was delivered against Socrates.

[5] Quidam naturalem esse rhetoricen uolunt et tamen adiuuari exercitatione non diffitentur, ut in libris Ciceronis de Oratore dicit Antonius obseruationem quandam esse, non artem.

[5] Some wish rhetoric to be natural and yet do not deny that it is aided by practice, as in Cicero’s books On the Orator Antonius says it is a certain observation, not an art.

[6] Quod non ideo ut pro uero accipiamus est positum, sed ut Antoni persona seruetur, qui dissimulator artis fuit: hanc autem opinionem habuisse Lysias uidetur. Cuius sententiae talis defensio est, quod indocti et barbari et serui, pro se cum locuntur, aliquid dicant simile principio, narrent, probent, refutent et, quod uim habeat epilogi, deprecentur.

[6] This is not therefore set down for us to accept it as true, but so that the persona of Antonius be preserved, who was a dissembler of the art; moreover, Lysias seems to have held this opinion. The defense of this sententia is as follows: that the unlearned and the barbarians and the slaves, when they speak on their own behalf, say something like a beginning, narrate, prove, refute, and, with something that has the force of an epilogue, they entreat.

[7] Deinde adiciunt illas uerborum cauillationes, nihil quod ex arte fiat ante artem fuisse: atqui dixisse homines pro se et in alios semper: doctores artis sero et circa Tisian et Coraca primum repertos: orationem igitur ante artem fuisse eoque

[7] Then they add those verbal cavillations, that nothing which is done by art existed before the art: and yet men have always spoken on their own behalf and against others: the doctors of the art were found late and first around Tisias and Corax: oration, therefore, existed before the art and for that reason

[8] artem non esse. Nos porro quando coeperit huius rei doctrina non laboramus, quamquam apud Homerum et praeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi tum etiam loquendi, et oratores plures, et omne in tribus ducibus orationis genus, et certamina quoque proposita eloquentiae inter iuuenes inuenimus,

[8] that there is no art. We, moreover, do not trouble over when the doctrine of this matter began, although in Homer we find a preceptor, Phoenix, both for doing and even for speaking, and several orators, and every genus of oration in the three leaders, and contests too of eloquence proposed among the youths,

[9] quin in caelatura clipei Achillis et lites sunt et actores. Illud enim admonere satis est, omnia quae ars consummauerit a natura initia duxisse: aut tollatur medicina, quae ex obseruatione salubrium atque his contrariorum reperta est et, ut quibusdam placet, tota constat experimentis (nam et uulnus deligauit aliquis antequam haec ars esset, et febrem quiete et abstinentia, non quia rationem uidebat, sed quia id ualetudo

[9] nay indeed in the engraving of Achilles’ shield there are lawsuits and pleaders. For this is enough to admonish: that all things which art has consummated have drawn their beginnings from nature; or else let medicine be abolished, which was found from observation of things salubrious and of their contraries and, as it pleases some, consists wholly of experiments (for someone also bound up a wound before this art existed, and a fever by rest and abstinence, not because he saw the reason, but because the health

[10] ipsa coegerat, mitigauit), nec fabrica sit ars (casas enim primi illi sine arte fecerunt), nec musica (cantatur ac saltatur per omnis gentes aliquo modo). Ita, si rhetorice uocari debet sermo quicumque, fuisse eam antequam esset ars confitebor:

[10] health itself had compelled, it alleviated), nor would the craft of building be an art (for those first men made huts without art), nor music (there is singing and dancing among all peoples in some fashion). Thus, if any discourse whatsoever ought to be called rhetoric, I will confess that it existed before it was an art:

[11] si uero non quisquis loquitur orator est, et tum non tamquam oratores loquebantur, necesse est oratorem factum arte nec ante artem fuisse fateantur. Quo illud quoque excluditur quod dicunt, non esse artis id quod faciat qui non didicerit:

[11] if indeed not just anyone who speaks is an orator, and then they were not speaking as orators, it is necessary that they confess that the orator is made by art and had not existed before the art. Whereby that claim too is excluded which they make, that that is not of the art which is done by one who has not learned:

[12] dicere autem homines et qui non didicerint. Ad cuius rei confirmationem adferunt Demaden remigem et Aeschinen hypocriten oratores fuisse. Falso: nam neque orator esse qui non didicit potest, et hos sero potius quam numquam didicisse quis dixerit, quamquam Aeschines ab initio sit uersatus in litteris, quas pater eius etiam docebat, Demaden neque non didicisse certum sit et continua dicendi exercitatio potuerit tantum quantuscumque postea fuit fecisse; nam id

[12] and yet men who have not learned do speak. For confirmation of this matter they adduce that Demades, an oarsman, and Aeschines, a hypocrite (stage-actor), were orators. False: for neither can one who has not learned be an orator, and one would say that these men learned late rather than never, although Aeschines from the beginning was conversant in letters (literature), which his father also taught, and it is certain that Demades too did not fail to learn; and continuous exercise in speaking could have made him to be just as much as he afterwards was, whatever he was; for that

[13] potentissimum discendi genus est. Sed et praestantiorem si didicisset futurum fuisse dicere licet: neque enim orationes scribere est ausus, ut eum multum ualuisse in dicendo sciamus.

[13] it is the most potent kind of learning. But it is permissible to say that he would have been more preeminent if he had learned: for he did not dare to write orations, whereby we might know that he was very powerful in speaking.

[14] Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam subtilitatis suae argumenta excogitauit in Grylo: sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed ei particulam ciuilitatis sicut dialectices

[14] Aristotle, as he is wont, for the sake of inquiring devised certain arguments of his own subtlety in the Gryllus: but the same man also wrote three books on the rhetorical art, and in the first of them he acknowledges not only that it is an art, but that there belongs to it a little portion of civil polity, just as to dialectic.

[15] adsignat. Multa Critolaus contra, multa Rhodius Athenodorus. Agnon quidem detraxit sibi inscriptione ipsa fidem, qua rhetorices accusationem professus est. Nam de

[15] he assigns. Many things Critolaus, on the contrary; many things Athenodorus the Rhodian. Agnon indeed detracted from his own credit by the very inscription, in which he professed an accusation of rhetoric. For about

[16] Epicuro, qui disciplinas omnes fugit, nihil miror. Hi complura dicunt, sed ex paucis locis ducta: itaque potentissimis eorum breuiter occurram, ne in infinitum quaestio euadat.

