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Dig. 27.3.0. De tutelae et rationibus distrahendis et utili curationis causa actione.
27.2.0. Where the ward ought to be educated or to reside, and on the aliments to be furnished to him.
Dig. 27.3.0. On sales to be made for the sake of guardianship and accounts, and on the useful action for the sake of curatorship.
Dig. 27.6.0. Quod falso tutore auctore gestum esse dicatur.
27.5.0. On one who has managed affairs in place of a tutor or of a curator.
Dig. 27.6.0. On what is said to have been transacted under the authorization of a false tutor.
Dig. 27.9.0. De rebus eorum, qui sub tutela vel cura sunt, sine decreto non alienandis vel supponendis.
27.8.0. On bringing actions against magistrates.
Dig. 27.9.0. On the property of those who are under tutelage or curatorship, not to be alienated or pledged without a decree.
Apeleuverikois orfanois eugeneis ou dwsousin ohi arxontes epitropous y kouratoras, plyn ei my pantelys aporia kata ton topon apeleuverwn estin: apeleuverikois gar apeleuverous monous dein didosvai tous ek tou autou topou ontas veiou markou oratiwn keleuei. ean de dovy, ho veiotatos sebyros twn afylikwn pronooumenos hupeuvunon auton einai ty epitropy, ean my emprovesmws dikaiologysytai, antegraqen.
For orphans of freedmen, the magistrates shall not appoint guardians or curators, unless there is an absolute lack, in that place, of freedmen; for to freedmen’s children one must assign only freedmen who are from the same locality, as the Oration of the Divine Marcus commands. But if they do so (contrary to this), the most pious Severus, caring for the friendless, by rescript has directed that he be held accountable in respect to the guardianship, unless he shall justify himself in due form.
Afientai epitropys kai kouratorias kai ohi hebdomykonta ety peplyrwkotes. huperbebykenai de dei ta hebdomykonta ety en ekeinw tw xronw en hw xeirotoneitai, y en hw ty klyronomia proserxetai tis, y en hw hy ahiresis hy ty diavyky prosgrafeisa peplyrwtai, ouk entos twn xronwn tys paraitysews.
They are released from tutelage and curatorship also those who have completed 70 years. But the 70 years must have been surpassed at that time in which one is appointed, or in which the inheritance accrues to someone, or in which the election or the designation prescribed in the testament has been completed, not merely within the period for declination.
Ou monon de uhioi afesin epitropys didoasin kai vugateres, alla kai eggonoi ec uhiwn arrenwn texventes arrenes te kai vyleiai. boyvousin de tote, hopotan tou patros autwn apovanontos ton ekeinou topon plyrwswsin tw pappw. hosoi d' an wsin eggonoi ec henos uhiou, anti henos teknou arivmountai.
Not only sons and daughters give a release from guardianship, but also grandchildren born from male sons, both males and females. They avail then, whenever, their father having died, they fill his place with respect to their grandfather. And as many as are grandchildren from one son are counted in place of a single child.
Ton de arivmon twn teknwn ton hwrismenon tais diatacesin einai dei hekastw tote, hote xeirotoneitai, ouxi kan meta to xeirotonyvynai genyvy pro tou ta dikaia tys afesews parasxesvai: ohi gar meta touto gegenymenoi ou boyvousin, hws diatacis fysin sebyrou kai antwninou.
The number of children prescribed by the ordinances must be had by each person at the time when he is appointed, not even if, after the appointment, a child is born before the rights of release (exemption) have been furnished; for those born after this are not counted, as is the nature of the ordinance of Severus and Antoninus.
Eti myn kai ohi treis exontes epitropas y treis kourationas y anamemigmenas treis kouratorias te kai epitropas kai eti menousas, tout' estin mypw ekbantwn tyn hylikian twn afylikwn, ohutoi afientai eis tetartyn epitropyn y kouratorian kaloumenoi. alla myn kan kouratwr tis y my afylikos, alla mainomenou, eis ton arivmon twn kouratoriwn kai auty hupologisvysetai hy kouratoria: hoper ohutws exein didaskei diatacis sebyrou kai antwninou. legei kai ho kratistos oulpianos peri twn triwn epitropwn tauta.
Moreover also, those who have three guardianships or three curatorships, or three mixed—curatorships and guardianships—and which are still continuing, that is, the wards not yet having come out into their age, these are allowed into a fourth guardianship or curatorship, so called. But indeed, even if someone is curator not of a minor, but of a madman, this curatorship too will be reckoned into the number of curatorships: which a constitution of Severus and Antoninus teaches to stand thus. And the most excellent Ulpian also says these things concerning the three guardianships.
Tria onera tutelarum dant excusationem. tria autem onera sic sunt accipienda, ut non numerus pupillorum plures tutelas faciat, sed patrimoniorum separatio: et ideo qui tribus fratribus tutor datus est, qui indivisum patrimonium haberent, vel quibusdam tutor, quibusdam curator, unam tutelam suscepisse creditur.
Three burdens of guardianships grant an exemption. Moreover, the three burdens are to be understood thus: not the number of pupils makes multiple guardianships, but the separation of patrimonies; and therefore he who has been appointed tutor to three brothers who hold an undivided patrimony, or tutor to some and curator to others, is considered to have undertaken one guardianship.
Efamen treis exontas epitropas eis tetartyn my kaleisvai. ezytyvy toinun, ean tis en duo wn epitropais eita eis epitropyn trityn problyveis ekkalesytai kai eti metewrou ousys tys dikys tys epi ty ekklytw eis tetartyn epitropyn problyvy, poteron eis tyn tetartyn dikaiologoumenos mnysvysetai kai tys tritys y pantapasin paraleiqei ekeinyn. kai ehuriskw hupo twn veiotatwn sebyrou kai antwninou diatetagmenon my dein eis tetartyn proxeirizesvai ton apo tys tritys ekklyton pepoiymenon, alla metewrou ousys tys epi ty trity xeirotonia dikaiologias to ekeinys telos perimenein horon esomenon ty tetarty xeirotonia, orvw tw logw: ei gar tyn ty tacei tetartyn hupodecetai tis hws ty dunamei trityn, adikou tys epi ty trity ekklytou apofanveisys tessarsi xreiais enkatasxevysetai para tous nomous.
We have said that one having three guardianships is not to be summoned to a fourth. I therefore inquire: if someone, being in two guardianships, then, on being appointed to a third guardianship, lodges an appeal, and while the case about the appeal is still pending, he is appointed to a fourth guardianship, will he, when pleading an excuse for the fourth, make mention also of the third, or will he wholly pass that one by? And I find it laid down by the most pious Severus and Antoninus that one who has made an appeal from the third is not to be appointed to a fourth, but, while the justification concerning the appointment to the third is pending, the outcome of that must be awaited, which will be a limit with respect to the appointment to the fourth, seeing the reasoning thus: for if in point of order someone receives the fourth as, in effect, a third, by an unjust pronouncement concerning the appeal on the third he will be equipped with four obligations contrary to the laws.
Ean patyr en trisin y frontisin y epitropwn y kouratoriwn, ho uhios autou ouk enoxlyvysetai, kai touto ohutw diatetaktai hupo twn veiotatwn sebyrou kai antwninou. touto de kai ek tou enantiou estin, hws dein tas tou uhiou epitropas anesin tw patri didonai kai palin amfoterois tas koinas, tout' estin mian tou uhiou kai duo tou patros ye eis to empalin. tote de tauta ohutws exei, epeidan to baros heni oikw, ouxi diakexwrismenois diafery.
If a father is engaged in three charges, either of tutorships or of curatorships, his son shall not be troubled; and this has been ordered thus by the most sacred Severus and Antoninus. And this also holds conversely: that exemptions for the son’s guardianships are to be given to the father, and again to both for the joint ones—that is, one of the son and two of the father—or in the reverse. But these things stand thus when the burden pertains to a single household, not when they are separated and distinct.
Tria onera in domo una esse sufficit: proinde si pater alicuius vel filius vel frater qui est in eiusdem potestate tria onera sustineat, quae ad periculum patris sui spectent, quia voluntate eius administrant, omnibus excusatio a tutela competit. sed si non patris voluntate administrent, non prodesse saepe rescriptum est.
It suffices that three burdens be in one house: accordingly, if someone’s father, or a son, or a brother who is under the same power, sustains three burdens which look to the peril of his father, since they administer by his will, an excuse from guardianship belongs to all. But if they administer not by the father’s will, it has often been rescripted that it does not profit.
Ean duo exonti epitropas allai duo homou epaxvwsin, hy ty tacei trity boyvysei autw eis tyn afesin tys tetartys, kan autokratwr y ho tyn tetartyn egxeirisas, y tyn trityn, prin mentoi gnwnai ta tou autokratoros fvasy problyveis eis allyn. ean de hy tacis my fainytai, alla en mia hymera ahi duo xeirotoniai protevwsin en diaforois xartais, oux' ho xeirotonyveis, alla ho xeirotonysas epilecetai, hopoian dei auton hupodecasvai.
If two have the power to appoint curators, and two others together concur, then the silence of a third will assist him toward the release of the fourth, even if he be an autokrator, or the one who entrusted the fourth, or the third—provided, however, that, before learning the autokrator’s position, he makes provision toward another. But if the order does not appear, and on one day two appointments take precedence in different charters, it is not the one being appointed, but the one appointing who is chosen, as to which he ought to accept.
Estin de kai ho arivmos hrytorwn en hekasty polei twn tyn aleitourgysian exontwn, kai ahireseis tines proskeimenai tw nomw, hoper dyloutai ec epistolys antwninou tou eusebous grafeisys men tw koinw tys asias, panti de tw kosmw diaferousys, hys estin to kefalaion touto hupotetagmenon: " ahi men elattous poleis dunantai pente iatrous ateleis exein kai treis sofistas kai grammatikous tous isous: ahi de meizous poleis hepta tous verapeuontas, tessaras tous paideuontas hekateran paideian: ahi de megistai poleis deka iatrous kai hrytoras pente kai grammatikous tous isous. huper de touton ton arivmon oude hy megisty polis tyn ateleian parexei". eikos de tw men megistw arivmw xrysasvai tas mytropoleis twn evnwn, tw de deuterw tas exousas agoras dikwn, tw de tritw tas loipas.
There is also the number of rhetors in each city who have exemption from public liturgies, and certain selections appended to the law, which is made clear from a letter of Antoninus the Pious, written to the common council of Asia, yet of concern to the whole world, whose principal contents are subjoined as follows: "In smaller cities they may have five physicians exempt, and three sophists, and an equal number of grammarians; in larger cities, seven practitioners and four instructors for each branch of education; in the very greatest cities, ten physicians, and five rhetors, and an equal number of grammarians. Beyond this number not even the greatest city shall grant exemption." It is likely that the maximum number is used by the metropolises of the provinces, the second by those that have assizes (law-courts), and the third by the rest.
Peri de twn filosofwn hy auty diatacis tou piou ohutw legei: " filosofwn de ouk etaxvy arivmos dia to spanious einai tous filosofountas: oimai de hoti ohi ploutw huperballontes evelontai parecousin tas apo twn hrymatwn wfeleias tais patrisin: ei de akribologointo peri tas ousias, autoven ydy faneroi genysontai my filosofountes".
Concerning the philosophers, the same ordinance of the Pious says thus: " philosophers, however, have not a fixed number assigned, because those who philosophize are rare: I think that those surpassing in wealth will willingly provide to their fatherlands the benefits arising from their money: but if they were to be over-precise about their estates, straightway they will become manifest as not philosophizing".
Estin de kai en tais tou basilews kommodou diatacesin engegrammenon kefalaion ec epistolys antwninou tou eusebous, en hw dyloutai kai filosofous aleitourgysian exein apo epitropwn. estin de ta hrymata tauta: " homoiws de toutois hapasin ho veiotatos patyr mou parelvwn euvus epi tyn arxyn diatagmati tas huparxousas timas kai ateleias ebebaiwsen, graqas filosofous hrytoras grammatikous iatrous ateleis einai gumnasiarxiwn agoranomiwn hierwsunwn epistavmiwn sitwnias elaiwnias kai myte krinein myte presbeuein myte eis strateian katalegesvai akontas myte eis allyn autous hupyresian evnikyn y tina allyn anagkazesvai".
There is also in the ordinances of Emperor Commodus a chapter recorded from a letter of Antoninus the Pious, in which it is declared that philosophers too have exemption from liturgies from the procurators. The words are these: "Likewise to all these things my most divine father, having happily entered upon the rule, by a decree confirmed the existing honors and immunities, having written that philosophers, rhetors, grammarians, and physicians are to be exempt from gymnasiarchies, agoranomies, priesthoods, superintendencies, the grain-supply and the oil-supply, and neither to judge nor to serve as envoys, nor to be enrolled for military service against their will, nor to be compelled into any other public service or any other."
Eti kakeino eidenai xry, hoti ho en ty idia patridi didaskwn y verapeuwn tyn aleitourgysian tautyn exei: ean gar komaneus wn en neokaisareia sofisteuy y verapeuy y didasky, para komaneusin aleitourgysian ouk exei. kai touto ohutw nenomovetytai hupo twn veiotatwn sebyrou kai antwninou.
And it is also necessary to know this, that the one teaching or practicing in his own fatherland has this exemption from liturgies: for if, being a Comanean, he is in Neocaesarea acting as a sophist or practicing or teaching, he does not have exemption from liturgies among the Comaneans. And this has been thus legislated by the most divine Severus and Antoninus.
Ton en hromy sofisteuonta y salariw y kai xwris salariou afesin exein nenomovetytai hupo twn veiotatwn sebyrou kai antwninou, ohutws hws an ei etuxen en idia patridi didaskwn. ahis nomovesiais dunatai tis ekeinon prosagagein ton logon, hoti koinys ousys te kai nomizomenys patridos tys basileuousys eikotws an hws en idia patridi xrysimon heauton parasxwn aleitourgysian karpwsetai.
the one sophisting in rome, with a salary and also without a salary, has been legislated to have exemption by the most divine severus and antoninus, just as if he happened to be teaching in his own fatherland. from these enactments one can advance this argument: since the imperial city is common and is considered a fatherland, he would reasonably, as though in his own fatherland, by presenting himself as useful, reap exemption from liturgies.
Didwsin afesin epitropys kai kefaliky exvra tw xeirotonyventi genomeny pros ton patera twn orfanwn, ektos ei my kata diavykas faneiy doveis ho epitropos, plyn ei my meta to grafynai tyn diavykyn kefalikos agwn autois pros allylous sunesty, y ei my presbutera men estin tys diavykys hy exvra, dia touto de dokei didosvai epitropos, hina hupoblyvy enoxy kai pragmasin: kai touto ec epistolys sebyrou basilews deiknutai.
He is given exemption from guardianship and from the capitation to the one elected to the office of Father of Orphans, unless the guardian appears to have been appointed by testament; except if, after the testament was written, a principal contest arose between them with one another, or if the widow is earlier than the testament—for this reason a guardian is thought to be assigned, in order that he may be subject to liability and to troubles: and this is shown by a letter of the emperor Severus.
Peri twn agroikwn kai twn tapeinwn kai twn agrammatwn grafei paulos ohutwsi: mediocritas et rusticitas interdum excusationem praebent secundum epistulas divorum hadriani et antonini. eius qui se neget litteras scire, excusatio accipi non debet, si modo non sit expers negotiorum.
Concerning the country people and the humble and the illiterate, Paulus writes thus: mediocrity and rusticity sometimes afford an excuse according to the letters of the deified Hadrian and Antoninus. As for one who says he does not know letters, an excuse ought not to be accepted, provided only that he is not devoid of experience in affairs.
Ohi palai stratiwtai ohi epitimws plyrwsantes ton tys strateias xronon afesin exousin epitropwn pros pantas tous idiwtas. pros de tous paidas twn tys autys tacews kekoinwnykotwn y pantwn palai stratiwtwn entos men eniautou tou apostrateusasvai afesin exousin, meta de eniauton ouketi. to gar isotimon tys strateias isxuroteron enomisvy tys twn palai stratiwtwn pronomias, ean my ara alla exwsin dikaia pros paraitysin epitropys, ohion arivmon etwn y ti toiouto, hopoion kai tois idiwtais pros hapantas sunairesvai eiwven.
The veterans, who have honorably completed the time of their military service, have an exemption from guardianships with respect to all private persons. But as to the sons of those who have shared in the same rank, or of all veterans, they have an exemption within a year from their discharge from service, but after a year no longer. For the equal worth of military service was judged stronger than the privileges of the veterans—unless perhaps they have other just grounds for declining a guardianship, such as age (a certain number of years) or something of that sort, such as is also wont to be allowed to private persons against everyone.
Esv' hote de ou plyrousi tines ton tys strateias xronon kai homws exousin afesin epitropwn kata ta auta tois plyrwsasin: ho gar eikoston etos tys strateias huperbas homoios einai pisteuetai tw plyrwsanti ton tys strateias xronon.
There are times when some do not complete the time of military service and yet have exemption from guardianships on the same terms as those who have completed: for he who has surpassed the twentieth year of military service is considered similar to one who has completed the time of military service.
Ho de entos toutwn twn etwn afeveis ouk exei diyneky tyn epi tais epitropais aleitourgysian, alla pros xronon, hwsper kai twn loipwn politikwn leitourgiwn afesin exei. ho men gar entos pente etwn tys strateias apoluveis oudemian heautw ekdikysei aleitourgysian, ho de meta pente henos eniautou exei aleitourgysian, ho de meta oktw dieteias, ho de meta dwdeka trieteias, ho de meta dekaec tetraeteias, ho de meta eikosin, hws proeipomen, diynekws apoluvysetai.
