Vico: GIAMBATTISTA VICO: ORATIO VI habita XV kal. novembris anno MDCCVII cuius argumentum:

Dura mihi, medius fidius, adolescentum in bonis literis instituendorum conditio videtur, cum eorum parentes qui neque harum rerum prudentes sunt, neque de his ipsis prudentes consulunt, filiorum ingenio ad quae-nam id factum natumque sit inexplorato, et eorumdem naturae viribus inexpensis, ex sua animi libidine, et ut magis e sua re familiari esse putant, adolescentulos vel invita quam saepissime Minerva huic vel illi certae arti scientiaeve addiscendae addicunt; vel quamquam indoles eos ad eas ducant, tamen sine aliarum necessario instrumento ad ipsas illotis, ut aiunt, manibus tractandas propellunt.

Hard to me, by my troth, the condition of training adolescents in good letters seems, when their parents — who are neither prudent in these matters nor prudent in consulting about these very things —, with their sons’ genius as to what and by what nature it was made and born unexplored, and with the very forces of their nature unweighed, from their own caprice, and because they think it more a matter of the household, most often, even against the youths’ will, commit them to Minerva to learn this or that certain art or science; or although natural bent may lead them to those studies, yet without the necessary instrument of other things, with, as they say, unwashed hands, they drive them to be handled.

Hinc illae lacryrnae, hinc illa est misericordia,

From this, those tears; from this, that mercy,

cum ii vel praesidiis, quae ad disciplinam cui dant operam desiderantur, nudati, in ea aut nihil aut parum ac summa cum difficultate proficiunt; et parentum peccatum ingenii sui vicio imputantes, de doctrina spem prorsus omnem abiiciunt; vel quamvis doctiores evadant, quia tamen a proposito parentum abhorrent, sive quod illi, ut honores in familiam inferrent, hos iurisprudentiae applicarint, hi vero, quia animi sunt sive modesti sive pusilli clientelas, fasces, imperia nihil quicquam morantur, sive quod parentes repraesentati quaestus avidi filios medicinae arti dediderint, qui altiore animo praediti amplissimos viros, qui reipublicae in eius partibus praesunt, spectant et admirantur; illud hinc fit, ut tantisper dum eos pudor patris continet, studia ingratiis et contemptim colant, non serio nec sedulo excolant;at ubi primum eo pietatis officio soluti sunt, eo literarum studio prorsus neglecto et posthabito, ad iners ocium, et saepe ad malas animi artes vitam traducant. Et si quis tamen est, qui, ut virum fortem decet, quam viam semel ingressus est, insistere velit, is sane quod ex parentum festinatione, nec rite, nec ordine, vel ex suo irato Deo neglectim et oscitanter didicerat, id aliena aetate curisque familiaribus et quandoque etiam publicis distentus, a surdis authoribus per semet ipsum ediscere debet; qua in re tot tantaeque se difficultates obiiciunt. ut compluribus saepe amarum duntaxat sanioris doctrinae desiderium relinquatur.

when they, either stripped of the protections which are desired for the discipline to which they give their attention, make little or no progress in it and that with the greatest difficulty; and blaming their parents’ fault on a defect of their own genius, they utterly abandon all hope of instruction; or although they become more learned, because they diverge from their parents’ intention — whether because those parents, to bring honors into the family, have applied them to jurisprudence, and these, being of a modest or timid spirit, are deterred by clientelae, fasces, imperia and delay from any concern; or because parents, eager for imagined profit, have surrendered their sons to the art of medicine — who, endowed with loftier mind, behold and admire the most eminent men who preside in those parts of the res publica; from this it happens that, so long as the son’s shame before his father restrains them, they cultivate studies with ingratitude and contempt, not seriously nor diligently; but as soon as they are released from that duty of pietas, with the study of letters wholly neglected and put last, they are led to inert idleness and often to wicked arts of the mind and a depraved life. And if there is any one who, as befits a brave man, wishes to persist in the way once entered, he must indeed unlearn, and by maturer age and the cares of family and sometimes even public business distracted, and from deaf instructors, teach himself again by his own exertion those things which, through his parents’ haste, he had learned neither rightly nor in order, or which he had learned slothfully and negligently from his own irascible master; in which matter so many and such great difficulties are thrown in his path, that for many the desire for sounder learning is left only bitterly and in longing.

Cumque ego saepissime eius rei incommoda, immo vero infelicitates mecum ipse considerarem, ipsam incusabam naturam, per quam ita comparatum esset, ut homines ea aetate vitae agendae genuseligerent, qua omnium rerum ignaris nulla esset electio, et dum caussas eius rei vestigarem, id ad caput fontemque malorum omnium, Adae peccatum et originis vicium revocabam. Sed eam ipsam rem penitius perscrutanti, ipse mihi iniurius visus sum; cum si nostram ipsorum corruptam contemplemur naturam, eam sane non solum, quae studia excolenda a nobis sint admonere, sed et eorum viam ac rationem apertissime commonstrare sentiemus: quae duo sunt summa capita dicendarum.

And when I very often considered with myself the inconveniences of that matter, nay rather its misfortunes, I blamed Nature herself, by which it had been so ordered that men, in that age of life for living, should choose their genus — an age in which, being ignorant of all things, there was no choice — and while I traced the causes of that matter I recalled it to the head and fountain of all evils, Adam’s sin and the vice of origin. But when I scrutinized that very thing more deeply, I seemed unjust to myself; for if we behold our own corrupted nature, we shall surely perceive that it not only admonishes what studies ought to be cultivated by us, but also most plainly shows their way and rationale: these two are the chief heads to be spoken.