[16] As for Epicurus, who flees all disciplines, I marvel at nothing. They say many things, but drawn from a few loci: therefore I shall briefly counter their most potent points, lest the inquiry run out into the infinite.

[17] Prima iis argumentatio ex materia est. Omnis enim artes aiunt habere materiam, quod est uerum: rhetorices nullam esse propriam, quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo.

[17] Their first argumentation is from matter. For they say all arts have matter, which is true: that rhetoric has no proper one—which I will prove to be false in the following.

[18] Altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis adsentiri opinionibus, quia constitui sine perceptione non possit, quae semper uera sit: rhetoricen adsentiri falsis: non esse igitur artem.

[18] The second is the calumny that no art assents to false opinions, because it cannot be constituted without perception, which is always true; that rhetoric assents to false things: therefore it is not an art.

[19] Ego rhetoricen nonnumquam dicere falsa pro ueris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque esse opinione concedam, quia longe diuersum est ipsi quid uideri et ut alii uideatur efficere. Nam et imperator falsis utitur saepe: ut Hannibal, cum inclusus a Fabio, sarmentis circum cornua boum deligatis incensisque, per noctem in aduersos montes agens armenta speciem hosti abeuntis exercitus dedit: sed illum

[19] I will confess that rhetoric sometimes speaks false things in place of true, but I will not therefore concede that it is also in a false opinion, because it is far different for something to seem so to oneself and to bring it about that it seem so to others. For a commander too often uses falsehoods: as Hannibal, when shut in by Fabius, with brushwood tied around the horns of the oxen and set ablaze, driving the herds by night toward the opposing mountains, gave the enemy the appearance of a departing army: but him

[20] fefellit, ipse quid uerum esset non ignorauit. Nec uero Theopompus Lacedaemonius, cum permutato cum uxore habitu e custodia ut mulier euasit, falsam de se opinionem habuit, sed custodibus praebuit. Item orator, cum falso utitur pro uero, scit esse falsum eoque se pro uero uti: non ergo falsam

[20] he deceived him; he himself was not ignorant of what was true. Nor indeed did Theopompus the Lacedaemonian, when, with his garb exchanged with his wife, he escaped from custody as a woman, have a false opinion about himself, but he presented it to the guards. Likewise the orator, when he uses the false in place of the true, knows it to be false and that he is using it as true: therefore not a false

[21] habet ipse opinionem, sed fallit alium. Nec Cicero, cum se tenebras offudisse iudicibus in causa Cluenti gloriatus est, nihil ipse uidit. Et pictor, cum ui artis suae efficit ut quaedam eminere in opere, quaedam recessisse credamus, ipse ea

[21] he himself holds the opinion, but he deceives another. Nor did Cicero, when he boasted that he had cast darkness over the judges in the case of Cluentius, himself see nothing. And the painter, when by the force of his art he effects that we believe certain things to be prominent in the work, certain things to have receded, he himself

[22] plana esse non nescit. Aiunt etiam omnes artes habere finem aliquem propositum ad quem tendant: hunc modo nullum esse in rhetorice, modo non praestari eum qui promittatur. Mentiuntur: nos enim esse finem iam ostendimus et quis

[22] he is not unaware that they are flat. They say also that all arts have some end proposed toward which they tend: now that there is no such end in rhetoric, now that the one which is promised is not furnished. They lie: for we have already shown that there is an end and what it is

[23] esset diximus; et praestabit hunc semper orator: semper enim bene dicet. Firmum autem hoc quod opponitur aduersus eos fortasse sit qui persuadere finem putauerunt: noster orator arsque a nobis finita non sunt posita in euentu; tendit quidem ad uictoriam qui dicit, sed cum bene dixit, etiam si

[23] we have said what it is; and the orator will always fulfill this: for he will always speak well. But perhaps this is a firm point which is opposed against those who have supposed persuading to be the end: our orator and the art as defined by us are not placed in the event (outcome); indeed he who speaks tends toward victory, but when he has spoken well, even if

[24] non uincat, id quod arte continetur effecit. Nam et gubernator uult salua naue in portum peruenire: si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator dicetque

[24] even if he does not conquer, he has accomplished that which is contained within art. For the helmsman too wishes to reach harbor with the ship safe: if, however, he should be carried off by a tempest, he will not on that account be any less a helmsman and will say

[25] notum illud: 'dum clauum rectum teneam'; et medicus sanitatem aegri petit: si tamen aut ualetudinis ui aut intemperantia aegri alioue quo casu summa non contingit, dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinae fine non excidet. Ita oratori bene dixisse finis est. Nam est ars ea, ut post paulum clarius ostendemus, in actu posita, non in

[25] that well-known saying: 'so long as I hold the tiller straight'; and the physician seeks the health of the sick man: if, however, either by the force of his condition or by the intemperance of the patient or by some other chance the outcome does not occur, provided that he himself has done everything according to reason, he will not fall short of the end of medicine. Thus for the orator, to have spoken well is the end. For it is an art, as we shall show a little more clearly after a short while, placed in act, not in

[26] effectu. Ita falsum erit illud quoque quod dicitur, artes scire quando sint finem consecutae, rhetoricen nescire: nam se quisque bene dicere intelleget. Vti etiam uitiis rhetoricen, quod ars nulla faciat, criminantur, quia et falsum dicat et

[26] in the effect. Thus that too will be false which is said, that the arts know when they have attained the end, but rhetoric does not know: for each person will understand himself to speak well. They also charge rhetoric with using vices—a thing which no art does—because it both speaks falsehood and

[27] adfectus moueat. Quorum neutrum est turpe, cum ex bona ratione proficiscitur, ideoque nec uitium; nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est, et adfectus, si aliter ad aequitatem perduci iudex non poterit, necessario mouebit orator: imperiti enim iudicant et qui frequenter in