But the one discharged within these years does not have a perpetual exemption from guardianships, but only for a time, just as he has a remission from the other civic liturgies. For the one released from military service within 5 years will vindicate no exemption for himself; but after 5 he has an exemption of 1 year; after 8, of 2 years; after 12, of 3 years; after 16, of 4 years; but after 20, as we said above, he will be released perpetually.
Grafei de kai oulpianos ohutws: sed ignominia missi ab urbicis plane tutelis excusabuntur, quia ingredi eis urbem non licet. plane si quis in cohortibus urbanis permilitavit, licet ante viginti annos mittitur, tamen perpetuam habet a tutelis excusationem.
And Ulpian also writes thus: but those discharged with ignominy will plainly be excused from urban guardianships, because it is not permitted for them to enter the city. Plainly, if someone has completed service in the urban cohorts, although he is discharged before 20 years, nevertheless he has a perpetual excuse from guardianships.
Ezytyvy de poteron mian hapac epitropyn anadexontai ohi palai stratiwtai, y heni kairw ou pleon tou hapac, pauomenys de tys prwtys epitropys palin analyqontai. all' hwsper epi twn idiwtwn ahi pausamenai ou boyvysousin tois esxykosi oude eis tas treis qyfizontai, ohutws kai epi twn palai stratiwtwn ouk wfelei to gegenysvai. touto de kai epi twn kouratoriwn estin nenomovetymenon, hws dyloi veia diatacis sebyrou kai antwninou.
They inquire whether the veteran soldiers will undertake one guardianship only once, or not more than once at one time, and, when the first guardianship ceases, whether they will take up another again. But just as, in the case of private persons, those that have ceased will not avail as to the sixty nor be counted among the three, so also in the case of veteran soldiers it is no benefit that it has happened. This too has been legislated concerning curatorships, as a divine ordinance of Severus and Antoninus makes clear.
Primipilarioi ek diatacewn basilikwn paraitysin exousin twn loipwn epitropwn, primipilariou de uhiwn epitropeusousin. primipilarioi de ohutoi nomizontai ohi dianusantes to primipilon: ean de my dianusas apovany, toutou twn paidwn primipilarios ouk epitropeusei.
Primipilares, by imperial constitutions, have an excuse from the other tutorships/guardianships, but they will be tutors/guardians of the sons of a primipilaris. Primipilares are considered those who have completed the primipilate; but if someone dies without having completed it, a primipilaris will not be tutor/guardian of this man’s children.
Has mentoi proteron eixon epitropas, dia de touto apevento hoti dymosiou heneka pragmatos apedymoun, tautas epanelvontes parauta epanalyqontai ouden autois boyvountos tou eniautou: ho gar eniautos pros tas mellousas kainas didontai, ouxi pros tas analyfvynai ofeilousas.
However, they previously had guardianships; and for this they were excused because they were absent on account of a public matter. Returning to these, they at once take them up again, the year giving them no assistance: for the year is granted for the forthcoming new ones, not for those that ought to be resumed.
Kai ohi kata diavykas doventes epitropoi paraitysontai kata nomous ton xeirismon twn en ally eparxia ontwn ktymatwn, hws dyloi hy hupotetagmeny tou veiotatou sebyrou diatacis: " divi severus et antoninus augusti valerio. testamento tutor datus ante praefinitum diem adire debuisti et postulare, ut ab administratione rerum, quae in alia provincia erant, liberareris".
And the guardians appointed by wills will, according to the laws, excuse themselves from the handling of properties that are in another province, as the subjoined ordinance of the most divine Severus shows: " the deified Severus and Antoninus Augusti to Valerius. Being given as tutor by a testament, you ought, before the pre-fixed day, to present yourself and to request that you be freed from the administration of the affairs which were in another province".
Homoiws kai eis ton topon ekeinou tou epitropou, hon meta tauta sunkavedron heautw tis apygagen, dovysetai kouratwr, hws fysin diatacis tou veiotatou sebyrou: hyn orvws efarmozwn pasin tois homoiois kefalaiois kouratora didosvai erei eis ton topon twn xronou anapausin lambanontwn.
Likewise, also into the place of that guardian, whom thereafter someone brought to sit with himself as a colleague, a curator shall be given, as the ordinance of the most venerable Severus states; and by rightly applying this, he will say that in all like headings a curator is to be given in the place of those who have passed into the rest of time.
Ean apeleuveros dovy afylic hupo patrwnos epitropos tois teknois autou, y kai heteros hoiosdypote elattwn twn eikosi pente eniautwn, hews men afylic y, ouk enoxlyvysetai. en tosoutw de heteros eis topon autou xeirotonyvysetai kydemwn. homoios estin toutw kai ho nomimos epitropos, ean afylic wn tuxy: kai gar kai eis ton topon toutou kydemwn en tw tews dovysetai.
If a freedman, appointed by his patron as guardian to his children, or any other person whatsoever under twenty‑five years, so long as he is under age, will not be troubled. Meanwhile, however, another will be appointed in his place as a curator. Similarly also with the lawful guardian, if it should happen that he is under age: for a curator too will be given in his place for the time being.
Ean tis ohutws nosysy, hws dein auton my pantapasin afevynai epitropys, eis ton topon autou kouratwr didotai. hraisas de palin ohutos analyqetai tyn epitropyn. ei de kai tis eis manian empesy, homoios estin toutw. ohutw kai oulpianos grafei: adversa quoque valetudo excusat, sed ea, quae impedimento est, quo minus quis suis rebus superesse possit, ut imperator noster cum patre rescripsit:
If someone falls ill in such a way that it is necessary that he not at all discharge a guardianship, a curator is given in his place. But when he has recovered, in turn the curatorship is dissolved. And if someone also falls into mania, it is the same. Thus too Ulpian writes: adverse health likewise excuses, but that which is an impediment, whereby a person is unable to look after his own affairs, as our emperor together with his father rescripted:
Eisin kai alloi, ohi, kan ydy wsin epitropoi y kouratores, diynekws loipon apoluontai tys frontidos, ohion ohi tyn hestian allaxou metaveinai tuxontes ec antigrafys basilews, eidotos men auton epitropeuein, to de metoikysai hrytws autw filotimoumenou, kai toutwn hekateron dylountos tois grammasin.
There are also others who, even if they are already guardians or curators, are thereafter continuously released from the charge: for example, those who have obtained from an imperial rescript to transfer their hearth elsewhere, it being known that they are acting as guardians, but that they are making it their ambition to change residence; and the letters declare each of these points.
Eidenai xry hoti oute ohi xeirotonyventes epitropoi oute ohi kata diavykyn doventes ekkaleisvai anagkyn exousin, hws dyloi diatacis twn veiotatwn sebyrou kai antwninou. touto de parafulattein dei kai epi twn xeirotonyventwn kouratorwn: en oligois gar panu diallattousin ohi kouratores apo twn epitropwn. kata mentoi twn qyfwn twn ekballouswn autois tas eckousationas adeian hecousin ekkaleisvai.
One must know that neither the tutors appointed by election nor those given under a testament have necessity to be summoned to an excusation, as the rescript of the most divine Severus and Antoninus makes clear. This must be safeguarded also in the case of curators appointed by election: for in a few points curators differ from tutors. However, as to the petitions (libelli) that reject their excusations, they have leave to appeal.
Polla de parafulattein prosykei, hina epitrapwsin epitropoi y kouratores ta dikaia parasxesvai tys afesews. dei gar autous emprovesmws proselvein tw dikasty. eisin de ahi provesmiai ahutai: ho men gar en auty ty polei wn, hopou kexeirotonytai, y entos hekatostou miliou tys polews entos pentykonta hymerwn paraitysetai, y meta touto ou sugxwryvysetai, all' hecetai tys frontidos.
It is proper to take many precautions, in order that guardians and curators be permitted to present the just grounds for release. For they must appear within the term before the judge. And these are the terms: one who is in the very city where he has been appointed, or within the hundredth milestone of the city, shall submit his excuse within fifty days; and after this it will not be allowed, but he will assume the charge.
and if he does not do any of these, he will be in the same fault, in that he is declared to have made light of his own danger, for leaving himself no route for an excuse. but he who is away more than 100 miles from the city will have 20 miles reckoned to him for each day, from the day on which he learns (he must be notified by the magistrates either in person or at his house); and besides these he has another 30 days for justification. this also applies to those appointments given by testaments, whether they be guardians or curators, which curators it is fitting to be confirmed by the governor.
Heteron de ekeino ehuriskomen ek tys markou nomovesias zytysews acion: tw gar en auty ty polei onti, en hy kexeirotonytai y entos hekaton miliwn pentykonta hymerwn edwken ho nomovetys provesmian. tw de huper hekaton milia diatribonti kav' hekastyn hymeran dein arivmeisvai eikosi milia ekeleusen kai ecwven toutwn allas triakonta hymeras prosevyken eis dikaiologian. hoven sumbainei, ean y tis apo hekaton hecykonta miliwn tas diatribas poioumenos, toutw einai provesmian oktw kai triakonta hymeron, oktw men twn hekaton hecykonta miliwn, hws kav' hekastyn hymeran eikosi miliwn arivmoumenwn, triakonta de tas pros tyn dikaiologian.
Moreover, we find another point from that statute of Marcus, worthy of inquiry: for to the one being in that very city in which he has been elected, or within 100 miles, the legislator gave a grace period of 50 days. But for the one spending time beyond 100 miles, he ordered that for each day 20 miles must be reckoned, and besides these he added another 30 days for justification. Whence it follows that, if someone is making his sojourn from 160 miles, for him the grace period is 38 days—8 on account of the 160 miles, since 20 miles are counted for each day, and 30 for the justification.
Therefore the one spending time far away will be in a worse position than the one within one hundred miles or in the city itself, if indeed to these there are always fifty days of grace period, but to those fewer. But even if, in the highest degree, the letter of the law produces this understanding, nevertheless the intention of the lawgiver wills otherwise. For thus also Cervidius Scaevola, Paulus, and Domitius Ulpianus, the leading men among the jurists, write, affirming that these things must be guarded in such a way as never to give anyone a grace period less than fifty days; and a longer one then, whenever the computation of the days on the road, when added to the thirty days which the law gives for justification, exceeds fifty days—for example, if we say that someone is residing at four hundred and forty miles: for such a man will have for the journey twenty-two days, and for justification another thirty.
Ohutws de epanagkes estin fulattein tyn provesmian, hoti kan dikaiologysamenos afevy, my eleuverousvai auton ohi veiotatoi sebyros kai antwninos dylousin en diatacei keleusantes my krateisvai ton eis topon autou xeirotonyventa, hws ouk econ dedomenon eis topon ontos epitropou.
Thus it is by necessity to keep the time limit, because even if, having pleaded a justification, he is let go, Severus and Antoninus, most authoritative, declare in a constitution that he is not freed, ordering that the person appointed in his place is not to be held valid, since it is not permitted that someone be given in his place while a curator exists.
Apoxry de entos tys provesmias entuxein monon: ean gar meta tauta my hekwn apoleifvy, ouk estai paragraqimos. dioper ean afosiwsews xarin monon entuxy, my epimeiny de meta tauta ty dikaiologia, meta tyn provesmian hupopeseitai ty paragrafy. kai legei touto diatacis twn autokratorwn sebyrou kai antwninou.
It suffices, within the time-limit, to submit a petition only; for if thereafter he is left hindered unwillingly, he will not be subject to the plea of bar. Wherefore, if he makes application only for the sake of obtaining a release, and does not thereafter persist in his justification, after the time-limit he will fall under the bar. And this is stated by an ordinance of the emperors Severus and Antoninus.
Ean gar tis dia noson y di' allyn anagkyn, ohion valassys y xeimwnos y efodou lystwn y tina heteran paraplysian, emprovesmws my dunytai entuxein, sungnwmys tugxanein. ohu tyn pistin yrkei sustysai kai ec autou tou fusei dikaiou, plyn alla kai diatacis estin twn autokratorwn sebyrou kai antwninou tauta legousa.
for if someone, because of illness or because of another necessity, such as the sea or winter or an incursion of robbers or some other similar thing, cannot in due time make an appearance, he obtains indulgence; provided one can establish proof, both from natural justice itself; moreover, there is also a constitution of the emperors Severus and Antoninus stating these things.
Eidenai de dei, hoti ouk apoxry to proselvein tw dikazonti, alla dei auton kai peri tou eidous tys afesews marturasvai, kai ei polla exei pros afesin dikaia, panta onomasai: ei de my, homoios estin tw myde tyn arxyn proselyluvoti ho proselvwn men, dikaion de afesews my onomasas.
One must know that it does not suffice to approach the judge, but he must also testify concerning the species of the release (exemption); and if he has many just causes for release, he must name them all: otherwise, he is like one who has not even come at the outset—having indeed approached, but not having named the just ground of release.
Ohi gar paranomws doventes epitropoi, tout' estin y huf' hwn my exryn, y ohutoi ohus my exryn, y ohis my exryn, y hon my exryn tropon, ean myte bebaiwvwsin myte efaqwntai tou xeirismou, eisin aneuvunoi, oude prooisei tis autois hoti tas provesmias ouk etyrysan twn paraitysewn: oude gar exousin paraitysews anagkyn, hws deiknutai ek twn hupotetagmenwn diatacewn, has paradeigmatos xarin hupetaca, efarmozointo de an pasin. divi severus et antoninus augusti narcisso. ab avo materno tutor datus necesse non habuisti excusari, cum ipso iure non teneris: si igitur administrationi te non miscuisti, potes esse securus " . homoiws de kai ean ton my hupokeimenon ty dikaiodosia xeirotonyswsin ohi arxontes epitropon y kouratora, oude ohutos anagkyn exei parafulassein tas provesmias, ohion ton myte polityn myte inkolan.
for guardians appointed unlawfully, that is, either those under whom I ought not to be, or those whom I ought not to be under, or those to whom I ought not to be subject, or in whatever manner I ought not to be subject—if they neither confirm nor touch the administration, they are without liability; nor will anyone proceed against them because they did not keep the time-limits for petitions of excuse: for they have no necessity of an excuse, as is shown from the subjoined constitutions, which I have appended for the sake of example, and they would be applicable to all. the deified severus and antoninus augusti to narcissus. appointed as tutor by your maternal grandfather, you did not need to be excused, since by the law itself you are not bound: if therefore you did not involve yourself in the administration, you can be secure ". likewise also, if the magistrates appoint as guardian or curator a person not subject to their jurisdiction, he too has no necessity to observe the time-limits, for example one who is neither a citizen nor an incola (resident).
Ean ho tys polews arxwn, tout' estin ho stratygos diapiptouses autw tys xeirotonias hupeuvunos genytai kindunw epitropys, tautyn ou sunarivmysei allais epitropais, hwsper oude ho egguysamenos epitropyn, all' oude ohi kata timyn epitropoi grafentes.
If the ruler of the city, that is, the strategos, the election having fallen to him, becomes answerable to the risk of a guardianship, he shall not reckon this together with other guardianships, just as neither shall the one who has given surety for a guardianship, nor those appointed as guardians by way of honor.
Ho polla dikaia exwn eipein, hwn hekaston kav' heauto ouk estin isxuron, ei dunysetai afevynai ezytyvy. ohion hebdomykonta men etwn ouk estin oude treis exei epitropas oude pente tekna y allo ti dikaion afesews, exei mentoi duo epitropas kai duo paidas kai hecykonta estin etwn, y alla tina toiauta legei kav' heauta men entely tyn boyveian my parexonta, ty de pros allyla koinwnia onta dikaiofany. all' edocen touton my afiesvai.
He who has many just grounds to allege, each of which by itself is not strong—can he obtain a discharge by having them added together? For example, he is not seventy years old, nor does he have three tutorships, nor five children, nor any other just ground of release; yet he does have two tutorships and two sons and is sixty years old, or says other such things which, taken by themselves, do not provide complete assistance, but in their conjunction with one another appear just. But it was decided not to release this man.
Ulpianus libro singulari de excusationibus ita scribit: si quis inter tres tutelas emancipati filii sui tutelam administret, an ei haec in numerum procedit, scio dubitatum: invenio tamen rescriptum emancipatae filiae tutelam numerari inter onera oportere.
Ulpian, in his single book On Excuses, writes thus: if someone, among the three guardianships, administers the guardianship of his emancipated son, whether this enters into the count for him, I know has been doubted; yet I find a rescript that the guardianship of an emancipated daughter ought to be counted among the burdens.
Ean tis xeirotonyvy epitropos wn en ty tou patros ecousia, eita ho patyr my bouloito huper autou asfalizesvai, ekeleusan ohi nomoi kai auton ton patera xeirotoneisvai epitropon, hws mydeni tropw diakrousvy to epi ty epitropy asfales: hws dyloi tou veiou hadrianou diatacis: " imperator hadrianus vitrasio pollioni legato lygdonensi. si clodius macer, quamvis filius familias sit, idoneus tutor esse videbitur, pater autem eius idcirco cavere non vult, ut filium suum tutela eximat, et in hoc artificio perseveraverit, existimo te huic fraudi recte occursurum, ut et filius et ipse ad tutelam liberorum clementis gerendam compellantur".