Et an vera dicam quisque vestrum in se ipsum descendat, et hominem contempletur. Is enim vero se nihil aliud esse sentiat, quam mentem, animum et sermonem; corpus narnque ac cetera discernet, et aut bruta, aut curn brutis communia esse iudicabit. Hinc notet hominem usquequaque corruptum, et primo linguae infantiam, tum mentem opinionibus involutam, animum denique viciis inquinatum comperiat: et has divinas esse poenas animadvertat, quibus summum Numen primi parentis peccatum puniit, ut humanum ab eo propagatum genus dissociaret, disiiceret, dissiparet.

And if any of you would truly speak, let him descend into himself and contemplate the man. For let him perceive that he is nothing else than mind, animus, and speech; let him distinguish the body and the other parts, and judge them either brutish or common to brutes. From this he will note the man to be utterly corrupted, and first perceive the infancy of the tongue, then the mind enwrapped in opinions, finally the animus defiled by vices: and let him observe these to be divine penalties, by which the supreme Numen punished the sin of the first parent, so that the human race propagated from him might be severed, scattered, and dispersed.

Nam tot linguarum generibus in impii ,Nemrotis poenam invectis et per universum terrarum orbem diffusis gentes alias ab aliis seiunxit: et unoquoque in aevum variante et incerto, in iisdem quoque nationibus maiorum linguas posteris voluit ignoratas; opinionibus autem, cum unaquaeque a se habeat aliquam similitudinem veri, quam libido, ut cuiusque fert animus, pro vero arripiat; inde suus cuique sensus est, et, quod vulgo dicitur, quot capita tot sententiae; et cum denique vicii tanta sit turpitudo, ut viciosi conniveant suis, ne videant aliena, prorsus abominentur; atque adeo quibus ipsis nos laboremus, ea improbemus in aliis: unde avarus avarum nollet., iniurius cum iniurio iniuriam expostulat; per vicia Deus ne improborum quidem inter se hominum ullam voluit esse societatem.

For by so many kinds of tongues the impious—Nemrotis’ punishment having been borne and peoples having been scattered throughout the whole orb of the lands—set nations apart from one another: and with each age changing and uncertain, he willed that in those same nations the languages of their ancestors be unknown to posterity; and as for opinions, since each has some likeness to truth in itself, which desire, as every mind bears, seizes upon for truth; hence each man has his own sense, and, as the proverb says, as many heads, so many judgments; and since the shame of vice is so great that the vicious wink at their own faults so as not to see another’s, they utterly abominate them; and indeed we condemn in others those very things by which we ourselves labor: whence a covetous man will not tolerate a covetous man, the wronged man with wrong demands a wrong in return; through such vices God willed that there should be no fellowship even among wicked men.

Quin immo his ipsis poenis, quibus summum Numen ob reatum primae stirpis homines, ut ita dixerim, dispalarit, iisdem in unumquemque eorum miseris modis animadvertit; narn per infantiam innumeris in rebus lingua menti non succurrit, eamque, dum ad explicandum suam implorat opem, destituit; vel incondita ineptaque rusticitate sermonis mentis sensa fraudat verbis, quae dignitatem non habent; sive foedat turpibus sordidisque, sive fallit aut prodit ambiguis, ut aliorsum accipiatur quam loquitur; vel captetur per ea ipsa, quae loquitur. Ad haec linguae illa mentis accedunt mala: quod eam perpetuus stupor habeat, falsae rerum imagines ludant, ac saepe etiam illudant, temeraria iudicia dent praecipitem,sophismata captent, et rerum denique confusio distrahat ac disperdat. At hercule, quanto his graviora sunt illa animi, quem omni fretu ac euripo graviores agitant perturbationum tempestates et aestus, ut in cupiditatibus ardeat, horreat in timoribus, insaniat in voluptatibus, in doloribus ad languorem detur, omnia ornniurn habeat, nec ullo unquam delectetur ingenio; quod [im]probavit mox probet; mox improbet, quod probavit; semper sui poeniteat; se ipsum semper fugiat ac persequatur.

Nay rather, with those very penalties by which the supreme Divinity, for the guilt of the first stock, so to speak, disjoined mankind, He visits each one of them in miserable ways; for through infancy the tongue fails the mind in countless matters, and abandons it when it begs for aid to explain itself; or with crude and inept rusticity of speech it cheats the senses of the mind with words that lack dignity; or it defaces them with filthy and disgraceful expressions, or deceives or betrays them by ambiguity so that what is spoken is taken otherwise than it means; or the mind is ensnared by the very things it utters. To these evils of the tongue are joined those of the mind: namely that it is held in perpetual stupor, false images of things play within it, and often mock it too, it gives rash judgments headlong, it is snared by sophisms, and finally a confusion of things tears it apart and wastes it. But by Hercules, how much graver are those troubles of the soul, which are driven by all tides and currents into storms and billows more violent: that it burns in desires, trembles in fears, raves in pleasures, is given over to languor in pains, has all things as want, and is never delighted by any faculty of mind; that which it approved it soon disapproves; soon it disapproves what it approved; it is always remorseful; it always flees and pursues itself.

