Cicero: PHILOSOPHIA

[1] Maiores nos res scribere ingressos, C. Trebati, et his libris quos brevi tempore satis multos edidimus digniores, e cursu ipso revocavit voluntas tua. Cum enim mecum in Tusculano esses et in bibliotheca separatim uterque nostrum ad suum studium libellos quos vellet evolveret, incidisti in Aristotelis Topica quaedam, quae sunt ab illo pluribus libris explicata. Qua inscriptione commotus continuo a me librorum eorum sententiam requisisti;

[1] We, having entered upon writing greater matters, Gaius Trebatius, and things more worthy than these little books, of which in a short time we have published quite many, your will called us back from the very course. For when you were with me at Tusculum and, in the library, each of us separately, according to his own study, was unrolling such little books as he wished, you happened upon certain Topics of Aristotle, which have been explicated by him in several books. Moved by that inscription, you straightway asked from me the meaning of those books;

[2] quam cum tibi euissem, disciplinam inveniendorum argumentorum, ut sine ullo errore ad ea ratione et via perveniremus, ab Aristotele inventam illis libris contineri, verecunde tu quidem ut omnia, sed tamen facile ut cernerem te ardere studio, mecum ut tibi illa traderem egisti. Cum autem ego te non tam vitandi laboris mei causa quam quia tua id interesse arbitrarer, vel ut eos per te ipse legeres vel ut totam rationem a doctissimo quodam rhetore acciperes, hortatus essem, utrumque, ut ex te audiebam, es expertus.

[2] when I had explained to you that the discipline of discovering arguments—so that we might arrive at them by reason and by a way without any error—devised by Aristotle, is contained in those books, you, modestly indeed as in all things, yet in such a way that I could easily perceive you burning with zeal, pressed me to hand those things over to you. But when I, not so much for the sake of avoiding my own toil as because I judged that it concerned your interest, had urged you either to read them yourself or to receive the whole method from a certain most learned rhetor, you, as I heard from you, have tried both.

[3] Sed a libris te obscuritas reiecit; rhetor autem ille magnus haec, ut opinor, Aristotelia se ignorare respondit. Quod quidem minime sum admiratus eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, qui ab ipsis philosophis praeter admodum paucos ignoretur; quibus eo minus ignoscendum est, quod non modo rebus eis quae ab illo dictae et inventae sunt allici debuerunt, sed dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cum copia tum etiam suavitate.

[3] But obscurity drove you away from the books; the great rhetor, however, replied that, as I suppose, he was ignorant of these Aristotelian things. This indeed I was not at all astonished at—that that philosopher was not known to the rhetor, since he is ignored by the philosophers themselves except by very few; and they are all the less to be pardoned, because they ought to have been attracted not only by the matters which were said and discovered by him, but also by a certain incredible copiousness of speaking and even suavity.

[4] Non potui igitur tibi saepius hoc roganti et tamen verenti ne mihi gravis esses—facile enim id cernebam—debere diutius, ne ipsi iuris interpreti fieri videretur iniuria. Etenim cum tu mihi meisque multa saepe scripsisses, veritus sum ne, si ego gravarer, aut ingratum id aut superbum videretur. Sed dum fuimus una, tu optimus es testis quam fuerim occupatus;

[4] Therefore I could not—since you were rather often asking this and yet fearing lest you be burdensome to me, for I easily discerned that—remain in your debt any longer, lest an injury seem to be done to the interpreter of the law himself. For indeed, since you had often written many things to me and to mine, I feared that, if I should hesitate, it would appear either ungrateful or haughty. But while we were together, you are the best witness how occupied I was;

[5] ut autem a te discessi in Graeciam proficiscens, cum opera mea nec res publica nec amici uterentur nec honeste inter arma versari possem, ne si tuto quidem mihi id liceret, ut veni Veliam tuaque et tuos vidi, admonitus huius aeris alieni nolui deesse ne tacitae quidem flagitationi tuae. Itaque haec, cum mecum libros non haberem, memoria repetita in ipsa navigatione conscripsi tibique ex itinere misi, ut mea diligentia mandatorum tuorum te quoque, etsi admonitore non eges, ad memoriam nostrarum rerum excitarem. Sed iam tempus est ad id quod instituimus accedere.

[5] But when I departed from you, setting out for Greece, since neither the commonwealth nor my friends were employing my service, and I could not honorably be engaged amid arms—even if it were permitted to me to do so safely—when I came to Velia and saw you and yours, being reminded of this debt I did not wish to fail even your silent demand. Therefore these things—since I did not have books with me—having called them back to memory, I wrote down on the voyage itself and sent to you from the road, so that by my diligence regarding your mandates I might also, though you have no need of a monitor, rouse you to the remembrance of our affairs. But now it is time to approach that which we have instituted.

[6] Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat partis, unam inveniendi alteram iudicandi, utriusque princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit. Stoici autem in altera elaboraverunt; iudicandi enim vias diligenter persecuti sunt ea scientia quam dialektikón appellant, inveniendi artem quae topikó dicitur, quae et ad usum potior erat et ordine naturae certe prior, totam reliquerunt.

[6] Since every diligent method of disserting has two parts, one of finding and the other of judging, the chief of both, as it seems to me at least, was Aristotle. The Stoics, however, labored in the latter; for they diligently pursued the ways of judging in that science which they call dialektikón, but the art of finding, which is called topikó—both more effective for use and certainly prior in the order of nature—they left entirely.

[7] Nos autem, quoniam in utraque summa utilitas est et utramque, si erit otium, persequi cogitamus, ab ea quae prior est ordiemur. Ut igitur earum rerum quae absconditae sunt demonstrato et notato loco facilis inventio est, sic, cum pervestigare argumentum aliquod volumus, locos nosse debemus; sic enim appellatae ab Aristotele sunt eae quasi sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur.

[7] But we, since in each there is the highest utility, and we intend to pursue both, if there shall be leisure, will begin from that which is prior. Therefore, just as, for those things which are hidden, discovery is easy once the place has been demonstrated and marked, so, when we wish to thoroughly investigate some argument, we ought to know the places; for thus those, as it were, seats, from which arguments are brought forth, were called by Aristotle.

[8] Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem.

[8] Therefore it is allowable to define a place as the seat of an argument, and an argument as a reason which gives credence to a doubtful matter.

Sed ex his locis in quibus argumenta inclusa sunt, alii in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, alii assumuntur extrinsecus. In ipso tum ex toto, tum ex partibus eius, tum ex nota, tum ex eis rebus quae quodam modo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. Extrinsecus autem ea ducuntur quae absunt longeque disiuncta sunt.

But from these places in which arguments are enclosed, some adhere in the very thing about which the matter is being conducted, others are assumed from without. In the thing itself, then, either from the whole, or from its parts, or from the mark, or from those things which are in some way affected/disposed toward that about which inquiry is made. From without, however, are drawn those which are absent and far disjoined.

[9] Sed ad id totum de quo disseritur tum definitio adhibetur, quae quasi involutum evolvit id de quo quaeritur; eius argumenti talis est formula: Ius civile est aequitas constituta eis qui eiusdem civitatis sunt ad res suas obtinendas; eius autem aequitatis utilis cognitio est; utilis ergo est iuris civilis scientia;

[9] But to the whole matter about which discourse is held a definition is then applied, which, as it were, unfolds the thing wrapped up that is being inquired about; the formula of this argument is of this sort: Civil law is equity constituted for those who are of the same commonwealth, for the obtaining of their own things; moreover, a useful cognition of that equity exists; therefore the science of civil law is useful;

[10] —tum partium enumeratio, quae tractatur hoc modo: Si neque censu nec vindicta nec testamento liber factus est, non est liber; neque ulla est earum rerum; non est igitur liber;—tum notatio, cum ex verbi vi argumentum aliquod elicitur hoc modo: Cum lex assiduo vindicem assiduum esse iubeat, locupletem iubet locupleti; is est enim assiduus, ut ait L. Aelius, appellatus ab aere dando.

[10] —then an enumeration of the parts, which is handled in this way: If he has been made free neither by the census nor by the vindicta nor by testament, he is not free; and none of those things is present; therefore he is not free;—then notation, when from the force of the word some argument is elicited in this way: Since the law orders that for an assiduus the surety be assiduus, it orders a wealthy man for a wealthy man; for he is called assiduus, as L. Aelius says, from giving bronze (money).

[11] Ducuntur etiam argumenta ex eis rebus quae quodam modo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. Sed hoc genus in pluris partis distributum est. Nam alia coniugata appellamus, alia ex genere, alia ex forma, alia ex similitudine, alia ex differentia, alia ex contrario, alia ex adiunctis, alia ex antecedentibus, alia ex consequentibus, alia ex repugnantibus, alia ex causis, alia ex effectis, alia ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum.

[11] Arguments are also drawn from those things which are in some manner affected toward that about which inquiry is made. But this kind is distributed into more parts. For we call some conjugates, others from genus, others from form, others from similitude, others from difference, others from the contrary, others from adjuncts, others from antecedents, others from consequents, others from repugnants, others from causes, others from effects, others from a comparison of greater, or equal, or lesser.

[12] Coniugata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem. Eiusdem autem generis verba sunt quae orta ab uno varie commutantur, ut sapiens sapienter sapientia. Haec verborum coniugatio suzug¤a dicitur, ex qua huius modi est argumentum: Si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere.

[12] Conjugates are said to be those which are from words of the same genus. But words of the same genus are those which, sprung from one, are variously altered, as wise, wisely, wisdom. This conjugation of words is called syzygy, from which there is an argument of this kind: If a field is common-pasture, there is a right to graze in common.

[13] A genere sic ducitur: Quoniam argentum omne mulieri legatum est, non potest ea pecunia quae numerata domi relicta est non esse legata; forma enim a genere, quoad suum nomen retinet, nunquam seiungitur, numerata autem pecunia nomen argenti retinet; legata igitur videtur.

[13] From the genus it is thus derived: Since all silver has been bequeathed to the woman, that money which, having been counted, was left at home cannot fail to be bequeathed; for the form is never sundered from the genus, so long as it retains its own name, and counted money retains the name of silver; therefore it is deemed bequeathed.

[14] A forma generis, quam interdum, quo planius accipiatur, partem licet nominare hoc modo: Si ita Fabiae pecunia legata est a viro, si ei viro materfamilias esset; si ea in manum non convenerat, nihil debetur. Genus enim est uxor; eius duae formae: una matrumfamilias, eae sunt, quae in manum convenerunt; altera earum, quae tantum modo uxores habentur. Qua in parte cum fuerit Fabia, legatum ei non videtur.

[14] From the form of the genus—which sometimes, so that it may be more plainly understood, one may call a part—in this way: If money was thus bequeathed to Fabia by her husband, on the condition that she be materfamilias to that man; if she had not come into his manus, nothing is owed. For the genus is “wife”; its two forms are: one, of matresfamilias—those who have come into the manus; the other, of those who are held merely as wives. Since Fabia was in the latter category, the legacy is not deemed due to her.

[15] A similitudine hoc modo: Si aedes eae corruerunt vitiumve faciunt quarum usus fructus legatus est, heres restituere non debet nec reficere, non magis quam servum restituere, si is cuius usus fructus legatus esset deperisset.

[15] By similitude in this way: If those buildings have collapsed or develop a defect, whose usufruct has been bequeathed, the heir ought neither to restore nor to repair, no more than to restore a slave, if he whose usufruct had been bequeathed had perished.

