Pseudoplatonica: Minos

S. Estne aliquid quo lex a lege secundum quod lex est, differt? Adverte plane quid quaeram. Sic enim interrogo, ac si dicam, quid est aurum: et si tu eodem modo de quo auro quaeram roges, haud recte te percontari censere.

S. Is there anything by which law differs from law in respect of what law is? Attend plainly to what I ask. For I question thus, as if I should say, What is gold? and if you were to ask in the same manner as about gold, I do not think you would be judged to inquire rightly.

Neque enim aurum ab auro, qua aurum, neque lapis, qua lapis, a lapide quicquam differt: eodemque modo lex a lege nil discrepat, sed omnes idem sunt. Etenim lex unaquaeque illarum similter est, nec una magis et alia minus. De hoc ipso igitur universo, quid lex est, generatim interrogo: Quod si in promptu nunc habes, explica.

For neither does gold differ from gold, as gold, nor stone, as stone, differ in anything from stone; and in the same way law differs nothing from law, but they are all the same. Indeed each one of those laws is similarly one, nor is one more or less than another. Therefore about this very whole matter I ask, generically, what law is: but if you have it now at hand, explain it.

M. Et quid aliud lex o Socrates esset, quam lege recepta et approbata?

M. And what else would law, O Socrates, be but law received and approved?

S. An sermo tibi videtur ea esse quae sermo dicuntur, vel visus quae videntur, vel auditus quae audiuntur? aut aliud sermo, aliud pronunciata, aliud visus, aliud visa, et auditus similiter atque qudita, necnon lex aliud, alid lege recepta? Sicne, an aliter tibi videtur?

S. Do you think that sermo is those things which are called “speech,” or visus those things which are seen, or auditus those things which are heard? Or is sermo one thing, pronunciata another, visus another, visa another, and auditus likewise as the things said; and likewise is lex one thing, and another the law received by statute? Is it so, or does it seem otherwise to you?

M. Sic utique.

M. Yes, certainly.

S. Non ergo lex est, quae lege recepta.

S. Therefore it is not a law which was received by law.

M. Non videtur.

M. It does not seem so.

S. Quid itaquesit lex, in hunc modum consideremus. Si quis de iis quae modo diximus, perconteur dicens: postquam visu asseritis quae videntur percipi: quid est visus quo illa percipiuntur: responderemus utique esse sensum huiusmodi qui per oculos colores declarat: et de auditu interrogati, sensum qui per aures vocem haurit. Eodemque pacto si roget, postquam lege legitima constituuntur, quid est lex qua recepta recipiuntur, utrum sensus aliquis, vel declaratio, quemadmodum quae discuntur, declarante scientia compraehenduntur, et inveniuntur inventione monstrante: quemadmodum salubria et noxia medicina monstrantur: quae vero dii cogitant, ut vates ferunt, divinandi facultate noscuntur.

S. What then is law? Let us consider it in this way. If anyone concerning those things which we have just said should ask, saying: after you have asserted by sight the things which are seen are perceived, what is sight by which those things are perceived? — we should certainly answer that it is a sense of that sort which through the eyes discloses colours; and, if questioned about hearing, the sense which draws in the voice through the ears. In the very same fashion if he asks, after things are established by a lawful statute, what is the law by which received things are received — whether some sense, or a declaration, just as those things which are learned are grasped by declaring science and are discovered when discovery points them out — just as wholesome and noxious medicines are shown: but those things which the gods think, as the seers say, are known by the faculty of divination.

Vaticinium namque rerum talium inventio est: an non?

Prophecy, for indeed it is the discovery of such things: is it not?

M. Prorsus.

M. Certainly.

S. Quae horum praecipue legem esse praesumimus? institutane ista atque decreta?

S. Which of these things do we especially suppose to be law? Or are those instituted and decreed?

M. Mihi quidem videntur.. Quid enim aliud quispiam legem esse dixerit? Ex quo apparet id totum quod rogabas, legem civitatis institutum esse.

M. They indeed seem so to me.. For what else would anyone have called law? From which it appears that that whole thing which you were asking is an instituted law of the state.

