Seneca: DE BENEFICIIS

[1] Inter multos ac uarios errores temere inconsulteque uiuentium nihil propemodum, uir optime Liberalis, dixerim, [quam] quod beneficia nec dare scimus nec accipere. Sequitur enim, ut male conlocata male debeantur; de quibus non redditis sero querimur; ista enim perierunt, cum darentur. Nec mirum est inter plurima maximaque uitia nullum esse frequentius quam ingrati animi.

[1] Among the many and various errors of those living rashly and without counsel, I would say there is scarcely anything, most excellent Liberalis, [than] that we do not know how to give benefits nor to receive them. For it follows that things ill-bestowed are ill-owed; and we complain too late about those not returned; for they perished when they were given. Nor is it a wonder that among the many and greatest vices none is more frequent than an ingrate mind.

Id euenire ex causis pluribus uideo. Prima illa est, quod non eligimus dignos, quibus tribuamus. Sed nomina facturi diligenter in patrimonium et uitam debitoris inquirimus, semina in solum effetum et sterile non spargimus: beneficia sine ullo dilectu magis proicimus quam damus.

I see that happening from several causes. The first is this: that we do not choose the worthy, to whom we may bestow. Yet when about to make loans, we inquire diligently into the patrimony and the life of the debtor; we do not scatter seeds upon an exhausted and sterile soil: benefits without any selection we rather hurl forth than give.

Nec facile dixerim, utrum turpius sit infitiari an repetere beneficium; id enim genus huius crediti est, ex quo tantum recipiendum sit, quantum ultro refertur; decoquere uero foedissimum ob hoc ipsum, quia non opus est ad liberandam fidem facultatibus sed animo; reddit enim beneficium, qui debet. Sed cum sit in ipsis crimen, qui ne confessione quidem grati sunt, in nobis quoque est. Multos experimur ingratos, plures facimus, quia alias graues exprobratores exactoresque sumus, alias leues et quos paulo post muneris sui paeniteat, alias queruli et minima momenta calumniantes; gratiam omnem corrumpimus non tantum postquam dedimus beneficia, sed dum damus.

Nor could I easily say whether it is more disgraceful to deny or to demand back a benefit; for this is a kind of credit, from which only so much ought to be received as is voluntarily returned; but to go bankrupt is most foul for this very reason, because to free one’s faith (obligation) there is need not of means but of spirit; for he returns the benefit who owes. Yet while the fault lies in those persons themselves who are not grateful even by acknowledgment, it lies in us as well. We find many ungrateful, we make more—at one time heavy reproachers and exactors, at another fickle, such as soon repent of their own gift, at another querulous and calumniating the least trifles; we spoil all goodwill not only after we have given benefits, but while we are giving them.

Quis nostrum contentus fuit aut leuiter rogari aut semel? quis non, cum aliquid a se peti suspicatus est, frontem adduxit, uoltum auertit, occupationes simulauit, longis sermonibus et de industria non inuenientibus exitum occasionem petendi abstulit et uariis artibus necessitates properantes elusit, in angusto uero conprensus aut distulit, id est timide negauit, aut promisit, sed difficulter, sed subductis superciliis, sed malignis et uix exeuntibus uerbis? Nemo autem libenter debet, quod non accepit, sed expressit.

Who of us has been content either to be asked lightly or once? who has not, when he suspected that something was being sought from him, knit his brow, turned his face away, simulated occupations, by long speeches and by design not finding an exit took away the occasion of petitioning and by various arts eluded pressing necessities as they hurried on, but when caught in a tight place either put it off—that is, denied timidly—or promised, but with difficulty, with eyebrows drawn up, with grudging and scarcely issuing words? No one, moreover, is glad to owe for what he did not receive, but extorted.

Gratus aduersus eum esse quisquam potest, qui beneficium aut superbe abiecit aut iratus inpegit aut fatigatus, ut molestia careret, dedit? Errat, si quis sperat responsurum sibi, quem dilatione lassauit, expectatione torsit. Eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur, et ideo non est neclegenter dandum--sibi enim quisque debet, quod a nesciente accepit--; ne tarde quidem, quia, cum omni in officio magni aestimetur dantis uoluntas, qui tarde fecit, diu noluit; utique non contumeliose: nam cum ita natura conparatum sit, ut altius iniuriae quam merita descendant et illa cito defluant, has tenax memoria custodiat, quid expectat, qui offendit, dum obligat?

Could anyone be grateful toward him who either haughtily has thrown aside a benefaction, or irate has thrust it upon one, or, fatigued, has given it so as to be rid of annoyance? He errs, whoever hopes for a response to himself from one whom he has wearied by dilation and tortured by expectation. A benefaction is owed back in the same animus in which it is given, and therefore it must not be given negligently—for each one owes to himself what he has received from one not knowing--; not tardily either, because, since in every office the will of the giver is greatly esteemed, he who did it late was long unwilling; certainly not contumeliously: for since it is so arranged by nature that injuries descend deeper than merits and the latter quickly flow away, while the former a tenacious memory guards, what does he expect, who offends while he obligates?

Satis aduersus illum gratus est, si quis beneficio eius ignoscit. Non est autem, quod tardiores faciat ad bene merendum turba ingratorum. Nam primum, ut dixi, nos illam augemus; deinde ne deos quidem inmortales ab hac tam effusa nec cess<ante benign>itate sacrilegi neclegentesque eorum deterrent: utuntur natura sua et cuncta interque illa ipsos munerum suorum malos interpretes iuuant.

One is grateful enough toward such a man, if someone pardons his “benefit.” Nor is there any reason why the mob of ingrates should make us slower to merit well by doing good. For, first, as I said, we ourselves increase that crowd; next, not even the immortal gods are deterred from this so outpoured and unceasing benignity by the sacrilegious and those neglectful of them: they make use of their own nature and help all things, and among them even those who are bad interpreters of their own gifts.

Hos sequamur duces, quantum humana inbecillitas patitur; demus beneficia, non feneremus. Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitauit, cum daret. 'At male cessit.' Et liberi et coniuges spem fefellerunt, tamen et educamus et ducimus, adeoque aduersus experimenta pertinaces sumus, ut bella uicti et naufragi maria repetamus.

Let us follow these leaders,
so far as human weakness allows; let us give benefits, not put them out at usury. He is worthy to be deceived who thought about getting back when he gave. 'But badly
it turned out.' Both children and spouses have disappointed hope; yet we both educate and
take in marriage, and to such a degree are we stubborn against experience that, defeated, we return to wars,
and, shipwrecked, we revisit the seas.

Quanto magis permanere in dandis beneficiis decet! quae si quis non dat, quia non recepit, dedit, ut reciperet, bonamque ingratorum facit causam, quibus turpe est non reddere, si licet. Quam multi indigni luce sunt!