[27] move the affections. Of which neither is disgraceful, when it proceeds from good reason, and therefore not a vice; for even to tell a lie has sometimes been granted even to the wise man, and the orator will of necessity move the affections, if the judge cannot otherwise be led to equity: for it is the unskilled who judge, and who frequently in

[28] hoc ipsum fallendi sint, ne errent. Nam si mihi sapientes iudices dentur, sapientium contiones atque omne consilium, nihil inuidia ualeat, nihil gratia, nihil opinio praesumpta falsique testes, perquam sit exiguus eloquentiae locus et

[28] be for this very purpose of deceiving them, so that they may not err. For if wise judges should be given to me, assemblies of the wise and every council, let envy avail nothing, let favor nothing, let preconceived opinion and false witnesses; the scope for eloquence would be exceedingly scant, and

[29] prope in sola delectatione ponatur. Sin et audientium mobiles animi et tot malis obnoxia ueritas, arte pugnandum est et adhibenda quae prosunt: neque enim qui recta uia depulsus est reduci ad eam nisi alio flexu potest.

[29] would be placed almost in delight alone. But if both the minds of the hearers are mobile and truth is obnoxious to so many ills, we must fight by art and apply what profits: for he who has been driven from the straight way cannot be brought back to it except by another bend.

[30] Plurima uero ex hoc contra rhetoricen cauillatio est, quod ex utraque causae parte dicatur. Inde haec: nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam sibi; nullam artem destruere quod effecerit, accidere hoc rhetorices operi. Item aut dicenda eam docere aut non dicenda: ita uel per hoc non esse artem, quod non dicenda praecipiat, uel per hoc, quod, cum dicenda praeceperit, etiam contraria his

[30] Very much indeed of the cavillation against rhetoric comes from this, that it is spoken on either side of a cause. Hence these: that no art is contrary to itself, rhetoric is contrary to itself; that no art destroys what it has effected, this befalls the work of rhetoric. Likewise, that it either teaches things to be said or things not to be said: thus either on this account it is not an art, because it prescribes things not to be said, or on this account, that, when it has prescribed things to be said, even things contrary to these

[31] doceat. Quae omnia apparet de ea rhetorice dici quae sit a bono uiro atque ab ipsa uirtute seiuncta: alioqui ubi iniusta causa est, ibi rhetorice non est, adeo ut uix admirabili quodam casu possit accidere ut ex utraque parte orator, id est

[31] should teach. All these things appear to be said about that rhetoric which is separated from the good man and from virtue itself: otherwise, where the cause is unjust, there is no rhetoric there, to such a degree that scarcely by some admirable accident can it happen that on both sides the orator, that is

[32] uir bonus, dicat. Tamen quoniam hoc quoque in rerum naturam cadit, ut duos sapientes aliquando iustae causae in diuersum trahant, quando etiam pugnaturos eos inter se, si ratio ita duxerit, credunt, respondebo propositis, atque ita quidem ut appareat haec aduersus eos quoque frustra excogitata

[32] a good man, might speak. Nevertheless, since this too falls within the nature of things—that two wise men may sometimes be drawn by just causes in opposite directions, since they even believe that they would fight one another, if reason should so lead—I will respond to the proposed points, and indeed in such a way that it may appear that these have been contrived in vain even against them.

[33] qui malis moribus nomen oratoris indulgent. Nam rhetorice non est contraria sibi: causa enim cum causa, non illa secum ipsa componitur. Nec, si pugnent inter se qui idem didicerunt, idcirco ars, quae utrique tradita est, non erit: alioqui nec armorum quia saepe gladiatores sub eodem

[33] against those who, upon men of bad morals, lavish the name of orator. For rhetoric is not contrary to itself: for case is matched with case, not it with itself. Nor, if those who have learned the same thing fight among themselves, will the art which has been handed down to both therefore not exist: otherwise neither would there be an art of arms, because often gladiators under the same

[34] magistro eruditi inter se componuntur, nec gubernandi quia naualibus proeliis gubernator est gubernatori aduersus, nec imperatoria quia imperator cum imperatore contendit. Item non euertit opus rhetorice quod efficit: neque enim positum a se argumentum soluit orator; sed ne rhetorice quidem, quia apud eos qui in persuadendo finem putant, aut si quis, ut dixi, casus duos inter se bonos uiros composuerit, ueri similia quaerentur: non autem, si quid est altero credibilius,

[34] nor the art of steering, because in naval battles the helmsman is set against the helmsman, nor generalship, because a general contends with a general. Likewise, what rhetoric effects does not overthrow the work of rhetoric: for the orator does not refute an argument posited by himself; but not even rhetoric itself, since among those who set the end in persuading, or if, as I said, some chance shall have brought two good men into opposition, likelihoods will be sought: not, however, if something is more credible than another,

[35] id ei contrarium est quod fuit credibile. Nam ut candido candidius et dulci dulcius non est aduersum, ita nec probabili probabilius. Neque praecipit umquam non dicenda nec dicendis

[35] that is not contrary to it which was credible. For just as something whiter is not adverse to white, and something sweeter to sweet, so neither is something more probable to something probable. Nor does it ever prescribe things not to be said, nor for things to be said.

[36] contraria, sed quae in quaque causa dicenda sunt. Non semdicenper autem ei, etiamsi frequentissime, tuenda ueritas erit, sed aliquando exigit communis utilitas ut etiam falsa defendat.

[36] not contraries, but the things that in each cause ought to be said. Not always, however, even if most frequently, will truth be to be defended by him; but sometimes the common utility requires that he even defend falsehoods.

