Pseudoplatonica: Theages

Dem. Opus habebam, o Socrates, quaedam privatim tecum communicare, siquidem otium sit, vel etiam negotium, modo non omnino magnum: velim enim mea causa otium agas. So. Equidem otiosus et alioqui sum, sed tui causa maxime.

Dem. I had a business, O Socrates, to communicate certain things with you privately, if indeed it be leisure, or even a small affair, provided it is not altogether great: for I would like you to spend leisure on my account. So. I am indeed idle and otherwise, but chiefly for your sake.

Si quid ergo dicere vis, licet. Dem. Vin secedamus hinc in proximam Iovis liberatoris porticum?

If therefore you wish to say anything, you may. Dem. Shall we withdraw from here to the nearest portico of Iupiter the Liberator?

So. Ut lubet. Dem. Eamus ergo, o Socrates.

So. As you please. Dem. Let us go then, O Socrates.

Omnes quidem plantae eodem se modo habere videntur et quae e terra nascuntur, animaliaque omnia et homines denique ipsi. Ut enim in plantis facillimum hoc nobis est qui terram colimus, praeparare quidem omnia antequam plantemus et ipsa etiam plantatio. Postquam vero quod plantatum est, vivit.

All plants indeed seem to behave in the same manner, and those that spring from the earth, and all animals, and finally men themselves. For as concerning plants it is easiest for us who cultivate the soil to prepare indeed everything before we plant, and even the very planting; but after that which has been planted, it lives.

Tunc cultus ipsius varius est et difficilis, sic et in hominibus videtur. Ex meis enim rebus caetera coniicio. Etenim haec mihi mei filii sive plantatio, seu generatio appellanda sit, omnium facillima extitit, educatio autem difficilis et plena timoris semper, maximum metum ipsius causa subeunti, fuit.

Then his cultus is various and difficult, and so it appears in men. From my own affairs I infer the rest. For indeed this of mine — whether it is to be called plantatio or generatio of my son — proved the easiest of all; but the educatio was difficult and always full of fear, and the greatest fear befell the very person undergoing it.

Et alia quidem multa de hoc dici possent, praecipue vero cupiditas, quae huic nunc inest, vehementer me sollicitat. Est enim non ingenerosa, verum talis, ut fallere possit. Cupit enim, o Socrates, ut ipse ait, sapiens effici.

And many other things indeed could be said about this; but especially desire, which now dwells in him, greatly disturbs me. For it is not ingenerous, but rather of such a kind that it can deceive. For he desires, O Socrates, as he himself says, to be made wise.

Et, ut mihi videtur, populares quidem eius ac aequales in urbem venientes sermones quosdam ei replentes hunc vehementer incitaverunt, quos aemulari coepit et mihi iam pridem molestus est, volens, ut eius curam suscipiam, ac pecuniam sophistae alicui, qui ipsum sapientem reddat, persolvam. Mihi vero pecuniarum minor est cura; verum hunc existimo ob hoc eius studium in periculum non mediocre incursurum. Hactenus igitur huic obstiti, consolando, sed ubi diutius nequeo, operae pretium fore duxi, ut ei obtemperem, ne sine me frequenter cum aliis vivens corrumpatur.

And, as it seems to me, his populares and aequales, coming into the city and filling him with certain speeches, have strongly incited him, which he began to emulate and has long been a nuisance to me, wishing that I undertake his care and pay money to some sophist who will make him himself wise. For my concern about money is smaller; but I judge that on account of this zeal of his he will incur not a slight danger. Therefore thus far I have opposed him by consoling, but where I can no longer, I have judged it worth the effort to comply with him, so that, living often with others without me, he may not be corrupted.

Nuc autem ad hoc proficiscor, ut eum alicui eorum qui sophistae existimantur, commendem. Tu igitur peropportune nobis obviam factus es, quem quidem hac in re mihi consultorem maxime cupiebam. Itaque siquid habes, quod mihi in iis, quae audisti, consulere queas, licet et expedit.

But now I set out for this purpose, that I might commend him to one of those who are reckoned sophists. You therefore have met us most opportunely, whom indeed in this matter I greatly desired as a consultor for me. So if you have anything which you can advise me about in those things which you have heard, it is both permitted and expedient.

So. Ceterum, o Demodoce, vulgo dicitur, consilium res sacra est et si umquam ullum aliud, hoc est imprimis de quo quaeris. Non est enim divinius aliquid, quo de quis consulere queat, quam de institutione sui atque suorum. Primum igitur conveniamus, quidnam hoc esse putemus, quo de consultamus, ne saepenumero ego quidem aliud illud existimem, tu autem aliud, ac deinde longe dissentiamus; ridiculi quidem existimem ambo et qui do et qui tu qui postulas consilium, cum nihildum consenserimus.

So. Moreover, O Demodoce, it is commonly said that counsel is a sacred matter, and if ever any thing is so, this is foremost of which you ask. For there is nothing more divine by which one can consult than concerning the institution of oneself and of one’s own. Therefore first let us agree what this is, about which we consult, lest oftentimes I think one thing and you another, and then we be far at variance; for I shall judge both ridiculous — both I who give and you who demand counsel — when we have agreed upon nothing.

Dem. Recte quidem mihi dicere videris, o Socrates. Itaque faciendum censeo.

Dem. You seem indeed to speak rightly to me, O Socrates. Therefore I judge that it ought to be done.

