Gaius: Commentarius Primus

[I. De iure civili et naturali.] 1. Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur: Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur. Populus itaque Romanus partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utitur. Quae singula qualia sint, suis locis proponemus.

[1. On civil and natural law.] 1. All peoples who are governed by laws and by customs use partly their own proper law, partly the common law of all human beings: For what law each people establishes for itself, that is its own proper law and is called civil law, as it were the law proper to the civitas; but what natural reason establishes among all human beings, that is observed equally among all peoples and is called the law of nations, as the law which all gentes use. The Roman people therefore uses partly its own proper law, partly the common law of all human beings. What each is like, we will set forth in its proper places.

2. Constant autem iura populi Romani ex legibus, plebiscitis, senatus consultis, constitutionibus principum, edictis eorum, qui ius edicendi habent, responsis prudentium. 3. Lex est, quod populus iubet atque constituit. Plebiscitum est, quod plebs iubet atque constituit.

2. Moreover, the iura of the Roman people consist of laws, plebiscites, senatorial decrees, constitutions of the princes, edicts of those who have the right to issue edicts, and the responses of the jurists. 3. A law is what the people order and establish. A plebiscite is what the plebs order and establish.

Plebs autem a populo eo distat, quod populi appellatione universi cives significantur, connumeratis et patriciis; plebis autem appellatione sine patriciis ceteri cives significantur; unde olim patricii dicebant plebiscitis se non teneri, quia sine auctoritate eorum facta essent; sed postea lex Hortensia lata est, qua cautum est, ut plebiscita universum populum tenerent: Itaque eo modo legibus exaequata sunt.

But the plebs
differs from the people in this, that by the appellation “people” all the citizens are signified,
the patricians being counted together; but by the appellation “plebs,” without the patricians, the other
citizens are signified; whence formerly the patricians used to say that they were not bound by plebiscites,
because they had been made without their authority; but afterwards the Hortensian Law was passed,
by which it was provided that plebiscites should bind the whole people: And so in that way
they were made equal to laws.

4. Senatus consultum est, quod senatus iubet atque constituit; idque legis vicem optinet, quamvis [de ea re] fuerit quaesitum. 5. Constitutio principis est, quod imperator decreto vel edicto vel epistula constituit. Nec umquam dubitatum est, quin id legis vicem optineat, cum ipse imperator per legem imperium accipiat.

4. A senatorial decree is what the Senate orders and establishes; and it obtains the force of a law
although [about that matter] inquiry has been made. 5. An imperial constitution
is what the emperor establishes by decree or edict or letter. Nor has it ever
been doubted that it obtains the force of a law, since the emperor himself by a law
receives authority.

6. Ius autem edicendi habent magistratus populi Romani. Sed amplissimum ius est in edictis duorum praetorum, urbani et peregrini, quorum in provinciis iurisdictionem praesides earum habent; item in edictis aedilium curulium, quorum iurisdictionem in provinciis populi Romani quaestores habent; nam in provincias Caesaris omnino quaestores non mittuntur, et ob id hoc edictum in his provinciis non proponitur. 7. Responsa prudentium sunt sententiae et opiniones eorum, quibus permissum est iura condere.

6. The right, moreover, of issuing edicts is held by the magistrates of the Roman people. But the most ample right resides in the edicts of the two praetors, urban and peregrine, whose jurisdiction in the provinces is held by the governors of those; likewise in the edicts of the curule aediles, whose jurisdiction in the provinces of the Roman People the quaestors hold; for into the provinces of Caesar quaestors are not sent at all, and for that reason this edict is not posted in these provinces. 7. The responsa of the jurists are the judgments and opinions of those to whom it is permitted to establish the laws.

Quorum omnium si in unum sententiae concurrunt, id, quod ita sentiunt, legis vicem optinet; si vero dissentiunt, iudici licet quam velit sententiam sequi; idque rescripto divi Hadriani significatur.

If the opinions of all of them converge into one, that which they thus think has the force of law; but if they dissent, it is permitted to the judge to follow whichever opinion he wishes; and this is signified by a rescript of the deified Hadrian.

[II. De iuris divisione.] 8. Omne autem ius, quo utimur, vel ad personas pertinet vel ad res vel ad actiones. Sed prius videamus de personis.

[2. On the division of law.] 8. All law, moreover, which we use, pertains either to persons or to things or to actions. But first let us see about persons.

[III. De condicione hominum.] 9. Et quidem summa divisio de iure personarum haec est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi. 10. Rursus liberorum hominum alii ingenui sunt, alii libertini.

[3. On the condition of men.] 9. And indeed the chief division concerning the law of persons is this: that all men are either free or slaves. 10. Again, of free men some are freeborn, others freedmen.

11. lngenui sunt, qui liberi nati sunt; libertini, qui ex iusta servitute manumissi sunt. 12. Rursus libertinorum tria sunt genera: Nam aut cives Romani aut Latini aut dediticiorum numero sunt. De quibus singulis dispiciamus; ac prius de dediticiis.

11. The freeborn are those who are born free; freedmen, those who have been manumitted from a lawful servitude. 12. Again, of freedmen there are three genera: for they are either Roman citizens or Latins or are in the number of the dediticii. Let us consider each of these; and first, about the dediticii.

[IIII. De dediticiis vel lege Aelia Sentia.] 13. Lege itaque Aelia Sentia cavetur, ut, qui servi a dominis poenae nomine vincti sunt, quibusve stigmata inscripta sunt, deve quibus ob noxam quaestio tormentis habita sit et in ea noxa fuisse convicti sunt, quive ut ferro aut cum bestiis depugnarent traditi sint, inve ludum custodiamve coniecti fuerint, et postea vel ab eodem domino vel ab alio manumissi, eiusdem condicionis liberi fiant, cuius condicionis sunt peregrini dediticii.

[4. On the dediticii or the Aelia Sentia law.] 13. Therefore by the Aelia Sentia law it is provided that those slaves who have been bound by their masters by way of punishment, or on whom stigmata have been inscribed (brands), or against whom, on account of an offense, an inquiry with tortures has been held and they have been convicted in that offense, or who have been delivered to fight with steel or with beasts, or have been cast into the gladiatorial school or into custody, and afterwards, whether by the same master or by another, have been manumitted, become free persons of the same condition as that of the peregrine dediticii.

[V. De peregrinis dediticiis.] 14. Vocantur autem peregrini dediticii hi, qui quondam adversus populum Romanum armis susceptis pugnaverunt, deinde victi se dediderunt. 15. Huius ergo turpitudinis servos quocumque modo et cuiuscumque aetatis manumissos, etsi pleno iure dominorum fuerint, numquam aut cives Romanos aut Latinos fieri dicemus, sed omni modo dediticiorum numero constitui intellegemus.

[5. On the peregrine dediticii.] 14. Now, peregrine dediticii are called those who once, arms having been taken up, fought against the Roman People, and then,
conquered, surrendered themselves. 15. Therefore the slaves of this disgrace, in whatever way and of whatever age manumitted, even if they had been under the full legal right of their masters, we shall say never
become either Roman citizens or Latins, but in every way we shall understand them to be placed in the number of the dediticii.

16. Si vero in nulla tali turpitudine sit servus, manumissum modo civem Romanum modo Latinum fieri dicemus. 17. Nam in cuius persona tria haec concurrunt, ut maior sit annorum triginta, et ex iure Quiritium domini, et iusta ac legitima manumissione liberetur, id est vindicta aut censu aut testamento, is civis Romanus fit; sin vero aliquid eorum deerit, Latinus erit.

16. If indeed the slave is in no such turpitude, when manumitted he will become either a Roman citizen or a Latin. 17. For in whose person these three things concur, that he is over thirty years of age, and that his master holds by the right of the Quirites, and that he is freed by a just and legitimate manumission, that is, by the vindicta or by census or by testament, he becomes a Roman citizen; but if any of these is lacking, a Latin he will be.

[VI. De manumissione vel causae probatione.] 18. Quod autem de aetate servi requiritur, lege Aelia Sentia introductum est. Nam ea lex minores XXX annorum servos non aliter voluit manumissos cives Romanos fieri, quam si vindicta, apud consilium iusta causa manumissionis adprobata, liberati fuerint. 19. Iusta autem causa manumissionis est, veluti si quis filium flliamve aut fratrem sororemve naturalem aut alumnum aut paedagogum aut servum procuratoris habendi gratia aut ancillam matrimonii causa apud consilium manumittat.

[6. On manumission or proof of cause.] 18. As to what is required concerning the age of the slave, it was introduced by the Lex Aelia Sentia. For that law willed that slaves under 30 years should not, when manumitted, become Roman citizens otherwise than if, by the vindicta, with a just cause of manumission approved before the council, they have been freed. 19. Now a just cause of manumission is, for example, if someone before the council manumits a son or daughter, or a natural brother or sister, or a foster-child (alumnus), or a pedagogue, or a slave for the purpose of having a procurator, or a maidservant for the sake of matrimony.

[VII. De consilio adhibendo.] 20. Consilium autem adhibetur in urbe Roma quidem quinque senatorum et quinque equitum Romanorum puberum, in provinciis autem viginti recuperatorum civium Romanorum. Idque fit ultimo die conventus; sed Romae certis diebus apud consilium manumittuntur.

[7. On the council to be brought in.] 20. Moreover, a council is brought in in the city of Rome of five senators and five Roman equestrians of full age, but in the provinces of twenty recuperators of Roman citizens. And this is done on the last day of the assize; but at Rome they are manumitted before the council on fixed days.

Maiores vero triginta annorum servi semper manumitti solent, adeo ut vel in transitu manumittantur, veluti cum praetor aut pro consule in balneum vel in theatrum eat.

Slaves over thirty years of age are regularly manumitted, to such an extent that they are even manumitted in passing, as, for example, when the praetor or the proconsul into the bath or into the theater goes.

21. Praeterea minor triginta annorum servus manumissus potest civis Romanus fieri, ei ab eo domino, qui solvendo non erat, testamento eum liberum et heredem relictum * 22. Homines Latini Iuniani appellantur; Latini ideo, quia adsimulati sunt Latinis coloniariis; Iuniani ideo, quia per legem Iuniam libertatem acceperunt, cum olim servi viderentur esse. 23. Non tamen illis permittit lex Iunia vel ipsis testamentum facere vel ex testamento alieno capere vel tutores testamento dari. 24. Quod autem diximus ex testamento eos capere non posse, ita intellegemus, ne quid inde directo hereditatis legatorumve nomine eos posse capere dicamus; alioquin per fideicommissum capere possunt.

21. Furthermore, a slave under thirty years, manumitted, can become a Roman citizen if by that master, who was not solvent, by testament he has been left free and heir. * 22. They are called the Junian Latins; Latins for this reason, because they are assimilated to the Latin colonials; Juniani for this reason, because through the Lex Junia they received liberty, since formerly they were deemed to be slaves. 23. Yet to those men the Lex Junia does not permit either to make a testament themselves or to take under another’s testament, or for guardians to be given by testament. 24. But as for what we have said—that from a testament they cannot take—we shall so understand it, lest we say that they can take anything there directly in the name of an inheritance or of legacies; otherwise, through a fideicommissum they can take.

25. Hi vero, qui dediticiorum numero sunt, nullo modo ex testamento capere possunt, non magis quam quilibet peregrinus; quin nec ipsi testamentum facere possunt secundum id quod magis placuit. 26. Pessima itaque libertas eorum est, qui dediticiorum numero sunt; nec ulla lege aut senatus consulto aut constitutione principali aditus illis ad civitatem Romanam datur. 27. Quin etiam in urbe Roma vel intra centesimum urbis Romae miliarium morari prohibentur; et si qui contra ea fecerint, ipsi bonaque eorum publice venire iubentur ea condicione, ut ne in urbe Roma vel intra centesimum urbis Romae miliarium serviant neve umquam manumittantur; et si manumissi fuerint, servi populi Romani esse iubentur.

25. But those who are in the number of the dediticii can in no way take under a testament, no more than any foreigner; indeed, nor can they themselves make a testament, according to the opinion which has more prevailed. 26. Their liberty, therefore, is the worst of all, namely of those who are in the number of the dediticii; nor is any access to Roman citizenship given to them by any law or senatorial decree or imperial constitution. 27. Moreover, they are forbidden to stay in the city of Rome or within the hundredth milestone of the city of Rome; and if any shall have acted contrary to these, they themselves and their goods are ordered to come to public sale on this condition: that they shall neither serve in the city of Rome nor within the hundredth milestone of the city of Rome, nor ever be manumitted; and if they should be manumitted, they are ordered to be slaves of the Roman people.

Et haec ita lege Aelia Sentia conprehensa sunt.

And these things are thus comprehended in the Aelian Sentian law.

[Quibus modis Latini ad civitatem Romanam perveniant.] 28. Latini vero multis modis ad civitatem Romanam perveniunt. 29. Statim enim ex lege Aelia Sentia minores triginta annorum manumissi et Latini facti si uxores duxerint vel cives Romanas vel Latinas coloniarias vel eiusdem condicionis, cuius et ipsi essent, idque testati fuerint adhibitis non minus quam septem testibus civibus Romanis puberibus et filium procreaverint, cum is filius anniculus esse coeperit, datur eis potestas per eam legem adire praetorem vel in provinciis praesidem provinciae et adprobare se ex lege Aelia Sentia uxorem duxisse et ex ea filium anniculum habere: Et si is, apud quem causa probata est, id ita esse pronuntiaverit, tunc et ipse Latinus et uxor eius, si et ipsa eiusdem condicionis sit, et filius eius, si et ipse eiusdem condicionis sit, cives Romani esse iubentur. 30. Ideo autem in [persona filii] adiecimus 'si et ipse eiusdem condicionis sit', quia si uxor Latini civis Romana est, qui ex ea nascitur, ex novo senatus consulto, quod auctore divo Hadriano factum est, civis Romanus nascitur.

[By what ways the Latins arrive at Roman citizenship.] 28. The Latins indeed arrive at Roman citizenship in many ways. 29. For immediately by the Lex Aelia Sentia, those manumitted under thirty years and made Latins, if they shall have taken wives either Roman citizen women or Latin colonial women or of the same condition as they themselves were, and shall have attested this with not fewer than seven witnesses, Roman citizens of full age, and shall have procreated a son, when that son has begun to be one year old, power is given them by that law to approach the praetor, or in the provinces the governor of the province, and to approve that in accordance with the Lex Aelia Sentia they took a wife and have from her a one-year-old son: And if he, before whom the case has been proved, shall have pronounced that it is so, then both the Latin himself and his wife, if she too is of the same condition, and his son, if he too is of the same condition, are ordered to be Roman citizens. 30. Moreover we have added in the [person of the son] 'if he too is of the same condition,' because if the wife of a Latin is a Roman citizen, he who is born from her, by a new senatus-consultum, which was made under the authority of the deified Hadrian, is born a Roman citizen.