If someone, being appointed guardian while under the father’s authority, and then the father should not wish to provide security on his behalf, the laws ordered that the father himself also be appointed guardian, so that in no way the security concerning the guardianship be thwarted: as the ordinance of the divine Hadrian makes clear: "emperor hadrian to vitrasio pollio, legate of lugdunum. if clodius macer, although he is a filius familias, will seem suitable to be tutor, but his father for that reason does not wish to give security, in order to remove his son from the tutelage, and has persisted in this contrivance, I think you will rightly counter this fraud, so that both the son and he himself are compelled to undertake the tutelage of the children of clements."
Gaius testamento nigidium filio suo tutorem dedit eundemque usque ad vicensimum quintum annum curatorem constituit: quaero, cum liceat nigidio a curatione etiam citra appellationem se excusare, ex qua die tempora, quae in excusationibus observanda divus marcus statuit, computanda sunt, utrum ex die aperti testamenti, an ex quo ad negotia gerenda vocatur, id est post quartum decimum annum impletum. modestinus respondit excusationem a cura tunc necessariam esse, cum decreto praetoris seu praesidis confirmatus curator fuerit.
Gaius by will gave Nigidius as tutor to his son and appointed the same man curator up to the twenty-fifth year: I ask, since it is permitted to Nigidius to excuse himself from the curatorship even without an appeal, from what day the periods which, in excuses, the deified Marcus established should be observed are to be computed, whether from the day the will is opened, or from the time he is called to manage the affairs, that is, after the fourteenth year has been completed. Modestinus replied that an excuse from the cura is then necessary when the curator has been confirmed by decree of the praetor or of the praeses (governor).
Non tantum magnitudo patrimoniorum ineunda est susceptarum trium tutelarum quaeque suscipienda est, sed etiam aetas pupillorum consideranda est: nam si priorum pupillorum aetas prope pubertatem sit, ita ut tantummodo semenstre tempus reliquum fuerit, aut eorum quorum suscipere tutelam cogitur, non dabitur excusatio: idque principalibus constitutionibus cavetur.
Not only must the magnitude of the patrimonies of the three tutelages already undertaken and of any tutelage to be undertaken be entered into consideration, but the age of the wards must also be considered: for if the age of the earlier wards is near puberty, such that only a half‑year of time remains, or (likewise) of those whose tutelage he is compelled to assume, no excuse will be given; and this is provided for by imperial constitutions.
Iliensibus et propter inclutam nobilitatem civitatis et propter coniunctionem originis romanae iam antiquitus et senatus consultis et constitutionibus principum plenissima immunitas tributa est, ut etiam tutelae excusationem habeant, scilicet eorum pupillorum, qui ilienses non sint: idque divus pius rescripsit.
To the Ilians, both on account of the renowned nobility of the city and on account of the conjunction of Roman origin, from antiquity already, by senatorial decrees and by the constitutions of the emperors, the fullest immunity has been granted, so that they even have an exemption from tutela, namely from that of wards who are not Ilians: and the deified Pius so rescripted.
Eos, qui in corporibus sunt veluti fabrorum, immunitatem habere dicimus etiam circa tutelarum exterorum hominum administrationem habebunt excusationem, nisi si facultates eorum adauctae fuerint, ut ad cetera quoque munera publica suscipienda compellantur: idque principalibus constitutionibus cavetur.
Those who are in the corpora, as for example of craftsmen, we say have immunity; they will also have an excuse with respect to the administration of guardianships of outside persons, unless their faculties have been augmented, so that they are compelled to undertake other public munera as well: and this is provided for by imperial constitutions.
Sane notum est, quod gerentibus honorem vacationem tutelarum concedi placuit, vacare autem eos, qui tunc primum vocentur ad suscipiendum officium tutelae: ceterum eos, qui iam se miscuerint administrationi, ne tempore quidem magistratus vacare aeque notum est.
Indeed it is well known that it was decided to grant exemption from tutelages to those bearing an honor (public office), and that those are exempt who are then for the first time called to undertake the office of tutelage; but as for those who have already involved themselves in the administration, it is equally well known that they do not be exempt, not even in the time of their magistracy.
Bello amissi ad tutelae excusationem prosunt: quaesitum est autem, qui sunt isti, utrum hi, qui in acie sunt interempti an vero omnes omnino, qui per causam belli parentibus sunt abrepti, in obsidione forte. melius igitur probabitur eos solos, qui in acie amittuntur, prodesse debere, cuiuscumque sexus vel aetatis sint: hi enim pro re publica ceciderunt.
Those lost in war are of benefit for an excusation from tutelage: the question has been raised, however, who these are—whether those who are slain in the battle-line, or indeed all altogether who, by reason of war, are snatched from their parents, perhaps in a siege. Therefore it will be better approved that only those who are lost in the battle-line ought to avail, of whatever sex or age they may be: for these fell for the commonwealth.
Si pupillum patruus contendat exheredtatum esse et se heredem scriptum, aequum est tutorem pupillo dari recepta patrui excusatione vel, si nolit excusationem petere, remoto eo a tutela ita litem de hereditate expedire.
If the paternal uncle contends that the ward has been disinherited and that he himself has been named heir, it is equitable that a tutor be given to the ward, upon acceptance of the uncle’s excuse; or, if he is unwilling to seek an excuse, that, he being removed from the tutela, the lawsuit over the inheritance be thus expedited.
Licet datus tutor ad universum patrimonium datus est, tamen excusare se potest, ne ultra centensimum lapidem tutelam gerat, nisi in eadem provincia pupilli patrimonium sit: et ideo illarum rerum dabunt tutores in provincia praesides eius.
Although a tutor has been appointed over the entire patrimony, nevertheless he can excuse himself, so as not to administer the tutelage beyond the hundredth milestone, unless the ward’s patrimony is in the same province: and therefore, for those matters, the governors of that province will appoint tutors.
Nequaquam credendum est ei privilegium excusationis ablatum, cui fideicommissaria libertas soluta est: nam in toto fere iure manumissor eiusmodi nihil iuris ut patronus adversus liberti personam consequitur, excepto quod in ius vocare patronum iniussu praetoris non debet.
By no means is it to be believed that the privilege of exemption has been taken away from him to whom fideicommissary liberty has been granted: for in almost the whole law the manumitter of this kind acquires no right, as patron, against the person of the freedman, except that he ought not to summon the patron into court without the praetor’s order.
Quae tutoribus remunerandae fidei causa testamento parentis relinquuntur, post excusationem ab heredibus extrariis quoque retineri placuit. quod non habebit locum in persona filii, quem pater impuberi fratri coheredem et tutorem dedit, cum iudicium patris ut filius, non ut tutor promeruit.
What things are left to tutors by a parent’s testament for the purpose of remunerating their fidelity, it has been decided may be retained by the heirs—even by extraneous heirs—after an excuse. This will not have place in the person of a son whom the father made coheir and tutor to his underage brother, since he earned the father’s judgment as a son, not as a tutor.
Cum oriundus ex provincia romae domicilium haberet, eiusdem curator decreto praesidis ac praetoris constitutus rerum administrationem utrubique suscepit. placuit eum duas curationes administrare non videri, quod videlicet unius duo patrimonia non viderentur.
Since, being native from a province, he had his domicile at Rome, the curator of the same person, constituted by decree of the governor and of the praetor, undertook the administration of affairs in both places. It was decided that he is not considered to administer two curatorships, because, namely, the two patrimonies of one person were not regarded as existing.
Si is, qui tres tutelas administrabat, duobus pupillis diversis decretis datus est qui potuit excusari, et priusquam causas excusationis allegaret, unus ex pupillis, quorum iam tutelam administrabat, decessit, ubi desiit ei competere excusatio, statim tenuit eum prius decretum, quasi in loco tertiae tutelae quarta subroganda: nam ipso iure tutor est et antequam excusetur. potuit ergo tutela eius, qui nunc quarto loco invenitur, excusari: sed cum non sit excusatus, necessario subeundum est onus illius quoque tutelae. nec me movet, quod dicat aliquis hoc ne exigi, an administretur tutela: hoc enim eo pertinet, ne sit finita administratio: ceterum si periculum sustineat cessationis, puto ei imputandam eam quoque tutelam.
If a man who was administering three guardianships was appointed to two wards by different decrees—an appointment from which he could have been excused—and before he alleged the causes of excuse one of the wards, whose guardianship he was already administering, died, then, when the excuse ceased to be available to him, the earlier decree immediately bound him, as though, in the place of the third guardianship, a fourth were to be subrogated: for by the law itself he is guardian even before he is excused. Therefore the guardianship of the one who is now found in the fourth place could have been excused; but since he has not been excused, he must necessarily undergo the burden of that guardianship as well. Nor does it move me that someone says this is not to be exacted on the ground whether the guardianship is being administered: for this pertains to the point that the administration has not been completed; moreover, if he bears the risk of cessation, I think that that guardianship too is to be imputed to him.
Idem evenire potest, si duobus testamentis, cum haberet tres tutelas, tutor datus est: ubi non apertarum tabularum tempus inspici debebit, si quaeratur, quae prior delata sit tutela, sed aditae hereditatis vel condicionis existentis.
The same can happen if, by two testaments, when he had three tutelages, a tutor was appointed: in which case, if it be asked which guardianship (tutela) was first conferred, the time when the tablets were opened should not be examined, but rather that of the inheritance having been entered upon or of the condition’s coming into existence.
Illa quoque erit differentia tutelarum, de quibus diximus, si tertia et quarta sit delata, licet in quartam prius detentus sit, quod huius, id est quartae, ex quo iussus est administrare, illius ex quo datus est periculum sustinet.
There will also be this difference of tutelages, of which we have spoken, if the third and the fourth have been delated, although he was previously detained in the fourth: namely, that as to this one, that is, the fourth, he bears the peril from the time he was ordered to administer; as to that one, from the time he was appointed.
Ceterum putarem recte facturum praetorem, si etiam unam tutelam sufficere crediderit, si tam diffusa et negotiosa sit, ut pro pluribus cedat. neque igitur fratres consortes plurium loco habendi sunt, neque non fratres, si idem patrimonium habent et ratio administrationis pariter reddenda sit. et ex diverso fratres diviso patrimonio duae tutelae sunt: non enim, ut dixi, numerus pupillorum, sed difficultas rationum conficiendarum et reddendarum consideranda est.
Moreover, I would think the praetor would act rightly if he should also believe that a single guardianship suffices, when it is so extensive and full of business as to count for several. And therefore co-heir brothers are not to be regarded as in the place of several, nor are those who are not brothers, if they have the same patrimony and the account of administration must be rendered jointly. And conversely, brothers with the patrimony divided amount to two guardianships: for, as I said, it is not the number of wards, but the difficulty of compiling and rendering the accounts that is to be considered.
Nesennius apollinaris iulio paulo. mater filium suum pupillum vel quivis alius extraneus extraneum aeque pupillum scripsit heredem et titio legatum dedit eumque eidem pupillo tutorem adscripsit: titius confirmatus excusavit se a tutela: quaero, an legatum amittat. et quid, si testamento quidem tutor non sit scriptus, legatum tamen acceperit datusque a praetore tutor excuset se, an aeque repellendus sit a legato?
Nesennius Apollinaris to Julius Paulus. A mother wrote her own son, a ward, as heir, or any other outsider wrote an outsider likewise a ward as heir, and she gave a legacy to Titius and appended him as tutor to that same ward: Titius, after being confirmed, excused himself from the guardianship: I ask whether he loses the legacy. And what if in the testament he is not written as tutor, yet he has received a legacy, and, having been given as tutor by the praetor, he excuses himself—whether he is likewise to be repelled from the legacy?
and whether it makes any difference if a guardian was given by the father to a ward or to an emancipated ward, or a curator to a pubes; I answered: he who, not lawfully appointed as guardian or curator by the father, when confirmed by the praetor preferred to avail himself of the benefit of excuse, is to be repelled from the legacy; and this also pleased our Scaevola: for the praetor, who confirms him as guardian, follows the judgment of the deceased. the same is to be said in the mother’s testament.
A stranger is similar to the mother, who appoints the ward as heir and also wished to provide for him in the giving of a tutor, such as our alumni are. Therefore it has rightly pleased that he who refuses that which the testator imposes be repelled from that which he seeks that the same man gave. Yet I do not think that one who has refused the burden of tutelage is always to be repelled from the legacy, but only if the legacy appears to have been assigned to him for this reason, that he was charged with the tutelage of the children, and not because otherwise he would have given it even without the tutelage.
Ex his apparet non esse his similem eum, quem praetor tutorem dedit, cum posset uti immunitate: hic enim nihil contra iudicium fecit testatoris. nam quem ille non dedit tutorem, eum voluisse tutelam administrare filii dicere non possumus.
From these points it appears that the man whom the praetor appointed as guardian, although he could have availed himself of immunity, is not similar to these; for he did nothing against the testator’s judgment. For we cannot say that one whom that man did not appoint as guardian wished to administer his son’s guardianship.
Quid autem, si se non excusaverit, sed administrare noluerit contentus, quod ceteri idonei essent? hic poterit conveniri, si ab illis res servari non potuisset. sed hoc non quaerendum est, sed contumacia punienda est eius, qui quodammodo se excusavit.
But what, moreover, if he has not excused himself, but, content that the others were fit, has been unwilling to administer? In that case he can be sued, if the matter could not have been preserved by them. But this is not to be inquired into; rather, the contumacy of him who, in a certain manner, excused himself is to be punished.
Amicissimos quidem et fidelissimos parentes liberis tutores eligere solere et ideo ad suscipiendum onus tutelae etiam honore legati eos persequi. sed cum proponatur is de quo quaeritur in testamento legatum meruisse et idem pupillo substitutus, non est verisimile hunc demum eum testatorem substituere voluisse, si et tutelam suscepisset: et ideo eum de quo quaeritur a legato quidem, si adhuc viveret pupillus, repellendum fuisse, a substitutione autem non esse summovendum, cum eo casu etiam suscepta tutela finiretur.
Most loving and most faithful parents are indeed accustomed to choose tutors for their children and, for that reason, to favor them with the honor of a legacy also for undertaking the burden of tutelage. But when it is set forth that the person in question in the testament has merited a legacy and that the same man was substituted to the ward, it is not credible that the testator wished to substitute him only then, if he had also undertaken the tutelage: and therefore the person in question ought to have been repelled from the legacy, if the ward were still living, but not to be removed from the substitution, since in that case even an undertaken tutelage would come to an end.
Lucius titius ex tribus filiis incolumibus unum habet emancipatum eius aetatis, ut curatores accipere debeat: quaero, si idem titius pater petente eodem filio emancipato curator a praetore detur, an iure publico uti possit et nihilo minus trium filiorum nomine vacationem postulare. respondi praemium quidem patri, quod propter numerum liberorum ei competit, denegari non oportere. sed cum filio suo curator petatur, contra naturales stimulos facit, si tali excusatione utendum esse temptaverit.
Lucius Titius, out of three sons safe and sound, has one emancipated, of such an age that he ought to receive curators: I ask, if the same Titius the father, at the request of the same emancipated son, is given as curator by the praetor, whether he can avail himself of public law and nonetheless, in the name of three sons, demand an exemption. I answered that the reward to the father, which is due to him on account of the number of children, ought not to be denied. But when a curator is sought for his son, he acts against natural impulses if he attempts to make use of such an excuse.
Qui testamento tutor datus fuerat, adito praetore dixit se tres liberos habere, adiecit praeterea habenti patruum legitimum tutorem se vitiose tutorem datum. praetor ita decrevit: " si legitimum tutorem habenti tutor datus es, non est tibi necessaria excusatio". quaero, cum nemo patruus impuberi tutor esset, an nihilo minus tutor remansit. respondi secundum ea quae proponerentur, quamvis iustas excusationis causas haberet, non tamen esse excusatum propter vitium pronuntiationis.
He who had been given as tutor by testament, having approached the praetor, said that he had three children; he added, moreover, that, to one having a paternal uncle as a legitimate tutor, he himself had been improperly appointed tutor. The praetor decreed thus: " if you have been appointed tutor to one who has a legitimate tutor, an excuse is not necessary for you". I ask, since no paternal uncle was tutor to the minor, whether nevertheless he remained tutor. I answered that, according to the matters proposed, although he had just causes for excuse, nevertheless he was not excused on account of the defect of the pronouncement.
Item quaero, si adquievisset sententiae, an ob id, quod non gessit tutelam, utilis actio in hunc dari debeat. respondi, si errore potius ( quod se pro iure trium liberorum, quod allegabat, excusatum crederet) quam malitia ab administratione cessasset, utilem actionem non dandam.
Likewise I ask, if he had acquiesced in the judgment, whether for that reason, because he did not conduct the guardianship, a useful action ought to be granted against him. I answered that, if rather through error ( because he believed himself excused on the ground of the right of three children, which he alleged) than through malice he had ceased from the administration, a useful action is not to be given.
At si antequam pupillus vel pubes minor annorum viginti quinque ius anulorum acciperet, lucius titius ei datus ut ingenuus excusatus fuit, post impetratum beneficium denuo eidem tutor curatorve dari poterit exemplo eo, quo placuit et rescriptum est eum, qui tempore, quod intra annum erat ex quo rei publicae causa abesse desierat, excusatus fuit, praeterito eo ipsum suo loco dari posse.