Atque has omnes malas pestes malosque cruciatus carnifex suus ipsius amor exercet; in quem humanitate per vicium originis comrnutata, hominum coetus in speciem societates videntur, re autem ipsa in corporum frequentia summa est solitudo animorum; nisi potius ergastulorum vicinia sit, ubi animi, in suo cuique attributo, quas supra memoravimus, poenas luunt.

And his very love, acting as its own executioner, exercises all these evil pestilences and cruel torments; into which, humanitas having been transformed by the vice of origin, the gatherings of men seem in appearance to be societies, yet in truth, in the multitude of bodies, there is the utmost solitude of souls; unless rather it is the neighbourhood of ergastula, where minds, in that attribute proper to each, pay the penalties we mentioned above.

Corruptae naturae humanae supplicia enumeravimus linguae infantiam, mentis opiniones, animi vicia. Emendatae igitur dotes sunt eloquentia, scientia, virtus: quae sunt tria veluti puncta quae totus artiurn scientiarumque circumagitur orbis. His enim tribus praeclarissimis rebus sapientia continetur: certo scire, recte agere, digne loqui; ita ut hominem nunquam falsum esse pudeat, nunquam prave egisse toedeat, nunquam non pro dignitate loquutum esse poeniteat; qui sane verus homo est, quern graphice Terentianus exprimit Chremes:

We have enumerated the punishments of corrupt human nature: the infancy of the tongue, the opinions of the mind, the vices of the soul. The corrected endowments therefore are eloquence, scientia, virtue: which are three, as it were points about which the whole orb of arts and sciences is revolved. In these three most illustrious things wisdom is contained: to know with certainty, to act rightly, to speak worthily; so that a man may never be ashamed to be false, never ashamed to have acted ill, never regret having spoken not according to dignity; who indeed is a true man, whom Terentian Chremes graphically expresses:

Homo sum: humani a me nihil alienum puto;

I am human: of human things nothing do I deem alien to me;

et Menedemum, qui stulti se ipsum cruciantis personam sustinet, non lucri spe ulla, non ex necessitudine aliqua, non ut gratiam referat, sed ex sola vicinitate, et caussam, cur is se ipsum cruciet, et afflictet sedulo perconctatur:

and Menedemum, who sustains the persona of one tormenting himself like a fool, not from any hope of gain, nor from any necessity, nor that he might return a favor, but from mere vicinity, and he diligently inquires into the cause why that man tortures and afflicts himself:

Ne lacryma atque istuc, quicquid est, fac me ut sciam: ne retice; ne verere:

Do not let a tear and that thing, whatever it is, keep me from knowing: do not be silent; do not be afraid:

et serio illia promittit:

and he earnestly promises those things:

Crede, inquam, mihi:

Believe me, I say:

aut consolando, aut consilio, aut re iuvero.

either by consoling, or by counsel, or by deed I will help.

Tria ipsissima sapientiae officia: eloquentia stultorum ferociam cicurire, prudentia eos ab errore deducere, virtute de iis benemereri; atque eo pacto pro se quemque sedulo hu anam adiuvare societatem. Quae qui faciant, ii sane multum supra homines, parum, fas sit dicere, infra numina viri sunt, quos non fucata nec fluxa, sed solida et vera gloria consequitur, nempe fama meritorum, quo fieri a quoque possit, ampliorum, longe lateque pervagata. Nec sane alio fictis fabulis po tae sapientissimi Orpheum lyra mulxisse feras, Amphionem cantu movisse saxa, iisque sese sponte sua ad symphoniam congerentibus, Thebas moenisse muris; et ob ea merita illius lyram, delphinum huius in coelum invectum astrisque appictum esse finxerunt.

Three very offices of wisdom itself: eloquence to curb the ferocity of fools, prudence to lead them away from error, virtue to do them good; and in this manner to zealously help each man and so sustain human society. Those who do these things are indeed far above ordinary men, and, if it may be said, a little below the numina, men upon whom not painted nor fleeting, but solid and true glory follows—namely the fame of merits, which any man may win, ampler, spread far and wide. Nor, indeed, by other invented tales did the most wise poets feign that Orpheus soothed beasts with his lyre, that Amphion moved stones with song, and that, the stones themselves gathering to his symphony, they built Thebes’ walls; and because of those merits they invented that the one’s lyre, the other’s dolphin, was borne into heaven and fixed among the stars.

Saxa illa, illa robora, illae ferae homines stulti sunt: Orpheus, Amphion sapientes, qui divinarum scientiam humanarumque prudentiam cum eloquentia coniunxerunt, eiusque flexanima vi homines a solitudine ad coetus, hoc est, a suo ipsorum amore ad humanitatem colendam, ab inertia ad industriam, ab effrena libertate ad legum obsequia traducunt; et viribus feroces cum imbecillis rationis aequabilitate consociant. Is perpetuo est horum studiorum verissimus, amplissimus et praeclarissiinus finis: quem quia complures sibi non proponunt, ex falsis, viciosis abiectisque moventur; cumque falsis, viciosis, abiectisque moveantur, aut falso, aut viciose, aut abiecte haec studia profiteantur necesse est. Atque heic facile possem eorum genera exequi; sed honoris caussa silentio praeterrnitto.