[16] A differentia: Non, si uxori vir legavit argentum omne quod suum esset, idcirco quae in nominibus fuerunt legata sunt. Multum enim differt in arcane positum sit argentum an in tabulis debeatur.

[16] From difference: Not, if a husband has bequeathed to his wife all the silver that was his, are therefore the sums that were “on the books” bequeathed. For it greatly differs whether the silver is placed in a chest or is owed on the tablets.

[17] Ex contrario autem sic: Non debet ea mulier cui vir bonorum suorum usum fructum legavit cellis vinariis et oleariis plenis relictis, putare id ad se pertinere. Usus enim, non abusus, legatus est. Ea sunt inter se contraria.

[17] Conversely, however, thus: That woman to whom her husband bequeathed the usufruct of his goods, the wine-cellars and oil-cellars having been left full, ought not to think that this pertains to her. For use, not abuse, was bequeathed. These are contrary to each other.

[18] Ab adiunctis: Si ea mulier testamentum fecit quae se capite nunquam deminuit, non videtur ex edicto praetoris secundum eas tabulas possessio dari. Adiungitur enim, ut secundum servorum, secundum exsulum, secundum puerorum tabulas possessio videatur ex edicto dari.

[18] From the adjuncts: If that woman made a testament who has never diminished herself in caput (civil status), it does not seem that, by the praetor’s edict, possession is given according to those tablets. For it is added that, according to the tablets of slaves, according to those of exiles, according to those of boys, possession seems to be given by the edict.

[19] Ab antecedentibus autem et consequentibus et repugnantibus hoc modo; ab antecedentibus: Si viri culpa factum est divortium, etsi mulier nuntium remisit, tamen pro liberis manere nihil oportet.

[19] From antecedents, moreover, and consequents and repugnant things in this way; from antecedents: If the divorce was brought about by the husband’s fault, even if the woman sent back the notice, nevertheless she ought not at all to remain for the children.

[20] A consequentibus: Si mulier, cum fuisset nupta cum eo quicum conubium non esset, nuntium remisit; quoniam qui nati sunt patrem non sequuntur, pro liberis manere nihil oportet.

[20] From consequents: If a woman, when she had been married with one with whom there was no conubium, sent back the notice; since those who are born do not follow the father, it is not proper to remain for the children.

[21] A repugnantibus: Si paterfamilias uxori ancillarum usum fructum legavit a filio neque a secundo herede legavit, mortuo filio mulier usum fructum non amittet. Quod enim semel testamento alicui datum est, id ab eo invito cui datum est auferri non potest. Repugnat enim recte accipere et invitum reddere.

[21] From repugnant (cases): If a paterfamilias bequeathed to his wife the usufruct of the maidservants, to be furnished by the son and not by the second heir, then upon the son’s death the woman will not lose the usufruct. For what has once by testament been given to someone cannot be taken away from him against the will of the one to whom it has been given. For it is repugnant to receive rightly and to return it unwilling.

[22] Ab efficientibus rebus hoc modo: Omnibus est ius parietem directum ad parietem communem adiungere vel solidum vel fornicatum. Sed qui in pariete communi demoliendo damni infecti promiserit, non debebit praestare quod fornix viti fecerit. Non enim eius vitio qui demolitus est damnum factum est, sed eius operis vitio quod ita aedificatum est ut suspendi non posset.

[22] From efficient factors in this way: Everyone has the right to adjoin a straight wall to a common wall, either solid or vaulted. But he who, when demolishing the common wall, has promised a bond for damage not yet done (damnum infectum), will not have to make good what the vault has caused by its defect. For the damage was not done by the fault of him who demolished, but by the defect of that work which was built in such a way that it could not be supported.

[23] Ab effectis rebus hoc modo: Cum mulier viro in manum convenit, omnia quae mulieris fuerunt viri fiunt dotis nomine.

[23] From effected things in this way: When a woman comes into the hand of a man, all the things which were the woman’s become the man’s in the name of dowry.

Ex comparatione autem omnia valent quae sunt huius modi: Quod in re maiore valet valeat in minore, ut si in urbe fines non reguntur, nec aqua in urbe arceatur. Item contra: Quod in minore valet, valeat in maiore. Licet idem exemplum convertere.

By comparison, moreover, all things of this sort are valid: What holds in the greater matter, let it hold in the lesser, as, if in a city boundaries are not regulated, neither is water in the city to be warded off. Likewise, conversely: What holds in the lesser, let it hold in the greater. It is permitted to invert the same example.

Item: Quod in re pari valet valeat in hac quae par est; ut: Quoniam usus auctoritas fundi biennium est, sit etiam aedium. At in lege aedes non appellantur et sunt ceterarum rerum omnium quarum annuus est usus. Valeat aequitas, quae paribus in causis paria iura desiderat.

Likewise: What holds in a like case, let it hold in this case which is like; for example: Since the usucapion of a farm is a biennium, let it be that of buildings as well. But in the statute buildings are not named, and they fall among all the other things whose usucapion is annual. Let equity prevail, which in equal causes demands equal rights.

[24] Quae autem assumuntur extrinsecus, ea maxime ex auctoritate ducuntur. Itaque Graeci talis argumentationes étšxnouw vocant, id est artis expertis, ut si ita respondeas: Quoniam P. Scaevola id solum esse ambitus aedium dixerit, quod parietis communis tegendi causa tectum proiceretur, ex quo tecto in eius aedis qui protexisset aqua deflueret, id ambitus videri.

[24] But those things which are assumed extrinsically are drawn chiefly from authority. And so the Greeks call such argumentations atechnoi, that is, devoid of art, as if you were to answer thus: Since P. Scaevola said that the only thing that is the ambitus of a house is when, for the sake of covering a party wall, a roof is projected, from which roof water would flow down into the house of the one who had projected it, that is seen to be ambitus.

[25] His igitur locis qui sunt eiti ad omne argumentum reperiendum tamquam elementis quibusdam significatio et demonstratio datur. Utrum igitur hactenus satis est? Tibi quidem tam acuto et tam occupato puto.

[25] Therefore to these loci, which are set forth for finding every argument, indication and demonstration are given, as it were by certain elements. Well then, is it enough thus far? For you, indeed, so acute and so occupied, I think so.

Sed quoniam avidum hominem ad has discendi epulas recepi, sic accipiam, ut reliquiarum sit potius aliquid quam te hinc patiar non satiatum discedere.

But since I have admitted an avid man to these banquets of learning, I will receive you thus, so that there may be rather some leftovers than that I should allow you to depart from here not satiated.

[26] Quando ergo unus quisque eorum locorum quos eui sua quaedam habet membra, ea quam subtilissime persequamur.

[26] Since therefore each one of those places has certain members of its own, let us pursue these as most subtly as possible.

Et primum de ipsa definitione dicatur. Definitio est oratio quae id quod definitur explicat quid sit. Definitionum autem duo genera prima: unum earum rerum quae sunt, alterum earum quae intelleguntur.

And first let it be said about definition itself. A definition is a discourse that explicates what the thing defined is. Now of definitions there are two primary kinds: one of those things which are, the other of those things which are understood.

[27] Esse ea dico quae cerni tangique possunt, ut fundum aedes, parietem stillicidium, mancipium pecudem, supellectilem penus et cetera; quo ex genere quaedam interdum vobis definienda sunt. Non esse rursus ea dico quae tangi demonstrarive non possunt, cerni tamen animo atque intellegi possunt, ut si usus capionem, si tutelam, si gentem, si agnationem definias, quarum rerum nullum subest corpus, est tamen quaedam conformatio insignita et impressa intellegentia, quam notionem voco. Ea saepe in argumentando definitione explicanda est.

[27] I call those things “to be” which can be seen and touched, such as an estate, a house, a wall, an eaves-drip, a person in mancipium, a head of livestock, furniture, provisions, and the rest; of which kind certain items will at times have to be defined by you. In turn, I call “not to be” those things which cannot be touched or demonstrated, yet can be seen by the mind and understood, as if you define usucapion, guardianship (tutelage), a gens, or agnation—of which things no body underlies, yet there is a certain conformation stamped and impressed upon understanding, which I call a notion. This often must be unfolded by definition in the course of arguing.

[28] Atque etiam definitiones aliae sunt partitionum aliae divisionum; partitionum, cum res ea quae proposita est quasi in membra discerpitur, ut si quis ius civile dicat id esse quod in legibus, senatus consultis, rebus iudicatis, iuris peritorum auctoritate, edictis magistratuum, more, aequitate consistat. Divisionum autem definitio formas omnis complectitur quae sub eo genere sunt quod definitur hoc modo: Abalienatio est eius rei quae mancipi est aut traditio alteri nexu aut in iure cessio inter quos ea iure civili fieri possunt.

[28] And furthermore, definitions are of two kinds, of partitions and of divisions; of partitions, when the matter that has been proposed is, as it were, torn into its members, as if someone were to say that civil law is that which consists in laws, senatorial decrees, adjudicated matters, the authority of experts in law, the edicts of magistrates, custom, and equity. The definition of divisions, however, embraces all the forms that are under that genus which is being defined, in this way: Alienation is, in the case of a thing that is res mancipi, either a delivery to another by nexum or an in iure cessio, between those among whom these can be done by civil law.

Sunt etiam alia genera definitionum, sed ad huius libri institutum illa nihil pertinent; tantum est dicendum qui sit definitionis modus.

There are also other genera of definitions, but those pertain nothing to the plan of this book; only this must be said: what the modus of definition is.

[29] Sic igitur veteres praecipiunt: cum sumpseris ea quae sint ei rei quam definire velis cum aliis communia, usque eo persequi, dum proprium efficiatur, quod nullam in aliam rem transferri possit. Ut haec: Hereditas est pecunia. Commune adhuc; multa enim genera pecuniae.

[29] Thus therefore the ancients prescribe: when you have taken those things which are common to the thing you wish to define together with other things, pursue it to that point until a proper characteristic is brought about, which can be transferred to no other thing. As these: Inheritance is money. Common still; for there are many kinds of money.

Adde quod sequitur: quae morte alicuius ad quempiam pervenit. Nondum est definitio; multis enim modis sine hereditate teneri pecuniae mortuorum possunt. Unum adde verbum: iure; iam a communitate res diiuncta videbitur, ut sit explicata definitio sic: Hereditas est pecunia quae morte alicuius ad quempiam pervenit iure.

Add what follows: which by the death of someone comes to someone. Not yet is it a definition; for in many ways the monies of the dead can be held without inheritance. Add one word: by right; now the thing will seem separated from the generality, so that the definition is unfolded thus: Inheritance is money which, by the death of someone, comes to someone by right.

Nondum est satis; adde: nec ea aut legata testamento aut possessione retenta; confectum est. Itemque: Gentiles sunt inter se qui eodem nomine sunt. Non est satis.

It is not yet enough; add: nor those either bequeathed by testament or retained by possession; it is completed. And likewise: Gentiles are among themselves those who are of the same name. It is not enough.

Qui ab ingenuis oriundi sunt. Ne id quidem satis est. Quorum maiorum nemo servitutem servivit.

Those who are descended from the freeborn. Not even that is sufficient. None of whose ancestors has been in servitude.

Abest etiam nunc. Qui capite non sunt deminuti. Hoc fortasse satis est.

It is still lacking even now. Those who have not been diminished in caput. This perhaps is sufficient.