How much more does it befit to persevere in giving benefits! If someone does not give them because he has not received, then he gave in order to receive, and he makes a good cause for the ungrateful, for whom it is disgraceful not to render back, if it is possible. How many are unworthy of the light!

tamen dies oritur. Quam multi, quod nati sunt, queruntur! tamen natura subolem nouam gignit ipsosque, qui non fuisse mallent, esse patitur.

yet the day arises. How many complain that they were
born! yet Nature begets new progeny and even those who
would prefer not to have been, she allows to be.

Hoc et magni animi et boni proprium est, non fructum beneficiorum sequi, sed ipsa et post malos quoque bonum quaerere. Quid magnifici erat multis prodesse, si nemo deciperet? nunc est uirtus dare beneficia non utique reditura, quorum a uiro egregio statim fructus perceptus est.

This, too, is the proper mark both of a great spirit and of a good man: not to pursue the fruit of benefits, but the benefits themselves, and to seek a good man even after bad ones as well. What would be magnificent about benefiting many, if no one deceived? Now it is virtue to give benefits not assuredly to return, the fruit of which is immediately gathered from an outstanding man.

Adeo quidem ista res fugare nos et pigriores ad rem pulcherrimam facere non debet, ut, si spes mihi praecidatur gratum hominem reperiendi, malim non recipere beneficia quam non dare, quia, qui non dat, uitium ingrati antecedit. Dicam, quod sentio: qui beneficium non reddit, magis peccat; qui non dat, citius.

Indeed, this matter ought not to drive us away and make us more sluggish toward the most beautiful thing, to such a degree that, if my hope of finding a grateful man were cut off, I would prefer not to receive benefits rather than not to give them; for he who does not give anticipates the fault of the ingrate. I will say what I think: he who does not return a benefaction sins more; he who does not give, sooner.

[2] Beneficia in uolgus cum largiri institueris,
Perdenda sunt multa, ut semel ponas bene.

[2] When you have set yourself to lavish benefits upon the vulgar crowd,
Many must be lost, so that you may once bestow one well.

In priore uersu utrumque reprehendas; nam nec in uolgum effundenda sunt, et nullius rei, minime beneficiorum, honesta largitio est; quibus si detraxeris iudicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliud quodlibet incident nomen. Sequens sensus mirificus est, qui uno bene posito beneficio multorum amissorum damna solatur. Vide, oro te, ne hoc et uerius sit et magnitudini bene facientis aptius, ut illum hortemur ad danda, etiam si nullum bene positurus est.

In the prior verse you may reprehend both; for benefits are not to be poured out into the common crowd, and there is honorable largess of nothing—least of all of benefits; from which, if you take away judgment, they cease to be benefits and fall under whatever other name you please. The following sense is admirable: that one benefit well placed makes up for the losses of many that were missed. See, I beg you, whether this is both truer and more fitting to the greatness of the doer of good, that we urge him on to giving, even if he is going to place not a single one well.

Illud enim falsum est 'perdenda sunt multa'; nullum perit, quia, qui perdit, conputauerat. Beneficiorum simplex ratio est: tantum erogatur; si redit aliquid, lucrum est, si non redit, damnum non est. Ego illud dedi, ut darem.

For that saying, 'many things must be lost,' is false; nothing perishes, because the one who loses had computed it. The simple account of benefactions is this: so much is disbursed; if something returns, it is profit; if it does not return, it is not loss. I gave that, in order to give.

Nemo beneficia in calendario scribit nec auarus exactor ad horam et diem appellat. Numquam illa uir bonus cogitat nisi admonitus a reddente; alioqui in formam crediti transeunt. Turpis feneratio est beneficium expensum ferre.

No one writes benefactions in the calendar, nor does an avaricious exactor summon to the hour and the day. A good man never thinks of them unless reminded by the one repaying; otherwise they pass into the form of credit. It is a shameful usury to carry a benefaction as an expense.

Qualiscumque priorum euentus est, perseuera in alios conferre; melius apud ingratos iacebunt, quos aut pudor aut occasio aut imitatio aliquando gratos poterit efficere. Ne cessaueris, opus tuum perage et partes boni uiri exequere. Alium re, alium fide, alium gratia, alium consilio, alium praeceptis salubribus adiuua.

Whatever the outcome of the former ones, persevere in conferring upon others; they will lie better with ingrates, whom either shame or occasion or imitation will someday be able to make grateful. Do not cease; carry through your work and perform the parts of a good man. Help one by means, another by faith, another by favor, another by counsel, another by salutary precepts.

Officia etiam ferae sentiunt, nec ullum tam inmansuetum animal est, quod non cura mitiget et in amorem sui uertat. Leonum ora a magistris inpune tractantur, elephantorum feritatem usque in seruile obsequium demeretur cibus; adeo etiam, quae extra intellectum atque aestimationem beneficii posita sunt, adsiduitas tamen meriti pertinacis euincit. Ingratus est aduersus unum beneficium?

Even wild beasts sense good offices, and there is no animal so untamed that care does not soften it and turn it into love of oneself. The mouths of lions are handled with impunity by their masters; food wins down the ferocity of elephants even into servile obsequiousness; so far that even those things which are set outside the understanding and estimation of a benefaction are nevertheless overcome by the assiduity of pertinacious merit. Is he ungrateful toward a single benefaction?

aduersus alterum non erit; duorum oblitus est? tertium etiam in eorum, quae exciderunt, memoriam reducet.

against another he will not be; he has forgotten two? A third will even bring back into memory those which have slipped out.

[3] Is perdet beneficia, qui cito se perdidisse credit; at qui instat et onerat priora sequentibus, etiam ex duro et inmemori pectore gratiam extundit. Non audebit aduersus multa oculos adtollere; quocumque se conuertit memoriam suam fugiens, ibi te uideat: beneficiis illum tuis cinge. Quorum quae uis quaeue proprietas sit, dicam, si prius illa, quae ad rem non pertinent, transilire mihi permiseris, quare tres Gratiae et quare sorores sint, et quare manibus inplexis, et quare ridentes et uirgines solutaque ac perlucida ueste.

[3] He will lose benefits, who quickly believes that he has lost them; but he who presses on and loads the former with the following, even from a hard and unmindful breast hammers out gratitude. He will not dare to lift his eyes against many; wherever he turns, fleeing his memory, there let him see you: encircle him with your benefactions. What their force and what their property is, I will say, if you first allow me to leap over those things which do not pertain to the matter—why the Graces are three and why sisters, and why with hands entwined, and why smiling and maidens with loosened and translucent garment.

Alii quidem uideri uolunt unam esse, quae det beneficium, alteram, quae accipiat, tertiam, quae reddat; alii tria beneficorum esse genera, promerentium, reddentium, simul accipientium reddentiumque. Sed utrumlibet ex istis iudica uerum: quid ista nos scientia iuuat? Quid ille consertis manibus in se redeuntium chorus?

Others indeed want it to seem
that there is one who gives a benefaction, another who receives, a third
who repays; others that there are three genera of benefactions—of promeriting,
of repaying, of simultaneously receiving and repaying. But whichever of these
you judge true: how does that science avail us? What of that chorus, with hands interlaced,
of those returning into themselves?