Those rocks, those oaks, those wild beasts are foolish men: Orpheus, Amphion are wise, who joined the divine scientia and human prudentia with eloquence, and by its pliant force lead men from solitude to gatherings, that is, from their own self‑love to the cultivation of humanitas, from inertia to industry, from unbridled liberty to the observance of laws; and they unite the fierce in strength with the weak in reason by the equability of judgement. He is continually the most true, most ample, and most illustrious finis of these studies: which, because many do not set before themselves, they are moved by false, vicious, and abject things; and since they are moved by the false, the vicious, the abject, it is necessary that they profess these studies falsely, viciously, or abjectly. And here I could easily follow out their genera; but for the sake of honour I pass them over in silence.

Illud duntaxat in summa dixerim: qui in hisce studiis ad sapientiam non spectat, hoc est, ea non excolit, ut suam emendet naturam, et mentem vero, animum virtute, linguam eloquentia conformet, quo et sibi constet homo, et humanam, quantum ab eo est, iuvet societatem; is saepe alius est, aliurn profitetur: saepe multis hiscit arti necessariis, quam profitetur: saepe fastidit, negligit et affligit artem ipsam, quam profitetur. At vero qui sapientia naturam emendare corruptam studet, nunquam nonomnibus suae artis praesidiis instructus agit, semper sedulo ac serio agit,semper ex suae artis proprio fine agit. Et in civitate ubi professores ex vero consummate et solius humanitatis gratia artes profiteantur, quam florentes sint cives, quam beata respublica, vobis ipsis, ne multus sim, coniiciendum relinquo.

I will say only this in summary: he who in these studies does not look toward wisdom, that is, does not cultivate them so as to amend his own nature, and to mold his mind with truth, his soul with virtue, his tongue with eloquence, so that the man may stand by himself and may help human society as far as he is able — that man is often other than he professes; often he declares more than his art requires; often he spurns, neglects, and abuses the very art he professes. But he who, by wisdom, strives to correct a corrupted nature, never acts without all the safeguards of his art, always acts diligently and seriously, always acts from the proper end of his art. And in a city where teachers practice the arts from true consummation and solely for the sake of humanity, how flourishing the citizens would be, how blessed the commonwealth — to you yourselves I leave the inference, that I may not be long-winded.

Firmato igitur quod ipsa humanitatis depravatae contemplatio nos ad universum humanarum artium scientiarumque orbem absolvendum admoneat, nunc videamus quonam ordine (quae erat nostri argomenti pars altera) eas nobis perdiscendas commone faciat.

Therefore, that having been established — that the very contemplation of corrupted humanity admonishes us to complete the whole orb of human arts and sciences — now let us see in what order (which was the other part of our argument) it admonishes that these be thoroughly learned by us.

Eo quo id facilius intelligere possitis, prius ipsam sapientiae suppellectilem omnem, instrumentumque explicemus. Sapientia, ut saepius dictum est, rerum divinarum cognitione, hurnanarum prudentia et orationis veritate dignitateque continetur. Sed cum vere tum digne orationis doctrinam illa recti sermonis Praemittatur necesse est, quam grammatice tradit.

So that you may understand it more easily, first we will set forth all the very furniture and instrumentarium of wisdom itself. Wisdom, as has often been said, is contained by the cognition of divine things, by prudence in human affairs, and by the truth and dignity of speech. But since the doctrine of speech must be prefixed both truly and worthily, that of right speaking must be taught as grammar hands down.

Succedit rerum divinarum cognitio, quas heic accipio, et quarum Deus natura est, et naturales dicuntur; et quarum natura Deus est, et proprio vocabulo " divinae" appellantur. Naturalium rerum contemplamur vel ea, de quibus iam inter homines convenit et constat formas et numeros, de quibus mathesis suas coficit apodixes; vel caussas, de quibus maxime inter doctissimos homines disceptatur, quas explicat physice; ad quam revoco anatomiam, quae est fabricae humani corporis contemplatio; et eam medicinae partem, quae morborum caussas vestigat, et aliud non est nisi physice humani corporis aegrotantis. Nam quae morborum tradit curationes, et proprio vocabulo medicina " ars " appellatur, ea est physices et anatomes practicum veluti corollarium, quemadmodum physices et mathesis est quaedam operaria appendix mechanice.

Next follows the cognition of divine things, which I here take to be those whose God is their nature and which are called natural; and those whose nature is God are by the proper name called "divinae." Of natural things we contemplate either those concerning which among men the forms and numbers are already agreed and fixed, whose demonstrations mathesis furnishes; or the causes, about which the most learned men chiefly dispute, which physics explains; to which I recall anatomia, which is the contemplation of the fabric of the human body; and that part of medicine which tracks the causes of diseases, and is nothing other than the physics of a sick human body. For that which hands down cures of diseases, and by the proper word is called "ars" (medicine), is the practical corollary of physics and anatomia, just as there is a certain operative appendix of mechanics to physics and mathesis.

Divinae autem res sunt mens hurnana et Deus; quae duo metaphysice ad scientiam, theologia ad religionem considerat. His itaque doctrinis cognitio naturalium rerum ac divinarum absolvitur. Humanarurn rerum prudentia id pollicetur, ut quisque officium faciat suum, et ut homo et ut civis.

Divine things, however, are the human mind and God; these two metaphysically pertain to science, theology to religion. By these doctrines, therefore, the knowledge of natural and divine things is completed. The prudence of human affairs promises this: that each may perform his officium (duty), both as homo (man) and as civis (citizen).

