Caesar•COMMENTARIORUM LIBRI VII DE BELLO GALLICO CUM A. HIRTI SUPPLEMENTO
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[1] Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. Hi omnes lingua, institutis, legibus inter se differunt. Gallos ab Aquitanis Garumna flumen, a Belgis Matrona et Sequana dividit.
[1] All Gaul is divided into three parts, of which one the Belgae inhabit, another the Aquitani, the third those who in their own language are called Celts, in ours they are called Gauls. All these differ among themselves in language, institutions, and laws. The Garonne river separates the Gauls from the Aquitani, the Marne and the Seine from the Belgae.
Of all these the bravest are the Belgae, for the reason that they are farthest removed from the culture and humanity of the Province, and merchants very seldom travel to them and import those things which pertain to the effeminizing of minds, and they are nearest to the Germans, who dwell across the Rhine, with whom they continually wage war. For which cause the Helvetii also surpass the remaining Gauls in virtue (valor), because they strive with the Germans in almost daily battles, when either they keep them from their own borders or they themselves wage war in their borders. Of these, one part, which it has been said the Gauls hold, takes its beginning from the river Rhone, is bounded by the Garonne river, by the Ocean, by the borders of the Belgae; it also touches, from the Sequani and the Helvetii, the Rhine river, it verges toward the north.
The Belgae arise from the farthest boundaries of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine, and look toward the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and that part of the Ocean which is at Spain; it looks between the setting of the sun and the north.
[2] Apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus fuit et ditissimus Orgetorix. Is M. Messala, [et P.] M. Pisone consulibus regni cupiditate inductus coniurationem nobilitatis fecit et civitati persuasit ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent: perfacile esse, cum virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri. Id hoc facilius iis persuasit, quod undique loci natura Helvetii continentur: una ex parte flumine Rheno latissimo atque altissimo, qui agrum Helvetium a Germanis dividit; altera ex parte monte Iura altissimo, qui est inter Sequanos et Helvetios; tertia lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano, qui provinciam nostram ab Helvetiis dividit.
[2] Among the Helvetii by far the most noble and most wealthy was Orgetorix. He, when M. Messala, [and P.] M. Piso were consuls, induced by a desire for kingship, made a conspiracy of the nobility and persuaded the civitas that they should go out from their boundaries with all their forces: that it was very easy, since they excelled all in virtue/valor, to get possession of the imperium of all Gaul. He persuaded them of this the more easily, because on all sides the Helvetii are confined by the nature of the place: on one side by the very broad and very deep river Rhine, which divides the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on another side by the very high Jura mountain, which is between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on the third by Lake Leman and the river Rhone, which divides our province from the Helvetii.
By these conditions it came about that they both wandered less widely and were less easily able to bring war upon their neighbors; and in this respect men desirous of warring were affected with great pain. Moreover, in proportion to the multitude of men and to the glory of war and fortitude, they judged that they had narrow borders, which extended in length 240 miles, in breadth 180.
[3] His rebus adducti et auctoritate Orgetorigis permoti constituerunt ea quae ad proficiscendum pertinerent comparare, iumentorum et carrorum quam maximum numerum coemere, sementes quam maximas facere, ut in itinere copia frumenti suppeteret, cum proximis civitatibus pacem et amicitiam confirmare. Ad eas res conficiendas biennium sibi satis esse duxerunt; in tertium annum profectionem lege confirmant. Ad eas res conficiendas Orgetorix deligitur.
[3] Led by these considerations and moved by the authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to prepare those things which pertained to setting out: to buy up the greatest possible number of draft animals and carts, to make sowings as great as possible so that on the journey a supply of grain might suffice, to confirm peace and friendship with the nearest states. For accomplishing these things they judged a two-year period sufficient for themselves; they confirm by law the departure in the third year. For accomplishing these things Orgetorix is chosen.
He takes upon himself a legation to the states. On that journey he persuades Casticus, son of Catamantaloedes, a Sequanian—whose father had possessed the kingship among the Sequani for many years and had been styled a friend by the senate of the Roman people—to seize the kingship in his own state, which his father had formerly held; and likewise he persuades Dumnorix the Aeduan, brother of Diviciacus, who at that time held the principate in the state and was most acceptable to the plebs, to attempt the same, and he gives him his own daughter in marriage. He shows them that it is very easy to bring their undertakings to completion, because he himself is about to obtain the imperium of his state: that there is no doubt that the Helvetii would have the greatest power in all Gaul; he affirms that with his own resources and his own army he will secure for them their kingdoms.
[4] Ea res est Helvetiis per indicium enuntiata. Moribus suis Orgetoricem ex vinculis causam dicere coegerunt; damnatum poenam sequi oportebat, ut igni cremaretur. Die constituta causae dictionis Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum milia decem, undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat, eodem conduxit; per eos ne causam diceret se eripuit.
[4] This affair was revealed to the Helvetii by an informer. By their customs they compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in chains; if convicted, it was necessary that the penalty follow, namely that he be burned with fire. On the day appointed for the pleading of the cause, Orgetorix mustered to the trial from all sides his entire household, to the number of ten thousand persons, and he gathered to the same place all his clients and debtors, of whom he had a great number; through them he snatched himself away so as not to plead his cause.
[5] Post eius mortem nihilo minus Helvetii id quod constituerant facere conantur, ut e finibus suis exeant. Ubi iam se ad eam rem paratos esse arbitrati sunt, oppida sua omnia, numero ad duodecim, vicos ad quadringentos, reliqua privata aedificia incendunt; frumentum omne, praeter quod secum portaturi erant, comburunt, ut domum reditionis spe sublata paratiores ad omnia pericula subeunda essent; trium mensum molita cibaria sibi quemque domo efferre iubent. Persuadent Rauracis et Tulingis et Latobrigis finitimis, uti eodem usi consilio oppidis suis vicisque exustis una cum iis proficiscantur, Boiosque, qui trans Rhenum incoluerant et in agrum Noricum transierant Noreiamque oppugnabant, receptos ad se socios sibi adsciscunt.
[5] After his death, nonetheless, the Helvetii attempt to do that which they had constituted: to go out from their boundaries. When they now judged themselves prepared for that undertaking, they ignite all their towns, to the number of about 12, their villages to about 400, and the remaining private buildings; they combust all the grain, except what they were going to carry with them, so that, the hope of a home-return removed, they might be more prepared for undergoing all dangers; they order each person to carry out from home for himself milled provisions for 3 months. They persuade the neighboring Rauraci, Tulingi, and Latobrigi, to set out together with them, employing the same plan, their towns and villages having been burned; and the Boii, who had dwelt across the Rhine and had crossed into the territory of Noricum and were besieging Noreia, once received to them, they enroll to themselves as allies.
[6] Erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent: unum per Sequanos, angustum et difficile, inter montem Iuram et flumen Rhodanum, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur, mons autem altissimus impendebat, ut facile perpauci prohibere possent; alterum per provinciam nostram, multo facilius atque expeditius, propterea quod inter fines Helvetiorum et Allobrogum, qui nuper pacati erant, Rhodanus fluit isque non nullis locis vado transitur. Extremum oppidum Allobrogum est proximumque Helvetiorum finibus Genava. Ex eo oppido pons ad Helvetios pertinet.
[6] There were in all two routes, by which routes they could go out from home: one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between Mount Jura and the River Rhone, where scarcely single wagons could be led; moreover a very high mountain overhung, so that a very few could easily prevent them; the other through our province, much easier and more expeditious, because between the borders of the Helvetians and the Allobroges, who had lately been pacified, the Rhone flows, and in some places it is crossed by a ford. The farthest town of the Allobroges and closest to the borders of the Helvetians is Geneva. From that town a bridge leads toward the Helvetians.
They reckoned that they would either persuade the Allobroges—since they did not yet seem of good mind toward the Roman people—or would by force coerce them to allow them to go through their borders. With all things for the departure prepared, they appoint a day, on which day all are to convene at the bank of the Rhone. That day was the 5th day before the Kalends.
[7] Caesari cum id nuntiatum esset, eos per provinciam nostram iter facere conari, maturat ab urbe proficisci et quam maximis potest itineribus in Galliam ulteriorem contendit et ad Genavam pervenit. Provinciae toti quam maximum potest militum numerum imperat (erat omnino in Gallia ulteriore legio una), pontem, qui erat ad Genavam, iubet rescindi. Ubi de eius adventu Helvetii certiores facti sunt, legatos ad eum mittunt nobilissimos civitatis, cuius legationis Nammeius et Verucloetius principem locum obtinebant, qui dicerent sibi esse in animo sine ullo maleficio iter per provinciam facere, propterea quod aliud iter haberent nullum: rogare ut eius voluntate id sibi facere liceat.
[7] When this had been announced to Caesar, that they were trying to make a journey through our province, he hastens to set out from the City and, by the greatest marches he can, presses into Farther Gaul and arrives at Geneva. He levies upon the whole province as great a number of soldiers as he can (there was altogether in Farther Gaul one legion), and orders the bridge, which was at Geneva, to be rescinded. When the Helvetii were informed of his arrival, they send to him legates, the most noble of the state—of which embassy Nammeius and Verucloetius were holding the chief place—who were to say that they had it in mind to make a journey through the province without any mischief, because they had no other route: they ask that by his goodwill it be permitted to them to do this.
Caesar, because he kept in memory that L. Cassius the consul had been slain and his army driven back by the Helvetii and sent under the yoke, did not think it should be conceded; nor did he judge that men with a hostile spirit, if the opportunity were given of making a journey through the province, would restrain themselves from injury and malefice. Nevertheless, in order that a space might intervene while the soldiers whom he had requisitioned could assemble, he replied to the envoys that he would take a day for deliberation: if they wished anything, they should return on the Ides of April.