31. Hoc tamen ius adipiscendae civitatis Romanae etiamsi soli minores triginta annorum manumissi et Latini facti ex lege Aelia Sentia habuerunt, tamen postea senatus consulto, quod Pegaso et Pusione consulibus factum est, etiam maioribus triginta annorum manumissis Latinis factis concessum est. 32. Ceterum etiamsi ante decesserit Latinus, quam anniculi filii causam probarit, potest mater eius causam probare, et sic et ipsa fiet civis Romana, si Latina fuerit * etiamsi ipse filius civis Romanus sit, quia ex cive Romana matre natus est, tamen debet causam probare, ut suus heres patri fiat. 32a.

31. Nevertheless, although this right of acquiring Roman citizenship was held by manumitted persons under thirty years and made Latins under the Lex Aelia Sentia alone, yet afterwards by a senatorial decree, which was made when Pegasus and Pusio were consuls, it was granted also to manumitted persons over thirty years who had been made Latins. 32. Moreover, even if the Latin has died before he has proved the case of his one‑year‑old son, his mother can prove the case, and thus she too will become a Roman citizen, if she was a Latina * even if the son himself is a Roman citizen, because he was born from a Roman‑citizen mother, nevertheless he ought to prove the case, in order that he may become his father’s proper heir. 32a.

Quae vero diximus de filio anniculo, eadem et de filia annicula dicta intellegemus. 32b. Praeterea ex lege Visellia tam maiores quam minores XXX annorum manumissi et Latini facti ius Quiritium adipiscuntur, id est fiunt cives Romani, si Romae inter vigiles sex annis militaverint.

What we have said about a one-year-old son, we will understand the same to have been said about a one-year-old daughter. 32b. Moreover, by the Lex Visellia both those older and those younger than 30 years who have been manumitted and made Latins acquire the ius Quiritium, that is, they become Roman citizens, if at Rome they have served among the Vigiles for six years.

Postea dicitur factum esse senatus consultum, quo data est illis civitas Romana, si triennium militiae expleverint. 32c. Item edicto Claudii Latini ius Quiritium consecuntur, si navem marinam aedificaverint, quae non minus quam decem milia modiorum frumenti capiat, eaque navis vel quae in eius locum substituta sit, sex annis frumentum Romam portaverit.

Afterwards it is said that a senatorial decree was made, by which Roman citizenship was given to them, if they have completed a three-year term of military service. 32c. Likewise, by the edict of Claudius, Latins obtain the Quiritian right, if they have built a sea‑going ship which holds not less than ten thousand modii of grain, and that ship, or one substituted in its place, has for six years carried grain to Rome.

33. Praeterea a Nerone constitutum est, ut, si Latinus, qui patrimonium sestertium CC milium plurisve habebit, in urbe Roma domum aedificaverit, in quam non minus quam partem dimidiam patrimonii sui impenderit, ius Quiritium consequatur. 34. Denique Traianus constituit, ut si Latinus in urbe triennio pistrinum exercuerit, quod in dies singulos non minus quam centenos modios frumenti pinseret, ad ius Quiritium perveniat * 35. Praeterea possunt maiores triginta annorum manumissi et Latini facti iteratione ius Quiritium consequi. Quo * triginta annorum manumittant * manumissus vindicta aut censu aut testamento et civis Romanus et eius libertus fit, qui eum iteraverit.

33. Furthermore, by Nero it was constituted that, if a Latin, who will have a patrimony of 200 thousand sesterces or more, shall have built a house in the city of Rome, upon which he will have expended not less than the half part of his patrimony, he attains the ius Quiritium. 34. Finally, Trajan constituted that, if a Latin in the city for three years shall have operated a bakery, which on each single day should grind not less than one hundred modii of grain, he arrives at the ius Quiritium * 35. Furthermore, those manumitted and made Latins who are more than thirty years old can by iteration attain the ius Quiritium. Whereby * they manumit at thirty years * one manumitted by vindicta or by the census or by testament becomes both a Roman citizen and the freedman of him who shall have iterated him.

Ergo si servus in bonis tuis, ex iure Quiritium meus erit, Latinus quidem a te solo fieri potest, iterari autem a me, non etiam a te potest et eo modo meus libertus fit. Sed et ceteris modis ius Quiritium consecutus meus libertus fit. Bonorum autem, quae *, cum is morietur, reliquerit, tibi possessio datur, quocumque modo ius Quiritium fuerit consecutus.

Therefore, if a slave is in your goods, by Quiritary right he will be mine, a Latin indeed can be made by you alone, but the iteration can be done by me, not by you as well, and in that way he becomes my freedman. But also, having obtained Quiritary right by the other modes, he becomes my freedman. Moreover, the possession of the goods which *, when he shall die, he will have left, is given to you, in whatever way he may have obtained Quiritary right.

Quod si cuius et in bonis et ex iure Quiritium sit, manumissus ab eodem scilicet et Latinus fieri potest et ius Quiritium consequi. 36. Non tamen cuicumque volenti manumittere licet. 37. Nam is, qui in fraudem creditorum vel in fraudem patroni manumittit, nihil agit, quia lex Aelia Sentia inpedit libertatem.

But if
someone be both in one’s goods and by Quiritary right of someone, being manumitted by that same person, of course, he can both become a Latin and attain the Quiritary right. 36. Nevertheless, it is not permitted to whomever wishes to manumit. 37. For he who manumits in fraud of creditors or in fraud of a patron does nothing, because the Lex Aelia Sentia impedes the freedom.

38. Item eadem lege minori XX annorum domino non aliter manumittere permittitur, quam si [vindicta] apud consilium iusta causa manumissionis adprobata fuerit. 39. Iustae autem causae manumissionis sunt, veluti si quis patrem aut matrem aut paedagogum aut conlactaneum manumittat. Sed et illae causae, quas superius in servo minore XXX annorum exposuimus, ad hunc quoque casum, de quo loquimur, adferri possunt.

38. Likewise, by the same law, a master under 20 years is not permitted to manumit otherwise than if [by the rod] before a council a just cause of manumission has been approved. 39. Now just causes of manumission are, for instance, if someone manumits his father or mother or pedagogue or milk-sibling. But those causes too, which we set forth above in the case of a slave under 30 years, can be adduced also to this case of which we speak.

Item ex diverso hae causae, quas in minore XX annorum domino rettulimus, porrigi possunt et ad servum minorem XXX annorum. 40. Cum ergo certus modus manumittendi minoribus XX annorum dominis per legem Aeliam Sentiam constitutus sit, evenit, ut qui XIIII annos aetatis explevnerit, licet testamentum facere possit et in eo heredem sibi instituere legataque relinquere possit, tamen si adhuc minor sit annorum XX, libertatem servo dare non possit. 41. Et quamvis Latinum facere velit minor XX annorum dominus, tamen nihilo minus debet apud consilium causam probare et ita postea inter amicos manumittere.

Likewise, conversely, these causes, which we have related for a master under 20 years, can be extended also to a slave under 30 years. 40. Accordingly, since a fixed mode of manumitting for masters under 20 years has been established by the Lex Aelia Sentia, it comes about that he who has completed 14 years of age, although he can make a testament and in it institute an heir for himself and can leave legacies, nevertheless if he is still under 20 years, he cannot give liberty to a slave. 41. And although a master under 20 years may wish to make him a Latin, nevertheless none the less he ought to prove the cause before the council, and only thereafter to manumit among friends.

42. Praeterea lege Fufia Caninia certus modus constitutus est in servis testamento manumittendis. 43. Nam ei, qui plures quam duos neque plures quam decem servos habebit, usque ad partem dimidiam eius numeri manumittere permittitur; ei vero, qui plures quam X neque plures quam XXX servos habebit, usque ad tertiam partem eius numeri manumittere permittitur. At ei, qui plures quam XXX neque plures quam centum habebit, usque ad partem quartam potestas manumittendi datur.

42. Moreover, by the Lex Fufia Caninia a fixed limit was established in respect to slaves to be manumitted by will. 43. For to him who shall have more than two and not more than ten slaves, it is permitted to manumit up to one-half of that number; but to him who shall have more than 10 and not more than 30 slaves, it is permitted to manumit up to a third part of that number. But to him who shall have more than 30 and not more than 100, power of manumitting is given up to a fourth part.

Novissime ei, qui plures quam C habebit nec plures quam D, non plures manumittere permittitur quam quintam partem; neque plures quam D habentis ratio habetur, ut ex eo numero pars definiatur, sed praescribit lex, ne cui plures manumittere liceat quam C. Quod si quis unum servum omnino aut duos habet, ad hanc legem non pertinet, et ideo liberam habet potestatem manumittendi. 44. Ac ne ad eos quidem omnino haec lex pertinet, qui sine testamento manumittunt. Itaque licet iis, qui vindicta aut censu aut inter amicos manumittunt, totam familiam suam liberare, scilicet si alia causa non inpediat libertatem.

Finally, for him who will have more than 100 and not more than 500, it is not permitted to manumit more than a fifth part; nor is any account taken of one having more than 500, so that a share be defined from that number, but the law prescribes that it be lawful for no one to manumit more than 100. But if someone has only one slave or two, he does not pertain to this law, and therefore he has a free power of manumitting. 44. And this law does not pertain at all to those who manumit without a will. Therefore it is permitted to those who manumit by the vindicta or by the census or among friends to free their whole household, of course if no other cause impedes the liberty.

45. Sed quod de numero servorum testamento manumittendorum diximus, ita intellegemus, ne umquam ex eo numero, ex quo dimidia aut tertia aut quarta aut quinta pars liberari potest, pauciores manumittere liceat quam ex antecedenti numero licuit. Et hoc ipsa ratione provisum est: Erat enim sane absurdum, ut X servorum domino quinque liberare liceret, quia usque ad dimidiam partem eius numeri manumittere ei conceditur, XII servos habenti non plures liceret manumittere quam IIII; at eis, qui plures quam X neque *

45. But what we have said about the number of slaves to be manumitted by testament, we shall understand thus, that never from that number, from which a half or a third or a fourth or a fifth part can be freed, may it be permitted to manumit fewer than from the preceding number it was permitted. And this has been provided by reason itself: For it was truly absurd, that to the master of 10 slaves it should be permitted to free five, because up to the half of that number he is allowed to manumit, while to one having 12 slaves it should be permitted no more to manumit than 4; but to those who have more than 10 and not *

46. Nam et si testamento scriptis in orbem servis libertas data sit, quia nullus ordo manumissionis invenitur, nulli liberi erunt, quia lex Fufia Caninia, quae in fraudem eius facta sint, rescindit. Sunt etiam specialia senatus consulta, quibus rescissa sunt ea, quae in fraudem eius legis excogitata sunt.

46. For even if, in a testament, liberty has been given to slaves written “in orbem,” because no order of manumission is found, none will be free, because the Lex Fufia Caninia rescinds the things which have been done in fraud of it. There are also special senatorial decrees, by which those things which were devised in fraud of that law have been rescinded.

47. In summa sciendum est, quod lege Aelia Sentia cautum sit, ut creditorum fraudandorum causa manumissi liberi non fiant, hoc etiam ad peregrinos pertinere, [senatus ita censuit ex auctoritate Hadrani] cetera vero iura eius legis ad peregrinos non pertinere.

47. In sum it must be known that, as is provided by the Lex Aelia Sentia, those manumitted for the purpose of defrauding creditors
do not become free; this also pertains to foreigners,
[the senate thus decreed by the authority of Hadrian] but the other rights
of that law do not pertain to foreigners.

48. Sequitur de iure personarum alia divisio. Nam quaedam personae sui iuris sunt, quaedam alieno iuri sunt subiectae. 49. Sed rursus earum personarum, quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt, aliae in potestate, aliae in manu, aliae in mancipio sunt.

48. There follows, concerning the law of persons, another division. For certain persons are of their own right (sui iuris), certain are subject to another’s right (alieni iuris). 49. But again, of those persons who are subject to another’s right, some are in power (in potestate), some in manus, some in mancipium.

50. Videamus nunc de iis, quae alieno iuri subiectae sint: Nam si cognoverimus, quae istae personae sint, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sint. 51. Ac prius dispiciamus de iis, qui in aliena potestate sunt. 52. In potestate itaque sunt servi dominorum.

50. Let us now see about those who are subject to another's right: For if we shall have recognized which persons those are, at the same time we shall understand which are of their own right. 51. And first let us examine those who are in another's power. 52. In power, therefore, are slaves of masters.

Quae quidem potestas iuris gentium est: Nam apud omnes peraeque gentes animadvertere possumus dominis in servos vitae necisque potestatem esse, et quodcumque per servum adquiritur, id domino adquiritur. 53. Sed hoc tempore neque civibus Romanis nec ullis aliis hominibus, qui sub imperio populi Romani sunt, licet supra modum et sine causa in servos suos saevire: Nam ex constitutione sacratissimi imperatoris Antonini, qui sine causa servum suum occiderit, non minus teneri iubetur, quam qui alienum servum occiderit. Sed et maior quoque asperitas dominorum per eiusdem principis constitutionem coercetur: Nam consultus a quibusdam praesidibus provinciarum de his servis, qui ad fana deorum vel ad statuas principum confugiunt, praecepit, ut si intolerabilis videatur dominorum saevitia, cogantur servos suos vendere.

This power indeed is of the law of nations: for among all peoples alike we can observe that masters have power of life and death over slaves, and that whatever is acquired through a slave is acquired for the master. 53. But at this time it is permitted neither to Roman citizens nor to any other men who are under the rule of the Roman people to be cruel toward their own slaves beyond measure and without cause: for by the constitution of the most sacred Emperor Antoninus, he who without cause shall have killed his own slave is ordered to be held no less than he who shall have killed another’s slave. But even the greater harshness of masters is restrained by the constitution of that same princeps: for, having been consulted by certain governors of provinces concerning those slaves who take refuge at the shrines of the gods or at the statues of the emperors, he directed that, if the savagery of the masters should seem intolerable, they be compelled to sell their slaves.

Et utrumque recte fit: Male enim nostro iure uti non debemus; qua ratione et prodigis interdicitur bonorum suorum administratio. 54. Ceterum cum apud cives Romanos duplex sit dominium (nam vel in bonis vel ex iure Quiritium vel ex utroque iure cuiusque servus esse intellegitur), ita demum servum in potestate domini esse dicemus, si in bonis eius sit, etiamsi simul ex iure Quiritum eiusdem non sit: Nam qui nudum ius Quiritium in servo habet, is potestatem habere non intellegitur.

And both are done rightly: for we ought not to use our law badly; for which reason the administration of their own goods is interdicted to prodigals as well. 54. Moreover, since among Roman citizens there is a twofold dominium (for a slave of anyone is understood to be either in bonis, or by the right of the Quirites, or by both rights), only then shall we say that a slave is in the power of his master, if he is in his goods, even if at the same time he is not by the Quiritary right of that same man: for he who has a naked Quiritary right in a slave is not understood to have power.

55. Item in potestate nostra sunt liberi nostri, quos iustis nuptiis procreavimus. Quod ius proprium civium Romanorum est (fere enim nulli alii sunt homines, qui talem in filios suos habent potestatem, qualem nos habemus) idque divi Hadriani edicto, quod proposuit de his, qui sibi liberisque suis ab eo civitatem Romanam petebant, significatur. Nec me praeterit Galatarum gentem credere in potestate parentum liberos esse.