Holminem probum moralis, sapientem civem doctrina civilis instituit; quae utraque ad nostramreligionem accommodata, theologia est, quam moralem apellant: quae tres doctrinae in iurisprudentiam corrivant et confluunt. Ea enim constat ferme tota ex doctrina morali: nam neque scientia, neque ars, sed prudentia iuris est, et iustitiam sibi habet propositam; ex civili, ad publicam enim spectat utilitatem; et ex morali theologia, nam iura in Christiana republica interpretatur. Porro de rebus divinis et humanis vel inter doctos disserimus, vel inter rudes eloquimur: ibi vera, hic digna oratione necesse habemus.

Morals made Holminem an upright man, civil doctrine established him as a wise citizen; both of which, fitted to our religion, are theology, which they call moral: these three doctrines run together and converge into jurisprudence. For that is composed almost entirely of moral doctrine: law is neither science nor art, but prudence, and holds justice proposed as its end; it derives from the civil, for it regards the public utility; and from moral theology, for laws are interpreted in the Christian commonwealth. Moreover concerning divine and human matters we either dispute among the learned or speak among the unlearned: there we have truths, here necessities fit for speech.

Vera autem oratio logicae, digna numeris soluta rhetoricae, costricta vero po ticae artis et scopus et opus est.

True speech, however, is of logic, worthy of numbers and loosed from rhetoric, yet constrained by poetic art, both in scope and in work.

Nunc sciatis oportet eas ferme omnes artes scientiasque, quas memoravimus, suas habere historias comparatas: et uti institutiones rerum genera prosequuntur, ita historiae species, sive exempla consignant. Linguarum historiae sunt optimi in unaquaque scriptores, ab iis enim exempla traduntur, quibus hunc vel illum populum ita locutum esse firmetur; et clari oratores ac po tae oratoriae po ticaeque artis sunt exemplaria. De physicis phoenomenis et historiae conscriptae sunt, et scribuntur in dies.

Now you should know that almost all those arts and sciences which we mentioned have their own prepared histories: and as the institutions pursue kinds of things, so the species of histories, or exempla, record them. The histories of languages are the best writers in each [case], for from them examples are handed down by whom it is established that this or that people spoke thus; and celebrated orators and poets are the exemplars of oratorical and poetic art. Of physical phenomena histories too are written and are being written day by day.

Quid certae morborum observationes eorumque diarii, et certa pharmaca excogitata, quae vulgo " specifica remedia " vocant? nonne sunt physicae artisque medicae commentarii? Et de novis bellicae, nauticae, architecturae inventis historias scribit mechanice.

What of the exact observations of diseases and their diaries, and the certain drugs devised, which are commonly called " specifica remedia "? Are they not commentaries of physica and the medical art? And about new inventions in war, nautical matters, and architecture, the mechanician writes histories.

Dogmaticae et moralis theologiae haud prave historias dixeris, quae dogmata fidei a summo Numine revelata, et regulas de moribus aliis atque aliis temporibus praescriptas tradunt. Certe quidem sacros libros magna ex parte historicos theologi numerant: et traditio ecclesiastica quid est, nisi doctrinae disciplinaeque ecclesiasticae perpetua nec unquam interrupta successio? Atqui commentarii, annales, clarorum vitae virorum et rerumpublicarum monumenta, moralis et civilis doctrinae tam propriae sunt, ut dominanti vocabulo " historiae " nuncupentur.

You would not ill call dogmatic and moral theologies "histories," since they hand down the dogmas of the faith revealed by the highest Deity, and the rules concerning morals prescribed at various times. Certainly theologians reckon the sacred books for the most part as historical; and what is ecclesiastical tradition but the perpetual and never-interrupted succession of ecclesiastical doctrine and discipline? Yet commentaries, annals, the lives of famous men and the monuments of republics belong so properly to moral and civil doctrine that they are named by the dominant word "histories."

Iurisprudentiae vero historiae sunt, quae leges in republica hoc vel illo tempore rogatas, et ad eas a iurisconsultis interpretationes adhibitas, et rerum iudicatarum exempla complectuntur. Mathesis autem historias non habet, quia exemplis non utitur; nec logice, quia utitur alienis, et ubi ea desunt, confmgit; multo minus metaphysice, quia mentem humanam et Deum, ut purissimas simplicissimasque naturas, nihil praeterea comtemplatur.

Jurisprudence, however, are histories, which embrace the laws enacted in the republic at one time or another, and the interpretations applied to them by jurists, and examples of adjudicated cases. Mathesis, however, has no histories, because it does not make use of examples; nor (does it have them) logically, since it uses the works of others, and where these are lacking it fabricates; much less metaphysically, because it contemplates nothing besides the human mind and God, as the most pure and most simple natures.

Atque hoc loco divisionem illam, qua disciplinae omnes in acroamaticas et exotericas diducuntur, a Graecis quidem accipio, sed aliorsum accipio; ut acroamaticae, sive quae a doctoribus audiendae sunt, quo facilius acquirantur, sint ipsae artium scientiarumque institutiones; exotericae vero, quibus addiscendis ex se quisque par est, sint quae de artibus scientiisque prodierunt historiae.

And in this place I adopt that division by which all disciplines are split into acroamatic and exoteric; from the Greeks indeed I take it, but I take it otherwise: that the acroamatic, or those things to be heard from teachers so that they may be more easily acquired, are the very institutiones of the arts and sciences; the exoteric, however, which in learning them each man is equal of himself, are the histories that have arisen out of the arts and sciences.