But if, before the ward or a youth under twenty‑five years had received the right of the gold ring, lucius titius, given to him as to an ingenuus, was excused, after the benefit has been obtained he can again be given to the same person as tutor or curator, by the example in accordance with which it has been settled and rescripted that one who was excused at a time which was within a year from when he had ceased to be away on public business, that period having passed, can be assigned in his own turn.
" titius filiis meis, quoad rei publicae causa non abierit, tutor esto". gessit tutelam ex testamento delatam, deinde rei publicae causa abesse coepit et desiit. an quasi nova tutela nunc delata excusari debeat etiam ob absentiam rei publicae causa, an, quia praecessit testamentum absentiam ob publicam causam et est ab eo iam administrata tutela, non oporteat eum excusari? quid si liberos interea susceperit aut aliam excusationem paravit?
" Let Titius be guardian to my sons, so long as he has not departed on public business." He administered the guardianship devolved by the testament; then he began to be absent for the sake of the Republic and discontinued it. Should he now, as if a new guardianship had been conferred, be allowed to be excused also on account of absence on public business; or, because the testament preceded the absence on public grounds and the guardianship has already been administered by him, ought he not to be excused? What if in the meantime he has begotten children or prepared some other excuse?
Sed si ita scriptum in testamento fuit: " titius tutor esto: cum rei publicae causa aberit, tutor ne esto: cum redierit, tutor esto", quid de excusatione aut ob absentiam rei publicae causa aut aliam quae post obvenit dici oporteat, videamus. praecedit autem alia quaestio, testamento ex die vel sub condicione tutores dati an se excusare ante diem condicionemve necesse habeant et in primis an iam dies quinquaginta eis cedant, intra quos necesse est causas excusationis exercere. sed verum est non ante esse tutorem, quam dies venerit: nam nec antequam adita sit hereditas.
But if it was written thus in the testament: " titius let be guardian: when he shall be absent on account of the commonwealth, let him not be guardian: when he shall have returned, let him be guardian", let us see what ought to be said about an excusation either on account of absence for the commonwealth or another which afterwards supervenes. But a different question precedes, whether guardians appointed by testament from a fixed day or under a condition must excuse themselves before the day or condition, and, first of all, whether already fifty days accrue to them, within which it is necessary to exercise the causes of excusation. But the truth is that one is not a guardian before the day has come: for neither is one before the inheritance has been entered upon.
since therefore from the same testament the tutelage has already been administered, and he who was excused as being otherwise about to be absent for the sake of the commonwealth, having returned, is immediately bound to the guardianships previously under suspicion even within the year; but this man, by the testament itself, has ceased to be a guardian, and therefore from the second tutelage he can excuse himself.
Si tanta corporis aut mentis valetudine ab agendis rebus libertus prohibeatur, ut ne suis quidem negotiis sufficiat, necessitati erit subcumbendum, ne impossibile iniungatur tutelae munus, quod obiri a liberto non potest cum incommodo pupilli et adversus utilitatem eius.
If by so great an infirmity of body or of mind the freedman is prevented from managing affairs, so that he is not even equal to his own business, necessity must be succumbed to, lest the impossible duty of guardianship be enjoined, which cannot be discharged by the freedman without the disadvantage of the ward and contrary to his interest.
Et solet ex persona, ex condicione et ex tempore statuere, ubi potius alendus sit: et nonnumquam a voluntate patris recedit praetor. denique cum quidam testamento suo cavisset, ut filius apud substitutum educetur, imperator severus rescripsit praetorem aestimare debere praesentibus ceteris propinquis liberorum: id enim agere praetorem oportet, ut sine ulla maligna suspicione alatur partus et educetur.
And the praetor is wont to determine, from the person, from the condition, and from the time, where it is preferable that the child be maintained: and sometimes the praetor departs from the father’s will. Finally, when someone had provided in his testament that the son be brought up with the substitute (heir), Emperor Severus wrote back in a rescript that the praetor ought to assess this with the other relatives of the children present: for this is what it behooves the praetor to pursue, that the offspring be nourished and reared without any malignant suspicion.
Quamvis autem praetor recusantem apud se educari non polliceatur se coacturum, attamen quaestionis est, an debeat etiam invitum cogere, ut puta libertum, parentem vel quem alium de adfinibus cognatisve. et magis est, ut interdum debeat id facere.
Although, however, the praetor does not promise that he will coerce one who refuses to be brought up with him, nevertheless it is a matter of question whether he ought to compel even one unwilling—for example a freedman, a parent, or some other of the affines or cognates. And the more accepted view is that sometimes he ought to do this.
Certe non male dicetur, si legatarius vel heres educationem recuset testamento sibi iniunctam, denegari ei actiones debere exemplo tutoris testamento dati: quod ita demum placuit, si idcirco sit relictum: ceterum si esset relicturus, etiamsi educationem recusaturum sciret, non denegabitur ei actio, et ita divus severus saepissime statuit.
Certainly it will not be ill said that, if a legatee or an heir refuses the education/upbringing enjoined upon him by the testament, the actions ought to be denied to him, by the example of a tutor given by testament: which has been approved only if it was left on that account; but if he would have left it even if he knew that he would refuse the education, the action will not be denied to him—and thus the deified Severus very often decided.
Modus autem, si quidem praetor arbitratus est, is servari debet, quem praetor statuit: si vero praetor non est aditus, pro modo facultatium pupilli debet arbitrio iudicis aestimari: nec enim permittendum est tutori tantum reputare quantum dedit, si plus aequo dedit.
As to the amount, if indeed the praetor has arbitrated, that which the praetor has established must be observed; but if the praetor has not been approached, it ought to be estimated, by the discretion of the judge, according to the measure of the ward’s means; for it must not be permitted to the tutor to reckon for himself only as much as he gave, if he gave more than is equitable.
Hoc amplius et si praetor modum alimentis statuit, verumtamen ultra vires facultatium est quod decretum est nec suggessit praetori de statu facultatium, non debet ratio haberi alimentorum omnium, quia, si suggessisset, aut minuerentur iam decreta aut non tanta decernerentur.
Moreover, even if the praetor set a measure for the maintenance (alimenta), nevertheless, if what was decreed is ultra vires of the means and he did not apprise the praetor of the state of the means, account ought not to be taken of the whole of the maintenance; for, had he apprised him, either the decrees already made would be reduced or not so much would be decreed.
Sed si pater statuit alimenta liberis quos heredes scripserit, ea praestando tutor reputare poterit, nisi forte ultra vires facultatium statuerit: tunc enim imputabitur ei, cur non adito praetore desideravit alimenta minui.
But if a father has fixed aliments for the children whom he has instituted as heirs, the tutor, by furnishing them, will be able to reckon them, unless perhaps he has fixed them ultra vires of the faculties: for then it will be imputed to him why he did not, after approaching the praetor, seek to have the aliments reduced.
Sed si non constat, quis modus facultatium sit, inter tutorem et eum, qui alimenta decerni desiderat, suscipere debet cognitionem nec temere alimenta decernere, ne in alterutram partem delinquat: prius tamen exigere debet, ut profiteatur tutor, quae sit penes se summa, et comminari graviores ei usuras infligi eius, quod supra professionem apud eum fuerit comprehensum.
But if it is not established what the measure of resources is, he ought to undertake a judicial cognition between the guardian and the one who desires that aliments be decreed, and not rashly decree aliments, lest he err to either side: nevertheless, he ought first to demand that the guardian profess what sum is in his possession, and to threaten that heavier interest be inflicted upon him for whatever, beyond the profession, shall have been found included with him.
Sed si egeni sint pupilli, de suo eos alere tutor non compellitur. et si forte post decreta alimenta ad egestatem fuerit pupillus perductus, deminui debent quae decreta sunt, quemadmodum solent augeri, si quid patrimonio accesserit.
But if the wards are needy, the guardian is not compelled to maintain them from his own. and if perchance after the alimenta have been decreed the ward has been brought to indigence, what has been decreed ought to be diminished, just as they are wont to be increased, if anything has accrued to the patrimony.
Qui filium heredem instituerat, filiae dotis nomine, cum in familia nupsisset, ducenta legaverat nec quicquam praeterea et tutorem eis sempronium dedit: is a cognatis et a propinquis pupillae perductus ad magistratum iussus est alimenta pupillae et mercedes, ut liberalibus artibus institueretur, pupillae nomine praeceptoribus dare: pubes factus pupillus puberi iam factae sorori suae ducenta legati causa solvit. quaesitum est, an tutelae iudicio consequi possit, quod in alimenta pupillae et mercedes a tutore ex tutela praestitum sit. respondi: existimo, etsi citra magistratuum decretum tutor sororem pupilli sui aluerit et liberalibus artibus instituerit, cum haec aliter ei contingere non possent, nihil eo nomine tutelae iudicio pupillo aut substitutis pupilli praestare debere.
He who had instituted his son as heir had bequeathed two hundred to his daughter by way of dowry, when she had married in manu, and nothing besides, and he gave Sempronius as tutor to them. He, brought by the cognates and relatives of the girl-ward before the magistrate, was ordered to give, in the name of the girl-ward, sustenance and fees to the instructors, so that she might be trained in the liberal arts. When the boy-ward became of age, he paid to his sister, now also of age, the two hundred by reason of the legacy. The question was asked whether, by an action of guardianship, he can recover what was furnished by the tutor from the guardianship for the sustenance and fees of the girl-ward. I answered: I consider that, even if, without a decree of the magistrates, the tutor has supported his ward’s sister and has trained her in the liberal arts—since these could not otherwise have come to her—he ought to owe nothing on that account, by an action of guardianship, to the boy-ward or to the substitutes of the boy-ward.
Si absens sit tutor et alimenta pupillus desideret, si quidem neglegentia et nimia cessatio in administratione tutoris obiciatur, quae etiam ex hoc arguatur, quod per absentiam eius deserta derelictaque sunt pupilli negotia, evocatis adfinibus atque amicis tutoris praetor edicto proposito causa cognita etiam absente tutore vel removendum eum, qui dignus tali nota videbitur, decernet vel adiungendum curatorem: et ita qui datus erit, expediet alimenta pupillo. si vero necessaria absentia tutoris et improvisa acciderit, forte quod subito ad cognitionem principalem profectus nec rei suae providere nec consulere pupillo potuerit et speratur redire et idoneus sit tutor nec expediat alium adiungi et pupillus alimenta de re sua postulet: recte constituetur ad hoc solum, ut ex re pupilli alimenta expediat.
If the guardian be absent and the ward desire sustenance, then indeed, if negligence and excessive cessation in the guardian’s administration be alleged—which is also argued from this, that by his absence the ward’s affairs have been left deserted and abandoned—the praetor, the affines and friends of the guardian having been summoned, an edict having been published, the case having been heard, even with the guardian absent, will decree either that he be removed, if he shall seem worthy of such a mark, or that a curator be adjoined; and so the one who is given will furnish sustenance to the ward. But if a necessary and unforeseen absence of the guardian has occurred, perhaps because he suddenly set out to an imperial hearing and could neither provide for his own affair nor take counsel for the ward, and it is hoped he will return and the guardian is suitable and it is not expedient that another be adjoined, and the ward demands sustenance from his own estate: it will be rightly arranged for this alone, that sustenance be furnished from the ward’s property.
Unde quaeritur apud iulianum libro vicensimo primo digestorum, si tutor pupillo auctoritatem ad mortis causa donationem accommodaverit, an tutelae iudicio teneatur. et ait teneri eum: nam sicuti testamenti factio, inquit, pupillis concessa non est, ita nec mortis quidem causa donationes permittendae sunt.
Whence it is asked in Julian, book 21 of the Digest, whether, if a tutor has furnished his authority to a ward for a donation mortis causa, he is liable under the action of guardianship. And he says he is liable: for just as the making of a testament, he says, is not granted to wards, so neither indeed should donations mortis causa be permitted.
Sed et si non mortis causa donaverit tutore auctore, idem iulianus scripsit plerosque quidem putare non valere donationem, et plerumque ita est: sed nonnullos casus posse existere, quibus sine reprehensione tutor auctor fit pupillo ad deminuendum, decreto scilicet interveniente: veluti si matri aut sorori, quae aliter se tueri non possunt, tutor alimenta praestiterit: nam cum bonae fidei iudicium sit, nemo feret, inquit, aut pupillum aut substitutum eius querentes, quod tam coniunctae personae alitae sint: quin immo per contrarium putat posse cum tutore agi tutelae, si tale officium praetermiserit.
But also if he has made a gift not on account of death with the guardian as authorizer, the same Julian wrote that many indeed think the donation is not valid, and for the most part it is so; but that some cases can arise in which, without reproach, the guardian becomes authorizer for the ward to a diminution, namely with a decree intervening: for example, if the guardian has furnished maintenance to a mother or sister who otherwise cannot protect themselves; for since it is an action of good faith, no one, he says, will tolerate either the ward or his substitute complaining that persons so closely connected have been supported; nay rather, on the contrary, he thinks that an action of tutela (guardianship) can be brought against the guardian, if he has omitted such an office.
Officio tutoris incumbit etiam rationes actus sui conficere et pupillo reddere: ceterum si non fecit aut si factas non exhibet, hoc nomine iudicio tutelae tenebitur. de servis quoque interrogationes, sed et quaestiones habendas et hoc officio iudicis convenire placuit. nam divus severus decrevit, cum neque inventaria neque auctionalia proferentur, remedio eo uti debere, ut rationes a servis qui rem gesserant proferantur: has rationes si esse mala fide conscriptas a servis dicunt tutores, etiam in quaestionem servi interrogari poterunt.
It falls upon the office of the tutor also to make up the accounts of his conduct and to render them to the ward: otherwise, if he has not done so, or if, having made them, he does not produce them, he will be held on this head by the tutelae action. As to slaves, it has been resolved that examinations—and even tortures—are to be held, and that this accords with the office of the judge. For the deified Severus decreed that, when neither inventories nor auction-registers are produced, one ought to use this remedy: that the accounts be produced by the slaves who had managed the affair. If the tutors say that these accounts have been drawn up in bad faith by the slaves, the slaves also can be questioned under torture.
Praeterea si matrem aluit pupilli tutor, putat labeo imputare eum posse: sed est verius non nisi perquam egenti dedit, imputare eum oportere de largis facultatibus pupilli: utrumque igitur concurrere oportet, ut et mater egena sit et filius in facultatibus positus.
Moreover, if the tutor of a ward supported the ward’s mother, Labeo thinks he can impute it; but it is truer that he ought to impute it only if he gave to one exceedingly needy, and out of the ward’s ample faculties; therefore both must concur, namely that the mother be needy and the son be in faculties.
Et si forte quis ex facto alterius tutoris condemnatus praestiterit vel ex communi gestu nec ei mandatae sunt actiones, constitutum est a divo pio et ab imperatore nostro et divo patre eius utilem actionem tutori adversus contutorem dandam.
And if by chance someone, condemned on account of the deed of another tutor, has satisfied the judgment, or from the common management, and the actions have not been entrusted to him, it has been established by the deified Pius and by our emperor and his deified father that a useful action is to be given to the tutor against his co-tutor.
Plane si ex dolo communi conventus praestiterit tutor, neque mandandae sunt actiones neque utilis competit, quia proprii delicti poenam subit: quae res indignum eum fecit, ut a ceteris quid consequatur doli participibus: nec enim ulla societas maleficiorum vel communicatio iusta damni ex maleficio est.
Clearly, if the guardian, having been sued on account of common fraud, has made payment, neither are actions to be assigned nor does a useful action lie, because he undergoes the penalty of his own delict: which circumstance has made him unworthy to obtain anything from the other participants in the fraud; for there is no society of misdeeds nor any just sharing of loss arising from a maleficium.
Usque adeo autem ad contutores non venitur, si sint solvendo contutores, ut prius ad magistratus qui eos dederunt vel ad fideiussores veniatur: et ita imperator noster ulpio proculo rescripsit. quod enim Marcellus libro octavo digestorum scripsit, quodque saepissime rescriptum est, quamdiu vel unus ex tutoribus idoneus est, non posse ad magistratus qui dederunt veniri, sic erit accipiendum, si non contutor ob hoc conveniatur, quod suspectum facere vel satis exigere noluit.
Moreover, one does not go past the co-guardians, if the co-guardians are solvent, to the point of going first to the magistrates who appointed them or to the sureties; and thus our emperor wrote back to Ulpius Proculus. For what Marcellus wrote in the eighth book of the Digesta, and what has been most frequently rescripted—that so long as even one of the tutors is suitable, one cannot have recourse to the magistrates who appointed them—must be understood thus: if the co-guardian is not proceeded against on this account, namely because he was unwilling to bring a proceeding to render the other suspect or to demand security.
Hunc tamen tutorem, qui intercepit pecuniam pupillarem, et furti teneri papinianus ait: qui etsi furti teneatur, hac actione conventus furti actione non liberatur: nec enim eadem est obligatio furti ac tutelae, ut quis dicat plures esse actiones eiusdem facti, sed plures obligationes: nam et tutelae et furti obligatur.
Papinian says that this tutor, who has intercepted pupillary money, is also liable for theft: and although he is liable for theft, having been sued by this action he is not freed from the action for theft; for the obligation of theft is not the same as that of tutelage, so that someone might say there are several actions for the same act, but rather several obligations: for he is obligated both under tutelage and for theft.
Quod si furandi animo fecit, etiam furti tenetur. utraque autem actione obligatur et altera alteram non tollet. sed et condictio ex furtiva causa competit, per quam si consecutus fuerit pupillus quod fuerit ablatum, tollitur hoc iudicium, quia nihil absit pupillo.