55. Likewise, our children are in our power, whom in lawful nuptials we have procreated. Which right is proper to Roman citizens (for scarcely any others are people who have such a power over their sons as we have), and this is indicated by the edict of the deified Hadrian, which he published concerning those who were asking from him Roman citizenship for themselves and their children. Nor does it escape me that the nation of the Galatians believes that children are in the power of their parents.

56. Iustas autem nuptias contraxisse liberosque iis procreatos in potestate habere cives Romani ita intelleguntur, si cives Romanas uxores duxerint vel etiam Latinas peregrinasve, cum quibus conubium habeant: Cum enim conubium id efficiat, ut liberi patris condicionem sequantur, evenit, ut non solum cives Romani fiant, sed et in potestate patris sint. 57. Unde et veteranis quibusdam concedi solet principalibus constitutionibus conubium cum his Latinis peregrinisve, quas primas post missionem uxores duxerint; et qui ex eo matrimonio nascuntur, et cives Romani et in potestatem parentum fiunt. 58. Nec tamen omnes nobis uxores ducere licet: Nam a quarundam nuptiis abstinere debemus.

56.
However, Roman citizens are understood to have contracted lawful nuptials and to have the children procreated therein in their power, if they have taken as wives Roman citizen-women, or even Latins or peregrines with whom they have connubium:
For since connubium brings it about that children follow the father’s condition, it comes about that they not only become Roman citizens, but also are in the father’s power. 57. Whence also it is accustomed to be granted to certain veterans by principal constitutions
connubium with those Latin or peregrine women whom they have as their first wives after discharge; and those who are born from that marriage both become Roman citizens and come into the power of their parents. 58. Nevertheless it is not permitted to us to take all women as wives:
For from the nuptials of certain women we ought to abstain.

59. Inter eas enim personas, quae parentum liberorumve locum inter se optinent, nuptiae contrahi non possunt, nec inter eas conubium est, velut inter patrem et filiam vel inter matrem et filium vel inter avum et neptem; et si tales personae inter se coierint, nefarias et incestas nuptias coutraxisse dicuntur. Et haec adeo ita sunt, ut quamvis per adoptionem parentum liberorumve loco sibi esse coeperint, non possint inter se matrimonio coniungi, in tantum, ut etiam dissoluta adoptione idem iuris maneat; itaque eam, quae mihi per adoptionem filiae seu neptis loco esse coeperit, non potero uxorem ducere, quamvis eam emancipaverim. 60. Inter eas quoque personas, quae ex transverso gradu cognatione iunguntur, est quaedam similis observatio, sed non tanta.

59. For among those persons who occupy between themselves the place of parents or of children, nuptials cannot be contracted, nor is there connubium between them, as between a father and a daughter or between a mother and a son or between a grandfather and a granddaughter; and if such persons have come together with each other, they are said to have contracted nefarious and incestuous nuptials. And these things are so to such a degree that, although by adoption they have begun to be to each other in the place of parents or children, they cannot be joined to each other by matrimony, to the extent that even, the adoption having been dissolved, the same law remains; and so her who has begun to be to me, by adoption, in the place of a daughter or a granddaughter, I shall not be able to take as a wife, even though I have emancipated her. 60. Among those persons also who are joined by cognation from a transverse (collateral) degree, there is a certain similar observance, but not so great.

61. Sane inter fratrem et sororem prohibitae sunt nuptiae, sive eodem patre eademque matre nati fuerint sive alterutro eorum: Sed si qua per adoptionem soror mihi esse coeperit, quamdiu quidem constat adoptio, sane inter me et eam nuptiae non possunt consistere; cum vero per emancipationem adoptio dissoluta sit, potero eam uxorem ducere; sed et si ego emancipatus fuero, nihil inpedimento erit nuptiis. 62. Fratris filiam uxorem ducere licet: Idque primum in usum uenit, cum divus Claudius Agrippinam, fratris sui filiam, uxorem duxisset: Sororis vero filiam uxorem ducere non licet. Et haec ita principalibus constitutionibus significantur.

61. Indeed, between a brother and a sister nuptials are prohibited, whether they were born from the same father and the same mother or from either one of them: but if someone has through adoption begun to be my sister, so long as the adoption stands, certainly nuptials cannot subsist between me and her; but when through emancipation the adoption has been dissolved, I shall be able to take her as a wife; and even if I have been emancipated, nothing will be an impediment to the nuptials. 62. It is permitted to take a brother’s daughter as a wife: and this first came into use when the deified Claudius took Agrippina, his brother’s daughter, as his wife: but it is not permitted to take a sister’s daughter as a wife. And these matters are thus signified by principal (imperial) constitutions.

63. Item amitam et materteram uxorem ducere non licet. Item eam, quae mihi quondam socrus aut nurus aut privigna aut noverca fuit. Ideo autem diximus 'quondam', qula, si adhuc constant eae nuptiae, per quas talis adfinitas quaesita est, alia ratione mihi nupta esse non potest, quia neque eadem duobus nupta esse potest neque idem duas uxores habere.

63. Likewise it is not permitted to take as wife a paternal aunt or a maternal aunt. Likewise one who was formerly my mother-in-law, or daughter-in-law, or stepdaughter, or stepmother. And we have said ‘formerly’ because, if those nuptials, through which such affinity was sought, are still in force, she cannot be married to me in any other way, since neither can the same woman be married to two men, nor can the same man have two wives.

64. Ergo si quis nefarias atque incestas nuptias contraxerit, neque uxorem habere videtur neque liberos: Itaque hi, qui ex eo coitu nascuntur, matrem quidem habere videntur, patrem vero non utique, nec ob id in potestate eius sunt, quales sunt ii, quos mater vulgo concepit: Nam et hi patrem habere non intelleguntur, cum is etiam incertus sit; unde solent spurii filii appellari vel a Graeca voce quasi spor£dhn concepti nel quasi sine patre filii.

64. Therefore, if anyone has contracted nefarious and incestuous marriages, he is not regarded as having either a wife or children: accordingly, those who are born from that union seem indeed to have a mother, but by no means a father, nor on that account are they in his power, such as are those whom the mother has conceived promiscuously: for they too are not understood to have a father, since he is even uncertain; whence they are wont to be called spurious sons, either from a Greek word as if conceived “sporadically,” or as if “sons without a father.”

65. Aliquando autem evenit, ut liberi, qui statim ut nati sunt, parentum in potestatem non fiant, ii postea tamen redigantur in potestatem. 66. Velut si Latinus ex lege Aelia Sentia uxore ducta filium procreaverit aut Latinum ex Latina aut civem Romanum ex cive Romana, non habebit eum in potestate; sed si postea causa probata civitatem Romanam consecutus fuerit, simul eum in potestate sua habere incipit. 67. Item si civis Romanus Latinam aut peregrinam uxorem duxerit per ignorantiam, cum eam civem Romanam esse crederet, et filium procreaverit, hic non est in potestate eius, quia ne quidem civis Romanus est, sed aut Latinus ant peregrinus, id est eius condicionis, cuius et mater fuerit, quia non aliter quisque ad patris condicionem accedit, quam si inter patrem et matrem eius conubium sit: Sed ex senatus consulto permittitur causam erroris probare, et ita uxor quoque et filius ad civitatem Romanam perveniunt, et ex eo tempore incipit filius in potestate patris esse.

65. Sometimes, however, it happens that children, who, as soon as they are born, do not fall into their parents’ power,
are nevertheless afterwards brought back under power. 66. For example, if a Latin, having taken a wife by the Lex Aelia Sentia, should beget a son—either a Latin from a Latin woman or a Roman citizen from a Roman citizen woman—he will not have him in his power; but
if afterwards, his cause having been approved, he shall have obtained Roman citizenship, at the same time he begins to have him in his power. 67. Likewise, if a Roman citizen has married a Latin or a peregrine through ignorance, when he believed her to be a Roman citizen, and has begotten a son, this one is not in his power, because he is not even a Roman citizen, but either a Latin or a peregrine, that is, of the same condition as his mother was, because no one otherwise accedes to the father’s condition unless there is connubium between his father and his mother: But
by a senatus consultum it is permitted to prove the cause of the error, and thus the wife also and the son attain to Roman citizenship, and from that time the son begins to be in the power of the father.

Idem iuris est, si eam per ignorantiam uxorem duxerit, quae dediticiorum numero est, nisi quod uxor non fit civis Romana. 68. Item si civis Romana per errorem nupta sit peregrino tamquam civi Romano, permittitur ei causam erroris probare, et ita filius quoque eius et maritus ad civitatem Romanam perveniunt, et aeque simul incipit filius in potestate patris esse. Idem iuris est, si peregrino tamquam Latino ex lege Aelia Sentia nupta sit; nam et de hoc specialiter senatus consulto cavetur.

The same law holds, if he through ignorance has taken as wife a woman who is in the number of the dediticians, except that the wife does not become a Roman citizen. 68. Likewise, if a Roman-citizen woman has by error been married to a foreigner as though to a Roman citizen, she is permitted to prove the cause of the error, and thus her son also and her husband attain to Roman citizenship, and equally at the same time the son begins to be in the father’s power. The same law holds, if she has been married to a foreigner as though to a Latin under the Aelia Sentia Law; for about this too it is specially provided by senatorial decree.

Idem iuris est aliquatenus, si ei, qui dediticiorum numero est, tamquam civi Romano aut Latino e lege Aelia Sentia nupta sit; nisi quod scilicet qui dediticiorum numero est, in sua condicione permanet, et ideo filius, quamuis fiat civis Romanus, in potestatem patris non redigitur. 69. Item si Latina peregrino, cum eum Latinum esse crederet, e lege Aelia Sentia nupserit, potest ex senatus consulto fllio nato causam erroris probare: Et ita omnes fiunt cives Romani, et filius in potestate patris esse incipit. 70. Idem constitutum est et si Latinus per errorem peregrinam quasi Latinam aut civem Romanam e lege Aelia Sentia uxorem duxerit.

To some extent the same law obtains, if she has married by the lex Aelia Sentia one who is in the number of the dediticii, as though he were a Roman citizen or a Latinus; except that, of course, he who is in the number of the dediticii remains in his own condition, and therefore the son, although he becomes a Roman citizen, is not brought under the father’s power. 69. Likewise, if a Latina has married a peregrine by the lex Aelia Sentia, when she believed him to be a Latinus, she can, by senatus-consultum, after a son has been born, prove the cause of her error; and thus all become Roman citizens, and the son begins to be in the father’s power. 70. The same has been established also if a Latinus by mistake has taken to wife by the lex Aelia Sentia a peregrine as if a Latin woman or a Roman citizen.

71. Praeterea si civis Romanus, qui se credidisset Latinum esse, ob id Latinam uxorem duxerit, permittitur ei filio nato erroris causam probare, tamquam si e lege Aelia Sentia uxorem duxisset: Item his, qui cum cives Romani essent, peregrinos se esse credidissent et peregrinas uxores duxissent, permittitur ex senatus consulto fllio nato causam erroris probare. Quo facto fiet uxor civis Romana, et filius ******* non solum ad civitatem Romanam pervenit, sed etiam in potestatem patris redigitur.

71. Furthermore, if a Roman citizen, who had believed himself to be a Latin, on that account took a Latin woman as wife, it is permitted to him, when a son has been born, to prove the cause of the error, as if he had taken a wife under the Lex Aelia Sentia: likewise, to those who, though they were Roman citizens, had believed themselves to be foreigners and had taken foreign wives, it is permitted by senatorial decree, when a son has been born, to prove the cause of the error. When this has been done, the wife becomes a Roman citizen, and the son ******* not only attains Roman citizenship, but is also brought back into the power of the father.

72. Quaecumque de filio esse diximus, eadem et de filia dicta intellegemus. 73. Et quantum ad erroris causam probandam attinet, nihil interest, cuius aetatis filius sit * si minor anniculo sit filius filiave, causa probari non potest. Nec me praeterit in aliquo rescripto divi Hadriani ita esse constitutum, tamquam quod ad erroris q * dedit.

72. Whatever we have said regarding a son, we shall understand the same to have been said regarding a daughter. 73. And as far as proving the cause of error pertains, it makes no difference of what age the son is: if the son or daughter is less than a year old, the cause cannot be proved. Nor does it escape me that in some rescript of the deified Hadrian it has been constituted thus, as though, as to the cause of error, q * granted.

74. Si peregrinus civem Romanam uxorem duxerit, an ex senatus consulto causam probare possit, quaesitum est. * hoc ei specialiter concessum est. Sed cum peregrinus civem Romanam uxorem duxisset et filio nato alias civitatem Romanam consecutus esset, deinde cum quaereretur, an causam probare posset, rescripsit imperator Antoninus proinde posse eum causam probare, atque si peregrinus mansisset.

74. If a peregrine should take a Roman
citizen woman as wife, whether he could prove the cause by a senatorial decree,
it has been asked. * this has been specially granted to him. But when a peregrine
had taken a Roman citizen woman as wife and, a son having been born, had otherwise obtained Roman citizenship,
then, when it was asked whether he could prove the cause, he wrote back by rescript,
Emperor Antoninus, that he could in like manner prove the cause, as if a peregrine
he had remained.

Ex quo colligimus etiam peregrinum causam probare posse. 75. Ex iis, quae diximus, apparet, sive civis Romanus peregrinam sive peregrinus civem Romanam uxorem duxerit, eum qui nascitur peregrinum esse, sed si quidem per errorem tale matrimonium contractum fuerit, emendari vitium eius ex senatus consulto secundum ea, quae superius diximus. Si vero nullus error intervenerit, sed scientes suam condicionem ita coierint, nullo casu emendatur vitium eius matrimonii.

From which we gather that even a peregrine can prove the cause. 75. From the things we have said it appears that, whether a Roman citizen has taken a peregrine woman as wife or a peregrine has taken a Roman woman as wife, the one who is born is a peregrine; but if indeed such matrimony was contracted through error, its defect is amended by senatus consultum according to what we have said above. But if no error has intervened, but they, knowing their own status, have come together thus, in no case is the defect of that matrimony amended.

76. Loquimur autem de his scilicet, inter quos conubium non sit; nam alioquin si civis Romanus peregrinam, cum qua ei conubium est, uxorem duxerit, sicut supra quoque diximus, iustum matrimonium contrahitur, et tunc ex iis qui nascitur, civis Romanus est et in potestate patris erit. 77. Item si civis Romana peregrino, cum quo ei conubium est, nupserit, peregrinus sane procreatur et is iustus patris filius est, tamquam si ex peregrina eum procreasset. Hoc tamen tempore e senatus consulto, quod auctore divo Hadriano sacratissimo factum est, etiamsi non fuerit conubium inter civem Romanam et peregrinum, qui naseitur, iustus patris filius est.

76. We are speaking, moreover, of those, namely, between whom there is no conubium; for otherwise, if a Roman citizen has taken as wife a foreign woman with whom he has conubium, as we also said above, a lawful marriage is contracted, and then the one who is born from them is a Roman citizen and will be in the father’s power. 77. Likewise if a Roman female citizen has married a foreigner with whom she has conubium, a foreigner indeed is begotten, and he is the father’s lawful son, as if he had begotten him from a foreign woman. Nevertheless, at this time by a senatus-consultum, which was made under the authority of the deified most-sacred Hadrian, even if there has not been conubium between a Roman female citizen and a foreigner, he who is born is the father’s lawful son.