[8] Interea ea legione quam secum habebat militibusque, qui ex provincia convenerant, a lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, milia passuum XVIIII murum in altitudinem pedum sedecim fossamque perducit. Eo opere perfecto praesidia disponit, castella communit, quo facilius, si se invito transire conentur, prohibere possit. Ubi ea dies quam constituerat cum legatis venit et legati ad eum reverterunt, negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare et, si vim facere conentur, prohibiturum ostendit.
[8] Meanwhile, with the legion that he had with him and with the soldiers who had assembled from the province, from Lake Lemannus, which flows into the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which divides the borders of the Sequani from the Helvetii, he carries along a wall for 19 miles, a wall of a height of 16 feet and a ditch. When this work was finished, he stations garrisons, he fortifies small forts, in order that the more easily, if they should attempt to cross against him unwilling, he might be able to prevent them. When the day that he had set with the envoys came and the envoys returned to him, he says that, according to the custom and precedent of the Roman People, he is not able to grant a route through the province to anyone, and he shows that, if they try to use force, he will forbid it.
The Helvetii, cast down from that hope, with boats joined together and several rafts constructed, and others by the shallows of the Rhone, where the depth of the river was least, sometimes by day, more often by night, having tried whether they could break through, were driven back by the fortification of the works and the concourse of the soldiers and by missiles, and they desisted from this attempt.
[9] Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via, qua Sequanis invitis propter angustias ire non poterant. His cum sua sponte persuadere non possent, legatos ad Dumnorigem Haeduum mittunt, ut eo deprecatore a Sequanis impetrarent. Dumnorix gratia et largitione apud Sequanos plurimum poterat et Helvetiis erat amicus, quod ex ea civitate Orgetorigis filiam in matrimonium duxerat, et cupiditate regni adductus novis rebus studebat et quam plurimas civitates suo beneficio habere obstrictas volebat.
[9] One route remained through the Sequani, by which, the Sequani being unwilling, they could not go on account of the narrowness. Since they could not persuade them of their own accord, they send legates to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that with him as deprecator they might obtain it from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by favor and largess, had very great power among the Sequani and was a friend to the Helvetii, because from that state he had taken to wife the daughter of Orgetorix; and, induced by desire of kingship, he was zealous for new affairs, and wished to have as many states as possible bound to him by his beneficence.
And so he takes the matter in hand and obtains from the Sequani that they allow the Helvetii to go through their own boundaries, and he brings it to completion that they give hostages to one another: the Sequani, that they not prohibit the Helvetii from the route; the Helvetii, that they pass without malefaction and injury.
[10] Caesari renuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et Haeduorum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia. Id si fieret, intellegebat magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet. Ob eas causas ei munitioni quam fecerat T. Labienum legatum praeficit; ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus contendit duasque ibi legiones conscribit et tres, quae circum Aquileiam hiemabant, ex hibernis educit et, qua proximum iter in ulteriorem Galliam per Alpes erat, cum his quinque legionibus ire contendit.
[10] It is reported to Caesar that the Helvetii intend to make a march through the field of the Sequani and Aedui into the borders of the Santones, who are not far from the borders of the Tolosates, which people is in the province. If this should happen, he understood it would be with great peril for the province to have as neighbors warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, in open regions and most especially grain-bearing. For these causes he sets T. Labienus, his legate, over that fortification which he had made; he himself hastens into Italy by great marches, and there he enrolls two legions and leads out three, which were wintering around Aquileia, from their winter-quarters; and, by that route where the nearest way into Further Gaul through the Alps was, he strives to go with these five legions.
Ibi the Ceutrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges, having occupied the higher positions, attempt to prohibit the army in its march. These having been driven back in several battles, from Ocelum, which is the farthest town of the nearer province, he came on the seventh day into the borders of the Vocontii of the farther province; thence into the borders of the Allobroges, from the Allobroges he leads the army into the Segusiavi. These are the first beyond the province across the Rhone.
[11] Helvetii iam per angustias et fines Sequanorum suas copias traduxerant et in Haeduorum fines pervenerant eorumque agros populabantur. Haedui, cum se suaque ab iis defendere non possent, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt rogatum auxilium: ita se omni tempore de populo Romano meritos esse ut paene in conspectu exercitus nostri agri vastari, liberi [eorum] in servitutem abduci, oppida expugnari non debuerint. Eodem tempore quo Haedui Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Haeduorum, Caesarem certiorem faciunt sese depopulatis agris non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere.
[11] The Helvetii had now led their forces through the narrows and the borders of the Sequani and had come into the territory of the Aedui, and they were ravaging their fields. The Aedui, since they could not defend themselves and their possessions from them, send legates to Caesar to request aid: that they had at all times deserved so well of the Roman people that their fields ought not—almost in sight of our army—to be laid waste, their children [of them] to be led away into slavery, their towns to be stormed. At the same time the Ambarri, close allies and kinsmen of the Aedui, make Caesar informed that, their fields having been devastated, they are not easily able to keep the violence of the enemy away from their towns.
Likewise the Allobroges, who had villages and possessions across the Rhone, take refuge with Caesar by flight and demonstrate that for them nothing is left except the soil of their fields. Induced by these things, Caesar decided that he ought not to wait until, with all the fortunes of the allies consumed, the Helvetii should arrive among the Santones.
[12] Flumen est Arar, quod per fines Haeduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit, incredibili lenitate, ita ut oculis in utram partem fluat iudicari non possit. Id Helvetii ratibus ac lintribus iunctis transibant. Ubi per exploratores Caesar certior factus est tres iam partes copiarum Helvetios id flumen traduxisse, quartam vero partem citra flumen Ararim reliquam esse, de tertia vigilia cum legionibus tribus e castris profectus ad eam partem pervenit quae nondum flumen transierat.
[12] There is the river Arar, which through the borders of the Aedui and the Sequani flows into the Rhone, with incredible lenity, such that by the eyes it cannot be judged to which side it flows. The Helvetii were crossing it with rafts and skiffs joined together. When Caesar was made certain by scouts that the Helvetii had now led across three parts of their forces, but that the fourth part remained on this side of the river Arar, about the third watch, having set out from the camp with three legions, he arrived at that part which had not yet crossed the river.
Eying them encumbered and unexpecting, having set upon them he cut down a great part of them; the rest committed themselves to flight and hid in the nearest woods. This pagus was called the Tigurinus; for the whole Helvetian civitas is divided into four pagi. This one pagus, when it had gone out from home, within the memory of our fathers had slain Lucius Cassius, consul, and had sent his army under the yoke.
Thus, whether by chance or by the counsel of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian commonwealth which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman people was the first to pay the penalty. In this matter Caesar avenged not only public but also private injuries, because the Tigurini, in the same battle in which they had slain Cassius, had killed the grandfather of his father-in-law, L. Piso—L. Piso, a legate.
[13] Hoc proelio facto, reliquas copias Helvetiorum ut consequi posset, pontem in Arari faciendum curat atque ita exercitum traducit. Helvetii repentino eius adventu commoti cum id quod ipsi diebus XX aegerrime confecerant, ut flumen transirent, illum uno die fecisse intellegerent, legatos ad eum mittunt; cuius legationis Divico princeps fuit, qui bello Cassiano dux Helvetiorum fuerat. Is ita cum Caesare egit: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis faceret, in eam partem ituros atque ibi futuros Helvetios ubi eos Caesar constituisset atque esse voluisset; sin bello persequi perseveraret, reminisceretur et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum.
[13] This battle having been fought, in order that he might be able to overtake the remaining forces of the Helvetii, he sees to a bridge being made over the Arar and thus leads his army across. The Helvetii, stirred by his sudden arrival, when they understood that that which they themselves had accomplished with the utmost difficulty in 20 days, namely to cross the river, he had done in one day, send envoys to him; of which embassy Divico was chief, who had been leader of the Helvetii in the Cassian war. He dealt thus with Caesar: if the Roman People should make peace with the Helvetii, the Helvetii would go into that region and remain there where Caesar had established them and had wished them to be; but if he should persist in pursuing them with war, let him remember both the old setback of the Roman People and the former virtue (valor) of the Helvetii.
As for his having attacked one canton unexpectedly, when those who had crossed the river were not able to bring help to their own, let him not on that account either ascribe it greatly to his own virtue or look down on them. They had learned thus from their fathers and forefathers: to contend rather by virtue than to rely on trick or ambushes. Therefore let him not bring it about that the place where they had taken their stand should take a name from a calamity of the Roman people and from the internecine destruction of the army, or should hand down the memory of it.
[14] His Caesar ita respondit: eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res quas legati Helvetii commemorassent memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre quo minus merito populi Romani accidissent; qui si alicuius iniuriae sibi conscius fuisset, non fuisse difficile cavere; sed eo deceptum, quod neque commissum a se intellegeret quare timeret neque sine causa timendum putaret. Quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium iniuriarum, quod eo invito iter per provinciam per vim temptassent, quod Haeduos, quod Ambarros, quod Allobrogas vexassent, memoriam deponere posse? Quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur quodque tam diu se impune iniurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere.
[14] To this Caesar thus responded: that the less hesitation was given to him because he held in memory those things which the envoys of the Helvetii had recounted, and that he bore it the more grievously the less they had befallen by the desert of the Roman people; that if he had been conscious to himself of any injury, it would not have been difficult to take precaution; but that he had been deceived in this, that he neither understood that anything had been committed by himself on account of which he ought to fear, nor thought that one should fear without cause. But if he were willing to forget the old contumely, could he also lay down the memory of the recent injuries—namely, that they had attempted a route through the province by force against him unwilling, that they had vexed the Aedui, the Ambarri, the Allobroges? That the fact that they gloried so insolently in their own victory and that they marveled that they had for so long inflicted injuries with impunity, tended to the same point.
