Seneca: EPISTULAE MORALES AD LUCILIUM

[1] Omnis dies, omnis hora quam nihil simus ostendit et aliquo argumento recenti admonet fragilitatis oblitos; tum aeterna meditatos respicere cogit ad mortem. Quid sibi istud principium velit quaeris? Senecionem Cornelium, equitem Romanum splendidum et officiosum, noveras: ex tenui principio seipse promoverat et iam illi declivis erat cursus ad cetera; facilius enim crescit dignitas quam incipit.

[1] Every day, every hour shows how nothing we are and, by some fresh proof, reminds those who had forgotten their fragility; then it compels those who have meditated on eternal things to look back toward death. You ask what this exordium means? You knew Cornelius Senecio, a splendid and dutiful Roman knight: from a slight beginning he had advanced himself, and now his course was downhill toward the rest; for dignity (rank) grows more easily than it begins.

[2] Pecunia quoque circa paupertatem plurimum morae habet; dum ex illa erepat haeret. Iam Senecio divitis inminebat, ad quas illum duae res ducebant efficacissimae, et quaerendi et custodiendi scientia, quarum vel altera locupletem facere potuisset.

[2] Money too has very great delay about poverty; while one is crawling out of it, he clings fast. Already Senecio was on the verge of wealth, to which two most efficacious things were leading him, the science of acquiring and of keeping, either one of which could have made him opulent.

[3] Hic homo summae frugalitatis, non minus patrimonii quam corporis diligens, cum me ex consuetudine mane vidisset, cum per totum diem amico graviter adfecto et sine spe iacentiusque in noctem adsedisset, cum hilaris cenasset, genere valetudinis praecipiti arreptus, angina, vix conpressum artatis faucibus spiritum traxit in lucem. Intra paucissimas ergo horas quam omnibus erat sani ac valentis officiis functus decessit.

[3] This man of the highest frugality, no less diligent of his patrimony than of his body, when in the morning he had seen me according to custom, when he had sat by throughout the whole day with a friend grievously affected and without hope, and, as he lay the more prostrate, into the night, when he had supped cheerful, seized by a precipitous kind of illness, angina, he scarcely drew a compressed breath, his throat narrowed, into the light. Within the very few hours, therefore, after which he had fulfilled all the duties of one sound and vigorous, he departed.

[4] Ille qui et mari et terra pecuniam agitabat, qui ad publica quoque nullum relinquens inexpertum genus quaestus accesserat, in ipso actu bene cedentium rerum, in ipso procurrentis pecuniae impeturaptus est.

[4] He who was turning over money both by sea and by land, who had also acceded to the public contracts, leaving no kind of gain untried, was snatched away in the very act of affairs going well, in the very impetus of money rushing forward.

Insere nunc, Meliboee, piros, pone [in] ordine vites.

Graft now, Meliboeus, pear trees, set [in] order the vines.

Quam stultum est aetatem disponere ne crastini quidem dominum! o quanta dementia est spes longas inchoantium: emam, aedificabo, credam, exigam, honores geram, tum deinde lassam et plenam senectutem in otium referam.

How foolish it is to dispose one’s lifetime, being not even master of tomorrow! O how great a madness it is in those commencing long hopes: I will buy, I will build, I will give credit, I will exact, I will bear honors; then, thereafter, I will consign a weary and replete old age to leisure.

[5] Omnia, mihi crede, etiam felicibus dubia sunt; nihil sibi quisquam de futuro debet promittere; id quoque quod tenetur per manus exit et ipsam quam premimus horam casus incidit. Volvitur tempus rata quidem lege, sed per obscurum: quid autem ad me an naturae certum sit quod mihi incertumest?

[5] Believe me, all things are doubtful even to the fortunate; no one ought to promise himself anything about the future; that, too, which is held slips through the hands, and chance strikes the very hour which we press. Time rolls on by a fixed law, but through darkness: what is it to me whether that which is uncertain to me is certain to Nature?

[6] Navigationes longas et pererratis litoribus alienis seros in patriam reditus proponimus, militiam et castrensium laborum tarda manipretia, procurationes officiorumque per officia processus, cum interim ad latus mors est, quae quoniam numquam cogitatur nisi aliena, subinde nobis ingeruntur mortalitatis exempla non diutius quam dum miramur haesura.

[6] We propose long voyages and, with alien shores traversed, late returns to the fatherland, military service and the tardy pay of camp labors, procurations and the progression of offices through offices, while meanwhile death is at our side, which, since it is never thought of except as another’s, has examples of mortality repeatedly thrust upon us, destined to cling no longer than while we marvel.

[7] Quid autem stultius quam mirari id ullo die factum quod omni potest fieri? Stat quidem terminusnobis ubi illum inexorabilis fatorum necessitas fixit, sed nemo scit nostrumquam prope versetur a termino; sic itaque formemus animum tamquam ad extremaventum sit. Nihil differamus; cotidie cum vita paria faciamus.

[7] What, moreover, is more foolish than to marvel that on any day there has happened that which can happen on every day? A limit indeed stands for us where the inexorable necessity of the fates has fixed it, but none of us knows how near he is to the limit; thus, then, let us form our mind as if we had come to the last extremity. Let us defer nothing; every day let us settle our accounts with life.

[8] Maximum vitae vitium est quod inperfecta semper est, quod [in] aliquid ex illa differtur. Qui cotidie vitae suae summam manum inposuit non indiget tempore;ex hac autem indigentia timor nascitur et cupiditas futuri exedens animum. Nihil est miserius dubitatione venientium quorsus evadant; quantum sit illud quod restat aut quale sollicita mens inexplicabili formidine agitatur.

[8] The greatest vice of life is that it is always imperfect, that something from it is deferred [into] something else. He who has put the finishing hand to his life every day has no need of time;from this indigence, however, fear is born and a cupidity for the future that eats away the spirit. Nothing is more wretched than uncertainty about things coming, whither they will turn out; how great that is which remains, or of what sort, the anxious mind is agitated by an inexplicable dread.

[9] Quo modo effugiemus hanc volutationem? Uno: si vita nostra non prominebit, si in se colligitur; ille enim ex futuro suspenditur cui inritum est praesens. Ubi vero quidquid mihi debui redditum est, ubi stabilita mens scit nihil interesse inter diem et saeculum, quidquid deinceps dierum rerumque venturum est ex alto prospicit et cum multo risu seriem temporum cogitat.

[9] How shall we escape this rolling to-and-fro? By one: if our life will not project, if it is gathered into itself; for he hangs from the future to whom the present is null. But when whatever I owed to myself has been paid back, when a settled mind knows that there is no difference between a day and an age, it looks out from on high at whatever of days and things is going to come thereafter, and with much laughter contemplates the series of times.

Quid enim varietas mobilitasque casuum perturbabit, si certus sis adversus incerta?

For what will the variety and mobility of events perturb you, if you stand certain against the uncertain?

[10] Ideo propera, Lucili mi, vivere, et singulos dies singulas vitas puta. Qui hoc modo se aptavit, cui vita sua cotidie fuit tota, securus est: inspem viventibus proximum quodque tempus elabitur, subitque aviditas et miserrimus ac miserrima omnia efficiens metus mortis. Inde illud Maecenatis turpissimum votum quo et debilitatem non recusat et deformitatem et novissime acutam crucem, dummodo inter haec mala spiritus prorogetur:

[10] Therefore hurry, my Lucilius, to live, and reckon each single day a single life. He who has adapted himself in this way, for whom his life each day has been whole, is secure: for those living on hope each successive time slips away, and craving steals on, and the fear of death—the most wretched thing, and making all things most wretched. From this comes that most shameful vow of Maecenas, in which he does not refuse both debility and deformity and, lastly, the sharp cross, provided that amid these evils his breath be prolonged:

[11] debilem facito manu,
debilem pede coxo,
tuber adstrue gibberum,
lubricos quate dentes:
vita dum superest, benest;
hanc mihi, vel acuta
si sedeam cruce, sustine.

[11] make me debilitated in hand,
debilitated in foot, in hip;
heap on a swelling,
a hunchback; shake my slippery teeth:
so long as life remains, all is well;
this for me— even if I should sit
on a sharp cross— prolong.

[12] Quod miserrimum erat si incidisset optatur, et tamquam vita petitur supplici mora. Contemptissimum putarem si vivere vellet usque ad crucem:'tu vero' inquit 'me debilites licet, dum spiritus in corpore fracto et inutili maneat; depraves licet, dum monstroso et distorto temporis aliquid accedat; suffigas licet et acutam sessuro crucem subdas': est tanti vulnus suum premere et patibulo pendere districtum, dum differat id quod est in malis optimum, supplici finem? est tanti habere animam ut agam?

[12] That which would be most miserable if it had occurred is desired, and a postponement of punishment is sought as if it were life. I would think it most contemptible if he should wish to live even to the cross: “but you,” he says, “may cripple me, provided that breath remains in a body broken and useless; you may deform me, provided that something of time is added to a monstrous and twisted frame; you may fasten me to a stake and set beneath me a sharp cross to sit upon.” Is it worth so much to press one’s own wound and hang, drawn tight, on the gibbet, while he puts off that which is best among evils, the end of punishment? Is it worth so much to have a soul, just so that I may go on living?

[13] Quid huic optes nisi deos faciles? quid sibi vult ista carminis effeminati turpitudo? quid timoris dementissimi pactio?

[13] What would you wish for this man except propitious gods? what does that turpitude of effeminate song mean? what is the pact of the most demented fear?

quid tam foeda vitae mendicatio? Huic putes umquam recitasse Vergilium:

what so foul a mendicancy for life? Would you suppose that one has ever recited Vergil to this man:

usque adeone mori miserum est?

Is dying really so miserable?

Optat ultima malorum et quae pati gravissimum est extendi ac sustineri cupit: qua mercede? scilicet vitae longioris. Quod autem vivere est diu mori?

He desires the ultimate of evils, and he longs for that which it is most grievous to suffer—to be prolonged and sustained: for what recompense? namely, a longer life. But what is living if not to die for a long time?

[14] Invenitur aliquis qui velit inter supplicia tabescere et perire membratim et totiens per stilicidia emittere animam quam semel exhalare? Invenitur qui velit adactus ad illud infelix lignum, iam debilis, iam pravuset in foedum scapularum ac pectoris tuber elisus, cui multae moriendi causae etiam citra crucem fuerant, trahere animam tot tormenta tracturam? Nega nunc magnum beneficium esse naturae quod necesse est mori.

[14] Is there found anyone who would wish to waste away amid tortures and to perish limb by limb, and to send out his spirit by driplets so many times, rather than to exhale it once? Is there found one who would wish, driven to that ill-fated wood, already debilitated, already warped, and knocked into a foul lump of the shoulders and chest—who had had many causes for dying even without the cross—to drag out his spirit, destined to drag along so many torments? Deny now that it is a great benefaction of nature that it is necessary to die.

[15] Multi peiora adhuc pacisci parati sunt: etiam amicum prodere, ut diutius vivant, et liberos ad stuprum manu sua tradere, ut contingat lucem videre tot consciam scelerum. Excutienda vitae cupido est discendumque nihil interesse quando patiaris quod quandoque patiendum est; quam bene vivas referre, non quamdiu; saepe autem in hoc esse bene, ne diu. Vale.

[15] Many are prepared to bargain for worse things yet: even to betray a friend, that they may live longer, and to hand over their children to stupration with their own hand, that it may befall them to see the light, so much a witness of so many crimes. The desire for life must be shaken off, and it must be learned that it makes no difference when you suffer that which must at some time be suffered; that it matters how well you live, not how long; and often the “well” lies in this, that it be not for long. Farewell.

CII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

102. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Quomodo molestus est iucundum somnium videnti qui excitat (aufertenim voluptatem etiam si falsam, effectum tamen verae habentem) sic epistulatua mihi fecit iniuriam; revocavit enim me cogitationi aptae traditum etiturum, si licuisset, ulterius.

[1] Just as he who rouses one seeing a pleasant dream is troublesome (for he carries off a pleasure, even if false, yet having the effect of a true one), so your letter did me an injury; for it called me back, I having been handed over to an apt cogitation and about to go, if it had been permitted, further.

[2] Iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere; praebebam enim me facilem opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium. Dabam me spei tantae, iam eram fastidio mihi, iam reliquias aetatis infractae contemnebamin immensum illud tempus et in possessionem omnis aevi transiturus, cumsubito experrectus sum epistula tua accepta et tam bellum somnium perdidi. Quod repetam, si te dimisero, et redimam.

[2] It was a pleasure to inquire about the eternity of souls—nay, by Hercules, to believe; for I was presenting myself amenable to the opinions of great men, who were promising a most-gratifying thing rather than proving it. I was giving myself over to so great a hope; already I was a disgust to myself; already I was despising the remnants of an unbroken age in comparison with that boundless time, and was about to pass into the possession of all time, when suddenly I was awakened upon receiving your letter and I lost so pretty a dream. I will seek it again, if I dismiss you, and I will buy it back.

[3] Negas me epistula prima totam quaestionem explicuisse in qua probare conabar id quod nostris placet, claritatem quae post mortem contingit bonum esse. Id enim me non solvisse quod opponitur nobis: 'nullum' inquiunt 'bonum ex distantibus; hoc autem ex distantibus constat'.

[3] You deny that in the first letter I explicated the whole question, in which I was trying to prove what pleases our side, that the renown which befalls after death is a good. For you say that I did not resolve what is opposed to us: 'no,' they say, 'good [arises] from things that are distant; but this, however, consists of things that are distant'.

[4] Quod interrogas, mi Lucili, eiusdem quaestionis est loci alterius, et ideo non id tantum sed alia quoque eodem pertinentia distuleram; quaedam enim, ut scis, moralibus rationalia inmixta sunt. Itaque illam partem rectam et ad mores pertinentem tractavi, numquid stultum sit ac supervacuum ultra extremum diem curastrans mittere, an cadant bona nostra nobiscum nihilque sit eius qui nullusest, an ex eo quod, cum erit, sensuri non sumus, antequam sit aliquis fructus percipi aut peti possit.

[4] What you ask, my Lucilius, belongs to another locus of the same question, and therefore I had deferred not only that but also other things likewise pertaining to the same; for certain rational matters, as you know, are intermixed with moral ones. Accordingly I treated that right part pertaining to morals—whether it is at all foolish and superfluous to transmit cares beyond the last day, or whether our goods fall with us and there is nothing of him who does not exist, or whether from that thing which, when it will be, we shall not feel, any fruit can be perceived or sought before it exists.

[5] Haec omnia ad mores spectant; itaque suo locoposita sunt. At quae a dialecticis contra hanc opinionem dicuntur segreganda fuerunt et ideo seposita sunt. Nunc, quia omnia exigis, omnia quae dicunt persequar, deinde singulis occurram.

[5] All these things pertain to morals; therefore they have been placed in their proper place. But the things which are said by the dialecticians against this opinion had to be segregated and therefore have been set aside. Now, since you demand everything, I will pursue everything they say, and then I will answer each point.

[6] Nisi aliquid praedixero, intellegi non poterunt quae refellentur. Quid est quod praedicere velim? quaedam continua corpora esse, ut hominem; quaedam esse composita, ut navem, domum, omnia denique quorum diversae partes iunctura in unum coactae sunt; quaedam ex distantibus, quorum adhuc membra separata sunt, tamquam exercitus, populus, senatus.

[6] Unless I preface something, the points that will be refuted cannot be understood. What is it that I wish to preface? that certain bodies are continuous, as a human being; that certain are composite, as a ship, a house, in fine all those whose diverse parts have been driven together into one by a joining; that certain are from things set apart, whose members are still separate, such as an army, a people, a senate.

Illi enim perquos ista corpora efficiuntur iure aut officio cohaerent, natura diductiet singuli sunt. Quid est quod etiam nunc praedicere velim?

For those through whom those bodies are effected cohere by law or by office; by nature they are drawn apart and are individuals. What is it that I would even now wish to say beforehand?

[7] nullum bonum putamus esse quod ex distantibus constat; uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi debet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hoc si quando desideraverisper se probatur: interim ponendum fuit, quia in nostra tela mittuntur.

[7] we think that no good is that which is constituted out of things that are apart; for by one spirit a single good ought to be contained and governed, there being one principal of a single good. This, if ever you should desire it, is proved per se: meanwhile it had to be posited, because in our own missiles are being hurled.