Ob hoc, quia ordo beneficii per manus transeuntis nihilo minus ad dantem reuertitur et totius speciem perdit, si usquam interruptus est, pulcherrimus, si cohaeret et uices seruat. In eo est aliqua tamen maioris dignatio, sicut promerentium. Voltus hilari sunt, quales solent esse, qui dant uel accipiunt beneficia; iuuenes, quia non debet beneficiorum memoria senescere; uirgines, quia incorrupta sunt et sincera et omnibus sancta; in quibus nihil esse adligati decet nec adstricti: solutis itaque tunicis utuntur; perlucidis autem, quia beneficia conspici uolunt.

On account of this: because the order of the benefaction, passing through hands, nonetheless returns to the giver, and it loses the appearance of the whole if it has been interrupted anywhere, but is most beautiful if it coheres and keeps the exchanges. In it, however, there is some greater dignity, as of those who oblige. Their faces are cheerful, such as those are wont to have who give or receive benefactions; they are young, because the memory of benefactions ought not to grow old; they are virgins, because they are incorrupt, sincere, and holy to all; in whom it is fitting that there be nothing bound or constricted: therefore they wear loosened tunics; and pellucid ones besides, because benefactions want to be seen.

Sit aliquis usque eo Graecis emancipatus, ut haec dicat necessaria; nemo tamen erit, qui etiam illud ad rem iudicet pertinere, quae nomina illis Hesiodus inposuerit. Aglaien maximam natu adpellauit, mediam Euphrosynen, tertiam Thaliam. Horum nominum interpretationem, prout cuique uisum est, deflectit et ad rationem aliquam conatur perducere, cum Hesiodus puellis suis, quod uoluit, nomen inposuerit.

Let there be someone so far emancipated to the Greeks that he says these things are necessary;
yet there will be no one who judges that this also pertains to the matter, what names Hesiod has imposed upon them.
He called Aglaia the eldest by birth, the middle one Euphrosyne, the third Thalia.
The interpretation of these names men deflect, as it has seemed to each, and try to bring it to some rationale,
whereas Hesiod imposed upon his maidens whatever name he wished.

Itaque Homerus uni mutauit, Pasithean adpellauit et in matrimonium promisit, ut scias non esse illas uirgines Vestales. Inueniam alium poetam, apud quem praecingantur et spissis aut Phryxianis prodeant. Ergo et Mercurius una stat, non quia beneficia ratio conmendat uel oratio, sed quia pictori ita uisum est.

Therefore Homer changed them to one, he named her Pasithea and promised her in
marriage, so that you may know that they are not Vestal virgins. I shall find another poet, with whom they are girded and in thick or Phrygian garments
come forth. Therefore Mercury too stands together, not because benefactions reason commends
or oration, but because it so seemed to the painter.

Chrysippus quoque, penes quem subtile illud acumen est et in imam penetrans ueritatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur et uerbis non ultra, quam ad intellectum satis est, utitur, totum librum suum his ineptiis replet, ita ut de ipso officio dandi, accipiendi, reddendi beneficii pauca admodum dicat; nec his fabulas, sed haec fabulis inserit. Nam praeter ista, quae Hecaton transcribit, tres Chrysippus Gratias ait Iouis et Eurynomes filias esse, aetate autem minores quam Horas, sed meliuscula facie et ideo Veneri datas comites. Matris quoque nomen ad rem iudicat pertinere: Eurynomen enim dictam, quia late patentis patrimonii sit beneficia diuidere; tamquam matri post filias soleat nomen inponi aut poetae uera nomina reddant.

Chrysippus also, in whom that subtle acumen is and which penetrates into the deepest truth, who speaks for the sake of the thing to be done and uses words no further than is enough for intellect, fills his whole book with these inanities, such that about the very duty of giving, receiving, and returning a benefit he says very few things; nor does he insert fables into these, but he inserts these into fables.
For besides those things which Hecaton transcribes, Chrysippus says that the three Graces are daughters of Jove and Eurynome, but younger in age than the Hours, yet somewhat better in face and therefore given as companions to Venus.
He judges also that the mother’s name pertains to the matter: for she is said to be called Eurynome, because it is her part to divide the benefits of a patrimony lying open widely; as though a name were wont to be imposed on the mother after the daughters, or poets rendered true names.

Quemadmodum nomenclatori memoriae loco audacia est et, cuicumque nomen non potest reddere, inponit, ita poetae non putant ad rem pertinere uerum dicere, sed aut necessitate coacti aut decore corrupti id quemque uocari iubent, quod belle facit ad uersum. Nec illis fraudi est, si aliud in censum detulerunt; proximus enim poeta suum illas ferre nomen iubet. Hoc ut scias ita esse, ecce Thalia, de qua cum maxime agitur, apud Hesiodum Charis est, apud Homerum Musa.

Just as for the nomenclator audacity stands in place of memory, and upon whoever’s name he cannot render, he imposes one, so poets do not think that telling the truth pertains to the matter, but, either compelled by necessity or corrupted by decor, they bid that each be called whatever nicely fits the verse. Nor is it a fraud to them if they have entered something different in the census-roll; for the next poet orders them to bear his own name. That you may know this is so—behold Thalia, about whom the dispute is just now at its hottest: with Hesiod she is a Charis, with Homer a Muse.

[4] Sed ne faciam, quod reprehendo, omnia ista, quae ita extra rem sunt, ut ne circa rem quidem sint, relinquam. Tu modo nos tuere, si quis mihi obiciet, quod Chrysippum in ordinem coegerim, magnum mehercules uirum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur; etiam cum agere aliquid uidetur, pungit, non perforat. Hic uero quod acumen est?

[4] But lest I do what I reprehend, I will leave aside all those things which are so outside the matter that they are not even around the matter. Only do you protect us, if anyone should object to me that I have coerced Chrysippus into order, a great man, by Hercules, but yet a Greek, whose acumen, too tenuous, is blunted and often folds back upon itself; even when he seems to be doing something, he pricks, he does not perforate. But indeed, what acumen is here?

De beneficiis dicendum est et ordinanda res, quae maxime humanam societatem adligat; danda lex uitae, ne sub specie benignitatis inconsulta facilitas placeat, ne liberalitatem, quam nec deesse oportet nec superfluere, haec ipsa obseruatio restringat, dum temperat; docendi sunt <libenter dare>, libenter accipere, libenter reddere et magnum ipsis certamen proponere, eos, quibus obligati sunt, re animoque non tantum aequare sed uincere, quia, qui referre gratiam debet, numquam consequitur, nisi praecessit; hi docendi sunt nihil inputare, illi plus debere. Ad hanc honestissimam contentionem beneficiis beneficia uincendi sic nos adhortatur Chrysippus, ut dicat uerendum esse, ne, quia Charites Iouis filiae sunt, parum se grate gerere sacrilegium sit et tam bellis puellis fiat iniuria. Tu me aliquid eorum doce, per quae beneficentior gratiorque aduersus bene merentes fiam, per quae obligantium obligatorumque animi certent, ut, qui praestiterunt, obliuiscantur, pertinax sit memoria debentium.