78. Quod autem diximus inter civem Romanum peregrinamque nisi conubium sit, qui nascitur, peregrinum esse, lege Minicia cavetur, ut is quidem deterioris parentis condicionem sequatur. Eadem lege autem ex diverso vavetur, ut si peregrinus, cum qua ei conubium non sit, uxorem duxerit civem Romanam, peregrinus ex eo coitu nascatur. Sed hoc maxime casu necessaria lex Minicia fuit; nam remota ea lege diversam condicionem sequi debebat, quia ex eis, inter quos non est conubium, qui nascitur, iure gentium matris condicioni accedit.

78. But what we have said—that between a Roman citizen and a peregrine woman, unless there is connubium, the one who is born is a peregrine—is provided by the Minician law, namely that he follows the condition of the worse parent. By the same law, moreover, conversely it is provided that if a peregrine, with whom there is no connubium, has taken to wife a Roman citizen woman, a peregrine is born from that union. But especially in this case the Minician law was necessary; for, that law removed, he ought to follow a different condition, because of this: that of those between whom there is no connubium, the one who is born, by the law of nations, accedes to the mother’s condition.

Qua parte autem iubet lex ex cive Romano et peregrina peregrinum nasci, supervacua videtur; nam et remota ea lege hoc utique iure gentium futurum erat. 79. Adeo autem hoc ita est, ut ex cive Romano et Latina qui nascitur, matris condicioni accedat; nam in lege Minicia quidem peregrinorum nomine comprehenduntur non solum exterae nationes et gentes, sed etiam qui Latini nominantur; sed ad alios Latinos pertinet, qui proprios populos propriasque civitates habebant et erant peregrinorum numero. 80. Eadem ratione ex contrario ex Latino et cive Romana sive ex lege Aelia Sentia sive aliter contractum fuerit matrimonium, civis Romanus nascitur.

In that part, however, in which the law orders that from a Roman citizen and a peregrine woman a peregrine be born, it seems superfluous; for even with that law removed, this would in any case, by the law of nations, have come about. 79. So true is this, moreover, that from a Roman citizen and a Latin woman the one who is born accedes to the mother’s condition; for in the Minician law, under the name of peregrini are comprehended not only foreign nations and peoples, but also those who are called Latins; but this pertains to other Latins, who had their own peoples and their own cities and were in the number of peregrini. 80. By the same reasoning, conversely, from a Latin man and a Roman citizen woman, whether the marriage has been contracted under the Aelia Sentia law or otherwise, a Roman citizen is born.

Fuerunt tamen, qui putaverunt ex lege Aelia Sentia contracto matrimonio Latinum nasci, quia videtur eo casu per legem Aeliam Sentiam et Iuniam conubium inter eos dari, et semper conubium efficit, ut qui nascitur, patris condicioni accedat; aliter vero contracto matrimonio eum, qui nascitur, iure gentium matris condicionem sequi et ob id esse civem Romanum. Sed hoc iure utimur ex senatus consulto, quod auctore diuo Hadriano significat, ut quoquomodo ex Latino et cive Romana natus civis Romanus nascatur. 81. His convenienter et illud senatus consultum divo Hadriano auctore significavit, ut ex Latino et peregrina, item contra ex peregrino et Latina qui nascitur, is matris condicionem sequatur.

There were, however, those who thought that, with a marriage contracted under the Lex Aelia Sentia, a Latin would be born, because in that case by the Lex Aelia Sentia and the Lex Iunia the connubium seems to be given between them, and connubium always brings it about that the one who is born accedes to the father’s condition; but if the marriage be otherwise contracted, the one who is born follows by the ius gentium the mother’s condition, and on that account is a Roman citizen. But we use this law from a senatus consultum, which, with the deified Hadrian as author, declares that in whatever way one born from a Latin and a Roman citizen woman is born, he is born a Roman citizen. 81. Consistently with these things, that senatus consultum too, with the deified Hadrian as author, declared that from a Latin and a peregrine woman, likewise conversely from a peregrine and a Latin woman, the one who is born follows the mother’s condition.

82. Illud quoque his consequens est, quod ex ancilla et libero iure gentium servus nascitur, et contra ex libera et servo liber nascitur. 83. Animadvertere tamen debemus , ne iuris gentium regulam vel lex aliqua vel quod legis vicem optinet, aliquo casu commutaverit. 84. Ecce enim ex senatus consulto Claudiano poterat civis Romana, quae alieno servo volente domino eius coiit, ipsa ex pactione libera permanere, sed servum procreare; nam quod inter eam et dominum istius servi convenerit ex senatus consulto ratum esse iubetur.

82. It is likewise consequent upon these, that from a female slave and a free man, by the law of nations, a slave is born, and conversely from a free woman and a slave, a free person is born. 83. We must, however, take note lest some law, or what obtains the place of a law, has in some case altered the rule of the law of nations. 84. For behold, by the Claudian senatus consultum a Roman citizen-woman who had intercourse with another’s slave, the slave’s master consenting, could by pact remain free herself, but beget a slave; for what was agreed between her and the master of that slave is ordered by the senatus consultum to stand ratified.

Sed postea divus Hadrianus iniquitate rei et inelegantia iuris motus restituit iuris gentium regulam, ut cum ipsa mulier libera permaneat, liberum pariat. 85. Item e lege * ex ancilla et libero poterant liberi nasci; nam ea lege cavetur, ut si quis cum aliena ancilla, quam credebat liberam esse, coierit, siquidem masculi nascantur, liberi sint, si vero feminae, ad eum pertineant, cuius mater ancilla fuerit. Sed et in hac specie divus Vespasianus inelegantia iuris motus restituit iuris gentium regulam, ut omni modo, etiamsi masculi nascantur, servi sint eius, cuius et mater fuerit.

But afterwards the deified Hadrian, moved by the iniquity of the matter and the inelegance of the law, restored the rule of the law of nations, that, while the woman herself remains free, she should bear a free child. 85. Likewise, from the law * from a slave-girl and a free man children could be born free; for by that law it is provided that if someone had intercourse with another’s slave-woman, whom he believed to be free, then if males are born, let them be free, but if females, let them belong to him to whom their mother had been a slave. But also in this case the deified Vespasian, moved by the inelegance of the law, restored the rule of the law of nations, that in every way, even if males are born, they are slaves of him to whom the mother belonged.

86. Sed illa pars eiusdem legis salva est, ut ex libera et servo alieno, quem sciebat servum esse, servi nascantur. Itaque apud quos talis lex non est, qui nascitur, iure gentium matris condicionem sequitur et ob id liber est.

86. But that part of the same law remains intact, that from a free woman and another’s slave, whom she knew to be a slave, slaves are born. And so, among those with whom such a law does not exist, he who is born, by the law of nations, follows the mother’s condition, and on that account is free.

87. Quibus autem casibus matris et non patris condicionem sequitur qui nascitur, iisdem casibus in potestate eum patris, etiamsi is civis Romanus sit, non esse plus quam manifestum est. Et ideo superius rettulimus quibusdam casibus per errorem non iusto contracto matrimonio senatum intervenire et emendare vitium matrimonii eoque modo plerumque efficere, ut in potestatem patris filius redigatur. 88. Sed si ancilla ex cive Romano conceperit, deinde manumissa civis Romana facta sit et tunc pariat, licet civis Romanus sit qui nascitur, sicut pater eius, non tamen in potestate patris est, quia neque ex iusto coitu conceptus est, neque ex ullo senatus consulto talis coitus quasi iustus constituitur.

87. But in whatever cases he who is born follows the mother’s condition and not the father’s, who
is born, in the same cases it is more than manifest that he is not in the father’s power, even if he is a Roman
citizen. And therefore we reported above that in certain cases, when through error a marriage not lawfully contracted had occurred, the senate
intervenes and emends the defect of the marriage, and in that way for the most part effects that
the son is brought into the father’s power. 88. But if a slave-woman conceived by a Roman
citizen, then, having been manumitted, became a Roman citizen and then gives birth, although
he who is born is a Roman citizen, like his father, nevertheless he is not in the power
of the father, because he was conceived neither from a lawful coitus, nor by any decree of the senate
is such a coitus constituted as if lawful.

89. Quod autem placuit, si ancilla ex cive Romano conceperit, deinde manumissa pepererit, qui nascitur, liberum nasci, naturali ratione fit; nam hi, qui illegitime concipiuntur, statum sumunt ex eo tempore, quo nascuntur; itaque si ex libera nascuntur, liberi fiunt, nec interest, ex quo mater eos conceperit, cum ancilla fuerit: at hi, qui legitime concipiuntur, ex conceptionis tempore statum sumunt. 90. Itaque si cui mulieri civi Romanae praegnati aqua et igni interdictum fuerit, eoque modo peregrina facta tunc pariat, conplures distinguunt et putant, si quidem ex iustis nuptiis conceperit, civem Romanum ex ea nasci, si vero volgo conceperit, peregrinum ex ea nasci. 91. Item si qua mulier civis Romana praegnas ex senatus consulto Claudiano ancilla facta sit ob id, quod alieno servo invito et denuntiante domino eius coierit, conplures distinguunt et existimant, si quidem ex iustis nuptiis conceptus sit, civem Romanum ex ea nasci, si vero volgo conceptus sit, servum nasci eius, cuius mater facta esset ancilla.

89. Moreover, that it has been decided that, if a slave‑woman shall have conceived from a Roman citizen, and then, after manumission, shall have given birth, the one who is born is born free, happens by natural reasoning; for those who are conceived illegitimately take their status from the time at which they are born; and so, if they are born from a free woman, they become free, nor does it matter at what time their mother conceived them, when she was a slave: but those who are conceived legitimately take their status from the time of conception. 90. Accordingly, if a certain woman, a Roman citizen, while pregnant, shall have been interdicted from fire and water, and in that way made a foreigner, then gives birth, many distinguish and think that, if indeed she conceived from lawful nuptials, a Roman citizen is born from her, but if she conceived promiscuously, a foreigner is born from her. 91. Likewise, if any woman, a Roman citizen, while pregnant, has been made a slave by the Claudian senatorial decree, on the ground that she had intercourse with another’s slave, his master being unwilling and having given warning, many distinguish and judge that, if indeed he was conceived from lawful nuptials, a Roman citizen is born from her, but if he was conceived promiscuously, a slave is born to him whose slave the mother had been made.

92. Peregrina quoque si volgo conceperit, deinde civis Romana facta tunc pariat, civem Romanum parit; si vero ex peregrino secundum leges moresque peregrinorum conceperit, ita videtur ex senatus consulto, quod auctore divo Hadriano factum est, civem Romanum parere, si et patri eius civitas Romana donetur.

92. A peregrine woman also, if she conceived promiscuously, and then, having become a Roman citizen, gives birth at that time, bears a Roman citizen; but if she conceived from a peregrine according to the laws and mores of the peregrines, thus it is held by a senatus-consultum, which was enacted under the authority of the deified Hadrian, that she bears a Roman citizen, if Roman citizenship is granted to the father as well.

93. Si peregrinus sibi liberisque suis civitatem Romanam petierit, non aliter filii in potestate eius fiunt, quam si imperator eos in potestatem redegerit: Quod ita demum is facit, si causa cognita aestimaverit hoc filiis expedire: Diligentius autem exactiusque causam cognoscit de impuberibus absentibusque: Et haec ita edicto divi Hadriani significantur. 94. Item si quis cum uxore praegnante civitate Romana donatus sit, quamvis is, qui nascitur, ut supra dixi, civis Romanus sit, tamen in potestate patris non fit: Idque subscriptione divi sacratissimi Hadriani significatur qua de causa, qui intellegit uxorem suam esse praegnantem, dum civitatem sibi et uxori ab imperatore petit, simul ab eodem petere debet, ut eum, qui natus erit, in potestate sua habeat. 95. Alia causa est eorum, qui Latii iure cum liberis suis ad civitatem Romanam perveniunt; nam horum in potestate fiunt liberi.

93. If a peregrine, for himself and his children, should seek Roman citizenship, the sons come into his power only if the emperor has brought them into his potestas: which he does only after the cause has been known and he has judged this to be expedient for the sons: moreover, he examines the cause more diligently and more exactly in the case of the underage and the absent: and these matters are thus signified by an edict of the deified Hadrian. 94. Likewise, if anyone has been granted Roman citizenship together with a pregnant wife, although he who is born, as I said above, is a Roman citizen, nevertheless he does not come into the father’s potestas: and this is indicated by a subscription of the most sacred deified Hadrian, for which reason he who understands that his wife is pregnant, while he seeks citizenship for himself and his wife from the emperor, ought at the same time to ask from that same emperor that he may have him who will be born in his own potestas. 95. Another case is that of those who, by the Right of Latium, come with their children to Roman citizenship; for the children of these come into their potestas.

96. Quod ius quibusdam peregrinis civitatibus datum est vel a populo Romano vel a senatu vel a Caesare * aut maius est Latium aut minus; maius est Latium, cum et hi, qui decuriones leguntur, et ei, qui honorem aliquem aut magistratum gerunt, civitatem Romanam consecuntur; minus Latium est, cum hi tantum, qui vel magistratum vel honorem gerunt, ad civitatem Romanam perveniunt. Idque conpluribus epistulis principum significatur. 97. Non solum tamen naturales liberi secundum ea, quae diximus, in potestate nostra sunt, verum et hi, quos adoptamus.

96. This right has been given to certain peregrine cities either by the Roman People
or by the Senate or by Caesar*, and it is either Greater Latium or Lesser; Greater Latium is
when both those who are elected as decurions and those who bear some honor or a magistracy obtain Roman citizenship; Lesser Latium is when only those who either hold a magistracy or an honor attain to Roman citizenship. And this is signified in several letters of the princes. 97. Not only, however, are natural children according to the things we have said in our power, but also those whom we adopt.

98. Adoptio autem duobus modis fit, aut populi auctoritate aut inperio magistratus velut praetoris. 99. Populi auctoritate adoptamus eos, qui sui iuris sunt: Quae species adoptionis dicitur adrogatio, quia et is, qui adoptat, rogatur, id est interrogatur, an velit eum, quem adoptaturus sit, iustum sibi filium esse; et is, qui adoptatur, rogatur, an id fieri patiatur; et populus rogatur, an id fieri iubeat. Imperio magistratus adoptamus eos, qui in potestate parentium sunt, sive primum gradum liberorum optineant, qualis est filius et filia, sive inferiorem, qualis est nepos neptis, pronepos proneptis.

98. Adoption, moreover, is effected in two modes
either by the authority of the people or by the imperium of a magistrate, as for instance the praetor. 99.
By the authority of the people we adopt those who are sui iuris: which species of adoption is called adrogation, because both he who adopts is asked—that is, interrogated—whether he wishes that the one whom he is about to adopt be a lawful son to himself; and he who is adopted is asked whether he allows that to be done; and the people are asked whether they order that to be done. By the imperium of a magistrate we adopt those who are in the power of their parents, whether they hold the first degree of descendants, such as a son and a daughter, or a lower one, such as a grandson, granddaughter, great-grandson, great-granddaughter.