For the immortal gods are accustomed, in order that men may grieve more grievously from a commutation of affairs, to grant to those whom they wish to avenge for their crime more favorable circumstances and a more prolonged impunity. Since these things are so, nevertheless, if hostages are given by them to himself, so that he may understand that they will do what they promise, and if they make satisfaction to the Haedui for the injuries which they have inflicted upon them and their allies, likewise if they make satisfaction to the Allobroges, he will make peace with them. Divico replied: that the Helvetii had been instructed by their ancestors thus, that they were accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them; of this matter the Roman people is witness.
[15] Postero die castra ex eo loco movent. Idem facit Caesar equitatumque omnem, ad numerum quattuor milium, quem ex omni provincia et Haeduis atque eorum sociis coactum habebat, praemittit, qui videant quas in partes hostes iter faciant. Qui cupidius novissimum agmen insecuti alieno loco cum equitatu Helvetiorum proelium committunt; et pauci de nostris cadunt.
[15] On the next day they move the camp from that place. Caesar does the same and sends forward all the cavalry, to the number of 4,000, which he had assembled from the whole province and from the Haedui and their allies, to see into what parts the enemy are making their march. These men, having too eagerly pursued the rearmost column, in an unfavorable place join battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii; and a few of our men fall.
Elated by this battle, the Helvetii—because with 500 horsemen they had driven back so great a multitude of cavalry—began more boldly at times to make a stand and, with their rear-guard, to challenge our men to battle. Caesar kept his troops from engagement, and deemed it sufficient for the present to prohibit the enemy from rapines, foragings, and depredations. Thus for about 15 days they made the march in such a way that between the enemy’s last column and our first there was not more than five or six thousand paces intervening.
[16] Interim cotidie Caesar Haeduos frumentum, quod essent publice polliciti, flagitare. Nam propter frigora [quod Gallia sub septentrionibus, ut ante dictum est, posita est,] non modo frumenta in agris matura non erant, sed ne pabuli quidem satis magna copia suppetebat; eo autem frumento quod flumine Arari navibus subvexerat propterea uti minus poterat quod iter ab Arari Helvetii averterant, a quibus discedere nolebat. Diem ex die ducere Haedui: conferri, comportari, adesse dicere.
[16] Meanwhile Caesar daily kept demanding from the Aedui the grain which they had publicly promised. For on account of the cold [because Gaul, as was said before, is situated under the northern constellations], not only were the grains in the fields not ripe, but not even of fodder was a sufficiently great supply available; and that grain which he had brought up by boats on the river Arar he was the less able to use, because the Helvetii had turned the march away from the Arar, from whom he was unwilling to depart. The Aedui kept putting it off day by day: saying it was being collected, being carried together, that it was at hand.
When he understood that he was being led on for too long and that the day was approaching on which it was necessary to measure out the grain to the soldiers, having called together their chieftains—of whom he had a great number in the camp—among them Diviciacus and Liscus, who presided over the highest magistracy, which the Haedui call the vergobret, who is elected annually and has the power of life and death over his own people, he gravely accuses them, because, since it can neither be bought nor taken from the fields, at so necessary a time, with the enemies so near, no support is furnished by them—especially since he had undertaken the war in great part induced by their prayers; he complains much more severely that he has been left forsaken.
[17] Tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus quod antea tacuerat proponit: esse non nullos, quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat, qui privatim plus possint quam ipsi magistratus. Hos seditiosa atque improba oratione multitudinem deterrere, ne frumentum conferant quod debeant: praestare, si iam principatum Galliae obtinere non possint, Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre, neque dubitare [debeant] quin, si Helvetios superaverint Romani, una cum reliqua Gallia Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi. Ab isdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus enuntiari; hos a se coerceri non posse.
[17] Then at last Liscus, induced by Caesar’s oration, sets forth what he had previously kept silent: that there are certain men whose authority with the plebs prevails most greatly, who in private can do more than the magistrates themselves. These men, by seditious and wicked speech, deter the multitude from contributing the grain which they owe: they declare it preferable, if now they cannot obtain the principate of Gaul, to endure the imperia of the Gauls rather than of the Romans; nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans shall have overcome the Helvetii, they will, together with the rest of Gaul, deprive the Aedui of liberty. By these same persons our counsels, and whatever is carried on in the camp, are divulged to the enemy; that these men cannot be restrained by him.
[18] Caesar hac oratione Lisci Dumnorigem, Diviciaci fratrem, designari sentiebat, sed, quod pluribus praesentibus eas res iactari nolebat, celeriter concilium dimittit, Liscum retinet. Quaerit ex solo ea quae in conventu dixerat. Dicit liberius atque audacius.
[18] By this oration of Liscus Caesar was perceiving that Dumnorix, the brother of Diviciacus, was being designated; but, because he did not wish these matters to be bandied about with more persons present, he quickly dismisses the council and detains Liscus. He inquires from him alone about the things which he had said in the assembly. He speaks more freely and more audaciously.
He asks the same things in secret from others; he finds them to be true: that it is Dumnorix himself, a man of highest audacity, with great favor among the plebs on account of his liberality, eager for new things. For several years he holds the port-duties and all the other revenues of the Aedui farmed at a small price, because, when he is bidding, no one dares to bid against him. By these means he has both increased his own estate and acquired great resources for largess; he always maintains at his own expense a great number of cavalry and keeps them around him, and he is able to be lavish not only at home but also among the neighboring states; and for the sake of this power he has settled his mother among the Bituriges with a man there most noble and most powerful; he himself has a wife from among the Helvetii; he has settled his sisters on his mother’s side and his own female relatives in marriage into other states.
that he favors and desires for the Helvetii on account of that affinity, and even hates, in his own name, Caesar and the Romans, because by their arrival his power has been diminished and his brother Diviciacus has been restored to his ancient place of favor and honor. that, if anything should befall the Romans, he comes into the highest hope of obtaining a kingship through the Helvetii; under the imperium of the Roman people to despair not only of kingship, but even of that favor which he has. Caesar was also discovering in his inquiry that, because a cavalry battle had been fought to disadvantage a few days before, the beginning of that flight was made by Dumnorix and his horsemen (for Dumnorix was in command of the cavalry which the Aedui had sent as aid to Caesar): by their flight the rest of the cavalry was panic‑stricken.
[19] Quibus rebus cognitis, cum ad has suspiciones certissimae res accederent, quod per fines Sequanorum Helvetios traduxisset, quod obsides inter eos dandos curasset, quod ea omnia non modo iniussu suo et civitatis sed etiam inscientibus ipsis fecisset, quod a magistratu Haeduorum accusaretur, satis esse causae arbitrabatur quare in eum aut ipse animadverteret aut civitatem animadvertere iuberet. His omnibus rebus unum repugnabat, quod Diviciaci fratris summum in populum Romanum studium, summum in se voluntatem, egregiam fidem, iustitiam, temperantiam cognoverat; nam ne eius supplicio Diviciaci animum offenderet verebatur. Itaque prius quam quicquam conaretur, Diviciacum ad se vocari iubet et, cotidianis interpretibus remotis, per C. Valerium Troucillum, principem Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rerum fidem habebat, cum eo conloquitur; simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio [Gallorum] de Dumnorige sint dicta, et ostendit quae separatim quisque de eo apud se dixerit.
[19] With these things known, since to these suspicions there were being added most certain facts—namely, that he had led the Helvetii through the borders of the Sequani, that he had taken care that hostages be given between them, that he had done all these things not only without his own and the state’s order but even with they themselves unaware, that he was being accused by the magistrate of the Aedui—he judged there to be sufficient cause why either he himself should proceed against him or should order the state to proceed against him. One thing resisted all these considerations: that he had come to know in Diviciacus his brother the highest zeal toward the Roman people, the highest goodwill toward himself, outstanding good faith, justice, and temperance; for he was afraid lest by that man’s punishment he might offend the spirit of Diviciacus. And so, before he attempted anything, he orders Diviciacus to be summoned to him and, with the usual interpreters removed, through Gaius Valerius Troucillus, a leading man of the province of Gaul, his intimate friend, in whom he had the utmost trust in all matters, he converses with him; at the same time he reminds him of the things that, with himself present, were said in the council [of the Gauls] about Dumnorix, and he shows what each person separately had said about him to himself.
[20] Diviciacus multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret: scire se illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se doloris capere, propterea quod, cum ipse gratia plurimum domi atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per se crevisset; quibus opibus ac nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed paene ad perniciem suam uteretur. Sese tamen et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri. Quod si quid ei a Caesare gravius accidisset, cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum teneret, neminem existimaturum non sua voluntate factum; qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae animi a se averterentur.
[20] Diviciacus, with many tears, having embraced Caesar, began to beseech him that he not determine anything more grave against his brother: that he knew those things to be true, and that no one took more pain from it than he himself, for the reason that, whereas he himself had very great favor at home and in the rest of Gaul, that man, on account of his youth, had very little power, and had grown through him; and that by those resources and sinews he was employing not only for the lessening of his favor, but almost for his own ruin. He himself, however, was being moved both by fraternal love and by the estimation of the common crowd. But if anything more grave should befall him from Caesar, since he himself held that place of friendship with him, no one would think it had not been done by his own will; from which matter it would result that the minds of all Gaul would be turned away from him.
When he, weeping, was asking these things from Caesar with many words, Caesar took his right hand; having consoled him, he asks that he make an end of pleading; he shows that his favor with him is of such great weight that he will condone both the injury to the Republic and his own pain to his will and prayers. He calls Dumnorix to himself, brings in the brother; he shows what he reproaches in him; he sets forth what he himself understands, and what the state complains of; he admonishes him to avoid all suspicions for the future; he says that he condones the past to his brother Diviciacus. He sets guards over Dumnorix, so that he may be able to know what he does and with whom he speaks.