[8] 'Dicitis' inquit 'nullum bonum ex distantibus esse; claritas aut emista bonorum virorum secunda opinio est. Nam quomodo fama non est unius sermo nec infamia unius mala existimatio, sic nec claritas uni bono placuisse;consentire in hoc plures insignes et spectabiles viri debent, ut claritassit. Haec autem ex iudiciis plurium efficitur, id est distantium; ergonon est bonum.

[8] 'You say,' he says, 'that no good is from things distant; renown is, rather, the favorable opinion of good men. For just as fame is not the utterance of one person nor ill‑fame the bad estimation of one person, so neither is renown to have pleased one good man;more notable and spectable men ought to agree in this, so that renownmay be. But this is brought about from the judgments of many, that is, of those who are distant; thereforeit is not a good.'

[9] 'Claritas' inquit 'laus est a bonis bono reddita; laus oratio, vox est aliquid significans; vox est autem, licet virorum sit bonum. Nec enim quidquid vir bonus facit bonum est; nam et plauditet sibilat, sed nec plausum quisquam nec sibilum, licet omnia eius admiretur et laudet, bonum dicit, non magis quam sternumentum aut tussim. Ergo claritas bonum non est.

[9] 'Renown,' he says, 'is praise rendered by good men to a good man; praise is an oration, a voice signifying something; but a voice, although it be of men , is not a good. For not everything which a good man does is a good; for he both applauds and hisses, but neither applause nor hissing, although one admires and praises all his things, does anyone call a good, any more than a sneeze or a cough. Therefore renown is not a good.'

[10] 'Ad summam dicite nobis utrum laudantis an laudati bonum sit: si laudati bonum esse dicitis, tam ridiculam rem facitis quam si adfirmetis meum esse quod alius bene valeat. Sed laudare dignos honesta actio est; ita laudantis bonum est cuius actio est, non nostrum qui laudamur: atqui hoc quaerebatur. '

[10] 'To sum up, tell us whether it is the good of the praiser or of the praised: if you say it is the good of the praised, you make a thing as ridiculous as if you were to affirm that another’s good health belongs to me. But to praise the worthy is an honorable action; thus it is the good of the one praising, whose action it is, not ours who are praised: and yet this was what was being asked. '

[11] Respondebo nunc singulis cursim. Primum an sit aliquod ex distantibus bonum etiamnunc quaeritur et pars utraque sententias habet. Deinde claritas desiderat multa suffragia?

[11] I will now respond to the individual points cursorily. First, whether there is any good among the externals is even now under inquiry, and each party has its opinions. Then, does renown desire many suffrages?

potest et unius boni viri iudicio esse contenta: nos bonus bonos iudicat.

It can also be content with the judgment of a single good man: a good man judges us to be good.

[12] 'Quid ergo? ' inquit 'et fama erit unius hominis existimatio et infamia unius malignus sermo? Gloriam quoque' inquit 'latius fusam intellego; consensum enim multorum exigit.

[12] 'What then?' he says, 'will fame be the estimation of one man, and will infamy be the malicious talk of one man? Glory too,' he says, 'I understand as spread more widely; for it demands the consent of many.'

' Diversa horum condicio est et illius. Quare? quia si de me bene vir bonus sentit, eodem loco sum quo si omnes boni idem sentirent; omnes enim, si me cognoverint, idem sentient.

' The condition of these and of that is diverse. Why? Because if a good man feels well about me, I am in the same place as if all good men felt the same; for all, if they come to know me, will feel the same.

Par illis idemque iudicium est, aeque vero inficiscitur. Dissidere nonpossunt; ita pro eo est ac si omnes idem sentiant, quia aliud sentire non possunt.

With them the same and equal judgment prevails, and in very truth it is equally adjudged. They cannot dissent; thus it is as if all felt the same, because they cannot think otherwise.

[13] Ad gloriam aut famam non est satis unius opinio. Illic idem potest una sententia quod omnium, quia omnium, si perrogetur, una erit:hic diversa dissimilium iudicia sunt. Difficiles adsensus, dubia omnia invenies, levia, suspecta.

[13] For glory or fame the opinion of one is not enough. There a single judgment can do the same as that of all, because the judgment of all, if thorough inquiry be made, will be one:here the judgments of the dissimilar are diverse. Assents are difficult; you will find everything doubtful, slight, suspect.

Putas tu posse unam omnium esse sententiam? non est unius una sententia. Illic placet verum, veritatis una vis, una facies est: apud hos falsa sunt quibus adsentiuntur.

Do you think a single opinion of all can exist? Not even of one is there one single opinion. There, the true is pleasing; truth has one force, one face: among these, the things to which they assent are false.

Numquam autem falsis constantia est; variantur et dissident.

But false things never have constancy; they vary and dissent.

[14] 'Sed laus' inquit 'nihil aliud quam vox est, vox autem bonum non est. ' Cum dicunt claritatem esse laudem bonorum a bonis redditam, non advocem referunt sed ad sententiam. Licet enim vir bonus taceat sed aliquem iudicet dignum laude esse, laudatus est.

[14] 'But “praise,”' he says, 'is nothing else than voice, and voice, however, is not a good.' When they say that renown is the laud of the good rendered by the good, they refer it not to the voice but to the judgment. For even if a good man keeps silent yet judges someone to be worthy of laud, he has been praised.

[15] Praeterea aliud est laus, aliud laudatio, haec et vocem exigit; itaque nemo dicit laudem funebrem sed laudationem, cuius officium oratione constat. Cum dicimus aliquem laude dignum, non verba illi benigna hominum sed iudicia promittimus. Ergo laus etiam taciti est bene sentientis ac bonum virum apud se laudantis.

[15] Moreover, praise is one thing, laudation another; the latter even requires a voice; and so no one says a funeral praise but a funeral laudation, whose office consists in an oration. When we say someone is worthy of praise, we promise him not the kindly words of men but judgments. Therefore praise belongs even to one who is silent, who thinks well and lauds a good man to himself.

[16] Deinde, ut dixi, ad animum refertur laus, non ad verba, quae conceptam laudem egerunt et in notitiam plurium emittunt. Laudat qui laudandum esse iudicat. Cum tragicus ille apud nos ait magnificum esse 'laudari a laudato viro', laude digno ait.

[16] Then, as I said, praise is referred to the mind, not to words, which convey the conceived praise and emit it into the notice of more. He praises who judges that someone is to be praised. When that tragedian among us says that it is magnificent 'to be praised by a praised man', he says 'by one worthy of praise'.

Et cum aeque antiquus poeta ait 'laus alit artis', non laudationem dicit, quae corrumpit artes; nihil enim aeque et eloquentiam et omne aliud studium auribus deditum vitiavit quam popularis adsensio.

And when an equally ancient poet says 'praise nourishes art,' he does not mean laudation, which corrupts the arts; for nothing has equally corrupted both eloquence and every other study devoted to the ears as popular assent.

[17] Fama vocem utique desiderat, claritas potest etiam citra vocem contingere contenta iudicio; plena est non tantum inter tacentis sed etiam inter reclamantis. Quid intersit inter claritatem et gloriam dicam: gloria multorum iudicis constat, claritas bonorum.

[17] Fame assuredly desires a voice; clarity can even come about without a voice, content with judgment; it is full not only among the silent but even among those protesting. What the difference is between clarity and glory I will say: glory consists in the judgment of many, clarity in that of the good.

[18] 'Cuius' inquit 'bonum est claritas, id est laus bono a bonis reddita? utrum laudati an laudantis? ' Utriusque.

[18] 'Whose,' he says, 'is the good of renown, that is, praise rendered to a good man by good men? whether of the one praised or of the one praising? ' Of both.

Meum, qui laudor; quia natura mea mantem omnium genuit, et bene fecisse gaudeo et gratos me invenisse virtutum interpretes laetor. Hoc plurium bonum est quod grati sunt, sed et meum;ita enim animo compositus sum ut aliorum bonum meum iudicem, utique eorum quibus ipse sum boni causa.

Mine, I who am lauded; because my nature has begotten me a lover of all, and I rejoice to have done well and am glad to have found appreciative interpreters of the virtues. This is the good of several that they are grateful, but also mine;for I am so composed in mind that I judge the good of others to be my own, especially of those for whom I myself am the cause of good.

[19] Est istud laudantium bonum; virtute enim geritur; omnis autem virtutis actio bonum est. Hoc contingere illis non potuisset nisi ego talis essem. Itaque utriusque bonum est merito laudari, tam mehercules quam bene iudicasse iudicantis bonum est et eius secundum quem iudicatum est.

[19] That is the good of those praising; for it is carried on by virtue; and every action of virtue is a good. This could not have befallen them unless I were such as I am. And so it is the good of both that one is deservedly praised, as, by Hercules, it is a good both of the one judging to have judged well, and of him according to whom the judgment has been made.

Numquid dubitas quin iustitia et habentis bonum sitet autem sit eius cui debitum solvit? Merentem laudare iustitia est; ergo utriusque bonum est.

Do you in any way doubt that justice is the good both of the one possessing it and also of him to whom it pays the debt? To laud the one deserving is justice; therefore it is the good of both.

[20] Cavillatoribus istis abunde responderimus. Sed non debet hoc nobis esse propositum, arguta disserere et philosophiam in has angustias ex sua maiestate detrahere: quanto satius est ire aperta via et recta quam sibi ipsum flexus disponere quos cum magna molestia debeas relegere? Neque enim quicquam aliud istae disputationes sunt quam inter se perite captantium lusus.

[20] We have abundantly answered those cavillers. But this ought not to be our aim: to discourse cleverly and to drag philosophy down from its own majesty into these straits; how much better it is to go by the open and straight road than to arrange convolutions for oneself which you must, with great vexation, retrace? For these disputations are nothing else than the sport of those expertly catching one another out.

[21] Dic potius quam naturale sit in immensum mentem suam extendere. Magna et generosa res est humanus animus; nullos sibi poni nisi communeset cum deo terminos patitur. Primum humilem non accipit patriam, Ephesum aut Alexandriam aut si quod est etiamnunc frequentius accolis laetius vetectis solum: patria est illi quodcumque suprema et universa circuitu suo cingit, hoc omne convexum intra quod iacent maria cum terris, intra quod aer humanis divina secernens etiam coniungit, in quo disposita tot numina in actus suos excubant.

[21] Say rather how natural it is to extend one’s mind into the immense. A great and generous thing is the human animus; it allows no termini to be set for itself save those common and shared with God. First, it does not accept a lowly patria—Ephesus or Alexandria, or, if there is any soil even now more frequently resorted to, more gladly reached by inhabitants conveyed thither: its fatherland is whatever the highest and the universal encircle by their circuit, this whole convex vault within which the seas lie with the lands, within which the air, separating human things from divine, also joins them, in which so many divinities, set in order, keep watch in their own acts.

[22] Deinde artam aetatem sibi dari non sinit: 'omnes' inquit 'anni mei sunt; nullum saeculum magnis ingeniis clusum est, nullum non cogitationi pervium tempus. Cum venerit dies ille qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hic ubi inveni relinquam, ipse mediis reddam. Nec nunc sine illis sum, sed gravi terrenoque detineor.'

[22] Then he does not allow a straitened lifespan to be assigned to himself: 'all,' he says, 'the years are mine; no age is closed to great ingenia, no time is not pervious to cogitation. When that day shall have come which separates this mixture of the divine and the human, I shall leave the body here where I found it; I myself shall be rendered back to the midst. Nor am I even now without those things, but I am detained by what is heavy and earthy.'

[23] Per has mortalis aevi moras illi meliori vitae longiorique proluditur. Quemadmodum decem mensibus tenet nos maternus uterus et praeparat non sibi sed illi loco in quem videmur emitti iam idonei spiritum trahere et inaperto durare, sic per hoc spatium quod ab infantia patet in senectutem in alium mature scimus partum. Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerum status.

[23] Through these delays of the mortal age a prelude is made to that better and longer life. Just as for ten months the maternal uterus holds us and prepares us not for itself but for that place into which we seem to be sent forth already fit to draw breath and to endure in the open, so through this span which extends from infancy into old age we know that we are being matured for another birth. Another origin awaits us, another condition of things.

[24] Nondum caelum nisi ex intervallo pati possumus. Proinde intrepidus horam illam decretoriam prospice: non est animo suprema, sed corpori. Quidquid circa te iacet rerum tamquam hospitalis loci sarcinas specta: transeundumest.

[24] We are not yet able to endure heaven except at intervals. Accordingly, intrepid, look forward to that decisive hour: it is not final for the spirit, but for the body. Whatever of things lies around you, regard as the baggage of a hostel: it must be passed through.

Excutit redeuntem natura sicut intrantem.

Nature shakes out the one returning, just as it does the one entering.

[25] Non licet plus efferrequam intuleris, immo etiam ex eo quod ad vitam adtulisti pars magna ponenda est: detrahetur tibi haec circumiecta, novissimum velamentum tui, cutis; detrahetur caro et suffusus sanguis discurrensque per totum; detrahentur ossa nervique, firmamenta fluidorum ac labentium.

[25] It is not permitted to carry out more than you have brought in; nay rather, even from that which you brought into life a great part must be laid down: this surrounding thing will be stripped from you, the last veil of yourself, the skin; the flesh will be taken off, and the suffused blood running through the whole; the bones and the nerves will be removed, the supports of the fluids and of what is slipping away.

[26] Dies iste quem tamquam extremum reformidas aeterni natalis est. Depone onus: quid cunctaris, tamquam non prius quoque relicto in quo latebas corpore exieris? Haeres, reluctaris:tum quoque magno nisu matris expulsus es. Gemis, ploras: et hoc ipsum flerenascentis est, sed tunc debebat ignosci: rudis et inperitus omnium veneras.

[26] This day which you dread as the last is the natal day of eternity. Lay down the burden: why do you delay, as though you had not before also gone out, leaving behind the body in which you lay hidden? You stick fast, you struggle:then too you were expelled by the great effort of your mother. You groan, you weep: and this very weeping is of one being born, but then it ought to have been forgiven: you had come raw and inexpert at all things.

Ex maternorum viscerum calido mollique fomento emissum adflavit aura liberior, deinde offendit durae manus tactus, tenerque adhuc et nullius rei gnarus obstipuisti inter ignota:

Sent forth from the warm and soft fomentation of maternal viscera, a freer breeze breathed upon you, then you met with the touch of a hard hand, and, still tender and knowing of nothing, you were struck dumb amid unknown things:

[27] nunc tibi non est novum separari ab eo cuius ante pars fueris; aequo animo membra iam supervacua dimitte et istuc corpus inhabitatum diu pone. Scindetur, obruetur, abolebitur: quid contristaris? ita solet fieri: pereunt semper velamenta nascentium.

[27] now it is not new for you to be separated from that of which you once were a part; with an even mind dismiss the members now superfluous and set aside that body long uninhabited. It will be rent, overwhelmed, abolished: why are you saddened? so it is wont to happen: the veils of the newborn always perish.

Quid ista sic diligis quasi tua? Istis opertus es: veniet qui te revellat dies et ex contubernio foedi atque olidi ventris educat.

Why do you so cherish those things as if they were yours? You are covered by those: a day will come to tear you away and to lead you out from the cohabitation of a foul and malodorous belly.

[28] Huic nunc quoque tu quantum potessub voluptatique nisi quae* * * necessariisque cohaerebit alienus iam hinc altius aliquid sublimiusque meditare: aliquando naturae tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lux undique clara percutiet. Imaginare tecum quantus ille sit fulgor tot sideribus inter se lumen miscentibus. Nulla serenum umbra turbabit; aequaliter splendebit omne caeli latus: dieset nox aeris infimi vices sunt.

[28] Even now, too, withdraw yourself from this as much as you can—sub—and be alien from pleasure, except that which* * * will cohere with necessities; from here on, meditate on something higher and more sublime: at some time the arcana of nature will be laid bare to you, that murk will be scattered, and clear light will strike you from every side. Imagine to yourself how great that splendor is, with so many stars mingling their light among themselves. No shadow will trouble the clear sky; every side of the heaven will shine evenly: day and night are the vicissitudes of the lowest air.