Ponuntur hae quoque in secundo Ciceronis de Oratore libro contradictiones: artem earum rerum esse quae sciantur: oratoris omnem actionem opinione, non scientia contineri, quia et apud eos dicat qui nesciant, et ipse dicat aliquando

These contradictions too are set down in the second book of Cicero’s On the Orator: that art pertains to those things which are known; that the orator’s whole action is contained in opinion, not in knowledge, because he both speaks before those who do not know, and he himself sometimes speaks

[37] quod nesciat. Ex his alterum, id est an sciat iudex de quo dicatur, nihil ad oratoris artem; alteri respondendum. 'Ars earum rerum est quae sciuntur'. Rhetorice ars est bene

[37] what he does not know. Of these, the one—namely, whether the judge knows that about which it is spoken—has nothing to do with the orator’s art; the other must be answered. 'Art is of those things which are known.' In rhetoric, art is well

[38] dicendi, bene autem dicere scit orator. 'Sed nescit an uerum sit quod dicit.' Ne ii quidem qui ignem aut aquam aut quattuor elementa aut corpora insecabilia esse ex quibus res omnes initium duxerint tradunt, nec qui interualla siderum et mensuras solis ac terrae colligunt: disciplinam tamen suam artem uocant. Quodsi ratio efficit ut haec non opinari sed propter uim probationum scire uideantur, eadem ratio

[38] of speaking, and moreover the orator knows how to speak well. 'But he does not know whether what he says is true.' Not even those who hand down that fire or water or the four elements, or indivisible bodies, are that from which all things have drawn their beginning, nor those who compute the intervals of the stars and the measures of the sun and the earth: nevertheless they call their discipline an art. But if reason brings it about that these men seem not to opine these things but, on account of the force of proofs, to know, the same reason

[39] idem praestare oratori potest. 'Sed an causa uera sit nescit.' Ne medicus quidem an dolorem capitis habeat qui hoc se pati dicet: curabit tamen tamquam id uerum sit, et erit ars medicina. Quid quod rhetorice non utique propositum habet semper uera dicendi, sed semper ueri similia?

[39] the same can be afforded to the orator. 'But he does not know whether the cause is true.' Not even the medic knows whether the one who says he is suffering this has head-pain; yet he will treat as though that were true, and the art will be medicine. What of the fact that rhetoric not by any means has as its proposed aim always to speak truths, but always things verisimilar?

Scit autem

But he knows.

[40] esse ueri similia quae dicit. Adiciunt his qui contra sentiunt quod saepe, quae in aliis litibus inpugnarunt actores causarum, eadem in aliis defendant. Quod non artis sed hominis est uitium.

[40] that the things he says are verisimilar. Those who think the contrary add to these points that often the pleaders of causes, what they have impugned in some other lawsuits, these same things they defend in others. Which is a vice not of the art but of the man.

Haec sunt praecipua quae contra rhetoricen dicantur, alia et minora et tamen ex his fontibus deriuata.

These are the principal things that may be said against rhetoric; there are others, lesser ones, nevertheless derived from these sources.

[41] Confirmatur autem esse artem eam breuiter. Nam siue, ut Cleanthes uoluit, ars est potestas uia, id est ordine, efficiens, esse certe uiam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitauerit, siue ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis obseruatur, artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem uitae, iam ostendimus nihil non

[41] Moreover, it is confirmed briefly that it is an art. For whether, as Cleanthes wished, art is a capacity effecting by a way, that is, by order, surely no one will have doubted that there is a way and an order in speaking well; or if that end almost approved by all is observed—that an art consists of perceptions agreeing and co-exercised toward the useful end of life—we have already shown that nothing not

[42] horum in rhetorice inesse. Quid quod et inspectione et exercitatione, ut artes ceterae, constat? Nec potest ars non esse si est ars dialectice (quod fere constat), cum ab ea specie magis quam genere differat. Sed nec illa omittenda sunt: qua in re alius se inartificialiter, alius artificialiter gerat, in ea esse artem, et in eo quod qui didicerit melius faciat quam

[42] that these things are present in rhetoric. What of the fact that it, like the other arts, consists both in inspection and in exercise? Nor can it not be an art if dialectic is an art (which is generally agreed), since it differs from it more in species than in genus. But nor must those points be omitted: that in a matter where one man conducts himself inartificially, another artificially, there is art in that very matter; and in this, that he who has learned does a thing better than

[43] qui non didicerit esse artem. Atqui non solum doctus indoctum sed etiam doctior doctum in rhetorices opere superabit, neque essent eius aliter tam multa praecepta tamque magni qui docerent. Idque cum omnibus confitendum est, tum nobis praecipue, qui rationem dicendi a bono uiro non separamus.

[43] than he who has not learned—that there is an art. And yet not only will the learned surpass the unlearned, but even the more learned will surpass the learned in the work of rhetoric; nor otherwise would there be so many of its precepts and teachers so great. And this must be acknowledged by all, but especially by us, who do not separate the rationale of speaking from the good man.

XVIII. Ex quibus artibus.

18. From which arts.

[1] Cum sint autem artium aliae positae in inspectione, id est cognitione et aestimatione rerum, qualis est astrologia nullum exigens actum, sed ipso rei cuius studium habet intellectu contenta, quaetheoretice uocatur, aliae in agendo, quarum in hoc finis est et ipso actu perficitur nihilque post actum operis relinquit, quae praktike dicitur, qualis saltatio

[1] But since some arts are set in inspection, that is, in the cognition and estimation of things, such as astrology, demanding no act, but content with the very intellect of the thing whose study it has, which is calledtheoretice, and others in doing, whose end is in this and is perfected in the very act and leaves nothing of the work behind after the act, which is called praktike, such as dance,

[2] est, aliae in effectu, quae operis quod oculis subicitur consummatione finem accipiunt, quampoietiken appellamus, qualis est pictura: fere iudicandum est rhetoricen in actu consistere: hoc enim quod est officii sui perficit; atque ita ab

[2] there are others in effect, which receive their end in the consummation of a work that is subjected to the eyes, which we callpoietiken, such as painting: it is generally to be judged that rhetoric consists in act: for it perfects that which is of its own office; and thus from

[3] omnibus dictum est. Mihi autem uidetur etiam ex illis ceteris artibus multum adsumere. Nam et potest aliquando ipsa per se inspectione esse contenta. Erit enim rhetorice in oratore etiam tacente, et si desierit agere uel proposito uel aliquo casu impeditus, non magis desinet esse orator quam