We must speak about benefits and the matter that most binds human society must be ordered; a law must be given to life, lest, under the appearance of benignity, unconsidered facility be pleasing, lest observance itself, while it tempers, restrain liberality, which ought neither to be lacking nor to overflow; men are to be taught , to receive gladly, to repay gladly, and to set before themselves a great contest, to not only equal but to conquer in deed and in spirit those to whom they are obligated, because he who ought to return gratitude never overtakes, unless he has gone before; these are to be taught to impute nothing, those to owe more. To this most honorable contention of conquering benefits with benefits Chrysippus thus exhorts us, saying that it is to be feared lest, because the Graces are daughters of Jove, to carry oneself not gratefully enough be sacrilege and an injustice be done to such lovely maidens. Do you teach me some of those things by which I may become more beneficent and more grateful toward the well‑deserving, by which the minds of those binding and those bound may contend, so that those who have rendered may forget, and the memory of those owing may be persistent.

Istae uero ineptiae poetis relinquantur, quibus aures oblectare propositum est et dulcem fabulam nectere. At qui ingenia sanare et fidem in rebus humanis retinere, memoriam officiorum ingerere animis uolunt, serio loquantur et magnis uiribus agant; nisi forte existimas leui ac fabuloso sermone et anilibus argumentis prohiberi posse rem perniciosissimam, beneficiorum nouas tabulas.

Let those ineptitudes be left to the poets, whose purpose is to delight the ears and to weave a sweet fable. But those who wish to heal minds and to retain faith in human affairs, to thrust the memory of duties into souls, should speak in earnest and act with great forces; unless perhaps you think that with light and fabulous speech and old-wives’ arguments it is possible to prohibit a most pernicious matter, the “new tablets” of benefactions.

[5] Sed quemadmodum superuacua transcurram, ita exponam necesse est hoc primum nobis esse discendum, quid accepto beneficio debeamus. Debere enim se alius pecuniam, quam accepit, alius consulatum, alius sacerdotium, alius prouinciam. Ista autem sunt meritorum signa, non merita.

[5] But just as I shall run through the superfluities, so I must set forth that this is first to be learned by us: what we owe upon receiving a benefaction. For one that he owes the money which he received, another a consulship, another a priesthood, another a province. But these are signs of merits, not the merits.

Non potest beneficium manu tangi: res animo geritur. Multum interest inter materiam beneficii et beneficium; itaque nec aurum nec argentum nec quicquam eorum, quae pro maximis accipiuntur, beneficium est, sed ipsa tribuentis uoluntas. Inperiti autem id, quod oculis incurrit et quod traditur possideturque, solum notant, cum contra illud, quod in re carum atque pretiosum <est, parui pendunt>. Haec, quae tenemus, quae aspicimus, in quibus cupiditas nostra haeret, caduca sunt, auferre nobis et fortuna et iniuria potest; beneficium etiam amisso eo, per quod datum est, durat; est enim recte factum, quod inritum nulla uis efficit.

A benefaction cannot be touched by the hand: the matter is carried on in the mind. Much difference lies between the material of the benefit and the benefit; and so neither gold nor silver nor anything of those things which are received as greatest is the benefit, but the very volition of the giver. The unskilled, however, note only that which strikes the eyes and which is handed over and possessed, while, on the contrary, that which in the matter is dear and precious . These things which we hold, which we behold, in which our desire clings, are perishable; both fortune and injury can take them from us; the benefit, even with that through which it was given lost, endures; for it is a right deed, which no force renders null.

Amicum a piratis redemi, hunc alius hostis excepit et in carcerem condidit: non beneficium, sed usum beneficii mei sustulit. Ex naufragio alicui raptos uel ex incendio liberos reddidi, hos uel morbus uel aliqua fortuita iniuria eripuit: manet etiam sine illis, quod in illis datum est. Omnia itaque, quae falsum beneficii nomen usurpant, ministeria sunt, per quae se uoluntas amica explicat.

I ransomed a friend from pirates; another enemy seized him and put him in
prison: he removed not the benefit, but the use of my benefit. From
shipwreck I restored to someone children snatched, or from a conflagration; these either disease
or some fortuitous injury tore away: what was given in them remains even without them. Whatsoever, therefore, usurp the false name of “benefit,”
are ministrations, through which a friendly will explicates itself.

Hoc in aliis quoque rebus euenit, ut aliubi sit species rei, aliubi ipsa res. Imperator aliquem torquibus, murali et ciuica donat: quid habet per se corona pretiosum? quid praetexta?

This happens in other matters as well, that the appearance of the thing is elsewhere, the thing itself elsewhere. The emperor bestows upon someone torques, and the mural and the civic crown: what does the crown have that is precious in itself? what the praetexta?

quid fasces? quid tribunal et currus? Nihil horum honor est, sed honoris insigne.

What are the fasces? What the tribunal and the chariot? None of these is honor, but the insignia of honor.

Sic non est beneficium id, quod sub oculos uenit, sed beneficii uestigium et nota.

Thus it is not the benefaction that comes before the eyes, but the vestige and mark of the benefaction.

[6] Quid est ergo beneficium? Beneuola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit, prona et sponte sua parata. Itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo.

[6] What, then, is a benefaction? A benevolent action granting joy
and, by granting, taking joy, inclined and of its own accord ready toward that which it does. And so it is not what is done or what is given that matters, but with what mind, because
a benefaction does not consist in that which is done or given, but in the very mind of the giver or doer.

Magnum autem esse inter ista discrimen uel ex hoc intellegas licet, quod beneficium utique bonum est, id autem, quod fit aut datur, nec bonum nec malum est. Animus est, qui parua extollit, sordida inlustrat, magna et in pretio habita dehonestat; ipsa, quae adpetuntur, neutram naturam habent, nec boni nec mali: refert, quo illa rector inpellat, a quo forma rebus datur. Non est beneficium ipsum, quod numeratur aut traditur, sicut ne in uictimis quidem, licet opimae sint auroque praefulgeant, deorum est honor sed <in> recta ac pia uoluntate uenerantium.

Moreover, you may understand that there is a great distinction among these things even from this: that a benefaction is in any case a good, but that which is done or given is neither good nor bad. It is the spirit that exalts small things, illuminates sordid ones, and disgraces great things even held in esteem; the things themselves that are sought have neither nature, neither of good nor of bad: it depends on the direction in which the steersman impels them, by whom form is given to things. The benefaction is not itself the thing that is counted out or handed over, just as not even in the victims—although they are opulent and gleam with gold—lies the honor of the gods, but in the upright and pious will of the worshipers.

Itaque boni etiam farre ac fitilla religiosi sunt; mali rursus non effugiunt inpietatem, quamuis aras sanguine multo cruentauerint.

Therefore the good are religious even with spelt and a potsherd; the wicked
in turn do not escape impiety, although they have made the altars run red with much blood.

