Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

PROHOEMIVM
I. Ventum est ad partem operis destinati longe gravissimam: cuius equidem onus [sit] si tantum opinione prima concipere potuissem quanto me premi ferens sentio, maturius consuluissem vires meas. Sed initio pudor omittendi quae promiseram tenuit, mox, quamquam per singulas prope partis labor cresceret, ne perderem quae iam effecta erant per omnes difficultates animo me sustentavi.
II. Quare nunc quoque, licet maior quam umquam moles premat, tamen prospicienti finem mihi constitutum est vel deficere potius quam desperare.

PREFACE
1. We have come to the far gravest part of the work undertaken: the burden of which, if I could have conceived in the first opinion as much as, bearing it, I feel myself pressed, I would more timely have consulted my strength. But at the beginning a sense of shame at omitting what I had promised held me; soon, although the labor almost increased with each several part, lest I lose what had already been accomplished, through all difficulties I sustained my spirit.
2. Wherefore now also, although a mass greater than ever presses, yet, looking toward the end, I have resolved rather to fail than to despair.

Fefellit autem quod initium a parvis ceperamus: mox velut aura sollicitante provecti longius, dum tamen nota illa et plerisque artium scriptoribus tractata praecipimus nec adhuc a litore procul videbamur et multos circa velut isdem se ventis credere ausos habebamus:
III. iam cum eloquendi rationem novissime repertam paucissimisque temptatam ingressi sumus, rarus qui tam procul a portu recessisset reperiebatur; postquam vero nobis ille quem instituebamus orator, a dicendi magistris dimissus, aut suo iam impetu fertur aut maiora sibi auxilia ex ipsis sapientiae penetralibus petit, quam in altum simus ablati sentire coepimus. Nunc "caelum undique et undique pontus".
IV. Vnum modo in illa inmensa vastitate cernere videmur M. tullium, qui tamen ipse, quamvis tanta atque ita instructa nave hoc mare ingressus, contrahit vela inhibetque remos et de ipso demum genere dicendi quo sit usurus perfectus orator satis habet dicere.

It deceived us, moreover, that we had taken our beginning from small things: soon, as if a breeze, enticing, had carried us farther forward, while yet we were laying down those familiar matters and handled by most writers of the arts, nor did we yet seem far from the shore, and we had many around who had, as it were, dared to entrust themselves to the same winds:
3. now when we entered upon the method of eloquence most recently discovered and tried by very few, rarely was anyone found who had withdrawn so far from harbor; after, in truth, the orator whom we were training, dismissed from the masters of speaking, is now either borne by his own impetus or seeks greater aids for himself from the very inner chambers of wisdom, we began to feel how far into the deep we had been carried. Now, “sky on every side and on every side sea.”
4. One thing only in that immense vastness we seem to discern, M. Tullius, who yet himself, although having entered this sea with so great and so well-equipped a ship, furls the sails and checks the oars, and deems it enough to speak about the very kind of speaking which the perfected orator is going to use.

At nostra temeritas etiam mores ei conabitur dare et adsignabit officia. Ita nec antecedentem consequi possumus et longius eundum est ut res feret. Probabilis tamen cupiditas honestorum, et velut tutioris audentiae est temptare quibus paratior venia est.

But our temerity will even attempt to give it morals and will assign it duties. Thus we cannot overtake the one going before, and we must go farther as the matter will bear. Yet the desire for honorable things is plausible, and it is, as it were, a safer audacity to attempt those things for which pardon is readier.

1
I. Sit ergo nobis orator quem constituimus is qui a M. Catone finitur vir bonus dicendi peritus, verum, id quod et ille posuit prius et ipsa natura potius ac maius est, utique vir bonus: id non eo tantum quod, si vis illa dicendi malitiam instruxerit, nihil sit publicis privatisque rebus perniciosius eloquentia, nosque ipsi, qui pro virili parte conferre aliquid ad facultatem dicendi conati sumus, pessime mereamur de rebus humanis si latroni comparamus haec arma, non militi.
II. Quid de nobis loquor? Rerum ipsa natura, in eo quod praecipue indulsisse homini videtur quoque nos a ceteris animalibus separasse, non parens sed noverca fuerit si facultatem dicendi sociam scelerum, adversam innocentiae, hostem veritatis invenit.