[3] it has been said by all. To me, however, it seems also to assume much from those other arts. For indeed it can sometimes be content with inspection in and of itself. For there will be rhetoric in the orator even when he is silent, and if he has ceased to act, either by purpose or impeded by some accident, he will no more cease to be an orator than

[4] medicus qui curandi fecerit finem. Nam est aliquis ac nescio an maximus etiam ex secretis studiis fructus, ac tum pura uoluptas litterarum cum ab actu, id est opera, recesserunt

[4] than a physician who has made an end of curing. For there is some, and I know not whether even the greatest, fruit even from secret studies, and then the pure pleasure of letters, when they have withdrawn from act, that is, from work

[5] et contemplatione sui fruuntur. Sed effectiuae quoque aliquid simile scriptis orationibus uel historiis, quod ipsum opus in parte oratoria merito ponimus, consequetur. Si tamen una ex tribus artibus habenda sit, quia maximus eius usus actu continetur atque est in eo frequentissima, dicatur actiua uel administratiua; nam et hoc eiusdem rei nomen est.

[5] and they enjoy contemplation of themselves. But something akin to the effective as well will be attained through speeches written out or through histories, which work itself we rightly place in the oratorical part. If, however, it must be held as one of the three arts, because its greatest use is contained in act and it is most frequent therein, let it be called active or administrative; for this too is a name of the same thing.

XIX. Natura an doctrina plus ei conferat.

19. Whether nature or doctrine confers more upon it.

[1] Scio quaeri etiam naturane plus ad eloquentiam conferat an doctrina. Quod ad propositum quidem operis nostri nihil pertinet (neque enim consummatus orator nisi ex utroque fieri potest), plurimum tamen referre arbitror quam

[1] I know it is also asked whether nature contributes more to eloquence or doctrine. As to the plan of our work, it pertains nothing (for a consummate orator can be made only from both), yet I judge that it makes a very great difference which

[2] esse in hoc loco quaestionem uelimus. Nam si parti utrilibet omnino alteram detrahas, natura etiam sine doctrina multum ualebit, doctrina nulla esse sine natura poterit. Sin ex pari coeant, in mediocribus quidem utrisque maius adhuc naturae credam esse momentum, consummatos autem plus doctrinae debere quam naturae putabo; sicut terrae nullam fertilitatem habenti nihil optimus agricola profuerit: e terra uberi utile aliquid etiam nullo colente nascetur: at in solo

[2] let us allow there to be a question in this place. For if from either side you take away the other altogether, nature even without doctrine will avail much, but doctrine can be nothing without nature. But if they meet on equal terms, in those mediocre in both I would believe the greater moment still to belong to nature, whereas the consummate I shall think to owe more to doctrine than to nature; just as to land possessing no fertility the best farmer will have brought no benefit: from rich soil something useful will be born even with no one cultivating: but in a soil

[3] fecundo plus cultor quam ipsa per se bonitas soli efficiet. Et si Praxiteles signum aliquod ex molari lapide conatus esset exculpere, Parium marmor mallem rude: at si illud idem artifex expolisset, plus in manibus fuisset quam in marmore. Denique natura materia doctrinae est: haec fingit, illa fingitur.

[3] in a fertile soil the cultivator will effect more than the very goodness of the soil by itself. And if Praxiteles had attempted to carve some statue out of a millstone, I would prefer Parian marble raw; but if that same craftsman had polished it, more would have been in the hands than in the marble. Finally, nature is the material of doctrine: this fashions, that is fashioned.

Nihil ars sine materia, materiae etiam sine arte pretium est; ars summa materia optima melior.

Art is nothing without material; material too, even without art, has a price; supreme art is better than the best material.

XX. An virtus rhetorice.

20. Whether virtue is rhetorical.

[1] Illa quaestio est maior, ex mediis artibus, quae neque laudari per se nec uituperari possunt, sed utiles aut secus secundum mores utentium fiunt, habenda sit rhetorice, an sit, ut compluribus etiam philosophorum placet, uirtus.

[1] That question is greater: whether rhetoric should be held among the middle arts, which can neither be praised in themselves nor blamed, but become useful or otherwise according to the morals of those using them, or whether it is, as it pleases quite a number even of the philosophers, a virtue.

[2] Equidem illud quod in studiis dicendi plerique exercuerunt et exercent aut nullam artem, quaeatekhnia nominatur, puto (multos enim uideo sine ratione, sine litteris, qua uel impudentia uel fames duxit ruentes), aut malam quasi artem, quam kakotekhnian dicimus: nam et fuisse multos et esse nonnullos existimo qui facultatem dicendi ad hominum perniciem

[2] For my part, that which in the studies of speaking most men have practiced and do practice I take to be either no art, which is namedatekhnia (for I see many, without reason, without letters, rushing headlong wherever either impudence or hunger has led), or a bad quasi‑art, which we call kakotekhnia: for I think that many have been and that some are who turn the faculty of speaking to the destruction of men

[3] conuerterint.Mataiotekhnia quoque est quaedam, id est superuacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat, sed uanum laborem, qualis illius fuit qui grana ciceris ex spatio distante missa in acum continuo et sine frustratione inserebat; quem cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur eiusdem leguminis modio, quod quidem

[3] have turned it. There is also a certainmataiotekhnia, that is, a superfluous imitation of art, which truly has nothing either of good or of evil, but empty toil, such as was that of the man who, from a distant range, as the grains of chickpea were sent, kept inserting them onto a needle continually and without a miss; whom, when Alexander had watched, he is said to have presented with a peck of the same legume, which indeed

[4] praemium fuit illo opere dignissimum. His ego comparandos existimo qui in declamationibus, quas esse ueritati dissimillimas uolunt, aetatem multo studio ac labore consumunt. Verum haec quam instituere conamur et cuius imaginem animo concepimus, quae bono uiro conuenit quaeque est

[4] which indeed was a reward most worthy of that work. With such men I consider comparable those who, in declamations—which they want to be most dissimilar to verity—consume their lifetime with much study and labor. But this which we are striving to institute, and whose image we have conceived in mind, which befits a good man and which is

[5] uere rhetorice, uirtus erit. Quod philosophi quidem multis et acutis conclusionibus colligunt, mihi uero etiam planiore hac proprieque nostra probatione uidetur esse perspicuum.