Nihil enim video Scaevolam pontificem ad hanc definitionem addidisse. Atque haec ratio valet in utroque genere definitionum, sive id quod est, sive id quod intellegitur definiendum est.

For I see that Scaevola the pontiff has added nothing to this definition. And this rationale is valid in each kind of definitions, whether what is, or what is understood, is to be defined.

[30] Partitionum autem et divisionum genus quale esset ostendimus, sed quid inter se differant planius dicendum est. In partitione quasi membra sunt, ut corporis, caput, umeri, manus, latera, crura, pedes et cetera. In divisione formae, quas Graeci eýdh vocant, nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant, non pessime id quidem sed inutiliter ad mutandos casus in dicendo.

[30] Moreover, we have shown what the kind of partitions and of divisions is, but how they differ from one another must be said more plainly. In a partition there are, as it were, the members, as of a body: head, shoulders, hands, sides, legs, feet, and the rest. In a division there are forms, which the Greeks call eýdh, and our people, if any who happen to handle these matters, call “species”—not very badly indeed, but uselessly for changing cases in speaking.

Nolim enim, ne si Latine quidem dici possit, specierum et speciebus dicere; et saepe his casibus utendum est; at formis et formarum velim. Cum autem utroque verbo idem significetur, commoditatem in dicendo non arbitror neglegendam.

For I would not wish—even if it could be said in Latin—to say specierum and speciebus; and these cases must often be used; but I would prefer formis and formarum. And since by either word the same thing is signified, I do not think convenience in speaking should be neglected.

[31] Genus et formam definiunt hoc modo: Genus est notio ad pluris differentias pertinens; forma est notio cuius differentia ad caput generis et quasi fontem referri potest. Notionem appello quod Graeci tum ¶nnoian tum pròlhcin. Ea est insita et ante percepta cuiusque cognitio enodationis indigens.

[31] They define genus and form in this way: Genus is a notion pertaining to several differences; form is a notion whose difference can be referred to the head of the genus and, as it were, the source. I call “notion” what the Greeks term both ¶nnoian and pròlhcin. It is the inborn and previously apprehended cognition of each thing, in need of elucidation.

Formae sunt igitur eae in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur; ut si quis ius in legem, morem, aequitatem dividat. Formas qui putat idem esse quod partis, confundit artem et similitudine quadam conturbatus non satis acute quae sunt secernenda distinguit.

Forms are therefore those into which a genus is divided with nothing omitted; as when someone divides law into statute, custom, and equity. Whoever thinks forms are the same as parts confounds the art, and, disconcerted by a certain likeness, does not sharply enough distinguish the things that ought to be set apart.

[32] Saepe etiam definiunt et oratores et poetae per translationem verbi ex similitudine cum aliqua suavitate. Sed ego a vestris exemplis nisi necessario non recedam. Solebat igitur Aquilius collega et familiaris meus, cum de litoribus ageretur, quae omnia publica esse vultis, quaerentibus eis quos ad id pertinebat, quid esset litus, ita definire, qua fluctus eluderet; hoc est, quasi qui adulescentiam florem aetatis, senectutem occasum vitae velit definire; translatione enim utens discedebat a verbis propriis rerum ac suis.

[32] Often too both orators and poets define by a translation of a word from a similitude, with some suavity. But I will not depart from your examples unless necessarily. Aquilius, therefore, my colleague and familiar, used, when the question was about the shores—which you wish all to be public—to define, for those who were concerned and were asking what a shore was, thus: where the wave plays; that is, as if someone should wish to define adolescence as the flower of age, old age as the setting of life; for by using translation he departed from the proper words of the things and their own.

Quod ad definitiones attinet, hactenus; reliqua videamus.

As far as definitions are concerned, thus far; let us see the rest.

[33] Partitione tum sic utendum est, nullam ut partem relinquas; ut, si partiri velis tutelas, inscienter facias, si ullam praetermittas. At si stipulationum aut iudiciorum formulas partiare, non est vitiosum in re infinita praetermittere aliquid. Quod idem in divisione vitiosum est.

[33] Partition is then to be used thus, that you leave no part; as, if you should wish to partition guardianships, you would act ignorantly if you were to omit any. But if you partition the formulas of stipulations or of lawsuits, it is not faulty, in a matter without limit, to pass over something. The same thing in division is faulty.

Formarum enim certus est numerus quae cuique generi subiciantur; partium distributio saepe est infinitior, tamquam rivorum a fonte diductio.

For of forms there is a fixed number which are subjected to each genus; the distribution of parts is often more infinite, as the diduction of streams from a fountain.

[34] Itaque in oratoriis artibus quaestionis genere proposito, quot eius formae sint, subiungitur absolute. At cum de ornamentis verborum sententiarumve praecipitur, quae vocant sxæmata, non fit idem. Res est enim infinitior; ut ex hoc quoque intellegatur quid velimus inter partitionem et divisionem interesse.

[34] Therefore, in the oratorical arts, when the genus of the question has been proposed, how many forms of it there are is subjoined absolutely. But when instruction is given about the ornaments of words or of sentences, which they call schemata, the same is not done. For the matter is more infinite; so that from this too it may be understood what we wish to be the difference between partition and division.

Quamquam enim vocabula prope idem valere videbantur, tamen quia res differebant, nomina rerum distare voluerunt.

Although indeed the vocables seemed to amount to nearly the same, yet because the realities differed, they wished the names of the things to differ.

[35] Multa etiam ex notatione sumuntur. Ea est autem, cum ex vi nominis argumentum elicitur; quam Graeci §tumolog¤an appellant, id est verbum ex verbo veriloquium; nos autem novitatem verbi non satis apti fugientes genus hoc notationem appellamus, quia sunt verba rerum notae. Itaque hoc quidem Aristoteles sÊmbolon appellat, quod Latine est nota.

[35] Many things also are taken from notation. This is, when an argument is elicited from the force of a name; which the Greeks call §tumolog¤an, that is, a word-from-word “truth-speaking”; but we, not quite apt and shunning the novelty of the word, call this kind “notation,” because words are marks of things. And so Aristotle calls this sÊmbolon, which in Latin is nota, “mark.”

Sed cum intellegitur quid significetur, minus laborandum est de nomine.

But when what is signified is understood, there is less need to labor over the name.

[36] Multa igitur in disputando notatione eliciuntur ex verbo, ut cum quaeritur postliminium quid sit—non dico quae sint postlimini; nam id caderet in divisionem, quae talis est: Postliminio redeunt haec: homo, navis, mulus clitellarius, equus, equa quae frenos recipere solet—; sed cum ipsius postlimini vis quaeritur et verbum ipsum notatur; in quo Servius noster, ut opinor, nihil putat esse notandum nisi post, et liminium illud productionem esse verbi vult, ut in finitimo, legitimo, aeditimo non plus inesse timum quam in meditullio tullium;

[36] Many things therefore in disputing are elicited by notation from the word, as when it is asked what postliminium is—I do not say what things are by postliminium; for that would fall under division, which is as follows: By postliminium these return: a man, a ship, a pack-mule, a horse, a mare that is accustomed to receive the bridle—; but when the force of postliminium itself is asked and the very word is noted; in which our Servius, as I think, holds that nothing is to be marked except post, and wishes that liminium to be a mere prolongation of the word, as in finitimo, legitimo, aeditimo there is no more timum present than there is tullium in meditullio;

[37] Scaevola autem P. F. iunctum putat esse verbum, ut sit in eo et post et limen; ut, quae a nobis alienata, cum ad hostem pervenerint, ex suo tamquam limine exierint, hinc ea cum redierint post ad idem limen, postliminio redisse videantur. Quo genere etiam Mancini causa defendi potest, postliminio redisse; deditum non esse, quoniam non sit receptus; nam neque deditionem neque donationem sine acceptione intellegi posse.

[37] Scaevola, however, P. F., thinks the word to be conjoined, so that in it there are both post and limen; namely, that things alienated from us, when they have come to the enemy, have gone out, as it were, from their own threshold, and that from here, when they have returned afterward to the same threshold, they seem to have returned by postliminium. By which kind, too, the case of Mancinus can be defended, that he returned by postliminium; that he was not surrendered, since he was not received; for neither surrender nor donation can be understood without acceptance.

[38] Sequitur is locus qui constat ex eis rebus quae quodam modo adfectae sunt ad id de quo ambigitur; quem modo dixi in plures partes distributum. Cuius est primus locus ex coniugatione, quam Graeci suzug¤an vocant, finitimus notationi, de qua modo dictum est; ut, si aquam pluviam eam modo intellegeremus quam imbri collectam videremus, veniret Mucius, qui, quia coniugata verba essent pluvia et pluendo, diceret omnem aquam oportere arceri quae pluendo crevisset.

[38] Next follows that locus which consists of those matters which are in some manner affected toward the point about which there is ambiguity; which I just said was distributed into several parts. Of these the first locus is from conjugation, which the Greeks call syzygy, neighboring to notation, about which mention was just made; as, if we were to understand rain-water only as that which we saw collected by a shower, Mucius would come, who, because the words were conjugate—pluvia and by-raining (pluendo)—would say that all water ought to be warded off which had increased by raining.

[39] Cum autem a genere ducetur argumentum, non erit necesse id usque a capite arcessere. Saepe etiam citra licet, dum modo supra sit quod sumitur, quam id ad quod sumitur; ut aqua pluvia ultimo genere ea est quae de caelo veniens crescit imbri, sed propiore, in quo quasi ius arcendi continetur, genus est aqua pluvia nocens: eius generis formae loci vitio et manu nocens, quarum altera iubetur ab arbitro coerceri altera non iubetur.

[39] But when an argument is drawn from a genus, it will not be necessary to fetch it all the way from the head. Often it is allowed to stop short, provided only that what is taken stands above that to which it is being applied; for example, “pluvial water” in the ultimate genus is that which, coming from the sky, increases by rainfall, but in a nearer genus—in which, as it were, the right of warding off is contained—the genus is “harmful pluvial water”: the species of this genus are “harmful by the defect of the place” and “harmful by hand,” of which the one is ordered by the arbiter to be restrained, the other is not ordered.

[40] Commode etiam tractatur haec argumentatio quae ex genere sumitur, cum ex toto partis persequare hoc modo: Si dolus malus est, cum aliud agitur aliud simulatur, enumerare licet quibus id modis fiat, deinde in eorum aliquem id quod arguas dolo malo factum includere; quod genus argumenti in primis firmum videri solet.

[40] This argumentation too, which is taken from the genus, is handled conveniently when you pursue the parts from the whole in this way: If fraud is when one thing is done and another is simulated, one may enumerate the modes by which that is done, and then include under one of them that which you allege to have been done by fraud; which genus of argument is apt to seem among the foremost in firmness.

[41] Similitudo sequitur, quae late patet, sed oratoribus et philosophis magis quam vobis. Etsi enim omnes loci sunt omnium disputationum ad argumenta suppeditanda, tamen aliis disputationibus abundantius occurrunt aliis angustius. Itaque genera tibi nota sint; ubi autem eis utare, quaestiones ipsae te admonebunt.

[41] Similitude follows, which ranges widely, but for orators and philosophers more than for you. For although all topics are for all disputations to furnish arguments, nevertheless they occur more abundantly for some disputations, for others more narrowly. Therefore let the genera be known to you; and as to where you should use them, the questions themselves will admonish you.