1
1. Let the orator, then, be for us the one we have constituted—the one who is defined by M. Cato as a good man, skilled in speaking; but, that which he too set first, and which nature itself holds to be preferable and greater, let him in any case be a good man: and this not only for the reason that, if that force of speaking should arm malice, nothing would be more pernicious to public and private affairs than eloquence; and we ourselves, who have tried, for our manly part, to contribute something to the faculty of speaking, would deserve most ill of human affairs if we were to match these arms to a brigand, not to a soldier.
2. Why do I speak of us? The very nature of things, in that which she seems especially to have indulged to man and by which she also separated us from the other animals, would be not a mother but a stepmother, if she found the faculty of speaking to be an ally of crimes, opposed to innocence, an enemy of truth.

Mutos enim nasci et egere omni ratione satius fuisset quam providentiae munera in mutuam perniciem convertere.
III. Longius tendit hoc iudicium meum.

For it would have been better to be born mute and to lack all reason than to turn the gifts of providence into mutual destruction.
3. This judgment of mine goes further.

Neque enim tantum id dico, eum qui sit orator virum bonum esse oportere, sed ne futurum quidem oratorem nisi virum bonum. Nam certe neque intellegentiam concesseris iis qui proposita honestorum ac turpium via peiorem sequi malent, neque prudentiam, cum in gravissimas frequenter legum, semper vero malae conscientiae poenas a semet ipsis inproviso rerum exitu induantur.
IV. Quod si neminem malum esse nisi stultum eundem non modo a sapientibus dicitur sed vulgo quoque semper est creditum, certe non fiet umquam stultus orator.

Nor indeed do I say only this, that he who is an orator ought to be a good man, but that there will not even be an orator unless he is a good man. For certainly you would not grant intelligence to those who, with the way of honorable and base things set before them, prefer to follow the worse; nor prudence, since they often, by the unexpected outcome of affairs, have the gravest penalties of the laws—and always those of an evil conscience—imposed upon themselves.
4. And if it is said not only by the wise but has always been commonly believed that no one is wicked unless he is also a fool, surely a fool will never become an orator.

Adde quod ne studio quidem operis pulcherrimi vacare mens nisi omnibus vitiis libera potest: primum quod in eodem pectore nullum est honestorum turpiumque consortium, et cogitare optima simul ac deterrima non magis est unius animi quam eiusdem hominis bonum esse ac malum:
V. tum illa quoque ex causa, quod mentem tantae rei intentam vacare omnibus aliis, etiam culpa carentibus, curis oportet. Ita demum enim libera ac tota, nulla distringente atque alio ducente causa, spectabit id solum ad quod accingitur.
VI. Quod si agrorum nimia cura et sollicitior rei familiaris diligentia et venandi voluptas et dati spectaculis dies multum studiis auferunt (huic enim rei perit tempus quodcumque alteri datur), quid putamus facturas cupiditatem avaritiam invidiam, quarum inpotentissimae cogitationes somnos etiam ipsos et illa per quietem visa perturbent?

Add, moreover, that the mind cannot even be free for the pursuit of the most beautiful work unless it is free from all vices: first, because in the same breast there is no fellowship of honorable and base things, and to think the best and the worst at the same time is no more the mark of one mind than for the same man to be both good and bad:
5. then also for this reason, that a mind intent on so great a matter ought to be free from all other cares, even those lacking fault. Thus then only, free and whole, with no cause distracting and leading elsewhere, will it regard that alone to which it girds itself.
6. But if excessive care of fields and a more anxious diligence of household affairs and the pleasure of hunting and a day given to spectacles take much away from studies (for to this thing there perishes whatever time is given to another), what do we think cupidity, avarice, envy will do, whose most unrestrained thoughts disturb even sleep itself and those visions during rest?

VII. Nihil est enim tam occupatum, tam multiforme, tot ac tam variis adfectibus concisum atque laceratum quam mala mens. Nam et cum insidiatur, spe curis labore distringitur, et, etiam cum sceleris compos fuit, sollicitudine, paenitentia, poenarum omnium exspectatione torquetur.

7. For nothing is so occupied, so multiform, so cut to pieces and lacerated by so many and so various affections as an evil mind. For both when it lies in wait, it is strained by hope, cares, and labor; and even when it has been successful in crime, it is tormented by solicitude, penitence, and the expectation of all punishments.