So. Recte, inquam, non omnino tamen recte, nam paulisper id muto: dubito enim ne forte hic adolescentulus, alia quaedam, quam quae nos rebamur, cupiat; quod si alia, nos quoque absurdius faciamus de alio consultantes. Rectissimum igitur mihi videtur, ut initium hinc sumentes, ipsum quid maxime instituat, rogemus. Dem.

So. Right, I say, yet not altogether right; for a little while I change that: I doubt, in truth, lest perchance this young man desire some other things than those we were thinking; which, if other, we too shall make ourselves more absurd by consulting about another. Therefore it seems to me most right that, taking a beginning from here, we ask him what he chiefly intends to institute for himself. Dem.

Optimum videtur ut dicis. So. Dic igitur mihi, quod pulchrum nomen est puero? Quo nomine ipsum vocabimus?

It seems best, as you say. So. Tell me then, what a handsome name is for the boy? By what name shall we call him?

Dem. Theages, o Socrates. So. Pulchrum, o Demodoce, et divinum filio nomen imposuisti.

Dem. Theages, O Socrates. So. Beautiful, O Demodoce, and you have bestowed a divine name on the son.

Sed tu dic mihi, Theages, cupisne sapiens esse? Ac dignum existimas esse, ut pater hic tuus virum inveniat, qui te sua consuetudine sapientem reddat? Theag.

But you tell me, Theages, do you desire to be wise? And do you deem it worthy that this your father should find a man who by his custom will render you wise? Theag.

Cupio. So. Sapientes autem utrum vocas homines scientiam habentes, quaecumque illa sint quae scierint, necne? Theag.

I desire. So. But do you call wise those men possessing scientia, whatever those things are that they have known, or not? Theag.

Scientes equidem. So. Quid igitur, nonne te pater edocuit, quae hic nobilium virorum filii docentur? Scilicet litteras, citharam pulsare, palaestram et alia certamina?

I know indeed. So. What then, did not your father teach you those things which here the sons of noble men are taught? Namely letters, to strike the cithara, the palaestra, and other contests?

Theag. Docuit. So. Putas praeterea te aliqua scientia indigere, de qua curam suscipere tui causa patrem deceat?

Theag. He taught me. So. Do you think, moreover, that you are in need of some knowledge, concerning which it would befit your father to undertake care for your sake?

Theag. Puto. So. Quae est igitur ipsa?

Theag. I think. So. What, then, is it itself?

Dic nobis, ut tibi gratificemur. Theag. Novit et hic, o Socrates, quoniam persaepe illi narravi, sed de industria haec nunc tecum loquitur, quasi nesciat quae cupiam; hoc enim modo et in aliis multis mecum pugnat, neque vult alicui me tradere.

Tell us, that we may gratify you. Theag. He knows this also, O Socrates, since I have told him very often, but now he speaks these things with you intentionally, as if he did not know what I desire; for in this way he contends with me in many other matters as well, and does not wish to hand me over to anyone.

So. Atqui quae hactenus adversus hunc abs te dicta sunt, testibus carent; nunc autem me adhibe testem, atque coram me denuo recense. Quaenam est haec sapientia, quam appetis? Age, si cuperes eam qua homines navigia gubernant et ego te rogarem, quanam, o Theages, sapientia indigens, patri succenses, quod te his, a quibus sapiens te reddi potes, non tradat, quamnam esse responderes?

So. But indeed those things hitherto spoken by you against this man lack witnesses; now, however, summon me as a witness, and once again recite them before me. What is this sapientia which you pursue? Come then: if you desired that wisdom by which men steer ships, and I asked you, “By what wisdom, O Theages, being in want and angry with your father because he will not deliver you to those by whom you can be made wise, what would you answer that it is?”

Nonne gubernatoriam? Theag. Certe.

Is it not the helmsman's art? Theag. Certainly.

So. Sin autem illius cuperes eruditum te fieri, qua currus reguntur, ac patri succenseres, ego vero rogem, quaenam ea esset, nonne aurigariam respondeas? Theag. Utique.

So. But if you wished to be instructed by that man in how chariots are governed, and were angry with your father, if I were to ask what that is, would you not answer “aurigarian skill” (charioteering)? Theag. Certainly.

So. Haec autem quam appetis utrum habet nomen, an non. Theag. Existimo habere.

So. But this thing which you seek, whether it has a name or not. Theag. I think it has.

So. Utrum hic illam quidem nosti, nomen autem ignoras? Vel nomen etiam tenes? Theag.

So. Do you indeed know this woman, yet are ignorant of her name? Or do you even retain the name? Theag.

Etiam nomen. So. Dic ergo quid est. Theag.

I too know the name. So. Then tell me what it is. Theag.

Quod aliud nomen huic congruere, o Socrates, quam sapientiae? So. Nonne etiam aurigaria, sapientia est? An ignorantia tibi videtur?

What other name could suit this, O Socrates, than wisdom? So. Is not even charioteering wisdom? Or does it seem to you ignorance?

Theag. Nullo modo. So. An non sapientia?

Theag. In no way. So. Is it not wisdom?

Theag. Sapientia. So. Qua ad quid utimur?

Theag. Wisdom. So. For what and to what end do we use it?

num qua scimus equorum iuga regere? Theag. Profecto.

Do we in any way know how to govern the yokes of horses? Theag. Certainly.

So. Num et ea est, qua naves gubernamus? Theag. Ea utique.

So. Is that also the thing by which we steer ships? Theag. That certainly is.

So. Ea vero quam nunc optas, quaenam sapientia est, quidve eam adepti scimus gubernare? Theag. Mihi quidem videtur ea, qua scimus hominibus imperare.