But if he did it with the intention of stealing, he is also liable for theft. Moreover, he is bound by both actions, and the one will not take away the other. But a condiction (condictio) arising from a furtive cause likewise lies, by which, if the ward (pupil) has obtained what was taken away, this action is extinguished, because nothing is lacking to the ward.
Cum furiosi curatore non tutelae, sed negotiorum gestorum actio est: quae competit etiam dum negotia gerit, quia non idem in hac actione, quod in tutelae actione, dum impubes est is cuius tutela geritur, constitutum est.
With the curator of a madman, the action is not the action of guardianship (tutela), but the action for management of affairs (negotiorum gestorum): which lies even while he is managing the affairs, because in this action it is not as in the action of guardianship, in which, so long as the one whose guardianship is administered is under age, the action does not lie.
Si tutor rem sibi depositam a patre pupilli vel commodatam non reddat, non tantum commodati vel depositi, verum tutelae quoque tenetur. et si acceperit pecuniam, ut reddat, plerisque placuit eam pecuniam vel depositi vel commodati actione repeti vel condici posse: quod habet rationem, quia turpiter accepta sit.
If a guardian does not return a thing that was deposited with him by the ward’s father or loaned for use (commodatum), he is liable not only under commodatum or deposit (depositum), but also under guardianship. And if he has taken money so that he may return it, most have held that that money can be reclaimed either by an action of deposit or of commodatum, or demanded by a condictio—which has rationale, because it was taken dishonorably.
Si filius familias tutelam administraverit et liberatus patria potestate dolo aliquid fecerit, an actio tutelae patrem quoque hoc nomine teneat, quaeritur. et aequum est, ut eum dumtaxat dolum pater praestet, qui commissus est ante emancipationem filii.
If a son under paternal power has administered a tutelage, and, once released from paternal power, has done something by fraud, the question is raised whether the action of tutelage also binds the father under this head. And it is equitable that the father make good only that fraud which was committed before the son’s emancipation.
Si tutor in hostium potestatem pervenerit, quia finita tutela intellegitur, fideiussores, qui pro eo rem salvam fore spoponderint, et si quis existat defensor eius, qui paratus est suscipere iudicium tutelae, vel si quis sit curator bonis eius constitutus, recte convenientur:
If a guardian has come into the power of the enemy, since the guardianship is understood to be ended, the sureties, who have pledged on his behalf that the property would be kept safe, and anyone who exists as his defender, who is prepared to undertake the action of guardianship, or if there is anyone appointed as curator for his goods, are rightly proceeded against:
Si tutor rei publicae causa abesse coeperit ac per hoc fuerit excusatus, quod rei publicae causa aberit, tutelae iudicio locus est. sed si desierit rei publicae causa abesse, consequenter desinit qui in locum eius datus est et tutelae conveniri poterit.
If a guardian has begun to be absent on public business and on this account has been excused, because he will be absent on public business, the action on guardianship lies. But if he ceases to be absent on public business, correspondingly the one who was appointed in his place ceases, and he can be sued in the action on guardianship.
Si duobus impuberibus fratribus tutor datus sit et alter eorum in legitimam tutelam fratris sui perfectae aetatis constituti reccidit, eum qui datus esset tutorem esse desisse neratius ait. quia igitur desinit, erit tutelae actio etiam ex persona impuberis, quamvis, si testamento datus fuisset, non desineret esse tutor eius, qui adhuc erat impubes, quia semper legitima tutela testamentariae cedit.
If a tutor has been given to two underage brothers, and one of them falls back into the legitimate tutelage of his brother who has been constituted of full age, Neratius says that the one who had been given has ceased to be tutor. Therefore, since he ceases, there will be the action of guardianship also at the suit of the minor; although, if he had been given by testament, he would not cease to be the tutor of him who was still underage, because legitimate tutelage always yields to the testamentary.
Et generaliter quod traditum est pupillum cum tutore suo agere tutelae non posse hactenus verum est, si eadem tutela sit: absurdum enim erat a tutore rationem administrationis negotiorum pupilli reposci, in qua adhuc perseveraret. in qua autem desinit tutor et iterum coepit esse, sic ex pristina administratione tutelae debitor est pupillo, quomodo si pecuniam creditam a patre eius accepisset. quem igitur effectum haec sententia habeat, videamus: nam si solus tutor est, utique ipse secum non aget.
And, generally, the statement that a pupil cannot bring the tutela action together with his tutor is true only so far as the same tutela is ongoing: for it would be absurd that an account of the management of the pupil’s affairs should be demanded from a tutor in an administration which he is still continuing. But when he ceases to be tutor and then begins to be so again, he is a debtor to the pupil for the earlier administration of the tutela, just as if he had received money lent by the pupil’s father. What effect, then, this opinion has, let us consider: for if he is the sole tutor, of course he will not sue himself.
but either he must be sued through a special curator, or he should arrange to have alongside him a co‑tutor who can accept a judge against him, for which reason a tutela action can be brought against him. Nay rather, if in the meantime he has ceased to be solvent, it will be imputed to the co‑tutors that they did not proceed against him.
Si filius familias tutelam administraverit, deinde fuerit emancipatus, remanere eum tutorem iulianus ait et cum pupillus adoleverit, agendum cum eo eius quidem temporis, quod est ante emancipationem, in quantum facere potest, eius vero, quod est post emancipationem, in solidum, cum patre vero dumtaxat de peculio: manere enim adversus eum etiam post pubertatem de peculio actionem: neque enim ante annus cedit, intra quem de peculio actio datur, quam tutela fuerit finita.
If a son in power has administered a guardianship and then has been emancipated, Julian says that he remains guardian; and when the pupil has come of age, suit is to be brought against him—for the period before emancipation, to the extent that he is able to satisfy, but for that which is after emancipation, for the whole (in solidum)—whereas against the father only by the action de peculio: for the action de peculio remains against him even after puberty; for the year within which the action de peculio is granted does not begin to run before the guardianship has been ended.
Si tutor post pubertatem pupilli negotia administraverit, in iudicium tutelae veniet id tantum, sine quo administratio tutelae expediri non potest: si vero post pubertatem pupilli is qui tutor eius fuerat fundos eius vendiderit, mancipia et praedia comparaverit, neque venditionis huius neque emptionis ratio iudicio tutelae continebitur. et est verum ea quae conexa sunt venire in tutelae actionem: sed et illud est verum, si coeperit negotia administrare post tutelam finitam, devolvi iudicium tutelae in negotiorum gestorum actionem: oportuit enim eum a semet ipso tutelam exigere. sed et si quis, cum tutelam administrasset, idem curator adulescenti fuerit datus, dicendum est negotiorum gestorum eum conveniri posse.
If a tutor, after the ward’s puberty, has administered his affairs, there will come into the action of guardianship only that without which the administration of the guardianship cannot be settled; but if, after the ward’s puberty, the one who had been his tutor sold his lands and bought slaves and estates, neither the account of this sale nor of the purchase will be contained in the action of guardianship. And it is true that things which are connected are brought within the action of guardianship; but it is also true that, if he began to administer affairs after the guardianship was finished, the action of guardianship is devolved into the action for the management of affairs; for he ought to have exacted from himself the account of the guardianship. And likewise, if someone, after he had administered the guardianship, was himself appointed curator to the adolescent, it must be said that he can be proceeded against by the action for the management of affairs.
Si ex duobus tutoribus cum altero quis transegisset, quamvis ob dolum communem, transactio nihil proderit alteri, nec immerito, cum unusquisque doli sui poenam sufferat. quod si conventus alter praestitisset, proficiet id quod praestitit ei qui conventus non est: licet enim doli ambo rei sint, tamen sufficit unum satisfacere, ut in duobus, quibus res commodata est vel deposita quibusque mandatum est.
If, out of two guardians, someone should have settled with one, although on account of common dolus, the settlement will profit the other nothing—and not undeservedly, since each suffers the penalty of his own dolus. But if, when called into court, the other had rendered performance, what he rendered will benefit him who has not been called into court: for although both are defendants on account of dolus, nevertheless it suffices for one to satisfy, as in the case of two to whom a thing has been loaned for use or deposited, or to whom a mandate has been given.
Si cum tutore ex stipulatu agatur vel cum his qui pro eo intervenerunt, erit dubitatio, an, quia tutelae agi non potest, nec ex stipulatu agi possit. et plerique putant etiam hanc actionem propter eandem utilitatem differendam.
If suit ex stipulatu is brought with the tutor or with those who intervened on his behalf, there will be a doubt whether, because an action tutelae cannot be brought, neither can an action ex stipulatu be brought. and most think that even this action should be deferred on account of the same utility.
Cum tutor negotiis impuberis administratis pupillum paterna hereditate abstinet, bonis patris venditis tractari solet, utilis actio pupillo relinqui an creditoribus concedi debeat. et probatur actionem inter pupillum et creditores patris esse dividendam, scilicet ut quod rationi bonorum per tutorem deerit creditoribus reddatur, quod autem dolo vel culpa tutoris in officio pupilli perperam abstenti contractum est, puero relinquatur. quae actio sine dubio non prius competet, quam pupillus ad pubertatem pervenerit: sed illa confestim creditoribus datur.
When a tutor, the affairs of an underage ward having been administered, keeps the ward abstinent from the paternal inheritance, once the father’s goods have been sold it is usual to consider whether a useful action (actio utilis) ought to be left to the ward or conceded to the creditors. And it is approved that the action be divided between the ward and the father’s creditors, namely, that what will have been lacking to the account of the estate (ratio bonorum) through the tutor be rendered to the creditors, but what was incurred by the tutor’s fraud (dolus) or fault (culpa) in conducting the ward’s affairs, the ward having improperly abstained, be left to the boy. Which action, without doubt, will not lie before the ward has reached puberty; but that other is granted at once to the creditors.
Alterius curatoris heredem minorem ut maiore pecunia condemnatum in integrum restitui placuit. ea res materiam litis adversus alterum curatorem instaurandae non dabit quasi minore pecunia condemnatum, si non sit eius aetatis actor, cui subveniri debeat: sed aequitatis ratione suadente per utilem actionem ei subveniri, in quantum alter relevatus est, oportet.
It has been decided that the minor heir of one curator, as having been condemned in a greater sum of money, be restored to his former condition. This will not furnish ground for renewing litigation against the other curator as if he had been condemned in a smaller sum, if the plaintiff is not of that age to whom aid ought to be given; but, equity persuading, he ought to be aided by a useful action, to the extent that the other has been relieved.
Non idcirco actio, quae post viginti quinque annos aetatis intra restitutionis tempus adversus tutorem minore pecunia tutelae iudicio condemnatum redditur, inutilis erit, quod adulescenti curatores ob eam culpam condemnati sunt: itaque si non iudicatum a curatoribus factum est, per doli exceptionem curatores consequi poterunt eam actionem praestari sibi.
The action, which after twenty-five years of age, within the period of restitution, is restored against a tutor who was condemned in the guardianship-judgment for a lesser sum, will not for that reason be useless, because the curators were condemned to the adolescent on account of that fault: and so, if the judgment has not been satisfied by the curators, through the exception of fraud the curators will be able to obtain that that action be made over to them.
Cum pupillus tutelae actione contra tutorem alterum tutori, quem iudex in solidum condemnavit, cessit, quamvis postea iudicatum fiat, tamen actio data non intercidit, quia pro parte condemnati tutoris non tutela reddita, sed nominis pretium solutum videtur.
When the ward, by the action of guardianship, ceded to one guardian—whom the judge condemned in solidum—the claim against the other guardian, although afterward the judgment is satisfied, nevertheless the action granted does not lapse, because, as to the portion of the condemned guardian, there is seen to have been paid not a rendering of the guardianship, but the price of the claim (nomen).
Postumo tutor datus non nato postumo neque tutelae, quia nullus pupillus est, neque negotiorum gestorum iudicio tenetur, quia administrasse negotia eius quia natus non esset non videtur: et ideo utilis in eum actio dabitur.
A tutor appointed for a posthumous child not yet born is bound neither to guardianship, because there is no ward, nor is he held by the action of negotiorum gestorum, because he does not seem to have administered his affairs, since he was not born; and therefore a useful action will be granted against him.
Non solum tutelae privilegium datur in bonis tutoris, sed etiam eius, qui pro tutela negotium gessit: vel ex curatione pupilli pupillaeve furiosi furiosaeve debebitur, si eo nomine cautum non sit.
Not only is the privilege of guardianship granted in the goods of the tutor, but also in those of one who has transacted business on behalf of the guardianship: likewise, it will be owed by reason of the curatorship of a male or female ward, or of a male or female mad person, if security has not been provided under that title.
Contrariam tutelae actionem praetor proposuit induxitque in usum, ut facilius tutores ad administrationem accederent scientes pupillum quoque sibi obligatum fore ex sua administratione. quamquam enim sine tutoris auctoritate pupilli non obligentur nec in rem suam tutor obligare pupillum possit, attamen receptum est, ut tutori suo pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate civiliter obligetur ex administratione scilicet. etenim provocandi fuerant tutores, ut promptius de suo aliquid pro pupillis impendant, dum sciunt se recepturos id quod impenderint.
The praetor proposed the contrary action of guardianship and brought it into use, so that guardians might more easily undertake the administration, knowing that the ward too would be obligated to them from their administration. For although wards are not obligated without the authority of a tutor, nor can a tutor obligate the ward for his own account, nevertheless it has been received that the ward is civilly obligated to his own guardian without the authority of a tutor—namely, from the administration. For guardians had to be encouraged, so that they might more readily expend something of their own for the wards, since they know that they will recover what they have expended.
Sed et si curator sit vel pupilli vel adulescentis vel furiosi vel prodigi, dicendum est etiam his contrarium dandum. idem in curatore quoque ventris probandum est. quae sententia sabini fuit existimantis ceteris quoque curatoribus ex isdem causis dandum contrarium iudicium.
But also, if there is a curator either of a pupil or of an adolescent or of a madman or of a prodigal, it must be said that to these also the contrary action is to be given. The same is to be approved also in the curator of the womb. This was the opinion of Sabinus, who judged that to the other curators also, from the same causes, the contrary action should be given.
Finito autem officio hanc actionem competere dicemus tutori: ceterum quamdiu durat, nondum competit. sed si pro tutore negotia gessit vel etiam curam administravit, locus erit iudicio etiam statim, quia hoc casu in ipsum quoque statim actio competit.
However, when the office has been finished, we shall say that this action is competent against the tutor (guardian); but so long as it endures, it does not yet lie. But if someone has managed business on behalf of the tutor or even administered the care, there will be room for a suit even immediately, because in this case the action at once also lies against him himself.
Praeterea si tutelae iudicio quis convenietur, reputare potest id quod in rem pupilli impendit: sic erit arbitrii eius, utrum compensare an petere velit ^ veli^ sumptus. quid ergo, si iudex compensationis eius rationem non habuit, an contrario iudicio experiri possit? et utique potest: sed si reprobata est haec reputatio et adquievit, non debet iudex contrario iudicio id sarcire.
Moreover, if someone is sued by the action of guardianship, he can reckon what he expended for the ward’s benefit: thus it will be at his discretion whether he wishes to compensate or to claim the expenses. What then, if the judge did not take account of that compensation, can he try by a contrary action? And certainly he can: but if this reckoning has been disallowed and he has acquiesced, the judge ought not to make it good in the contrary action.
An in hoc iudicio non tantum quae pro pupillo vel in rem eius impensa sunt veniant, verum etiam ea quoque, quae debebantur alias tutori, ut puta a patre pupilli si quid debitum fuit, quaeritur. et magis puto, cum integra sit actio tutori, non esse in contrarium iudicium deducendum.
Whether in this judgment there should come not only those things which were expended for the pupil or for his property, but also those things as well which were otherwise owed to the tutor, for instance, if anything was owed by the pupil’s father, is asked. And I am rather of the opinion that, since the tutor’s action is entire, it is not to be brought into the contrary judgment.
Quid tamen si ideo exspectavit, quia tutor erat et ideo non exegit? videamus, an contrario iudicio tutelae indemnitatem consequatur. quod magis probandum est: nam sicuti quodcumque aliud gessit pro utilitate pupilli, id contrario iudicio consequetur, ita etiam id quod sibi debetur consequi debet vel eius securitatem.
What then if he waited for that reason, because he was the tutor and therefore did not exact it? Let us see whether by the contrary action of guardianship he may obtain indemnity. This is rather to be approved: for just as whatever else he has managed for the utility of the pupil he will obtain by the contrary action, so also he ought to obtain that which is owed to himself, or security for it.
Hanc actionem dandam placet et si tutelae iudicio non agatur: etenim nonnumquam pupillus idcirco agere tutelae non vult, quia nihil ei debetur, immo plus in eum impensum est, quam quod ei abest, nec impediendus est tutor contrario agere.
It is held that this action is to be granted even if the guardianship action is not brought: for sometimes the ward for that very reason does not wish to sue by the guardianship action, because nothing is owed to him; rather, more has been expended upon him than what is lacking to him, and the guardian is not to be impeded from bringing the contrary action.
Yet it must be understood thus, if it is expedient for the ward that the guardianship be administered in this way; but if it is not expedient, it must be said that the ward ought to be absolved; for guardianships are not administered for this purpose, that wards be submerged. Therefore the judge who takes cognizance of the counter-suit will look to the utility of the ward and whether the tutor has incurred expenses ex officio.