[5] truly rhetorical, will be virtue. Which the philosophers indeed collect by many and acute conclusions, but to me it seems perspicuous even by this plainer and properly our proof.

Ab illis haec dicuntur. Si consonare sibi in faciendis ac non faciendis uirtutis est (quae pars eius prudentia uocatur),

These things are said by them. If to be consonant with oneself in things to be done and not to be done is of virtue (which part of it is called prudence),

[6] eadem in dicendis ac non dicendis erit. Et si uirtutes sunt ad quas nobis, etiam ante quam doceremur, initia quaedam ac semina sunt concessa natura, ut ad iustitiam, cuius rusticis quoque ac barbaris apparet aliqua imago, nos certe sic esse ab initio formatos ut possemus orare pro nobis, etiamsi non perfecte tamen ut inessent quaedam, ut dixi, semina eius

[6] the same will hold in things to be said and not to be said. And if there are virtues toward which, even before we were taught, certain beginnings and seeds were granted to us by nature—such as toward justice, some image of which appears even to rustics and barbarians—we certainly have been formed from the beginning so that we could plead for ourselves, even if not perfectly, nevertheless such that, as I said, certain seeds of it were present.

[7] facultatis, manifestum est. Non eadem autem iis natura artibus est quae a uirtute sunt remotae. Itaque cum duo sint genera orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera concisa, quae dialectice, quas quidem Zenon adeo coniunxit ut hanc compressae in pugnum manus, illam explicatae diceret similem, etiam disputatrix uirtus erit: adeo de hac, quae speciosior atque apertior tanto est, nihil dubitabitur.

[7] As to this capacity, it is manifest. But the arts which are removed from virtue do not have the same nature. And so, since there are two kinds of oration, the one continuous, which is called rhetorical, the other concise, which is called dialectical, which indeed Zeno so conjoined that he said this one was like a hand compressed into a fist, that one like a hand unfolded, there will even be a disputational virtue; thus about this one, which is so much more showy and more open, nothing will be doubted.

[8] Sed plenius hoc idem atque apertius intueri ex ipsis operibus uolo. Nam quid orator in laudando faciet nisi honestorum et turpium peritus? aut in suadendo nisi utilitate perspecta?

[8] But I wish to behold this same thing more fully and more openly from the works themselves. For what will the orator do in praising, unless he is skilled in honorable and base things? or in advising, unless the utility has been thoroughly surveyed?

aut in iudiciis si iustitiae sit ignarus? Quid? non fortitudinem postulat res eadem, cum saepe contra turbulentas populi minas, saepe cum periculosa potentium offensa, nonnumquam, ut iudicio Miloniano, inter circumfusa militum arma dicendum sit: ut, si uirtus non est, ne perfecta quidem

or in the courts, if he is ignorant of justice? What? Does not the same matter demand fortitude, since often against the turbulent threats of the populace, often with the perilous offense of the powerful, sometimes, as at Milo’s trial, one must speak amid soldiers’ weapons surrounding: so that, if virtue is not present, not even perfected

[9] esse possit oratio? Quod si ea in quoque animalium est uirtus qua praestat cetera uel pleraque, ut in leone impetus, in equo uelocitas, hominem porro ratione atque oratione excellere ceteris certum est: cur non tam in eloquentia quam in ratione uirtutem eius esse credamus, recteque hoc apud Ciceronem dixerit Crassus: 'est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis uirtutibus', et ipse Cicero sua persona cum ad Brutum in epistulis tum aliis etiam locis uirtutem eam

[9] can there be an oration? But if in each of the animals there is that virtue by which it excels the rest or the majority, as in the lion impetus, in the horse velocity, moreover it is certain that man excels the others by reason and oration: why should we not believe his virtue to be as much in eloquence as in reason, and Crassus rightly said this in Cicero: 'for eloquence is indeed a certain one of the highest virtues,' and Cicero himself in his own person, both in the epistles to Brutus and also in other places, [calls] that virtue

[10] appellet? At prohoemium aliquando ac narrationem dicet malus homo et argumenta sic ut nihil sit in iis requirendum. Nam et latro pugnabit acriter, uirtus tamen erit fortitudo, et tormenta sine gemitu feret malus seruus, tolerantia tamen doloris laude sua non carebit.

[10] would he call it? But a wicked man will sometimes deliver a proem and a narration, and arguments, in such a way that nothing is to be found wanting in them. For even a robber will fight fiercely, yet fortitude will be the virtue; and a bad slave will bear torments without a groan, yet toleration of pain will not lack its own praise.

Multa fiunt eadem, sed aliter. Sufficiant igitur haec, quia de utilitate supra tractauimus.

Many things are done the same, but otherwise. Let these, therefore, suffice, since above we have treated of utility.

XXI. Quae materia eius.

21. What its subject-matter is.

[21] Materiam rhetorices quidam dixerunt esse orationem: qua in sententia ponitur apud Platonem Gorgias. Quae si ita accipitur ut sermo quacumque de re compositus dicatur oratio, non materia sed opus est, ut statuarii statua; nam et oratio efficitur arte sicut statua. Sin hac appellatione uerba ipsa significari putamus, nihil haec sine rerum substantia faciunt.

[21] Some have said that the material of rhetoric is the oration; and in this opinion Gorgias is placed by Plato. But if this is taken so that a discourse composed on whatever subject is called an oration, it is not material but a work, as the statue is of the statuary; for an oration too is effected by art just as a statue. But if we suppose that by this appellation the words themselves are signified, these do nothing without the substance of things.

Quidam argumenta persuasibilia: quae et ipsa in parte sunt operis et arte fiunt et materia egent.

Some [say it is] persuasive arguments: which themselves too are a part of the work, and are made by art, and stand in need of material.