S. Opinionemne civitatis legem vocas?

S. Do you call the opinion of the state a law?

M. Equidem.

M. Indeed I do.

S. Et forte recte loqueris: forsitan vero in hunc modum melius intelligemus. Aliquos sapientes vocas?

S. And perhaps you speak rightly: perhaps indeed in this way we shall understand better. Do you call some men wise?

M. Voco.

M. I call.

S. Nonne sapientes sapientia sapientes sunt?

S. Are not the wise, by wisdom, wise?

M. Ita.

M. Yes.

S. Et iusti iustitia iusti?

S. And are the just just by justice?

M. Prorsus.

M. Certainly.

S. Ergo et legitimi lege legitimi?

S. Therefore are legitimate persons legitimate by law?

M. Nempe.

M. Indeed.

S. Iniqui autem iniquitate iniqui?

S. But are the unjust unjust by iniquity?

M. Certe.

M. Certainly.

S. Legitimi vero iusti?

S. Legitimate, then, the righteous?

M. Ita.

M. Yes.

S. Iniqui autem iniusti?

S. But the iniquitous, are they unjust?

M. Iniusti.

M. Unjust.

S. An non pulcherrimum quiddam lex atque iustitia?

S. Is not law and justice something most beautiful?

M. Sic est.

M. Thus it is.

S. Turpissimum vero iniustitia atque iniquitas?

S. Is injustice and iniquity indeed the most shameful?

M. Turpissimum.

M. Most shameful.

S. Et illud quidem civitates, ac reliqua omnia servat, hoc autem pervertit atque corrumpit?

S. And that indeed preserves cities and all other things, but this perverts and corrupts them?

M. Ita.

M. Yes.

S. Ergo legem oportet, ut pulchrum aliquid cogitare, et ut bonum quaerere.

S. Therefore there ought to be a law that one should think of some beautiful thing, and seek the good.

M. Quidni?

M. Why not?

S. An non institutum civitatis legem esse diximus?

S. Did we not say that the institution of the civitas is law?

M. Diximus.

M. We have said so.

S. Nonne decreta quaedam bona, nonnulla etiam mala sunt?

S. Are not certain decrees good, and some even bad?

M. Sunt certe.

M. They certainly are.

S. Lex tamen mala non erat.

S. The law, however, was not evil.

M. Non certe.

M. Certainly not.

S. Non igitur ita simpliciter asserendum est, legem civitatis institutum esse.

S. Therefore it must not be so simply asserted that it is an institution of the law of the state.

M. Nequaquam mihi videtur.

M. By no means does it seem so to me.

S. Neque enim congruit iniquam constitutionem legem esse.

S. For it is not fitting that an unjust constitution should be law.

M. Non.

M. No.

S. Verumtamen opinio quaedam lex mihi quoque videtur: cumque prava opinio minime sit, an non perspicuum est, si quidem est opinio, probam opinionem esse?

S. Yet a certain opinion likewise seems to me to be law: and since a perverse opinion is by no means [so], is it not clear that, if it is indeed an opinion, it is a probable opinion?

M. Constat.

M. It is agreed.

S. Proba vero opinio, nonne vera opinio est?

S. But a probative opinion, is it not a true opinion?

M. Est.

M. It is so.

S. At opinio vera veritatis inventio.

S. But opinion is the true discovery of truth.

M. Certe.

M. Certainly.

S. Lex itaque veritatis inventio esse vult.

S. Therefore the law desires that the discovery of truth exist.

M. At quomodo, o Socrates, si lex veritatis inventio est, non iisdem semper legibus circa eadem utimur, cum rerum veritas inventa sit?

M. But how, O Socrates, if the law of truth is an invention, do we not always employ the same laws concerning the same things, since the truth of things has been discovered?

S. Nihilominus lex veritati, inventio esse vult. Quod si non iisdem, ut videtur, legibus homines utuntur, non semper veritatem, quam lex expetit, reperire possunt. Sed age videamus, an hinc nobis liquidius pateat, sive iisdem semper, sive alias aliis vivamus legibus, et num cuncti homines eiusdem, aut aliis alii.

S. Nevertheless the law wills that truth be an inventio, a discovery. But if men do not, it seems, use the same laws, they cannot always find the verity which the law seeks. But come, let us see whether from this it will lie more clearly open to us, whether we always live by the same laws or at times by other laws, and whether all men are of the same, or some men of other laws.

M. Verum neque id cognitu difficile est, o Socrates, quod neque iidem semper eisdem, nec alii semper aliis legibus vivunt, Neque enim leges nostrae hostia humana sacrificare permittunt, sed nefarium est: apud Carthaginenses autem iustum sanctumque habetur, adeo, ut eorum nonnulli Saturno filios litent, quod ipse forsitan audivisti. Nec modo Barbari homines diversas ac nos leges sequuntur, verumetiam qui Lyciam incolunt: illi Athamatis successores qualia sacra offerunt, quum tamen Graeci sint? Nos quoque audivisti quales quondam leges circa inferias servaverimus, hostias iugulantes antequam efferetur cadaver, praeficasque accersentes.