[42] Sunt enim similitudines quae ex pluribus collationibus perveniunt quo volunt hoc modo: Si tutor fidem praestare debet, si socius, si cui mandaris, si qui fiduciam acceperit, debet etiam procurator. Haec ex pluribus perveniens quo vult appellatur inductio, quae Graece §pagvgó nominatur, qua plurimum est usus in sermonibus Socrates.

[42] For there are likenesses which, from several comparisons, arrive where they wish in this way: If a tutor ought to furnish good faith, if a partner, if a mandatary, if one who has received a fiducia (trust), then a procurator also ought to do so. This, arriving from many to the point it wants, is called induction, which in Greek is named §pagvgó, which Socrates used most of all in his conversations.

[43] Alterum similitudinis genus collatione sumitur, cum una res uni, par pari comparatur hoc modo: Quem ad modum, si in urbe de finibus controversia est, quia fines magis agrorum videntur esse quam urbis, finibus regendis adigere arbitrum non possis, sic, si aqua pluvia in urbe nocet, quoniam res tota magis agrorum est, aquae pluviae arcendae adigere arbitrum non possis.

[43] Another kind of similitude is taken by collation, when one thing is compared to one, a peer to a peer, in this way: Just as, if in the city there is a controversy about boundaries, since boundaries seem to belong more to fields than to a city, you cannot compel an arbiter for the regulating of boundaries; so, if rainwater harms in the city, since the whole matter belongs more to fields, you cannot compel an arbiter for keeping off rainwater.

[44] Ex eodem similitudinis loco etiam exempla sumuntur, ut Crassus in causa Curiana exemplis plurimis usus est, qui testamento sic heredes instituti, ut si filius natus esset in decem mensibus isque mortuus prius quam in suam tutelam venisset, hereditatem obtinuissent. Quae commemoratio exemplorum valuit, eaque vos in respondendo uti multum soletis.

[44] From the same locus of similarity examples also are taken, as Crassus in the Curian case made use of very many examples, those who had been instituted as heirs by a testament on this footing: that, if a son had been born within ten months and had died before he had come into his own guardianship, they were to obtain the inheritance. This commemoration of examples had weight, and this you are very much accustomed to employ in replying.

[45] Ficta enim exempla similitudinis habent vim; sed ea oratoria magis sunt quam vestra; quamquam uti etiam vos soletis, sed hoc modo: Finge mancipio aliquem dedisse id quod mancipio dari non potest. Num idcirco id eius factum est qui accepit? aut num is qui mancipio dedit ob eam rem se ulla re obligavit?

[45] For feigned examples of similarity have force; but they are more oratorical than yours; although you too are accustomed to use them, yet in this way: Imagine someone to have given by mancipatio something which cannot be given by mancipatio. Is it therefore made his who received it? Or did he who gave by mancipatio on that account obligate himself in any matter?

In hoc genere oratoribus et philosophis concessum est, ut muta etiam loquantur, ut mortui ab inferis excitentur, ut aliquid quod fieri nullo modo possit augendae rei gratia dicatur aut minuendae, quae Íperboló dicitur, multa alia mirabilia. Sed latior est campus illorum. Eisdem tamen ex locis, ut ante dixi, et [in] maximis et minimis [in] quaestionibus argumenta ducuntur.

In this kind it has been conceded to orators and philosophers that even mute things speak, that the dead be summoned up from the underworld, that something which can in no way come to pass be said for the sake of augmenting the matter or of diminishing it, which is called hyperbole, and many other marvels. But their field is broader. Yet from the same places, as I said before, arguments are drawn both in the greatest and in the least [in] questions.

[46] Sequitur similitudinem differentia rei maxime contraria superiori; sed est eiusdem dissimile et simile invenire. Eius generis haec sunt: Non, quem ad modum quod mulieri debeas, recte ipsi mulieri sine tutore auctore solvas, item, quod pupillo aut pupillae debeas, recte possis eodem modo solvere.

[46] Following similarity comes difference, a thing most contrary to what precedes; but it is of the same kind to find both the dissimilar and the similar. Of this kind are these: Not, just as you may rightly pay to a woman, without the authorization of a guardian (tutor), what you owe to the woman herself, likewise can you rightly pay in the same way what you owe to a boy or a girl under guardianship.

[47] Deinceps locus est qui e contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera plura; unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt, ut sapientia stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas.

[47] Next, the locus is that which is called from the contrary. Now the kinds of contraries are several; one consists of those things which, within the same genus, differ the most, as wisdom and stupidity. In the same genus, moreover, are those to which, when they are proposed, there occur, as it were from the opposite side, certain contraries, as to celerity, tardity, not debility.

Ex quibus contrariis argumenta talia existunt: Si stultitiam fugimus, sapientiam sequamur, et bonitatem si malitiam. Haec quae ex eodem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa.

From which contraries such arguments arise: If we flee stupidity, let us follow wisdom, and, if we flee malice, goodness. These things which are contraries from the same genus are called adverse.

[48] Sunt enim alia contraria, quae privantia licet appellemus Latine, Graeci appellant sterhtikã. Praeposito enim 'in' privatur verbum ea vi quam haberet si 'in' praepositum non fuisset, dignitas indignitas, humanitas inhumanitas, et cetera generis eiusdem, quorum tractactio est eadem quae superiorum quae adversa dixi.

[48] For there are other contraries, which we may call privatives in Latin; the Greeks call them sterhtikã. For, when 'in-' is prefixed, a word is deprived of the force which it would have had if 'in-' had not been prefixed: dignity/indignity, humanity/inhumanity, and the rest of the same kind, whose treatment is the same as that of the former, which I called adversa.

[49] Nam alia quoque sunt contrariorum genera, velut ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur, ut duplum simplum, multa pauca, longum breve, maius minus. Sunt etiam illa valde contraria quae appellantur negantia; ea épofatikå Graece, contraria aientibus: Si hoc est, illud non est. Quid enim opus exemplo est?

[49] For there are also other kinds of contraries, such as those which are compared with something: double [to] single, many [to] few, long [to] short, greater [to] less. There are also those very strongly contrary which are called negating; these are apophatika in Greek, contrary to affirming: If this is, that is not. For what need is there of an example?

Tantum intellegatur, in argumento quaerendo contrariis omnibus contraria non convenire.

Only let it be understood that, in seeking the argument, contraries do not agree with all contraries.

[50] Ab adiunctis autem posui equidem exemplum paulo ante, multa adiungi, quae suscipienda essent si statuissemus ex edicto secundum eas tabulas possessionem dari, quas is instituisset cui testamenti factio nulla esset. Sed locus hic magis ad coniecturales causas, quae versantur in iudiciis, valet, cum quaeritur quid aut sit aut evenerit aut futurum sit aut quid omnino fieri possit.

[50] From adjuncts, moreover, I indeed set down an example a little before: that many things would be adjoined which would have to be undertaken if we had determined that, by the edict, possession be given according to those tablets which one had set up who had no testamentary capacity. But this locus avails more for conjectural causes, which are dealt with in trials, when it is asked what either is, or has happened, or will be, or what altogether can come to pass.

[51] Ac loci quidem ipsius forma talis est. Admonet autem hic locus, ut quaeratur quid ante rem, quid cum re, quid post rem evenerit. 'Nihil hoc ad ius; ad Ciceronem,' inquiebat Gallus noster, si quis ad eum quid tale rettulerat, ut de facto quaereretur.

[51] And indeed the form of the topic itself is of this sort. Moreover this topic admonishes that one inquire what happened before the matter, what with the matter, and what after the matter happened. 'This has nothing to do with law; to Cicero,' our Gallus used to say, if anyone had referred to him something of such a kind, so that the question was one of fact.

Tu tamen patiere nullum a me artis institutae locum praeteriri; ne, si nihil nisi quod ad te pertineat scribendum putabis, nimium te amare videare. Est igitur magna ex parte locus hic oratorius non modo non iuris consultorum, sed ne philosophorum quidem.

Yet do allow that no part of the instituted art be passed over by me; lest, if you think that nothing except what pertains to you ought to be written, you may seem to love yourself too much. Therefore this topic is for the most part oratorical, belonging not only not to the jurisconsults, but not even to the philosophers.

[52] Ante rem enim quaeruntur quae talia sunt: apparatus, colloquia, locus, constitutum, convivium; cum re autem: pedum crepitus, strepitus hominum, corporum umbrae et si quid eius modi; at post rem: pallor, rubor, titubatio, si qua alia signa conturbationis et conscientiae, praeterea restinctus ignis, gladius cruentus ceteraque quae suspicionem facti possunt movere.

[52] For before the deed there are inquired things of such a sort: preparations, colloquies, the place, an appointment, a convivium; but during the deed: the clatter of feet, the din of men, shadows of bodies, and if anything of that sort; but after the deed: pallor, rubor, titubation, if there are any other signs of perturbation and conscience, furthermore an extinguished fire, a bloodied sword, and the rest which can arouse suspicion of the deed.

[53] Deinceps est locus dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus. Nam coniuncta, de quibus paulo ante dictum est, non semper eveniunt; consequentia autem semper. Ea enim dico consequentia quae rem necessario consequuntur; itemque et antecedentia et repugnantia.

[53] Next is the topic proper to the dialecticians, from consequents and antecedents and repugnants. For conjoined things, about which a little before was said, do not always occur; but consequents do always. For I call those things consequents which follow a matter necessarily; and likewise antecedents and repugnants.

Quidquid enim sequitur quamque rem, id cohaeret cum re necessario; et quidquid repugnat, id eius modi est ut cohaerere numquam possit. Cum tripertito igitur distribuatur locus hic, in consecutionem, antecessionem, repugnantiam, reperiendi argumenti locus simplex est, tractandi triplex. Nam quid interest, cum hoc sumpseris, pecuniam numeratam mulieri deberi cui sit argentum omne legatum, utrum hoc modo concludas argumentum: Si pecunia signata argentum est, legata est mulieri.

For whatever follows upon any thing, that coheres with the thing necessarily; and whatever is repugnant is of such a kind that it can never cohere. Since therefore this locus is distributed tripartitely—into consequence, antecedence, and repugnance—the locus for finding an argument is single, but for handling it threefold. For what difference does it make, when you have assumed this, that counted money is owed to a woman to whom all argent (silver) has been bequeathed, whether you conclude the argument in this way: If coined money is silver, it has been bequeathed to the woman.

Est autem pecunia signata argentum. Legata igitur est; an illo modo: Si numerata pecunia non est legata, non est numerata pecunia argentum. Est autem numerata pecunia argentum; legata igitur est; an illo modo: Non et legatum argentum est et non est legata numerata pecunia.

Now stamped (coined) money is silver. Therefore it is bequeathed; or in this way: If counted money is not bequeathed, counted money is not silver. But counted money is silver; therefore it is bequeathed; or in this way: It is not both the case that silver is bequeathed and that counted money is not bequeathed.

Legatum autem argentum est; legata igitur numerata pecunia est?

But the silver is bequeathed; therefore is the counted money bequeathed?

[54] Appellant autem dialectici eam conclusionem argumenti, in qua, cum primum assumpseris, consequitur id quod annexum est primum conclusionis modum; cum id quod annexum est negaris, ut id quoque cui fuerit annexum negandum sit, secundus is appellatur concludendi modus; cum autem aliqua coniuncta negaris et ex eis unum aut plura sumpseris, ut quod relinquitur tollendum sit, is tertius appellatur conclusionis modus.