[7] Si beneficia in rebus, non in ipsa bene faciendi uoluntate consisterent, eo maiora essent, quo maiora sunt, quae accipimus. Id autem falsum est; non numquam enim magis nos obligat, qui dedit parua magnifice, qui 'regum aequauit opes animo', qui exiguum tribuit sed libenter, qui paupertatis suae oblitus est, dum meam respicit, qui non uoluntatem tantum iuuandi habuit sed cupiditatem, qui accipere se putauit beneficium, cum daret, qui dedit tamquam recepturus, recepit, tamquam non dedisset, qui occasionem, qua prodesset, et occupauit et quaesiit. Contra ingrata sunt, ut dixi, licet re ac specie magna uideantur, quae danti aut extorquentur aut excidunt, multoque gratius uenit, quod facili quam quod plena manu datur.

[7] If benefits consisted in the things, not in the very will of doing well, they would be greater the greater are the things we receive. But that is false; for sometimes he obligates us more who gave small things magnificently, who “equaled the riches of kings in spirit,” who bestowed a slight thing yet willingly, who forgot his own poverty while he regarded mine, who had not only the will but the desire of helping, who thought he received a benefit when he gave, who gave as though not about to receive, and received as though he had not given, who both seized and sought the opportunity by which he might do good. By contrast, as I said, though they may seem great in fact and in appearance, those are ungracious which are either wrung from the giver or merely drop from him; and what is given with an easy hand comes far more gratefully than what is given with a full hand.

Exiguum est, quod in me contulit, sed amplius non potuit; at hic quod dedit, magnum est, sed dubitauit, sed distulit, sed, cum daret, gemuit, sed superbe dedit, sed circumtulit et placere non ei, cui praestabat, uoluit; ambitioni dedit, non mihi.

Meager is what he conferred upon me, but he could not do more; but this man, what he gave was great, but he hesitated, but he deferred it, but, when he gave, he groaned, but he gave superbly, but he paraded it about and wished to please not him to whom he was bestowing it; to ambition he gave, not to me.

[8] Socrati cum multa pro suis quisque facultatibus offerrent, Aeschines, pauper auditor: 'Nihil' inquit 'dignum te, quod dare tibi possim, inuenio et hoc uno modo pauperem esse me sentio. Itaque dono tibi, quod unum habeo, me ipsum. Hoc munus rogo, qualecumque est, boni consulas cogitesque alios, cum multum tibi darent, plus sibi reliquisse.' Cui Socrates: 'Quidni tu' inquit 'magnum munus mihi dederis, nisi forte te paruo aestimas?

[8] When many were offering things to Socrates according to each one’s faculties, Aeschines, a poor auditor: 'I find nothing worthy of you that I can give to you, and in this one way I perceive that I am poor. And so I gift to you the one thing I have—myself. I ask that you take this gift, whatever it is, kindly, and think that others, when they gave much to you, left more for themselves.' To whom Socrates: 'Why should you not have given me a great gift, unless perhaps you esteem yourself at a small price?'

Habebo itaque curae, ut te meliorem tibi reddam, quam accepi.' Vicit Aeschines hoc munere Alcibiadis parem diuitiis animum et omnem iuuenum opulentorum munificentiam.

'I will therefore take care to render you better to yourself than I received you.' By this gift Aeschines outdid the spirit of Alcibiades—equal to his riches—and all the munificence of opulent youths.

[9] Vides, quomodo animus inueniat liberalitatis materiam etiam inter angustias? Videtur mihi dixisse: 'Nihil egisti, fortuna, quod me pauperem esse uoluisti; expediam dignum nihilo minus huic uiro munus, et quia de tuo non possum, de meo dabo.' Neque est, quod existimes illum uilem sibi fuisse: pretium se sui fecit. Ingeniosus adulescens inuenit, quemadmodum Socraten sibi daret.

[9] Do you see how the spirit finds material for liberality even amid straits? It seems to me he said: 'You have achieved nothing, Fortune, by wishing me to be poor; I will make ready nonetheless a gift worthy of this man, and since I cannot give from what is yours, I will give from what is mine.' Nor is there reason for you to suppose that he was cheap in his own eyes: he set a value on himself. The ingenious youth found, how he might give Socrates to himself.

Non quanta quaeque sint, sed a quali profecta, prospiciendum. Callidus non difficilem aditum praebuit inmodica cupientibus spesque inprobas nihil re adiuturus uerbis fouit; at peior opinio, si lingua asper, uoltu grauis cum inuidia fortunam suam explicuit. Colunt enim detestanturque felicem et, si potuerint, eadem facturi odere facientem.

One must look not at how great each thing is, but from what sort it has proceeded. The shrewd man did not present a difficult access to those desiring immoderate things, and he fomented improper hopes with words, about to aid in nothing in reality; but there is a worse opinion, if, harsh in tongue and grave in countenance, he displayed his fortune with envy. For they both court and detest the fortunate man, and, if they can, being about to do the same things, they hate the one doing them.

Coniugibus alienis ne clam quidem sed aperte ludibrio habitis suas aliis permisere. Rusticus, inhumanus ac mali moris et inter matronas abominandus conuicio est, si quis coniugem suam in sella prostare uetuit et uulgo admissis inspectoribus uehi perspicuam undique. Si quis nulla se amica fecit insignem nec alienae uxori annuum praestat, hunc matronae humilem et sordidae libidinis et ancillariolum uocant.

With other men’s spouses held up to mockery not even secretly but openly, they have permitted their own to others. A man is railed at as rustic, inhuman, of bad morals, and to be abominated among matrons, if he has forbidden his wife to stand forth on a chair for sale and to be carried, visible on all sides, with “inspectors” from the vulgar crowd admitted. If someone has made himself conspicuous by no girlfriend and does not furnish an annual payment to another’s wife, the matrons call this man lowly, of sordid libido, and an ancillary little fellow.

Inde decentissimum sponsaliorum genus est adulterium et in consensu uiduitas caelibatusque: nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit. Iam rapta spargere, sparsa fera et acri auaritia recolligere certant, nihil pensi habere, paupertatem alienam contemnere, suam <magis> quam ullum aliud uereri malum, pacem iniuriis perturbare, inbecilliores ui ac metu premere. Nam prouincias spoliari et nummarium tribunal audita utrimque licitatione alteri addici non mirum, quoniam, quae emeris, uendere gentium ius est.

Thence the most becoming kind of betrothals is adultery, and by consensus widowhood and celibacy: no one has taken a wife, save he who has abducted her. Now they vie to scatter what has been snatched, and with wild and keen avarice to gather again what was scattered,
to reckon nothing of weight, to contemn another’s poverty, to fear their own <more> than any other ill, to disturb peace by injuries, to press the weaker by force and fear. For that provinces are despoiled and the pecuniary tribunal, after hearing the bidding on both sides, is assigned—knocked down—to one party is no wonder, since to sell what you have bought is the law of nations.