M. But it is not difficult to grasp, O Socrates, that neither the same people always live under the same laws, nor do other peoples always live by other laws. For our laws do not permit sacrificing a human victim — it is nefarious; among the Carthaginians, however, it is held just and holy, so much so that some of them offer their children to Saturn, which you yourself have perhaps heard. Nor do only Barbarians follow laws different from ours, but even those who inhabit Lycia: they, successors of Athamas, offer such sacred rites, although they are Greeks. You have also heard what sort of laws we once observed about funerary rites, slaughtering victims before the corpse is carried out, and summoning the praeficae.

Et qui iis antiquiores, defunctos etiam domi sepeliebant, quorum nos his temporibus nihil omnino servamus. Innumerabilia praeterea huiusmodi exempla referre possemus. Latissimus enim demonstrandi campus est, quod nec nos iisdem semper nobiscum, nec homines invicem legibus vitam agunt.

And those who are more ancient even buried the deceased at home, which we in these times do not observe at all. Moreover I could relate innumerable examples of this kind. For the field for demonstrating is very wide: neither do we always live by the same laws among ourselves, nor do men live with one another under identical laws.

S. Nil mirum est, o vir optime, si tu recte loqueris, me vero id latuit. Verum donec ipse per teipsum quae tibi videntur, prolixa oratione narrabis, egoque rursus idem faciam, nunquam, ut arbitror, consentiemus. At si communis disceptatio proponatur, forsitan congruemus: itaque si id vis, interrogans ipse me, communiter una mecum considera: sin autem respondere mavis, responde.

S. It is no wonder, O most excellent man, if you speak rightly and that escaped me. But until you yourself, in a prolix oration, relate what seems to you, and I again do the same, we shall never, as I suppose, agree. Yet if a common disputation is proposed, perhaps we shall concur: therefore if you will it, questioning me yourself, consider jointly and communally with me; but if you prefer to answer, answer.

M. Volo equidem, o Socrates, ad quodcunque libuerit respondere.

M. For my part I indeed wish, O Socrates, to reply to whatever he may please.

S. Age igitur, num iusta putas iniusta, iniusta vero duntaxat iniusta?

S. Well then, surely you do not think that the just are unjust, and that the unjust, however, are only merely unjust?

M. Equidem quae iusta sunt, iusta: necnon iniusta, quaecunque iniusta sunt.

M. For my part, those things which are just are just: and likewise the unjust, whatever things are unjust.

S. An non quemadmodum hic, sic et ubique gentium existimatur?

S. Or is he not, just as here, thus esteemed everywhere among the peoples?

M. Ita.

M. Yes.

S. Et apud Persas nonne?

S. And among the Persians, is it not so?

M. Et apud Persas.

M. And among the Persians.

S. An non et semper?

S. Or not always?

M. Et semper.

M. And always.

S. Utrum quae plus trahunt, graviora hic censentur: quae minus leviora: vel huius oppositum?

S. Whether those things which draw more are here reckoned graver: those which draw less, lighter: or the opposite of this?

M. Non, immo plus trahentia graviora, minus trahentia leviora.

M. No, on the contrary: those that draw more are more serious, those that draw less are lighter.

S. Num et in Lycia, et Carthagine idem?

S. Is it the same both in Lycia and in Carthage?

M. Idem.

M. The same.

S. Pulchra quippe ut videtur, ubique pulchra putantur: turpia contra, turpia: non autem pulchra turpia, vel turpia pulchra.

S. Beautiful, indeed as it seems, are thought beautiful everywhere: ugly things, on the contrary, ugly: yet not "beautiful ugly," nor "ugly beautiful."

M. Ita est.

M. So it is.

S. Nonne per omnia generatim quae vera sunt, esse censentur: non autem quae minime vera, tum apud nos, tum apud homines universos?

S. Are not, generally, those things which are true considered to be in every respect: but not those which are least true, either among us or among all men?

M. Videtur.

M. It seems.

S. Ergo quisquis a vero aberrat, a legitimo quoque aberrat.

S. Therefore whoever departs from the true departs also from the legitimate.

M. Secundum rationem tuam, o Socrates, eadem legitima semper et inter nos, et inter caeteros esse videntur. At cum nos animadverto absque fine quotidie leges sursum deorsumque mutantes, fidem tibi habere non possum.

M. According to your reasoning, O Socrates, the same legitimate laws always seem to hold both among us and among others. But when I observe that, without end, laws daily changing up and down, I cannot put faith in you.

S. Forte non percipis, quod haec transposita eadem perseverant. Caeterum sic ipsa mecum intuere: librumne unquam de curatione morborum aliquem nactus est?

S. Perchance you do not perceive that these things, when transposed, remain the same. Moreover, behold them thus with me: has anyone ever found any book at all concerning the cure of diseases?