[54] The dialecticians call that the conclusion of an argument, in which, when you have assumed the first, that which is annexed follows, the first mode of conclusion; when you have denied that which is annexed, so that that too to which it had been annexed must be denied, that is called the second mode of concluding; but when you have denied certain things conjoined and from them have taken one or more, so that what is left must be taken away, that is called the third mode of conclusion.

[55] Ex hoc illa rhetorum ex contrariis conclusa, quae ipsi §nyumæmata appellant; non quod omnis sententia proprio nomine §nyÊmhma non dicatur, sed, ut Homerus propter excellentiam commune poetarum nomen efficit apud Graecos suum, sic, cum omnis sententia §nyÊmhma dicatur, quia videtur ea quae ex contrariis conficitur acutissima, sola proprie nomen commune possedit. Eius generis haec sunt:

[55] From this come those conclusions of the rhetors from contraries, which they themselves call enthymemata; not that every sentence is not called by its proper name an enthymema, but, just as Homer, on account of his excellence, made the common name of “poet” among the Greeks his own, so, since every sentence is called an enthymema, because that which is fashioned from contraries seems the sharpest, that alone has properly possessed the common name. Of this kind are these:

        hoc metuere, alterum in metu non ponere!
        eam quam nihil accusas damnas, bene quam
        meritam esse autumas
        dicis male merere?
        id quod scis prodest nihil; id quod nescis obest? *

        to fear this, to not place the other in fear!
        her whom you accuse of nothing you condemn, whom you
        aver to have well-merited
        you say she ill-merits?
        that which you know profits nothing; that which you do not know harms? *

[56] Hoc disserendi genus attingit omnino vestras quoque in respondendo disputationes, sed philosophorum magis, quibus est cum oratoribus illa ex repugnantibus sententiis communis conclusio quae a dialecticis tertius modus, a rhetoribus §nyÊmhma dicitur. Reliqui dialecticorum modi plures sunt, qui ex disiunctionibus constant: Aut hoc aut illud; hoc autem; non igitur illud. Itemque: Aut hoc aut illud; non autem hoc; illud igitur.

[56] This genus of disputing touches also your disputations in replying, but more those of the philosophers, for whom together with the orators that common conclusion from repugnant propositions exists, which by the dialecticians is called the third mode, by the rhetoricians an enthymeme. The remaining modes of the dialecticians are more numerous, which consist of disjunctions: Either this or that; but this; therefore not that. Likewise: Either this or that; but not this; therefore that.

Quae conclusiones idcirco ratae sunt quod in disiunctione plus uno verum esse non potest.

These conclusions are therefore valid because in a disjunction more than one cannot be true.

[57] Atque ex eis conclusionibus quas supra scripsi prior quartus posterior quintus a dialecticis modus appellatur. Deinde addunt coniunctionum negantiam sic: Non et hoc et illud; hoc autem; non igitur illud. Hic modus est sextus.

[57] And from those conclusions which I wrote above, the former is called by the dialecticians the fourth mode, the latter the fifth. Then they add the negation of conjunctions thus: Not both this and that; but this; therefore not that. This mode is the sixth.

Septimus autem: Non et hoc et illud; non autem hoc; illud igitur. Ex eis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur, in quo est tota fere dialektikæ. Sed ne hae quidem quas eui ad hanc institutionem necessariae.

The seventh, however: Not both this and that; but not this; therefore that. From these modes innumerable conclusions are born, in which almost the whole of dialectic consists. But not even these are necessary for this instruction.

[58] Proximus est locus rerum efficientium, quae causae appellantur; deinde rerum effectarum ab efficientibus causis. Harum exempla, ut reliquorum locorum, paulo ante posui equidem ex iure civili; sed haec patent latius.

[58] The next place is that of efficient things, which are called causes; then that of things effected by efficient causes. Of these I have indeed set examples a little before, as of the remaining places, from civil law; but these lie open more broadly.

Causarum enim genera duo sunt; unum, quod vi sua id quod sub eam vim subiectum est certe efficit, ut: Ignis accendit; alterum, quod naturam efficiendi non habet sed sine quo effici non possit, ut si quis aes statuae causam velit dicere, quod sine eo non possit effici.

For there are two kinds of causes; one, which by its own force certainly effects that which is subjected to that force, as: Fire ignites; the other, which does not have the nature of effecting, but without which it cannot be effected, as if someone should wish to call bronze the cause of a statue, because without it it cannot be effected.

[59] Huius generis causarum, sine quo non efficitur, alia sunt quieta, nihil agentia, stolida quodam modo, ut locus, tempus, materia, ferramenta, et cetera generis eiusdem; alia autem praecursionem quandam adhibent ad efficiendum et quaedam afferunt per se adiuvantia, etsi non necessaria, ut: Amori congressio causam attulerat, amor flagitio. Ex hoc genere causarum ex aeternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nectitur.

[59] Of this kind of causes, without which a thing is not effected, some are quiescent, doing nothing, in a certain way stolid, such as place, time, material, tools, and the rest of the same genus; others, however, apply a kind of precursion toward effecting and bring with them certain things helpful in themselves, though not necessary, as: for love, congress had supplied a cause; love, for the flagitious deed. From this genus of causes depending from eternity, Fate is woven by the Stoics.

Atque ut earum causarum sine quibus effici non potest genera divisi, sic etiam efficientium dividi possunt. Sunt enim aliae causae quae plane efficiant nulla re adiuvante, aliae quae adiuvari velint, ut: Sapientia efficit sapientis sola per se; beatos efficiat necne sola per sese quaestio est.

And just as I divided the kinds of those causes without which a thing cannot be effected, so too the efficient ones can be divided. For there are some causes which plainly effect without any thing aiding, others which would wish to be aided, as: Wisdom by itself alone makes the wise man wise; whether it makes men blessed (happy) by itself or not is a question.

[60] Qua re cum in disputationem inciderit causa efficiens aliquid necessario, sine dubitatione licebit quod efficitur ab ea causa concludere. Cum autem erit talis causa, ut in ea non sit efficiendi necessitas, necessaria conclusio non sequitur. Atque illud quidem genus causarum quod habet vim efficiendi necessariam errorem afferre non fere solet; hoc autem sine quo non efficitur saepe conturbat.

[60] Wherefore, when in disputation an efficient cause that necessarily brings something about has occurred, it will be without doubt permissible to conclude what is brought about by that cause. But when there is such a cause that there is in it no necessity of bringing about, a necessary conclusion does not follow. And that kind of causes, indeed, which has a necessary power of bringing about hardly is wont to bring error; but this kind, without which a thing is not brought about, often throws matters into confusion.

Non enim, si sine parentibus filii esse non possunt, propterea in parentibus causa fuit gignendi necessaria.

For if children cannot exist without parents, it does not follow that therefore in the parents there was a necessary cause of begetting.

[61] Hoc igitur sine quo non fit, ab eo in quo certe fit diligenter est separandum. Illud enim est tamquam utinam ne in nemore Pelio—Nisi enim 'accedissent abiegnae ad terram trabes,' Argo illa facta non esset, nec tamen fuit in his trabibus efficiendi vis necessaria. At cum in Aiacis navim crispisulcans igneum fulmen iniectum est, inflammatur navis necessario.

[61] This, therefore, the “without which” a thing does not happen, must be carefully separated from that “by which” it certainly happens. For the former is like “would that not in the Pelian grove—” For unless “the fir-wood beams had come to land,” that Argo would not have been made; and yet in those beams there was not a necessary power of effecting. But when a fiery thunderbolt, furrow‑scorching, was cast upon Ajax’s ship, the ship is necessarily set ablaze.

[62] Atque etiam est causarum dissimilitudo, quod aliae sunt, ut sine ulla appetitione animi, sine voluntate, sine opinione suum quasi opus efficiant, vel ut omne intereat quod ortum sit; aliae autem aut voluntate efficiunt aut perturbatione animi aut habitu aut natura aut arte aut casu: voluntate, ut tu, cum hunc libellum legis; perturbatione, ut si quis eventum horum temporum timeat; habitu, ut qui facile et cito irascitur; natura, ut vitium in dies crescat; arte, ut bene pingat; casu, ut prospere naviget. Nihil horum sine causa nec quidquam omnino; sed huius modi causae non necessariae.

[62] And moreover there is a dissimilarity of causes, in that some are such as to accomplish their, as it were, work without any appetition of mind, without will, without opinion, or so that everything which has arisen should perish; but others bring things about either by will or by perturbation of mind or by habit or by nature or by art or by chance: by will, as you, when you read this little book; by perturbation, as if someone should fear the event of these times; by habit, as one who gets angry easily and quickly; by nature, as a vice grows from day to day; by art, as that he paints well; by chance, as that he sails prosperously. Nothing of these is without a cause, nor anything at all; but causes of this kind are not necessary.

[63] Omnium autem causarum in aliis inest constantia, in aliis non inest. In natura et in arte constantia est, in ceteris nulla. Sed tamen earum causarum quae non sunt constantes aliae sunt perspicuae, aliae latent.

[63] But of all causes, in some constancy is present, in others it is not. In nature and in art constancy is; in the rest, none. And yet, of those causes which are not constant, some are perspicuous, others are latent.

Perspicuae sunt quae appetitionem animi iudiciumque tangunt; latent quae subiectae sunt fortunae. Cum enim nihil sine causa fiat, hoc ipsum est fortuna, qui eventus obscura causa et latenter efficitur. Etiam ea quae fiunt partim sunt ignorata partim voluntaria; ignorata, quae necessitate effecta sunt; voluntaria, quae consilio.

Perspicuous are those which touch the appetition of the mind and judgment; hidden are those which are subjected to fortune. For since nothing happens without a cause, fortune is precisely this: an outcome which is brought about by an obscure cause and covertly. Also the things that come to pass are partly unknown and partly voluntary; unknown, which have been effected by necessity; voluntary, which by counsel.

[64] Nam iacere telum voluntatis est, ferire quem nolueris fortunae. Ex quo aries subicitur ille in vestris actionibus: si telum manu fugit magis quam iecit. Cadunt etiam in ignorationem atque imprudentiam perturbationes animi; quae quamquam sunt voluntariae—obiurgatione enim et admonitione deiciuntur—tamen habent tantos motus, ut ea quae voluntaria sunt aut necessaria interdum aut certe ignorata videantur.

[64] For to hurl a missile is a matter of will, to strike one whom you did not wish is a matter of fortune. Whence that defense is brought forward in your legal actions: if the missile escaped from the hand rather than he cast it. Disturbances of the mind also fall under ignorance and imprudence; although they are voluntary—for by objurgation and admonition they are brought low—nevertheless they have such great motions that things which are voluntary sometimes seem either necessary, or at any rate done in ignorance.

[65] Toto igitur loco causarum explicato, ex earum differentia in magnis quidem causis vel oratorum vel philosophorum magna argumentorum suppetit copia; in vestris autem si non uberior, at fortasse subtilior. Privata enim iudicia maximarum quidem rerum in iuris consultorum mihi videntur esse prudentia. Nam et adsunt multum et adhibentur in consilia et patronis diligentibus ad eorum prudentiam confugientibus hastas ministrant.

[65] Therefore, with this whole locus of causes explained, from their difference in great causes—whether of orators or of philosophers—a great abundance of arguments is at hand; but in yours, if not more copious, yet perhaps more subtle. For private judgments of matters indeed of the greatest moment seem to me to belong to the prudence of the jurisconsults. For they are much present, and are called into counsels, and they supply the spears to diligent patrons who take refuge in their prudence.