So. That very wisdom which you now desire — what kind of wisdom is it, and, having obtained it, do we know how to govern it? Theag. To me indeed that seems to be the wisdom by which we know how to command men.

So. Num qua aegrotantibus? Theag. Minime.

So. Surely not the sort for the sick? Theag. By no means.

So. Ipsa enim medicina est, nonne? Theag. Est.

So. For it is medicine itself, is it not? Theag. It is.

So. At qua canentibus scimus in choris praeesse? Theag. Nequaquam.

So. But do we know which of the singers presides in the choirs? Theag. By no means.

So. Musica enim est. Theag. Ita.

So. For it is music. Theag. Yes.

So. Sed utrum qua certantibus praeesse? Theag. Nequaquam.

So. But whether to preside over those contending? Theag. By no means.

So. Gymnastica enim est. Theag. Est.

So. For it is gymnastics. Theag. It is.

So. Verum qua quid facientibus, conare exprimere sic, quemadmodum superiora ego. Theag. Mihi plane videtur ea, qua his qui sunt in civitate.

So. But as to what they will do, try to express it thus, just as I did the foregoing. Theag. It plainly seems to me that those things belong to those who are in the city.

So. Nonne in civitate aegroti etiam sunt? Theag. Sunt quidem, sed non istis solum dico, verum omnibus qui in civitate versantur.

So. Are there not also sick people in the city? Theag. There are indeed, but I say not of those only, rather of all who dwell in the city.

So. Intelligo quam artem dicis. Videris enim non eam qua praeesse novimus metentibus, aut vindemiantibus, aut plantantibus, aut serentibus, aut triturantibus: ipsa enim per quam iis imperamus, agricultura est. Theag.

So. I understand which art you mean. For you seem not to mean that by which we know how to preside over the reapers, or the grape-harvesters, or the planters, or the sowers, or the grinders: for that very art by which we command them is agriculture. Theag.

Est. So. Neque rursus qua vel secantibus, vel perforantibus, vel polientibus, vel torno aliquid facientibus: nam haec ad fabros pertinet. Theag.

It is. So. Nor again to those who cut, or pierce, or polish, or make anything on the lathe: for these things pertain to smiths. Theag.

Certe. So. Verum fortasse qua iis universis, et agricolis, et fabris, et artificibus omnibus, ac privatis cunctis mulieribusque et viris imperitamus, eam tu sapientiam dicis. Theag.

Certe. So. But perhaps that wisdom by which we command all those, both farmers, and smiths, and all artisans, and all private individuals, both women and men, you call that wisdom. Theag.

Istam ipsam, o Socrates, iampridem dicere volebam. So. Potes dicere, an Aegisthus qui Agamemnonem apud Argos interfecit, his omnibus imperavit, quos dixisti, artificibus, privatis viris, mulieribusque universis, an aliis quibusdam? Theag.

That very thing, O Socrates, I long ago wished to speak. So. Can you say whether Aegisthus, who killed Agamemnon at Argos, commanded all these whom you named—artisans, private men, and all women—or some others? Theag.

Non aliis, sed iis omnibus. So. Quid autem Peleus Aeaci filius in Phthia, nonne iisdem dominatus est? Theag.

Not to others, but to all of them. So. But what of Peleus, son of Aeacus, in Phthia—did he not hold dominion over those same people? Theag.

Eisdem. So. Periandrum vero Cypseli, nonne audivisti apud Corinthios imperasse? Theag.

To the same. So. Did you not hear that Periander, son of Cypselus, ruled among the Corinthians? Theag.

Equidem. So. Nonne eisdem in civitate sua dominatus est? Theag.

Indeed I. So. Did he not rule over the same ones in his own city? Theag.

Certe. So. Quid vero Archelaum Perdiccae nuper in Macedonia imperantem, num iisdem existimas dominatum? Theag.

Certainly. So. But what of Archelaus, lately commanding Macedonia for Perdiccas, do you reckon him to have held dominion in the same way? Theag.

Equidem. So. Hippiam autem Pisistrati in hac urbe dominantem, quibusnam prefuisse arbitraris? Nonne eisdem?

Indeed. So. But Hippias, son of Pisistratus, ruling in this city, whom do you reckon he preferred? Was it not the same [men]?

Theag. Quidni. So. Bacis vero, et Sibylla, et nostras Amphylitus, quonam pacto tibi cognominandi viderentur?

Theag. Why not. So. But Bacis, and the Sibyl, and our Amphylitus, in what manner would they seem to you to be surnamed?

Theag. Non alio, quam vatum nomine. So. Recte dicis, eodem modo conare, ut invenias quo cognomine Hippiam et Periandrum propter eundem principatum nomines.

Theag. By no other than the name "vates." So. You speak rightly; in the same way try likewise, that you may discover by what cognomen Hippias and Periander were named on account of the same principality.

Theag. Qui vocem, quam tyrannos? So. Ergo quicunque cupit more istorum universis suis civibus imperare, tyrannidem appetit, et esse tyrannus studet?

Theag. Who gives the name, "tyrants"? So. Therefore whoever wishes, in the manner of those men, to rule over all his fellow-citizens, desires tyranny, and strives to be a tyrant?

Theag. Ita videtur. So. Hanc tu optas?

Theag. It seems so. So. Do you choose this?

Theag. Videtur ex iis quae dixi. So. Sceleste, more tyranni nobis praeesse cupis?

Theag. It seems from those things which I said. So. Wretch, do you desire to preside over us in the manner of a tyrant?