M. Equidem.

M. For my part.

S. Nostin' cuius artis libet ille sit?

S. Do you know to which art he wishes to belong?

M. Novi quod medicinae.

M. I know that he belongs to the medical art.

S. Medicos vocas qui haec sciunt?

S. Do you call physicians those who know these things?

M. Voco.

M. I call.

S. Qui sciunt, eadem de eiusdem, an diversi diversa constituunt?

S. Do those who know, the same things about the same person, or do different people establish different things?

M. Eadem.

M. The same.

S. Utrum Graeci soli cum Graecis, aut etiam Barbari, et secum et cum Graecis de iis quae sciunt, conveniunt?

S. Whether Greeks alone convene with Greeks, or also Barbarians, both among themselves and with the Greeks, concerning those things which they know?

M. Necesse est omnino eadem de iis quae sciunt Graecos Barbarosque censere.

M. It is altogether necessary to hold the same judgment concerning those things which Greeks and Barbarians know.

S. Probe respondisti, sed nonne et semper?

S. You have answered well, but surely not always?

M. Et semper.

M. And always.

S. Nonne medici circa valetudinem conscribunt, quae esse censent?

S. Do not the physicians write concerning health what they judge it to be?

M. Immo.

M. On the contrary.

S. Scripta igitur medicorum leges medicorum sunt?

S. Are the writings of physicians, then, the laws of physicians?

M. Sunt.

M. They are.

S. Et geometrica scripta geometrarum leges?

S. And are the geometrical writings of the geometers their laws?

M. Certe.

M. Certainly.

S. Quorum sunt scripta constitutionesque de cultu hortorum?

S. Whose writings and constitutions concerning the cultivation of gardens are these?

M. Horticultorum.

M. Of the gardeners.

S. Hae igitur leges horticultoriae sunt?

S. Are these, then, the laws of horticulture?

M. Ita.

M. Yes.

S. Eorum qui hortis praeesse sciunt?

S. Of those who know how to preside over gardens?

M. Quidni?

M. Why not?

S. Sciunt autem horticultores?

S. Do gardeners, then, know?

M. Nempe.

M. Certainly.

S. At quorum sunt de condimentis obsoniorum scripta atque instituta?

S. But whose are the writings and instructions concerning the condiments of the dishes?

M. Coquorum.

M. Of the cooks.

S. Coquorum igitur hae leges sunt?

S. Are these, then, the laws of cooks?

M. Sunt.

M. They are.

S. Eorum videlicet, qui praeparandis obsoniis praeesse sciunt.

S. Of those, namely, who know how to preside over the preparing of dishes.

M. Procul dubio.

M. Without doubt.

S. Sciunt haec, ut aiunt, coqui?

S. Do cooks know these things, as they say?

M. Sciunt. Age igitur, dic quorum sunt conscripta, et instituta de civitatis gubernatione. An non eorum qui administrandis reipublicae periti sunt?

M. They know. Come then, say whose the conscripta and instituta concerning the governance of the city are. Are they not of those who are skilled in administering the republic?

M. Apparet.

M. appears.

S. Num alii quidam praeter civiles atque regios homines id noverunt?

S. Surely some other certain men, besides civilian and royal persons, knew this?

M. Isti soli.

M. Those alone.

S. Civilia ergo conscripta haec sunt, quae homines regum bonorumque virorum decreta nominant.

S. Therefore these civil writings are those which men call the decrees of kings and of good men.

M. Vera narras.

M. You tell the truth.

S. Qui sciunt, haud alias aliud de iisdem rebus statuunt?

S. Do those who know, then, decide otherwise something different about the same matters?

M. Non certe.

M. Certainly not.

S. Non igitur alia atque alia legitima sunt.

S. Therefore this and that are not lawful.

M. Nequaquam.

M. By no means.

S. Si quos dissentientes mutantesque viderimus, num scire illos, an ignorare dicemus?

S. If we see any who dissent and are ever changing, shall we say that they know, or that they are ignorant?

M. Nescire.

M. Not to know.

S. An non, quod in singulis rectum est, id in singulis legitimum nuncupandum? Ut pote quod secundum rationem medici fit, vel coqui, vel horticultoris, id in eis legitimum?

S. Is not that which is right in the particulars to be called lawful in the particulars? As, for example, that which is done according to the judgment of the physician, or of the cook, or of the gardener—is that lawful in them?

M. Absque dubio.

M. Without doubt.

S. Contra vero, quod minime rectum, haud amplius legitimum appellandum?

S. On the contrary, ought that which is least right no longer to be called legitimate?

M. Haud amplius.

M. No more.

S. Illegitimum itaque sit.

S. Therefore let it be illegitimate.

M. Necessarium est.

M. It is necessary.

S. Quamobrem in constitutionibus de iustis atque iniustis, et universe de civitatis ordine et gubernandi ratione tractantibus quodcunque rectum est, regia lex existit: non rectum vero, nequaquam lex regia: quia scientia deest, esse videtur, quippe cum illegitimum sit.