Quis inter haec litteris aut ulli bonae arti locus? Non hercule magis quam frugibus in terra sentibus ac rubis occupata.
VIII.

What place, amid these things, is there for letters or for any good art? Not, by Hercules, any more than for fruits in a land occupied by briers and brambles.
8.

Age, non ad perferendos studiorum labores necessaria frugalitas? Quid ergo ex libidine ac luxuria spei? Non praecipue acuit ad cupiditatem litterarum amor laudis?

Come now, is frugality not necessary for enduring the labors of studies? What hope, then, out of lust and luxury? Does not the love of praise especially sharpen the desire for letters?

Num igitur malis esse laudem curae putamus? Iam hoc quis non videt, maximam partem orationis in tractatu aequi bonique consistere? Dicetne de his secundum debitam rerum dignitatem malus atque iniquus?

Do we then think that praise ought to be a care to the wicked? And now who does not see this, that the greatest part of oratory consists in the tractation of the just and the good? Will a bad and iniquitous man speak about these according to the due dignity of the matters?

IX. Denique, ut maximam partem quaestionis eximam, demus, id quod nullo modo fieri potest, idem ingenii studii doctrinae pessimo atque optimo viro: uter melior dicetur orator? Nimirum qui homo quoque melior. Non igitur umquam malus idem homo et perfectus orator.

9. Finally, to remove the greatest part of the question, let us concede—though it can in no way be done—the same talent, zeal, and learning to the worst and to the best man: which will be called the better orator? Surely the one who is also the better man. Therefore a bad man is never at the same time a perfect orator.

X. Non enim perfectum est quicquam quo melius est aliud. Sed, ne more Socraticorum nobismet ipsi responsum finxisse videamur, sit aliquis adeo contra veritatem opstinatus ut audeat dicere eodem ingenio studio doctrina praeditum nihilo deteriorem futurum oratorem malum virum quam bonum: convincamus huius quoque amentiam.
XI. Nam hoc certe nemo dubitabit, omnem orationem id agere ut iudici quae proposita fuerint vera et honesta videantur.

10. For nothing is perfect of which there is something else better. But, lest we seem, after the manner of the Socratics, to have fabricated an answer for ourselves, let there be someone so obstinate against the truth that he dares to say that a bad man, endowed with the same talent, zeal, and learning, will be in no way a worse orator than a good one: let us refute the madness of this man as well.
11. For this surely no one will doubt, that every oration aims at making the things that have been put forward seem true and honorable to the judge.

Vtrum igitur hoc facilius bonus vir persuadebit an malus? Bonus quidem et dicet saepius vera atque honesta.
XII.

Will a good man, then, more easily persuade this, or a bad one? The good man, indeed, will also more often speak things true and honorable.
12.

Sed etiam si quando aliquo ductus officio (quod accidere, ut mox docebimus, potest) falso haec adfirmare conabitur, maiore cum fide necesse est audiatur. At malis hominibus ex contemptu opinionis et ignorantia recti nonnumquam excidit ipsa simulatio: inde inmodeste proponunt, sine pudore adfirmant.
XIII.

But even if at some time, led by some duty (which can happen, as we shall soon teach), he tries to affirm these things falsely, it is necessary that he be heard with greater credibility. But in bad men, from contempt of opinion and ignorance of the right, the very simulation sometimes slips away: hence they propose immoderately, they affirm without shame.
13.

Sequitur in iis quae certum est effici non posse deformis pertinacia et inritus labor: nam sicut in vita, ita in causis quoque spes improbas habent; frequenter autem accidit ut fis etiam vera dicentibus fides desit videaturque talis advocatus malae causae argumentum.
XIV. Nunc de iis dicendum est quae mihi quasi conspiratione quadam vulgi reclamari videntur: "orator ergo Demosthenes non fuit?

There follows, in those things which it is certain cannot be brought about, a misshapen obstinacy and a fruitless labor: for, just as in life, so also in cases they have shameless hopes; and it frequently happens that even to those speaking true things credibility is lacking, and such an advocate seems an argument of a bad cause.
14. Now it must be said about those things which seem to me to be cried out against, as if by a certain conspiracy of the crowd: "So then, was Demosthenes not an orator?"

atqui malum virum accepimus. Non Cicero? atqui huius quoque mores multi reprenderunt." Quid agam?

and yet we have received that he was a bad man. Not Cicero? and yet many have also reprehended this man’s morals. What am I to do?