100. Et quidem illa adoptio, quae per populum fit, nusquam nisi Romae fit; at haec etiam in provinciis apud praesides earum fieri solet. 101. Item per populum feminae non adoptantur, nam id magis placuit; apud praetorem vero vel in provinciis apud proconsulem legatumve etiam feminae solent adoptari. 102. Item inpuberem apud populum adoptari aliquando prohibitum est, aliquando permissum est: Nunc ex epistula optimi imperatoris Antonini, quam scripsit pontificibus, si iusta causa adoptionis esse videbitur, cum quibusdam condicionibus permissum est.

100. And indeed that adoption which is done through the people is done nowhere except at Rome; but this one also is accustomed to be done in the provinces before their governors. 101. Likewise through the people females are not adopted, for that course was more approved; but before the praetor, or in the provinces before the proconsul or the legate, even females are wont to be adopted. 102. Likewise, the adoption before the people of one not yet of puberty has sometimes been prohibited, sometimes permitted: Now, from a letter of the best Emperor Antoninus, which he wrote to the pontiffs, if a just cause of adoption shall seem to exist, with certain conditions it has been permitted.

Apud praetorem vero et in provinciis apud proconsulem legatumve cuiuscumque aetatis adoptare possumus. 103. Illud vero utriusque adoptionis commune est, quod et hi, qui generare non possunt, quales sunt spadones, adoptare possunt. 104. Feminae vero nullo modo adoptare possunt, quia ne quidem naturales liberos in potestate habent.

Before the praetor, in fact, and in the provinces before the proconsul or the legate, we can adopt persons of whatever age. 103. This, truly, is common to both kinds of adoption: that even those who cannot beget, such as spadones (eunuchs), can adopt. 104. Women, however, can in no way adopt, because they do not even have their natural children in their power.

105. Item si quis per populum sive apud praetorem vel apud praesidem provinciae adoptaverit, potest eundem alii in adoptionem dare. 106. Sed et illud, de quo quaestio est, an minor natu maiorem natu adoptare possit, utriusque adoptionis commune est. 107. Illud proprium est eius adoptionis, quae per populum fit, quod is, qui liberos in potestate habet, si se adrogandum dederit, non solum ipse potestati adrogatoris subicitur, sed etiam liberi eius in eiusdem fiunt potestate tanquam nepotes.

105. Likewise, if someone has adopted through the People or before the praetor or before the governor of a province, he can give that same person into adoption to another. 106. But also this point, about which there is a question—whether a younger by birth can adopt an older by birth—is common to both kinds of adoption. 107. That is peculiar to the adoption which is done through the People: that he who has children in his power, if he has given himself to be adrogated, not only is he himself subjected to the power of the adrogator, but his children also come into the power of that same man as if grandchildren.

108. Nunc de his personis videamus, quae in manu nostra sunt. Quod et ipsum ius proprium civium Romanorum est. 109. Sed in potestate quidem et masculi et feminae esse solent; in manum autem feminae tantum conveniunt.

108. Now let us look at those persons who are in our manus. And this itself is a right proper to Roman citizens. 109. But under potestas indeed both males and females are wont to be; into manus, however, only females come.

110. Olim itaque tribus modis in manum conveniebant: usu, farreo, coemptione. 111. Usu in manum conveniebat, quae anno continuo nupta perseverabat; quia enim velut annua possessione usucapiebatur, in familiam viri transibat filiaeque locum optinebat. Itaque lege duodecim tabularum cautum est, ut si qua nollet eo modo in manum mariti convenire, ea quotannis trinoctio abesset atque eo modo cuiusque anni usum interrumperet.

110. Formerly, therefore they used to come into the hand in three ways: by usus, by farreum, by coemption. 111. By usus a woman came into the hand who remained married for a continuous year; for indeed, as it were, by an annual possession she was acquired by usucaption, she passed into the husband’s family and held the place of a daughter. Therefore, by the Law of the Twelve Tables it was provided, that if any woman did not wish in that way to come into the hand of her husband, she should be absent three nights every year, and in that way she should interrupt the usus of each year.

Sed hoc totum ius partim legibus sublatum est, partim ipsa desuetudine obliteratum est. 112. Farreo in manum conveniunt per quoddam genus sacrificii, quod Iovi Farreo fit; in quo farreus panis adhibetur, unde etiam confarreatio dicitur; complura praeterea huius iuris ordinandi gratia cum certis et sollemnibus verbis praesentibus decem testibus aguntur et fiunt. Quod ius etiam nostris temporibus in usu est: Nam flamines maiores, id est Diales, Martiales, Quirinales, item reges sacrorum, nisi ex farreatis nati non leguntur: Ac ne ipsi quidem sine confarreatione sacerdotium habere possunt.

But this whole law has been partly removed by statutes, and partly obliterated by desuetude itself. 112. By farreum they come into manus through a certain kind of sacrifice, which is made to Jupiter Farreus; in which spelt bread is employed, whence it is also called confarreatio; moreover, many things besides, for the sake of ordering this law, are transacted and done with fixed and solemn words, ten witnesses being present. Which law even in our times is in use: For the greater flamens, that is, the Dialis, Martialis, Quirinalis, likewise the kings of sacred rites, are not chosen unless born from parents married by confarreatio: And they themselves cannot hold the priesthood without confarreation.

113. Coemptione vero in manum conveniunt per mancipationem, id est per quandam imaginariam venditionem: Nam adhibitis non minus quam V testibus civibus Romanis puberibus, item libripende, emit vir mulierem, cuius in manum convenit. 114. Potest autem coemptionem facere mulier non solum cum marito suo, sed etiam cum extraneo; scilicet aut matrimonii causa facta coemptio dicitur aut fiduciae; quae enim cum marito suo facit coemptionem, ut apud eum filiae loco sit, dicitur matrimonii causa fecisse coemptionem; quae uero alterius rei causa facit coemptionem aut cum viro suo aut cum extraneo, velut tutelae evitandae causa, dicitur fiduciae causa fecisse coemptionem. 115. Quod est tale: Si qua velit quos habet tutores deponere et alium nancisci, illis auctoribus coemptionem facit; deinde a coemptionatore remancipata ei, cui ipsa velit, et ab eo vindicta manumissa incipit eum habere tutorem, a quo manumissa est; qui tutor fiduciarius dicitur, sicut inferius apparebit.

113. By coemption indeed they come into manus through mancipation, that is, through a certain imaginary sale: For, with not fewer than 5 witnesses, Roman citizens of full age, and likewise a libripens, the man buys the woman, into whose manus she comes. 114. Moreover, a woman can do coemption not only with her own husband, but also with an outsider; namely, coemption made is said either for the sake of marriage or of fiducia; for she who does coemption with her husband, in order that she may be in his household in the place of a daughter, is said to have done coemption for the sake of marriage; but she who for the sake of some other matter does coemption either with her husband or with an outsider, for example for the sake of avoiding tutela (guardianship), is said to have done coemption for the sake of fiducia. 115. Which is as follows: If some woman wishes to lay down the tutors whom she has and to obtain another, with those men as authorizers she does coemption; then, being remancipated by the coemptionator to him whom she herself wishes, and by him manumitted by the vindicta (rod), she begins to have as tutor the one by whom she was manumitted; which tutor is called fiduciary, as will appear below.

115a. Olim etiam testamenti faciendi gratia fiduciaria fiebat coemptio: Tunc enim non aliter feminae testamenti faciendi ius habebant, exceptis quibusdam personis, quam si coemptionem fecissent remancipataeque et manumissae fuissent; sed hanc necessitatem coemptionis faciendae ex auctoritate divi Hadriani senatus remisit. * 115b.

115a. Formerly also for the sake of making a testament a fiduciary coemption was performed: For then women had the right of making a testament in no other way, except certain persons, than if they had made a coemption and had been remancipated and manumitted; but this necessity of making a coemption the senate, by the authority of the deified Hadrian, remitted. * 115b.

fiduciae causa cum viro suo fecerit coemptionem, nihilo minus filiae loco incipit esse: Nam si omnino qualibet ex causa uxor in manu viri sit, placuit eam filiae iura nancisci.

if she has made a coemption with her own husband for a fiduciary cause, none the less she begins to be in the place of a daughter: For if in general from whatever cause a wife is in the hand of her husband, it has been decided that she acquires the rights of a daughter.

116. Superest, ut exponamus, quae personae in mancipio sint. 117. Omnes igitur liberorum personae, sive masculini sive feminini sexus, quae in potestate parentis sunt, mancipari ab hoc eodem modo possunt, quo etiam servi mancipari possunt. 118. Idem iuris est in earum personis, quae in manu sunt: Nam feminae a coemptionatoribus eodem modo possunt mancipari, quo liberi a parente possunt, adeo quidem, ut quamvis ea sola apud coemptionatorem filiae loco sit.

116. It remains that we set forth which persons are in mancipium. 117. Therefore all the persons of children, whether of the male or the female sex, who are in the power of a parent, can be mancipated by this same person in the same way in which slaves also can be mancipated. 118. The same law holds concerning those persons who are in manu: for women can be mancipated by their coemptionators in the same way in which children can be mancipated by a parent, indeed to such an extent that, although she alone is in the position of a daughter with the coemptionator, yet she may be so mancipated.

Quae ei nupta sit, tamen nihilo minus etiam quae ei nupta non sit nec ob id filiae loco sit, ab eo mancipari possit. 118a. Sed plerumque solum et a parentibus et a coemptionatoribus mancipantur, cum velint parentes coemptionatoresque ex suo iure eas personas dimittere, sicut inferius evidentius apparebit.

She who has been married to him, nevertheless no less even she who has not been married to him and on that account is not in the place of a daughter, can be mancipated by him. 118a. But for the most part they are mancipated only both by parents and by coemptionators, when parents and coemptionators wish to release those persons from their own right, as will appear more evidently below.

119. Est autem mancipatio, ut supra quoque diximus, imaginaria quaedam venditio: Quod et ipsum ius proprium civium Romanorum est; eaque res ita agitur: Adhibitis non minus quam quinque testibus civibus Romanis puberibus et praeterea alio eiusdem condicionis, qui libram aeneam teneat, qui appellatur libripens, is, qui mancipio accipit, rem tenens ita dicit: HUNC EGO HOMINEM EX IURE QUIRITIUM MEUM ESSE AIO ISQUE MIHI EMPTUS ESTO HOC AERE AENEAQUE LIBRA; deinde aere percutit libram idque aes dat ei, a quo mancipio accipit, quasi pretii loco. 120. Eo modo et serviles et liberae personae mancipantur; animalia quoque, quae mancipi sunt, quo in numero habentur boves, equi, muli, asini; item praedia tam urbana quam rustica, quae et ipsa mancipi sunt, qualia sunt Italica, eodem modo solent mancipari. 121. In eo solo praediorum mancipatio a ceterorum mancipatione differt, quod personae serviles et liberae, item animalia, quae mancipi sunt, nisi in praesentia sint, mancipari non possunt; adeo quidem, ut eum, qui mancipio accipit, adprehendere id ipsum, quod ei mancipio datur, necesse sit; unde etiam mancipatio dicitur, quia manu res capitur: Praedia vero absentia solent mancipari.

119. Mancipation, moreover, as we also said above, is a certain imaginary vendition: and this very law is proper to Roman citizens; and the matter is transacted thus: with no fewer than five witnesses, Roman citizens of age, being called in, and, besides, another of the same condition, who holds a bronze scale, called the libripens, the one who takes by mancipation, holding the thing, says thus: I DECLARE THAT THIS MAN IS MINE BY QUIRITARIAN RIGHT, AND LET HIM BE BOUGHT FOR ME WITH THIS BRONZE AND THIS BRONZE SCALE; then he strikes the scale with the bronze and gives that bronze to the one from whom he takes by mancipation, as if in the place of a price. 120. In that way both servile and free persons are mancipated; animals also which are res mancipi, among which are reckoned oxen, horses, mules, asses; likewise landed estates both urban and rustic, which themselves too are res mancipi, such as Italian lands, are wont to be mancipated in the same way. 121. In this one point the mancipation of estates differs from the mancipation of other things, that servile and free persons, likewise animals which are res mancipi, cannot be mancipated unless they are present; indeed, to such a degree that it is necessary for him who takes by mancipation to lay hold of the very thing which is given to him by mancipation; whence it is also called mancipation, because the thing is taken by the hand: estates, however, are wont to be mancipated while absent.

122. ldeo autem aes et libra adhibetur, quia olim aereis tantum nummis utebantur; et erant asses, dipundii, semisses, quadrantes, nec ullus aureus vel argenteus nummus in usu erat, sicut ex lege XII tabularum intellegere possumus; eorumque nummorum vis et potestas non in numero erat, sed in pondere; ************ asses librales erant, et dipondii ************ unde etiam dupondius dictus est, quasi duo pondo: Quod nomen adhuc in usu retinetur. Semisses quoque et quadrantes pro rata scilicet portione ad pondus examinati erant. Tunc igitur et qui dabat alicui pecuniam, non numerabat eam, sed appendebat; unde servi, quibus permittitur administratio pecuniae, dispensatores appellati sunt.

122. Therefore bronze and a balance are employed, because in former times they used only bronze coins; and there were asses, dipundii, semisses, quadrantes, and no gold or silver coin was in use, as we can understand from the Law of the 12 Tables; and the force and authority of those coins were not in the number but in the weight; ************ the asses were pound-weight, and the dipondii ************ whence the dupondius also was so called, as if “two weight” (duo pondo): which name is still retained in use. Likewise the semisses and quadrantes were examined by weight in proportion to their proper share. Then therefore even he who was giving money to someone did not count it, but weighed it out; whence slaves to whom the administration of money is permitted have been called dispensers.

123. * Illa quidem, quae coemptionem facit, non deducitur in servilem condicionem, at a parentibus et a coemptionatoribus mancipati mancipataeve servorum loco constituuntur, adeo quidem, ut ab eo, cuius in mancipio sunt, neque hereditatem neque legata aliter capere possint, quam si simul eodem testamento liberi esse iubeantur, sicuti iuris est in persona servorum. Sed differentiae ratio manifesta est, cum a parentibus et a coemptionatoribus isdem verbis mancipio accipiantur, quibus servi; quod non similiter fit in coemptione.

123. * The one, indeed, who performs coemption is not brought down into a servile condition, but those mancipated by parents and by coemptionators, male or female, are placed in the station of slaves, to such a degree that from him in whose mancipium they are, they can neither take inheritance nor legacies otherwise than if at the same time in the same testament they are ordered to be free, just as is the law in the person of slaves. But the reason for the difference is manifest, since by parents and by coemptionators they are received by mancipation with the same words with which slaves are; which is not done similarly in coemption.

124. Videamus nunc, quo modo ii, qui alieno iuri subiecti sunt, eo iure liberentur.

124. Let us now see in what manner those who are subject to another’s law are liberated from that law.

125. Ac prius de his dispiciamus, qui in potestate sunt. 126. Et quidem servi quemadmodum potestate liberentur, ex his intellegere possumus, quae de servis manumittendis superius exposuimus. 127. Hi uero, qui in potestate parentis sunt, mortuo eo sui iuris fiunt.