Contrarium iudicium an ad hoc quoque competat, ut quis a pupillo exigat liberationem, videndum est. et nemo dixit in hoc agere quem contrario posse, ut tutelae iudicio liberetur, sed tantum de his, quae ei propter tutelam absunt. consequitur autem pecuniam, si quam de suo consumpsit, etiam cum usuris, sed vel trientibus, vel his quae in regione observantur, vel his quibus mutuatus est, si necesse habuit mutuari, ut pupillo ex iusta causa prorogaret, vel his a quibus pupillum liberavit, vel quibus caruit tutor, si nimium profuit pupillo pecuniam esse exsolutam.
Whether the contrary action also lies to this effect, that someone demand from the ward an acquittance, is a matter to be considered. And no one has said that in this respect he can proceed by the contrary action, namely, that he be freed by the action of tutelage, but only as to those things which are lacking to him on account of the tutelage. He does, however, recover money, if he has spent any of his own, even with interest—either at the trient rate (one-third), or at those which are observed in the region, or at those at which he borrowed, if he had necessity to borrow, in order that he might prorogue for the ward on a just cause; or at those of the persons from whom he freed the ward; or that of which the tutor was deprived, if it greatly benefited the ward that the money was paid out.
Quare et si in usus suos convertit, deinde aliquid impendit in rem pupillarem, quam impendit desinit vertisse et exinde usuras non praestabit. et si ante impendit in rem pupillarem, mox in usus suos vertit, non videbitur vertisse quantitatem, quae concurrit cum quantitate sibi debita, ut eius summae non praestet usuras.
Wherefore, even if he converts to his own uses, then expends something on the ward’s estate, what he has expended ceases to be treated as converted, and thereafter he will not pay interest on it. And if he first expends on the ward’s estate, and soon after converts to his own uses, he will not be seen to have converted the amount that coincides with the amount due to himself, so that he does not pay interest for that sum.
Quid ergo, si de re pupillari non potuit sibi solvere, quia erat deposita ad praediorum comparationem? si quidem non postulavit a praetore, ut promatur pecunia vel hoc minus deponatur, sibi imputet: si vero hoc desideravit nec impetravit, dicendum est non deperire ei usuras.
What then, if he could not pay himself from the ward’s property, because it had been deposited for the acquisition of estates? If indeed he did not request from the praetor that the money be brought out, or that at least this lesser amount be deposited, let him impute it to himself; but if he did desire this and did not obtain it, it must be said that interest does not perish for him.
Iudicio contrario tutelae praestatur et id, quod in rem pupilli versum ante tutelam vel post tutelam, si negotiis tutelae tempore gestis nexum probatur, et quod ante impensum est, sive pro tutore negotia gessit et postea tutor constitutus est, vel ventri erat curator: sed et si non pro tutore negotia gerebat, debet venire quod ante impensum est: deducuntur enim in tutelae iudicium sumptus, quoscumque fecerit in rem pupilli, sic tamen, si ex bona fide fecit.
By the counter-action of guardianship there is also provided that which was turned into the ward’s estate before the guardianship or after the guardianship, if a nexus is proven to have arisen from affairs transacted during the time of the guardianship; and what was expended beforehand, whether he managed affairs as acting for a tutor and was afterwards appointed tutor, or was curator for the womb (ventri curator): but even if he was not managing affairs as for a tutor, what was previously expended ought to be admitted; for in the action of guardianship there are deducted the expenses, whatever he has made into the ward’s estate, provided, however, that he did so in good faith.
A tutela remotus eo loco haberi debet, quo esset finita tutela, et sicut actiones patitur perinde ac si pupillus pubes factus esset, ita contrario iudicio, si quid ei aberit, persequi debebit: nihil enim prohibet suspectum tutorem esse, quamvis complura in rem pupilli impenderit, quae eum amittere non oportet.
Removed from tutelage, he ought to be held in that position in which he would be were the tutelage finished; and just as he undergoes actions as if the ward had become of age, so by a contrary action, if anything is lacking to him, he ought to pursue it: for nothing prevents a guardian from being suspect, although he has expended many things in the interest of the ward, which he ought not to lose.
Protutelae actionem necessario praetor proposuit: nam quia plerumque incertum est, utrum quis tutor an vero quasi tutor pro tutore administraverit tutelam, idcirco in utrumque casum actionem scripsit, ut sive tutor est sive non sit qui gessit, actione tamen teneretur. solent enim magni errores intercedere, ut discerni facile non possit, utrum quis tutor fuerit et sic gesserit, an vero non fuerit, pro tutore tamen munere functus sit.
The praetor necessarily put forward the action for acting as a tutor: for since it is very often uncertain whether someone administered the guardianship as a tutor, or indeed as a quasi-tutor in place of a tutor, he therefore drafted an action for each case, so that whether the person who managed the affair is a tutor or is not, he would nevertheless be held by the action. For great errors are apt to intervene, so that it cannot easily be discerned whether someone was a tutor and thus acted, or indeed was not, yet performed the office in place of a tutor.
Si quis quasi tutor negotia gesserit eius qui iam pubes est neque tutorem habere potest, protutelae actio cessat: simili modo et si eius, qui nondum natus est. nam ut pro tutore quis gerat, eam esse personam oportet, cuius aetas recipiat tutorem, id est impuberem esse oportet. sed erit negotiorum gestorum actio.
If someone, as a quasi-tutor, has managed the affairs of one who is already pubes and cannot have a tutor, the action for protutela ceases; likewise if of one who is not yet born. For, in order that someone may act in place of a tutor, the person must be one whose age admits a tutor—that is, he must be impubes. But an action of negotiorum gestorum will lie.
Si curator impuberi a praetore datus negotia gesserit, an, quasi pro tutore gesserit, teneatur, quaeritur. et est verius cessare hanc actionem, quia officio curatoris functus est. si quis tamen, cum tutor non esset, compulsus a praetore vel a praeside, dum se putat tutorem, gesserit tutelam, videndum, an pro tutore teneatur.
If a curator appointed by the praetor for an underage person has managed the affairs, the question is whether he is liable as though he had acted in place of a tutor. And the sounder view is that this action does not lie, because he has discharged the office of curator. If, however, someone, when he was not a tutor, compelled by the praetor or by the provincial governor (praeses), while thinking himself a tutor, has administered a tutelage, it must be considered whether he is liable pro tutore.
Sed utrum solummodo in id quod gessit tenebitur an vero in id etiam quod gerere debuit? et si quidem omnino non attigit tutelam, non tenebitur: neque enim attingere debuit qui tutor non fuit. quod si quaedam gessit, videndum, an etiam eorum quae non gessit teneatur: et hactenus tenebitur, si alius gesturus fuit.
But whether he will be held only to the extent of what he managed, or indeed also to the extent of what he ought to have managed? And if he did not touch the guardianship at all, he will not be held: for he ought not to touch it who was not a guardian. But if he managed certain things, it must be seen whether he is also held for those which he did not manage; and he will be held thus far, if another would have managed them.
Si is, qui pro tutore negotia gerebat, cum tutor non esset, rem pupilli vendidit nec ea usucapta est, petet eam pupillus, quamquam ei cautum est: non enim eadem huius quae tutoris est rerum pupilli administratio.
If someone who was managing affairs in place of a tutor, when he was not a tutor, sold the pupil’s property and it has not been acquired by usucaption, the pupil will demand it, although security has been provided for him; for the administration of the pupil’s affairs by this man is not the same as that of a tutor.
Quaero, an is qui, cum tutor testamento datus esset et id ipsum ignoraret, pro tutore negotia pupilli gesserit, quasi tutor an quasi pro tutore negotia gesserit, teneatur. respondit: non puto teneri quasi tutorem, quia scire quoque se tutorem esse debet, ut eo affectu negotia gerat, quo tutor gerere debeat.
I ask whether one who, although appointed tutor by testament and unaware of that very fact, has managed the ward’s affairs as a tutor, is liable as though a tutor or as though one acting in place of a tutor. He answered: I do not think he is held as though a tutor, because he ought also to know that he is a tutor, so that he may manage the affairs with that disposition with which a tutor ought to manage.
Idem pomponius scribit, etiamsi pro tutore negotia gerens auctoritatem accommodaverit, nihilo minus hoc edictum locum habere, nisi forte praetor decrevit ratum se habiturum id, quod his auctoribus gestum est: tunc enim valebit per praetoris tuitionem, non ipso iure.
The same Pomponius writes that, even if someone acting in place of a tutor, while managing affairs, has furnished authority, nonetheless this edict has application, unless perhaps the praetor has decreed that he will hold as ratified that which has been done with these as authorizers: for then it will be valid through the praetor’s protection, not by the law itself.
Pupilli scientia computanda non est, tutoris eius computanda est: utique etsi pupillo cautum sit, melius dicitur rem suam restitui pupillo quam incertum cautionis eventum eum spectare: quod et iulianus, si alias circumventus sit pupillus, respondit.
The pupil’s knowledge is not to be computed; that of his tutor is to be computed: and certainly, even if caution has been provided for the pupil, it is better said that his own property be restored to the pupil than that he look to the uncertain event of the caution: which Julian also answered, if otherwise the pupil has been circumvented.
Has in factum actiones heredibus quidem competere ceterisque successoribus, in eos vero non reddi labeo scribit nec in ipsum post annum, quoniam et factum puniunt et in dolum concipiuntur: et adversus eas personas, quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt, noxales erunt.
These actions in factum do indeed belong to heirs and to the other successors; but Labeo writes that they are not granted against them, nor against the person himself after one year, since they both punish the deed and are conceived in dolus; and against those persons who are subject to another’s right, they will be noxal.
Sed et si quis filiae familias auctor factus sit ad contrahendum, tenetur. idemque iuris est, si ancillae quis tutore auctore credidisset: nam omnibus istis modis propter tutorem decipitur is qui contraxit, quia aliter cum impubere contracturus non fuit, quam si tutoris auctoritas intercessisset.
But also, if someone has become an authorizer for contracting for a daughter of the household, he is held liable. And the same rule of law obtains if someone has given credit to a slave-girl with a tutor as authorizer: for in all these ways the one who contracted is deceived on account of the tutor, because otherwise he would not have contracted with one under age, unless the authority of the tutor had intervened.
Iulianus libro vicesimo primo digestorum tractat, in patrem debeat dari haec actio, qui filiam minorem duodecim annis nuptum dedit. et magis probat patri ignoscendum esse, qui filiam suam maturius in familiam sponsi perducere voluit: affectu enim propensiore magis quam dolo malo id videri fecisse.
Julianus, in book 21 of the Digest, treats whether this action should be granted against a father who gave his daughter, under 12 years, in marriage. And he more approves that the father ought to be excused, who wished to conduct his daughter earlier into the bridegroom’s household: for he seems to have done this out of a more inclined affection rather than out of malicious fraud.
Quod si intra duodecim annos haec decesserit, cum haberet dotem, putat iulianus, si dolo malo conversatus sit is ad quem dos pertinet, posse maritum doli mali exceptione condicentem summovere in casibus, in quibus dotem vel in totum vel in partem, si constabat matrimonium, fuerat lucraturus.
But if she dies within twelve years, though she had a dowry, Julian thinks that, if the one to whom the dowry pertains has conducted himself with malicious fraud, the husband can, by the exception of malicious fraud, ward off the one suing by condictio, in cases in which, if the marriage had stood, he would have been going to gain the dowry either in whole or in part.
Cum ostendimus heredem quoque tutelae iudicio posse conveniri, videndum, an etiam proprius eius dolus vel propria administratio veniat in iudicium. et exstat servii sententia existimantis, si post mortem tutoris heres eius negotia pupilli gerere perseveraverit aut in arca tutoris pupilli pecuniam invenerit et consumpserit vel eam pecuniam quam tutor stipulatus fuerat exegerit, tutelae iudicio eum teneri suo nomine: nam cum permittatur adversus heredem ex proprio dolo iurari in litem, apparet eum iudicio tutelae teneri ex dolo proprio.
Since we have shown that the heir too can be sued by the action of guardianship, it must be considered whether his own fraud as well, or his own administration, comes into judgment. And there exists the opinion of Servius, who judges that, if after the death of the guardian his heir has persisted in managing the ward’s affairs, or has found in the guardian’s coffer money of the ward and has consumed it, or has exacted the money which the guardian had stipulated, he is held by the action of guardianship in his own name: for since it is permitted to swear in the suit (in litem) against the heir on account of his own fraud, it is apparent that he is held by the action of guardianship by reason of his own fraud.
Fideiussores a tutoribus nominati si praesentes fuerunt et non contradixerunt et nomina sua referri in acta publica passi sunt, aequum est perinde teneri, atque si iure legitimo stipulatio interposita fuisset. eadem causa videtur adfirmatorum, qui scilicet cum idoneos esse tutores adfirmaverint, fideiussorum vicem sustinent.
Sureties named by tutors, if they were present and did not object and allowed their names to be entered in the public records, it is equitable that they be held liable just as if by legitimate law a stipulation had been interposed. the same case seems to apply to affirmers, who, namely when they have affirmed that the tutors are suitable, sustain the role of sureties.
Pupillus contra tutores eorumque fideiussores iudicem accepit: iudice defuncto, priusquam ad eum iretur, contra solos fideiussores alter iudex datus est. officio cognoscentis conveniet, si tutores solvendo sint et administratio non dispar, sed communis fuit, portionum virilium admittere rationem ex persona tutorum.
The ward obtained a judge against the guardians and their sureties: the judge having died, before proceedings were brought before him, another judge was appointed against the sureties alone. It will accord with the office of the cognizant judge, if the guardians are solvent and the administration was not disparate but was common, to admit the reckoning of virile portions with reference to the persons of the guardians.
Si fideiussores, qui rem salvam fore pupillo caverant, tutorem adulescens ut ante conveniret petierant atque ideo stipulanti promiserunt se reddituros quod ab eo servari non potuisset: placuit inter eos, qui solvendo essent, actionem residui dividi, quod onus fideiussorum susceptum videretur: nam et si mandato plurium pecunia credatur, aeque dividitur actio: si enim quod datum pro alio solvitur, cur species actionis aequitatem divisionis excludit?
If the sureties, who had guaranteed that the property would be safe for the ward, had requested that the young man should first proceed against the guardian, and therefore, to the stipulator, promised that they would render what could not have been preserved by him: it has been decided that, among those who are solvent, the action for the remainder is divided, because the burden of the sureties is regarded as undertaken: for even if, at the mandate of several, money is credited, the action is likewise divided: for if what was given is paid on behalf of another, why should the form of the action exclude the equity of division?
Paulus respondit tale iudicium in heredem tutoris transferri oportere, quale defunctus suscepit. hoc eo pertinet, ut non excusetur heres, si dicat se instrumenta tutelaria non invenisse: nam cum ex omnibus bona fide iudiciis propter dolum defuncti heres teneatur, idem puto observandum et in tutelae actione. sed constitutionibus subventum est ignorantiae heredum.
Paulus answered that such a judgment ought to be transferred onto the heir of the guardian, such as the deceased had undertaken. This pertains to this, that the heir is not excused if he says that he did not find the tutelary instruments: for since in all good‑faith actions, on account of the deceit of the deceased, the heir is held liable, I think the same is to be observed also in the action of guardianship. But by constitutions relief has been afforded to the ignorance of heirs.
This, however, is to be observed then, when after the guardian’s death the heir is sued, not if the guardian has died after the suit has been joined (litis contestatio): for upon the contestation of the suit both penal actions are transmitted on both sides, and actions that were temporal are perpetuated.
In ordinem subsidiaria actio non dabitur, sed in magistratus, nec in fideiussores eorum: hi enim rem publicam salvam fore promittunt, non pupilli. proinde nec nominatores magistratuum ex hac causa tenebuntur, sed soli magistratus. sed si ordo receperit in se periculum, dici debet teneri eos, qui praesentes fuerunt: parvi enim refert, nominaverint vel fideiusserint an in se periculum receperint: utilis ergo in eos actio competit.
A subsidiary action will not be granted against the order, but against the magistrates, nor against their sureties: for these promise that the commonwealth will be safe, not the ward. Accordingly, neither will the nominators of magistrates be held from this cause, but the magistrates alone. But if the order has taken the risk upon itself, it ought to be said that those who were present are held liable: for it matters little whether they have nominated or have stood surety, or have taken the risk upon themselves: therefore a utilis action lies against them.
Si praeses provinciae denuntiare magistratus tantum de facultatibus tutorum voluit, ut ipse daret, videamus, an et quatenus teneantur. et extat divi marci rescriptum, quo voluit eos, qui praesidi renuntiant, non perinde teneri atque si ipsi dedissent, sed si deceperunt, gratia forte aut pecunia falsa renuntiantes. plane si praeses provinciae satis eos exigere iussit, non dubitabimus teneri eos, etiamsi praeses dederit.
If the provincial governor wished the magistrates to report only about the faculties of the tutors, so that he himself might appoint, let us see whether, and to what extent, they are held liable. And there exists a rescript of the deified Marcus, by which he willed that those who report to the governor are not held liable in the same way as if they themselves had appointed, but only if they have deceived, reporting falsely perhaps through favor or money. Plainly, if the provincial governor ordered them to exact security from them, we shall not hesitate to hold them liable, even if the governor appointed.