[66] In omnibus igitur eis iudiciis, in quibus ex fide bona est additum, ubi vero etiam ut inter bonos bene agier oportet, in primisque in arbitrio rei uxoriae, in quo est quod eius aequius melius, parati eis esse debent. Illi dolum malum, illi fidem bonam, illi aequum bonum, illi quid socium socio, quid eum qui negotia aliena curasset ei cuius ea negotia fuissent, quid eum qui mandasset, eumve cui mandatum esset, alterum alteri praestare oporteret, quid virum uxori, quid uxorem viro tradiderunt. Licebit igitur diligenter argumentorum cognitis locis non modo oratoribus et philosophis, sed iuris etiam peritis copiose de consultationibus suis disputare.

[66] Therefore in all those judgments in which “from good faith” has been added, and indeed where also “as between good men things ought to be well transacted,” and especially in the arbitration concerning a wife’s property, in which the rule is “whatever of it is more equitable and better,” they ought to be prepared for these. They have handed down evil deceit, good faith, the equitable good; they have handed down what a partner owes to a partner, what he who has managed another’s business owes to the one whose business it was, what he who gave a mandate and he to whom it was mandated ought to render one to the other, what a husband to a wife, what a wife to a husband. Thus, with the loci of arguments carefully known, not only orators and philosophers, but also experts in law, will be able to discourse copiously about their consultations.

[67] Coniunctus huic causarum loco ille locus est qui efficitur ex causis. Ut enim causa quid sit effectum indicat, sic quod effectum est quae fuerit causa demonstrat. Hic locus suppeditare solet oratoribus et poetis, saepe etiam philosophis, sed eis qui ornate et copiose loqui possunt, mirabilem copiam dicendi, cum denuntiant quid ex quaque re sit futurum.

[67] Conjoined to this place of causes is that place which is effected from causes. For as a cause indicates what the effect is, so that which has been effected demonstrates what the cause was. This place is wont to supply to orators and poets, often even to philosophers—but to those who can speak ornately and copiously—a marvelous abundance of speaking, when they foretell what from each thing will be in the future.

Causarum enim cognitio cognitionem eventorum facit.

For the cognition of causes makes the cognition of events.

[68] Reliquus est comparationis locus, cuius genus et exemplum supra positum est ut ceterorum; nunc explicanda tractatio est. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur; in quibus spectantur haec: numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio.

[68] The remaining topic is comparison, whose kind and example have been set above as with the others; now the treatment is to be explained. Therefore those things are compared which are said to be either greater, or lesser, or equal; in which these are considered: number, species, force, and even a certain affection toward particular things.

[69] Numero sic comparabuntur, plura bona ut paucioribus bonis anteponantur, pauciora mala malis pluribus, diuturniora bona brevioribus, longe et late pervagata angustis, ex quibus plura bona propagentur quaeque plures imitentur et faciant.

[69] By number they will be compared thus: that more goods be preferred to fewer goods, fewer evils to more evils, more enduring goods to briefer ones, those spread far and wide to those narrow and confined, from which more goods are propagated, and which more people imitate and do.

Specie autem comparantur, ut anteponantur quae propter se expetenda sunt eis quae propter aliud et ut innata atque insita assumptis atque adventiciis, integra contaminatis, iucunda minus iucundis, honesta ipsis etiam utilibus, proclivia laboriosis, necessaria non necessariis, sua alienis, rara vulgaribus, desiderabilia eis quibus facile carere possis, perfecta incohatis, tota partibus, ratione utentia rationis expertibus, voluntaria necessariis, animata inanimis, naturalia non naturalibus, artificiosa non artificiosis.

By species, moreover, they are compared, so that things to be sought for their own sake are set before those for the sake of something else, and so that innate and implanted before assumed and adventitious, intact before contaminated, pleasant before less pleasant, honorable even before the useful themselves, easy/inclined before laborious, necessary before non-necessary, one’s own before alien, rare before common, desirable before those which you can easily be without, perfect before inchoate, wholes before parts, things using reason before those devoid of reason, voluntary before necessary, animate before inanimate, natural before non-natural, artificial before non-artificial.

[70] Vis autem in comparatione sic cernitur: efficiens causa gravior quam non efficiens; quae se ipsis contenta sunt meliora quam quae egent aliis; quae in nostra quam quae in aliorum potestate sunt; stabilia incertis; quae eripi non possunt eis quae possunt.

[70] But the force in comparison is thus discerned: an efficient cause is weightier than a non-efficient; things that are content with themselves are better than those that need others; those which are in our power than those in the power of others; the stable than the uncertain; things which cannot be snatched away than those which can.

Affectio autem ad res aliquas est huius modi: principum commoda maiora quam reliquorum; itemque quae iucundiora, quae pluribus probata, quae ab optimo quoque laudata. Atque ut haec in comparatione meliora, sic deteriora quae eis sunt contraria.

Affection, moreover, toward certain things is of this kind: the advantages of princes are greater than those of the rest; likewise those things which are more pleasant, those approved by more people, those praised by every excellent man. And as these are better in comparison, so worse are those which are contrary to them.

[71] Parium autem comparatio nec elationem habet nec summissionem; est enim aequalis. Multa autem sunt quae aequalitate ipsa comparantur; quae ita fere concluduntur: Si consilio iuvare cives et auxilio aequa in laude ponendum est, pari gloria debent esse ei qui consulunt et ei qui defendunt; at quod primum, est; quod sequitur igitur.

[71] The comparison of equals has neither elevation nor submission; for it is equal. Many things, moreover, are compared by equality itself; which are commonly concluded thus: If to help citizens by counsel and by aid ought to be placed as equal in praise, then he who counsels and he who defends ought to be in equal glory; but the former is; therefore so is what follows.

Perfecta est omnis argumentorum inveniendorum praeceptio, ut, cum profectus sis a definitione, a partitione, a notatione, a coniugatis, a genere, a formis, a similitudine, a differentia, a contrariis, ab adiunctis, a consequentibus, ab antecedentibus, a repugnantibus, a causis, ab effectis, a comparatione maiorum, minorum, parium, nulla praeterea sedes argumenti quaerenda sit.

The entire precept for discovering arguments is perfected, so that, when you have set out from definition, from partition, from notation, from conjugates, from genus, from forms, from similarity, from difference, from contraries, from adjuncts, from consequents, from antecedents, from repugnants, from causes, from effects, from comparison of the greater, the lesser, and the equal, no further seat of argument should be sought.

[72] Sed quoniam ita a principio divisimus, ut alios locos diceremus in eo ipso de quo ambigitur haerere, de quibus satis est dictum, alios assumi extrinsecus, de eis pauca dicamus, etsi ea nihil omnino ad vestras disputationes pertinent; sed tamen totam rem efficiamus, quandoquidem coepimus. Neque enim tu is es quem nihil nisi ius civile delectet, et quoniam haec ita ad te scribuntur ut etiam in aliorum manus sint ventura, detur opera, ut quam plurimum eis quos recta studia delectant prodesse possimus.

[72] But since from the beginning we divided the matter thus, that we said some loci cling in the very thing about which there is dispute—about which enough has been said—others are assumed extrinsically, let us say a few things about these, even if they pertain nothing at all to your disputations; yet nevertheless let us bring the whole matter to completion, since we have begun. For you are not the sort of person whom nothing except civil law delights; and since these things are written to you in such a way that they are going to come into the hands of others also, let effort be given, that we may be able to profit as much as possible those whom right studies delight.

[73] Haec ergo argumentatio, quae dicitur artis expers, in testimonio posita est. Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quod ab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem. Persona autem non qualiscumque est testimoni pondus habet; ad fidem enim faciendam auctoritas quaeritur; sed auctoritatem aut natura aut tempus affert.

[73] Therefore this argumentation, which is called artless, is set in testimony. By “testimony” we now call whatever is taken from some external thing to establish belief. Moreover, not just any sort of person bears the weight of testimony; for, to establish belief, authority is sought; but authority is brought either by nature or by time.

Naturae auctoritas in virtute inest maxima; in tempore autem multa sunt quae afferant auctoritatem: ingenium, opes, aetas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas, concursio etiam non numquam rerum fortuitarum. Nam et ingeniosos et opulentos et aetatis spatio probatos dignos quibus credatur putant; non recte fortasse, sed vulgi opinio mutari vix potest ad eamque omnia dirigunt et qui iudicant et qui existimant. Qui enim rebus his quas dixi excellunt, ipsa virtute videntur excellere.

The authority of nature is inherent in virtue in the highest degree; but in respect to time there are many things that bring authority: ingenium (talent), opes (wealth), age, fortune, art, use (experience), necessity, and sometimes even the concurrence of fortuitous things. For they think the ingenious, the opulent, and those approved by the span of age worthy to be believed; not rightly perhaps, but the opinion of the crowd can scarcely be changed, and toward it both those who judge and those who estimate direct everything. For those who excel in these things which I have named seem to excel in virtue itself.

[74] Sed reliquis quoque rebus quas modo enumeravi quamquam in his nulla species virtutis est, tamen interdum confirmatur fides, si aut ars quaedam adhibetur—magna est enim vis ad persuadendum scientiae—aut usus; plerumque enim creditur eis qui experti sunt. Facit etiam necessitas fidem, quae tum a corporibus tum ab animis nascitur. Nam et verberibus, tormentis, igni fatigati quae dicunt ea videtur veritas ipsa dicere, et quae perturbationibus animi, dolore, cupiditate, iracundia, metu, qui necessitatis vim habent, afferunt auctoritatem et fidem.

[74] But in the remaining things also which I have just enumerated, although in these there is no appearance of virtue, nevertheless at times credence is confirmed, if either a certain art is applied—for great is the force of science for persuading—or experience; for for the most part credence is given to those who have been experienced. Necessity too makes credence, which is born both from bodies and from minds. For those wearied by beatings, torments, fire—what they say truth itself seems to say; and the things which, by perturbations of mind—pain, desire, wrath, fear, which have the force of necessity—are brought forth, confer authority and credence.

[75] Cuius generis etiam illa sunt ex quibus verum nonnunquam invenitur, pueritia, somnus, imprudentia, vinolentia, insania. Nam et parvi saepe indicaverunt aliquid, quo id pertineret ignari, et per somnum, vinum, insaniam multa saepe patefacta sunt. Multi etiam in res odiosas imprudenter inciderunt, ut Staieno nuper accidit, qui ea locutus est bonis viris subauscultantibus pariete interposito, quibus patefactis in iudiciumque prolatis ille rei capitalis iure damnatus est.

[75] Of which kind also are those by which truth is sometimes discovered: childhood, sleep, imprudence, wine-inebriation, insanity. For even little ones have often indicated something, unaware to what it pertained; and through sleep, wine, and insanity many things have often been laid open. Many too have imprudently stumbled into odious matters, as happened recently to Staienus, who spoke such things while honorable men were secretly listening, with a wall interposed; and when these matters were laid open and brought forth into court, that man was by law condemned on a capital charge.

Huic simile quiddam de Lacedaemonio Pausania accepimus.

We have received something similar about the Lacedaemonian Pausanias.

[76] Concursio autem fortuitorum talis est, ut si interventum est casu, cum aut ageretur aliquid quod proferendum non esset, aut diceretur. In hoc genere etiam illa est in Palamedem coniecta suspicionum proditionis multitudo; quod genus refutare interdum veritas vix potest. Huius etiam est generis fama vulgi, quoddam multitudinis testimonium.