125. And first let us examine those who are under potestas. 126. And indeed in what manner slaves are freed from potestas, we can understand from those things which we set forth above concerning the manumitting of slaves. 127. Those, however, who are in the potestas of a parent, upon his death become of their own right (sui iuris).

Sed hoc distinctionem recipit; nam mortuo patre sane omni modo filii filiaeve sui iuris efficiuntur; mortuo vero avo non omni modo nepotes neptesve sui iuris fiunt, sed ita si post mortem avi in patris sui potestatem recasuri non sunt. Itaque si moriente avo pater eorum et vivat et in potestate patris fuerit, tunc post obitum avi in patris sui potestate fiunt; si vero is, quo tempore avus moritur, aut iam mortuus est aut exiit de potestate patris, tunc hi, quia in potestatem eius cadere non possunt, sui iuris fiunt. 128. Cum autem is, cui ob aliquod maleficium ex lege Cornelia aqua et igni interdicitur, civitatem Romanam amittat, sequitur, ut quia eo modo ex numero civium Romanorum tollitur, proinde ac mortuo eo desinant liberi in potestate eius esse: Nec enim ratio patitur, ut peregrinae condicionis homo civem Romanum in potestate habeat.

But this admits a distinction; for
with the father dead, assuredly in every way sons and daughters become sui iuris; with the
grandfather dead, however, grandsons and granddaughters do not in every way become sui iuris, but only if after
the grandfather’s death they are not going to fall back into their father’s power. And so, if, as the
grandfather is dying, their father both is alive and has been in his own father’s power, then after the grandfather’s decease they
come into their father’s power; but if he, at the time the grandfather dies, either is already
dead or has gone out of his father’s power, then these, because they cannot fall into his power,
become sui iuris. 128. But when a man to whom, on account of some maleficium, water and fire are interdicted under the Lex Cornelia,
loses Roman citizenship, it follows that, because in that way he is removed from the number of Roman citizens,
his children cease to be in his power just as if he had died: Nor indeed does reason
allow that a man of peregrine condition should have a Roman citizen in his power.

Pari ratione et si ei, qui in potestate parentis sit, aqua et igni interdictum fuerit, desinit in potestate parentis esse, quia aeque ratio non patitur, ut peregrinae condicionis homo in potestate sit civis Romani parentis. 129. Quod si ab hostibus captus fuerit parens, quamvis servus hostium fiat, tamen pendet ius liberorum propter ius postliminii, quo hi, qui ab hostibus capti sunt, si reversi fuerint, omnia pristina iura recipiunt; itaque reversus habebit liberos in potestate: Si vero illic mortuus sit, erunt quidem liberi sui iuris; sed utrum ex hoc tempore, quo mortuus est apud hostes parens, an ex illo, quo ab hostibus captus est, dubitari potest. Ipse quoque filius neposve si ab hostibus captus fuerit, similiter dicemus propter ius postliminii potestatem quoque parentis in suspenso esse.

By the same reasoning, if one who is in the power of a parent has been interdicted from water and fire, he ceases to be in the power of the parent, because likewise the rationale does not allow that a man of foreign condition be in the power of a Roman-citizen parent. 129. But if the parent has been captured by enemies, although he becomes a slave of the enemies, nevertheless the right over the children hangs in suspense on account of the right of postliminy, by which those who have been captured by enemies, if they have returned, recover all their former rights; and so, upon his return he will have the children in his power: But if he has died there, the children will indeed be of their own right; yet whether from the time at which the parent died among the enemies, or from that at which he was captured by the enemies, can be doubted. The son himself also, or the grandson, if he should be captured by enemies, we will similarly say that, by reason of the right of postliminy, the power of the parent likewise is in suspense.

130. Praeterea exeunt liberi virilis sexus de parentis potestate, si flamines Diales inaugurentur, et feminini sexus, si virgines Vestales capiantur. 131. Olim quoque, quo tempore populus Romanus in Latinas regiones colonias deducebat, qui iussu parentis in coloniam Latinam nomen dedissent, desinebant in potestate parentis esse, quia efficerentur alterius civitatis cives. 132. Praeterea emancipatione desinunt liberi in potestate parentum esse.

130. Moreover, male children exit from the power of the parent if they are inaugurated as Flamines Diales, and female children, if they are taken as Vestal Virgins. 131. Formerly too, at the time when the Roman people was leading colonies into the Latin regions, those who, by order of a parent, had given their name into a Latin colony ceased to be in the power of the parent, because they became citizens of another state. 132. Moreover, by emancipation children cease to be in the power of their parents.

Sed filius quidem tribus mancipationibus, ceteri vero liberi sive masculini sexus sive feminini una mancipatione exeunt de parentium potestate: Lex enim XII tabularum tantum in persona filii de tribus mancipationibus loquitur his verbis: 'Si pater ter filium venum duit a patre fliius liber esto'. Eaque res ita agitur: Mancipat pater filium alicui; is eum vindicta manumittit: Eo facto revertitur in potestatem patris; is eum iterum mancipat vel eidem vel alii (sed in usu est eidem mancipari) isque eum postea similiter vindicta manumittit; eo facto rursus in potestatem patris revertitur; tertio pater eum mancipat vel eidem vel alii (sed hoc in usu est, ut eidem mancipetur) eaque mancipatione desinit in potestate patris esse, etiamsi nondum manumissus sit, sed adhuc in causa mancipii. * 133. Admonendi autem sumus liberum esse arbitrium ei, qui filium et ex eo nepotem in potestate habebit, filium quidem de potestate dimittere, nepotem vero in potestate retinere: Vel ex diverso filium quidem in potestate retinere, nepotem vero manumittere, vel omnes sui iuris efficere. Eadem et de pronepote dicta esse intellegemus.

But the son indeed by three mancipations, but the other children, whether of the male sex or the female, by one mancipation, go out of the parents’ power: For the Law of the 12 Tables speaks only in the person of the son about three mancipations in these words: 'If a father sells a son three times, let the son be free from the father.' And the matter is transacted thus: The father mancipates the son to someone; he manumits him with the vindicta; by that done he returns into the father’s power; he mancipates him again either to the same person or to another (but in practice he is mancipated to the same one), and he afterwards similarly manumits him with the vindicta; by that done he again returns into the father’s power; a third time the father mancipates him either to the same person or to another (but the practice is that he be mancipated to the same), and by that mancipation he ceases to be in the father’s power, even if he has not yet been manumitted, but is still in the state of mancipium. *133. We must, however, be reminded that it is a free choice for him who will have a son and from him a grandson in his power, to release the son indeed from power, but to retain the grandson in power; or conversely to retain the son in power, but to manumit the grandson, or to make them all of their own right. We shall understand the same to have been said also about a great‑grandson.

134. Praeterea parentes etiam liberos in adoptionem datos in potestate habere desinunt. Et in filio quidem, si in adoptionem datur, tres mancipationes et duae intercedentes manumissiones proinde fiunt, ac fieri solent, cum ita eum pater de potestate dimittit, ut sui iuris efficiatur. Deinde aut patri remancipatur, et ab eo is, qui adoptat, vindicat apud praetorem filium suum esse, et illo contra non vindicante a praetore vindicanti filius addicitur, aut non remancipatur patri, sed ab eo vindicat is, qui adoptat, apud quem in tertia mancipatione est: Sed sane commodius est patri remancipari.

134. Moreover, parents also cease to have in their power children given into adoption to have. And indeed in the case of a son, if he is given into adoption, three mancipations and two intervening manumissions take place in like manner as they are wont to take place, when the father thus releases him from power, so that he becomes sui juris. Then either he is remancipated to his father, and from him the one who adopts claims before the praetor that he is his son, and as the former does not counter-vindicate, the son is by the praetor adjudged to the vindicator; or he is not remancipated to his father, but the one who adopts vindicates him from the person in whose hands he is upon the third mancipation: But assuredly it is more convenient that he be remancipated to the father.

In ceteris vero liberorum personis, seu masculini seu feminini sexus, una scilicet mancipatio sufficit, et aut remancipantur parenti aut non remancipantur. Eadem et in provinciis apud praesidem provinciae solent fieri. 135. Qui ex filio semel iterumve mancipato conceptus est, licet post tertiam mancipationem patris sui nascatur, tamen in avi potestate est, et ideo ab eo et emancipari et in adoptionem dari potest.

In the other cases indeed of the persons of children, whether of the male or
female sex, one, namely, mancipation suffices, and either they are remancipated
to the parent or they are not remancipated. The same things are wont to be done also in the provinces before the president (praeses) of the
province. 135. He who has been conceived from a son mancipated once or twice,
although he is born after the third mancipation of his father, nevertheless
is in the power of his grandfather, and therefore by him can both be emancipated and be given into adoption.

At is, qui ex eo filio conceptus est, qui in tertia mancipatione est, non nascitur in avi potestate: Sed eum Labeo quidem existimat in eiusdem mancipio esse, cuius et pater sit: Utimur autem hoc iure, ut quamdiu pater eius in mancipio sit, pendeat ius eius, et si quidem pater eius ex mancipatione manumissus erit, cadat in eius potestatem, si vero is, dum in mancipio sit, decesserit, sui iuris fiat. 135a. Eadem scilicet * ut supra diximus, quod in filio faciunt tres mancipationes, hoc facit una mancipatio in nepote.

But he who is conceived from that son who is in the third mancipation is not born in the grandfather’s power: But Labeo indeed thinks that he is in the mancipium of the same person under whom his father also is: However, we use this law, that so long as his father is in mancipium, his right hangs in suspense, and if indeed his father shall have been manumitted from the mancipation, he falls into his power; but if he, while in mancipium, shall have deceased, he becomes sui iuris. 135a. Likewise namely * as we said above, what three mancipations effect in the son, one mancipation effects in the grandson.

136. * Maximi et Tuberonis cautum est, ut haec quod ad sacra tantum videatur in manu esse, quod vero ad ceteras causas proinde habeatur, atque si in manum non convenisset. Eae vero mulieres, quae in manum conveniunt per coemptionem, potestate parentis liberantur; nec interest, an in viri sui manu sint an extranei, quamvis hae solae Ioco filiarum habeantur, quae in viri manu sunt.

136. * It is provided by Maximus and Tubero that, as regards the sacra only, she is seen to be in manus; but as to the other causes, it is to be held just as if she had not come into manus. Those women, however, who come into manus through coemptio are freed from the parent’s power; nor does it matter whether they are in the manus of their own husband or of a stranger, although only those are considered in the place of daughters who are in the manus of their husband.

137. * desinunt in manu esse, et si ex ea mancipatione manumissae fuerint, sui iuris efficiuntur. 137a. * nihilo magis potest cogere, quam et filia patrem.

137. * they cease to be in manu, and if they have been manumitted from that mancipation, they become of their own right. 137a. * he can no more compel than a daughter can her father.

Sed filia quidem nullo modo patrem potest cogere, etiam si adoptiva sit: Haec autem virum repudio misso proinde compellere potest, atque si ei numquam nupta fuisset.

But a daughter indeed can in no way compel her father, even if she is adopted: however, she can compel her husband, a repudiation having been sent, just as if she had never been married to him.

138. Ii, qui in causa mancipii sunt, quia servorum loco habentur, vindicta, censu, testamento manumissi sui iuris fiunt. 139. Nec tamen in hoc casu lex Aelia Sentia locum habet: Itaque nihil requirimus, cuius aetatis sit is, qui manumittit et qui manumittitur; ac ne illud quidem, an patronum creditoremve manumissor habeat; ac ne numerus quidem lege Fufia Caninia finitus in his personis locum habet. 140. Quin etiam invito quoque eo, cuius in mancipio sunt, censu libertatem consequi possunt, excepto eo, quem pater ea lege mancipio dedit, ut sibi remancipetur; nam quodam modo tunc pater potestatem propriam reservare sibi videtur eo ipso, quod mancipio recipit.

138. Those who are in the condition of mancipium, because they are held in the place of slaves, when manumitted by vindicta, by the census, or by testament, become sui iuris. 139. Nevertheless, in this case the Lex Aelia Sentia does not have application: and so we do not require of what age is he who manumits and he who is manumitted; nor even this, whether the manumitter has a patron or a creditor; nor does the number limited by the Lex Fufia Caninia have place for these persons. 140. Indeed, even with the one unwilling in whose mancipium they are, they can obtain liberty by the census, except for him whom the father gave into mancipium on the condition that he be remancipated to himself; for in a certain way then the father seems to reserve his own power to himself by that very fact, that he receives by mancipation.

Ac ne is quidem dicitur invito eo, cuius in mancipio est, censu libertatem consequi, quem pater ex noxali causa mancipio dedit, veluti quod furti eius nomine damnatus est et eum mancipio actori dedit: Nam hunc actor pro pecunia habet. 141. In summa admonendi sumus adversus eos, quos in mancipio habemus, nihil nobis contumeliose facere licere; alioquin iniuriarum tenebimur. Ac ne diu quidem in eo iure detinentur homines, sed plerumque hoc fit dicis gratia uno momento; nisi scilicet ex noxali causa mancipantur.

Nor is even he said to obtain freedom by the census against the will of him in whose mancipium he is, whom a father has given by mancipation on a noxal ground, for instance because he was condemned on a charge of theft and delivered him by mancipation to the plaintiff: For the plaintiff holds this man in place of money. 141. In sum, we must be admonished that against those whom we have in mancipium it is not permitted for us to do anything contumeliously; otherwise we shall be held liable for injuries. Nor indeed are men detained long in that right, but for the most part this is done for the sake of form in a single moment; unless, of course, they are mancipated on a noxal ground.

142. Transeamus nunc ad aliam divisionem. Nam ex his personis, quae neque in potestate neque in manu neque in mancipio sunt, quaedam vel in tutela sunt vel in curatione, quaedam neutro iure tenentur. Videamus igitur, quae in tutela, quae in curatione sint: Ita enim intellegemus ceteras personas, quae neutro iure tenentur.

142. Let us pass now to another division. For of those persons who are neither in power nor in manus nor in mancipium, some are either in tutelage or in curation, some are held by neither law. Let us therefore see which are in tutelage, which are in curation: thus we shall understand the other persons who are held by neither law.

143. Ac prius dispiciamus de his, quae in tutela sunt. 144. Permissum est itaque parentibus liberis, quos in potestate sua habent, testamento tutores dare: Masculini quidem sexus inpuberibus, feminini vero inpuberibus puberibusque, vel cum nuptae sint. Veteres enim voluerunt feminas, etiamsi perfectae aetatis sint, propter animi levitatem in tutela esse.

143. And first let us look into those who are in tutelage. 144. It is permitted, therefore, to parents to give by testament tutors for their children whom they have in their power: for males while under puberty, but for females both before and after puberty, even when they are married. For the ancients wished women, even if of perfect age, to be in tutelage on account of levity of mind.

145. Itaque si quis filio filiaeque testamento tutorem dederit, et ambo ad pubertatem pervenerint, filius quidem desinit habere tutorem, filia vero nihilo minus in tutela permanet: Tantum enim ex lege Iulia et Papia Poppaea iure liberorum a tutela liberantur feminae. Loquimur autem exceptis virginibus Vestalibus, quas etiam veteres in honorem sacerdotii liberas esse voluerunt: Itaque etiam lege XII tabularum cautum est. 146. Nepotibus autem neptibusque ita demum possumus testamento tutores dare, si post mortem nostram in patris sui potestatem iure recasuri non sint.