Magna responsi invidia subeunda est: mitigandae sunt prius aures.
XV. Mihi enim nec Demosthenes tam gravi morum dignus videtur invidia ut omnia quae in eum ab inimicis congesta sunt credam, cum et pulcherrima eius in re publica consilia et finem vitae clarum legam, nec M. tullio defuisse video in ulla parte civis optimi voluntatem.
XVI.

A great invidiousness of the reply must be undergone: the ears must first be mitigated.
15. For to me neither does Demosthenes seem worthy of so grave an invidious reproach of morals that I should believe everything that has been heaped upon him by enemies, since I read both his most beautiful counsels in the republic and an illustrious end of life; nor do I see that in M. Tullius there was lacking, in any part, the will of a most excellent citizen.
16.

Testimonio est actus nobilissime consulatus, integerrime provincia administrata et repudiatus vigintiviratus, et civilibus bellis, quae in aetatem eius gravissima inciderunt, neque spe neque metu declinatus animus quo minus optimis se partibus, id est rei publicae, iungeret.
XVII. Parum fortis videtur quibusdam, quibus optime respondit ipse non se timidum in suscipiendis sed in providendis periculis: quod probavit morte quoque ipsa, quam praestantissimo suscepit animo.

Testimony to this is the most noble conduct of his consulship, a province administered with the utmost integrity and the vigintivirate repudiated, and, in the civil wars which most grievously fell within his lifetime, a spirit deflected neither by hope nor by fear from joining himself to the best party—that is, to the Republic.
17. To some he seems not quite brave enough, to whom he himself most excellently replied that he was not timid in undertaking dangers, but in providing against (foreseeing) them; which he proved by death itself as well, which he met with a most outstanding spirit.

XVIII. Quod si defuit his viris summa virtus, sic quaerentibus an oratores fuerint respondebo quo modo Stoici, si interrogentur an sapiens Zenon, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus ipse, respondeant, magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles, non tamen id quod natura hominis summum habet consecutos.
XIX. Nam et Pythagoras non sapientem se, ut qui ante eum fuerunt, sed studiosum sapientiae vocari voluit.

18. But if the highest virtue was lacking to these men, to those inquiring whether they were orators I will answer as the Stoics, if they are interrogated whether Zeno was a sage, or Cleanthes, or Chrysippus himself, answer: that those men indeed were great and venerable, yet had not attained that which the nature of man holds as highest.
19. For Pythagoras too wished to be called not a wise man, as those before him were, but a student of wisdom.

Ego tamen secundum communem loquendi consuetudinem saepe dixi dicamque perfectum oratorem esse Ciceronem, ut amicos et bonos viros et prudentissimos dicimus vulgo, quorum nihil nisi perfecte sapienti datur: sed cum proprie et ad legem ipsam veritatis loquendum erit, eum quaeram oratorem quem et ille quaerebat.
XX. Quamquam enim stetisse ipsum in fastigio eloquentiae fateor, ac vix quid adici potuerit invenio, fortasse inventurus quid adhuc abscisurum putem fuisse (nam et fere sic docti iudicaverunt plurimum in eo virtutum, nonnihil fuisse vitiorum, et se ipse multa ex illa iuvenili abundantia coercuisse testatur): tamen, quando nec sapientis sibi nomen minime sui contemptor adseruit et melius dicere certe data longiore vita et tempore ad componendum securiore potuisset, non maligne crediderim defuisse ei summam illam ad quam nemo propius accessit.
XXI.

I, however, according to the common custom of speaking, have often said and will say that Cicero is a perfect orator, just as we commonly call friends and good men and most prudent men so, of which nothing is granted except to the perfectly wise; but when it will be necessary to speak properly and according to the very law of truth, I shall seek the orator whom he too was seeking.
20. For although I admit that he himself stood at the pinnacle of eloquence, and I scarcely find what could have been added, perhaps I should find something which I would think he would still have excised (for the learned have generally judged thus, that there was very much of virtues in him, and somewhat of vices, and he himself testifies that he restrained many things from that youthful abundance): nevertheless, since he, by no means a despiser of himself, did not assert for himself the name of wise man, and certainly could have spoken better, had a longer life been granted and a more secure time for polishing, I would not grudgingly believe that that summit was lacking to him, to which no one approached nearer.
21.