Ac iamdudum succenses patri, qui te ad aliquem tyrannidis praeceptorem non mittit? Et te Demodoce non pudet, qui cum dudum noris quid hic concupiscat, et quia quo ipsum mittas habes, artificem sapientiae illius, quam petit, facere potueris, invides, et nolis mittere? sed nunc vides.

And have you not long been inflamed against your father, that he does not send you to some tutor of tyranny? And are you not ashamed, Demodoce, you who for some time have known what he desires here, and since you have someone to whom you might send him, and could have made the artificer of that wisdom which he seeks, do you begrudge and refuse to send him? but now you see.

Cum vero te coram accusaverit, consultemus simul ego et tu, estne quo mittamus, ut alicuius consuetudine sapiens tyrannus efficiatur? Dem. Per Iovem, o Socrates, consultemus.

But when he shall have accused you openly, shall we two, you and I, consult together whether there is anyone to whom we might send [him], so that by some one's custom he may be made a wise tyrant? Dem. By Jove, O Socrates, let us consult.

Est enim, ut mihi videtur, consilio opus, et maximo. So. Sine, bone vir, interrogemus ipsum prius. Dem.

For, as it seems to me, counsel is needed, and of the greatest. So. Allow it, good man; let us question him himself first. Dem.

Interroga. So. Quid si Euripide ad aliquid utamur, o Theages? Inquit enim ille,

Ask. So. What if we make use of Euripides for something, O Theages? For he says,

Si quis Euripidem roget, o Euripides qua in re sapientum consuetudine ais sapere tyrannos? quemadmodum si cum dixisset, sapientes agricolae sunt sapientum consuetudine, percontaremur, quanam in re sapientum, quid putas ipsum dicturum? an aliud, quam in re rustica?

If someone asks Euripides, "O Euripides, in what matter, by the consuetude of the wise, do you say that tyrants are wise?" — just as if, had he said, "farmers are wise by the consuetude of the wise," we should inquire, "in what matter of the wise — what do you think he himself would say?" or something other than in matters rustic?

Theag. Nihil aliud. So. Eodem modo si dixisset, sapientes coci sapientum consuetudine, nosque rogaremus, quanam in re sapientum, quid aliud responderet, quam coquinaria?

Theag. Nothing else. So. In the same way, if he had said, “the cooks are wise by the custom of the wise,” and we were to ask, “in what respect of the wise?” what else would he answer but cookery?

Theag. Idipsum. So. Quid si dixisset, sapientes athletae sapientum consuetudine, et nos in quo sapientum interrogemus, nonne certando responderet?

Theag. The very same. So. What if he had said, “the athletes are wise by the custom of the wise,” and we, in asking in what matter they are wise, would he not answer, “in contesting”?

Theag. Immo. So. Et quia dixit, Sapientes tyranni sapientum consuetudine, si rogaremus illum, qua in re, o Euripides sapientum, quid eum responsurum putas?

Theag. Nay. So. And since he said, “wise tyrants by the custom of the wise,” if we were to ask him, “in what matter, O Euripides of the wise, what do you suppose he would answer?”

Theag. Per Iovem nescio. So. Vis tibi dicam?

Theag. By Jupiter, I do not know. So. Do you wish me to tell you?

Theag. Ut lubet. So. Haec sunt quae ait Anacreo ipsam Calicretem nosse.

As you please. These are the things which he says Calicretes himself knows to Anacreon.

Audisti carmen? Theag. Audivi.

Did you hear the song? Theag. I heard it.

So. Quid igitur, huiusmodine viri consuetudinem cupis, qui eam artem teneat, quam tenebat Callicretes Cyane nata, quique sciret tyrannica quae Callicretem novisse po‘ta inquit, ut et in nos et civitatem tyrannidem exerceas? Theag. Iamdudum me mordes Socrates, atque irrides.

So. What then, do you desire the familiarity of such a man, who should hold that art which Callicretes, born of Cyane, possessed, and who would know the tyrannical things which, he says, Callicretes was able to learn, so that you might exercise tyranny both over us and over the city? Theag. You have long been biting me, Socrates, and deriding me.

So. Quamobrem? nonne ais hanc te sapientiam optare, qua cunctis imperes? Atqui haec faciens aliudne, quam tyrannus sit?

So. Wherefore? Do you not say you desire that wisdom by which you might command all? And yet, in doing this, is one anything other than a tyrant?

Theag. Optarem quidem, ut arbitror, vel omnium hominum, vel quam plurimorum tyrannide potiri, quo idem de te ac caeteris omnibus persuadeo mihi, aut etiam Deus esse. Veruntamen non hoc appetere dicebam.

Theag. I would indeed wish, as I suppose, either to seize by tyranny the rule of all men, or of as many as possible, whereby I might persuade myself the same about you and about all the others — that I am even a god. Nevertheless I was saying that I did not desire this.

So. Quid tandem est hoc quod cupis? nonne civibus praeesse? Theag.

So. What, then, is this that you long for? Is it not to preside over the citizens? Theag.

Non vi quidem, neque ut tyranni: sed volentibus, quemadmodum alii in civitate bene morati ac boni viri. So. Dicis ergo qualis Themistocles fuit, et Pericles, et Cimo, et quicunque alii in adminstratione reipublicae floruerunt? Theag.

Not by force, indeed, nor like tyrants: but with the willing, just as other well‑bred and good men in the city. So. So you mean, then, what sort of man Themistocles was, and Pericles, and Cimon, and whoever else prospered in the administration of the republic? Theag.

Per Iovem istos inquam. So. Quid vero si nobiles eques esse studeas, et in ea arte sapiens, ad quosnam alios accederes, quam ad equites? Theag.