145. And so, if someone has given a tutor by testament to his son and daughter, and both have reached puberty, the son indeed ceases to have a tutor, but the daughter nonetheless remains in guardianship: For only by the Lex Julia and Papia Poppaea, by the right of children, are women freed from guardianship. We speak, however, with the Vestal Virgins excepted, whom even the ancients wished to be free in honor of the priesthood: And so it is also provided by the Law of the 12 Tables. 146. But to grandsons and granddaughters we can give tutors by testament only if after our death they are not by law going to revert into their father’s power.

Itaque si filius meus mortis meae tempore in potestate mea sit, nepotes ex eo non poterunt ex testamento meo habere tutorem, quamvis in potestate mea fuerint; scilicet quia mortuo me in patris sui potestate futuri sunt. 147. Cum tamen in compluribus aliis causis postumi pro iam natis habeantur, et in hac causa placuit non minus postumis quam iam natis testamento tutores dari posse, si modo in ea causa sint, ut si vivis nobis nascantur, in potestate nostra fiant. Hos enim etiam heredes instituere possumus, cum extraneos postumos heredes instituere permissum non sit.

And so, if my son at the time of my death is in my power, the grandchildren from him will not be able to have a guardian from my testament, although they were in my power; clearly because, I being dead, they will be in their father’s power.
147. However, since in several other causes posthumous children are held as though already born, in this cause too it has been decided that guardians can be given by testament no less to posthumous than to already-born, provided they are in such a condition that, if they are born while we are living, they become in our power. For we can even institute these as heirs, whereas it is not permitted to institute outsiders as posthumous heirs.

148. Uxori, quae in manu est, proinde ac filiae, item nurui, quae in filii manu est, proinde ac nepti tutor dari potest. 149. Rectissime autem tutor sic dari potest: LUCIUM TITIUM LIBERIS MEIS TUTOREM DO vel UXORI MEAE TUTOREM DO. Sed et si ita scriptum sit: LIBERIS MEIS vel UXORI MEAE TITIUS TUTOR ESTO, recte datus intellegitur. 150. In persona tamen uxoris, quae in manu est, recepta est etiam tutoris optio, id est ut liceat ei permittere, quem velit ipsa, tutorem sibi optare, hoc modo: TITIAE UXORI MEAE TUTORIS OPTIONEM DO. Quo casu licet uxori tutorem optare vel in omnes res vel in unam forte aut duas.

148. To a wife who is in manus, just as to a daughter, likewise to a daughter-in-law who is in the son’s manus, just as to a granddaughter, a guardian can be given. 149. Most correctly, moreover, a guardian can be given thus: LUCIUS TITIUS I GIVE AS GUARDIAN TO MY CHILDREN or I GIVE AS GUARDIAN TO MY WIFE. But even if it is written thus: TO MY CHILDREN or TO MY WIFE LET TITIUS BE GUARDIAN, he is understood to have been rightly given. 150. In the case, however, of a wife who is in manus, the option of a guardian has also been received, that is, that it be permitted to her to choose for herself, whom she herself wishes, as guardian, in this manner: TO MY WIFE TITIA I GIVE THE OPTION OF A GUARDIAN. In which case it is permitted to the wife to choose a guardian either for all matters or perhaps for one or two.

151. Ceterum aut plena optio datur aut angusta. 152. Plena ita dari solet, ut proxime supra diximus. Angusta ita dari solet: TITIAE UXORI MEAE TUTORIS OPTIONEM DUMTAXAT SEMEL DO aut DUMTAXAT BIS DO. 153. Quae optiones plurimum inter se differunt: Nam quae plenam optionem habet, potest semel et bis et ter et saepius tutorem optare; quae vero angustam habet optionem, si dumtaxat semel data est optio, amplius quam semel optare non potest, si tantum bis, amplius quam bis optandi facultatem non habet.

151. Moreover, either a full option is given or a narrow one. 152. A full one is wont to be given as we said just above. A narrow one is wont to be given thus: TO TITIA MY WIFE I GIVE THE OPTION OF A TUTOR ONLY ONCE or I GIVE ONLY TWICE. 153. These options differ very greatly among themselves: for she who has a full option can choose a tutor once and twice and thrice and more often; but she who has a narrow option—if the option has been given only once—cannot choose more than once; if only twice, she does not have the faculty of choosing more than twice.

154. Vocantur autem hi, qui nominatim testamento tutores dantur, dativi, qui ex optione sumuntur, optivi. 155. Quibus testamento quidem tutor datus non sit, iis ex lege XII tabularum agnati sunt tutores, qui vocantur legitimi. 156. Sunt autem agnati per virilis sexus personas cognatione iuncti, quasi a patre cognati, veluti frater eodem patre natus, fratris filius neposve ex eo, item patruus et patrui filius et nepos ex eo. At hi, qui per feminini sexus personas cognatione coniunguntur, non sunt agnati, sed alias naturali iure cognati.

154. They are called, moreover, those who are given as tutors by name
in a testament, “datives,” and those who are taken by option, “optives.” 155. For those to whom indeed a tutor has not been given by testament, to them, by the law of the 12 Tables
the agnates are tutors, who are called “legitimate.” 156. Now agnates are
joined in kinship through persons of the male sex, as if kinsmen from the father, such as
a brother born of the same father, a brother’s son or a grandson from him, likewise a paternal uncle and
the paternal uncle’s son and a grandson from him. But those who are connected in kinship through persons of the female sex
are not agnates, but otherwise cognates by natural law.

Itaque inter avunculum et sororis filium non agnatio est, sed cognatio. Item amitae, materterae filius non est mihi agnatus, sed cognatus, et invicem scilicet ego illi eodem iure coniungor, quia qui nascuntur, patris, non matris familiam secuntur. 157. Sed olim quidem, quantum ad legem XII tabularum attinet, etiam feminae agnatos habebant tutores.

Accordingly, between a maternal uncle and a sister’s son there is not agnation, but cognation. Likewise, the son of a paternal aunt or a maternal aunt is not my agnate, but a cognate, and in turn, of course, I am joined to him by the same right, because those who are born follow the family of the father, not of the mother. 157. But formerly indeed, so far as concerns the law of the 12 Tables, even women had agnates as guardians.

Sed postea lex Claudia lata est, quae, quod ad feminas attinet, agnatorum tutelas sustulit: Itaque masculus quidem inpubes fratrem puberem aut patruum habet tutorem; femina vero talem habere tutorem non potest. 158. Sed adgnationis quidem ius kapitis diminutione perimitur, cognationis vero ius eo modo non commutatur, quia civilis ratio civilia quidem iura corrumpere potest, naturalia vero non potest. 159. Est autem kapitis diminutio prioris status permutatio: Eaque tribus modis accidit: Nam aut maxima est kapitis diminutio aut minor, quam quidam mediam vocant, aut minima.

But afterward the Lex Claudia was passed, which, so far as concerns women, abolished the guardianships of agnates: Therefore a male under puberty has as guardian an adult brother or a paternal uncle; but a female cannot have such a guardian. 158. But the right of agnation is extinguished by capitis diminutio, whereas the right of cognation is not altered in that way, because the civil scheme can indeed corrupt civil rights, but it cannot [corrupt] natural [rights]. 159. Now capitis diminutio is a change of prior status: and it happens in three ways: for either there is a greatest capitis diminutio, or a lesser, which some call the middle, or a least.

160. Maxima est kapitis diminutio, cum aliquis simul et civitatem et libertatem amittit; quae accidit incensis, qui ex forma censuali venire iubentur: Quod ius *, qui contra eam legem in urbe Roma domicilium habuerint; item feminae, quae ex senatus consulto Claudiano ancillae fiunt eorum dominorum, quibus invitis et denuntiantibus cum servis eorum coierint. 161. Minor sive media est kapitis diminutio, cum civitas amittitur, libertas retinetur; quod accidit ei, cui aqua et igni interdictum fuerit. 162. Minima est capitis diminutio, cum et civitas et libertas retinetur, sed status hominis conmutatur; quod accidit in his, qui adoptantur, item in his, quae coemptionem faciunt, et in his, qui mancipio dantur quique ex mancipatione manumittuntur; adeo quidem, ut quotiens quisque mancipetur aut manumittatur, totiens capite diminuatur.

160. The greatest capitis diminution is when someone at once loses both citizenship and liberty; which befalls the unregistered, who are ordered to be sold according to the censual form: which right applies to those who shall have had a domicile in the city of Rome contrary to that law; likewise to women who, by the senatus consultum of Claudius, become slave-girls of those masters with whose slaves they have had intercourse, the masters being unwilling and having given warning. 161. The lesser or middle capitis diminution is when citizenship is lost, liberty retained; which befalls him to whom water and fire have been interdicted. 162. The least capitis diminution is when both citizenship and liberty are retained, but the person’s status is changed; which happens in the case of those who are adopted, likewise in the case of those who perform coemption, and in the case of those who are given by mancipation and who are manumitted from mancipation; indeed, to such a degree that as often as anyone is mancipated or manumitted, so often is he diminished in capite.

163. Nec solum maioribus capitis diminutionibus ius adgnationis corrumpitur, sed etiam minima; et ideo si ex duobus liberis alterum pater emancipaverit, post obitum eius neuter alteri agnationis iure tutor esse poterit. 164. Cum autem ad agnatos tutela pertineat, non simul ad omnes pertinet, sed ad eos tantum, qui proximo gradu sunt. *

163. Not only by greater diminutions of status is the right of agnation corrupted, but also by the least; and therefore, if out of two children the father has emancipated one, after his death neither will be able to be guardian to the other by the right of agnation. 164. But when guardianship pertains to the agnates, it does not pertain to all at once, but only to those who are in the nearest degree. *

165. Ex eadem lege XII tabularum libertarum et inpuberum libertorum tutela ad patronos liberosque eorum pertinet; quae et ipsa tutela legitima vocatur, non quia nominatim ea lege de hac tutela cavetur, sed quia proinde accepta est per interpretationem, atque si verbis legis introducta esset: Eo enim ipso, quod hereditates libertorum libertarumque, si intestati decessissent, iusserat lex ad patronos liberosve eorum pertinere, crediderunt veteres voluisse legem etiam tutelas ad eos pertinere, quia et agnatos, quos ad hereditatem vocavit, eosdem et tutores esse iusserat.

165. By the same Law of the 12 Tables the guardianship of freedwomen and of underage freedmen pertains to the patrons and their children; and this guardianship too is called legitimate, not because that law expressly provides by name about this guardianship, but because it has been accepted thus by interpretation, as if it had been introduced by the words of the law: For from the very fact that the law had ordered the inheritances of freedmen and freedwomen, if they had died intestate, to belong to their patrons or their children, the ancients believed that the law also willed the tutelages to pertain to them, because it had likewise ordered that the agnates, whom it called to the inheritance, be the same persons as guardians.

[De fiduciaria tutela.] 166. Exemplo patronorum recepta est et alia tutela, quae et ipsa legitima vocatur. Nam si quis filium nepotemve aut pronepotem inpuberes, vel filiam neptemve aut proneptem tam puberes quam inpuberes alteri ea lege mancipio dederit, ut sibi remanciparentur, remancipatosque manumiserit, legitimus eorum tutor erit. 166a.

[On fiduciary tutelage.] 166. By the precedent of patrons another tutelage has been accepted, which likewise is called legitimate. For if anyone should give by mancipation to another his son or grandson or great‑grandson, being impuberal, or his daughter or granddaughter or great‑granddaughter, both puberal and impuberal, under the stipulation that they be remancipated to himself, and, when remancipated, should manumit them, he will be their legitimate tutor (guardian). 166a.

Sunt et aliae tutelae, quae fiduciariae vocantur, id est quae ideo nobis competunt, quia liberum caput mancipatum nobis vel a parente vel a coemptionatore manumiserimus. 167. Sed Latinarum et Latinorum impuberum tutela non omni modo ad manumissores libertinorum pertinet, sed ad eos, quorum ante manumissionem ex iure Quiritium fuerunt: Unde si ancilla ex iure Quiritium tua sit, in bonis mea, a me quidem solo, non etiam a te manumissa Latina fieri potest, et bona eius ad me pertinent, sed eius tutela tibi competit; nam ita lege Iunia cavetur. Itaque si ab eo, cuius et in bonis et ex iure Quiritium ancilla fuerit, facta sit Latina, ad eundem et bona et tutela pertinent.

There are also other guardianships, which are called fiduciary, that is, which on that account belong to us because we have manumitted a free person who had been mancipated to us either by a parent or by a coemptionator. 167. But the guardianship of Latinas and of Latin males under puberty does not in every way pertain to the manumitters of freedmen, but to those to whom, before manumission, they had belonged by Quiritary right: Whence, if a female slave be yours by Quiritary right, but be in my goods, she can be made a Latina by my manumission alone, not also by yours, and her goods pertain to me, but her guardianship falls to you; for thus it is provided by the Lex Junia. And so, if by him to whom the slave had been both in his goods and by Quiritary right she has been made a Latina, to that same person both the goods and the guardianship pertain.

168. Agnatis et patronis et liberorum capitum manumissoribus permissum est feminarum tutelam alii in iure cedere; pupillorum autem tutelam non est permissum cedere, quia non videtur onerosa, cum tempore pubertatis finiatur. 169. Is autem, cui ceditur tutela, cessicius tutor vocatur. 170. Quo mortuo aut kapite diminuto revertitur ad eum tutorem tutela, qui cessit; ipse quoque, qui cessit, si mortuus aut kapite diminutus sit, a cessicio tutela discedit et revertitur ad eum, qui post eum, qui cesserat, secundum gradum in ea tutela habuerit.

168. It has been permitted to agnates and patrons and to the manumitters of free persons to cede in iure to another the guardianship of women; but it is not permitted to cede the guardianship of pupils, because it is not considered onerous, since it is ended at the time of puberty. 169. And the one to whom the guardianship is ceded is called a cessicius tutor. 170. Upon his death or capitis deminutio, the guardianship reverts to the tutor who ceded; likewise the one who ceded, if he is dead or has suffered capitis deminutio, the guardianship departs from the cessicius and reverts to him who, after the one who had ceded, held the second rank in that guardianship.

171. Sed quantum ad agnatos pertinet, nihil hoc tempore de cessicia tutela quaeritur, cum agnatorum tutelae in feminis lege Claudia sublatae sint. 172. Sed fiduciarios quoque quidam putaverunt cedendae tutelae ius non habere, cum ipsi se oneri subiecerint. Quod etsi placeat, in parente tamen, qui filiam neptemve aut proneptem alteri ea lege mancipio dedit, ut sibi remanciparetur, remanicipatamque manumisit, idem dici non debet, cum is et legitimus tutor habeatur et non minus huic quam patronis honor praestandus sit.