[76] The concurrence of fortuitous things is of this sort: namely, if there is an intervention by chance, when either something was being done which ought not to be brought forth, or was being said. In this kind too is that multitude of suspicions of treachery cast against Palamedes; which sort truth can scarcely refute at times. Also of this kind is the rumor of the crowd, a certain testimony of the multitude.

Quae autem virtute fidem faciunt ea bipertita sunt; ex quibus alterum natura valet alterum industria. Deorum enim virtus natura excellit, hominum autem industria.

But the things which by their virtue make credibility are bipartite; of which the one prevails by nature, the other by industry. For the virtue of the gods excels by nature, but that of men by industry.

[77] Divina haec fere sunt testimonia: primum orationis—oracula enim ex eo ipso appellata sunt, quod inest in his deorum oratio—; deinde rerum, in quibus insunt quasi quaedam opera divina: primum ipse mundus eiusque omnis ordo et ornatus; deinceps aerii volatus avium atque cantus; deinde eiusdem aeris sonitus et ardores multarumque rerum in terra portenta atque etiam per exta inventa praesensio; a dormientibus quoque multa significata visis. Quibus ex locis sumi interdum solent ad fidem faciendam testimonia deorum.

[77] These are for the most part divine testimonies: first, of oration—for oracles are named from this very fact, that there is in them the oration of the gods—; then, of things, in which there are, as it were, certain divine works: first, the world itself and its entire order and ornament; next, the airy flights of birds and their song; then, the sounds and burnings of that same air, and on land the portents of many things, and even a presensation discovered through entrails; also, many things signified by visions to sleepers. From these sources testimonies of the gods are sometimes wont to be taken to produce belief.

[78] In homine virtutis opinio valet plurimum. Opinio est autem non modo eos virtutem habere qui habeant, sed eos etiam qui habere videantur. Itaque quos ingenio, quos studio, quos doctrina praeditos vident quorumque vitam constantem et probatam, ut Catonis, Laeli, Scipionis, aliorumque plurium, rentur eos esse qualis se ipsi velint; nec solum eos censent esse talis qui in honoribus populi reque publica versantur, sed et oratores et philosophos et poetas et historicos, ex quorum et dictis et scriptis saepe auctoritas petitur ad faciendam fidem.

[78] In a human being the opinion of virtue prevails most. Opinion is, moreover, that not only those have virtue who truly have it, but also those who seem to have it. And so those whom people see endowed with ingenuity, with study/zeal, with doctrine (learning), and whose life is constant and approved—like that of Cato, Laelius, Scipio, and many others—they consider to be such as they themselves would wish to be; nor do they judge only those to be of this sort who are engaged in the honors of the people and in the republic, but also orators and philosophers and poets and historians, from whose sayings and writings authority is often sought to make faith.

[79] Eitis omnibus argumentandi locis illud primum intellegendum est nec ullam esse disputationem in qua non aliquis locus incurrat, nec fere omnis locos incidere in omnem quaestionem et quibusdam quaestionibus alios, quibusdam alios esse aptiores locos. Quaestionum duo genera sunt: alterum infinitum, definitum alterum. Definitum est quod Ípòyesin Graeci, nos causam; infinitum quod yšsin illi appellant, nos propositum possumus nominare.

[79] Of all these places for argumentation, this first must be understood: that there is no disputation in which some place does not occur, nor, for the most part, do all the places fall upon every question, and that for certain questions some places, for others other places are more apt. There are two kinds of questions: one indefinite, the other definite. The definite is what the Greeks call hypothesis, what we call a cause; the indefinite is what they call thesis, which we can name a proposition.

[80] Causa certis personis, locis, temporibus, actionibus, negotiis cernitur aut in omnibus aut in plerisque eorum, propositum autem aut in aliquo eorum aut in pluribus nec tamen in maximis. Itaque propositum pars est causae. Sed omnis quaestio earum aliqua de re est quibus causae continentur, aut una aut pluribus aut nonnunquam omnibus.

[80] A cause is discerned with definite persons, places, times, actions, affairs, either in all or in most of them; a proposition, however, in some of them or in several, yet not in the most. Therefore the proposition is a part of the cause. But every question is about some one of the things by which causes are contained, either about one, or about several, or sometimes about all.

[81] Quaestionum autem 'quacumque de re' sunt duo genera: unum cognitionis alterum actionis.

[81] But of questions "of whatever matter" there are two kinds: one of cognition, the other of action.

[82] Cognitionis sunt eae quarum est finis scientia, ut si quaeratur a naturane ius profectum sit an ab aliqua quasi condicione hominum et pactione. Actionis autem huius modi exempla sunt: Sitne sapientis ad rem publicam accedere. Cognitionis quaestiones tripertitae sunt; aut sitne aut quid sit aut quale sit quaeritur.

[82] Those are of cognition whose end is knowledge, as, for instance, if it be asked whether law has proceeded from nature or from some quasi-condition and pact of men. But examples of action are of this sort: Whether it be the part of a wise man to accede to the Republic. Questions of cognition are tripartite; one asks whether it is, or what it is, or of what sort it is.

Horum primum coniectura, secundum definitione, tertium iuris et iniuriae distinctione explicatur.

Of these, the first is explained by conjecture, the second by definition, the third by the distinction between right and wrong.

Coniecturae ratio in quattuor partes distributa est, quarum una est cum quaeritur sitne aliquid; altera unde ortum sit; tertia quae id causa effecerit; quarta in qua de commutatione rei quaeritur. Sitne sic: ecquidnam sit honestum, ecquid aequum re vera; an haec tantum in opinione sint. Unde autem sit ortum: ut cum quaeritur, natura an doctrina possit effici virtus.

Conjecture’s method is distributed into four parts, of which one is when it is asked whether something is; the second, whence it arose; the third, what cause effected it; the fourth, in which inquiry is made about the commutation/change of the thing. Whether it be thus: whether there is anything honorable, whether anything equitable in reality; or whether these are only in opinion. And whence it has arisen: as when it is asked, whether virtue can be effected by nature or by doctrine/teaching.

Causa autem efficiens sic quaeritur, quibus rebus eloquentia efficiatur. De commutatione sic: possitne eloquentia commutatione aliqua converti in infantiam.

But the efficient cause is inquired thus: by what things eloquence is effected. About commutation thus: whether eloquence can, by some commutation, be converted into infancy (i.e., speechlessness).

[83] Cum autem quid sit quaeritur, notio explicanda est et proprietas et divisio et partitio. Haec enim sunt definitioni attributa; additur etiam descriptio, quam xaraktƒra Graeci vocant. Notio sic quaeritur: sitne id aequum quod ei qui plus potest utile est.

[83] But when what a thing is is sought, the notion must be unfolded, and the property, and the division, and the partition. For these are attributes of a definition; a description is also added, which the Greeks call “character.” The notion is inquired thus: whether that is equitable which is advantageous to him who has more power.

Proprietas sic: in hominemne solum cadat an etiam in beluas aegritudo. Divisio et eodem pacto partitio sic: triane genera bonorum sint. Descriptio, qualis sit avarus, qualis assentator ceteraque eiusdem generis, in quibus et natura et vita describitur.

Property thus: whether distress falls upon man alone or also upon beasts. Division, and in the same manner partition, thus: whether there are three kinds of goods. Description: of what sort the miser is, of what sort the flatterer, and the rest of the same genus, in which both nature and life are described.

[84] Cum autem quaeritur quale quid sit, aut simpliciter quaeritur aut comparate; simpliciter: Expetendane sit gloria; comparate: Praeponendane sit divitiis gloria. Simplicium tria genera sunt: de expetendo fugiendoque, de aequo et iniquo, de honesto et turpi. Comparationum autem duo: unum de eodem et alio, alterum de maiore et minore.

[84] But when it is asked of what quality something is, it is asked either simply or comparatively; simply: whether glory is to be sought; comparatively: whether glory is to be preferred to riches. There are three kinds of simple questions: of the to-be-sought and the to-be-fled, of the equitable and inequitable, of the honorable and the base. But of comparisons there are two: one about the same and the other, the other about the greater and the lesser.

De expetendo et fugiendo huius modi: Si expetendae divitiae, si fugienda paupertas. De aequo et iniquo: Aequumne sit ulcisci a quocumque iniuriam acceperis. De honesto et turpi: Honestumne sit pro patria mori?

On the to-be-sought and the to-be-fled of this sort: Whether wealth is to be sought, whether poverty is to be fled. On the equitable and the iniquitous: Whether it is equitable to avenge oneself against anyone from whom you have received an injury. On the honorable and the base: Whether it is honorable to die for the fatherland?

[85] Ex altero autem genere, quod erat bipertitum, unum est de eodem et alio: Quid intersit inter amicum et assentatorem, regem et tyrannum; alterum de maiore et minore, ut si quaeratur eloquentiane pluris sit an iuris civilis scientia. De cognitionis quaestionibus hactenus.

[85] But of the other kind, which was bipartite, one is about the same and the other: what difference there is between a friend and a flatterer, a king and a tyrant; the other is about the greater and the lesser, as if it were asked whether eloquence is of more worth than the science of civil law. So much for questions of cognition.

[86] Actionis reliquae sunt, quarum duo genera: unum ad officium, alterum ad motum animi vel gignendum vel sedandum planeve tollendum. Ad officium sic, ut cum quaeritur suscipiendine sint liberi. Ad movendos animos cohortationes ad defendendam rem publicam, ad laudem, ad gloriam; quo ex genere sunt querellae, incitationes, miserationesque flebiles; rursusque oratio tum iracundiam restinguens, tum metum eripiens, tum exsultantem laetitiam comprimens, tum aegritudinem abstergens.

[86] As for delivery, there remain points of which there are two kinds: one pertains to duty, the other to the movement of the mind, either to be generated, or to be soothed, or plainly to be taken away altogether. To duty thus, as when it is asked whether children are to be taken up. To move the feelings: exhortations to defend the republic, to praise, to glory; of which kind are complaints, incitations, and tearful commiserations; and in turn speech now extinguishing anger, now snatching away fear, now compressing exultant joy, now wiping away affliction.

Haec cum in propositi quaestionibus genera sint, eadem in causas transferuntur.

Since these are the kinds in the proposed questions, the same are transferred into causes.

[87] Loci autem qui ad quasque quaestiones accommodati sint deinceps est videndum. Omnes illi quidem ad plerasque, sed alii ad alias, ut dixi, aptiores. Ad coniecturam igitur maxime apta quae ex causis, quae ex effectis, quae ex coniunctis sumi possunt.

[87] Next it must be considered which topics are accommodated to each questions. All of them indeed suit the greater part, but some are more apt to some than to others, as I said. Therefore, for conjecture, the most apt are those that can be taken from causes, from effects, and from concomitants.

Ad definitionem autem pertinet ratio et scientia definiendi. Atque huic generi finitimum est illud quod appellari de eodem et de altero diximus, quod genus forma quaedam definitionis est; si enim quaeratur idemne sit pertinacia et perseverantia, definitionibus iudicandum est.

But to definition pertain the rationale and the science of defining. And to this genus is closely akin that which we said is called “about the same and about the other,” which kind is a certain form of definition; for if it be asked whether pertinacity and perseverance are the same, it must be adjudged by definitions.