By Jove, I mean those men. So. But what, then, if you strove to be a noble eques (knight), and wise in that art, to whom else would you go than to the equites? Theag.

Ad nullos alios. So. Quippe ad hos ipsos qui equestri arte pollent, et qui equis tum nostratibus, tum alienis quam plurimis utuntur. Theag.

To no others. So. For indeed to these very men who are potent in the equestrian art, and who make use of horses, both our own and as many foreign ones as possible. Theag.

Scilicet. So. Eodemque modo si sapienter iaculandi artem adipisci cupias, ad eos qui optime iaculantur, et qui multis tam alienis, quam propris utuntur spiculis, proficiscereris. Theag.

Of course. So. And in the same way, if you wished wisely to acquire the art of javelin-throwing, you would go to those who throw javelins best, and who make use of many javelins, both alien and their own. Theag.

Mihi quidem videtur. So. Age itaque postquam in civilibus erudiri vis, ut in iis sapiens fias, ad alios accedendum putas, quam ad hos civiles homines, qui disciplina civili summopere valent, et utuntur tum patria, tum aliis civitatibus: versanturque ob id in Graecis et in barbaris. An putas cum aliis quibusdam conversans, sapiens evadere in iis quibus ipsi sunt: et non in his ipsis.

It indeed seems to me. So. Come then: after you desire to be educated in civil matters, so that you become wise in them, do you think you should approach others rather than these civil men, who are extremely powerful in civil disciplina, and who serve both their patria and other states; and for that reason move among Greeks and among barbarians? Do you think, associating with certain others, to become wise in those things in which they themselves are, and not in these very things?

Theag. Audivi Socrates, sermones quosdam, quos tuos asserunt, civilium virorum liberos nihilo meliores, quam cerdonum esse. Et mea quidem sententia vera dicis.

Theag. I have heard Socrates utter certain discourses which assert that the sons of civil men are by no means better than those of peddlers. And in my judgment you speak truth.

Insipiens ergo sim ego, qui de illorum numero esse possum, si mihi persuadeam, aliquem istorum suam mihi sapientiam traditurum, qui quidem suos filios ipsorum minime iuvent, putemque vel mihi, vel ulli mortalium ad hanc rem posse prodesse. So. Quid tu igitur optime hominum agas, si cum tibi filius esset, huiusmodi negotia exhiberet, ostendens cupere in optimum pictorem evadere, succenseatque tibi quod nullam in se pecuniam eius gratia collocares, sed ipsos pingendi artifices parvi penderet, neque ab eis aliquid vellet discere, tibicines item, tibicen effici volens, vel etiam citharoedos. Habes quod cum eo agas, vel quo tandem illum mitteres, nolentem ab iis discere?

Then I would be unwise, if I could be counted among their number, should I persuade myself that one of those men would hand over his sapientia to me, who indeed scarcely benefits even his own sons, and I would think that he could be of use either to me or to any of mortals in this matter. So. What then would you, best of men, do if, though you had a son, he pursued such affairs, showing he longs to become the very best pictor, and is angry with you because you would not invest any money in him for that reason, but would hold the painters themselves in little esteem and would wish to learn nothing from them, likewise the tibicines, wanting to be made a tibicen, or even a citharoedus? What would you do with him, or where, in the end, would you send him, unwilling to learn from them?

Theag. Minime profecto habeo. So. Nonne igitur eadem haec faciens, miraris atque succenses patri, cum dubitat quid tecum agat, et quo te mittat, quem Atheniensium in administranda republica praestantissimorum cuicunque voluisses commendaturi eramus, qui tecum sine pretio versatus fuisset: simulque et sumptibus pepercisses, et ab huiusmodi consuetudine plus nominis quaesivisses, quam omnium caeterorum.

Theag. Certainly I do not have it. So. Then, doing these very things, do you marvel and grow angry at your father, when he hesitates what to do with you and where to send you, to whichever of the most distinguished Athenians we would have been about to recommend you for the administration of the republic, who would have associated with you without fee: and at the same time you would have spared expenses, and from such a connexion you would have sought more renown than from all the rest.

Theag. Quid igitur Socrates, nonne tu ex bonis viris es? Si me susceperis, sat habeo, neque alium quaero. So. Quid hoc dicis?

Theag. What then, Socrates, are you not one of the good men? If you accept me, I have enough, and I seek no other. So. What do you mean by this?

Dem. Non male dicit, o Socrates, neque mihi quicquam hoc iucundius utiliusque, ut arbitror, esse posset, quam si huic tua consuetudo placeat, et si tu cum eo versari velis: et profecto pudore impedior dicere, quam vehementer affectem. Itaque ambos vos rogatos velim, et te ut velis hunc suscipere, et te ne alium, quam Socratem quaeras, meque maximis curis, et formidine plenis obsecro liberetis, quoniam nunc vehementer timeo, ne hic cuiuspiam alterius consuetudinem quaerat a quo deinde perdatur.

He speaks not ill, O Socrates, nor could anything be more pleasant or more useful to me, I think, than if to this man your acquaintance were pleasing, and if you were willing to associate with him; and indeed modesty restrains me from saying how strongly I am attached. Therefore I would have you both, whom I beseech, — I beg you, that you be willing to take this man under your care, and that you seek no one other than Socrates, and that you free me, beset with the greatest anxieties and full of fear, for I now greatly fear lest this man seek the acquaintance of some other by whom he will thereafter be ruined.

Theag. Ne ulterius mihi timeas, mi pater, si huic persuadere potes, ut me suscipiat. Dem.