Expositis igitur omnibus humanarum artium scientiarumque copiis, in iis ordine, ad sapientiam ediscendis nostram ipsorum corruptam naturam sequamur ducem. Nullum sane dubium est, quin pueritia, quantum ratione infirma aetas est, tantum memoria valeat: pueri enim vix trimuli omnia verba, omnes locutiones ad omnem vitae usum necessarias iam tenent, quas ingens lexici volumen vix capiat. Nulladoctrina ratione minus, magis memoria constat, quam sermonis, nam eius ratio consensus et usus populi est:

Having therefore set forth all the stores of human arts and sciences, in their order, for learning toward wisdom, let us follow our own corrupted nature itself as our guide. There is certainly no doubt that childhood, insofar as it is an age weak in reason, is so much the more powerful in memory: for boys of scarcely three years already hold all the words, all the locutions necessary for every use of life, which a huge volume of a lexicon would hardly contain. It is not that doctrine is less by reason; rather memory prevails more than discourse, for the rationale of speech is the consensus and usage of the people:

Quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi.

In whose keeping are the authority, the right, and the rule of speaking.

Nulla igitur sane aetas linguis addiscendis aptior, quam pueritia. At heic quis vestrum roget: quibusnam linguis potissimum danda sit opera?

Therefore no age, certainly, is more apt for learning languages than childhood. But here, someone of you will ask: to which languages, chiefly, should efforts be devoted?

Id vos docet ipsa corruptae naturae cognitio; etenim in praecipuis poenis, ad quas damnata est, enumeravimus linguarum barbariem, varietatem, incertitudinem in humanae societatis distractam. Haec itaque vicia sunt emendanda linguarum eruditione, quae, quantum fieri possit, doctae sint, certae, communes, ut per eas, quantum pote est, humanam societatem complectamur. Eae autem duae sunt:

This is taught you by the very knowledge of corrupted nature; for among the chief punishments to which it has been condemned we have set down the barbarism, the variety, the uncertainty of languages, scattered through human society. These, then, are vices to be corrected by the erudition of languages, which, as far as possible, should be learned, certain, common, so that through them, as far as may be, we embrace human society. And they are two:

graeca una, latina altera, utraque certa; sed graeca doctior; nunc latina communior.His igitur a pueris incumbendum; et praeterea, quo deinde sanius sacrorum sententias librorum assequantur, qui theologiae Christianae praecipuum sunt instrumentum, eos sanctae quoque linguae dare operam iuvat.

Greek one, Latin the other, both certain; but Greek more learned; now Latin more common. These therefore should be undertaken by boys; and moreover, so that afterwards they may more soundly attain the meanings of the sacred books, which are the chief instrument of Christian theology, it is beneficial to devote them also to the holy language.

Pueritia superata, mens humana seu ratio ex materiae luto altius emergere occipit. Mentis autem poenas ob originis vicium inflictas diximus esse opiniones. Corrupta igitur natura ab ea aetate opiniones profligandas expostulat.

With boyhood overcome, the human mind, or reason, begins to rise up from the clay of matter. The penalties of the mind, however, we said are opinions inflicted because of the defect of origin. Corrupt nature therefore demands that those opinions be cast away from that age.

Atqui in ephoebis phantasia plurimum pollet: cuius rei illud argumento sit, ut quam semel adolescentuli de longinquis urbibus ac regionibus formam situmque confinximus, vix reliqua aetate de iis aliam imaginem conformemus; tam alte prior caelata est, ut complanari, et alia super ea induci non possit. Nihil autem rationi magis, quam phantasia adversatur: quod in foeminis experimur, quae quia phantasia praevalent, ratione minus utuntur: quamobrem acrioribus quam viri animi perturbationibus infestantur. Cum haec ita sint, medicos imitari necesse est, qui mala venena cum modo morbis adhibent et medentur.

Moreover, phantasia wields the most power in youths: a proof of this is that once, as young lads, we have fashioned and stamped the form and situation of distant cities and regions, we scarcely in later life form any other image of them; the earlier impression has been engraved so deeply that it cannot be smoothed down, nor can other things be laid upon it. Nothing, moreover, opposes reason more than phantasia: which we observe in women, who, because phantasia prevails, make less use of reason; therefore their minds are assailed by keener perturbations than those of men. Since these things are so, it is necessary to imitate physicians, who apply remedies and treat poisons according to the kind of diseases.

Phantasia attenuanda est, ut per eam ipsam ratio invalescat, et mathesi ab adolescentibus incumbendum: quae doctrina vehementi imaginum conformandarum vi plurimum adiuvatur; nam saepe longissimam formarum, aut numerorum seriem mente contueri becesse est, ut apodixeos, quae inde conficitur, veritas agnoscatur. Sed cum puncta lineasque sine omni crassitie et corpulentia consideret, per eam mens humana liquescit, et incipit defoecari. Atque eo pacto adolescentes in rebus, de quibus iam inter homines convenit, ex dato vero verum conficere assuefiunt; ut in physicis, de quibus maxime contenditur, idem praestare possint.

Phantasia must be lessened, so that by it alone reason may grow strong, and mathesis must be applied to adolescents: a doctrine which is very greatly helped by the vehement force of images being conformed; for often it is necessary to behold in the mind a very long series of forms or of numbers, so that the truth of the apodixis which is made from them may be recognized. But when it considers points and lines without any thickness or corpulence, through it the human mind liquefies, and begins to be thinned. And in this way adolescents become accustomed to construct the true about matters in which men already agree from what is given; so that they may be able to show the same in the physica, about which people most contend.