171. But so far as concerns the agnates, at this time nothing is inquired about cessionary tutela, since the tutela of agnates over women has been abolished by the Lex Claudia. 172. But some have thought that fiduciary tutors do not have the right of ceding the tutela, since they themselves subjected themselves to the burden. And even if this is acceptable, nevertheless in the case of a parent who mancipated his daughter, granddaughter, or great-granddaughter to another on this condition, that she be remancipated to him, and, once remancipated, manumitted her, the same ought not to be said, since he is also regarded as a legitimate tutor, and honor is to be rendered to him no less than to patrons.

173. Praeterea senatus consulto mulieribus permissum est in absentis tutoris locum alium petere, quo petito prior desinit; nec interest, quam longe absit is tutor. 174. Sed excipitur, ne in absentis patroni locum liceat libertae tutorem petere. 175. Patroni autem loco habemus etiam parentem, qui ex eo, quod ipso sibi remancipatam filiam neptemve aut proneptem manumisit, legitimam tutelam nanctus est.

173. Moreover, by decree of the senate it was permitted to women to seek another in the place of an absent guardian, and once this has been sought, the prior ceases; nor does it matter how far away that guardian is. 174. But an exception is made, that it is not permitted for a freedwoman to seek a guardian in the place of an absent patron. 175. And in the place of a patron we also hold the parent, who, from the fact that he himself manumitted to himself a daughter or granddaughter or great-granddaughter remancipated to him, has obtained legitimate tutelage.

Sed huius quidem liberi fiduciarii tutoris loco numerantur; patroni autem liberi eandem tutelam adipiscuntur, quam et pater eorum habuit. 176. Sed aliquando etiam in patroni absentis locum permittitur tutorem petere, veluti ad hereditatem adeundam. 177. Idem senatus censuit et in persona pupilli patroni filii.

But indeed the children of this man are counted in the place of a fiduciary guardian; but the children of a patron acquire the same tutela (guardianship) which their father also had. 176. But sometimes it is also permitted to petition for a guardian in place of an absent patron, for instance for entering upon an inheritance. 177. The same the senate decreed also in the case of a ward, the son of a patron.

178. Nam et lege Iulia de maritandis ordinibus ei, quae in legitima tutela pupilli sit, permittitur dotis constituendae gratia a praetore urbano tutorem petere. 179. Sane patroni filius, etiamsi inpubes sit, tamen libertae efficietur tutor, quamquam in nulla re auctor fieri potest, cum ipsi nihil permissum sit sine tutoris auctoritate agere. 180. Item si qua in tutela legitima furiosi aut muti sit, permittitur ei senatus consulto dotis constituendae gratia tutorem petere.

178. For also by the Julian law on marrying the orders, to her who is in the legitimate tutelage of a pupil (pupillus), it is permitted, for the sake of constituting a dowry, to seek a tutor from the urban praetor. 179. Indeed the patron’s son, even if underage (impubes), nevertheless will be made the freedwoman’s tutor, although he can in no matter become an auctor, since nothing is permitted to him to do without a tutor’s authority. 180. Likewise, if any woman is in the legitimate tutelage of a madman or a mute, it is permitted to her by a senatorial decree, for the sake of constituting a dowry, to seek a tutor.

181. Quibus casibus salvam manere tutelam patrono patronique filio manifestum est. 182. Praeterea senatus censuit, ut si tutor pupilli pupillaeve suspectus a tutela remotus sit sive ex iusta causa fuerit excusatus, in locum eius alius tutor detur, quo facto prior tutor amittit tutelam. 183. Haec omnia similiter et Romae et in provinciis observantur, scilicet ut in provinciis a praeside provinciae tutor peti debeat.

181. In which cases it is manifest that the tutelage remains safe for the patron and the patron’s son. 182. Moreover, the senate decreed that, if the tutor of a boy or girl pupil has been removed from the tutelage as suspect, or has been excused for a just cause, another tutor shall be given in his place; whereupon the prior tutor loses the tutelage. 183. All these things are observed similarly both at Rome and in the provinces, namely that in the provinces a tutor ought to be sought from the governor of the province.

184. Olim cum legis actiones in usu erant, etiam ex illa causa tutor dabatur, si inter tutorem et mulierem pupillumve lege agendum erat: Nam quia ipse tutor in re sua auctor esse non poterat, alius dabatur, quo auctore legis actio perageretur: Qui dicebatur praetorius tutor, quia a praetore urbano dabatur. Sed post sublatas legis actiones quidam putant hanc speciem dandi tutoris in usu esse desisse; aliis autem placet adhuc in usu esse, si legitimo iudicio agatur.

184. Formerly, when the legis actiones were in use, a tutor was also given for that reason, if there had to be litigation at law between the tutor and a woman or a pupillus: For because the tutor himself could not be auctor in his own matter, another was given, by whose authorization the legis actio might be carried through: He was called the praetorian tutor, because he was given by the urban praetor. But after the legis actiones were abolished, some think that this kind of giving a tutor has fallen out of use; others, however, hold it still to be in use, if the case is brought by a legitimate iudicium.

185. Si cui nullus omnino tutor sit, ei datur in urbe Roma ex lege Atilia a praetore urbano et maiore parte tribunorum plebis, qui Atilianus tutor vocatur; in provinciis vero a praesidibus provinciarum ex lege Iulia et Titia. 186. Et ideo si cui testamento tutor sub condicione aut ex die certo datus sit, quamdiu condicio aut dies pendet, tutor dari potest; item si pure datus fuerit, quamdiu nemo heres existat, tamdiu ex his legibus tutor petendus est; qui desinit tutor esse, posteaquam aliquis ex testamento tutor esse coeperit. 187. Ab hostibus quoque tutore capto ex his legibus tutor peti debet; qui desinit tutor esse, si is, qui captus est, in civitatem reversus fuerit: Nam reversus recipit tutelam iure postliminii.

185. If anyone has no tutor at all, one is given to him in the City of Rome by the Atilian law by the urban praetor and the greater part of the tribunes of the plebs, who is called the Atilian tutor; but in the provinces by the presidents of the provinces under the Julian and Titian law. 186. And therefore, if to someone by testament a tutor has been given under a condition or from a fixed day, so long as the condition or the day is pending, a tutor can be given; likewise, if he has been given purely (unconditionally), so long as no heir exists, for just so long a tutor must be sought under these laws; who ceases to be tutor after someone from the testament has begun to be tutor. 187. Also, with the tutor captured by the enemies, a tutor must be sought under these laws; who ceases to be tutor if he who was captured shall have returned into the state: For, upon returning, he resumes the tutelage by the right of postliminium.

188. Ex his apparet, quot sint species tutelarum. Si vero quaeramus, in quot genera hae species diducantur, longa erit disputatio: Nam de ea re valde veteres dubitaverunt. Nosque diligentius hunc tractatum exsecuti sumus et in edicti interpretatione et in his libris, quos ex Quinto Mucio fecimus: Hoc solum tantisper sufficit admonuisse, quod quidam quinque genera esse dixerunt, ut Quintus Mucius; alii tria, ut Servius Sulpicius; alii duo, ut Labeo; alii tot genera esse crediderunt, quot etiam species essent.

188. From these it appears how many species of guardianships there are. But if we inquire into how many genera these species are divided, the disputation will be long: for about that matter the ancients greatly doubted. And we have pursued this tractate more diligently both in the interpretation of the edict and in those books which we made from Quintus Mucius: for the present this alone suffices to have admonished, that certain men said there are five genera, as Quintus Mucius; others, three, as Servius Sulpicius; others, two, as Labeo; others believed that there are as many genera as there were species.

189. Sed inpuberes quidem in tutela esse omnium civitatium iure contingit; quia id naturali rationi conueniens est, ut is, qui perfectae aetatis non sit, alterius tutela regatur, nec fere ulla civitas est, in qua non licet parentibus liberis suis inpuberibus testamento tutorem dare; quamvis, ut supra diximus, soli cives Romani videantur tantum liberos suos in potestate habere. 190. Feminas vero perfectae aetatis in tutela esse fere nulla pretiosa ratio suasisse videtur: Nam quae vulgo creditur, quin levitate animi plerumque decipiuntur et aequum erat eas tutorum auctoritate regi, magis speciosa videtur quam vera; mulieres enim, quae perfectae aetatis sunt, ipsae sibi negotia tractant, et in quibusdam causis dicis gratia tutor interponit auctoritatem suam; saepe etiam invitus auctor fieri a praetore cogitur. 191. Unde cum tutore nullum ex tutela iudicium mulieri datur: At ubi pupillorum pupillarumve negotia tutores tractant, eis post pubertatem tutelae iudicio rationem reddunt.

189. But that the underage be in tutelage happens by the right of all civitates; because it is agreeable to natural reason that he who is not of perfected age be governed by another’s tutelage, nor is there almost any civitas in which it is not permitted to parents by testament to give a tutor to their underage children; although, as we said above, Roman citizens alone seem to have their children in potestas. 190. As for women of perfected age, that they be in tutelage, scarcely any weighty reason seems to have persuaded: for what is commonly believed—that by lightness of mind they are for the most part deceived, and that it was equitable that they be ruled by the authority of tutors—seems more specious than true; for women who are of perfected age conduct their own negocios, and in certain causes, for the sake of form, the tutor interposes his authority; often even unwilling, he is compelled by the praetor to become an authorizer. 191. Whence, with a tutor, no action from tutelage is given to a woman; but where tutors handle the negocios of boys or girls, they render an account to them after puberty by the action of tutelage.

192. Sane patronorum et parentum legitimae tutelae vim aliquam habere intelleguntur eo, quod hi neque ad testamentum faciendum neque ad res mancipi alienandas neque ad obligationes suscipiendas auctores fieri coguntur, praeterquam si magna causa alienandarum rerum mancipi obligationisque suscipiendae interveniat. Eaque omnia ipsorum causa constituta sunt, ut quia ad eos intestatarum mortuarum hereditates pertinent, neque per testamentum excludantur ab hereditate, neque alienatis pretiosioribus rebus susceptoque aere alieno minus locuples ad eos hereditas perveniat. 193. Apud peregrinos non similiter, ut apud nos, in tutela sunt feminae; sed tamen plerumque quasi in tutela sunt: Ut ecce lex Bithynorum, si quid mulier contrahat, maritum auctorem esse iubet aut filium eius puberem.

192. Surely the legitimate tutelages of patrons and parents are understood to have some force in this, that these are not compelled to become authorizing parties either for making a testament, or for alienating res mancipi, or for undertaking obligations, except if a weighty cause for the alienation of res mancipi and the undertaking of an obligation should intervene. And all these things have been established for their sake, since the inheritances of women dying intestate pertain to them, so that they may neither be excluded from the inheritance by testament, nor, the more valuable things having been alienated and debt assumed, may the inheritance come to them less well-endowed. 193. Among foreigners women are not in tutela in the same way as among us; yet for the most part they are as if in tutela: For example, behold the law of the Bithynians, which orders that, if a woman enters into any contract, the husband be the authorizing party, or her son who is of puberty.

194. Tutela autem liberantur ingenuae quidem trium liberorum iure, libertinae vero quattuor, si in patroni liberorumve eius legitima tutela sint; nam et ceterae, quae alterius generis tutores habent, velut Atilianos aut fiduciarios, trium liberorum iure tutela liberantur. 195. Potest autem pluribus modis libertina tutorem alterius generis habere, veluti si a femina manumissa sit; tunc enim e lege Atilia petere debet tutorem, vel in provincia e lege Iulia et Titia: Nam in patronae tutela esse non potest. 195a.

194. Freeborn women, indeed, are released from tutela by the right of three children, but freedwomen by that of four, if they are in the legitimate tutela of a patron or his children; for the others too, who have tutors of another kind, such as Atilian or fiduciary tutors, are released from tutela by the right of three children. 195. Moreover, a freedwoman can have a tutor of another kind in several ways, as if she has been manumitted by a woman; for then by the Lex Atilia she ought to petition for a tutor, or in a province by the Lex Julia and Titia: For she cannot be in the tutela of a patroness. 195a.

Item si sit a masculo manumissa et auctore eo coemptionem fecerit, deinde remancipata et manumissa sit, patronum quidem habere tutorem desinit, incipit autem habere eum tutorem, a quo manumissa est, qui fiduciarius dicitur. 195b. Item si patronus eiusve filius in adoptionem se dedit, debet liberta lege Atilia vel Iulia et Titia tutorem petere.

Likewise, if she has been manumitted by a male and, with him as auctor, has made a coemption, then, having been re‑mancipated and manumitted, she ceases to have her patron as tutor, but begins to have as tutor the one by whom she was manumitted, who is called a fiduciary. 195b. Likewise, if her patron or his son has given himself into adoption, the freedwoman ought, by the lex Atilia or by the lex Iulia and Titia, to seek a tutor.

195c. Similiter ex iisdem legibus petere debet tutorem liberta, si patronus decesserit nec ullum virilis sexus liberorum in familia reliquerit. 196. Masculi autem cum puberes esse coeperint, tutela liberantur: Puberem autem Sabinus quidem et Cassius ceterique nostri praeceptores eum esse putant, qui habitu corporis pubertatem ostendit, id est eum, qui generare potest; sed in his, qui pubescere non possunt, quales sunt spadones, eam aetatem esse spectandam, cuius aetatis puberes fiunt; sed diversae scholae auctores annis putant pubertatem aestimandam, id est eum puberem esse existimant, qui XIIII annos explevit.

195c. Likewise, under these same laws the freedwoman ought to seek a tutor, if the patron has died and has left in the household no offspring of the male sex. 196. Males, moreover, when they begin to be puberes (i.e., when they reach puberty), are freed from tutelage: as to who is puber, Sabinus and Cassius and the rest of our instructors think him to be one who by the habit of the body shows puberty, that is, one who can generate; but in those who cannot become pubescent, such as eunuchs, that age is to be considered at which people become puberes; but the authorities of the opposite school think that puberty is to be assessed by years—that is, they deem him puber who has completed 14 years.

* 197. * aetatem pervenerit, in qua res suas tueri possit, sicuti apud peregrinas gentes custodiri superius indicavimus. 198. Ex iisdem causis et in provinciis a praesidibus earum curatores dari volunt. 199. Ne tamen et pupillorum et eorum, qui in curatione sunt, negotia a tutoribus curatoribusque consumantur aut deminuantur, curat praetor, ut et tutores et curatores eo nomine satisdent.

* 197. * has reached the age at which he can guard his own affairs, just as we indicated above is observed among foreign nations. 198. For the same reasons they also wish curators to be given in the provinces by their governors. 199. Nevertheless, lest the business of both wards and those who are under curatorship be consumed or diminished by tutors and curators, the praetor takes care that both tutors and curators give surety on that account.

200. Sed hoc non est perpetuum; nam et tutores testamento dati satisdare non coguntur, quia fides eorum et diligentia ab ipso testatore probata est; et curatores, ad quos non e lege curatio pertinet, sed qui vel a consule vel a praetore vel a praeside provinciae dantur, plerumque non coguntur satisdare, scilicet quia satis honesti electi sunt.

200. But this is not perpetual; for both tutors given by testament are not compelled to give surety, because their good faith and diligence have been approved by the testator himself; and curators, to whom the curatorship does not pertain by law, but who are appointed either by a consul or by a praetor or by the governor of a province, for the most part are not compelled to give surety, namely because they have been chosen sufficiently honorable.