Theag. Fear me no further, my father, if you can persuade this man to take me in. Dem.

Recte loqueris, et ad te, o Socrates, omnis posthac oratio convertetur. Ego enim ut brevissime loquar, me simul ac mea omnia vel charissima quocunque indigeas tibi libentissime trado, si hunc Theagem susceperis, eique pro virili tua bene feceris. So. Equidem, o Demodoce, studium hoc tuum non admirer, siquidem existimas maxime a me hunc iuvari posse.

You speak rightly, and all speech henceforth will turn to you, O Socrates. For I, to speak as briefly as possible, will at once most willingly entrust myself and all my goods, even my dearest things, to you wherever you may need them, if you receive this Theages, and you will have done well for him according to your virile power. So. Indeed, O Demodoce, I do not marvel at this zeal of yours, since you suppose most of all that he can be helped by me.

Non enim video ubi maiore diligentia opus sit, si quis mentem modo habet, quam ut filium optimum reddat. Sed unde tibi hoc visum est, me videlicet tuum filium meliorem posse civem reddere, quam tute possis? Atque unde hic sibi persuasit posse magis a me, quam abs te ad hanc rem iuvari?

For I do not see where greater diligence is required, if one only has a mind, than in making a son an excellent citizen. But how has it seemed to you that I, evidently, can make your son a better citizen than you yourself can? And by what persuasion has this man convinced himself that he can be helped more by me than by you in this matter?

Id enim vehementer admiror: tu enim primum me senior es, deinde multis ac maxima apud Athenienses functus es magistratibus, neque te magis quisquam a popularibs Anagyrusiis ac reliquis civibus honoratur. In me autem horum quicquam neuter vestrum videt. Verum si civilium virorum consuetudines Theages iste contemnit, aliosque quaerit qui instruere iuventam profitentur, est hic Prodicus Chius, et Gorgias Leontinus, et Polus Agrigentinus, aliique permulti, qui adeo sapientes sunt, ut cum urbes adeunt, nobilissimos et ditissimos alliciant ad se iuvenes: quibus cum vel optimorum quoruncunque familiaritate gratis uti liceret, eorum assuetudine relicta, persuasi ad illos conferunt se, pretium, atque id ingens, offerentes ultra, et gratiam insuper maximas habentes.

This I greatly admire: for first you are my senior, and further you have performed many and the greatest magistracies among the Athenians, nor is anyone more honored by the populace, the Anagyrusians, and the other citizens than you. In me, however, neither of you sees any of these things. But if that Theages scorns the customs of civic men, and seeks others who profess to instruct youth, here are Prodicus Chius, and Gorgias Leontinus, and Polus Agrigentinus, and very many others, who are so wise that when they visit cities they entice the most noble and most wealthy youths to themselves: to whom, although it would be permitted to make free use of the acquaintance of any of the best, leaving behind the familiarities of those, the persuaded bring themselves to those men, offering a fee—and a great one at that—and besides enjoying very great favor.

Ex his ergo decebat te ac filium tuum aliquem eligere, me vero ad id elegisse non convenit. Nullam enim ex istis beatis et pulchris disciplinis, scio ac dico (et ut paucis loquar) velim tamen mihi illas esse notas. Verum semper nihil scire, praeter exiguam quandam amandi disciplinam, qua vulgo praestantior, tum superioribus, tum etiam praesentibus viris esse videor.

From these, then, it was fitting for you and some one of your son to choose, but it does not suit that I should have chosen for that. For none of those blessed and fair disciplines, I know and say (and to speak briefly) — yet I would wish that those were known to me. But to know always nothing, except a certain small discipline of loving, by which I seem to be more esteemed commonly both among former and also among present men.

Theag. Videsne pater Socratem hunc non admodum familiaritatem meam recipere? Nam quod ad me attinet, paratus eram, modo ipse voluisset: sed haec omnia ille ioco adversus nos dicit.

Theag. Do you see, father, that this Socrates does not much receive my familiarity? For as to me, I was ready, provided he himself had wished it; but all these things he says in jest against us.

Novi enim meorum aequalium, et aliquando seniorum nonnullos, qui priusquam cum hoc versarentur, nullius erant pretii: postquam autem familiaritate istius usi sunt, brevi omnium supremi eorum evaserunt, quorum infimi prius erant. So. Nosti quale hoc fit, o Demodoci fili? Theag.

For I know some of my equals, and at times some seniors, who before they consorted with this man were of no esteem: but after they made use of his familiarity, in a short time they became the highest of all, of whom formerly they had been the lowest. So. Do you know how this happens, O son of Demodocus? Theag.

Novi per Iovem: si voles enim, talis fiam, quales illi fuerunt. So. Non ita, o optime, sed hoc te fefellit, quale sit: ergo autem tibi dicam. Adest mihi divina quadam sorte daemonium quoddam a prima pueritia me secutum: hoc enim vox est quaedam, quae cum fit, semper eius rei, quam facturus sum, dissuasionem innuit, provocat vero nunquam.

I know by Jove: if you will, for I will become such as those were. So. Not so, O excellent one, but this deceives you as to what sort he is: therefore I will tell you. There is present to me by a certain divine lot a certain daemon that has followed me from earliest boyhood: for this is a certain voice which, when it comes, always intimates dissuasion of the thing I am about to do, but never provokes.

Quod si quis amicorum mecum quandoque aliquid communicat, venitque vox, hoc illa dissuadet, neque facere sinit. Cuius quidem rei vobis testes dabo. Charmidem virum bonum Glauconis filium noscitis.