S. Wherefore, in constitutions treating of the just and the unjust, and generally concerning the order of the city and the art of governing, whatever is right exists as royal law: but what is not right is by no means royal law; for when knowledge is lacking it may appear to be so, although it is illegitimate.

M. Sic est.

M. Thus it is.

S. Probe igitur confessi sumus legem ese veritatis inventionem?

S. Have we, then, rightly confessed that law is the invention of truth?

M. Apparet.

M. It appears.

S. Praeterea et hoc ad idem consideremus: quis spargendorum in terram seminum peritus est?

S. Furthermore, and to the same purpose let us consider this: who is skilled in scattering seeds upon the earth?

M. Agricola.

S. Hic utique convenientia semina unicuique solo distribuit.

S. Here, to be sure, he distributes convenient seeds to each soil.

M. Sane.

M. Indeed.

S. Agricola igitur in iis legislator beonus est, iusque leges et ad ista distributionis rectae.

S. Therefore Agricola is a good legislator in those things, and law and statutes conduce to that right distribution.

M. Verum.

M. Indeed.

S. Quis in ipsis ad harmonaim pulsationibus bonus legis conditor est, ac pro dignitate impertit, et cuius leges rectae?

S. Who among them, in the very pulsations of harmonies, is the good founder of the law, and imparts as befits dignity, and whose laws are right?

M. Tibicen et citharista haec agunt. Qui ergo in iis maxime legitimus est, is maxime tibicen.

M. The piper and the citharist do these things.
Therefore he who among them is most legitimate is chiefly a piper.

M. Ita.

M. Yes.

S. Quis optime corporibus alimenta accomadate potest, nonne qui congrua cuique adhibere novit?

S. Who can most fitly furnish bodies with nourishment, if not he who knows how to apply to each what is congrua?

M. Is ipse.

M. He himself.

S. Huius partitiones institutionesque optimae: et quicunque circa haec legitimus maxime, is legiis conditor optimus.

S. The partitions and institutions of this are excellent: and whoever concerning these is most learned in law, he is the best founder of laws.

M. Prorsus.

M. Entirely.

S. Quis iste?

S. Who is that?

M. Paedotriba.

M. A paedotribe.

S. Is humani corporis gregem pascere optime novit?

S. Does he know very well how to feed the flock of the human body?

M. Sane.

M. Certainly.

S. Ei vero qui pecudum gregem pascere novit, quod nomen est?

S. But what, then, is the name of him who knows how to pasture a flock of sheep?

M. Pastor.

M. A shepherd.

S. Pastoris itaque leges ovibus optimae.

S. Therefore the shepherd’s laws are best for the sheep.

M. Optimae.

M. Excellent.

S. Et bubulci bobus.

S. And the ox-herds for the oxen.

M. Etiam.

M. Also.

S. At cuius potissimum leges animis hominum optimae sunt? an non regis?

S. But whose laws above all are the best in the minds of men? Are they not the king’s?

M. Regis.

M. Of the king.

S. Bene dicis: sed num referre potes, quis e priscis hominibus legum circa tibiarum inflationem conditor optimus extitit? forte non tenes, visne tibi memorem?

S. You speak well: but can you bring to mind who, of the ancient men, proved the best founder of laws about the inflation (blowing) of the tibiae? Perchance you do not remember—would you have me remind you?

M. Valde.

M. Very much.

S. Marsya, et quem ille maxime amavit Olympus Phrygius.

S. Marsya, and Olympus the Phrygian, whom that one most dearly loved.

M. Vera loqueris.

M. You speak truly.

S. Horum sane tibicines harmoniae divinissimae sunt, et solae concitant audientes, qui potissimum Deos qui usui sunt ostendunt, ac solae in hunc usque diem ut pote divinae perstiterunt.

These pipers indeed are of most divine harmony, and alone they stir up the listeners, who above all reveal the gods who are useful, and alone to this very day have, as it were divine, endured.

M. Vera haec sunt.

M. These things are true.

S. Quis autem ex antiquis regibus legis conditor optimus fuisse fertur, cuius adhuc tanquam divinae institutiones extent?

S. But which of the ancient kings is reported to have been the best founder of the law, whose ordinances even now stand forth as if divine institutions?

M. Nequaquam teneo.

M. By no means do I hold it.

S. An nescis, quae Graecorun gentes antiquissimis legibus utantur?

S. Do you not know which Greek peoples make use of the most ancient laws?

M. Forte Lacaedemonios et Lycurgum Lacaedaemoniorum legum latorem dicis.

M. Perhaps you mean the Lacedaemonians and Lycurgus, the lawgiver of the Lacedaemonian laws.

S. At haec instituta nondum forte trecentos annos, vel paulo plures impleverunt, sed legum earum praecipuae unde venerunt, nosti?