Tunc in tenebris vixisse te dices cum totam lucem et totus aspexeris, quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias obscure intueris, et tamen admiraris illam iam procul: quid tibi videbitur divina lux cum illam suo loco videris?

Then you will say that you have lived in darkness when you have beheld the whole light, and have beheld it wholly, which now you gaze upon obscurely through the most narrow ways of the eyes, and yet you already admire it from afar: what will the divine light seem to you when you have seen it in its own place?

[29] Haec cogitatio nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos rerum omnium esse testes ait; illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum parari iubet et aeternitatem proponere. Quam qui mente concepit nullos horret exercitus, non terretur tuba, nullis ad timorem minis agitur.

[29] This cogitation allows nothing sordid to settle in the mind, nothing base, nothing cruel. It says that the gods are witnesses of all things; it bids that we be approved by them, prepared for them for the future, and that we set eternity before us. Whoever has conceived this with his mind shudders at no armies, is not terrified by the trumpet, is driven by no menaces into fear.

[30] Quidni non timeat qui mori sperat? is quoque qui animum tamdiu iudicat manere quamdiu retinetur corporis vinculo, solutum statim spargi, id agit ut etiam post mortem utilis esse possit. Quamvis enim ipse ereptus sit oculis, tamen

[30] Why should he not be unafraid who hopes for death? He too who judges that the mind remains only so long as it is retained by the bond of the body, and that once loosed it is straightway scattered, aims at this: that even after death he may be able to be useful. For although he himself has been snatched from the eyes, nevertheless

multa viri virtus animo multusque recursat
gentis honos.

much of the man's valor keeps recurring to his mind,
and much the honor of his race.

Cogita quantum nobis exempla bona prosint: scies magnorum virorum non minus praesentiam esse utilem quam memoriam. Vale.

Consider how much good examples profit us: you will know that the presence of great men is no less useful than their memory. Farewell.

CIII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

103. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Quid ista circumspicis quae tibi possunt fortasse evenire sed possunt et non evenire? Incendium dico, ruinam, alia quae nobis incidunt, non insidiantur: illa potius vide, illa [vide] vita [illa] quae nos observant, quae captant. Rari sunt casus, etiamsi graves, naufragium facere, vehiculo everti: ab homine homini cotidianum periculum.

[1] Why do you look around at those things which perhaps can befall you but can also not befall you? I mean fire, collapse, other things which incident upon us, not which lie in ambush: rather look at those—yes, look at those—in life which observe us, which try to catch us. Cases are rare, even if grave, to suffer shipwreck or be overturned by a vehicle: from man to man the peril is quotidian.

Adversus hoc te expedi, hoc intentis oculis intuere; nullum est malum frequentius, nullum pertinacius, nullum blandius.

Against this, make yourself ready, look upon this with eyes intent; no evil is more frequent, none more pertinacious, none more blandishing.

[2] Tempestas minatur antequam surgat, crepant aedificia antequam corruant, praenuntiat fumus incendium: subita est ex homine pernicies [est], et eo diligentius tegitur quo propius accedit. Erras si istorum tibi qui occurrunt vultibus credis: hominum effigies habent, animos ferarum, nisi quod illarum perniciosus est primus incursus: quos transiere non quaerunt. Numquam enim illas ad nocendum nisi necessitas incitat; [hae] aut fame aut timore coguntur ad pugnam: homini perdere hominem libet.

[2] A storm threatens before it rises, buildings creak before they collapse, smoke foretells a conflagration: perdition from man is sudden [is], and the nearer it approaches, the more carefully it is concealed. You err if you trust the faces of those who meet you: they have the effigy of men, the souls of wild beasts, except that with the latter the first incursion is the pernicious one: those whom they have passed by they do not seek. For never are they incited to harm except by necessity; [these] are driven to battle either by hunger or by fear: to man it is pleasing to destroy man.

[3] Tu tamen ita cogita quod ex homine periculum sit ut cogites quod sit hominis officium; alterum intuere ne laedaris, alterum ne laedas. Commodis omnium laeteris, movearis incommodis, et memineris quae praestare debeas, quae cavere.

[3] You, however, think in such a way about what danger there is from man, as also to think what the office of man is; regard the one lest you be injured, the other lest you injure. In the advantages of all rejoice, be moved by their disadvantages, and remember what you ought to render, what to beware.

[4]Sic vivendo quid consequaris? non te ne noceant, sed ne fallant. Quantum potes autem in philosophiam recede: illa te sinu suo proteget, in huius sacrario eris aut tutus aut tutior.

[4]Thus by living in this way what do you achieve? Not that they may not harm you, but that they may not deceive you. But withdraw into philosophy as much as you can: she will protect you in her bosom; in this sacrarium you will be either safe or safer.

Non arietant inter se nisi in eadem ambulantes via.

They do not butt against each other unless walking on the same way.

[5] Ipsam autem philosophiam non debebis iactare; multis fuit periculi causa insolenter tractata et contumaciter: tibi vitia detrahat, non aliis exprobret. Non abhorreat a publicis moribus nec hoc agat ut quidquid non facit damnare videatur. Licet sapere sine pompa, sine invidia.

[5] But you ought not to vaunt philosophy itself; handled insolently and contumaciously, it has been a cause of peril to many: let it draw off your vices, not reproach others with them. Let it not abhor from public customs, nor so act as to seem to condemn whatever it does not do. It is permitted to be wise without pomp, without envy.

Vale.

Farewell.

CIV. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

104. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS

[1] In Nomentanum meum fugi -- quid putas? urbem? immo febrem et quidemsubrepentem; iam manum mihi iniecerat.

[1] I fled to my Nomentum -- what do you think? the city? nay, a fever, and indeed a creeping one; already it had laid its hand upon me.

Medicus initia esse dicebat motisvenis et incertis et naturalem turbantibus modum. Protinus itaque pararivehiculum iussi; Paulina mea retinente exire perseveravi. Illud mihi inore erat domini mei Gallionis, qui cum in Achaia febrem habere coepisset, protinus navem escendit clamitans non corporis esse sed loci morbum.

The physician said that the beginnings were the veins set in motion and unsteady, disturbing the natural mode. Therefore at once I ordered a vehicle to be prepared; though my Paulina was holding me back, I persisted in going out. That remark of my master Gallio was on my lips, who, when in Achaia he had begun to have a fever, immediately went aboard ship, shouting that the malady was not of the body but of the place.

[2]Hoc ego Paulinae meae dixi, quae mihi valetudinem meam commendat. Nam cumsciam spiritum illius in meo verti, incipio, ut illi consulam, mihi consulere. Et cum me fortiorem senectus ad multa reddiderit, hoc beneficium aetatisamitto; venit enim mihi in mentem in hoc sene et adulescentem esse cuiparcitur.

[2]This I said to my Paulina, who commends to me my health. For since I know that her spirit is turned upon mine, I begin, that I may take counsel for her, to take counsel for myself. And although old age has made me stronger for many things, I lose this benefit of age; for it comes into my mind that in this old man there is also an adolescent to whom forbearance is shown.

Itaque quoniam ego ab illa non inpetro ut me fortius amet, <ame> inpetrat illa ut me diligentius amem.

And so, since I do not obtain from her that she love me more strongly, <ame> she obtains that I love myself more diligently.

[3] Indulgendum est enim honestisadfectibus; et interdum, etiam si premunt causae, spiritus in honorem suorumvel cum tormento revocandus et in ipso ore retinendus est, cum bono virovivendum sit non quamdiu iuvat sed quamdiu oportet: ille qui non uxorem, non amicum tanti putat ut diutius in vita commoretur, qui perseverabitmori, delicatus est. Hoc quoque imperet sibi animus, ubi utilitas suorumexigit, nec tantum si vult mori, sed si coepit, intermittat et suis commodet.

[3] For one must indulge honorable affections; and sometimes, even if causes press, the breath, in honor of one’s own, must be recalled even with torment and held upon the very lips, since a good man should live not as long as it pleases but as long as it is fitting: he who does not reckon his wife, nor his friend, of such worth that he should linger longer in life, who will persevere in dying, is delicate. Let the mind also command itself this, where the utility of his own requires: not only, if he wishes to die, but even if he has begun, let him intermit, and accommodate to his own.

[4] Ingentis animi est aliena causa ad vitam reverti, quodmagni viri saepe fecerunt; sed hoc quoque summae humanitatis existimo, senectutem suam, cuius maximus fructus est securior sui tutela et vitaeusus animosior, attentius , si scias alicui id tuorum esse dulce, utile, optabile.

[4] It is of a great-souled spirit to revert to life for the sake of another, which great men have often done; but this too I reckon to be of the highest humanity: to care for one’s own old age more attentively—whose greatest fruit is a securer tutelage of oneself and a more spirited use of life—if you know that to someone of your own this is sweet, useful, and desirable.

[5] Habet praeterea in se non mediocre ista res gaudiumet mercedem; quid enim iucundius quam uxori tam carum esse ut propter hoctibi carior fias? Potest itaque Paulina mea non tantum suum mihi timoreminputare sed etiam meum.

[5] Moreover, this matter has in itself no mediocre joy and reward; for what is more delightful than to be so dear to a wife that on account of this you become dearer to yourself? Therefore my Paulina can impute not only her own fear to me but even my own.

[6] Quaeris ergo quomodo mihi consilium profectionis cesserit? Ut primumgravitatem urbis excessi et illum odorem culinarum fumantium quae motaequidquid pestiferi vaporis sorbuerunt cum pulvere effundunt, protinus mutatamvaletudinem sensi. Quantum deinde adiectum putas viribus postquam vineasattigi?

[6] You ask, then, how the plan of my departure has turned out for me? As soon as I went beyond the heaviness of the city and that odor of smoking kitchens which, when stirred, pour out along with the dust whatever pestiferous vapor they have gulped down, I immediately felt my health changed. How much do you think was then added to my strength after I reached the vineyards?

in pascuum emissus cibum meum invasi. Repetivi ergo iam me; nonpermansit marcor ille corporis dubii et male cogitantis. Incipio toto animostudere.

sent out into pasture, I fell upon my food. Therefore I have now recovered myself; that languor of a wavering and ill-thinking body did not persist. I begin to study with my whole mind.

[7] Non multum ad hoc locus confert nisi se sibi praestat animus, qui secretum in occupationibus mediis si volet habebit: at ille qui regioneseligit et otium captat ubique quo distringatur inveniet. Nam Socraten querenticuidam quod nihil sibi peregrinationes profuissent respondisse ferunt, 'non inmerito hoc tibi evenit; tecum enim peregrinabaris'.

[7] Not much does the place contribute to this, unless the mind provides itself to itself, which, if it wishes, will have seclusion in the midst of occupations: but the man who chooses regions and hunts after leisure will everywhere find something by which he is distracted. For they relate that Socrates replied to a certain complainant, because his peregrinations had profited him nothing, 'not undeservedly has this happened to you; for you were journeying abroad with yourself.'

[8] O quam benecum quibusdam ageretur, si a se aberrarent! Nunc premunt se ipsi, sollicitant, corrumpunt, territant. Quid prodest mare traicere et urbes mutare?

[8] O how well it would fare with certain people, if they would stray from themselves! Now they press themselves, they agitate, they corrupt, they terrify. What profit is there in crossing the sea and changing cities?

si visista quibus urgueris effugere, non aliubi sis oportet sed alius. Puta venissete Athenas, puta Rhodon; elige arbitrio tuo civitatem: quid ad rem pertinetquos illa mores habeat? tuos adferes.

if you wish to escape those things by which you are pressed, you must be not elsewhere but other. Suppose you had come to Athens, suppose to Rhodes; choose a city by your own arbitrament: what does it matter what morals that place has? you will bring your own.

[9] Divitias iudicabis bonum: torquebitte paupertas, quod est miserrimum, falsa. Quamvis enim multum possideas, tamen, quia aliquis plus habet, tanto tibi videris defici quanto vinceris. Honores iudicabis bonum: male te habebit ille consul factus, ille etiamrefectus; invidebis quotiens aliquem in fastis saepius legeris.

[9] You will judge riches a good: poverty will torture you, and, which is most miserable, falsely. For although you may possess much, yet, because someone has more, by as much as you are surpassed, by so much you will seem to yourself to be deficient. You will judge honors a good: that man made consul, that man even reappointed, will make you feel ill; you will envy whenever you read someone more often in the fasti.

Tantuserit ambitionis furor ut nemo tibi post te videatur si aliquis ante tefuerit.

So great will be the frenzy of ambition that no one will seem to you to be behind you, if anyone has been before you.

[10] Maximum malum iudicabis mortem, cum illa nihil sitmali nisi quod ante ipsam est, timeri. Exterrebunt te non tantum periculased suspiciones; vanis semper agitaberis. Quid enim proderit

[10] You will judge death the greatest evil, since in it there is nothing of evil except what is before it—to be feared. Not only perils but suspicions will terrify you; by vain things you will always be agitated. For what will it profit

evasisse tot urbes
Argolicas mediosque fugam tenuisse per hostis?

have I escaped so many Argolic cities
and held my flight through the midst of enemies?

Ipsa pax timores sumministrabit; ne tutis quidem habebitur fides consternatasemel mente, quae ubi consuetudinem pavoris inprovidi fecit, etiam ad tutelamsalutis suae inhabilis est. Non enim vitat sed fugit; magis autem periculispatemus aversi.

Peace itself will supply fears; trust will not be reposed even in what is safe, the mind once thrown into consternation, which, when it has made a habit of improvident dread, is even unfit for the protection of its own safety. For it does not avoid but flees; and we lie more open to perils when turned away.

[11] Gravissimum iudicabis malum aliquem ex his quos amabisamittere, cum interim hoc tam ineptum erit quam flere quod arboribus amoeniset domum tuam ornantibus decidant folia. Quidquid te delectat aeque vide+ut videres+: dum virent, utere. Alium alio die casus excutiet, sed quemadmodumfrondium iactura facilis est quia renascuntur, sic istorum quos amas quosqueoblectamenta vitae putas esse damnum, quia reparantur etiam si non renascuntur.

[11] You will judge it the gravest evil to lose someone from among those whom you will love, whereas meanwhile this will be as inept as to weep because the foliage falls from the pleasant trees ornamenting your house. Whatever delights you, see +as if you were seeing+: while they are green, use them. Chance will shake off one on one day, another on another; but just as the loss of foliage is easy because it is reborn, so the loss of those whom you love and whom you suppose to be the amusements of life is a loss of the same kind, because they are repaired even if they are not reborn.

[12] 'Sed non erunt idem. ' Ne tu quidem idem eris. Omnis dies, omnis horate mutat; sed in aliis rapina facilius apparet, hic latet, quia non exaperto fit.

[12] 'But they will not be the same. ' Nor will you yourself be the same. Every day, every hour changes you; but in other cases the rapine more easily appears, here it lies hidden, because it does not happen in the open.

Alii auferuntur, at ipsi nobis furto subducimur. Horum nihilcogitabis nec remedia vulneribus oppones, sed ipse tibi seres sollicitudinumcausas alia sperando, alia desperando? Si sapis, alterum alteri misce:nec speraveris sine desperatione nec desperaveris sine spe.

Others are carried off, but we ourselves are stolen away from ourselves by stealth. Will you think on none of these things, nor oppose remedies to the wounds, but yourself sow for yourself the causes of anxieties, by hoping some things, by despairing of others? If you are wise, mix the one with the other: neither hope without desperation nor despair without hope.

[13] Quid per se peregrinatio prodesse cuiquam potuit? Non voluptatesilla temperavit, non cupiditates refrenavit, non iras repressit, non indomitosamoris impetus fregit, nulla denique animo mala eduxit. Non iudicium dedit, non discussit errorem, sed ut puerum ignota mirantem ad breve tempus rerumaliqua novitate detinuit.

[13] What could peregrination by itself ever profit anyone? It did not temper pleasures, did not restrain cupidities, did not repress angers, did not break the untamed impulses of love; finally, it drew out no evils from the mind. It gave no judgment, did not disperse error, but, like a boy marveling at unknown things, it detained one for a short time by some novelty of affairs.

[14] Ceterum inconstantiam mentis, quae maximeaegra est, lacessit, mobiliorem levioremque reddit ipsa iactatio. Itaquequae petierant cupidissime loca cupidius deserunt et avium modo transvolantcitiusque quam venerant abeunt.