[10] Sed longius nos inpetus euehit prouocante materia; itaque sic finiamus, ne in nostro saeculo culpa subsidat. Hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, euersos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque, paulum dumtaxat ultro aut citro mota, ut fluctus, quos aestus accedens longius extulit, recedens interiore litorum uestigio tenuit. Nunc in adulteria magis quam in alia peccabitur, abrumpetque frenos pudicitia; nunc conuiuiorum uigebit furor et foedissimum patrimoniorum exitium, culina; nunc cultus corporum nimius et formae cura prae se ferens animi deformitatem; nunc in petulantiam et audaciam erumpet male dispensata libertas; nunc in crudelitatem priuatam ac publicam ibitur bellorumque ciuilium insaniam, qua omne sanctum ac sacrum profanetur; habebitur aliquando ebrietati honor, et plurimum meri cepisse uirtus erit.

[10] But our impulse carries us farther, the subject-matter provoking; and so let us finish thus, lest blame settle upon our own age. This our ancestors complained of, this we complain of, this our posterity will complain of: morals overturned, iniquity to reign, human affairs and every nefarious thing to slip into the worse; yet those things stand in the same place and will stand, moved only a little this way or that, like waves which, the tide advancing, has borne farther out, but receding has held within an inner trace of the shores. Now there will be sinning in adulteries more than in other matters, and pudicity will snap the reins; now the fury of banquets will thrive, and the most foul destruction of patrimonies, the kitchen; now an excessive cult of bodies and a care for form, carrying before itself the deformity of mind; now ill-dispensed liberty will burst forth into petulance and audacity; now there will be a going into private and public cruelty and into the insanity of civil wars, whereby every holy and sacred thing is profaned; honor will sometimes be held for drunkenness, and to have taken very much unmixed wine will be virtue.

Non expectant uno loco uitia, sed mobilia et inter se dissidentia tumultuantur, pellunt in uicem fuganturque; ceterum idem semper de nobis pronuntiare debebimus, malos esse nos, malos fuisse, - inuitus adiciam, et futuros esse. Erunt homicidae, tyranni, fures, adulteri, raptores, sacrilegi, proditores; infra omnia ista ingratus est, nisi quod omnia ista ab ingrato sunt, sine quo uix ullum magnum facinus adcreuit. Hoc tu caue tamquam maximum crimen ne admittas, ignosce tamquam leuissimo, si admissum est.

Vices do not wait in one place, but, mobile and mutually dissentient, they tumultuate, they drive in turn and are driven into flight; nevertheless we must always pronounce the same about ourselves, that we are bad, that we have been bad—unwillingly I will add, and that we shall be so in the future. There will be homicides, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, raptores, sacrilegists, traitors; below all these is the ungrateful man—except that all these things are from the ungrateful man, without which scarcely any great crime has accrued. This do you beware of as the greatest crime, that you not admit it; forgive it as the very lightest, if it has been admitted.

Haec est enim iniuriae summa: beneficium perdidisti. Saluum est enim tibi ex illo, quod est optimum: dedisti. Quemadmodum autem curandum est, ut in eos potissimum beneficia conferamus, qui grate responsuri erunt, ita quaedam, etiam si male de illis sperabitur, faciemus tribuemusque, non solum si iudicabimus ingratos fore, sed si sciemus fuisse.

For this is the sum of the injury: you have lost the benefit. For what from it is best remains safe for you: you gave. And just as it must be seen to that we confer benefits chiefly upon those who will respond gratefully, so certain things we will do and bestow even if we have a poor hope concerning them—not only if we judge that they will be ungrateful, but even if we know that they have been.

Tamquam si filios alicui restituere potero magno periculo liberatos sine ullo meo, non dubitabo. Dignum etiam inpendio sanguinis mei tuebor et in partem discriminis ueniam; indignum si eripere latronibus potero clamore sublato, salutarem uocem homini non pigebit emittere.

As if, if I shall be able to restore to someone his sons, freed from great peril, without any peril of my own, I will not hesitate. The worthy I will protect even at the expenditure of my blood, and I will come into a share of the peril; the unworthy, if I can snatch him from robbers with a cry raised, it will not irk me to emit a saving voice for the man.

[11] Sequitur, ut dicamus, quae beneficia danda sint et quemadmodum. Primum demus necessaria, deinde utilia, deinde iocunda, utique mansura. Incipiendum est autem a necessariis; aliter enim ad animum peruenit, quod uitam continet, aliter, quod exornat aut instruit.

[11] It follows that we should say what benefits are to be given and in what manner. First let us give the necessary things, then the useful, then the pleasant—at any rate those that will be lasting. We must, however, begin with the necessary; for that which maintains life reaches the mind in one way,
that which adorns or equips it, in another.

Potest in eo aliquis fastidiosus esse aestimator, quo facile cariturus est, de quo dicere licet: 'Recipe, non desidero; meo contentus sum.' Interim non reddere tantum libet, quod acceperis, sed abicere. Ex his, quae necessaria sunt, quaedam primum optinent locum, sine quibus non possumus uiuere, quaedam secundum, sine quibus non debemus, quaedam tertium, sine quibus nolumus. Prima huius notae sunt: hostium manibus eripi et tyrannicae irae et proscriptioni et aliis periculis, quae uaria et incerta humanam uitam obsident.

One can be a fastidious appraiser in the case of that which he will easily do without, about which it is allowable to say: 'Take it back; I do not desire it; I am content with my own.' At times one is inclined not merely to not return what one has received, but to cast it away. Of the things that are necessary, some hold first place, without which we cannot live; some second, without which we ought not; some third, without which we are unwilling. Things of the first mark are these: rescue from the hands of enemies, from tyrannical wrath, from proscription, and from other perils which, diverse and uncertain, besiege human life.

Quidquid horum discusserimus, quo maius ac terribilius erit, hoc maiorem inibimus gratiam; subit enim cogitatio, quantis sint liberati malis, et lenocinium est muneris antecedens metus. Nec tamen ideo debemus tardius quemquam seruare, quam possumus, ut muneri nostro timor inponat pondus. Proxima ab his sunt, sine quibus possumus quidem uiuere, sed ut mors potior sit, tamquam libertas et pudicitia et mens bona.

Whatever of these we dispel, the greater
and more terrible it is, the greater a gratitude we shall enter; for the thought comes up,
of how great evils they have been freed, and the antecedent fear is a seductive enhancement of the gift. Nor yet on that account ought we to save anyone more slowly than we can, in order that fear may impose weight on our gift. Next after these are those things, without which
indeed we can live, but such that death is preferable, such as liberty and
pudicity and a good mind.

Post haec habebimus coniunctione ac sanguine usuque et consuetudine longa cara, ut liberos, coniuges, penates, cetera, quae usque eo animus sibi adplicuit, ut ab illis quam uita diuelli grauius existimet. Subsecuntur utilia, quorum uaria et lata materia est; hic erit pecunia non superfluens sed ad sanum modum habendi parata; hic erit honor et processus ad altiora tendentium; nec enim utilius quicquam est quam sibi utilem fieri. Iam cetera ex abundanti ueniunt delicatos factura; in his sequemur, ut opportunitate grata sint, ut non uolgaria, quaeque aut pauci habuerint aut pauci intra hanc aetatem aut hoc modo, quae, etiam si natura pretiosa non sunt, tempore aut loco fiant.