Et licebat, si aliter sentirem, fortius id liberiusque defendere. An vero M. Antonius neminem a se visum eloquentem, quod tanto minus erat, professus est, ipse etiam M. Tullius quaerit adhuc eum et tantum imaginatur ac fingit: ego non audeam dicere aliquid in hac quae superest aeternitate inveniri posse eo quod fuerit perfectius?
XXII.

And it was permitted, if I thought otherwise, to defend that more strongly and more freely. Or indeed did M. Antonius profess that no one eloquent had been seen by him—which was so much the lesser claim—and does M. Tullius himself also still seek him and only imagine and fashion him: shall I not dare to say that in this eternity which remains something can be found more perfect than what has been?
22.

Transeo illos qui Ciceroni ac Demostheni ne in eloquentia quidem satis tribuunt: quamquam neque ipsi Ciceroni Demosthenes videatur satis esse perfectus, quem dormitare interim dicit, nec Cicero Bruto Calvoque, qui certe compositionem illius etiam apud ipsum reprendunt, nec Asinio utrique, qui vitia orationis eius etiam inimice pluribus locis insecuntur.
XXIII. Concedamus sane, quod minime natura patitur, repertum esse aliquem malum virum summe disertum, nihilo tamen minus oratorem eum negabo.

I pass over those who do not grant even in eloquence enough to Cicero and Demosthenes: although neither does Demosthenes himself seem to Cicero to be sufficiently perfect—he says that he dozes at times—nor does Cicero to Brutus and Calvus, who certainly reprehend that man’s composition even in his own writings, nor to Asinius do both of them, who in many places even inimically pursue the vices of his oration.
23. Let us concede, indeed, what nature least allows, that there has been found some evil man supremely eloquent; nonetheless I will no less deny him to be an orator.

Nam nec omnibus qui fuerint manu prompti viri fortis nomen concesserim, quia sine virtute intellegi non potest fortitudo.
XXIV. An ei qui ad defendendas causas advocatur non est opus fide quam neque cupiditas corrumpat nec gratia avertat nec metus frangat: sed proditorem transfugam praevaricatorem donabimus oratoris illo sacro nomine?

For neither would I grant to all who have been ready with the hand the name of a brave man, since fortitude cannot be understood without virtue.
24. Or does he who is called as advocate to defend causes have no need of good faith, which neither cupidity may corrupt nor favor turn aside nor fear shatter? But shall we bestow upon a betrayer, a deserter, a prevaricator that sacred name of orator?

Quod si mediocribus etiam patronis convenit haec quae vulgo dicitur bonitas, cur non orator ille, qui nondum fuit sed potest esse, tam sit moribus quam dicendi virtute perfectus?
XXV. Non enim forensem quandam instituimus operam nec mercennariam vocem neque, ut asperioribus verbis parcamus, non inutilem sane litium advocatum, quem denique causidicum vulgo vocant, sed virum cum ingenii natura praestantem, tum vero tot pulcherrimas artis penitus mente complexum, datum tandem rebus humanis, qualem nulla antea vetustas cognoverit, singularem perfectumque undique, optima sentientem optimeque dicentem.

But if even for mediocre patrons this goodness, which is commonly so called, is fitting, why should not that orator, who has not yet been but can be, be perfected as much in morals as in the virtue of speaking?
25. For we are not instituting a certain forensic service nor a mercenary voice, nor—to spare harsher words—an advocate of lawsuits, indeed not useless, whom at last they commonly call a pleader, but a man outstanding both by the nature of his innate talent and truly having deeply embraced in his mind so many most beautiful arts, given at last to human affairs, such as no antiquity before has known: unique and perfected on every side, thinking the best things and speaking best.

XXVI. In hoc quota pars erit quod aut innocentis tuebitur aut improborum scelera compescet aut in pecuniariis quaestionibus veritati contra calumniam aderit? summus ille quidem in his quoque operibus fuerit, sed maioribus clarius elucebit, cum regenda senatus consilia et popularis error ad meliora ducendus.