[21] Eodem die ab exploratoribus certior factus hostes sub monte consedisse milia passuum ab ipsius castris octo, qualis esset natura montis et qualis in circuitu ascensus qui cognoscerent misit. Renuntiatum est facilem esse. De tertia vigilia T. Labienum, legatum pro praetore, cum duabus legionibus et iis ducibus qui iter cognoverant summum iugum montis ascendere iubet; quid sui consilii sit ostendit.
[21] On the same day, having been informed more certainly by scouts that the enemy had encamped under the mountain eight miles from his own camp, he sent men to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was and what sort of ascent there was in circuit. It was reported to be easy. At the third watch he orders T. Labienus, legate with propraetorian authority, to ascend the highest ridge of the mountain with two legions and with those guides who had come to know the route; he shows what his own plan is.
He himself, at the fourth watch, presses on toward them by the same route by which the enemies had gone, and sends all the cavalry before him. P. Considius, who was held most expert in military science and had been in the army of L. Sulla and afterwards in that of M. Crassus, is sent ahead with the scouts.
[22] Prima luce, cum summus mons a [Lucio] Labieno teneretur, ipse ab hostium castris non longius mille et quingentis passibus abesset neque, ut postea ex captivis comperit, aut ipsius adventus aut Labieni cognitus esset, Considius equo admisso ad eum accurrit, dicit montem, quem a Labieno occupari voluerit, ab hostibus teneri: id se a Gallicis armis atque insignibus cognovisse. Caesar suas copias in proximum collem subducit, aciem instruit. Labienus, ut erat ei praeceptum a Caesare ne proelium committeret, nisi ipsius copiae prope hostium castra visae essent, ut undique uno tempore in hostes impetus fieret, monte occupato nostros expectabat proelioque abstinebat.
[22] At first light, when the highest mountain was being held by [Lucius] Labienus, he himself was not farther than one thousand and five hundred paces from the enemy’s camp, and— as he learned afterward from captives— neither his own arrival nor Labienus’s had been known, Considius, with his horse let go (at full speed), runs up to him, says that the mountain which he had wished to be seized by Labienus is held by the enemy: that he had recognized this from Gallic arms and insignia. Caesar draws up his forces onto the nearest hill, arrays the battle line. Labienus, as it had been prescribed to him by Caesar not to commit to battle unless his own troops had been seen near the enemy’s camp, so that from all sides at one time an attack might be made upon the enemy, with the mountain seized was awaiting our men and was abstaining from battle.
At length, much of the day having passed, Caesar learned through the scouts that both the mountain was held by his own men and that the Helvetians had moved their camp, and that Considius, panic-stricken with fear, had reported to him as seen what he had not seen. On that day he followed the enemy at the interval to which he was accustomed and pitched camp three miles from their camp.
[23] Postridie eius diei, quod omnino biduum supererat, cum exercitui frumentum metiri oporteret, et quod a Bibracte, oppido Haeduorum longe maximo et copiosissimo, non amplius milibus passuum XVIII aberat, rei frumentariae prospiciendum existimavit; itaque iter ab Helvetiis avertit ac Bibracte ire contendit. Ea res per fugitivos L. Aemilii, decurionis equitum Gallorum, hostibus nuntiatur. Helvetii, seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere a se existimarent, eo magis quod pridie superioribus locis occupatis proelium non commisissent, sive eo quod re frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent, commutato consilio atque itinere converso nostros a novissimo agmine insequi ac lacessere coeperunt.
[23] On the next day, since in all a space of two days remained and it was necessary to measure out grain to the army, and since he was not more than 18 miles from Bibracte, the town of the Aedui, by far the greatest and most copious, he judged that provision must be made for the grain-supply; and so he turned his march away from the Helvetii and strove to go to Bibracte. This matter is reported to the enemy by fugitives from L. Aemilius, a decurion of the Gallic cavalry. The Helvetii, either because they supposed that the Romans, panic-struck with fear, were withdrawing from them—the more so because on the previous day, though the higher positions had been seized, they had not joined battle—or because they were confident that they could be cut off in the matter of the grain-supply, with plan changed and the route reversed, began to pursue our men from the rear-guard and to provoke them.
[24] Postquam id animum advertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subduxit equitatumque, qui sustineret hostium impetum, misit. Ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranarum; in summo iugo duas legiones quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat et omnia auxilia conlocavit, ita ut supra se totum montem hominibus compleret; impedimenta sarcinasque in unum locum conferri et eum ab iis qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit. Helvetii cum omnibus suis carris secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; ipsi confertissima acie, reiecto nostro equitatu, phalange facta sub primam nostram aciem successerunt.
[24] After he adverted his mind to this, Caesar withdrew his forces onto the nearest hill and sent the cavalry to withstand the enemy’s onslaught. He himself meanwhile on the middle of the hill drew up a triple battle line of four veteran legions; on the top ridge he stationed two legions which he had recently levied in Cisalpine Gaul and placed all the auxiliaries, in such a way that above him he filled the whole mountain with men; he ordered the baggage and packs to be brought together into one place, and that spot to be fortified by those who had taken position in the upper line. The Helvetii, following with all their wagons, likewise gathered their baggage into one place; they themselves, in the most crowded order, our cavalry having been driven back, with a phalanx formed advanced up beneath our foremost line.
[25] Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus suos proelium commisit. Milites loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. Ea disiecta gladiis destrictis in eos impetum fecerunt.
[25] Caesar, first with his own, then with the horses of all removed from sight, so that, with the danger equalized for all, he might take away the hope of flight, after exhorting his men committed the battle. The soldiers, from the higher ground, when their javelins had been hurled, easily broke through the enemy phalanx. That having been scattered, with swords drawn they made an assault upon them.
To the Gauls there was a great impediment for the fight, because with several of their shields transfixed and fastened together by a single blow of the pila, since the iron had bent upon itself, they could neither wrench them out nor, with the left hand impeded, fight quite commodiously; many, after long having swung the arm, preferred to let the shield slip from the hand and to fight with the body bare. At length, wearied by wounds, they began both to give ground and—because a mountain lay below at a distance of about a thousand paces—to withdraw themselves thither. The mountain having been taken and as our men were coming up, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the number of about 15 thousand men, were closing the enemy’s column and were a guard to the rearmost, straight from the march attacked our men on the open flank to surround them; and the Helvetii, catching sight of this, who had withdrawn onto the mountain, began again to press on and to renew the battle.
[26] Ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt. Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit.
[26] Thus, in a double-fronted battle, it was fought for a long time and fiercely. When they could no longer sustain the impetus of our men, the one party, as they had begun, withdrew themselves into the mountain, the other betook themselves to their baggage and their carts. For in this whole battle, since it was fought from the seventh hour to evening, no one was able to see the enemy turned away in flight.
Until late at night there was fighting even at the baggage-train, because they threw their wagons forward for a rampart and from higher ground were hurling missiles at our men coming up, and some, among the wagons and wheels, were thrusting under mataras and tragulas and wounding our men. After it had been fought for a long time, our men gained possession of the baggage and the camp. There the daughter of Orgetorix and one of his sons were captured.
From that battle about 130,000 men survived, and they went continuously through the whole night [with no part of the night’s march intermitted]; on the fourth day they arrived into the borders of the Lingones, since both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and on account of the burial of the slain our men, [delayed three days], had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones, that they should not assist them with grain nor with any other thing: who, if they had assisted, he would hold them in the same position as the Helvetii. He himself, a three-day interval intermitted, began to follow them with all his forces.
[27] Helvetii omnium rerum inopia adducti legatos de deditione ad eum miserunt. Qui cum eum in itinere convenissent seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent, atque eos in eo loco quo tum essent suum adventum expectare iussisset, paruerunt. Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos perfugissent, poposcit.
[27] The Helvetii, driven by a scarcity of all things, sent envoys to him concerning surrender. When they had met him on the march and had thrown themselves at his feet and, speaking supplicantly and weeping, had sought peace, and when he had ordered them to await his arrival in the place where they then were, they obeyed. After Caesar arrived there, he demanded hostages, arms, and the slaves who had fled for refuge to them.
While these things are being sought out and brought together, [a night intervening] about 6 thousand men of that pagus which is called the Verbigenus, either panic-struck with fear, lest, the arms having been handed over, they should be subjected to punishment, or induced by hope of safety, because in so great a multitude of the surrendered they supposed their flight could either be concealed or altogether go unknown, in the first watch of the night, having gone out from the camp of the Helvetii, hastened toward the Rhine and the borders of the Germans.
[28] Quod ubi Caesar resciit, quorum per fines ierant his uti conquirerent et reducerent, si sibi purgati esse vellent, imperavit; reductos in hostium numero habuit; reliquos omnes obsidibus, armis, perfugis traditis in deditionem accepit. Helvetios, Tulingos, Latobrigos in fines suos, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit, et, quod omnibus frugibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent, Allobrogibus imperavit ut iis frumenti copiam facerent; ipsos oppida vicosque, quos incenderant, restituere iussit. Id ea maxime ratione fecit, quod noluit eum locum unde Helvetii discesserant vacare, ne propter bonitatem agrorum Germani, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, ex suis finibus in Helvetiorum fines transirent et finitimi Galliae provinciae Allobrogibusque essent.