After these we shall have those dear by conjunction and by blood and by use and long consuetude, such as children, spouses, Penates, and the rest, which the spirit has attached to itself to such a degree that it judges being torn from them more grievous than from life. Next follow the utilia, whose materia is varied and broad; here will be money not superfluous but kept to a sound measure of having; here will be honor and progress for those tending toward higher things; for nothing is more useful than to make oneself useful to oneself. Now the remaining things come out of abundance, destined to make people delicate; in these we shall aim that they be pleasing by opportunity, that they be not vulgar, things which either few have possessed or few within this age or in this manner, things which, even if they are not by nature precious, are made so by time or by place.

Videamus, quid oblatum maxime uoluptati futurum sit, quid frequenter occursurum habenti, ut totiens nobiscum quotiens cum illo sit; utique cauebimus, ne munera superuacua mittamus, ut feminae aut seni arma uenatoria, ut rustico libros, ut studiis ac litteris dedito retia. Aeque ex contrario circumspiciemus, ne, dum grata mittere uolumus, suum cuique morbum exprobratura mittamus, sicut ebrioso uina et ualetudinario medicamenta. Maledictum enim incipit esse, non munus, in quo uitium accipientis adgnoscitur.

Let us see what, when offered, will be most for pleasure,
what will frequently present itself to the one possessing it, so that he may be with us as often as he is with
it; surely we will beware lest we send superfluous gifts, as hunting arms to a woman
or an old man, as books to a rustic, as nets to one devoted to studies and letters.
Likewise, conversely, we will look around, lest, while we wish to send pleasing things, we send things that will reproach each one’s own malady, such as wines to a drunkard and
medicines to a valetudinarian. For it begins to be a malediction, not a gift, in
which the vice of the recipient is recognized.

[12] Si arbitrium dandi penes nos est, praecipue mansura quaeremus, ut quam minime mortale munus sit. Pauci enim sunt tam grati, ut, quid acceperint, etiam si non uident, cogitent. Ingratos quoque memoria cum ipso munere incurrit, ubi ante oculos est et obliuisci sui non sinit, sed auctorem suum ingerit et inculcat.

[12] If the discretion of giving is in our hands, we will seek especially things that will endure,
so that the gift may be as little mortal as possible. For few are so grateful that they think of what
they have received even if they do not see it. Remembrance too comes upon the ungrateful along with the gift itself,
when it is before their eyes and does not allow itself to be forgotten,
but thrusts upon them and inculcates its author.

Eo quidem magis duratura quaeramus, quia numquam admonere debemus; ipsa res euanescentem memoriam excitet. Libentius donabo argentum factum quam signatum; libentius statuas quam uestem et quod usus breuis deterat. Apud paucos post rem manet gratia; plures sunt, apud quos non diutius in animo sunt donata, quam in usu.

All the more let us seek things that will be durable, because we should never have to admonish; the thing itself should excite the evanescent memory. I will more willingly give wrought silver than coined; more willingly statues than clothing and what brief use wears out. Among a few, gratitude remains after the thing; there are more with whom the gifts are no longer in the mind than they are in use.

Ego, si fieri potest, consumi munus meum nolo; extet, haereat amico meo, conuiuat. Nemo tam stultus est, ut monendus sit, ne cui gladiatores aut uenationem iam munere edito mittat et uestimenta aestiua bruma, hiberna solstitio. Sit in beneficio sensus communis; tempus, locum obseruet, personas, quia momentis quaedam grata et ingrata sunt.

I, if it can be done, do not want my gift to be consumed; let it stand forth, let it adhere to my friend, let it live on with him. No one is so foolish as to need to be warned not to send to someone gladiators or a venation (beast-hunt) when the show has already been given, and summer garments at midwinter, winter ones at the summer solstice. Let there be common sense in a benefaction; let it observe time, place, persons, since at certain moments some things are welcome and others unwelcome.

Quanto acceptius est, si id damus, quod quis non habet, quam cuius copia abundat? quod diu quaerit nec inuenit, quam quod ubique uisurus est? Munera non tam pretiosa quam rara et exquisita sint, quae etiam apud diuitem sibi locum faciant, sicut gregalia quoque poma et post paucos dies itura in fastidium delectant, si prouenere maturius.

How much more acceptable is it, if we give what someone does not have, than what
he has a copious abundance of? that which he has long sought and not found, than what he is going to see everywhere?
Let gifts be not so much precious as rare and exquisite, which also may make a place for themselves even with a rich man,
just as even common orchard-fruits delight, though after a few days they are going to pass into distaste,
if they have matured earlier.

Illa quoque non erunt sine honore, quae aut nemo illis alius dedit aut nos nulli alii.

Those things
also will not be without honor, which either no one else has given to them, or we
to no other.

[13] Alexandro Macedoni, cum uictor Orientis animos supra humana tolleret, Corinthii per legatos gratulati sunt et ciuitate illum sua donauerunt. Cum risisset hoc Alexander officii genus, unus ex legatis: 'Nulli' inquit 'ciuitatem umquam dedimus alii quam tibi et Herculi.' Libens accepti non dilutum honorem et legatos inuitatione aliaque humanitate prosecutus cogitauit, non qui sibi ciuitatem darent, sed cui dedissent; et homo gloriae deditus, cuius nec naturam nec modum nouerat, Herculis Liberique uestigia sequens ac ne ibi quidem resistens, ubi illa defecerant, ad socium honoris sui respexit a dantibus, tamquam caelum, quod mente uanissima conplectebatur, teneret, quia Herculi aequabatur. Quid enim illi simile habebat uesanus adulescens, cui pro uirtute erat felix temeritas?

[13] Alexander the Macedonian, when as victor of the East he was raising his spirit above the human, the Corinthians through legates offered congratulations and endowed him with their civitas. When Alexander laughed at this genus of courtesy, one of the legates said: 'To no one have we ever given citizenship other than to you and to Hercules.' He gladly accepted the honor, not diluted, and, having attended the legates with an invitation and other humanity, he cogitated, not who were giving citizenship to himself, but to whom they had given it; and the man devoted to gloria, whose nature and measure he knew not, following the vestiges of Hercules and Liber, and not even halting there where those had failed, looked, on the donors’ part, to a partner of his honor, as though he were holding heaven, which he embraced with a most vain mind, because he was being equated to Hercules. For what had that frenzied adolescent like unto him, to whom fortunate temerity stood in place of virtue?

Hercules nihil sibi uicit; orbem terrarum transiuit non concupiscendo, sed iudicando, quid uinceret, malorum hostis, bonorum uindex, terrarum marisque pacator; at hic a pueritia latro gentiumque uastator, tam hostium pernicies quam amicorum, qui summum bonum duceret terrori esse cunctis mortalibus, oblitus non ferocissima tantum, sed ignauissima quoque animalia timeri ob malum uirus.