S. But these institutions have not yet, perhaps, completed three hundred years, or a little more; do you know whence the chief parts of their laws came?

M. Ex Creta ferunt.

M. They say he is from Crete.

S. Isti itaque ex Graecis omnibus antiquissimis legibus vivunt.

S. These, therefore, live by all the most ancient Greek laws.

M. Verum.

M. True.

S. Scis qui apud eos praestantissimi reges extiterint? Minos videlicet et Rhadamanthus Iovis et Europae filii, quorum hae leges sunt.

S. Do you know who among them have been the most outstanding kings? Minos, certainly, and Rhadamanthus, sons of Jupiter and Europa, whose these laws are.

M. Rhadamanthum quidem, o Socrates, iustum virum fuisse tradunt, Minoem autem agrestem, durum atque iniustum.

M. They report that Rhadamanthus, O Socrates, was a just man, but Minos a rustic, harsh, and unjust one.

S. Atticam, o vir optime, ac tragicam fabulam refers.

S. You recount an Attic and tragic tale, O most excellent man.

M. Nonne haec de Minoe circunferuntur?

M. Are not these things circulated about Minos?

S. Non tamen Homerus, aut Hesiodus ista testantur, quanquam locupletiores admodum testes sunt, quam cuncti tragici, quorum testimonio talia loqueris.

S. But neither Homer nor Hesiod testify to those things, although they are far richer witnesses than all the tragic poets whose testimony you invoke for such matters.

M. Et quid isti de Minoe tradunt?

M. And what do those men relate about Minos?

S. Dicam, ne tu, ut alii multi, impia loquaris. Nihil enim hoc magis impium est. Etenim primo cavendum est, ne quid in Deum, aut verbo, aut opere, aliquando peccemus deinde ne quid adversus divinos homines.

S. I will speak, lest you, like many others, speak impiously. For nothing is more impious than this. And indeed, first one must take care that we in no way sin against God, either in word or in deed; secondly, that we do nothing against divine men.

Quin diligenter cavere decet, quoties virum aliquem laudaturus, aut vituperaturus es, ne aberres. Atque huius gratia in primis cavendum est, ut bonos ac malos homines dignoscamus. Deus quippe nimium indignatur, quoties quispiam illius similem improbat, aut probat dissimilem.

Indeed one ought to take heed carefully whenever you are about to praise or to blame any man, lest you go astray. And for this reason above all one must beware, so that we may discern good and bad men. For God in truth is overly indignant whenever anyone reproves one like him, or approves one unlike him.

Dei vero similis est vir bonus. Neque lapides ac ligna, avesque atque serpentes sacra existimes, homines vero nequaquam. Immo sacratissimum omnium est vir bonus, prophanissimum contra vir malus.

But a good man is truly like God. Do not think stones and wood, birds and snakes sacred, nor ever think men so. Indeed, the most sacred of all is a good man, whereas a bad man is most profane.

Et nunc iam quemadmodum Homerus Hesiodusque Minoem ipsium extollunt, hac de causa referam, ne amplius homo ipse ex homine natus, adversus heroa Iovis filium perperam obloquaris. Nam Homerus ubi de Creta mentionem faceret, quod esset admodum populosa, et in ea nonaginta urbes, inter illas, inquit, est Gnosos ampla civitas, in qua Minos regnavit, novem annos magno cum Iove collocutus. Tanta est haec in Minoe Homeri laus paucis verbis explicata, ut nunquam pari laudatione heroum quenquam extulerit.

And now I will relate for this reason how Homer and Hesiod exalt Minos himself, so that henceforth you should not wrongly revile a man born of man against the hero, son of Jove. For when Homer made mention of Crete, that it was very populous, and that in it were ninety cities, among them, he says, Gnossos is a spacious city, in which Minos reigned, having been associated with great Jove for nine years. Such is this praise of Minos in Homer, expressed in few words, that he never raised any one of the heroes with equal praise.

quod enim Iupiter sophista est, eaque ars praeclarissima, quum alibi saepenumero, tum hoc in loco, vel maxime patefacit. Nam Minoem annos novem cum Iove colloquutum inquit, ad eumque disciplinae gratia proficisci solitum, quasi Iupiter sophista sit. Quod autem tanto munere, hoc est ab Iove eruditum esse, alium heroa nullum Homerus affecit, mira quaedam laus existimanda est.

for that Jupiter is a sophist, and that very brilliant art, while elsewhere often, yet in this place especially, most fully discloses itself. for he says that Minos spoke with Jove for nine years, and was wont to set out to him for the sake of discipline, as if Jupiter were a sophist. but that Homer has bestowed no other hero with so great a munus, that is, to be instructed by Jove, must be reckoned a somewhat wondrous praise.