[28] When Caesar learned this, he ordered those through whose territories they had gone to search them out and bring them back, if they wished to be cleared in his sight; those brought back he held in the number of enemies; all the rest, with hostages, arms, and the runaways handed over, he accepted in surrender. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to their own borders whence they had set out; and, because with all their grain lost there was nothing at home by which they might endure hunger, he commanded the Allobroges to furnish them with a supply of grain; he ordered them themselves to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burned. He did this chiefly for this reason: that he did not wish the place from which the Helvetii had departed to stand vacant, lest, on account of the goodness of the fields, the Germans who dwell across the Rhine should cross from their own borders into the borders of the Helvetii and be neighbors to the Province of Gaul and to the Allobroges.
[29] In castris Helvetiorum tabulae repertae sunt litteris Graecis confectae et ad Caesarem relatae, quibus in tabulis nominatim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item separatim, quot pueri, senes mulieresque. [Quarum omnium rerum] summa erat capitum Helvetiorum milium CCLXIII, Tulingorum milium XXXVI, Latobrigorum XIIII, Rauracorum XXIII, Boiorum XXXII; ex his qui arma ferre possent ad milia nonaginta duo. Summa omnium fuerunt ad milia CCCLXVIII.
[29] In the camp of the Helvetii tablets were found, prepared in Greek letters, and reported to Caesar, in which tablets there had been drawn up by name an account: what number had gone out from home of those who could bear arms, and likewise separately, how many boys, old men, and women. [Of all which things] the total was: of the Helvetii, 263,000 heads; of the Tulingi, 36,000; of the Latobriges, 14,000; of the Rauraci, 23,000; of the Boii, 32,000; of these, those who could bear arms, about 92,000. The total of all was about 368,000.
[30] Bello Helvetiorum confecto totius fere Galliae legati, principes civitatum, ad Caesarem gratulatum convenerunt: intellegere sese, tametsi pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani ab his poenas bello repetisset, tamen eam rem non minus ex usu [terrae] Galliae quam populi Romani accidisse, propterea quod eo consilio florentissimis rebus domos suas Helvetii reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur, locumque domicilio ex magna copia deligerent quem ex omni Gallia oportunissimum ac fructuosissimum iudicassent, reliquasque civitates stipendiarias haberent. Petierunt uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris facere voluntate liceret: sese habere quasdam res quas ex communi consensu ab eo petere vellent. Ea re permissa diem concilio constituerunt et iure iurando ne quis enuntiaret, nisi quibus communi consilio mandatum esset, inter se sanxerunt.
[30] With the Helvetian war finished, legates of almost all Gaul, the chiefs of the states, came together to Caesar to offer congratulations: they understood that, although on account of the long-standing injuries of the Helvetii the Roman people had exacted penalties by war from them, nevertheless this matter had turned out no less to the advantage of the [land] of Gaul than of the Roman people, for the reason that with this plan, in their most flourishing circumstances, the Helvetii had left their homes in order to bring war upon all Gaul and to obtain dominion, and to choose for a domicile, out of a great plenty, a place which from the whole of Gaul they had judged most opportune and fruitful, and to hold the remaining states as tributaries. They asked that it be permitted them to proclaim an assembly of all Gaul for a fixed day, and to do this with Caesar’s goodwill: that they had certain matters which by common consent they wished to request from him. This permission being granted, they appointed a day for the council and, by a sworn oath, ordained among themselves that no one should disclose it, except to those to whom by common counsel it had been entrusted.
[31] Eo concilio dimisso, idem princeps civitatum qui ante fuerant ad Caesarem reverterunt petieruntque uti sibi secreto in occulto de sua omniumque salute cum eo agere liceret. Ea re impetrata sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt: non minus se id contendere et laborare ne ea quae dixissent enuntiarentur quam uti ea quae vellent impetrarent, propterea quod, si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum se venturos viderent. Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Haeduus: Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos, alterius Arvernos.
[31] With that council dismissed, the same princes of the states who had been before returned to Caesar and asked that it be permitted to them to deal with him in secret, in concealment, concerning their own and everyone’s safety. This obtained, they all, weeping, threw themselves at Caesar’s feet: that they strove and labored no less that the things they had said not be divulged than that they obtain the things they wished, because, if it were divulged, they saw that they would come into utmost torment. Diviciacus the Aeduan spoke for them: that the factions of all Gaul are two; of these the Aedui hold the principate of the one, the Arverni of the other.
Since these, for many years, had contended so greatly among themselves about supremacy, it came about that by the Arverni and the Sequani Germans were summoned for pay. Of these at first about 15,000 crossed the Rhine; afterward, when the fierce and barbarian men had come to love the fields, the cultivation, and the resources of the Gauls, more were led across; now there are in Gaul to the number of about 120,000. With these the Aedui and their clients once and again contended with arms; having been driven back, they received a great calamity, and lost all their nobility, all their senate, all their cavalry.
By these battles and disasters broken—men who, both by their own valor and by the hospitality and friendship of the Roman people, had formerly been very powerful in Gaul—they were forced by the Sequani to give hostages, the most noble of the state, and by an oath to bind the commonwealth that they would neither demand back the hostages, nor implore aid from the Roman people, nor refuse to be perpetually under their dominion and command. That he was the one man out of the entire state of the Aedui who could not be induced either to swear or to give his children as hostages. For this reason he had fled from the state and had come to Rome to the senate to seek help, because he alone was held neither by oath nor by hostages.
but that it had turned out worse for the Sequani the victors than for the Aedui the vanquished, for the reason that Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had settled within their borders and had occupied a third part of the land of the Sequani, which was the best of all Gaul, and now was ordering the Sequani to withdraw from another third part, for the reason that a few months before 24 thousand men of the Harudes had come to him, for whom a place and seats were being prepared. That it would come to pass within a few years that they would all be driven from the borders of Gaul and that all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for the Gallic land was not to be compared with the land of the Germans, nor this habit of living to be compared with that. But that Ariovistus, once he had conquered the forces of the Gauls in battle (the battle was fought at Magetobriga), was ruling arrogantly and cruelly, demanding hostages, the children of each most noble man, and inflicting upon them every exemplary punishment and tortures, if anything had not been done at his nod or to his will.
that the man is a barbarian, irascible, temerarious: that his commands cannot be sustained any longer. Unless there is some assistance in Caesar and the Roman People, the same thing must be done by all the Gauls as the Helvetii have done: that they emigrate from home, seek another domicile, other seats, remote from the Germans, and make trial of fortune, whatever may befall. If these things should be announced to Ariovistus, they do not doubt that he would exact the most grievous punishment from all the hostages who are with him.
[32] Hac oratione ab Diviciaco habita omnes qui aderant magno fletu auxilium a Caesare petere coeperunt. Animadvertit Caesar unos ex omnibus Sequanos nihil earum rerum facere quas ceteri facerent sed tristes capite demisso terram intueri. Eius rei quae causa esset miratus ex ipsis quaesiit.
[32] This oration having been delivered by Diviciacus, all who were present began with great weeping to seek aid from Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani alone out of all were doing none of the things which the others were doing, but, sad, with head cast down, were gazing at the ground. Wondering what the cause of this matter was, he asked it of them themselves.
The Sequani made no answer, but remained silent in the same sadness. When he asked them repeatedly and could not elicit any voice at all, the same Diviacus the Aeduan replied: that the fortune of the Sequani was more miserable and more grievous than that of the rest, because they alone did not dare even in secret to complain nor to implore aid, and they shuddered at the cruelty of the absent Ariovistus as if he were present face-to-face; for to the others at least a faculty of flight was granted, but to the Sequani, who had received Ariovistus within their borders, whose towns all were in his power, all torments had to be borne.
[33] His rebus cognitis Caesar Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est sibi eam rem curae futuram; magnam se habere spem et beneficio suo et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniuriis facturum. Hac oratione habita, concilium dimisit. Et secundum ea multae res eum hortabantur quare sibi eam rem cogitandam et suscipiendam putaret, in primis quod Haeduos, fratres consanguineosque saepe numero a senatu appellatos, in servitute atque [in] dicione videbat Germanorum teneri eorumque obsides esse apud Ariovistum ac Sequanos intellegebat; quod in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et rei publicae esse arbitrabatur.
[33] With these matters learned, Caesar fortified the spirits of the Gauls with words and promised that that affair would be a matter of concern to him; he had great hope that, induced by his beneficence and authority, Ariovistus would put an end to the injuries. With this oration delivered, he dismissed the council. And after that many considerations urged him why he should think that matter to be pondered and undertaken by himself, in the first place because he saw the Aedui, brothers and blood‑kin, often so styled by the Senate, to be held in servitude and under the dominion of the Germans, and he understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus and the Sequani; which he judged to be most disgraceful for himself and for the commonwealth, under so great a sway of the Roman people.
Gradually, moreover, he saw that the Germans were becoming accustomed to cross the Rhine and that a great multitude of them was coming into Gaul, a danger to the Roman people, nor did he reckon that fierce and barbarous men would restrain themselves from, once they had occupied all Gaul, going out into the Province, as before the Cimbri and Teutones had done, and from there hastening into Italy [, especially since the Rhone separated the Sequani from our Province]; against which things he thought it should be met as speedily as possible. Ariovistus himself, moreover, had assumed to himself such high spirit, such arrogance, that he did not seem to be tolerable.
[34] Quam ob rem placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum legatos mitteret, qui ab eo postularent uti aliquem locum medium utrisque conloquio deligeret: velle sese de re publica et summis utriusque rebus cum eo agere. Ei legationi Ariovistus respondit: si quid ipsi a Caesare opus esset, sese ad eum venturum fuisse; si quid ille se velit, illum ad se venire oportere. Praeterea se neque sine exercitu in eas partes Galliae venire audere quas Caesar possideret, neque exercitum sine magno commeatu atque molimento in unum locum contrahere posse.