[14] Moreover, it provokes the inconstancy of the mind, which is most ailing, and the very agitation makes it more mobile and lighter. And so the places they had most avidly sought they more avidly desert, and in the manner of birds they fly across and depart more swiftly than they had come.

[15] Peregrinatio notitiam dabit gentium, novas tibi montium formas ostendet, invisitata spatia camporum et inriguasperennibus aquis valles; alicuius fluminis sub observationenaturam, sive ut Nilus aestivo incremento tumet, sive ut Tigris eripiturex oculis et acto per occulta cursu integrae magnitudinis redditur, siveut Maeander, poetarum omnium exercitatio et ludus, implicatur crebris anfractibuset saepe in vicinum alveo suo admotus, antequam sibi influat, flectitur:ceterum neque meliorem faciet neque saniorem.

[15] A peregrination will give knowledge of nations, it will show you new forms of mountains, the unvisited expanses of plains and valleys irrigated by perennial waters; the nature of some river under observation, whether how the Nile swells with summer increment, or how the Tigris is snatched from sight and, its course driven through hidden places, is returned of intact magnitude, or how the Maeander, the exercise and play of all poets, is entangled in frequent windings and, often brought near to its neighbor by its own channel, before it flows into itself, is bent: but it will make one neither better nor saner.

[16] Inter studia versandumest et inter auctores sapientiae ut quaesita discamus, nondum inventa quaeramus;sic eximendus animus ex miserrima servitute in libertatem adseritur. Quamdiuquidem nescieris quid fugiendum, quid petendum, quid necessarium, quidsupervacuum, quid iustum, quid iniustum, quid honestum, quid inhonestumsit, non erit hoc peregrinari sed errare.

[16] One must be turned among studies and among the authors of wisdom, so that we may learn the things sought, and seek the things not yet found; thus the mind, to be taken out from the most wretched servitude, is asserted into liberty. For as long as you do not know what is to be fled, what to be sought, what is necessary, what superfluous, what just, what unjust, what honorable, what dishonorable, this will not be to peregrinate but to err.

[17] Nullam tibi opem feret istediscursus; peregrinaris enim cum adfectibus tuis et mala te tua sequuntur. Utinam quidem sequerentur! Longius abessent: nunc fers illa, non ducis.

[17] That running about will bring you no aid; for you travel abroad with your affections, and your own evils follow you. Would that they indeed followed! They would be farther away: now you bear them, you do not lead them.

Itaque ubique te premunt et paribus incommodis urunt. Medicina aegro, nonregio quaerenda est.

Therefore they press you everywhere and scorch you with equal inconveniences. Medicine is to be sought for the sick man, not for the region.

[18] Fregit aliquis crus aut extorsit articulum: nonvehiculum navemque conscendit, sed advocat medicum ut fracta pars iungatur, ut luxata in locum reponatur. Quid ergo? animum tot locis fractum et extortumcredis locorum mutatione posse sanari?

[18] Someone has broken a leg or dislocated a joint: he does not board a vehicle or a ship, but calls in a medic so that the fractured part may be joined, so that the luxated part may be set back into its place. What then? Do you believe that a mind broken and wrenched in so many places can be healed by a change of places?

Maius est istud malum quam ut gestationecuretur.

This evil is too great to be cured by being carried about.

[19] Peregrinatio non facit medicum, non oratorem; nulla ars locodiscitur: quid ergo? sapientia, ars omnium maxima, in itinere colligitur? Nullum est, mihi crede, iter quod te extra cupiditates, extra iras, extrametus sistat; aut si quod esset, agmine facto gens illuc humana pergeret.

[19] Peregrination does not make a physician, nor an orator; no art is learned by place: what then? Is wisdom, the greatest art of all, gathered on the journey? There is no journey, believe me, that will set you outside desires, outside angers, outside fears; or if there were any such, with the column formed the human race would march thither.

Tamdiu ista urguebunt mala macerabuntque per terras ac maria vagum quamdiumalorum gestaveris causas.

So long will those evils urge and macerate you, a wanderer across lands and seas, as long as you shall have carried the causes of your evils.

[20] Fugam tibi non prodesse miraris? tecumsunt quae fugis. Te igitur emenda, onera tibi detrahe et [emenda] desideriaintra salutarem modum contine; omnem ex animo erade nequitiam.

[20] Do you wonder that flight does not profit you? What you flee is with you. Therefore emend yourself, take the burdens off yourself, and [emend] your desires; keep them within a salutary measure; eradicate all wickedness from your soul.

Si vis peregrinationeshabere iucundas, comitem tuum sana. Haerebit tibi avaritia quamdiu avarosordidoque convixeris; haerebit tumor quamdiu superbo conversaberis; numquamsaevitiam in tortoris contubernio pones; incendent libidines tuas adulterorumsodalicia.

If you wish to have pleasant peregrinations, heal your companion. Avarice will adhere to you as long as you have lived with the avaricious and the sordid; tumor (arrogance) will adhere as long as you consort with the proud; never will you set aside cruelty in the tent-fellowship of a torturer; the sodalities of adulterers will inflame your lusts.

[21] Si velis vitiis exui, longe a vitiorum exemplis recedendumest. Avarus, corruptor, saevus, fraudulentus, multum nocituri si propea te fuissent, intra te sunt. Ad meliores transi: cum Catonibus vive, cumLaelio, cum Tuberone.

[21] If you should wish to be divested of vices, one must withdraw far from the exemplars of vices. The avaricious, the corrupter, the savage, the fraudulent—those who would be much to harm, if they had been near you—are within you. Pass over to better men: live with the Catones, with Laelius, with Tubero.

Quod si convivere etiam Graecis iuvat, cum Socrate, cum Zenone versare: alter te docebit mori si necesse erit, alter antequamnecesse erit.

But if it also delights you to live in company with the Greeks, be conversant with Socrates, with Zeno: the one will teach you to die if it will be necessary, the other before it will be necessary.

[22] Vive cum Chrysippo, cum Posidonio: hi tibi tradent humanorumdivinorumque notitiam, hi iubebunt in opere esse nec tantum scite loquiet in oblectationem audientium verba iactare, sed animum indurare et adversusminas erigere. Unus est enim huius vitae fluctuantis et turbidae portuseventura contemnere, stare fidenter ac paratum tela fortunae adverso pectoreexcipere, non latitantem nec tergiversantem.

[22] Live with Chrysippus, with Posidonius: these will hand down to you a knowledge of human and divine things; these will bid you be at work, and not merely to speak skillfully and to fling words for the delectation of auditors, but to harden your mind and raise it against threats. For the single harbor of this fluctuating and turbid life is to contemn what will befall, to stand confidently and, prepared, to receive Fortune’s missiles with a breast set against her, not skulking nor dodging.

[23] Magnanimos nos naturaproduxit, et ut quibusdam animalibus ferum dedit, quibusdam subdolum, quibusdampavidum, ita nobis gloriosum et excelsum spiritum quaerentem ubi honestissime, non ubi tutissime vivat, simillimum mundo, quem quantum mortalium passibuslicet sequitur aemulaturque; profert se, laudari et aspici credit.

[23] Nature has produced us magnanimous, and just as to certain animals it has given the feral, to certain the subdolous, to certain the pavid, so to us it has given a glorious and exalted spirit, seeking where it may live most honorably, not where most safely, most similar to the world, which, so far as is permitted to mortal steps, it follows and emulates; it brings itself forth, and believes itself to be lauded and be seen.

[24] omnium est, supra omnia est;itaque nulli se rei summittat, nihil illi videatur grave, nihil quod virum incurvet.

[24] of all things he is, he is above all things; and so let him submit himself to no thing, let nothing seem grave to him, nothing that would bend a man.

Terribiles visu formae, Letumque Labosque:

Forms terrible to behold, and Death and Labor:

minime quidem, si quis rectis oculis intueri illa possit et tenebras perrumpere;multa per noctem habita terrori dies vertit ad risum.

by no means, indeed, if anyone could behold those things with straight eyes and break through the darkness;many things that in the night were held for terror the day turns to laughter.

Terribiles visu formae, Letumque Labosque:

Forms terrible to see, and Death and Toil:

egregie Vergilius noster non re dixit terribiles esse sed visu, id estvideri, non esse.

excellently our Vergil said that they are terrible not in reality but in sight, that isto seem, not to be.

[25] Quid, inquam, in istis est tam formidabile quamfama vulgavit? quid est, obsecro te, Lucili, cur timeat laborem vir, mortemhomo? Totiens mihi occurrunt isti qui non putant fieri posse quidquid facerenon possunt, et aiunt nos loqui maiora quam quae humana natura sustineat.

[25] What, I say, in these matters is so formidable as rumor has spread? what is there, I beseech you, Lucilius, why should a man fear labor, a human being death? So often I meet those who do not think that whatever they cannot do can be done, and say that we speak things greater than what human nature can sustain.

[26] At quanto ego de illis melius existimo! ipsi quoque haec possunt facere, sed nolunt. Denique quem umquam ista destituere temptantem?

[26] But how much more favorably do I esteem them! They too can do these things, but they are unwilling. Finally, whom have those ever deserted when attempting?

cui non facilioraapparuere in actu? Non quia difficilia sunt non audemus, sed quia non audemusdifficilia sunt.

to whom have things not appeared easier in the act? It is not because they are difficult that we do not dare, but because we do not dare that they are difficult.

[27] Si tamen exemplum desideratis, accipite Socraten, perpessiciumsenem, per omnia aspera iactatum, invictum tamen et paupertate, quam gravioremilli domestica onera faciebant, et laboribus, quos militares quoque pertulit. Quibus ille domi exercitus, sive uxorem eius moribus feram, lingua petulantem, sive liberos indociles et matri quam patri similiores +sivere+ aut in bellofuit aut in tyrannide aut in libertate bellis ac tyrannis saeviore.

[27] If, however, you desire an example, take Socrates, a most long‑suffering old man, tossed through all hardships, yet unconquered both by poverty—which domestic burdens made heavier for him—and by labors, which he endured even in military service. By these he was drilled at home, whether by a wife wild in manners, petulant of tongue, or by children unteachable and more like the mother than the father; whether he was in war, or under a tyranny, or in a liberty more savage than wars and tyrannies.

[28]Viginti et septem annis pugnatum est; post finita arma triginta tyrannisnoxae dedita est civitas, ex quibus plerique inimici erant. Novissime damnatioest sub gravissimis nominibus impleta: obiecta est et religionum violatioet iuventutis corruptela, quam inmittere in deos, in patres, in rem publicamdictus est. Post haec carcer et venenum.

[28]For twenty-seven years there was fighting; after the arms were ended, the commonwealth was given over, for punishment, to thirty tyrants, of whom the majority were enemies. Lastly, condemnation was fulfilled under the gravest charges: both violation of religions and corruption of youth were alleged, whom he was said to unleash against the gods, against the Fathers, against the Republic. After these, prison and poison.

Haec usque eo animum Socratisnon moverant ut ne vultum quidem moverint. <O> illam mirabilem laudemet singularem! usque ad extremum nec hilariorem quisquam nec tristioremSocraten vidit; aequalis fuit in tanta inaequalitate fortunae.

These things had not moved the mind of Socrates so far as even to have moved his countenance. <O> that marvelous and singular praise! Right up to the end no one saw Socrates either more cheerful or more sad; he was equal in so great an inequality of fortune.

[29] Vis alterum exemplum? accipe hunc M. Catonem recentiorem, cumquo et infestius fortuna egit et pertinacius. Cui cum omnibus locis obstitisset, novissime et in morte, ostendit tamen virum fortem posse invita fortunavivere, invita mori.

[29] Do you want another example? Take this M. Cato the Younger, with whom fortune dealt both more hostilely and more pertinaciously. Although it had opposed him in every place, and at last even in death, nevertheless he showed that a brave man can live with fortune unwilling, and die with it unwilling.

Tota illi aetas aut in armis est exacta civilibusaut +intacta+ concipiente iam civile bellum; et hunc licet dicas non minusquam Socraten +inseruisse dixisse+ nisi forte Cn. Pompeium et Caesaremet Crassum putas libertatis socios fuisse.

His whole age was either spent in arms in civil wars, or +untouched+ while a civil war was already conceiving; and you may say that this man no less than Socrates +claimed to have said+, unless perhaps you think Cn. Pompeius and Caesar and Crassus were associates of liberty.

[30] Nemo mutatum Catonem totiensmutata re publica vidit; eundem se in omni statu praestitit, in praetura, in repulsa, in accusatione, in provincia, in contione, in exercitu, inmorte. Denique in illa rei publicae trepidatione, cum illinc Caesar essetdecem legionibus pugnacissimis subnixus, totis exterarum gentium praesidiis, hinc Cn. Pompeius, satis unus adversus omnia, cum alii ad Caesarem inclinarent, alii ad Pompeium, solus Cato fecit aliquas et rei publicae partes.

[30] No one saw Cato altered when the commonwealth was so often altered; he showed himself the same in every condition: in the praetorship, in electoral repulse, in accusation, in his province, in the public assembly, in the army, in death. Finally, in that trepidation of the Republic, when there on that side Caesar was propped by ten most pugnacious legions, with all the supports of foreign nations, and on this side Gnaeus Pompey, a single man sufficient against all, while some inclined to Caesar, others to Pompey, Cato alone made some party for the Republic as well.

[31]Si animo conplecti volueris illius imaginem temporis, videbis illinc plebemet omnem erectum ad res novas vulgum, hinc optumates et equestrem ordinem, quidquid erat in civitate sancti et electi, duos in medio relictos, rempublicam et Catonem. Miraberis, inquam, cum animadverteris

[31]If you wish to embrace in your mind the image of that time, you will see there the plebs and all the common crowd aroused toward new things, here the Optimates and the equestrian order—whatever in the state was sacred and select—two left in the middle, the Republic and Cato. You will marvel, I say, when you observe

Atriden Priamumque et saevom ambobus Achillen;

the Atreid and Priam, and Achilles savage to both;

utrumque enim inprobat, utrumque exarmat.

for he disapproves both, he disarms both.

[32] Hanc fert de utroque sententiam:ait se, si Caesar vicerit, moriturum, si Pompeius, exulaturum. Quid habebatquod timeret qui ipse sibi et victo et victori constituerat quae constitutaesse ab hostibus iratissimis poterant? Perit itaque ex decreto suo.

[32] He carries this sentence concerning both: he says that, if Caesar shall have conquered, he will die; if Pompey, he will be exiled. What did he have to fear who himself had determined for himself, both for the vanquished and for the victor, the things which could have been determined by the most irate enemies? He perishes, therefore, by his own decree.

[33]Vides posse homines laborem pati: per medias Africae solitudines pedesduxit exercitum. Vides posse tolerari sitim: in collibus arentibus sineullis inpedimentis victi exercitus reliquias trahens inopiam umoris loricatustulit et, quotiens aquae fuerat occasio, novissimus bibit. Vides honoremet notam posse contemni: eodem quo repulsus est die in comitio pila lusit.

[33]You see that men are able to endure labor: on foot he led his army through the middle solitudes of Africa. You see that thirst can be tolerated: on parched hills, without any impedimenta, dragging the remnants of a defeated army, loricated, he bore the want of moisture, and, whenever there was an occasion for water, he drank last. You see that honor and stigma can be contemned: on the same day on which he was repulsed, in the comitium he played ball.

Vides posse non timeri potentiam superiorum: et Pompeium et Caesarem, quorumnemo alterum offendere audebat nisi ut alterum demereretur, simul provocavit. Vides tam mortem posse contemni quam exilium: et exilium sibi indixit etmortem et interim bellum.

You see that the power of superiors can be not feared: he provoked both Pompey and Caesar at once—men whom no one dared to offend the one except in order to win the favor of the other. You see that death can be despised as much as exile: and he imposed upon himself exile and death, and in the interim war.

[34] Possumus itaque adversus ista tantum habereanimi, libeat modo subducere iugo collum. In primis autem respuendae voluptates:enervant et effeminant et multum petunt, multum autem a fortuna petendumest. Deinde spernendae opes: auctoramenta sunt servitutum.