[2] Quidam ciuiles quaestiones: quorum opinio non qualitate sed modo errauit; est enim haec materia rhetorices, sed non

[2] Some civil questions: whose opinion has erred not in quality but in mode; for this is the material of rhetoric, but not

[3] sola. Quidam, quia uirtus sit rhetorice, materiam eius totam uitam uocant. Alii, quia non omnium uirtutum materia sit tota uita, sed pleraeque earum uersentur in partibus, sicut iustitia fortitudo continentia propriis officiis et suo fine intelleguntur, rhetoricen quoque dicunt in una aliqua parte ponendam, eique locum inethike negotialem adsignant, id est pragmatikon.

[3] alone. Some, because rhetoric is a virtue, call the whole of life its material. Others, because the material of not all the virtues is the whole of life, but most of them are conversant in parts—just as justice, fortitude, continence are understood by their proper offices and their own end—they say that rhetoric too must be placed in some one part, and assign to it a businesslike place inethike, that is, pragmatikon.

[4] Ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt. Nam Socrates apud Platonem dicere Gorgiae uidetur non in uerbis esse materiam sed in rebus, et in Phaedro palam non in iudiciis modo et contionibus sed in rebus etiam priuatis ac domesticis rhetoricen esse demonstrat: quo manifestum

[4] I (nor is this without authorities) judge the material of rhetoric to be all things whatsoever shall be subjected to it for speaking. For Socrates with Plato seems to say in the Gorgias that the material is not in words but in things, and in the Phaedrus he openly demonstrates that rhetoric is not only in judgments and assemblies but also in private and domestic matters: whence it is manifest

[5] est hanc opinionem ipsius Platonis fuisse. Et Cicero quodam loco materiam rhetorices uocat res quae subiectae sint ei, sed certas demum putat esse subiectas: alio uero de omnibus rebus oratori dicendum arbitratur his quidem uerbis: 'quamquam uis oratoris professioque ipsa bene dicendi hoc suscipere ac polliceri uidetur, ut omni de re quaecumque

[5] it is that this opinion was Plato’s own. And Cicero in a certain passage calls the material of rhetoric the things which are subjected to it, but he thinks that only certain things are in fact subjected; elsewhere, however, he judges that the orator must speak about all things, with these very words: 'although the power of the orator and the very profession of speaking well seems to undertake and to promise this: that about every matter whatsoever'

[6] sit proposita ornate ab eo copioseque dicatur'. Atque adhuc alibi: 'uero enim oratori quae sunt in hominum uita, quandoquidem in ea uersatur orator atque ea est ei subiecta materies, omnia quaesita audita lecta disputata tracsubtata agitata esse debent'.

[6] be proposed may be said by him ornately and copiously.' And further elsewhere: 'for indeed to the orator the things that are in human life—since the orator is engaged in it and that is the subject material set before him—everything ought to have been sought out, heard, read, disputed, treated, and agitated.'

[7] Hanc autem quam nos materiam uocamus, id est res subiectas, quidam modo infinitam, modo non propriam rhetorices esse dixerunt, eamque artem circumcurrentem uocarheuerunt,

[7] This, however, which we call material—that is, the subjects—certain people have said to be at one time infinite, at another not proper to rhetoric; and they have called that art “circumcurrent.”

[8] quod in omni materia diceret. Cum quibus mihi minima pugna est; nam de omni materia dicere eam fatentur, propriam habere materiam quia multiplicem habeat negant. Sed neque infinita est, etiamsi est multiplex, et aliae quoque artes minores habent multiplicem materiam, uelut architectonice (namque ea in omnibus quae sunt aedificio

[8] on the ground that it would speak on every material. With whom I have the least quarrel; for they admit that it speaks on every material, they deny that it has a proper material because it has a multiple one. But it is not infinite, even if it is manifold, and other, lesser arts also have multiple material, as architecture (for that is in all things which belong to a building

[9] utilia uersatur) et caelatura, quae auro argento aere ferro opera efficit. Nam scalptura etiam lignum ebur marmor uitrum gemmas praeter ea quae supra dixi complectitur.

[9] it is engaged with useful things) and caelature (chasing/engraving), which produces works in gold, silver, bronze, and iron. For sculpture also embraces wood, ivory, marble, glass, and gems, besides those which I said above.

[10] Neque protinus non est materia rhetorices si in eadem uersatur et alius. Nam si quaeram quae sit materia statuarii, dicetur aes: si quaeram quae sit excusoris, id est fabricae eius quam Graecikhalkeutiken uocant, similiter aes esse

[10] Nor straightway is it not the material of rhetoric if another too is engaged upon the same. For if I should ask what is the material of the statuary, it will be said to be bronze; if I should ask what is the material of the excusor, that is, of his craft which the Greeks callkhalkeutiken, likewise it is bronze.

[11] respondeant: atqui plurimum statuis differunt uasa. Nec medicina ideo non erit ars quia unctio et exercitatio cum palaestrica, ciborum uero qualitas etiam cum cocorum ei sit arte communis.

[11] let them answer: and yet vases differ very much from statues. Nor on that account will medicine not be an art, because unction and exercise are shared with the palaestric discipline, while the quality of foods also is common to it with the cooks’ art.

[12] Quod uero de bono utili iusto disserere philosophiae officium esse dicunt, non obstat; nam cum philosophum dicunt, hoc accipi uolunt uirum bonum. Quare igitur oratorem, quem a bono uiro non separo, in eadem materia uersari

[12] But that to discourse about the good, the useful, and the just is the office of philosophy, they say, is no obstacle; for when they say “philosopher,” they wish this to be understood, a good man. Why therefore should the orator, whom I do not separate from the good man, not be engaged in the same material

[13] mirer; cum praesertim primo libro iam ostenderim philosophos omissam hanc ab oratoribus partem occupasse, quae rhetorices propria semper fuisset, ut illi potius in nostra materia uersentur. Denique cum sit dialectices materia de rebus subiectis disputare, sit autem dialectice oratio concisa, cur non eadem perpetuae quoque materia uideatur?

[13] should I marvel; especially since in the first book I have already shown that the philosophers have occupied this part, omitted by the orators, which would always have been proper to rhetoric, so that they rather are engaged in our subject-matter. Finally, since it is the subject-matter of dialectic to dispute about matters submitted, and the oration of dialectic is concise, why should not the same seem to be the subject-matter of continuous discourse as well?