[34] Wherefore it seemed good to him to send envoys to Ariovistus, to demand from him that he choose some place mid-way for a colloquy for both: that he wished to deal with him concerning the commonwealth and the highest interests of each side. To that embassy Ariovistus replied: if he himself had need of anything from Caesar, he would have come to him; if that man wanted anything from him, it was proper that he come to him. Besides, he did not dare to come without an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar possessed, nor could he concentrate his army into one place without great provisioning and trouble.
[35] His responsis ad Caesarem relatis, iterum ad eum Caesar legatos cum his mandatis mittit: quoniam tanto suo populique Romani beneficio adtectus, cum in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset, hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam referret ut in conloquium venire invitatus gravaretur neque de communi re dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, haec esse quae ab eo postularet: primum ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius trans Rhenum in Galliam traduceret; deinde obsides quos haberet ab Haeduis redderet Sequanisque permitteret ut quos illi haberent voluntate eius reddere illis liceret; neve Haeduos iniuria lacesseret neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret. Si [id] ita fecisset, sibi populoque Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eo futuram; si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae lacere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum.
[35] With these responses reported back to Caesar, Caesar again sends envoys to him with these mandates: since, having been affected by so great a benefaction of himself and of the Roman people, when in his consulship he had been entitled by the senate king and friend, he now “repays” this favor to him and to the Roman people in such a way that, though invited to come into a colloquy, he hesitates, and does not think that matters of common concern ought to be spoken of and examined, these are the things which he demands from him: first, that he should not lead any further multitude of men across the Rhine into Gaul; then, that he should return the hostages which he holds from the Aedui, and permit the Sequani that, with his consent, those whom they hold it may be lawful to return to them; and that he neither provoke the Aedui by injury nor wage war upon them and their allies. If he should do [it] thus, for himself and for the Roman people there would be perpetual gratitude and friendship with him; if he should not obtain [it], he—since, in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, the senate had decreed that whoever should hold the province of Gaul should, whatever he could do for the advantage of the republic, defend the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman people—would not neglect the injuries of the Aedui.
[36] Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: ius esse belli ut qui vicissent iis quos vicissent quem ad modum vellent imperarent. Item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse. Si ipse populo Romano non praescriberet quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere se a populo Romano in suo iure impediri.
[36] To these things Ariovistus responded: that it is the law of war that those who have conquered command those whom they have conquered in whatever manner they wish. Likewise, that the Roman people are accustomed to command the vanquished not according to another’s prescription, but according to their own arbitration. If he himself did not prescribe to the Roman people in what way they should use their own right, it was not proper that he be impeded by the Roman people in his own right.
The Aedui, since they had tried the fortune of war and, having met in arms and been overcome, had been made tributary to himself. Caesar is doing a great injury, in that by his arrival he makes his revenues worse for him. He will not return hostages to the Aedui, nor will he bring an unjust war upon them or their allies, if they remain in that which had been agreed and pay the stipend year by year; if they do not do this, the fraternal name of the Roman people will be far from them.
As for Caesar’s giving notice to him that he would not neglect the injuries of the Aedui, no one had contended with him without his own ruin. Whenever he wished, let him join battle: he would understand what the unconquered Germans, most exercised in arms, who for 14 years had not gone under a roof, could do by valor.
[37] Haec eodem tempore Caesari mandata referebantur et legati ab Haeduis et a Treveris veniebant: Haedui questum quod Harudes, qui nuper in Galliam transportati essent, fines eorum popularentur: sese ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse; Treveri autem, pagos centum Sueborum ad ripas Rheni consedisse, qui Rhemum transire conarentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium fratres. Quibus rebus Caesar vehementer commotus maturandum sibi existimavit, ne, si nova manus Sueborum cum veteribus copiis Ariovisti sese coniunxisset, minus facile resisti posset. Itaque re frumentaria quam celerrime potuit comparata magnis itineribus ad Ariovistum contendit.
[37] These messages were being reported to Caesar at the same time, and envoys were coming from the Haedui and from the Treveri: the Haedui to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been transported into Gaul, were devastating their borders; that they had not been able to redeem peace from Ariovistus even with hostages given; but the Treveri, that a hundred cantons of the Suebi had sat down on the banks of the Rhine and were trying to cross the Rhine; that Nasua and Cimberius, brothers, were in command of them. Greatly stirred by these matters, Caesar judged that he must make haste, lest, if a new band of Suebi had joined itself with the veteran forces of Ariovistus, resistance might be less easy. Therefore, the grain-supply having been arranged as most swiftly as he could, he hastened by great marches toward Ariovistus.
[38] Cum tridui viam processisset, nuntiatum est ei Ariovistum cum suis omnibus copiis ad occupandum Vesontionem, quod est oppidum maximum Sequanorum, contendere [triduique viam a suis finibus processisse]. Id ne accideret, magnopere sibi praecavendum Caesar existimabat. Namque omnium rerum quae ad bellum usui erant summa erat in eo oppido facultas, idque natura loci sic muniebatur ut magnam ad ducendum bellum daret facultatem, propterea quod flumen [alduas] Dubis ut circino circumductum paene totum oppidum cingit, reliquum spatium, quod est non amplius pedum MDC, qua flumen intermittit, mons continet magna altitudine, ita ut radices eius montis ex utraque parte ripae fluminis contingant, hunc murus circumdatus arcem efficit et cum oppido coniungit. Huc Caesar magnis nocturnis diurnisque itineribus contendit occupatoque oppido ibi praesidium conlocat.
[38] When he had advanced a three-days’ march, it was announced to him that Ariovistus, with all his forces, was hastening to seize Vesontio, which is the greatest town of the Sequani, [and that he had advanced a three‑days’ march from his own borders]. Caesar judged that he must greatly take precautions lest this happen. For of all things which were of use for war, the highest supply was in that town, and it was fortified by the nature of the place in such a way as to give great opportunity for conducting war, because the river [alduas] Dubis, as if drawn with a compass, encircles almost the whole town; the remaining space, which is no more than 1,600 feet, where the river leaves off, a mountain of great height encloses, such that the roots of that mountain on both sides touch the banks of the river; a wall drawn around this makes a citadel and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by great marches by night and by day, and, the town having been occupied, he stations a garrison there.
[39] Dum paucos dies ad Vesontionem rei frumentariae commeatusque causa moratur, ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis esse praedicabant (saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse), tantus subito timor omnem exercitum occupavit ut non mediocriter omnium mentes animosque perturbaret. Hic primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis, reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant: quorum alius alia causa inlata, quam sibi ad proficiscendum necessariam esse diceret, petebat ut eius voluntate discedere liceret; non nulli pudore adducti, ut timoris suspicionem vitarent, remanebant. Hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas tenere poterant: abditi in tabernaculis aut suum fatum querebantur aut cum familiaribus suis commune periculum miserabantur.
[39] While he delayed a few days at Vesontio for the sake of the grain-supply and of convoys, from the inquiry of our men and the voices of Gauls and merchants—who were proclaiming that the Germans were of enormous magnitude of body, of incredible virtue and exercise in arms (they said that, having often met with them, they had not been able even to bear their look and the keenness of their eyes)—so great a sudden fear seized the whole army that it disturbed in no mediocre measure the minds and spirits of all. This arose first among the military tribunes, the prefects, and the rest who, having followed Caesar from the city for the sake of friendship, did not have great use/experience in the military matter: of whom one, another with another cause alleged, which he said was necessary for himself for setting out, was seeking that it might be permitted to depart with his consent; some, led by shame to avoid the suspicion of fear, remained. These could neither feign their countenance nor at times hold back their tears: hidden in their tents they either were lamenting their own fate or with their familiars were bewailing the common peril.
Commonly, throughout the whole camp, testaments were being sealed. By the voices and fear of these men, gradually even those who had great experience in the camp—the soldiers, the centurions, and those who were in charge of the cavalry—were being perturbed. Those who wished to be thought less timid among these said that they did not fear the enemy, but the narrowness of the march and the magnitude of the forests which intervened between themselves and Ariovistus, or the grain-supply, fearing that it might not be able to be brought up sufficiently commodiously.
[40] Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio omniumque ordinum ad id consilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent. Ariovistum se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse; cur hunc tam temere quisquam ab officio discessurum iudicaret? Sibi quidem persuaderi cognitis suis poslulatis atque aequitate condicionum perspecta eum neque suam neque populi Romani gratiam repudiaturum.
[40] When he had noticed these things, with a council convened and the centurions of all the orders summoned to that council, he vehemently reproached them: first, because they thought it was for him to ask or to consider into what quarter, or with what plan, they were being led. Ariovistus, in his consulship, had most eagerly sought the friendship of the Roman People; why should anyone judge that this man would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was persuaded that, once his own demands were known and the equity of the conditions perceived, he would repudiate neither his own favor nor that of the Roman People.
But if, impelled by frenzy and madness, he had brought war, what, pray, should they fear? Or why should they despair either of their own virtue or of his diligence? A trial of this enemy was made within the memory of our fathers, when the Cimbri and the Teutoni were driven back by Gaius Marius [when the army seemed to have earned no less praise than the commander himself]; likewise it was done recently in Italy in the servile tumult, whom nevertheless some practice and discipline, which they had received from us, did somewhat sustain.
From this it can be judged how much good there is in constancy, because those whom they had for some time feared, unarmed and without cause, these afterward, when armed and victors, they overcame. Finally, that these are the same Germans with whom the Helvetii, meeting often, have for the most part prevailed not only in their own borders but even in theirs—who nevertheless could not be a match for our army. If any were stirred by an adverse battle and the flight of the Gauls, these, if they inquired, could find that, with the Gauls wearied by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus—since he had kept himself for many months in camp and in the marshes and had not given an opportunity of engaging him—suddenly, when they were now despairing of a fight and scattered, attacked and conquered more by method and counsel than by valor.