[34] We can, therefore, have enough spirit against these things, if only it please us to withdraw the neck from the yoke. First of all, pleasures must be rejected: they enervate and effeminate, and they demand much; and much, moreover, must be sought from Fortune. Next, riches must be spurned: they are the pledges of servitude.

Aurum et argentumet quidquid aliud felices domos onerat relinquatur: non potest gratis constarelibertas. Hanc si magno aestimas, omnia parvo aestimanda sunt. Vale.

Let gold and silver and whatever else loads down the fortunate homes be left behind: liberty cannot be had gratis. If you esteem this highly, all things must be esteemed at a low price. Farewell.

CV. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

105. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETINGS

[1] Quae observanda tibi sint ut tutior vivas dicam. Tu tamen sic audiascenseo ista praecepta quomodo si tibi praeciperem qua ratione bonam valetudinemin Ardeatino tuereris. Considera quae sint quae hominem in perniciem hominisinstigent: invenies spem, invidiam, odium, metum, contemptum.

[1] I will tell what things must be observed by you so that you may live safer. Yet I advise that you listen to these precepts just as if I were instructing you by what method you should protect good health in the Ardeatine district. Consider what things there are that instigate a man to the ruin of another man: you will find hope, envy, hatred, fear, contempt.

[2] Ex omnibusistis adeo levissimum est contemptus ut multi in illo remedii causa delituerint. Quem quis contemnit, calcat sine dubio sed transit; nemo homini contemptopertinaciter, nemo diligenter nocet; etiam in acie iacens praeteritur, cum stante pugnatur.

[2] Of all these, contempt is by far the lightest, such that many have taken cover in it for the sake of a remedy. The one whom someone contemns he doubtless treads upon, but passes by; no one harms a man under contempt with pertinacity, no one with diligence; even one lying in the battle-line is passed by, since the fight is with the one standing.

[3] Spem inproborum vitabis si nihil habueris quod cupiditatem alienamet inprobam inritet, si nihil insigne possederis; concupiscuntur enim etiam+pars innotarum sunt sic raro+. Invidiam effugies si te non ingesserisoculis, si bona tua non iactaveris, si scieris in sinu gaudere. Odium autest ex offensa (hoc vitabis neminem lacessendo) aut gratuitum, a quo tesensus communis tuebitur. Fuit hoc multis periculosum: quidam odium habueruntnec inimicum.

[3] You will avoid the hope of the shameless if you have nothing that may irritate another’s depraved cupidity, if you possess nothing conspicuous; for even unknown things are coveted+some of the known are thus rare+. You will escape envy if you do not obtrude yourself upon eyes, if you do not vaunt your goods, if you know how to rejoice in your bosom. Hatred is either from an offense (this you will avoid by provoking no one) or gratuitous, from which common sense will protect you. This has been dangerous to many: some have had odium and no enemy.

[4] Illud, ne timearis, praestabit tibi et fortunae mediocritaset ingeni lenitas: eum esse te homines sciant quem offendere sine periculopossint; reconciliatio tua et facilis sit et certa. Timeri autem tam domimolestum est quam foris, tam a servis quam a liberis: nulli non ad nocendumsatis virium est. Adice nunc quod qui timetur timet: nemo potuit terribilisesse secure.

[4] This, that you not be feared, both a mediocrity of fortune and a lenity of disposition will provide for you: let men know that you are one whom they can offend without danger; and let your reconciliation be both easy and sure. Moreover, to be feared is as troublesome at home as abroad, as much from slaves as from free men: no one lacks strength enough to do harm. Add now this, that he who is feared fears: no one has been able to be formidable with security.

[5] Contemptus superest, cuius modum in sua potestate habetqui illum sibi adiunxit, qui contemnitur quia voluit, non quia debuit. Huius incommodum et artes bonae discutiunt et amicitiae eorum qui apudaliquem potentem potentes sunt, quibus adplicari expediet, non inplicari, ne pluris remedium quam periculum constet.

[5] Contempt remains, the measure of which is in his own power who has adjoined it to himself—who is contemned because he willed it, not because he owed it. The inconvenience of this both good arts disperse and the friendships of those who are potent with some potent person, to whom it will be expedient to attach oneself, not to be implicated, lest the remedy cost more than the danger.

[6] Nihil tamen aeque proderit quam quiescere et minimum cum aliisloqui, plurimum secum. Est quaedam dulcedo sermonis quae inrepit et eblandituret non aliter quam ebrietas aut amor secreta producit. Nemo quod audierittacebit, nemo quantum audierit loquetur; qui rem non tacuerit non tacebitauctorem.

[6] Nothing, however, will be equally profitable as to keep quiet and to speak the least with others, the most with oneself. There is a certain sweetness of speech which creeps in and cajoles, and, no otherwise than inebriation or love, brings secrets forth. No one will keep silent about what he has heard; no one will speak as much as he has heard; he who has not kept the matter silent will not keep the author silent.

Habet unusquisque aliquem cui tantum credat quantum ipsi creditumest; ut garrulitatem suam custodiat et contentus sit unius auribus, populumfaciet; sic quod modo secretum erat rumor est.

Each person has someone to whom he entrusts as much as has been entrusted to himself; and, that he may guard his own garrulity and be content with the ears of one, he will make a crowd; thus what just now was a secret is rumor.

[7] Securitatis magna portio est nihil inique facere: confusam vitamet perturbatam inpotentes agunt; tantum metuunt quantum nocent, nec ullotempore vacant. Trepidant enim cum fecerunt, haerent; conscientia aliudagere non patitur ac subinde respondere ad se cogit. Dat poenas quisquisexpectat; quisquis autem meruit expectat.

[7] A great portion of security is to do nothing iniquitously: the incontinent lead a confused and perturbed life; they fear as much as they harm, and at no time are they free. For they tremble when they have done it, they stick fast; conscience does not allow them to do anything else and repeatedly compels them to answer to themselves. Whoever expects pays the penalty; and whoever has deserved, expects.

[8] Tutum aliqua res in malaconscientia praestat, nulla securum; putat enim se, etiam si non deprenditur, posse deprendi, et inter somnos movetur et, quotiens alicuius scelus loquitur, de suo cogitat; non satis illi oblitteratum videtur, non satis tectum. Nocens habuit aliquando latendi fortunam, numquam fiduciam. Vale.

[8] Some thing affords safety to an evil conscience, nothing affords security; for he thinks that, even if he is not apprehended, he can be apprehended, and he is stirred in his sleep, and whenever he speaks of someone’s crime, he thinks of his own; it does not seem to him sufficiently obliterated, not sufficiently covered. The guilty man has at some time had the fortune of lying hidden, never confidence. Farewell.

CVI. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

106. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Tardius rescribo ad epistulas tuas, non quia districtus occupationibussum. Hanc excusationem cave audias: vaco, et omnes vacant qui volunt. Neminemres sequuntur: ipsi illas amplexantur et argumentum esse felicitatis occupationemputant.

[1] I reply more slowly to your epistles, not because I am constrained by occupations. Mind you do not listen to this excuse: I have leisure, and all have leisure who wish to. Affairs follow no one; people themselves embrace them, and they think occupation to be an argument of felicity.

Quid ergo fuit quare non protinus rescriberem? id de quo quaerebasveniebat in contextum operis mei;

What, then, was the reason why I did not write back at once? The thing you were asking about was coming into the context of my work;

[2] scis enim me moralem philosophiamvelle conplecti et omnes ad eam pertinentis quaestiones explicare. Itaquedubitavi utrum differrem te donec suus isti rei veniret locus, an ius tibiextra ordinem dicerem: humanius visum est tam longe venientem non detinere.

[2] For you know that I wish to embrace moral philosophy and to explicate all questions pertaining to it. And so I hesitated whether I should defer you until the proper place for that matter should come, or declare the law to you out of order: it seemed more humane not to detain one coming from so far.

[3] Itaque et hoc ex illa serie rerum cohaerentium excerpam et, si quaerunt eiusmodi, non quaerenti tibi ultro mittam.
Quae sint haec interrogas? Quae scire magis iuvat quam prodest, sicuthoc de quo quaeris: bonum an corpus sit?

[3] Therefore I will also excerpt this from that series of coherent matters, and, if things of this sort are being asked, I will send them to you, unasked, of my own accord.
You ask what these are? Those which it pleases more to know than it profits, like this about which you ask: whether the good is a body?

[4] Bonum facit; prodest enim;quod facit corpus est. Bonum agitat animum et quodam modo format et continet, quae [ergo] propria sunt corporis. Quae corporis bona sunt corpora sunt;ergo et quae animi sunt; nam et hoc corpus est.

[4] The good acts; it profits;what acts is a body. The good stirs the mind and in a certain mode forms and contains it, which [therefore] are proper to body. The things which are goods of body are bodies;therefore also those of the mind are; for this too is a body.

[5] Bonum hominis necesseest corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis. Mentior, nisi et quae alunt illumet quae valetudinem eius vel custodiunt vel restituunt corpora sunt; ergoet bonum eius corpus est. Non puto te dubitaturum an adfectus corpora sint(ut aliud quoque de quo non quaeris infulciam), tamquam ira, amor, tristitia, nisi dubitas an vultum nobis mutent, an frontem adstringant, an faciemdiffundant, an ruborem evocent, an fugent sanguinem.

[5] The good of a human being must be a body, since he himself is corporeal. I would be lying, unless both the things that nourish him and the things that either guard or restore his health are bodies; therefore his good also is a body. I do not think you will hesitate whether affections are bodies (so that I may also cram in something else about which you do not ask), such as anger, love, sadness, unless you doubt whether they change our countenance, whether they tighten the brow, whether they diffuse the face, whether they call forth a blush, whether they put the blood to flight.

Quid ergo? tam manifestasnotas corporis credis inprimi nisi a corpore?

What then? Do you believe that such manifest marks of the body are imprinted unless by a body?

[6] Si adfectus corpora sunt, et morbi animorum, ut avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia et in statuminemendabilem adducta; ergo et malitia et species eius omnes, malignitas, invidia, superbia;

[6] If the affections are bodies, and the diseases of souls, such as avarice, cruelty, vices indurated and brought into an unamendable state; therefore malice too and all its forms, malignity, envy, pride;

[7] ergo et bona, primum quia contraria istis sunt, deinde quia eadem tibi indicia praestabunt. An non vides quantum oculisdet vigorem fortitudo? quantam intentionem prudentia?

[7] therefore the good things as well, first because they are contrary to those, then because they will furnish you the same indicia. Do you not see how much vigor fortitude gives to the eyes? how much intentness prudence?

quantam modestiamet quietem reverentia? quantam serenitatem laetitia? quantum rigorem severitas?

how much modesty and quiet does reverence give? how much serenity does joy? how much rigor does severity?

quantam remissionem lenitas? Corpora ergo sunt quae colorem habitumque corporum mutant, quae in illis regnum suum exercent. Omnes autem quas rettuli virtutes bona sunt, et quidquid ex illis est.

how much remission does lenity give? Therefore, bodies are those which change the color and the habit of bodies, which exercise their rule in them. But all the virtues which I have recounted are good things, and whatever comes from them.

[8] Numquid est dubium anid quo quid tangi potest corpus sit? Tangere enim et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res, ut ait Lucretius. Omnia autem ista quae dixi non mutarent corpus nisi tangerent; ergo corpora sunt.

[8] Is there any doubt whether that by which a thing can be touched is a body? For to touch and to be touched nothing except a body can, as Lucretius says. Moreover, all those things which I mentioned would not change a body unless they touched; therefore they are bodies.

[9] Etiam nunc cui tanta vis est ut inpellat et cogat et retineatet inhibeat corpus est. Quid ergo? non timor retinet?

[9] Even now, whatever has such force as to impel and compel and restrain and inhibit is a body. What then? Does not fear restrain?

non audacia inpellit? non fortitudo inmittit et impetum dat? non moderatio refrenat ac revocat?

does not audacity impel? does not fortitude send in and give impetus? does not moderation rein back and recall?

non gaudium extollit? non tristitia deducit?

does not joy lift up? does not sadness draw down?

[10] Denique quidquid facimus aut malitiae aut virtutis gerimus imperio: quod imperat corpori corpus est, quod vim corpori adfert, corpus. Bonum corporis corporale est, bonum hominis et corporis bonum est; itaque corporale est.

[10] Finally, whatever we do we carry out under the command either of malice or of virtue: that which commands the body is body; that which brings force to the body is body. The good of the body is corporeal; the good of the human is the good of the body as well; therefore it is corporeal.

[11] Quoniam, ut voluisti, morem gessi tibi, nunc ipse dicam mihi quod dicturum esse te video: latrunculis ludimus. In supervacuis subtilitasteritur: non faciunt bonos ista sed doctos.

[11] Since, as you wished, I have deferred to you, now I myself will say to myself what I see you are going to say: we are playing at the game of latrunculi. On superfluities subtlety is worn down: these things make not good men but learned ones.

[12] Apertior res est sapere, immo simplicior: paucis est ad mentem bonam uti litteris, sed nos ut cetera in supervacuum diffundimus, ita philosophiam ipsam. Quemadmodum omnium rerum, sic litterarum quoque intemperantia laboramus: non vitae sed scholae discimus. Vale.

[12] The matter of being wise is more open—rather, simpler: for a good mind, a few are for the use of letters; but we, as we spill other things into superfluity, so [we do] philosophy itself. Just as in all matters, so too we labor under an intemperance of letters: we learn not for life but for school. Farewell.

CVII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

107. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Ubi illa prudentia tua? ubi in dispiciendis rebus subtilitas? ubimagnitudo?

[1] Where is that prudence of yours? where the subtlety in discerning matters? where the magnitude?

Tam pusilla <te res> tangit? Servi occupationes tuas occasionemfugae putaverunt. Si amici deciperent (habeant enim sane nomen quod illisnoster error inposuit, et vocentur quo turpius non sint) * * * omnibusrebus tuis desunt illi qui et operam tuam conterebant et te aliis molestumesse credebant.

Does so paltry a thing affect you? Your slaves took your occupations as an occasion for flight. If “friends” were deceiving you (for let them indeed have the name which our error has imposed on them, and let them be called so, that they may not be the more disgraceful) * * * from all your affairs those are now absent who both were wearing out your effort and believed that you were troublesome to others.

[2] Nihil horum insolitum, nihil inexpectatum est; offendi rebus istis tam ridiculum est quam queri quod spargaris in publico aut inquineris in luto. Eadem vitae condicio est quaebalnei, turbae, itineris: quaedam in te mittentur, quaedam incident. Nonest delicata res vivere.

[2] None of these things is unusual, none unexpected; to be offended by those things is as ridiculous as to complain that you are splashed in public or are fouled in the mud. The same condition of life is that of a bath, of a crowd, of a journey: some things will be hurled at you, some will fall upon you. Living is not a delicate thing.

Longam viam ingressus es: et labaris oportet etarietes et cadas et lasseris et exclames 'o mors!', id est mentiaris. Alioloco comitem relinques, alio efferes, alio timebis: per eiusmodi offensasemetiendum est confragosum hoc iter.

You have entered upon a long road: and it is necessary that you slip and butt your head and fall and grow weary and cry out 'o death!'—that is, that you lie. In one place you will leave a companion, in another you will carry one forth (to burial), in another you will be afraid: through offenses of this kind this rugged, craggy journey must be measured out.

[3] Mori vult? praeparetur animuscontra omnia; sciat se venisse ubi tonat fulmen; sciat se venisse ubi

[3] Does he wish to die? let the mind be prepared against all things; let him know that he has come where the thunderbolt thunders; let him know that he has come where

Luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae

Griefs and avenging Cares have set their couches

pallentesque habitant Morbi tristisque Senectus.

and pale Diseases dwell, and sad Old Age.

In hoc contubernio vita degenda est. Effugere ista non potes, comtemnerepotes; contemnes autem si saepe cogitaveris et futura praesumpseris.

In this companionship life must be lived. You cannot escape those things; you can contemn them; and you will contemn them if you have often reflected and have pre-assumed the future.

[4]Nemo non fortius ad id cui se diu composuerat accessit et duris quoque, si praemeditata erant, obstitit: at contra inparatus etiam levissima expavit. Id agendum est ne quid nobis inopinatum sit; et quia omnia novitate graviorasunt, hoc cogitatio adsidua praestabit, ut nulli sis malo tiro.