Hercules conquered nothing for himself; he traversed the orb of the lands not by coveting, but by judging what to conquer, an enemy of evils, a vindicator of the good, a pacifier of lands and sea; but this man, from boyhood a bandit and a devastator of nations, as much the ruin of enemies as of friends, who reckoned the highest good to be to stand as a terror to all mortals, forgetful that not only the fiercest, but also the most craven animals are feared on account of a noxious venom.

[14] Ad propositum nunc reuertamur. Beneficium qui quibuslibet dat, nulli gratum dat; nemo se stabularii aut cauponis hospitem iudicat nec conuiuam dantis epulum, ubi dici potest: 'Quid enim in me contulit? Nempe hoc, quod et in illum uix bene notum sibi et in illum etiam inimicum ac turpissimum hominem.

[14] Let us now return to our proposed subject. He who gives a benefaction to just anybody gives it gratifying to no one; no one judges himself the guest of a stable-keeper or a tavern-keeper, nor the dinner-companion of one giving a banquet, where it can be said: 'What indeed has he conferred upon me? Surely this, which also upon that man scarcely well known to him, and upon that man even an enemy and a most disgraceful fellow.'

Numquid enim me dignum iudicauit? morbo suo morem gessit.' Quod uoles gratum esse, rarum effice: quis patitur sibi inputari <uolgaria>? Nemo haec ita interpretetur, tamquam reducam liberalitatem et frenis artioribus reprimam; illa uero, in quantum libet, exeat, sed eat, non erret. Licet ita largiri, ut unusquisque, etiam si cum multis accepit, in populo se esse non putet.

‘For did he judge me worthy? He humored his own malady.’ Whatever you want to be welcome, make it rare: who allows to himself to have <vulgar things> imputed? Let no one interpret these things thus, as if I were drawing back liberality and restraining it with tighter reins; let that, indeed, go forth as far as it pleases, but let it go, not err. It is permitted to bestow largesse in such a way that each person, even if he has received along with many, does not think himself to be in the crowd.

Nemo non habeat aliquam familiarem notam, per quam speret se propius admissum; dicat: 'Accepi idem, quod ille, sed ultro. Accepi, quod ille, sed ego intra breue tempus, cum ille diu meruisset. Sunt, qui idem habeant, sed non eisdem uerbis datum, non eadem comitate tribuentis.

Nobody not
let him have some familiar mark, through which he may hope himself admitted more closely; let him say: 'I received the same as he, but unasked. I received what he did, but I within a short time, whereas he had long deserved it. There are those who have the same, but not given with the same words, not with the same comity of the bestower.'

Ille accepit, cum rogasset; ego non rogaram. Ille accepit, sed facile redditurus, sed cuius senectus et libera orbitas magna promittebat; mihi plus dedit, quamuis idem dederit, quia sine spe recipiendi dedit.' Quemadmodum meretrix ita inter multos se diuidet, ut nemo non aliquod signum familiaris animi ferat, ita, qui beneficia sua amabilia esse uult, excogitet, quomodo et multi obligentur et tamen singuli habeant aliquid, quo se ceteris praeferant.

He received it,
when he had asked; I had not asked. He received it, but being likely to repay easily, and whose old age and unencumbered lack of heirs promised much; to me he gave more, although he gave the same, because he gave without hope of receiving back.' Just as a prostitute thus divides herself among many, so that no one fails to bear some token of familiar feeling, so let him who wants his benefactions to be amiable devise how both many may be obligated and yet individuals have something
by which they may set themselves before the rest.

[15] Ego uero beneficiis non obicio moras; quo plura maioraque fuerint, plus adferent laudis. At sit iudicium; neque enim cordi esse cuiquam possunt forte ac temere data. Quare si quis existimat nos, cum ista praecipimus, benignitatis fines introrsus referre et illi minus laxum limitem aperire, ne perperam monitiones nostras exaudit.

[15] I, for my part, do not interpose delays to benefits; the more and the greater they are, the more they will bring of praise. But let there be judgment; for things given by chance and rashly cannot be dear to anyone’s heart. Therefore, if someone thinks that we, when we give these precepts, draw the boundaries of benignity inward and open for it a less lax limit, let him not mis-hear our monitions.

Quam enim uirtutem magis ueneramur? cui magis stimulos addimus? quibusue tam conuenit haec adhortatio quam nobis societatem generis humani sancientibus?

For what virtue, indeed, do we venerate more? whom do we spur on more? and to whom does this exhortation so well befit as to us who are sanctioning the fellowship of the human race?

Quid ergo est? Cum sit nulla honesta uis animi, etiam si a recta uoluntate incepit, nisi quam uirtutem modus fecit, ueto liberalitatem nepotari. Tunc iuuat accepisse beneficium et supinis quidem manibus, ubi illud ratio ad dignos perducit, non quolibet casus et consilii indigens inpetus defert; quod ostentare libet et inscribere sibi.

What, then, is it? Since no honorable force of mind—even if it began from a right will—exists except that which measure has made into virtue, I veto liberality’s playing the spendthrift. Then it is a joy to have received a benefit, and indeed with upturned hands, when reason conducts it to the worthy, not when any chance and an impulse in need of counsel confers it; a thing one likes to ostentate and to ascribe to oneself.

Beneficia tu uocas, quorum auctorem fateri pudet? At illa quanto gratiora sunt quantoque in partem interiorem animi numquam exitura descendunt, cum delectant cogitantem magis a quo, quam quid acceperis? Crispus Passienus solebat dicere quorundam se iudicium malle quam beneficium, quorundam beneficium malle quam iudicium, et subiciebat exempla: 'Malo' aiebat 'diui Augusti iudicium, malo Claudii beneficium.' Ego uero nullius puto expetendum esse beneficium, cuius uile iudicium est.

Do you call those “benefits,” whose author you are ashamed to confess? But how much more grateful are those, and how they descend into the inner part of the mind, never to go out, when, in reflecting, you are delighted more by from whom than by what you have received? Crispus Passienus used to say that he preferred the judgment of some to their benefit, and the benefit of some to their judgment, and he subjoined examples: 'I prefer,' he said, 'the judgment of the deified Augustus; I prefer the benefit of Claudius.' But I, for my part, think that the benefit of no one whose judgment is vile is to be sought.

Quid ergo? non erat accipiendum a Claudio, quod dabatur? Erat, sed sicut a fortuna, quam scires posse statim malam fieri.

What then? Was it not to be accepted from Claudius, what was being given? It was, but as from Fortune, which you knew could at once turn bad.

Quid ista inter se mixta diuidimus? Non est beneficium, cui deest pars optima, datum esse iudicio; alioqui pecunia ingens, si non ratione nec recta uoluntate donata est, non magis beneficium est quam thesaurus. Multa sunt autem, quae oportet accipere nec debere.

Why do we divide things that are mixed among themselves? It is not a benefit, if the best part is lacking—that it was given with judgment; otherwise, a huge sum of money, if it has not been given with reason nor with a right will, is no more a benefit than a treasure. There are many things, moreover, which one ought to accept and yet not owe.