But if any of my friends ever communicates anything to me, and a voice comes, that voice dissuades me from it and does not permit me to do it. Of this very matter I will give you witnesses. You know Charmides, a good man, the son of Glaucon.

hic aliquando in Nemea stadio se exercitaturus mecum communicabat. Ac statim ubi dicere inciperet quod se exercitaturus esset, affuit vox: ego prohibui, edicens quemadmodum ipso loquente daemonii vox extiterat, ne se exerceret. Ille vero, fortasse, inquit, significat tibi me victorem non evasurum sed et si victoria non potiar, tamen hoc tempore me exercens, aliquid proficiam.

Once here he was communicating with me that he was about to exercise in the Nemean stadium. And immediately, when he began to say that he was going to train, a voice came: "I forbade," saying in what manner, while he himself was speaking, the voice of a daemon had appeared, that he should not train. He, however, said, "perhaps he signals to you that I shall not escape as victor; but even if I do not obtain victory, yet by training at this time I shall profit somewhat."

Atque ita locutus, in certamen abit. Operae pretium igitur est audire ab eo quid ei ex eo certamine contigerit. Iam si vultis et Clitomachum Timarchi fratrem rogate quid ei Timarchus dixerit, cum iam moriturus esset: is enim et Euathlus quidam cursor, qui illum fugientem suscepit, referet vobis quid ille tunc dixerit.

And thus having spoken, he went away into the contest. It is therefore worth the trouble to hear from him what happened to him in that contest. Now if you wish, also ask Clitomachus, Timarchus’s brother, what Timarchus said to him when he was about to die: for he, and also a certain runner Euathlus, who took him up as he fled, will relate to you what he then said.

Theag. Quidnam? So. O Clitomache, inquit, equidem quam primum moriturus venio, quoniam Socrati obtemperare nolui.

Theag. What then? So. "O Clitomachus," he said, "I for my part come, intending to die as soon as possible, since I would not obey Socrates."

Hoc quid ita dixerit Timarchus, ego exponam. Cum enim surrexissent ex convivio Timrachus, et Philemon Philemonidis filius, interfecturi Niciam Hiroscamandri filium, soli enim infediarum ii conscii fuerant: hic Timarchus, Quid ais, o Socrates, inquit. Vos quidem bibite, me vero oportet alio ire, redibo autem paulo post, si occasio erit.

I will explain why Timarchus said this. For when Timarchus and Philemon, son of Philemonides, had risen from the banquet, about to kill Nicias, son of Hiroscamandrus—for they alone had been privy to the treachery—Timarchus said, “What do you say, O Socrates? You indeed drink; as for me, I must go elsewhere; I will return a little later, if opportunity allows.”

Tum mihi aderat vox: Itaque ne surgas inquam: solitum enim mihi a daemone signum factum est. Quievit ille. Deinde paulisper commoratus, ardebat iterum eundi cupiditate, dicens, Eo iam Socrates.

Then a voice came to me: “Therefore do not rise,” I said; for a sign had been made to me by the daemon as is usual. He became quiet. Afterwards, having delayed a little, he again burned with the desire to go, saying, “I go now, Socrates.”

Et quia iterum vocem audivi, rursus illum cohibui, donec ille tertio latere me cupiens, surrexit, nihil mihi dicens, sed observans, cum ego mentem alio advertissem: et sic profectus ea patravit, quae mortis ei causa fuerant. Haec eadem ille fratri, quemadmodum nunc ego vobis, dixit, se scilicet moriturum venire, quod mihi credere noluisset. Audietis praeterea ex multis qui in Sicilia sunt, quae de exercitus clade praedixeram.

And because I heard the voice again, I restrained him once more, until he, wishing to hide himself from me for a third time, rose up, saying nothing to me, but watching when I had turned my mind elsewhere; and thus having set out he accomplished those things which were the cause of his death. These same things he said to his brother, just as now I to you, namely that he himself was about to die — which his brother had been unwilling to believe me. Moreover, you will hear from many who are in Sicily the things which I had foretold concerning the army’s destruction.

Et praeterita quidem ab his qui illa noverunt, audire licet. Experiri vero daemonii signum siquid forte dicat, etiam nunc possumus. In expeditionem namque exiit Sannionis Cali filius.

And the past things indeed it is permitted to hear from those who knew them. But to try whether the daemonic sign might perhaps say anything, even now we can. For into the expedition went forth Sannio’s son, Cali.

Mihi autem signum adfuit. proficiscitur vero nunc cum Thrasylo adversus Ephesum et Ioniam militaturus. Ego autem illum existimo, vel interfectum iri, vel huiusmodi aliquid incursurum, et de reliquo negotio vehementer metuo.

A sign, however, was afforded to me. He now sets out with Thrasylo to campaign against Ephesus and Ionia. I, however, judge that he will either be killed, or will encounter something of that kind, and I greatly fear for the remaining business.

Haec omnia ideo tibi dico, quia potestas omnis ad familiaritates cum his, qui mecum sunt, instituendas penes daemonium est. Multis enim adversatur, neque licet his auxilium ferre, qui mecum invito daemone conversantur: quare impossibile est mihi, cum his vivere. Multis autem haerere non prohibet, sed consuetudine nostra nihil omnino iuvantur.

I tell you all this because the whole power for establishing familiaritates with those who are with me resides with the daemon. For he opposes many, and it is not permitted to bring aid to those who, against my will, converse with the daemon: therefore it is impossible for me to live with them. He does not, however, forbid clinging to many, but by our consuetudine they are in no way helped at all.