[4]No one fails to approach more stoutly that to which he has long composed himself, and he has resisted even hardships, if they were premeditated; but on the contrary, the unprepared has taken fright even at the very lightest things. This must be done, that nothing be unforeseen for us; and because all things are more grievous by their novelty, assiduous cogitation will provide this, that you be a tyro to no evil.

[5] 'Servi me reliquerunt. ' Alium compilaverunt, alium accusaverunt, alium occiderunt, alium prodiderunt, alium mulcaverunt, alium veneno, aliumcriminatione petierunt: quidquid dixeris multis accidit* * * deincepsquae multa et varia sunt in nos deriguntur. Quaedam in nos fixa sunt, quaedamvibrant et cum maxime veniunt, quaedam in alios perventura nos stringunt.

[5] 'My slaves have left me. ' They plundered another, accused another, killed another, betrayed another, beat another, attacked another with poison, anotherby accusation: whatever you may say has happened to many* * * thereafterwhich things that are many and various are directed against us. Some are fixed in us, somequiver and are at the very moment coming, some, destined to reach others, graze us.

[6] Nihil miremur eorum ad quae nati sumus, quae ideo nulli querenda quiaparia sunt omnibus. Ita dico, paria sunt; nam etiam quod effugit aliquispati potuit. Aequum autem ius est non quo omnes usi sunt sed quod omnibuslatum est.

[6] Let us marvel at none of those things for which we were born, which therefore are to be complained of by no one, because they are equal to all. So I say, they are equal; for even what someone has escaped he could have suffered. Moreover, the equitable law is not that which all have used, but that which has been extended to all.

Imperetur aequitas animo et sine querella mortalitatis tributapendamus.

Let equanimity be enjoined upon the mind, and let us pay the tributes of mortality without complaint.

[7] Hiems frigora adducit: algendum est. Aestas calores refert:aestuandum est. Intemperies caeli valetudinem temptat: aegrotandum est.

[7] Winter brings chills: one must feel cold. Summer brings back heats:one must swelter. The inclemency of the sky tests health: one must fall ill.

Et fera nobis aliquo loco occurret et homo perniciosior feris omnibus. Aliud aqua, aliud ignis eripiet. Hanc rerum condicionem mutare non possumus:illud possumus, magnum sumere animum et viro bono dignum, quo fortiterfortuita patiamur et naturae consentiamus.

And a wild beast will meet us somewhere, and a man more pernicious than all beasts. Water will snatch away one thing, fire another. We cannot change this condition of things:that we can, to take up a great spirit and one worthy of a good man, whereby we may bravelyendure fortuitous things and consent to nature.

[8] Natura autem hoc quod videsregnum mutationibus temperat: nubilo serena succedunt; turbantur mariacum quieverunt; flant in vicem venti; noctem dies sequitur; pars caeliconsurgit, pars mergitur: contrariis rerum aeternitas constat.

[8] Nature, moreover, tempers this realm that you see by changes: serene follows upon cloudy; the seas are stirred when they have been at rest; the winds blow in turn; day follows night; part of the heaven rises, part sinks: the eternity of things consists in contraries.

[9] Ad hanclegem animus noster aptandus est; hanc sequatur, huic pareat; et quaecumquefiunt debuisse fieri putet nec velit obiurgare naturam. Optimum est patiquod emendare non possis, et deum quo auctore cuncta proveniunt sine murmurationecomitari: malus miles est qui imperatorem gemens sequitur.

[9] To this law our mind must be adapted; let it follow this, let it obey this; and let it think that whatever things happen ought to have happened, nor wish to upbraid Nature. The best thing is to suffer what you cannot emend, and to accompany God, the Author by whom all things proceed, without murmuring: a bad soldier is he who follows his emperor groaning.

[10] Quare inpigriatque alacres excipiamus imperia nec deseramus hunc operis pulcherrimicursum, cui quidquid patiemur intextum est; et sic adloquamur Iovem, cuiusgubernaculo moles ista derigitur, quemadmodum Cleanthes noster versibusdisertissimis adloquitur, quos mihi in nostrum sermonem mutare permittiturCiceronis, disertissimi viri, exemplo. Si placuerint, boni consules; sidisplicuerint, scies me in hoc secutum Ciceronis exemplum.

[10] Wherefore let us receive the commands un-sluggish and alacr(ious), and let us not desert this most beautiful course of the work, into which whatever we shall suffer has been woven; and thus let us address Jove, by whose rudder this mass is directed, just as our Cleanthes addresses him in most eloquent verses, which it is permitted me to change into our speech by the example of Cicero, a most eloquent man. If they shall have pleased, judge it kindly; if they shall have displeased, you will know that in this I have followed Cicero’s example.

[11]

Duc, o parens celsique dominator poli,
quocumque placuit: nulla parendi mora est;
adsum inpiger. Fac nolle, comitabor gemens
malusque patiar facere quod licuit bono.
Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.

Lead, O parent and dominator of the lofty pole,
whithersoever it has pleased: there is no delay in obeying;
I am present, untiring. Make me unwilling; I will accompany, groaning,
and as a bad man I shall suffer to do what was permitted to the good.
The Fates lead the willing, they drag the unwilling.

[12] Sic vivamus, sic loquamur; paratos nos inveniat atque inpigros fatum. Hic est magnus animus qui se ei tradidit: at contra ille pusillus et degenerqui obluctatur et de ordine mundi male existimat et emendare mavult deosquam se. Vale.

[12] Let us live thus, let us speak thus; let fate find us prepared and energetic. This is the great spirit that has handed itself over to it; but on the contrary, that one is petty and degenerate who struggles against it and judges ill of the order of the world and prefers to amend the gods rather than himself. Farewell.

CVIII. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

108. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] Id de quo quaeris ex iis est quae scire tantum eo, ut scias, pertinet. Sed nihilominus, quia pertinet, properas nec vis expectare libros quoscum maxime ordino continentis totam moralem philosophiae partem. Statim expediam; illud tamen prius scribam, quemadmodum tibi ista cupiditas discendi, qua flagrare te video, digerenda sit, ne ipsa se inpediat.

[1] The matter about which you ask is among those which concern you to know only to the extent that you may know them. But nonetheless, since it does pertain, you hasten and do not wish to await the books which I am at this very moment arranging, containing the whole moral part of philosophy. I will set it forth at once; yet first I will write this—how that desire of learning in you, with which I see you aflame, ought to be digested and ordered, lest it hinder itself.

[2] Nec passim carpenda sunt nec avide invadenda universa: per partes pervenietur ad totum. Aptari onus viribus debet nec plus occupari quam cui sufficere possimus. Non quantum vis sed quantum capis hauriendum est.

[2] Neither are things to be plucked at indiscriminately, nor is the whole to be invaded avidly: through parts one will arrive at the whole. The onus ought to be adapted to the strengths, and no more is to be undertaken than what we can suffice for. Not as much as you wish but as much as you can contain is to be drawn.

Bonum tantum habe animum: capies quantum voles. Quo plus recipit animus, hoc se magis laxat.

Only have good spirit: you will take in as much as you wish. The more the spirit receives, the more it loosens itself.

[3] Haec nobis praecipere Attalum memini, cum scholam eius obsideremus et primi veniremus et novissimi exiremus, ambulantem quoque illum ad aliquas disputationes evocaremus, non tantum paratum discentibus sed obvium. 'Idem' inquit 'et docenti et discenti debet esse propositum, ut ille prodesse velit, hic proficere.'

[3] I remember Attalus instructing us in these things, when we would besiege his school and be the first to arrive and the last to leave, and we would even summon him, as he walked, to some disputations—he was not only prepared for learners but went to meet them. 'The same,' he says, 'ought to be the proposed purpose both for the teacher and the learner: that the former should wish to be of profit, the latter to make progress.'

[4] Qui ad philosophum venit cotidie aliquid secum boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat aut sanabilior. Redibit autem: ea philosophiae vis est ut non studentis sed etiam conversantis iuvet. Qui in solem venit, licet non in hoc venerit, colorabitur; qui in unguentaria taberna resederuntet paullo diutius commorati sunt odorem secum loci ferunt; et qui ad philosophum fuerunt traxerint aliquid necesse est quod prodesset etiam neglegentibus.

[4] Whoever comes to the philosopher, let him daily carry something good away with him: let him go home either sounder or more curable. And he will indeed return so; such is the power of philosophy that it helps not only the student but even the one conversing. Whoever comes into the sun, although he did not come for this, will be colored; those who have sat down in an unguent shop and have lingered a little longer carry the place’s odor with them; and those who have been to the philosopher must have drawn in something that would profit even the negligent.

Attende quid dicam: neglegentibus, non repugnantibus.

Attend to what I say: to the negligent, not to the resisting.

[5] 'Quid ergo? non novimus quosdam qui multis apud philosophum annis persederint et ne colorem quidem duxerint? ' Quidni noverim?

[5] 'What then? Do we not know certain people who have sat for many years with a philosopher and have not taken on even a color? ' Why should I not know?

pertinacissimos quidem et adsiduos, quos ego non discipulos philosophorum sed inquilinos voco.

most pertinacious indeed and assiduous, whom I call not disciples of philosophers but lodgers.

[6] Quidam veniunt ut audiant, non ut discant, sicut in theatrum voluptatis causa ad delectandas aures oratione vel voce vel fabulis ducimur. Magnam hanc auditorum partem videbis cui philosophi schola deversorium otii sit. Non id agunt ut aliqua illo vitia deponant, ut aliquam legemvitae accipiant qua mores suos exigant, sed ut oblectamento aurium perfruantur.

[6] Some come to hear, not to learn, just as into the theater we are led for the sake of pleasure, to delight the ears with oration or voice or tales. You will see this to be a great portion of the auditors, for whom the philosopher’s school is a lodging of leisure. They do not aim at this: that there they should lay aside any vices, that they should receive some law of life by which they may regulate their morals, but that they may enjoy the delectation of the ears.

Aliqui tamen et cum pugillaribus veniunt, non ut res excipiant, sed ut verba, quae tam sine profectu alieno dicant quam sine suo audiunt.

Some, however, even come with writing-tablets, not to take down the matters, but the words—words which they repeat as much without others’ progress as they listen to without their own.

[7]Quidam ad magnificas voces excitantur et transeunt in adfectum dicentium alacres vultu et animo, nec aliter concitantur quam solent Phrygii tibicinis sono semiviri et ex imperio furentes. Rapit illos instigatque rerum pulchritudo, non verborum inanium sonitus. Si quid acriter contra mortem dictum est, si quid contra fortunam contumaciter, iuvat protinus quae audias facere.

[7]Some are roused by magnificent voices and pass into the affect of the speakers, lively in countenance and spirit, nor are they stirred otherwise than the Phrygian half-men are wont to be by the sound of the piper and, at command, raging. The beauty of things seizes and instigates them, not the sound of empty words. If anything has been said sharply against death, if anything contumaciously against fortune, it straightway pleases them to do what they hear.

Adficiuntur illis et sunt quales iubentur, si illa animo forma permaneat, si non impetum insignem protinus populus, honesti dissuasor, excipiat: pauci illam quam conceperant mentem domum perferre potuerunt.

They are affected by those things and are such as they are bidden, if that form remains in the mind, if the populace—the dissuader of the honorable—does not straightway catch the remarkable impetus: few have been able to carry home the purpose which they had conceived.

[8] Facile est auditorem concitare ad cupidinem recti; omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum. Omnes ad omnia ista nati sumus: cum inritator accessit, tunc illa animi bona veluti sopita excitantur. Non vides quemadmodum theatra consonent quotiens aliqua dicta sunt quae publice adgnoscimus etconsensu vera esse testamur?

[8] It is easy to incite a hearer to a desire for rectitude; for nature has given to all the foundations and the seed of the virtues. We all are born for all these things: when a stimulator comes on the scene, then those goods of the soul, as if asleep, are awakened. Do you not see how the theaters resound whenever some sayings are spoken which we publicly recognize and attest by consensus to be true?

[9]

Desunt inopiae multa, avaritiae omnia.
In nullum avarus bonus est, in se pessimus.

Many things are lacking to need, to avarice everything.
An avaricious man is good to no one, to himself worst.

Ad hos versus ille sordidissimus plaudit et vitiis suis fieri convicium gaudet: quanto magis hoc iudicas evenire cum a philosopho ista dicuntur, cum salutaribus praeceptis versus inseruntur, efficacius eadem illa demissuri in animum inperitorum?

At these verses that most sordid man applauds and rejoices that invective is made against his own vices: how much more do you judge this to come to pass when these things are said by a philosopher, when verses are inserted among salutary precepts, about to let those same things sink more effectively into the mind of the inexpert?

[10] Nam ut dicebat Cleanthes, 'quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem sonum reddit cum illum tuba per longi canalis angustias tractum patentiore novissime exitu effudit, sic sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit. ' Eadem neglegentius audiuntur minusque percutiunt quamdiu soluta oratione dicuntur: ubi accessere numeri et egregium sensum adstrinxere certi pedes, eadem illa sententia velut lacerto excussiore torquetur.

[10] For, as Cleanthes used to say, 'just as our spirit renders a clearer sound when the trumpet, having drawn it through the narrowings of a long canal, finally pours it out by a wider outlet, so the tight necessity of poetry makes our thoughts clearer. ' The same things are heard more negligently and strike less so long as they are said in loose speech: when the measures have come in and fixed feet have constrained the outstanding sense, that same sententia is, as it were, twisted with a more vigorously-shaken arm.

[11] De contemptu pecuniae multa dicuntur et longissimis orationibus hoc praecipitur, ut homines in animo, non in patrimonio putent esse divitias, eum esse locupletem qui paupertati suae aptatus est et parvo se divitem fecit; magis tamen feriuntur animi cum carmina eiusmodi dicta sunt:

[11] Concerning the contempt of money many things are said, and in very long orations this is enjoined: that people should think riches to be in the mind, not in the patrimony, that he is opulent who has been adapted to his own poverty and has made himself rich with a little; yet minds are struck more when verses of this sort have been spoken:

Is minimo eget mortalis qui minimum cupit.
Quod vult habet qui velle quod satis est potest.

That mortal needs the least who desires the least.
He has what he wills who can will what is sufficient.

[12] Cum haec atque eiusmodi audimus, ad confessionem veritatis adducimur;illi enim quibus nihil satis est admirantur, adclamant, odium pecuniaeindicunt. Hunc illorum adfectum cum videris, urge, hoc preme, hoc onera, relictis ambiguitatibus et syllogismis et cavillationibus et ceteris acuminisinriti ludicris. Dic in avaritiam, dic in luxuriam; cum profecisse te videriset animos audientium adfeceris, insta vehementius: veri simile non estquantum proficiat talis oratio remedio intenta et tota in bonum audientiumversa.

[12] When we hear these things and the like, we are led to the confession of truth; for those to whom nothing is enough marvel, acclaim, and proclaim a hatred of money. When you see this affect of theirs, press on, press this point, load it on, leaving aside ambiguities and syllogisms and cavillations and the other ludicrous trifles of ineffectual acumen. Speak against avarice, speak against luxury; when you seem to yourself to have made progress and have moved the minds of the hearers, press on more vehemently: it is not unlikely how much such an oration, intent on remedy and wholly turned to the good of the hearers, will profit.

Facillime enim tenera conciliantur ingenia ad honesti rectique amorem, et adhuc docilibus leviterque corruptis inicit manum veritas si advocatumidoneum nacta est.

For most easily are tender dispositions won over to the love of the honorable and the right, and upon those still docile and lightly corrupted truth lays its hand, if it has found a suitable advocate.

[13] Ego certe cum Attalum audirem in vitia, in errores, in mala vitae perorantem, saepe miseritus sum generis humani et illum sublimemaltioremque humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse dicebat, sed plusquam regnare mihi videbatur cui liceret censuram agere regnantium.

[13] I for my part, when I used to hear Attalus declaiming against vices, against errors, against the evils of life, often pitied the human race and thought him sublime and loftier than the human summit. He himself used to say that he was a king, but he seemed to me to do more than reign, to whom it was permitted to exercise the censure of those reigning.