Nam procedente aetate, et mathesis usu mens humana iam corporis vinculis solutior est, et ordinatior agit: atque ex rebus, quae sensu percipiuntur, par est, quae omnem sensum effugiunt colligere, adhuc corpora tamen. Itaque a mathesi physicae opera danda est, quae insensibiliae corpora eorumque insensibiles et figuras et motus, quae sunt naturalium rerum principia et caussae, contemplatur. Itaque per mathesim et physicam mens humana a pingui crassoque cogitationum genere, tamquam per gradus, depuratur, ut ad res spiritales contemplandas accedat, et intellectu mero puroque se ipsam, et per se ipsam Deum Opt.

For with advancing age, and by the use of mathesis, the human mind is already more loosened from the bonds of the body, and acts more ordered: and it is able to collect from things that are perceived by sense those things which escape every sense, yet still are bodies. Therefore from mathesis the tasks of physics must be undertaken, which contemplates insensible bodies and their insensible forms and motions, which are the principles and causes of natural things. Thus through mathesis and physics the human mind is purified from the fat and gross kind of thoughts, as if by degrees, so that it may approach to contemplate spiritual things, and with an intellect pure and simple know itself, and by itself know God, the Best.

Max. intelligat; ac per mathesis data, per physices dubia ad metapbysicen, quae res veras, certas et usquequaque exploratas aperit, perducatur.

Let him understand most fully; and, having received mathesis, through the doubts of physics let him be led to metaphysics, which reveals those things true, certain, and examined throughout.

Atque ita vobis metaphysice expeditis, cum iam regulam tenueritis de falsis, dubiis verisque iudicandi, hoc loci commoda explicatu est ipsa ars disserttatrix. Tum cognito Deo Opt. Max.

And thus, with metaphysical matters prepared for you, when you shall have held the rule for judging the false, the doubtful, and the true, the very dissertative art itself is to be explained for the conveniences of this place. Then, with God, the Best and Greatest, having been known.

quem natura fatetur, ad eum cognoscendum gradum faciatis, quem nostra religio profitetur; et theologiae Christianae animum adiungatis.

whom nature confesses, to him, for the purpose of knowing, make the degree which our religion professes; and join the mind of Christian theology.

Absolutam rerum divinarum scientiam humanarum prudentia sequitur: in quo doctrinarum ordine navium gubernatores imitari debemus: et quemadmodum ii coelestia observant, cynosuram aliaque astra, quo certa per occeanum itinera teneant, et ad quos portus contendunt, inoffenso cursu naves appellent; ita nos divina contemplemur, mentem humanam, summumque numen; earumque rerum scientia tamquam cynosura utamur, quo per medias opinionum syrtes, dubiorum vada et coecos errorum scopulos humanae vitae cursum cautius tutiusque dirigamus. Cum enim stulti homines veri internoscendi solertiam non habeant, veros bonorum et malorum fines, quod est omnis humanae prudentiae caput, ignorant. Cumque mala multa sint, quae bonorum, contra multa bona, quae malorum speciem obiiciunt; earum imprudentes rerum corporis voluptates sequuntur; labores, paupertatem ac mortem honestam abhorrent: unde per vicia se ipsos affligunt, et humanam societatem corrumpunt.

Human prudence follows the completed knowledge of divine things: in this order of teachings we ought to imitate the steersmen of ships; and just as they observe the heavens, the cynosure and the other stars, by which they hold sure courses across the ocean, and to which harbors they make for, with an unoffending course the ships make land; so let us contemplate divine things, the human mind, and the supreme divinity; and let us use the knowledge of those matters as a cynosure, by which, through the shoals of opinions, the shallows of doubt, and the blind rocks of errors, we may direct more cautiously and more safely the course of human life. For since foolish men have not the skill to discern the true, they are ignorant of the true limits of good and evil, which is the head of all human prudence. And since there are many evils that present the appearance of goods, and many goods that exhibit the appearance of evils, the imprudent follow the bodily pleasures of things; they shrink from labor, poverty, and an honorable death: whence by vices they afflict themselves, and corrupt human society.

Iccirco corrupta hominum natura scire desiderat, quia beatam esse desiderat.

Therefore the corrupted nature of mankind desires to know, because it desires to be blessed (to attain beatitude).

Qui ad sapientiam igitur humanam beatitudinem parentem literarum studia non ordinarit, solvit fortasse linguae aut mentis poenas, animi non absolvit. Quare complures sunt doctissimi homines, qui tamen ambitione circumaguntur, de fluxa eruditionis gloriola anxii vivunt, invidia doctiorum uruntur. Id eo fit, quia quae studia ad sapientiam comparandam sunt media, sibi fines proposuerunt.

Therefore he who has not ordered the studies of letters to human sapience, the parent of beatitude, perhaps pays the penalties of tongue or mind, but does not absolve the soul. Wherefore there are many very learned men who nevertheless are driven about by ambition, anxiously living for the little glory of mutable erudition, and burned with envy of the more learned. This comes about because those studies which are means for acquiring wisdom have set themselves up as ends.

Verus igitur disciplinarum, quas praemisimus, usus est, ut mens veris assuescat; ut, cum semel assueverit, delectetur, ut cum velit, facile possit, et cum possit, impensius velit veros bonorum fines in vita agenda deligere: nempe virtutes et bonas animi artes, et per eas mentis divinitatem excolere, et per mentem adire Deum.