Si praeses provinciae nominibus ab alio acceptis ad magistratus municipales remiserit, ut se de nominibus instruant, et perinde instructus dederit tutores: an exemplo eorum qui praetorem instruunt debeant magistratus teneri, quaeritur: utique enim interest, utrum ipsi magistratus nomina electa dederint praesidi an ea, quae ab alio praeses accepit, inquisierint. et puto utroque casu sic teneri, quasi dolo vel lata culpa versati sunt.
If the governor of the province, having received names from another, has referred them to the municipal magistrates so that they may inform themselves about the names, and, being so instructed, has appointed guardians: the question is raised whether the magistrates ought to be held liable, on the model of those who inform the praetor; for it certainly makes a difference whether the magistrates themselves gave the chosen names to the governor, or whether they inquired into those which the governor received from someone else. And I think that in either case they are thus held, as though they had conducted themselves with fraud or gross negligence.
Si curatores fuerunt minus idonei dati, dicendum est teneri magistratus oportere, si ex suggestu eorum vel nominibus ab eis acceptis praeses dederit. sed et si ad eos remiserit, ut ipsi dent vel post dationem ut exigerent satisdationem, periculum ad eos pertinebit.
If curators have been appointed who are less suitable, it must be said that the magistrates ought to be held liable, if the governor appointed them on their suggestion or from names received from them. But also, if he referred the matter to them, that they themselves appoint, or after the appointment that they exact a satisdation (security), the risk will pertain to them.
Magistratibus imputatur etiam, si omnino tutor vel curator datus non sit: sed ita demum tenentur, si moniti non dederint. ideo damnum, quod impuberes vel adulescentes medio tempore passi sunt, ad eos magistratus pertinere non ambigitur, qui munere mandato non paruerunt.
It is also imputed to magistrates, if no tutor or curator has been appointed at all; but they are held liable only then, if, after being warned, they did not appoint one. Therefore the loss which minors not yet of puberty or adolescents suffered in the meantime is without doubt understood to pertain to those magistrates who did not comply with the mandate of their office.
Si inter magistratus hoc convenerit, ut alterius tantum periculo tutores darentur, conventiones pupillo non praeiudicare divus hadrianus rescripsit: conventione enim duumvirorum ius publicum mutari non potest. prius tamen arbitror conveniendum eum, qui hoc suscepit, deinde excussis facultatibus eius tunc veniendum ad collegam, quemadmodum, si solus dedisset, diceremus prius eum, deinde collegam adgrediendum.
If among the magistrates it has been agreed that tutors be appointed at the peril of only one, the deified Hadrian wrote in a rescript that such agreements do not prejudice the ward; for by the agreement of the duumviri the public law cannot be altered. Yet I judge that the one who undertook this should first be convened; then, his means having been excussed, one should then come against his colleague—just as, if he had given alone, we would say that he should first be attacked, and then the colleague.
Si quando desint in civitate, ex qua pupilli oriundi sunt, qui idonei videantur, officium est magistratuum exquirere ex vicinis civitatibus honestissimum quemque et nomina praesidibus provinciae mittere, non ipsos arbitrium dandi sibi vindicare.
If at any time there are lacking in the city from which the wards originate men who seem suitable, it is the duty of the magistrates to seek out from neighboring cities each most honorable man and to send the names to the governors of the province, not to claim for themselves the discretion of making the appointment.
Si magistratus ab initio tutorem idoneum dedit et satis non exegit, non sufficit: quod si satis exegit et idoneum exegit, quamvis postea facultatibus lapsi sint tutores vel fideiussores, nihil est, quod ei qui dedit imputetur: non enim debent magistratus futuros casus et fortunam pupillo praestare.
If the magistrate from the beginning appointed a suitable tutor and did not exact security, that is not sufficient; but if he exacted security, and that adequate, then although afterwards the tutors or the sureties have fallen from their means, there is nothing that can be imputed to him who appointed: for magistrates ought not to guarantee to the ward future contingencies and fortune.
Exigere autem cautionem magistratus sic oportet, ut pupilli servus aut ipse pupillus, si fari potest et in praesentiarum est, stipuletur a tutoribus, item fideiussoribus eorum rem salvam fore: aut, si nemo est qui stipuletur, servus publicus stipulari debet rem salvam fore pupillo, aut certe ipse magistratus.
Moreover, the magistrate ought to exact the security thus: that the ward’s slave, or the ward himself, if he can speak and is at hand, should stipulate from the tutors, likewise from their sureties, that the estate will be kept safe; or, if there is no one to stipulate, a public slave ought to stipulate that the estate will be kept safe for the ward, or, at any rate, the magistrate himself.
Si filius familias fuit magistratus et caveri pupillo non curaverit aut non idonee cautum sit culpa eius, an et quatenus in patrem eius actio danda sit, quaeritur. et ait iulianus in patrem de peculio dandam, sive voluntate eius filius decurio factus sit sive non: nam et si voluntate patris magistratum administravit, attamen non oportere patrem ultra quam de peculio conveniri, quasi rem publicam salvam solam fore promittat, qui dat voluntatem, ut filius decurio creetur.
If a son in the household was a magistrate and did not see to it that security be taken for a ward, or it was not adequately secured through his fault, the question is asked whether, and to what extent, an action should be granted against his father. And Julianus says that an action de peculio should be granted against the father, whether the son became a decurion with his consent or not: for even if with the father’s consent he administered the magistracy, nevertheless the father ought not to be sued beyond the peculium, as though he who gives the consent that his son be created a decurion promises only that the commonwealth will be safe.
Proponebatur duos tutores a magistratibus municipalibus datos cautione non exacta, quorum alterum inopem decessisse, alterum in solidum conventum satis pupillo fecisse, et quaerebatur, an tutor iste adversus magistratum municipalem habere possit aliquam actionem, cum sciret a contutore suo satis non esse exactum. dicebam, cum a tutore satis pupillo factum sit, neque pupillum ad magistratus redire posse neque tutorem, cum numquam tutor adversus magistratus habeat actionem: senatus enim consultum pupillo subvenit: praesertim cum sit, quod tutori imputetur, quod satis a contutore non exegit vel suspectum non fecit, si scit, ut proponitur, magistratibus eum non cavisse.
It was proposed that two tutors given by the municipal magistrates, security not having been exacted, of whom the one had died indigent, the other, being sued in solidum, had made sufficient satisfaction to the pupil; and the question was raised whether this tutor could have any action against the municipal magistrate, since he knew that from his co-tutor security had not been exacted. I said that, when satisfaction has been made to the pupil by a tutor, neither can the pupil return to the magistrates nor the tutor, since a tutor never has an action against magistrates: for the senatus consultum brings aid to the pupil; especially since there is something to be imputed to the tutor—namely, that he did not exact security from his co-tutor or did not have him declared suspect, if he knows, as proposed, that he had not given security to the magistrates.
Duo tutores partiti sunt inter se administrationem tutelae: alter sine herede decessit: quaesitum est, in magistratum, qui non curasset ut caveretur, an in alterum tutorem actio pupillo dari deberet. respondi aequius esse in alterum tutorem dari quam in magistratum: debuisse enim eum, cum sciret pupillo cautum non esse, universa negotia curare, et in ea parte, quam alteri tutori commisisset, similem esse ei, qui ad administrationem quorundam negotiorum pupilli non accessisset: nam etsi aliquam partem negotiorum pupilli administraverit, tenetur etiam ob rem, quam non gessit, cum gerere deberet.
Two tutors divided between themselves the administration of the guardianship: one died without an heir. The question was raised whether an action ought to be given to the ward against the magistrate who had not taken care that security be required, or against the other tutor. I answered that it is more equitable that it be given against the other tutor than against the magistrate: for he ought, since he knew that no security had been provided for the ward, to attend to all the business, and, in that part which he had entrusted to the other tutor, he is like one who had not undertaken the administration of certain affairs of the ward; for even if he has administered some part of the ward’s affairs, he is liable also for the matter which he did not manage, since he ought to have managed it.
Quod ad heredem magistratus pertinet, exstat divi pii rescriptum causa cognita debere dari actionem: nam magistratus si tanta fuit neglegentia, ut omnem cautionem omitteret, aequum est haberi eum loco fideiussoris, ut et heres eius teneatur: si vero cavit et tunc idonei fuerunt et postea desierunt, sicut et ipse magistratus probe recusaret hanc actionem, ita et heres multo iustius. novissime non alias ait in heredem actionem dandam, quam si evidenter magistratus cum minus idoneis fideiussoribus contrahunt.
As to the heir of a magistrate, there exists a rescript of the Deified Pius that, the cause having been inquired into, the action ought to be granted: for if the magistrate was of such negligence as to omit every caution (security), it is equitable to hold him in the place of a surety, so that his heir also is bound; but if he did take security and at that time they were adequate and afterwards ceased to be, just as the magistrate himself would rightly refuse this action, so too the heir, much more justly. Lastly, he says that an action is to be given against the heir only if it is evident that magistrates contract with less adequate sureties.
In magistratus qui tutorem dederunt rogo rescribas utrum pro virili portione actio danda sit, an optio sit eius qui pupillus fuit, cum quo potissimum agat. respondit, si dolo fecerunt magistratus, ut minus pupillo caveretur, in quem vult actio ei danda in solidum est: sin culpa dumtaxat eorum neque dolo malo id factum est, aequius esse existimo pro portione in quemque eorum actionem dari, dum pupillo salva res sit.
Concerning magistrates who appointed a tutor, I ask you to write back whether an action should be granted pro rata (pro virili portione), or whether there is an option for the one who was a ward (pupillus) as to which of them he should rather sue. He responded: if the magistrates acted with dolus, so that less security was provided for the ward, an action is to be granted to him in solidum (for the whole) against whichever one he wishes; but if it was done by their fault only and not by dolus malus, I consider it more equitable that an action be given proportionally against each of them, provided the ward’s matter remains safe.
An in magistratus actione data cum usuris sors exigi debeat, an vero usurae peti non possint, quoniam constitutum est poenarum usuras peti non posse, quaesitum est. et rescriptum est a divis severo et antonino et usuras peti posse, quoniam eadem in magistratibus actio datur, quae competit in tutores.
It was asked whether, in the action given against magistrates, the principal ought to be exacted together with interest, or indeed that interest cannot be sought, since it is established that interest on penalties cannot be sought. And it was rescripted by the deified Severus and Antoninus that interest too can be sought, since the same action is given against magistrates as is available against guardians.
" praeterea, patres conscripti, interdicam tutoribus et curatoribus, ne praedia rustica vel suburbana distrahant, nisi ut id fieret, parentes testamento vel codicilllis caverint. quod si forte aes alienum tantum erit, ut ex rebus ceteris non possit exsolvi, tunc praetor urbanus vir clarissimus adeatur, qui pro sua religione aestimet, quae possunt alienari obligarive debeant, manente pupillo actione, si postea potuerit probari obreptum esse praetori. si communis res erit et socius ad divisionem provocet, aut si creditor, qui pignori agrum a parente pupilli acceperit, ius exsequetur, nihil novandum censeo".
" furthermore, Conscript Fathers, I will issue an interdict to tutors and curators, that they not sell off rural or suburban estates, unless the parents have provided by testament or codicils that this be done. But if by chance the debt is so great that it cannot be paid out of the other assets, then let the Urban Praetor, a most illustrious man, be approached, who, according to his conscientious duty, shall assess which things can be alienated or ought to be pledged, with an action remaining to the ward, if afterward it can be proved that the praetor had been deceived. If the property is common and a partner calls for division, or if a creditor who has received a field from the ward’s parent in pledge will enforce his right, I am of the opinion that nothing should be changed".
Sed hic videtur illud movere, quod cum dominio pignus quaesitum est et ab initio obligatio inhaesit. quod si a fisco emerit, nec dubitatio est, quin ius pignoris salvum sit. si igitur talis species in privato venditore inciderit, imperiali beneficio opus est, ut ex rescripto pignus confirmetur.
But here that matter seems to arise: that the pledge was acquired together with dominion, and from the beginning the obligation has adhered. But if he has bought from the fisc, there is no doubt that the right of pledge remains safe. Therefore, if such a case should occur with a private seller, an imperial beneficium is needed, so that by rescript the pledge may be confirmed.
Sed si pecunia alterius pupilli alteri pupillo fundus sit comparatus isque pupillo vel minori traditus, an pignoris obligationem possit habere is, cuius pecunia fundus sit emptus et magis est, ut salvum sit ius pignoris secundum constitutionem imperatoris nostri et divi patris eius ei pupillo, cuius pecunia comparatus est fundus.
But if with the money of one ward a landed estate be purchased for another ward, and it be delivered to the ward or to the minor, whether the one with whose money the estate was bought can have a pledge-obligation; and the stronger view is that the right of pledge is preserved, according to the constitution of our emperor and of his deified father, to that ward with whose money the estate was purchased.
Pignori tamen capi iussu magistratus vel praesidis vel alterius potestatis et distrahi fundus pupillaris potest. sed et in possessionem mitti rerum pupillarum a praetore quis potest et ius pignoris contrahitur, sive legatorum servandorum causa sive damni infecti, ut procedat, iuberi etiam possideri poterit: hae enim obligationes sive alienationes locum habent, quia non ex tutoris vel curatoris voluntate id fit, sed ex magistratuum auctoritate.
Nevertheless a pupillary estate (fundus) can be taken in pledge by order of a magistrate or a praeses or another authority, and be sold. But also someone can be sent into possession of pupillary things by the praetor, and a right of pledge is contracted; whether for the sake of preserving legacies or of damnum infectum (threatened damage), so that the matter may proceed, he can even be ordered to possess. For these obligations or alienations have a place, because this is done not by the will of the tutor or curator, but by the authority of the magistrates.
Item quaeri potest, si fundus a tutore petitus sit pupillaris nec restituatur, an litis aestimatio oblata alienationem pariat, et magis est, ut pariat: haec enim alienatio non sponte tutorum fit.
Likewise, it can be asked, if a ward’s farm has been sued for by the tutor and is not restored, whether the valuation of the suit (litis aestimatio) when tendered produces an alienation; and the stronger view is that it does produce one: for this alienation does not come about by the tutors’ own free will.
but if the pupil has proprietorship, he cannot alienate the usufruct or the use, although the oration says nothing about the usufruct. in a similar way it can be said that neither can a servitude be imposed upon the fund/estate of a pupil or an adolescent nor can a servitude be remitted, which likewise has been decided in the case of a dotal fund/estate.
Si fundus pupillo pigneratus sit, an vendere tutores? hunc enim quasi debitoris, hoc est alienum vendunt. si tamen impetraverat pupillus vel pater eius, ut iure dominii possideant, consequens erit dicere non posse distrahi quasi praedium pupillare.
If a landed estate has been pledged to a ward, may the guardians sell it? For they sell this as if it were the debtor’s, that is, alien property. If, however, the ward or his father had obtained that they possess it by right of dominion, it will follow to say that it cannot be sold off as a ward’s estate.
Si fundus legatus vel per fideicommissum fuerit relictus seio a pupillo herede instituto, an tutores restituere hunc fundum possint sine auctoritate praetoris? et putem, si quidem rem suam legavit, cessare orationem, sin vero de re pupilli, dicendum erit locum esse orationi nec inconsulto praetore posse alienare.
If a fundus has been bequeathed or left by fideicommissum to Seius by a ward instituted as heir, can the guardians restore this fundus without the authority of the praetor? And I think that, if indeed he bequeathed a thing of his own, the oratio does not apply; but if it is a matter of the ward’s property, it must be said there is room for the oratio and that they cannot alienate without the praetor being consulted.
Sed si pater stipulanti fundum spoponderit successeritque pupillus in stipulatum, fortius dicetur sine praetoris auctoritate posse eum reddere. idemque et si iure hereditario alii successerit, qui erat obligatus.
But if a father has promised a farm to a stipulating party, and the ward has succeeded in respect of the stipulation, it will be said with stronger reason that he can render it without the praetor’s authority. And the same is true if by hereditary right someone else has succeeded to one who was obligated.
Non passim tutoribus sub optentu aeris alieni permitti debuit venditio: namque non esse viam eis distractionis tributam. et ideo praetori arbitrium huius rei senatus dedit, cuius officio in primis hoc convenit excutere, an aliunde possit pecunia ad extenuandum aes alienum expediri. quaerere ergo debet, an pecuniam pupillus habeat vel in numerato vel in nominibus, quae conveniri possunt, vel in fructibus conditis vel etiam in redituum spe atque obventionum.
Sale ought not to be permitted to tutors (guardians) indiscriminately under the pretext of debt: for no way of disposal by sale has been granted to them. And therefore the Senate gave to the praetor the discretion of this matter, in whose office it is first of all fitting to examine whether money can be procured from elsewhere to extenuate the debt. He ought therefore to inquire whether the ward has money either in ready cash, or in claims (nomina) which can be called in (sued), or in stored fruits, or also in the hope of revenues and receipts (obventions).
likewise let him inquire whether there are other things besides the estates which can be sold, from whose price the debt can be satisfied. If therefore he discovers that it cannot be paid from elsewhere than from the sale of the estates, then he will permit them to be sold, provided that the creditor presses, or the rate of usury suggests that the debt must be complied with.
Idem praetor aestimare debebit, utrum vendere potius an obligare permittat nec non illud vigilanter observare, ne plus accipiatur sub obligatione praediorum faenoris, quam quod opus sit ad solvendum aes alienum: aut distrahendum arbitrabitur, ne propter modicum aes alienum magna possessio distrahatur, sed si sit alia possessio minor vel minus utilior pupillo, magis eam iubere distrahi quam maiorem et utiliorem.