[14] Cum vero commendare paupertatem coeperat et ostendere quam quidquid usumexcederet pondus esset supervacuum et grave ferenti, saepe exire e scholapauperi libuit. Cum coeperat voluptates nostras traducere, laudare castumcorpus, sobriam mensam, puram mentem non tantum ab inlicitis voluptatibus sed etiam supervacuis, libebat circumscribere gulam ac ventrem.

[14] But when indeed he began to commend poverty and to show how whatever exceeded use was a weight superfluous and heavy to the bearer, it often pleased me to go out of the school a pauper. When he began to traduce our pleasures, to praise a chaste body, a sober table, a pure mind not only from illicit pleasures but even from superfluous ones, it was pleasing to circumscribe the gullet and the belly.

[15] Indemihi quaedam permansere, Lucili; magno enim in omnia impetu veneram, deindead civitatis vitam reductus ex bene coeptis pauca servavi. Inde ostreisboletisque in omnem vitam renuntiatum est; nec enim cibi sed oblectamenta sunt ad edendum saturos cogentia (quod gratissimum est edacibus et se ultraquam capiunt farcientibus), facile descensura, facile reditura.

[15] Then certain things remained with me, Lucilius; for I had come at everything with great impetus, then, brought back to civic life, I preserved a few of the good beginnings. Then oysters and boletes were renounced for my whole life; for they are not foods but oblectments, compelling the sated to eat (which is most pleasing to the edacious and to those stuffing themselves beyond what they can hold), things that will go down easily, will easily return.

[16] Indein omnem vitam unguento abstinemus, quoniam optimus odor in corpore estnullus. Inde vino carens stomachus. Inde in omnem vitam balneum fugimus;decoquere corpus atque exinanire sudoribus inutile simul delicatumque credidimus.

[16] Thence for the whole life we abstain from unguent, since the best odor on the body is none. Thence a stomach lacking wine. Thence for the whole life we flee the bath; to decoct the body and to empty it by sweats we judged useless and at the same time delicate.

Cetera proiecta redierunt, ita tamen ut quorum abstinentiam interrupi modumservem et quidem abstinentiae proximiorem, nescio an difficiliorem, quoniamquaedam absciduntur facilius animo quam temperantur.

The remaining things that had been cast aside have returned, yet in such a way that, in those from which I broke abstinence, I keep a measure—and indeed one closer to abstinence, I know not whether more difficult—since certain things are more easily cut off in the mind than they are tempered.

[17] Quoniam coepi tibi exponere quanto maiore impetu ad philosophiamiuvenis accesserim quam senex pergam, non pudebit fateri quem mihi amoremPythagoras iniecerit. Sotion dicebat quare ille animalibus abstinuisset, quare postea Sextius. Dissimilis utrique causa erat, sed utrique magnifica.

[17] Since I have begun to set forth to you with how much greater an impulse I, as a youth, approached philosophy than I, as an old man, go on, it will not shame me to confess what love Pythagoras instilled in me. Sotion used to say for what reason that man had abstained from animals, and for what reason later Sextius. The cause was dissimilar for each, but for each magnificent.

[18] Hic homini satis alimentorum citra sanguinem esse credebat et crudelitatisconsuetudinem fieri ubi in voluptatem esset adducta laceratio. Adiciebatcontrahendam materiam esse luxuriae; colligebat bonae valetudini contrariaesse alimenta varia et nostris aliena corporibus.

[18] This man believed that for a human there are enough aliments without blood, and that a consuetude of cruelty comes to be when laceration has been brought into pleasure. He added that the material of luxury ought to be contracted; he inferred that various aliments, alien to our bodies, are contrary to good health.

[19] At Pythagoras omniuminter omnia cognationem esse dicebat et animorum commercium in alias atquealias formas transeuntium. Nulla, si illi credas, anima interit, ne cessatquidem nisi tempore exiguo, dum in aliud corpus transfunditur. Videbimusper quas temporum vices et quando pererratis pluribus domiciliis in hominemrevertatur: interim sceleris hominibus ac parricidii metum fecit, cum possentin parentis animam inscii incurrere et ferro morsuve violare, si in quo cognatus aliqui spiritus hospitaretur.

[19] But Pythagoras used to say that there is a kinship of all among all, and a commerce of spirits passing over into one form after another. No soul, if you believe him, perishes; nor does it even cease, except for a scant time, while it is transferred into another body. We shall see through what vicissitudes of times, and when, after many domiciles have been wandered through, it returns into a human being: meanwhile he produced in men a fear of crime and of parricide, since they might unwittingly run upon a parent’s soul and violate it by the sword or by death, if in any some kindred spirit were lodging.

[20] Haec cum exposuissetSotion et implesset argumentis suis, 'non credis' inquit 'animas in aliacorpora atque alia discribi et migrationem esse quod dicimus mortem? Noncredis in his pecudibus ferisve aut aqua mersis illum quondam hominis animummorari? Non credis nihil perire in hoc mundo, sed mutare regionem?

[20] When Sotion had set forth these things and had filled them out with his arguments, he said, 'Do you not believe that souls are distributed into other bodies and yet others, and that what we call death is migration? Do you not believe that in these cattle or wild beasts, or those submerged in water, that former soul of a man lingers? Do you not believe that nothing perishes in this world, but changes its region?'

nectantum caelestia per certos circuitus verti, sed animalia quoque per vicesire et animos per orbem agi? Magni ista crediderunt viri.

not only that the celestial things are turned through certain circuits, but that animals also go by turns and souls are driven around the orb? Great men have believed these things.

[21] Itaque iudiciumquidem tuum sustine, ceterum omnia tibi in integro serva. Si vera suntista, abstinuisse animalibus innocentia est; si falsa, frugalitas est. Quod istic credulitatis tuae damnum est?

[21] Therefore, indeed, hold back your judgment; but keep everything intact for yourself. If those things are true, to have abstained from animals is innocence; if false, it is frugality. What loss to your credulity is there in this?

alimenta tibi leonum et vulturumeripio. '

I snatch away from you the nourishment of lions and vultures.'

[22] His ego instinctus abstinere animalibus coepi, et anno peractonon tantum facilis erat mihi consuetudo sed dulcis. Agitatiorem mihi animumesse credebam nec tibi hodie adfirmaverim an fuerit. Quaeris quomodo desierim?

[22] Urged by these, I began to abstain from animals, and with a year completed the custom was to me not only easy but sweet. I used to believe my mind to be more agitated, nor would I affirm to you today whether it was so. You ask how I ceased?

In primum Tiberii Caesaris principatum iuventae tempus inciderat: alienigenatum sacra movebantur et inter argumenta superstitionis ponebatur quorundamanimalium abstinentia. Patre itaque meo rogante, qui non calumniam timebatsed philosophiam oderat, ad pristinam consuetudinem redii; nec difficultermihi ut inciperem melius cenare persuasit.

My time of youth fell in the first principate of Tiberius Caesar: the sacred rites of foreigners were being targeted, and among the proofs of superstition was reckoned the abstinence from certain animals. Therefore, at my father’s urging—who did not fear calumny but hated philosophy—I returned to my former custom; nor did he with difficulty persuade me to begin to dine better.

[23] Laudare solebat Attalusculcitam quae resisteret corpori: tali utor etiam senex, in qua vestigiumapparere non possit.
Haec rettuli ut probarem tibi quam vehementes haberent tirunculi impetusprimos ad optima quaeque, si quis exhortaretur illos, si quis inpelleret. Sed aliquid praecipientium vitio peccatur, qui nos docent disputare, nonvivere, aliquid discentium, qui propositum adferunt ad praeceptores suosnon animum excolendi sed ingenium.

[23] Attalus used to praise a cushion that would resist the body: I use such a one even as an old man, one on which no imprint could appear.
I have recounted these things to prove to you how vehement the tyros would have their first impulses toward every best thing, if someone would exhort them, if someone would impel them. But some fault is on the side of the preceptors, who teach us to dispute, not to live, and some on the side of the learners, who bring to their preceptors a purpose not of cultivating the animus but the ingenium.

Itaque quae philosophia fuit facta philologiaest.

Therefore what was philosophy has been made philology.

[24] Multum autem ad rem pertinet quo proposito ad quamquam rem accedas. Qui grammaticus futurus Vergilium scrutatur non hoc animo legit illud egregium

[24] But it pertains much to the matter with what purpose you accede to any matter whatsoever. He who is going to be a grammarian scrutinizes Vergil does not read that outstanding work with this disposition.

fugit inreparabile tempus:

time flees irreparable:

'vigilandum est; nisi properamus relinquemur; agit nos agiturque veloxdies; inscii rapimur; omnia in futurum disponimus et inter praecipitialenti sumus': sed ut observet, quotiens Vergilius de celeritate temporumdicit, hoc uti verbo illum 'fugit'.

'we must be vigilant; unless we hasten we shall be left behind; the swift day drives us and is driven; unknowing we are rapt away; we dispose everything for the future and amid precipices we are slow': but let him observe that, whenever Vergil speaks about the celerity of time, he uses this word 'flees'.

Optima quaeque dies miseris mortalibus aevi
prima fugit; subeunt morbi tristisque senectus
et labor, et durae rapit inclementia mortis.

The best days, each one, for wretched mortals of life
are the first to flee; diseases come on and sad old age
and labor, and the inclemency of harsh death snatches away.

[25] Ille qui ad philosophiam spectat haec eadem quo debet adducit. 'NumquamVergilius' inquit 'dies dicit ire, sed fugere, quod currendi genus concitatissimumest, et optimos quosque primos rapi: quid ergo cessamus nos ipsi concitare, ut velocitatem rapidissimae rei possimus aequare? Meliora praetervolant, deteriora succedunt. '

[25] He who looks toward philosophy brings forward these same points as he ought. 'Vergil,' he says, 'never says that days go, but that they flee, because that is the most impelled kind of running, and that the best are snatched away first: why then do we cease to spur ourselves on, so that we may be able to equal the velocity of the most rapid thing? Better things fly past, worse things succeed.'

[26] Quemadmodum ex amphora primum quod est sincerissimumeffluit, gravissimum quodque turbidumque subsidit, sic in aetate nostraquod est optimum in primo est. Id exhauriri [in] aliis potius patimur, ut nobis faecem reservemus? Inhaereat istud animo et tamquam missum oraculoplaceat:

[26] Just as from an amphora the most pure first flows out, while whatever is most heavy and turbid settles, so in our age what is best is at the beginning. Shall we allow that to be drained off in others rather, so that we reserve the dregs for ourselves? Let that stick in the mind and be pleasing as if sent from an oracle:

optima quaeque dies miseris mortalibus aevi
prima fugit.

the best days of miserable mortals
are the first to flee.

[27] Quare optima? quia quod restat incertum est. Quare optima?

[27] Why the best? Because what remains is uncertain. Why the best?

quia iuvenespossumus discere, possumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad melioraconvertere; quia hoc tempus idoneum est laboribus, idoneum agitandis perstudia ingeniis [est] et exercendis per opera corporibus: quod superestsegnius et languidius est et propius a fine. Itaque toto hoc agamus animoet omissis ad quae devertimur in rem unam laboremus, ne hanc temporis pernicissimiceleritatem, quam retinere non possumus, relicti demum intellegamus. Primusquisque tamquam optimus dies placeat et redigatur in nostrum.

because, while we are young, we can learn; we can turn an easy and still tractable mind to better things; because this time is fit for labors, fit for talents to be stirred by studies and bodies to be exercised by works: what remains is more sluggish and more languid and nearer to the end. Therefore let us pursue all this with our whole mind, and, laying aside the things to which we turn aside, let us toil at one thing, lest we finally, when left behind, come to understand this most pernicious celerity of time, which we cannot retain. Let each first day please as though the best, and be made ours.

[28] Quodfugit occupandum est. Haec non cogitat ille qui grammatici oculis carmenistud legit, ideo optimum quemque primum esse diem quia subeunt morbi, quia senectus premit et adhuc adulescentiam cogitantibus supra caput est, sed ait Vergilium semper una ponere morbos et senectutem -- non meherculesinmerito; senectus enim insanabilis morbus est.

[28] What flees is to be seized. These things he does not consider, the one who reads that poem with a grammarian’s eyes, holding that each day is the best at the beginning for this reason: because sicknesses come on, because old age presses and, while people are still thinking of youth, it is already over their head; but he says that Vergil always sets diseases and old age together -- not, by Hercules, without merit; for old age is an incurable disease.

[29] 'Praeterea' inquit'hoc senectuti cognomen inposuit, "tristem" illam vocat:

[29] 'Moreover' he says'this cognomen to old age he has imposed, he calls that "sad":

subeunt morbi tristisque senectus.
Alio loco dicit
pallentesque habitant Morbi tristisque Senectus. '

diseases come on and sad old age.
In another place he says
pale Diseases and sad Old Age dwell. '

Non est quod mireris ex eadem materia suis quemque studiis apta colligere:in eodem prato bos herbam quaerit, canis leporem, ciconia lacertam.

There is no cause for you to marvel that from the same material each collects things apt to his own studies:in the same meadow the ox seeks grass, the dog a hare, the stork a lizard.

[30] Cum Ciceronis librum de re publica prendit hinc philologus aliquis, hinc grammaticus, hinc philosophiae deditus, alius alio curam suam mittit. Philosophus admiratur contra iustitiam dici tam multa potuisse. Cum adhanc eandem lectionem philologus accessit, hoc subnotat: duos Romanos regesesse quorum alter patrem non habet, alter matrem.

[30] When someone takes up Cicero’s book On the Republic—here a philologist, here a grammarian, here one devoted to philosophy—each sends his concern in a different direction. The philosopher marvels that so many things could have been said against justice. When the philologist approaches this same reading, he notes this down: that there are two Roman kings, of whom one has no father, the other no mother.

Nam de Servi matre dubitatur;Anci pater nullus, Numae nepos dicitur.

For concerning Servius’s mother there is doubt; Ancus has no father, he is said to be Numa’s grandson.

[31] Praeterea notat eum quem nosdictatorem dicimus et in historiis ita nominari legimus apud antiquos magistrumpopuli' vocatum. Hodieque id extat in auguralibus libris, et testimoniumest quod qui ab illo nominatur 'magister equitum' est. Aeque notat Romulumperisse solis defectione; provocationem ad populum etiam a regibus fuisse;id ita in pontificalibus libris +et aliqui qui+ putant et Fenestella.

[31] Furthermore, he notes that the man whom we call 'dictator', and whom we read in histories to be so named, was among the ancients called 'master of the people'. And even today this exists in the augural books, and there is testimony in that the one appointed by him is the 'master of horse'. Likewise he notes that Romulus perished at a solar eclipse; that appeal to the people existed even under the kings; that this is so in the pontifical books, as +and some who+ think, and Fenestella.

[32]Eosdem libros cum grammaticus explicuit, primum [verba expresse] 'reapse'dici a Cicerone, id est 're ipsa', in commentarium refert, nec minus 'sepse', id est 'se ipse'. Deinde transit ad ea quae consuetudo saeculi mutavit, tamquam ait Cicero 'quoniam sumus ab ipsa calce eius interpellatione revocati. 'Hanc quam nunc in circo 'cretam' vocamus 'calcem' antiqui dicebant.

[32]When the grammarian explained those same books, he first records in his commentary [words expressly] that 'reapse' is said by Cicero, that is, 're ipsa', and no less 'sepse', that is, 'se ipse'. Then he passes to those things which the custom of the age has changed, as, for example, Cicero says 'since we have been recalled from its very calx by an interruption. 'This which we now in the circus call 'chalk' the ancients used to call 'calx'.

[33]Deinde Ennianos colligit versus et in primis illos de Africano scriptos:

[33] Then he collects Ennian verses, and in the first place those written about Africanus:

cui nemo civis neque hostis
quibit pro factis reddere opis pretium.

to whom no citizen nor enemy
will be able to render the price of aid for his deeds.

Ex eo se ait intellegere <opem> apud antiquos non tantum auxilium significassesed operam. Ait [opera] enim Ennius neminem potuisse Scipioni neque civemneque hostem reddere operae pretium.

From this he says he understands that <opem> among the ancients signified not only aid but also effort. He says that Ennius [opera], in fact, that no one, neither citizen nor enemy, could render to Scipio the price of effort.

[34] Felicem deinde se putat quodinvenerit unde visum sit Vergilio dicere

[34] Then he deems himself happy because he has found whence it seemed good to Vergil to say

quem super ingens
porta tonat caeli.

above whom the vast
portal of heaven thunders.