Qinetiam in Odyssea ubi funus describitur, Minoem mortuorum animas iudicantem, aureum sceptrum tenentem induxit. Rhadamanthum vero neque hic, neque alibi iudicantem, aut cum Iove colloquentem inducit. Quamobrem ab Homero prae caeteris omnibus Minoem honoratum assero.

Moreover in the Odyssey, where a funeral is described, he introduces Minos judging the souls of the dead, holding a golden scepter. But he does not introduce Rhadamanthus judging either here or elsewhere, nor conversing with Jove. Wherefore I assert that Minos is honoured by Homer above all others.

Etenim quum Iovis sit filius, quod ab illo duntaxat sit eruditus, non habet magnam laudem. hoc nempe carmen illud significat, Minos regnavit novem annos, magno cum Iove colloqui solitus. Minoem videlicet cum Iove annos novem in sermonibus congressum.

For because he is a son of Jove, and that he was taught by him alone, he does not have great praise. That poem indeed states, “Minos reigned nine years, and was wont to converse much with great Jove.” It plainly means that Minos conversed with Jove for nine years.

oaroi namque sermones sunt, oaristês autem est in sermonibus congrediens. Minos itaque annos novem Iovis antrum erudiendus accessit. Unde et didicit, et docuit inde caeteros, quae ab Iove novem annis acceperat.

oaroi for they are conversations, oaristês however is one joining in conversations. Minos therefore approached Jove’s cave to be instructed for 9 years. Whence he both learned, and from it taught the others, those things which he had received from Jove for nine years.

Nec tamen desunt qui oaristên aliter exponant, compotatorem, comessatoremque, et collusorem Iovis. Verum ex hoc maxime istos non recte exponere coniicere possumus, quod nulli vel Graeci, vel Barbari symposiis, id est, compotationibus, atque eiusmodi ludis abstinent praeter Cretenses, atque Lacedaemonios, qui a Cretensibus didicerunt. In Creta praeterea inter caeteras Minois ipsius leges haec extat, Ne invicem compotetis ad ebrietatem.

Nor yet are there lacking those who explain oaristên otherwise — as compotator, comessator, and collusor of Jupiter. But from this especially we may conjecture that they do not expound these matters rightly, since neither Greeks nor Barbarians abstain from symposia, that is, from banquets and such games, except the Cretans and the Lacedaemonians, who learned [this] from the Cretans. Moreover in Crete, among the other laws of Minos, this stands: Do not make one another drunk to intoxication.

Constat autem eum quae honesta censebat, civibus suis observanda Creta per omne tempus est felix, ac etiam Lacedamon, ex quo iis legibus, ut pote divinis, uti coepit. Rhadamanthus autem vir quidem bonus extitit, a Minoe siquidem instructus erat: nec tamen regiam disciplinam omnem, sed regi tantum ministrare in iudiciis didicit: unde iudex bonus apellatus est. Eo plane veluti legum custode per urbem usus est Minos, ad reliquam vero Cretam custode Talo.

It is agreed moreover that Crete was fortunate for all time in that the things which he judged honorable were to be observed by his citizens, and likewise Lacedaemon, since it began to make use of those laws, as being divine. Rhadamanthus, moreover, proved to be a truly good man, for he had been instructed by Minos; yet he did not learn the whole royal discipline, but only to serve the king in judgments — whence he was called a good judge. Thus Minos plainly used him as it were a guardian of the laws throughout the city, and for the remaining part of Crete he used Talus as guardian.

Talos enim ter quotannis pagos omnes lustrabat, leges eorum observaturus, tabulis aereis leges insculptas circumferens: unde aereus nominatus est. Hesiodus praeterea similia quaedam in ipsum Minoem intulit. Nam cum nominis illis mentionem fecisset, inquit: Qui mortalibus regibus praestitit, pluribusque gentibus imperavit, Iovis sceptrum habens, quo civitates regebat.

For Talos thrice each year traversed all the districts, to see that their laws were observed, bearing around bronze tablets with the laws inscribed upon them: whence he was called Aereus. Hesiod moreover ascribed similar things to Minos himself. For when he made mention of that name he says: “He who presided over mortal kings and ruled many peoples, bearing Jove’s scepter, with which he governed the cities.”

Hic item sceptrum Iovis nihil aliud vocat, quam Iovis doctrinam, qua Cretam omnem moderabatur.

Here likewise he calls the scepter of Jove nothing else than the doctrine of Jove, by which he governed all Crete.