For a plan which might have had scope against barbarous and unskilled men, by this not even he himself hoped that our armies could be taken. Those who transfer their own fear onto a simulation—namely of the grain-supply and the straits of the route—act arrogantly, since they seemed either to despair of the duty of the commander or to prescribe to the commander. These matters were his care: that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones supply grain, and that already the grain-crops were ripe in the fields; as for the march, they themselves would judge in a short time.
As to the report that they would not be obedient to the word nor would bear the standards, he said he was not at all moved by this matter: for he knew that, in whatever cases an army had not been obedient to command, either, the affair having been ill-conducted, fortune had been lacking, or, some crime having been discovered, avarice had been convicted. His own innocence had been shown by a perpetual life, his felicity had been made clear in the war of the Helvetii. Therefore what he had intended to defer to a more distant day he would bring forward, and on the next night, at the fourth watch, he would move the camp, so that he might as soon as possible understand whether among them shame and duty or fear had greater power.
[41] Hac oratione habita mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes summaque alacritas et cupiditas belli gerendi innata est, princepsque X. legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset, seque esse ad bellum gerendum paratissimam confirmavit. Deinde reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus egerunt uti Caesari satis facerent: se neque umquam dubitasse neque timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium sed imperatoris esse existimavisse. Eorum satisfactione accepta et itinere exquisito per Diviciacum, quod ex Gallis ei maximam fidem habebat, ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret, de quarta vigilia, ut dixerat, profectus est.
[41] This oration having been delivered, the minds of all were in a wondrous way turned, and the highest alacrity and an inborn desire of waging war arose; and foremost the 10th legion, through the military tribunes, gave him thanks because he had made the best judgment about it, and confirmed that it was most ready for carrying on war. Then the remaining legions, with the military tribunes and the centurions of the first ranks, took measures to give satisfaction to Caesar: that they had neither ever doubted nor feared, nor had they thought that the supreme decision of the war was their judgment, but the general’s. Their satisfaction having been accepted, and a route having been carefully ascertained through Diviciacus—because among the Gauls he had with him the greatest credit—so as to lead the army, by a circuit of more than 50 miles, through open places, at the fourth watch, as he had said, he set out.
[42] Cognito Caesaris adventu Ariovistus legatos ad eum mittit: quod antea de conloquio postulasset, id per se fieri licere, quoniam propius accessisset seque id sine periculo facere posse existimaret. Non respuit condicionem Caesar iamque eum ad sanitatem reverti arbitrabatur, cum id quod antea petenti denegasset ultro polliceretur, magnamque in spem veniebat pro suis tantis populique Romani in eum beneficiis cognitis suis postulatis fore uti pertinacia desisteret. Dies conloquio dictus est ex eo die quintus.
[42] With Caesar’s arrival learned, Ariovistus sends legates to him: that which he had earlier demanded concerning a colloquy, that it was permitted to be done on his own part, since he had approached nearer and thought that he could do it without danger. Caesar did not refuse the condition, and already was judging him to be returning to sanity, since he was of his own accord promising that which he had previously denied to one requesting; and he was coming into great hope that, in view of such great benefactions of his own and of the Roman people toward him, and with his own demands made known, it would come about that he would desist from pertinacity. A day for the colloquy was appointed, the fifth from that day.
Meanwhile, as envoys were often being sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar bring no infantryman to the conference: he feared that he might be surrounded by him through ambush; let each come with cavalry; otherwise he would not come. Caesar, because he neither wished the conference to be annulled on a pretext nor dared to commit his safety to the Gallic cavalry, decided it was most expedient, with all the horses taken from the Gallic horsemen, to mount upon them the legionary soldiers of the 10th Legion, in which he most trusted, so that he might have a guard as friendly as possible, if there were any need of action. As this was being done, not without a jest, a certain one of the soldiers of the 10th Legion said that Caesar was doing more than he had promised; he had promised that he would have the 10th Legion in the place of the praetorian cohort, but now he was enrolling it as cavalry.
[43] Planities erat magna et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis. Hic locus aequum fere spatium a castris Ariovisti et Caesaris aberat. Eo, ut erat dictum, ad conloquium venerunt.
[43] There was a great plain, and in it an earthen tumulus, quite large. This place was at nearly an equal distance from the camps of Ariovistus and of Caesar. Thither, as had been said, they came to the colloquy.
When they had come there, Caesar at the beginning of his speech recalled his and the senate’s benefactions toward him: that he had been styled king by the senate, that he had been called a friend, that gifts had been sent most amply; he was showing that this had both befallen few and was accustomed to be granted for great services of men; that he, when he had neither access nor a just cause for petitioning, had by his and the senate’s beneficence and liberality attained those rewards. He was also showing how old and how just the causes of necessitude were that intervened between themselves and the Haedui, what decrees of the senate, how often and how honorific, had been made in their favor, with the result that at every time the Haedui had held the principate of all Gaul, even before they had sought our friendship. This is the consuetude of the Roman People: that it wishes allies and friends not only to lose nothing of what is their own, but to be made more in favor, dignity, and honor; but as to what they had brought to the friendship of the Roman People, who could endure that to be snatched away from them?
[44] Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa praedicavit: transisse Rhenum sese non sua sponte, sed rogatum et arcessitum a Gallis; non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse; sedes habere in Gallia ab ipsis concessas, obsides ipsorum voluntate datos; stipendium capere iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint. Non sese Gallis sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse: omnes Galliae civitates ad se oppugnandum venisse ac contra se castra habuisse; eas omnes copias a se uno proelio pulsas ac superatas esse. Si iterum experiri velint, se iterum paratum esse decertare; si pace uti velint, iniquum esse de stipendio recusare, quod sua voluntate ad id tempus pependerint.
[44] To Caesar’s demands Ariovistus replied little, but he proclaimed much about his own virtues: that he had crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but asked and summoned by the Gauls; that not without great hope and great rewards had he left home and kinsfolk; that he held settlements in Gaul granted by them, and hostages given by their own will; that he took stipend/tribute by the law of war, which the victors are accustomed to impose upon the vanquished. That it was not he who had brought war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon himself: that all the states of Gaul had come to attack him and had maintained a camp against him; that all those forces had been routed and overcome by him in a single battle. If they wish to try again, he is again prepared to fight it out; if they wish to use peace, it is inequitable to refuse the tribute, which up to that time they had paid of their own volition.
That the friendship of the Roman people ought to be for him an ornament and a protection, not a detriment, and that he had sought it with this hope. If by the Roman people the tribute be remitted and the surrendered be withdrawn, he would no less willingly refuse the friendship of the Roman people than he had sought it. As to his bringing a multitude of Germans across into Gaul, he does this for the sake of fortifying himself, not of attacking Gaul; the testimony of this is that he did not come unless asked, and that he has not brought war but has defended.
Because he said that the Aedui had been appellated “brothers” by the senate, he was not so barbarous nor so inexpert in affairs as not to know that neither in the latest war of the Allobroges had the Aedui brought aid to the Romans, nor had they themselves in those contentions which the Aedui had had with them and with the Sequani availed themselves of the aid of the Roman people. He ought, he said, to suspect that Caesar, under simulated friendship, since he has an army in Gaul, has it for the purpose of oppressing him. Unless he withdraw and lead his army away from these regions, he will hold him not as a friend but as a foe.
But if he should kill him, he would do something that would be pleasing to many noble princes of the Roman people (this, he said, he had ascertained from those men themselves through their messengers), whose favor and friendship he could redeem by his death. But if he should withdraw and hand over to him free possession of Gaul, he would remunerate him with a great reward and would effect whatever wars he might wish to be waged, without any toil or danger to him.
[45] Multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset: neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati ut optime meritos socios desereret, neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani. Bello superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos a Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium posuisset. Quod si antiquissimum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset.
[45] Many things were said by Caesar to that purport why he could not desist from the undertaking: neither his own nor the Roman people’s custom suffered that he should desert allies who had deserved very well, nor did he judge Gaul to belong rather to Ariovistus than to the Roman people. The Arverni and the Ruteni had been overcome in war by Q. Fabius Maximus, to whom the Roman people had granted pardon, and had neither reduced them into a province nor imposed tribute. But if the most ancient time ought to be looked to, the Roman people’s dominion in Gaul is the most just; if the judgment of the Senate ought to be observed, Gaul ought to be free, which, though conquered in war, he had willed to use its own laws.
[46] Dum haec in conloquio geruntur, Caesari nuntiatum est equites Ariovisti propius tumulum accedere et ad nostros adequitare, lapides telaque in nostros coicere. Caesar loquendi finem fecit seque ad suos recepit suisque imperavit ne quod omnino telum in hostes reicerent. Nam etsi sine ullo periculo legionis delectae cum equitatu proelium fore videbat, tamen committendum non putabat ut, pulsis hostibus, dici posset eos ab se per fidem in conloquio circumventos.
[46] While these things were being transacted in the colloquy, it was reported to Caesar that Ariovistus’s cavalry were approaching nearer to the mound and riding up to our men, hurling stones and missiles at our men. Caesar made an end of speaking and betook himself back to his own, and ordered his men not at all to throw back any weapon against the enemy. For although he saw that a battle for the chosen legion with the cavalry would be without any danger, nevertheless he did not think it should be allowed that, with the enemy routed, it could be said that they had been circumvented by him, under good faith, in the colloquy.
After it had been spread abroad among the rank-and-file of the soldiers with what arrogance Ariovistus had conducted himself in the colloquy, that he had interdicted all Gaul to the Romans, and that his cavalry had made an attack upon our men, and that this affair had broken off the colloquy, a much greater alacrity and a greater zeal for fighting was instilled into the army.