The true use, therefore, of the disciplines which we prefixed is that the mind be habituated to the true; so that, once it has become accustomed, it may take delight, so that when it wills it may easily be able, and when it is able, more eagerly will to choose to pursue in life the true ends of good things: namely virtues and the good arts of the soul, and by these to cultivate the divinity of the mind, and by the mind to approach God.

Quare, divinarum rerum scientia imbuti, humanae prudentiae studeatis, primum morali, quae hominem, tum civili, quae civem format. Hinc, eas edocti, morali theologiae facilem operam dabitis ut olim a confessionibus principum eos in ordinandis regendisque rebus publicis quam sapientissimis consiliis dirigatis. Porro ad iurisprudentiam addiscendam multo expeditiores agetis: quae ex morali, civili et Christianorum, tum dogmatum, tum morum doctrina ferme omnis derivat.

Therefore, imbued with the knowledge of divine things, apply yourselves to human prudence — first moral, which forms the man, then civil, which forms the citizen. Hence, instructed in these, you will give ready attention to moral theology, so that, as once from the confessions of princes, you may direct them in ordering and governing public affairs with the wisest counsels. Moreover, you will render yourselves much more ready to learn jurisprudence: for almost all of it is derived from moral, civil, and Christian doctrine, both of dogmas and of morals.

Tandem, ut quisque vestrum, his sapientiae studiis instructus, non sibi aut paucis, sed longe lateque de humana societate benemereri et iuvare quam plurimos possit,sapientiae studiis illa eloquentiae coniungat. Neque enim quis vestrum, quando haec omnia ad sapientiam studia excolenda sunt, in iis a doctoribus condiscendis dubitet consenescere. Consenescet sane, et nequicquam consenescet, si qua ex iis non rite instructus colat, si non ex suo cuiusque fine colat, si perverso ordine colat; ut quos Fabius Quintilianus eleganter in hoc argumento dixit " compendio morari "; eos argutius, nec minus ex vero, ni fallor, dixeris, haerere, quia properant.

Finally, that each of you, instructed in these studies of wisdom, may join to the studies of wisdom that eloquence whereby he may do good and aid not for himself or a few, but far and wide for as many as possible of human society. For let none of you doubt that he will grow old in learning from teachers when all these things are to be cultivated as studies for forming wisdom. He will indeed age, and will age in vain, if he cultivates any of them not properly instructed, if he does not cultivate them from each one's proper end, if he cultivates in a perverse order; as whom Fabius Quintilian elegantly called "compendio morari" — to be detained by a shortcut — you will more sharply, and not less truly, if I am not mistaken, say that they hang back because they hurry.

Quid illud, quod nemini aeque plura obiici solent impedimenta, quarn festinanti? Et qui confusis studiorum ordinibus agunt, ut in labyrintho movent, non promovent. At via omnium brevissima recta est: et ordinis haec virtus multa brevi loco concludere.

What is it but that none have more impediments opposed to them than the one who is hasty? And those who proceed with the orders of studies confused move as in a labyrinth, not advance. But the straight way is the shortest of all: and this virtue of order brings many things to a close in a brief space.

At quia haec studia natura coniuncta et quo enarravimus ordine disposita, hominum vicio scissa saepe et turbata sunt, multa videntur, at reipsa non multa, sed eadem deprehendas multiplicata. Artium enim institutiones et scientiarum doctrinae, quas acroamaticas censuimus, et a doctoribus ediscendas, si nihil in aliis aliunde forinsecus accersatur (quid enim opus est accersiri, si omnia suo quaeque loco dispensate edocentur?) sunt ferme omnes brevissimae. Scientiarum artiurnque historias exotericas esse existimavimus, ut eas per vosmet ipsos erudiri possitis.

But because these studies, joined by nature and disposed in the order we have set forth, are often rent and disturbed by the fault of men, they appear many, yet in reality not many, but you find the same things multiplied. For the institutions of the arts and the doctrines of the sciences, which we have judged acroamatic and to be learned from teachers, if nothing is summoned in from elsewhere or from abroad (for what need is there to summon anything, if each thing is taught disposed in its proper place?), are for the most part very brief. We considered the histories of the sciences and of the arts to be exoteric, so that you yourselves may be instructed in them.

Atque habetis, optimae spei adolescentes, quod sequamini de studiorum fine et ratione consilium, si ab honestate spectetis praeclarissimum; si ab utilitate, optimum; si a facilitate, expeditissimum, quod me dedisse non poenitet: quia, quamquam sapiens non sim, in eo tamen dando sum sapientes secutus. Si semper faciunt, quia semper possunt: ego, quando mihi haec, quae dixi, corruptae meae naturae cognitio admonuit, in hac suasione feci; quia in hac tantum potui, ut sedulo serioque et ex meae artis proprio fine vobiscum agerem, et pro mea virili parte humanam adiuvarem societatem.

And you have, youths of the finest hope, the counsel which you should follow concerning the end and method of studies: if you view it from honesty, most illustrious; if from utility, best; if from facility, most expedient—this I do not regret having given: for, although I am not wise, in giving it I nevertheless followed the wise. "They always do, because they always can": I, when the knowledge of my corrupted nature admonished me of these things which I have said, acted under this persuasion; for in this alone could I so act, that diligently and seriously and from the proper end of my art I might deal with you, and in my manly part assist human society.