26. In this, what portion will there be that he either will protect the innocent, or will restrain the crimes of the wicked, or in pecuniary questions will stand by truth against calumny? He indeed will be supreme in these works also; but in greater ones he will shine forth more clearly, when the counsels of the senate are to be steered and popular error to be led to better things.

XXVII. An non talem quendam videtur finxisse Vergilius, quem in seditione vulgi iam faces et saxa iaculantis moderatorem dedit:
"tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem
conspexere, silent arrectisque auribus adstant"?
Habemus igitur ante omnia virum bonum: post hoc adiciet dicendi peritum: "ille regit dictis animos et pectora mulcet".
XXVIII. Quid?

27. Or does not Vergil seem to have fashioned such a one, whom he presented as a moderator in a sedition of the crowd now hurling torches and stones:
"then, if by chance they have caught sight of some man weighty with piety and merits,
they fall silent and stand with ears pricked"?
We have, therefore, before all, a good man: after this he will add one expert in speaking: "he rules minds by his words and soothes their hearts."
28. What?

non in bellis quoque idem ille vir quem instituimus, si sit ad proelium miles cohortandus, ex mediis sapientiae praeceptis orationem trahet? Nam quo modo pugnam ineuntibus tot simul metus laboris, dolorum, postremo mortis ipsius exciderint nisi in eorum locum pietas et fortitudo et honesti praesens imago successerit?
XXIX.

Will not that same man whom we are training, even in wars, if a soldier is to be exhorted to battle, draw his oration from the very midst of the precepts of wisdom? For how could so many fears at once—for toil, for pains, and finally for death itself—fall away from those going into the fight, unless in their place piety and fortitude and the present image of the honorable should succeed?
29.

Quae certe melius persuadebit aliis qui prius persuaserit sibI. Prodit enim se, quamlibet custodiatur, simulatio, nec umquam tanta fuerit loquendi facultas ut non titubet [ad] haereat quotiens ab animo verba dissentiunt.
XXX.

Whoever has first persuaded himself will certainly persuade others better. For simulation betrays itself, however much it be guarded, nor has there ever been such a faculty of speaking as not to falter and [ad] stick whenever words disagree with the mind.
30.

Vir autem malus aliud dicat necesse est quam sentit: bonos numquam honestus sermo deficiet, numquam rerum optimarum (nam idem etiam prudentes erunt) inventio: quae etiam si lenociniis destituta sit, satis tamen natura sua ornatur, nec quicquam non diserte quod honeste dicitur.
XXXI. Quare, iuventus, immo omnis aetas (neque enim rectae voluntati serum est tempus ullum) totis mentibus huc tendamus, in haec elaboremus: forsan et consummare contingat.

But a wicked man must needs say something other than what he thinks; an honorable discourse will never fail good men, nor the invention of the best things (for they will be prudent as well): which, even if it be deprived of allurements, is yet sufficiently adorned by its own nature, and nothing that is said honorably is not said eloquently.
31. Wherefore, youth—nay, every age (for to a right will no time is late)—with whole minds let us aim hither, let us toil at these things: perhaps it may even be granted to consummate them.

Nam si natura non prohibet et esse virum bonum et esse dicendi peritum, cur non aliquis etiam unus utrumque consequi possit? cur autem non se quisque speret fore illum aliquem?
XXXII.

For if nature does not prohibit both being a good man and being an expert in speaking, why may not some one person attain both? why, moreover, should not each person hope that he will be that someone?
32.

Ad quod si vires ingenii non suffecerint, tamen ad quem usque modum processerimus meliores erimus ex utroque. Hoc certe procul eximatur animo, rem pulcherrimam eloquentiam cum vitiis mentis posse misceri. Facultas dicendi, si in malos incidit, et ipsa iudicanda est malum: peiores enim illos facit quibus contingit.

And if the powers of genius should not suffice for that, yet to whatever measure we shall have advanced, we shall be better in both. Let this, surely, be banished far from the mind: that most beautiful thing, eloquence, can be mingled with the vices of the mind. The faculty of speaking, if it falls upon the wicked, must itself be judged an evil; for it makes worse those upon whom it befalls.