The same praetor ought to assess whether he should permit rather a sale or a pledge, and also diligently observe this: that under the obligation upon the estates no more in the way of interest be received than what is needed to discharge the debt: or he will judge that there must be a sale, lest on account of a small debt a great possession be sold off; but if there is another possession smaller or less useful to the ward, he should order that one rather to be sold off than the larger and more useful.
In primis igitur quotiens desideratur ab eo, ut remittat distrahi, requirere debet eum, qui se instruat de fortunis pupilli, nec nimium tutoribus vel curatoribus credere, qui nonnumquam lucri sui gratia adseverare praetori solent necesse esse distrahi possessiones vel obligari. requirat ergo necessarios pupilli vel parentes vel libertos aliquos fideles vel quem alium, qui notitiam rerum pupillarium habet, aut, si nemo inveniatur aut suspecti sint qui inveniuntur, iubere debet edi rationes itemque synopsin bonorum pupillarium, advocatumque pupillo dare, qui instruere possit praetoris religionem, an adsentire venditioni vel obligationi debeat.
First of all, therefore, whenever it is requested of him that he permit a sale to proceed, he ought to require someone who will instruct himself about the fortunes of the ward, and not trust too much the tutors or curators, who sometimes, for the sake of their own profit, are accustomed to assert to the praetor that it is necessary that the possessions be sold or obligated. Let him therefore inquire of the ward’s necessarii or parents, or of some faithful freedmen, or of any other person who has knowledge of the ward’s affairs; or, if no one is found, or those found are suspect, he ought to order that the accounts be produced, as well as a synopsis of the ward’s goods, and to assign an advocate to the ward, who can inform the praetor’s conscience whether he ought to assent to the sale or to the obligation.
Ne tamen titulo tenus tutores aere alieno allegato pecunia abutantur quam mutuam acceperunt, oportebit praetorem curare, ut pecunia accepta creditoribus solvatur et de hoc decernere dareque viatorem, qui ei renuntiet pecuniam istam ad hoc conversam, propter quod desiderata est alienatio vel obligatio.
Lest, however, guardians, under color in title only by alleging indebtedness, abuse the money which they received as a loan, it will be proper for the praetor to see to it that the money received be paid to the creditors, and to decree concerning this and appoint a viator, who shall report back to him that that money has been applied to this end, for the sake of which alienation or obligation was desired.
Si aes alienum non interveniat, tutores tamen allegent expedire haec praedia vendere et vel alia comparare vel certe istis carere, videndum est, an praetor eis debeat permittere. et magis est, ne possit: praetori enim non liberum arbitrium datum est distrahendi res pupillares, sed ita demum, si aes alienum immineat. proinde et si permiserit aere alieno non allegato, consequenter dicemus nullam esse venditionem nullumque decretum: non enim passim distrahi iubere praetori tributum est, sed ita demum, si urgueat aes alienum.
If no debt intervenes, yet the tutors allege that it is expedient to sell these estates and either to purchase others or at any rate to do without these, it must be considered whether the praetor ought to permit them. And the sounder view is that he cannot: for a free discretion has not been given to the praetor for selling off pupillary property, but only if debt is impending. Accordingly, if he should permit it with no debt alleged, we shall consequently say that there is no sale and no decree: for it has not been granted to the praetor to order things to be sold off indiscriminately, but only if debt presses.
Manet actio pupillo, si postea poterit probari obreptum esse praetori. sed videndum est, utrum in rem an in personam dabimus ei actionem. et magis est, ut in rem detur, non tantum in personam adversus tutores sive curatores.
The action remains to the ward, if afterwards it can be proven that obreption was practiced upon the praetor. But it must be considered whether we will grant him an action in rem or in personam. And the more correct view is that an action in rem be granted, not merely an in personam against the tutors or curators.
Si pupillorum sint communia praedia qui diversos tutores habent, videamus, an alienatio locum habere possit. et cum provocatio necessaria sit, puto alienationem impediri: neuter enim poterit provocare, sed ambo provocationem exspectare. item si eosdem tutores habeant, multo magis quis impeditam alienationem dicet.
If the estates are common to pupils who have different tutors, let us see whether alienation can take place. And since a calling-out (public proclamation) is necessary, I think the alienation is impeded: for neither will be able to issue the call, but both must await the calling. Likewise, if they have the same tutors, much more will one say that the alienation is impeded.
Quid ergo si praetor ita decreverit " vendere obligareve permitto " , an possit liberum arbitrium habere, qui faciat? et magis est ut possit, dummodo sciamus praetorem non recte partibus suis functum: debuit enim ipse statuere et eligere, utrum magis obligare an vendere permittat.
What then if the praetor has thus decreed " I permit to sell or to obligate " , can he have free discretion as to which he does? and the better view is that he can, provided that we understand the praetor has not rightly discharged his parts: for he ought himself to have determined and chosen whether he permits rather to obligate or to sell.
Sed si curator sit furiosi vel cuius alterius non adulescentis, videndum est, utrum iure veteri valebit venditio an hanc orationem admittemus. et puto, quia de pupillis princeps loquitur et coniuncti tutoribus curatores accipiunt, pertinere: et de ceteris puto ex sententia orationis idem esse dicendum.
But if the curator be of a madman (furiosus) or of some other who is not an adolescent, it must be considered whether under the old law the sale (vendition) would be valid, or whether we shall admit this Oration. And I think that, since the princeps speaks about pupils (pupilli), and curators are taken as conjoined with tutors, it applies; and as to the others, I think the same must be said according to the tenor of the Oration.
Quamvis antecessor praesidis decrevisset ea praedia venumdari, quae tutor pupilli, subiecto nomine alterius emptoris, ipse sibi comparabat, tamen, si fraudem et dolum contra senatus consulti auctoritatem et fidem tutori commissam deprehendisset successor eius, aestimabit, quatenus tam callidum commentum etiam in exemplum coercere debeat.
Although the predecessor of the governor had decreed that those estates be sold which the tutor of a pupil, with the name of another buyer interposed, was procuring for himself, nevertheless, if his successor should detect fraud and dolus committed against the authority of the senatus-consult and the trust committed to the tutor, he will assess to what extent he ought to coerce so crafty a contrivance also by way of example.
Si fundus sit sterilis vel saxosus vel pestilens, videndum est, an alienare eum non possit. et imperator antoninus et divus pater eius in haec verba rescripserunt: " quod allegastis infructuosum esse fundum, quem vendere vultis, movere nos non potest, cum utique pro fructuum modo pretium inventurus sit".
If a landed estate be sterile or rocky or pestilential, it must be considered whether he cannot alienate it. and the emperor antoninus and his deified father wrote back in these words: " that which you have alleged, that the estate is unfruitful, which you wish to sell, cannot move us, since in any case he will find a price according to the measure of the fruits".
Quamquam autem neque distrahere neque obligare tutor pupillare praedium possit, attamen papinianus libro quinto responsorum ait tutorem pupilli sine decreto praetoris non iure distrahere: si tamen, inquit, errore lapsus vendiderit et pretium acceptum creditoribus paternis pueri solverit, quandoque domino praedium cum fructibus vindicanti doli non inutiliter opponitur, exceptio pretium ac medii temporis usuras, quae creditoribus debentur, non offerenti, si ex ceteris eius facultatibus aes alienum solvi non poterit. ego autem notavi: etsi solvi potuerit, si tamen illae res salvae erunt, ex quarum pretio aeri alieno satisfieri potuit, dicendum est adhuc doli exceptionem obstare, si lucrum captet pupillus ex damno alieno.
Although, moreover, a tutor cannot either sell off (distract) or encumber the pupillary praedium, nevertheless Papinian, in the fifth book of the Responses, says that the tutor of a ward, without a decree of the praetor, does not lawfully alienate: if, however, he says, having slipped by error he has sold and has paid to the boy’s paternal creditors the price received, then, whenever the owner vindicating the praedium together with its fruits is met not ineffectually by the defense of fraud, it is against one who does not tender the price and the interest for the intervening time, which are owed to the creditors, provided the alien debt cannot be discharged from his other means. But I have noted this: even if it could have been paid, nevertheless, if those things are safe, from the price of which the alien debt could have been satisfied, it must still be said that the defense of fraud bars recovery, if the ward would seize a profit from another’s loss.
Paulus respondit, etsi testamentum patris postea irritum esse apparuit, tamen tutores pupilli sive curatores filii nihil contra orationem divorum principum fecisse videri, si secundum voluntatem defuncti testamento scriptam praedium rusticum pupillare vendiderunt.
Paulus responded: although the father’s testament later appeared to be void, nevertheless the tutors of the ward or the curators of the son are not considered to have done anything against the oration of the deified emperors, if, according to the will of the deceased written in the testament, they sold a rural estate (praedium rusticum) of the ward.
Lege duodecim tabularum prodigo interdicitur bonorum suorum administratio, quod moribus quidem ab initio introductum est. sed solent hodie praetores vel praesides, si talem hominem invenerint, qui neque tempus neque finem expensarum habet, sed bona sua dilacerando et dissipando profudit, curatorem ei dare exemplo furiosi: et tamdiu erunt ambo in curatione, quamdiu vel furiosus sanitatem vel ille sanos mores receperit: quod si evenerit, ipso iure desinunt esse in potestate curatorum.
By the Law of the Twelve Tables, a prodigal is interdicted from the administration of his own goods, which indeed from the beginning was introduced by mores. But today the praetors or provincial governors, if they find such a man who has neither term nor limit of expenses, but has squandered his goods by tearing them to pieces and dissipating them, are accustomed to give him a curator on the model of a madman; and both will be under curatorship as long as either the madman has recovered sanity or that man has recovered sane mores: and if this should come to pass, by the law itself they cease to be in the power of their curators.
Curator ex senatus consulto constituitur, cum clara persona, veluti senatoris vel uxoris eius, in ea causa sit, ut eius bona venire debeant: nam ut honestius ex bonis eius quantum potest creditoribus solveretur, curator constituitur distrahendorum bonorum gratia vel a praetore vel in provinciis a praeside.
A curator is appointed by senatorial decree, when a prominent person, such as a senator or his wife, is in such a case that that person’s goods ought to come up for sale: for, so that as honorably as possible there may be paid to the creditors out of the goods, a curator is appointed for the purpose of selling off the goods, either by the praetor or, in the provinces, by the governor.
Curator dementi datus decreto interposito, uti satisdaret, non cavit et tamen quasdam res de bonis eius legitimo modo alienavit. si heredes dementis easdem res vindicent, quas curator alienavit, et exceptio opponetur " si non curator vendiderit", replicatio dari debet " aut si satisdatione interposita secundum decretum vendiderit". quod si pretio accepto curator creditores furiosi dimisit, triplicatio doli tutos possessores praestabit.
A curator appointed to a demented person, a decree having been interposed that he should furnish surety, did not give security and yet alienated certain things from his goods in a legitimate manner. If the heirs of the demented man vindicate those same things which the curator alienated, and the exceptio is opposed, “if the curator did not sell,” a replicatio ought to be given, “or if, with a suretyship interposed according to the decree, he sold.” But if, the price having been received, the curator discharged the creditors of the madman, a triplicatio of dolus will make the possessors safe.
Cum dementis curatorem, quia satis non dederat et res male administraret, proconsul removerit a bonis aliumque loco eius substituerit curatorem, et hic posterior, cum nec ipse satisdedisset, egerit cum remoto negotiorum gestorum, posteaque heredes dementis cum eodem negotiorum gestorum agant et is exceptione rei iudicatae inter se et curatorem utatur: heredibus replicatio danda erit: " aut si is qui egit satisdederat". sed an replicatio curatori profutura esset, iudex aestimabit: nam si curator sequens pecuniam, quam ex condemnatione consecutus fuerat, in rem furiosi vertisset, doli triplicatio obstabit.
When the curator of a demented person, because he had not furnished security and was mismanaging the affairs, has been removed from the goods by the proconsul, and another curator has been substituted in his place; and this later curator, since he likewise had not furnished security, has brought an actio negotiorum gestorum against the one removed; and afterwards the heirs of the demented bring an actio negotiorum gestorum against that same person, and he employs the exceptio rei iudicatae as between himself and the curator: a replicatio is to be given to the heirs: "or if the one who sued had furnished security." But whether the replicatio would be of benefit to the curator, the judge will assess: for if the subsequent curator turned the money which he had obtained from the condemnation into the estate of the madman, the doli triplicatio will stand in the way.
Quaesitum est, an alteri ex curatoribus furiosi recte solvetur vel an unus rem furiosi alienare possit. respondi recte solvi. eum quoque, qui ab altero ex curatoribus fundum furiosi legitime mercaretur, usucapturum, quia solutio venditio traditio facti magis quam iuris sunt ideoque sufficit unius ex curatoribus persona, quia intellegitur alter consentire: denique si praesens sit et vetet solvi, vetet venire vel tradi, neque debitor liberabitur neque emptor usucapiet.
It was asked whether payment is rightly made to one of the curators of an insane person, or whether a single one can alienate the insane person’s property. I answered: it is rightly paid. I also answered that he who should lawfully purchase a tract of land of the insane person from one of the curators will acquire by usucapion, because payment, sale, and delivery are matters more of fact than of law, and therefore the person of one of the curators suffices, since the other is understood to consent: finally, if he be present and forbids that payment be made, forbids that it be sold or delivered, neither will the debtor be released nor will the buyer usucapt.
Bonorum ventris nomine curatorem dari oportet eumque rem salvam fore viri boni arbitratu satisdare proconsul iubet: sed hoc, si non ex inquisitione detur: nam si ex inquisitione, cessat satisdatio.
It is proper that, for the goods on account of the womb (i.e., of the unborn), a curator be appointed, and the proconsul orders him to give surety, at the arbitrament of a good man, that the property shall be kept safe: but this, if he is not appointed upon an investigation; for if upon an investigation, the requirement of surety ceases.
Cuius bonis distrahendis curatores facere senatus permisit, eius bona creditoribus vendere non permisit, quamvis creditores post id beneficium bona vendere mallent: sicut enim integra re potestas ipsorum est utrum velint eligendi, ita cum alterum elegerint, altero abstinere debent. multoque magis id servari aequum est, si etiam factus est curator, per quem bona distraherentur, quamvis nondum explicato eo negotio decesserit. nam et tunc ex integro alius curator faciendus est neque heres prioris curatoris onerandus, cum accidere possit, ut negotio vel propter sexus vel propter aetatis infirmitatem vel propter dignitatem maiorem minoremve, quam in priore curatore spectata erat, habilis non sit, possint etiam plures heredes ei existere neque aut per omnes id negotium administrari expediat aut quicquam dici possit, cur unus aliquis ex his potissimum onerandus sit.
For one whose goods the senate permitted curators to be appointed for the selling-off of his goods, it did not permit his goods to be sold to the creditors, although the creditors after that benefit would prefer to sell the goods: for just as, with the matter still intact, the power is theirs to choose which they wish, so when they have chosen the one, they ought to refrain from the other. And much more is it equitable that this be observed if a curator has even been appointed through whom the goods would be sold off, although, before that business was concluded, he has died. For then too from the start another curator must be appointed, nor is the heir of the prior curator to be burdened, since it can happen that he is not apt for the business either on account of sex, or on account of weakness of age, or on account of a higher or lower dignity than had been considered in the prior curator; several heirs may also arise to him, and it would neither be expedient for that business to be administered by all of them, nor could anything be said why one of them in particular should be burdened.
His consequens est, ut et si prodigo curatorem dederit pater, voluntatem eius sequi debeat praetor eumque dare curatorem. sed utrum omnimodo, an ita, si futurum esset, ut, nisi pater aliquid testamento cavisset, praetor ei bonis interdicturus esset? et maxime si filios habeat iste prodigus?
It follows from this that, even if a father has appointed a curator for a prodigal, the praetor ought to follow his will and to give him a curator. But is this so in every case, or only thus, if it would be the case that, unless the father had provided something by testament, the praetor would be about to interdict him from his goods? And especially if that prodigal has sons?
Potuit tamen pater et alias providere nepotibus suis, si eos iussisset heredes esse et exheredasset filium eique quod sufficeret alimentorum nomine ab eis certum legasset addita causa necessitateque iudicii sui: aut si non habuit in potestate nepotes, quoniam emancipato iam filio nati fuissent, sub condicione eos heredes instituere, ut emanciparentur a patre prodigo.
Nevertheless the father could also otherwise provide for his grandchildren, if he had ordered them to be heirs and had disinherited his son, and had bequeathed to him, chargeable upon them, a fixed amount sufficient for maintenance, with the reason and the necessity of his own judgment added; or, if he did not have the grandchildren in his power, since they had been born of a son already emancipated, to institute them as heirs under the condition that they be emancipated by their prodigal father.
Curator furiosi nullo modo libertatem praestare potest, quod ea res ex administratione non est: nam in tradendo ita res furiosi alienat, si id ad administrationem negotiorum pertineat: et ideo si donandi causa alienet, neque traditio quicquam valebit, nisi ex magna utilitate furiosi hoc cognitione iudicis faciat.
The curator of an insane person can in no way furnish liberty, because that matter is not of administration: for in handing over he thus alienates a thing of the insane person, if it pertains to the administration of the affairs; and therefore if he alienates for the sake of gifting, neither the delivery (traditio) will be of any force, unless he does this, by the judge’s cognition, because of great utility to the insane person.