[14] Solet a quibusdam et illud opponi: omnium igitur artium peritus erit orator si de omnibus ei dicendum est. Possem hic Ciceronis respondere uerbis, apud quem hoc inuenio: 'mea quidem sententia nemo esse poterit omni laude cumulatus orator nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus': sed mihi satis est eius esse oratorem

[14] This too is put forward by some as an objection: will the orator therefore be skilled in all arts if he must speak about all of them? I could here reply in Cicero’s words, in whose works I find this: 'in my judgment, indeed, no orator will be able to be crowned with every praise unless he has attained the knowledge of all great matters and of the arts': but for me it is enough that he be an orator

[15] rei de qua dicet non inscium. Neque enim omnis causas nouit, et debet posse de omnibus dicere. De quibus ergo dicet?

[15] not unknowing of the matter about which he will speak. For he does not know all causes, and he ought to be able to speak about all things. About which, then, will he speak?

De quibus didicit. Similiter de artibus quoque de quibus dicendum erit interim discet, et de quibus didicerit dicet.

About those which he has learned. Similarly, as to the arts as well, those about which it will be necessary to speak he will in the meantime learn, and about those which he will have learned he will speak.

[16] Quid ergo? non faber de fabrica melius aut de musice musicus? Si nesciat orator quid sit de quo quaeratur, plane melius; nam et litigator rusticus inlitteratusque de causa sua melius quam orator qui nesciet quid in lite sit: sed accepta a musico, a fabro, sicut a litigatore, melius orator

[16] What then? does not the craftsman speak better about craftsmanship, or the musician about music? If the orator does not know what the matter is that is being inquired into, plainly they do better; for even a rustic and unlettered litigant will speak better about his own case than an orator who does not know what is in dispute in the suit: but, once he has received [the facts] from the musician, from the craftsman, just as from the litigant, the orator [will speak] better.

[17] quam ipse qui docuerit. Verum et faber, cum de fabrica, et musicus, cum de musica, si quid confirmationem desiderauerit, dicet: non erit quidem orator, sed faciet illud quasi orator, sicut, cum uulnus imperitus deligabit, non erit medicus,

[17] than the very one who will have taught him. But indeed both the craftsman, when about his craft, and the musician, when about music, if he will have desired any confirmation, will speak: he will not indeed be an orator, but he will do that as if an orator, just as, when an unskilled man will bandage a wound, he will not be a medic,

[18] sed faciet ut medicus. An huius modi res neque in laudem neque in deliberationem neque in iudicium ueniunt? Ergo cum de faciendo portu Ostiensi deliberatum est, non debuit dicere sententiam orator? Atqui opus erat ratione

[18] but he will act as a physician. Or do matters of this kind come neither into praise nor into deliberation nor into judgment? Therefore, when it was deliberated about making a port at Ostia, ought not the orator to have given an opinion? And yet there was need of reasoning

[19] architectorum. Liuores et tumores in corpore cruditatis an ueneni signa sint non tractat orator? At est id ex ratione medicinae.

[19] of the architects. Does the orator not treat whether lividities and tumors in the body are signs of indigestion or of poison? Yet that is a matter from the rationale of medicine.

Circa mensuras et numeros non uersabitur? Dicamus has geometriae esse partes. Equidem omnia fere posse credo casu aliquo uenire in officium oratoris: quod si non accidet, non erunt ei subiecta.

Will he not be engaged about measures and numbers? Let us say these are parts of geometry. Indeed, I believe that almost everything can by some accident come into the office of the orator: but if it does not occur, they will not be subject to him.

[20] Ita sic quoque recte diximus materiam rhetorices esse omnis res ad dicendum ei subiectas: quod quidem probat etiam sermo communis; nam cum aliquid de quo dicamus accepimus, positam nobis esse materiam frequenter etiam

[20] Thus in this way too we have rightly said that the matter of rhetoric is all things subjected to it for speaking: which indeed even common speech proves; for when we have received something about which we may speak, we frequently also say that the matter has been set before us.

[21] praefatione testamur. Gorgias quidem adeo rhetori de omnibus putauit esse dicendum ut se in auditoriis interrogari pateretur qua quisque de re uellet. Hermagoras quoque dicendo materiam esse in causa et in quaestionibus omnes

[21] we attest in the preface. Gorgias indeed thought to such a degree that it must be spoken by the rhetor about everything that he allowed himself in the auditoria to be questioned on whatever matter anyone wished. Hermagoras also, by saying that the material is in the cause and in questions, all

[22] res subiectas erat complexus: sed quaestiones si negat ad rhetoricen pertinere, dissentit a nobis; si autem ad rhetoricen pertinent, ab hoc quoque adiuuamur: nihil est enim

[22] he had encompassed the subjects set forth: but if he denies that questions pertain to rhetoric, he dissents from us; if, however, they pertain to rhetoric, we are aided by him as well: for there is nothing indeed

[23] quod non in causam aut quaestionem cadat. Aristoteles tris faciendo partes orationis, iudicialem deliberatiuam demonstratiuam, paene et ipse oratori subiecit omnia: nihil enim non in haec cadit.

[23] that does not fall into a cause or a question. Aristotle, by making three parts of oration—judicial, deliberative, demonstrative—almost he too subjected all things to the orator; for everything falls into these.

[24] Quaesitum a paucissimis et de instrumento est. Instrumentum uoco sine quo formari materia in id quod uelimus effici opus non possit. Verum hoc ego non artem credo egere, sed artificem.

[24] A question has been raised by very few also about the instrument. I call “instrument” that without which the material cannot be formed into that which we wish, so that the work cannot be effected. But I believe that this is required not by the art, but by the artificer.

Neque enim scientia desiderat instrumentum, quae potest esse consummata etiam si nihil faciat, sed ille opifex, ut caelator caelum et pictor penicilla. Itaque haec in eum locum quo de oratore dicturi sumus differamus.

For neither does science require an instrument, which can be consummate even if it does nothing, but the artificer does, as the engraver the graving-tool and the painter brushes. Therefore let us defer these matters to that place where we are going to speak about the orator.