XXXIII. Videor mihi audire quosdam (neque enim deerunt umquam qui diserti esse quam boni malint) illa dicentis: "Quid ergo tantum est artis in eloquentia? cur tu de coloribus et difficilium causarum defensione, nonnihil etiam de confessione locutus es, nisi aliquando vis ac facultas dicendi expugnat ipsam veritatem?

33. I seem to myself to hear certain people (for there will never be lacking those who would prefer to be eloquent rather than good) saying these things: "What then is there so much of art in eloquence? why have you spoken about colors and the defense of difficult causes, and not a little also about confession, unless sometimes the force and faculty of speaking assaults even truth itself?

Bonus enim vir non agit nisi bonas causas, eas porro etiam sine doctrina satis per se tuetur veritas ipsa."
XXXIV. Quibus ego, cum de meo primum opere respondero, etiam pro boni viri officio, si quando eum ad defensionem nocentium ratio duxerit, satisfaciam. Pertractare enim quo modo aut pro falsis aut etiam pro iniustis aliquando dicatur non est inutile, vel propter hoc solum, vi ea facilius et deprendamus et refellamus, quem ad modum remedia melius adhibebit cui nota quae nocent fuerint.

“For a good man does not plead except good causes, and moreover even without doctrine truth itself sufficiently upholds them by itself.”
34. To these people I, after I have first given a reply about my own work, will also, on behalf of the office of the good man, if ever reason shall have led him to the defense of the guilty, give satisfaction. For to examine how one may sometimes speak either for falsehoods or even for injustices is not un-useful, if only for this: that we may more easily both detect and refute them—just as remedies will be better applied by one to whom the things that harm have been known.

XXXV. Neque enim Academici, cum in utramque disserunt partem, non secundum alteram vivunt, nec Carneades ille, qui Romae audiente Censorio Catone non minoribus viribus contra iustitiam dicitur disseruisse quam pridie pro iustitia dixerat, iniustus ipse vir fuit. Venim et virtus quid sit adversa ei malitia detegit, et aequitas fit ex iniqui contemplatione manifestior, et plurima contrariis probantur: debent ergo oratori sic esse adversariorum nota consilia ut hostium imperatori.

35. Nor indeed do the Academics, though they dispute on both sides, fail to live according to one of them; nor was that Carneades, who at Rome, with Censorial Cato listening, is said to have argued against justice with no less vigor than he had spoken for justice the day before, himself an unjust man. And indeed virtue reveals what it is by the malice set against it, and equity becomes more manifest from the contemplation of the iniquitous, and very many things are proved by their contraries: therefore the counsels of adversaries ought to be as well known to the orator as those of enemies to a general.

XXXVI. Verum et illud, quod prima propositione durum videtur, potest adferre ratio, ut vir bonus in defensione causae velit auferre aliquando iudici veritatem. Quod si quis a me proponi mirabitur (quamquam non est haec mea proprie sententia, sed eorum quos gravissimos sapientiae magistros aetas vetus credidit), sic iudicet, pleraque esse quae non tam factis quam causis eorum vel honesta fiant vel turpia.

36. But even this, which at first proposition seems harsh, reason can adduce: that a good man, in the defense of a cause, may sometimes wish to remove the truth from the judge. And if anyone will marvel that this is put forward by me (although this is not my own opinion strictly, but that of those whom antiquity believed the most weighty teachers of wisdom), let him judge thus: that very many things become either honorable or base not so much by the deeds as by their causes.

XXXVII. Nam si hominem occidere saepe virtus, liberos necare non numquam pulcherrimum est, asperiora quaedam adhuc dictu si communis utilitas exegerit facere conceditur: ne hoc quidem nudum est intuendum, qualem causam vir bonus, sed etiam quare et qua mente defendat.
XXXVIII.

37. For if to kill a human being is often virtue, to slay one’s own children is sometimes most beautiful; certain things yet harsher even to say are granted to be done, if the common utility has required it: not even this is to be looked at bare, not only what sort of cause the good man defends, but also why and with what mind he defends it.
38.