Quibus autem faverit in ipsa familiaritate potestas daemonii, illi sunt de quibus illud animadvertisti. brevi enim proficiunt. Sed eorum partim hoc beneficium firmum habent atque durabile, plerique vero quoad mecum sunt, mirifice pollent: at ubi discesserint, rursus nihil a caeteris differunt.

But those whom the power of the daemon has favoured in that very familiarity are the ones of whom you remarked. For they make progress in a short time. Yet some of them in part have this benefit firm and durable, and most, so long as they are with me, wield wonderful power; but when they have departed, again they differ in nothing from the rest.

Hoc quandoque accidit Aristidi Lysimachi filio, eius qui filius fuit Aristidis. Nam mecum commorans, brevi multum profecit: postea vero in militiam profectus est: rediens deinde offendit apud me agentem Thucydidem Melissi filium: hic autem Thucydides pridie mihi inter disputandum nescio qua de re obiecerat. Cum me salutasset, et quaedam insuper collocutus esset Aristides, Thucydidem, inquit, o Socrates, audio gloriari, et in quibusdam tecum etiam concertare tanquam aliquid fit.

This once happened to Aristides, son of Lysimachus, he who was the son of Aristides. For residing with me, he made very great progress in a short time; afterwards he set out into military service; and on returning he encountered at my house Thucydides, son of Melisus, who had the day before, while disputing with me, objected about I know not what matter. When he had greeted me, and Aristides had said certain things besides, he said, "Thucydides, O Socrates, I hear you boast, and in some respects even contend with him as though something of consequence were at stake."

Est inquam, ut dicis. Tum ille, non meminit, inquit, antequam tibi adhaereret, quale fuerit mancipium? Non videtur, inquam per deos.

There is, I said, as you say. Then he, “He does not remember, before he adhered to you, what sort of mancipium he was?” “He does not seem to,” I said, “by the gods.”

At ego, inquit ille, ridiculus sum. Quidnam maxime inquam? Quoniam priusquam hinc abirem, cum quovis disputare audebam, neque aliquo videbat in disserendo deterior, adeo ut coetus praestantium virorum audacter adirem.

But I, he said, am ridiculous. What, most of all, I ask? Because before I departed from here I would dare to dispute with anyone, and I did not seem in arguing to be inferior to anyone, so much so that I would boldly join the gatherings of outstanding men.

Nunc autem contra, fugio quemcumque eruditum esse intellexi, adeo pudore adducor ob inscitiam. Utrum igitur inquam e vestigio te relinquit illa vis, an paulatim? Paulatim, inquit.

But now, on the contrary, I shun whoever I have perceived to be erudite; I am so carried by shame because of my ignorance. Therefore, I ask, does that force leave you from the outset, or little by little? Little by little, he said.

Quando vero in te incessit, utrum accidit tibi aliquid a me discenti, an aliter? Dicam, o Socrates, rem quidem per deos incredibilem, veram tamen. Nihil unquam a te, ut ipse scis, didici.

When indeed it fell upon you, did anything befall you from learning from me, or otherwise? I will say, O Socrates, a thing indeed incredible by the gods, yet true. Nothing ever did I learn from you, as you yourself know.

proficiebam autem quotiescunque tecum essem, et si in eadem solum domo essem, non tamen in eadem parte domus, magis tamen quoties eadem in parte. Et mihi quidem videbar multo magis, quando in eadem parte existens, aliquid te dicentem intuebar, quam cum alio essem aversus. Sed longe magis proficiebam, cum apud te sedens, te tangebam.

But I made progress whenever I was with you, and even if I were only in the same house — though not in the same part of the house — still more whenever I was in the same part. And indeed it seemed to me much more, when, being in the same part, I beheld you speaking something, than when I was turned away and with another. But far more I profited when, sitting beside you, I touched you.

Nunc autem omnis habitus ille defluxit. Est igitur, o Theages, huiusmodi nostra consuetudo. Si enim Deo gratum est, permultum quidem et brevi proficies: sin contra, minime.

Now, however, all that habit has flowed away. There is therefore, O Theages, such our consuetude. For if it is pleasing to God, you will profit very much and in a short time; but if contrariwise, not at all.

Vide igitur ne tibi tutius sit ab aliquo illorum erudiri, quibus in sua potestate sita est utilitas qua caeteris prosunt, quam a me fortuna quadam id assequi. Theag. Mihi quidem sit faciendum, Socrates, videtur, ut consuetudine nostra de daemonio intelligamus.

See then whether it would be safer for you to be instructed by some of those whose usefulness to others is placed in their own power, than to obtain that from me by a certain fortune. Theag. It seems to me, Socrates, that this ought indeed to be done, that we should understand the daemon according to our custom.

Quod si nobis annuerit, recte omnia: sin minus, quid agendum sit consultabimus tum, alterine cuipiam adhaereamus, an hoc divinum quod tibi insitum est, precibus et sacrificiis et alio quovis denique pacto, quo vates iubent, placare conemur. Dem. Nihil ad haec, o Socrates, huic adolescenti repugnes, bene enim dicit Theages.

But if he consents to us, all is well; if not, then we will deliberate what must be done — whether we should adhere to some other person, or strive to propitiate this divine thing which is innate in you by prayers and sacrifices and by any other means whatsoever, in short by the manner in which the seers command. Dem. Oppose nothing of this, O Socrates, to this youth; for Theages speaks well.

So. Atqui si videtur oportere sic agere, sic agamus.

So. And yet, if it seems right to act thus, let us act thus.