[88] Loci autem convenient in eius generis quaestionem consequentis, antecedentis, repugnantis; adiuncti etiam eis qui sumuntur ex causis et effectis. Nam si hanc rem illa sequitur, hanc autem non sequitur; aut si huic rei illa antecedit, huic non antecedit; aut si huic rei repugnat, illi non repugnat; aut si huius rei haec, illius alia causa est; aut si ex alio hoc, ex alio illud effectum est: ex quovis horum id de quo quaeritur idemne an aliud sit inveniri potest.

[88] The topics will be suitable, moreover, for a question of that kind—of the consequent, the antecedent, the repugnant; joined also to those which are taken from causes and effects. For if that follows this thing, but does not follow that; or if that antecedes this thing, but does not antecede that; or if it is repugnant to this thing, but not repugnant to that; or if this is the cause of this thing, but another is the cause of that; or if this has been effected from one source, that from another: from any one of these it can be found whether the matter under inquiry is the same or something else.

[89] Ad tertium genus quaestionis, in quo quale sit quaeritur, in comparationem ea cadunt quae paulo ante in comparationis loco enumerata sunt. In illud autem genus in quo de expetendo fugiendoque quaeritur adhibentur ea quae sunt aut animi aut corporis aut externa vel commoda vel incommoda. Itemque cum de honesto turpique quaeritur, ad animi bona aut mala omnis oratio dirigenda est.

[89] With regard to the third genus of question, in which it is asked of what quality it is, there fall under comparison those things which a little before were enumerated under the topic of comparison. But in that genus in which the inquiry is about what is to be sought and what is to be shunned, there are employed those considerations which are either of the mind or of the body or external, whether advantages or disadvantages. Likewise, when the inquiry is about the honorable and the disgraceful, the whole discourse ought to be directed to the goods or the ills of the mind.

[90] Cum autem de aequo et iniquo disseritur, aequitatis loci colligentur. Hi cernuntur bipertito, et natura et instituto. Natura partes habet duas, tributionem sui cuique et ulciscendi ius.

[90] When, however, one argues about the equitable and the inequitable, the topics of equity are to be gathered. These are discerned in a twofold way, both by nature and by institution. Nature has two parts: the distribution of what is one’s own to each (to each his own), and the right of avenging.

Institutio autem aequitatis tripertita est: una pars legitima est, altera conveniens, tertia moris vetustate firmata. Atque etiam aequitas tripertita dicitur esse: una ad superos deos, altera ad manes, tertia ad homines pertinere. Prima pietas, secunda sanctitas, tertia iustitia aut aequitas nominatur.

Moreover, the institution of equity is threefold: one part is legitimate, another fitting, a third made firm by the antiquity of custom. And equity also is said to be threefold: one pertains to the gods above, another to the spirits of the dead, a third to human beings. The first is called piety, the second sanctity, the third justice or equity.

De proposito satis multa, deinceps de causa pauciora dicenda sunt. Pleraque enim sunt ei cum proposito communia.

About the proposition, enough has been said; next, about the cause, fewer things must be said. For most things are common to it with the proposition.

[91] Tria sunt igitur genera causarum: iudici, deliberationis, laudationis. Quarum fines ipsi declarant quibus utendum locis sit. Nam iudici finis est ius, ex quo etiam nomen.

[91] Therefore there are three kinds of causes: judicial, deliberative, laudatory. The ends of these themselves declare which places are to be used. For the end of the judicial is law/right (ius), from which also the name is derived.

Iuris autem partes tum eitae, cum aequitatis. Deliberandi finis utilitas, cuius eae partes quae modo eitae. Laudationis finis honestas, de qua item est ante dictum.

But the parts of law are the written [law] and equity. The end of deliberation is utility, whose parts are those which were just stated. The end of laudation is honorableness, about which likewise it has been said before.

[92] Sed definitae quaestiones a suis quaeque locis quasi propriis instruuntur, . . . quae in accusationem defensionemque partitae; in quibus exsistunt haec genera, ut accusator personam arguat facti, defensor aliquid opponat de tribus: aut non esse factum aut, si sit factum, aliud eius facti nomen esse aut iure esse factum. Itaque aut infitialis aut coniecturalis prima appelletur, definitiva altera, tertia, quamvis molestum nomen hoc sit, iuridicialis vocetur. Harum causarum propria argumenta ex eis sumpta locis quos euimus in praeceptis oratoriis explicata sunt.

[92] But defined questions are each furnished by their own loci as if proper to them, . . . which are divided into accusation and defense; in which these kinds arise, that the accuser charge the person with the deed, the defender oppose something of three: either that it was not done, or, if it was done, that the name (definition) of that deed is other, or that it was done by right (law). And so let the first be called either infitial (denial) or conjectural, the second definitive, the third—although this name is troublesome—juridical. The proper arguments of these causes, taken from those loci which we have gone through, have been set forth in the oratorical precepts.

[93] Refutatio autem accusationis, in qua est depulsio criminis, quoniam Graece stãsiw dicitur appelletur Latine status; in quo primum insistit quasi ad repugnandum congressa defensio. Atque in deliberationibus etiam et laudationibus idem existunt status. Nam et negantur saepe ea futura quae ab aliquo in sententia dicta sunt fore, si aut omnino fieri non possint aut sine summa difficultate non possint; in qua argumentatione status coniecturalis exsistit;

[93] But the refutation of the accusation, in which is the warding off of the charge, since in Greek it is called stasis, let it be called in Latin “status”; in which the defense, as if having come to close quarters for resistance, first takes its stand. And in deliberations also and in laudations the same statuses exist. For those things are often denied to be going to come to pass which someone has said in a proposal will be, if either they cannot altogether be done or cannot be done without the utmost difficulty; in which argumentation a conjectural status arises;

[94] aut cum aliquid de utilitate, honestate, aequitate disseritur deque eis rebus quae his sunt contrariae incurrunt status aut iuris aut nominis; quod idem contingit in laudationibus. Nam aut negari potest id factum esse quod laudetur, aut non eo nomine afficiendum quo laudator affecerit, aut omnino non esse laudabile quod non recte, non iure factum sit. Quibus omnibus generibus usus est nimis impudenter Caesar contra Catonem meum.

[94] or when something about utility, honorableness, and equity is discoursed, and about those things which are contrary to these, there arise statuses either of right or of name; the same happens in laudations. For either it can be denied that that which is praised was done, or that it ought not to be denominated by that name with which the praiser has denominated it, or that it is not at all laudable, since it was not done rightly, not by right. In all these kinds Caesar employed, most shamelessly, against my Cato.

[95] Sed quae ex statu contentio efficitur, eam Graeci krinòmenon vocant, mihi placet id, quoniam quidem ad te scribo, qua de re agitur vocari. Quibus autem hoc qua de re agitur continetur, ea continentia vocentur, quasi firmamenta defensionis, quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit. Sed quoniam lege firmius in controversiis disceptandis esse nihil debet, danda est opera ut legem adiutricem et testem adhibeamus.

[95] But the contention that is brought forth from the status, the Greeks call krinòmenon; it pleases me, since I am writing to you, that it be called what the matter is about. But the things by which this “what the matter is about” is contained, let these be called containments, as it were the firmaments of the defense, with which removed, there would be no defense. But since nothing ought to be firmer than the law in adjudicating controversies, effort must be given to bring in the law as helper and as witness.

In qua re alii quasi status existunt novi, sed appellentur legitimae disceptationes.

In this matter other, as it were, new statuses come into being, but let them be called legal disputations.

[96] Tum enim defenditur non id legem dicere quod adversarius velit, sed aliud. Id autem contingit, cum scriptum ambiguum est, ut duae sententiae differentes accipi possint. Tum opponitur scripto voluntas scriptoris, ut quaeratur verbane plus an sententia valere debeant.

[96] Then it is defended that the law does not say what the adversary wishes, but something else. This, however, happens when the writing is ambiguous, so that two different meanings can be taken. Then the will of the writer is set in opposition to the writing, so that it is inquired whether the words or the sense ought to have greater force.

Tum legi lex contraria affertur. Ista sunt tria genera quae controversiam in omni scripto facere possint: ambiguum, discrepantia scripti et voluntatis, scripta contraria. Iam hoc perspicuum est, non magis in legibus quam in testamentis, in stipulationibus, in reliquis rebus quae ex scripto aguntur, posse controversias easdem existere.

Then a contrary law is brought against the law. These are three kinds that can produce controversy in any writing: the ambiguous, the discrepancy of the writing and the will (intention), and contrary writings. Now this is clear: controversies of the same sort can arise no more in laws than in testaments, in stipulations, and in the remaining matters which are transacted by written instrument.

Horum tractationes in aliis libris explicantur.

The treatments of these are explained in other books.

[97] Nec solum perpetuae actiones sed etiam partes orationis isdem locis adiuvantur, partim propriis, partim communibus; ut in principiis, quibus ut benevoli, ut dociles, ut attenti sint qui audiant, efficiendum est propriis locis; itemque narrationes ut ad suos fines spectent, id est ut planae sint, ut breves, ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae, ut cum dignitate. Quae quamquam in tota oratione esse debent, magis tamen sunt propria narrandi.

[97] Not only perpetual pleadings but also the parts of the oration are aided by the same places, partly proper, partly common; as in beginnings, in which by proper places it must be brought about that those who hear be well-disposed, teachable, and attentive; likewise that narratives look to their own ends, that is, that they be plain, brief, evident, credible, moderate, and with dignity. Although these things ought to be in the whole oration, yet they are more proper to narrating.

[98] Quae autem sequitur narrationem fides, ea persuadendo quoniam efficitur, qui ad persuadendum loci maxime valeant dictum est in eis in quibus de omni ratione dicendi. Peroratio autem et alia quaedam habet et maxime amplificationem, cuius effectus hic debet esse, ut aut perturbentur animi aut tranquillentur et, si ita affecti iam ante sint, ut aut augeat eorum motus aut sedet oratio.

[98] As for the credibility that follows the narration, since it is brought about by persuading, which places are most effective for persuading has been stated in those sections where we spoke about the entire method of speaking. The peroration, however, has certain other elements, and most of all amplification, whose effect ought to be this: that either minds are perturbed or are tranquilized, and, if they have already been so affected before, that the speech either augments their motions or settles.

[99] Huic generi, in quo et misericordia et iracundia et odium et invidia et ceterae animi affectiones perturbantur, praecepta suppeditantur aliis in libris, quos poteris mecum legere cum voles. Ad id autem quod te velle senseram, cumulate satis factum esse debet voluntati tuae.

[99] To this genus, in which mercy and anger and hatred and envy and the other affections of the mind are perturbed, precepts are supplied in other books, which you can read with me whenever you wish. But as to that which I perceived you to wish, your desire ought to have been amply satisfied.

[100] Nam ne praeterirem aliquid quod ad argumentum in omni ratione reperiendum pertineret, plura quam a te desiderata erant sum complexus fecique quod saepe liberales venditores solent, ut, cum aedes fundumve vendiderint rutis caesis receptis, concedant tamen aliquid emptori quod ornandi causa apte et loco positum esse videatur; sic tibi nos ad id quod quasi mancipio dare debuimus ornamenta quaedam voluimus non debita accedere.

[100] For, lest I should pass by anything which pertained to the argument to be discovered by every method, I have embraced more things than were desired by you, and I have done what generous sellers are wont to do: when they have sold a house or a farm, with rubble and felled timber reserved, yet they concede something to the buyer which seems to have been suitably and in its place set for the sake of ornament; so to you we have wished that, to that which we ought to deliver as it were by mancipation, certain ornaments not owed should be added.