M. Quam igitur ob causam, o Socrates, fama haec inter homines diffusa est, Minoem ipsum rudem, durumque hominem extitisse?

M. For what, then, O Socrates, cause has this fame among men been spread, that Minos himself proved a rude and harsh man?

S. Ob quam et tu, o vir optime, et unusquisque alius cui bona existimatio curae est, si modo sapitis, diligenter cavere debetis, ne poeticum hominem infensum aliquem habeatis. Poetae quippe vim maximam in utranque partem, et ad laudandum et vituperandum habent. Qua in re profecto Minos deliquit, cum huic urbi bellum indiceret, quae cum caeteris sapientibus plurimis, tum vel maxime poetis omnis generis, ac tragicis praesertim referta est.

S. For which reason you also, O most excellent man, and every other person to whom a good reputation is of concern, if indeed you are wise, ought diligently to beware, lest you have any poetic man hostile to you. For poets possess very great power in both directions, both to praise and to vituperate. In this matter certainly Minos erred, when he declared war on this city, which, together with very many other wise men, was above all filled with poets of every sort, and especially with tragedians.

Tragoedia vero hic est antiquissima, nec ut plerique putant a Thespide aut a Phrynicho sumpsit initium: sed si perscrutari volueris, reperies tragediam longe antiquius huius civitatis inventum. Haec autem ex universa poesi populum vehementer oblectat atque allicit auditores, qua nos Minoa ferientes, ulti sumus: sed et huius gratia tributa illa pendere nos coegit. In hoc igitur deliquit Minos, cum nos lacesseret, ex quo evenit quod ipse quaeris, ut infamis evaderet.

But tragedy here is most ancient, nor — as many suppose — did it take its beginning from Thespis or from Phrynichus: rather, if you care to scrutinize, you will find tragedy invented far earlier in this city. And this branch of all poetry greatly delights the people and seductively attracts auditors, by which — when we struck Minoa — we were avenged; and for its sake it likewise compelled us to pay those tributes. In this, then, Minos transgressed, when he provoked us, whence it came to pass, as you ask, that he issued forth infamous.

Quoniam quod vir bonus, atque legitimus, ut supra diximus, et excellens pastor populi fuerit, leges eius argumento sunt, quae immutabiles perseverant, ut pote vera civitatis gubernatione reperta.

Since the laws of a man who was good and legitimate, as we said above, and an excellent shepherd of the people, are by proof — laws which persevere immutable, being found to be the true governance of the city.

M. Verisimilem rationem, o Socrates, invenise videris.

M. You will seem to have discovered the most plausible account, O Socrates.

S. Nonne igitur, si vera loquor, videntur tibi Cretenses Minois Rhadamanthique cives antiquissimis legibus uti?

S. Therefore, if I speak truly, do the Cretans seem to you to use, as citizens, the most ancient laws of Minos Rhadamanthus?

M. Videntur sane.

M. They certainly seem so.

S. Isti ergo priscorum omnium legum latores excellentissimi fuerunt, hominumque pastores, quemadmodum et Homerus bonum exercitus ducem pastorem populi nuncupat.

S. Those men, then, were the most excellent bearers of all ancient laws, and shepherds of men, just as Homer likewise calls the good leader of an army the shepherd of the people.

M. Prorsus.

M. Certainly.

S. Age itaque per Iovem amicabilem, si quis bonus legislator et hominum pastor vos roget, circa corporis valetudinem, quid corrpori adhibet ut bonam valetudinemtueatur? responderemus utique recte ac breviter, quod nutrimentum et exercitium, tum intendens, tum remittens, atque ita corpus componens.

Come then, by friendly Jove, if any good legislator and shepherd of men asks you, concerning the body’s health, what one applies to the body so that it may preserve good health? we would certainly answer rightly and briefly: namely, nourishment and exercise, now straining, now relaxing, and thus composing the body.

M. Probe.

M. Well.

S. Si posthac iterum idem legislator bonus, et hominum pastor ex nobis quaerat, quidnam animae adhibens atque impertiens meliorem efficit? quid nos potissimum respondebimus, ut minus de nobis ipsis deque aetate nostra erubescamus?

S. If henceforth again the same good legislator and pastor of men should ask of us what he applies to and imparts to the soul to make it better, what would we above all reply, so that we might be less ashamed of ourselves and of our age?

M. Quid dicam nescio.

M. What I should say I do not know.

S. At turpe nimium utriusque nostrum animis est si quae sibi ipsis bona, malave sunt ignorare, quae vero ad corpus, et ad alia pertinent, cognoscere videantur.

S. But it is altogether shameful in the minds of each of us if we are ignorant of what is good or bad for ourselves, while yet we appear to know those things that pertain to the body and to other matters.