[47] Biduo post Ariovistus ad Caesarem legatos misit: velle se de iis rebus quae inter eos egi coeptae neque perfectae essent agere cum eo: uti aut iterum conloquio diem constitueret aut, si id minus vellet, ex suis legatis aliquem ad se mitteret. Conloquendi Caesari causa visa non est, et eo magis quod pridie eius diei Germani retineri non potuerant quin tela in nostros coicerent. Legatum ex suis sese magno cum periculo ad eum missurum et hominibus feris obiecturum existimabat.
[47] Two days later Ariovistus sent legates to Caesar: that he wished to deal with those matters which between them had begun to be transacted and had not been completed; that he should either again appoint a day for a conference, or, if he should wish that less, send to him someone from his own legates. To Caesar a cause for conferencing did not seem good, and all the more because on the day before that day the Germans had not been able to be restrained from hurling missiles at our men. He thought that he would be sending a legate from his own to him with great danger and exposing him to savage men.
It seemed most commodious to send C. Valerius Procillus, son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest virtue and humanity—whose father had been presented with citizenship by C. Valerius Flaccus—both on account of his fidelity and on account of his knowledge of the Gallic tongue, which Ariovistus already used in many matters by long-standing custom, and because in him there would be no cause of offending for the Germans; and together with him M. Metius, who availed himself of the hospitality of Ariovistus. To these he gave orders that they should learn what Ariovistus would say and report back to him. When Ariovistus had caught sight of them with him in the camp, with his army present he cried out aloud: why were they coming to him?
[48] Eodem die castra promovit et milibus passuum VI a Caesaris castris sub monte consedit. Postridie eius diei praeter castra Caesaris suas copias traduxit et milibus passuum duobus ultra eum castra fecit eo consilio uti frumento commeatuque qui ex Sequanis et Haeduis supportaretur Caesarem intercluderet. Ex eo die dies continuos V Caesar pro castris suas copias produxit et aciem instructam habuit, ut, si vellet Ariovistus proelio contendere, ei potestas non deesset.
[48] On the same day he advanced his camp and encamped 6 miles from Caesar’s camp at the foot of a mountain. On the next day he led his forces past Caesar’s camp and made camp 2 miles beyond him, with this plan: to cut off Caesar from grain and commissariat which were being brought in from the Sequani and the Aedui. From that day, for 5 continuous days, Caesar led out his forces in front of the camp and kept his battle line drawn up, so that, if Ariovistus wished to contend in battle, the opportunity would not be lacking to him.
Ariovistus, during all these days, kept the army within the camp, and he contended daily in equestrian battle. This was the kind of fighting in which the Germans had exercised themselves: there were 6 thousand horsemen, and an equal number of foot-soldiers, the most swift and the most strong, whom, out of the whole force, individuals had each chosen one apiece for the sake of their own safety; with these they maneuvered in battles, to them the horsemen withdrew; these, if anything was tougher, would run together; if anyone, having received a more serious wound, had fallen from his horse, they would stand around him; if there was need to advance farther or to withdraw more swiftly, such was their celerity from exercise that, being lifted by the horses’ manes, they equaled the course of the horses.
[49] Ubi eum castris se tenere Caesar intellexit, ne diutius commeatu prohiberetur, ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant, circiter passus DC ab his, castris idoneum locum delegit acieque triplici instructa ad eum locum venit. Primam et secundam aciem in armis esse, tertiam castra munire iussit. [Hic locus ab hoste circiter passus DC, uti dictum est, aberat.] Eo circiter hominum XVI milia expedita cum omni equitatu Ariovistus misit, quae copiae nostros terrerent et munitione prohiberent.
[49] When Caesar realized that he was keeping himself to his camp, in order not to be cut off from supply any longer, beyond the place where the Germans had taken up position, about 600 paces from them, he chose a place suitable for a camp, and, with a triple battle line drawn up, he came to that place. He ordered the first and second battle line to be under arms, the third to fortify the camp. [This place was about 600 paces from the enemy, as has been said.] To that spot Ariovistus sent about 16,000 unencumbered troops with all the cavalry, forces which might terrify our men and prevent the fortification.
[50] Proximo die instituto suo Caesar ex castris utrisque copias suas eduxit paulumque a maioribus castris progressus aciem instruxit hostibusque pugnandi potestatem fecit. Ubi ne tum quidem eos prodire intellexit, circiter meridiem exercitum in castra reduxit. Tum demum Ariovistus partem suarum copiarum, quae castra minora oppugnaret, misit.
[50] On the next day, following his established practice, Caesar led his forces out from both camps and, having advanced a little from the larger camp, drew up the battle line and gave the enemy the opportunity for fighting. When he perceived that not even then would they come forth, about midday he led the army back into camp. Then at last Ariovistus sent a part of his forces to assault the smaller camp.
It was fought keenly on both sides until evening. At the setting of the sun Ariovistus, with many wounds both inflicted and received, led his forces back into camp. When Caesar inquired from the captives for what reason Ariovistus did not fight it out in battle, he found this to be the cause: that among the Germans there was this custom, that their matrons (matres familiae) by lots and vaticinations declared whether it was to their advantage that a battle be engaged or not; that they declared thus: it was not permitted by divine law for the Germans to prevail, if they should contend in battle before the new moon.
[51] Postridie eius diei Caesar praesidio utrisque castris quod satis esse visum est reliquit, alarios omnes in conspectu hostium pro castris minoribus constituit, quod minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad speciem alariis uteretur; ipse triplici instructa acie usque ad castra hostium accessit. Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Tribocos, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos, omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne qua spes in fuga relinqueretur. Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae ad proelium proficiscentes milites passis manibus flentes implorabant ne se in servitutem Romanis traderent.
[51] On the following day Caesar left, as a garrison for both camps, what seemed sufficient, and he stationed all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy in front of the smaller camp, because he was less strong in the multitude of legionary soldiers in proportion to the number of the enemy, so that he might use the auxiliaries for show; he himself, with a triple battle line drawn up, advanced up to the enemy’s camp. Then at last, of necessity, the Germans led their forces out of camp and arranged them by tribes at equal intervals—the Harudes, Marcomanni, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suebi—and they surrounded their whole battle line with wagons and carts, lest any hope in flight be left. Upon these they placed their women, who, as the soldiers were setting out to the battle, with hands outstretched, weeping, implored them not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.
[52] Caesar singulis legionibus singulos legatos et quaestorem praefecit, uti eos testes suae quisque virtutis haberet; ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit. Ita nostri acriter in hostes signo dato impetum fecerunt itaque hostes repente celeriterque procurrerunt, ut spatium pila in hostes coiciendi non daretur. Relictis pilis comminus gladiis pugnatum est.
[52] Caesar set over each legion a single legate and the quaestor, in order that each man might have them as witnesses of his own valor; he himself, from the right wing—since he had noticed that part to be the least firm of the enemy—joined battle. Thus our men, the signal having been given, made a fierce charge upon the enemy, and thus the enemy suddenly and swiftly ran forward, so that no space was afforded for hurling the pila at them. With the pila left aside, they fought hand-to-hand with swords.
But the Germans quickly, according to their custom, having formed a phalanx, withstood the thrusts of the swords. There were found several of our men who leapt into the phalanx and wrenched away the shields with their hands and wounded them from above. When the enemy’s battle-line had been driven from the left wing and hurled into flight, from the right wing they were pressing our line vehemently by the multitude of their own men.
[53] Ita proelium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga verterunt nec prius fugere destiterunt quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex eo loco circiter L pervenerunt. Ibi perpauci aut viribus confisi tranare contenderunt aut lintribus inventis sibi salutem reppererunt. In his fuit Ariovistus, qui naviculam deligatam ad ripam nactus ea profugit; reliquos omnes consecuti equites nostri interfecerunt.
[53] Thus the battle was restored, and all the enemies turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they had arrived at the river Rhine, about 50 miles from that place. There, very few, either relying on their strength, endeavored to swim across, or, having found skiffs, secured safety for themselves. Among these was Ariovistus, who, having come upon a little boat tied to the bank, fled by it; our cavalry, having overtaken all the rest, killed them.
There were two wives of Ariovistus, one of the Sueban nation, whom he had led out with him from home, the other Norican, sister of King Voccio, whom in Gaul he had taken to wife, sent by her brother: both perished in that flight; two daughters: of these, one was slain, the other was captured. C. Valerius Procillus, while in the flight he was being dragged by his guards, bound with triple chains, happened upon Caesar himself as he was pursuing the enemy with cavalry. This indeed brought to Caesar a pleasure no less than the victory itself, because he saw the most honorable man of the province of Gaul, his familiar and guest-friend, snatched from the hands of the enemy and restored to him, nor had Fortune diminished anything from so great pleasure and congratulation by his calamity.
[54] Hoc proelio trans Rhenum nuntiato, Suebi, qui ad ripas Rheni venerant, domum reverti coeperunt; quos ubi qui proximi Rhenum incolunt perterritos senserunt, insecuti magnum ex iis numerum occiderunt. Caesar una aestate duobus maximis bellis confectis maturius paulo quam tempus anni postulabat in hiberna in Sequanos exercitum deduxit; hibernis Labienum praeposuit; ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventus agendos profectus est.
[54] When this battle was reported across the Rhine, the Suebi, who had come to the banks of the Rhine, began to return home; and when those who dwell nearest the Rhine perceived them terrified, they pursued and killed a great number of them. Caesar, with two very great wars finished in one summer, led the army into winter quarters among the Sequani somewhat earlier than the time of year required; he put Labienus in command of the winter quarters; he himself set out into Cisalpine (Nearer) Gaul to hold the assizes.