Ennium hoc ait Homero [se] subripuisse, Ennio Vergilium; esse enim apudCiceronem in his ipsis de re publica hoc epigramma Enni:

He says that Ennius [himself] purloined this from Homer, and Vergil from Ennius; for in Cicero, in those very books On the Republic, there is this epigram of Ennius:

si fas endo plagas caelestum ascendere cuiquam est,
mi soli caeli maxima porta patet.

if it is right for anyone to ascend into the regions of the celestials,
to me alone the greatest gate of heaven stands open.

[35] Sed ne et ipse, dum aliud ago, in philologum aut grammaticum delabar, illud admoneo, auditionem philosophorum lectionemque ad propositum beataevitae trahendam, non ut verba prisca aut ficta captemus et translationesinprobas figurasque dicendi, sed ut profutura praecepta et magnificas voceset animosas quae mox in rem transferantur. Sic ista ediscamus ut quae fuerintverba sint opera.

[35] But lest I too, while doing something else, slip into being a philologist or a grammarian, I give this warning: the hearing of philosophers and the reading of them must be drawn toward the aim of the blessed life, not so that we may snatch at ancient or feigned words and at improper translations (metaphors) and figures of speech, but so that we may take up precepts that will be of use and magnificent and high-spirited utterances, which are soon transferred into reality. Let us memorize such things in this way: that what have been words become deeds.

[36] Nullos autem peius mereri de omnibus mortalibusiudico quam qui philosophiam velut aliquod artificium venale didicerunt, qui aliter vivunt quam vivendum esse praecipiunt. Exempla enim se ipsosinutilis disciplinae circumferunt, nulli non vitio quod insequuntur obnoxii.

[36] Moreover, I judge that none among all mortals deserves worse than those who have learned philosophy as if it were some venal craft, who live otherwise than they prescribe one ought to live. For they carry themselves about as examples of a useless discipline, there being no vice which they assail to which they are not liable.

[37] Non magis mihi potest quisquam talis prodesse praeceptor quam gubernatorin tempestate nauseabundus. Tenendum rapiente fluctu gubernaculum, luctandumcum ipso mari, eripienda sunt vento vela: quid me potest adiuvare rectornavigii attonitus et vomitans? Quanto maiore putas vitam tempestate iactariquam ullam ratem?

[37] No more can such a preceptor profit me than a helmsman seasick in a storm. The helm must be held while the wave is snatching it away, one must wrestle with the very sea, the sails must be torn from the wind: how can the ship’s rector, stunned and vomiting, help me? By how much greater a tempest do you think life is tossed than any raft?

Non est loquendum sed gubernandum.

One must not talk, but steer.

[38] Omnia quae dicunt, quae turba audiente iactant, aliena sunt: dixit illa Platon, dixit Zenon, dixit Chrysippus et Posidonius et ingens agmen nominum tot ac talium. Quomodoprobare possint sua esse monstrabo: faciant quae dixerint.

[38] All the things they say, which they vaunt with the crowd listening, are alien: Plato said those, Zeno said them, Chrysippus and Posidonius said them, and an immense host of names, so many and such. How they can prove them to be theirs I will show: let them do what they have said.

[39] Quoniam quae volueram ad te perferre iam dixi, nunc desideriotuo satis faciam et in alteram epistulam integrum quod exegeras transferam, ne ad rem spinosam et auribus erectis curiosisque audiendam lassus accedas. Vale.

[39] Since I have now said what I wished to convey to you, I will now satisfy your desire and transfer intact into another epistle what you had required, lest you come weary to a thorny matter, to be listened to with ears pricked and curious. Farewell.

CIX. SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM

109. SENECA TO HIS LUCILIUS, GREETING

[1] An sapiens sapienti prosit scire desideras. Dicimus plenum omnibono esse sapientem et summa adeptum: quomodo prodesse aliqui possit summumhabenti bonum quaeritur. Prosunt inter se boni.

[1] You desire to know whether a sapient man may profit a sapient man. We say that the sapient man is full of every good and has attained the highest; the question is how anyone could profit one having the highest good. The good profit one another.

Exercent enim virtuteset sapientiam in suo statu continent; desiderat uterque aliquem cum quoconferat, cum quo quaerat.

For they exercise virtues and keep wisdom in its own state; each of the two desires someone with whom to confer, with whom to inquire.

[2] Peritos luctandi usus exercet; musicum quiparia didicit movet. Opus est et sapienti agitatione virtutum; ita quemadmodumipse se movet, sic movetur ab alio sapiente.

[2] Use exercises those skilled in wrestling; a musician is moved by one who has learned similar things. The wise man too has need of an agitation of the virtues; thus, just as he moves himself, so he is moved by another wise man.

[3] Quid sapiens sapienti proderit? Impetum illi dabit, occasiones actionum honestarum commonstrabit. Praeter haec aliquas cogitationes suas exprimet; docebit quae invenerit.

[3] How will a wise man be of benefit to a wise man? He will give him impetus, he will point out opportunities for honorable actions. Besides these, he will express some of his own cogitations; he will teach what he has discovered.

Semper enim etiam sapienti restabit quod inveniat et quo animus eius excurrat.

For there will always remain, even for the wise man, something to discover and whither his mind may run forth.

[4] Malus malo nocet facitque peiorem, iram eius incitando, tristitiae adsentiendo, voluptates laudando; et tunc maxime laborant mali ubi plurimumvitia miscuere et in unum conlata nequitia est. Ergo ex contrario bonusbono proderit. 'Quomodo?

[4] The bad man harms the bad man and makes him worse, by inciting his ire, by assenting to his sadness, by lauding his pleasures; and then most of all the wicked are hard-pressed when they have mingled the most vices and wickedness has been gathered into one. Therefore, conversely, a good man will profit a good man. 'How?

' inquis.

' you inquire.

[5] Gaudium illi adferet, fiduciam confirmabit;ex conspectu mutuae tranquillitatis crescet utriusque laetitia. Praeterea quarumdam illi rerum scientiam tradet; non enim omnia sapiens scit; etiamsi sciret, breviores vias rerum aliqui excogitare posset et has indicareper quas facilius totum opus circumfertur.

[5] He will bring him joy, he will confirm confidence; from the sight of mutual tranquility the gladness of each will grow. Moreover, he will transmit to him knowledge of certain matters; for the wise man does not know all things; and even if he did know, someone could excogitate shorter ways of things and indicate these, by which the whole work is more easily carried through.

[6] Proderit sapienti sapiens, non scilicet tantum suis viribus sed ipsius quem adiuvabit. Potest quidemille etiam relictus sibi explicare partes suas: utetur propria velocitate, sed nihilominus adiuvat etiam currentem hortator. 'Non prodest sapienti sapiens sed sibi ipse.

[6] A wise man will be of use to a wise man, not, of course, only by his own powers but by those of the very one whom he will aid. Indeed, he can, even when left to himself, carry out his own parts: he will use his own velocity, but nonetheless an exhorter helps even one who is running. 'A wise man is not of use to a wise man but to himself.

Hoc <ut> scias, detrahe illi vim propriam et ille nihil aget.'

This <that> you may know, take away from him his proper force, and he will do nothing.'

[7] Isto modo dicas licet non essein melle dulcedinem; nam ipse ille qui esse debeat ita aptatuslingua palatoque est ad eiusmodi gustum ut illum talis sapor capiat, offendetur;sunt enim quidam quibus morbi vitio mel amarum videatur. Oportet utrumque valere ut et ille prodesse possit et hic profuturo idonea materia sit.

[7] In this way you may say that there is not sweetness in honey; for that very person who ought to perceive it, he is so adapted with tongue and palate for a gust of that sort that such a savor may seize him, will be offended; for there are certain ones to whom, by the fault of a disease, honey seems bitter. It behooves that both be sound, so that both that one may be able to profit, and this be suitable matter for one about to be benefited.

[8] ' in summum' inquit 'perducto calorem calefieri supervacuumest, et in summum perducto bonum supervacuum est qui prosit. Numquidinstructus omnibus rebus agricola ab alio instrui quaerit? numquid armatusmiles quantum in aciem exituro satis est ulla amplius arma desiderat?

[8] ' to the summit,' he says, 'once it has been brought to the summit, for heat to be heated is superfluous; and, once the good has been brought to the summit, its being of use is superfluous it benefit anyone. Does a farmer furnished with all things seek to be furnished by another? Does a soldier, armed with as much as is sufficient for one about to go into the battle-line, desire any further arms?

Ergonec sapiens; satis enim vitae instructus, satis armatus est. '

Therefore neither does the wise man; for he is sufficiently instructed for life, sufficiently armed.'

[9] Ad haecrespondeo: et qui in summum opus est caloreadiecto ut summum teneat. 'Sed ipse se' inquit 'calor continet. ' Primummultum interest inter ista quae comparas.

[9] To this I respond: even he who has need of heat added so that he may hold the summit. 'But heat itself,' he says, 'contains itself. ' First, there is much difference between those things which you compare.

Calor enim unus est, prodesse varium est. Deinde calor non adiuvatur adiectione caloris ut caleat: sapiens non potest in habitu mentis suae stare nisi amicos aliquos similes sui admisit cum quibus virtutes suas communicet.

For heat is one; being of benefit is various. Then heat is not aided by the addition of heat so that it may be hot: the wise man cannot stand firm in the habit of his mind unless he has admitted some friends like himself with whom he may communicate his virtues.

[10] Adice nunc quod omnibus inter se virtutibus amicitia est; itaque prodest qui virtutes alicuius paris sui amat amandasque invicem praestat. Similia delectant, utique ubi honesta sunt et probare ac probari sciunt.

[10] Add now that among all the virtues there is friendship among themselves; and thus he benefits who loves the virtues of someone his peer and, in turn, furnishes them to be loved. Like things delight, especially when they are honorable and know how to approve and to be approved.

[11] Etiam nunc sapientis animum perite movere nemo alius potest quam sapiens, sicut hominem movere rationaliter non potest nisi homo. Quomodo ergo ad rationem movendam ratione opus est, sic ut moveatur ratio perfecta opus est ratione perfecta.

[11] Even now, no one else can skillfully move the mind of the wise man except a wise man, just as no one can move a human being rationally except a human being. Therefore, as for the moving of reason there is need of reason, so for perfect reason to be moved there is need of perfect reason.

[12] Prodesse dicuntur et qui media nobis largiuntur, pecuniam, gratiam, incolumitatem, alia in usus vitae cara aut necessaria; in his dicetur etiam stultus prodesse sapienti. Prodesse autem est animum secundum naturam movere virtute sua. Ut eius qui movebitur, hoc non sine ipsius quoque qui proderit bono fiet; necessest enim alienam virtutem exercendo exerceat et suam.

[12] They are said also to be of profit who bestow upon us the means: money, favor, safety, and other things dear or necessary for the uses of life; among these even a fool will be said to profit a wise man. But to profit is to move the mind according to nature by one’s own virtue. As for the one who will be moved, this will not take place without a good accruing also to the very one who does the benefiting; for it is necessary that, by bringing another’s virtue into exercise, he also exercise his own.

[13] Sed utremoveas ista quae aut summa bona sunt aut summorum efficientia, nihilominus prodesse inter se sapientes possunt. Invenire enim sapientem sapienti perse res expetenda est, quia natura bonum omne carum est bono et sic quisqueconciliatur bono quemadmodum sibi.

[13] But even if you remove those things which are either the highest goods or the efficient causes of the highest goods, nevertheless the wise can benefit one another. For for a wise man to find a wise man is, in itself, a thing to be sought, because by nature every good is dear to the good, and thus each person is conciliated to the good just as to himself.

[14] Necesse est ex hac quaestione argumenti causa in alteram transeam. Quaeritur enim an deliberaturus sit sapiens, an in consilium aliquem advocaturus. Quod facere illi necessarium est cum ad haec civilia et domestica venituret, ut ita dicam, mortalia; in his sic illi opus est alieno consilio quomodomedico, quomodo gubernatori, quomodo advocato et litis ordinatori.

[14] It is necessary, for the sake of the argument, that I pass from this question into another. For it is asked whether the wise man will be about to deliberate, or will call someone into counsel. This it is necessary for him to do when he is going to come to these civil and domestic, so to speak, mortal matters; in these he has need of another’s counsel just as of a physician, just as of a helmsman, just as of an advocate and an arranger of a lawsuit.

Proderitergo sapiens aliquando sapienti; suadebit enim. Sed in illis quoque magnisac divinis, ut diximus, communiter honesta tractando et animos cogitationesquemiscendo utilis erit.

Therefore the wise man will sometimes profit a wise man; for he will persuade. But even in those great and divine matters, as we have said, by treating honorable things in common and by mingling minds and thoughts, he will be useful.

[15] Praeterea secundum naturam est et amicos conplectiet amicorum auctu ut suo proprioque laetari; nam nisi hoc fecerimus, nevirtus quidem nobis permanebit, quae exercendo sensu valet. Virtus autemsuadet praesentia bene conlocare, in futurum consulere, deliberare et intendereanimum: facilius intendet explicabitque qui aliquem sibi adsumpserit. Quaeretitaque aut perfectum virum aut proficientem vicinumque perfecto.

[15] Furthermore, it is according to nature both to embrace friends and to rejoice at the augmentation of friends as at one’s own proper good; for unless we do this, not even virtue will remain to us, which has its strength by exercising sense. But virtue advises to dispose present things well, to consult for the future, to deliberate, and to intend/strain the mind: he will more easily intend and unfold it who has associated someone with himself. He will therefore seek either a perfect man or one proficient—neighboring to the perfect.

Proderitautem ille perfectus, si consilium communi prudentia iuverit.

However, that perfect man will be of profit, if he shall have aided the counsel with common prudence.

[16] Aiunthomines plus in alieno negotio videre +initio+. Hoc illis evenit quos amorsui excaecat quibusque dispectum utilitatis timor in periculis excutit:incipiet sapere securior et extra metum positus. Sed nihilominus quaedamsunt quae etiam sapientes in alio quam in se diligentius vident. Praetereaillud dulcissimum et honestissimum 'idem velle atque idem nolle' sapienssapienti praestabit; egregium opus pari iugo ducet.

[16] They say that men see more in another’s business +at the beginning+. This befalls those whom love of self blinds and in whom fear, in dangers, shakes off the view of utility: one more secure and set outside fear will begin to be wise. But nonetheless there are certain things which even the wise see more diligently in another than in themselves. Moreover, that most sweet and most honest thing, 'to will the same and to not will the same,' a wise man will furnish to a wise man; he will lead a distinguished work under an equal yoke.

[17] Persolvi quod exegeras, quamquam in ordine rerum erat quas moralisphilosophiae voluminibus conplectimur. Cogita quod soleo frequenter tibidicere, in istis nos nihil aliud quam acumen exercere. Totiens enim illorevertor: quid ista me res iuvat?

[17] I have discharged what you exacted, although it was among the things which we encompass in the volumes of moral philosophy. Consider what I am accustomed frequently to say to you, that in these matters we exercise nothing other than acumen. For so often do I return to that point: how does this thing avail me?

fortiorem fac me, iustiorem, temperantiorem. Nondum exerceri vacat: adhuc medico mihi opus est.

Make me stronger, more just, more temperate. It is not yet time for training: I still have need of a medic.

[18] Quid me poscis scientiam inutilem? Magna promisisti: exhibe fidem. Dicebas intrepidumfore etiam si circa me gladii micarent, etiam si mucro tangeret iugulum;dicebas securum fore etiam si circa me flagrarent incendia, etiam si subitus turbo toto navem meam mari raperet: hanc mihi praesta curam, ut voluptatem, ut gloriam contemnam.

[18] Why do you demand from me useless knowledge? You promised great things: exhibit good faith. You said I would be intrepid even if swords flashed around me, even if the blade’s point touched my jugular; you said I would be secure even if conflagrations blazed around me, even if a sudden whirlwind were to snatch my ship over the whole sea: grant me this care, that I may contemn pleasure and glory.

Postea docebis inplicta solvere, ambigua distinguere, obscura perspicere: nunc doce quod necesse est. Vale.

Afterwards you will teach how to resolve the entangled, distinguish the ambiguous, see through the obscure: now teach what is necessary. Farewell.