Ac primum concedant mihi omnes oportet, quod Stoicorum quoque asperrimi confitentur, facturum aliquando bonum virum ut mendacium dicat, et quidem nonnumquam levioribus causis, ut in pueris aegrotantibus utilitatis eorum gratia multa fingimus, multa non facturi promittimus, nedum si ab homine occidendo grassator avertendus sit aut hostis pro salute patriae fallendus:
XXXIX. ut hoc, quod alias in servis quoque reprendendum est, sit alias in ipso sapiente laudandum. Id si constiterit, multa iam video posse evenire propter quae orator bene suscipiat tale causae genus quale remota ratione honesta non recepisset.

And first everyone ought to concede to me, what even the severest of the Stoics confess, that a good man will sometimes tell a lie, and indeed sometimes for lighter causes—just as in sick children we feign many things for the sake of their benefit, we promise many things we are not going to do—let alone if a robber must be turned away from killing a man, or an enemy must be deceived for the safety of the fatherland:
39. so that this, which at other times is to be reproved even in slaves, at other times is to be praised in the wise man himself. If that is established, I now see that many things can occur on account of which an orator may rightly undertake such a kind of case as, with the rationale of the honorable set aside, he would not have accepted.

XL. Nec hoc dico (quia severiores sequi placet leges) pro patre, fratre, amico periclitantibus, tametsi non mediocris haesitatio est hinc iustitiae proposita imagine, inde pietatis. Nihil dubii relinquamus. Sit aliquis insidiatus tyranno atque ob id reus: utrumne salvum eum nolet is qui a nobis finitur orator?

40. Nor do I say this (since it pleases me to follow severer laws) on behalf of a father, brother, or friend in peril, although there is no small hesitation, on this side with the image of justice set forth, on that of piety. Let us leave nothing doubtful. Let someone have laid ambush for a tyrant and on that account be a defendant: will the orator, as defined by us, not wish him to be safe?

An, si tuendum susceperit, non tam falsis defendet quam qui apud iudices malam causam tuetur?
XLI. Quid si quaedam bene facta damnaturus est iudex nisi ea non esse facta convicerimus: non vel hoc modo servabit orator non innocentem modo sed etiam laudabilem civem?

Or, if he has undertaken the defense, will he not defend by falsehoods just as much as one who before the judges maintains a bad cause?
41. What if the judge is about to condemn certain well-done deeds unless we convince him that they were not done: will not the orator even in this way save not only an innocent man but even a laudable citizen?

Quid si quaedam iusta natura, sed condicione temporum inutilia civitati sciemus: nonne utemur arte dicendi bona quidem, sed malis artibus simili?
XLII. Ad hoc nemo dubitabit quin, si nocentes mutari in bonam mentem aliquo modo possint, sicut posse conceditur, salvos esse eos magis e re publica sit quam puniri.

What if we know that certain things are just by nature, but, by the condition of the times, useless to the civic community: shall we not use the art of speaking—good indeed, yet similar to bad arts?
42. To this, no one will hesitate that, if the guilty can in some way be changed into a good mind, as it is conceded that they can, it is more in the interest of the Republic that they be kept safe rather than punished.

Si liqueat igitur oratori futurum bonum virum cui vera obicientur, non id aget ut salvus sit?
XLIII. Da nunc ut crimine manifesto prematur dux bonus et sine quo vincere hostem civitas non possit: nonne ei communis utilitas oratorem advocabit?

If, therefore, it be evident to the orator that the man, against whom true charges will be alleged, will be a good man, will he not aim to keep him safe?
43. Grant now that a good commander is pressed by a manifest crime, and one without whom the commonwealth cannot conquer the enemy: will not the common utility call an orator as advocate for him?

Certe Fabricius Cornelium Rufinum, et alioqui malum civem et sibi inimicum, tamen, quia utilem sciebat ducem, imminente bello palam consulem suffragio suo fecit, atque id mirantibus quibusdam respondit, a cive se spoliari malle quam ab hoste venire. Ita hic si fuisset orator, non defendisset eundem Rufinum vel manifesti peculatus reum?
XLIV.

Certainly Fabricius made Cornelius Rufinus—otherwise a bad citizen and inimical to himself—nevertheless, because he knew him to be a useful leader, with war impending, publicly consul by his own suffrage; and to certain men marveling at this he replied that he would rather be despoiled by a citizen than for the enemy to come. Thus, if this man had been an orator, would he not have defended that same Rufinus even as a defendant of manifest peculation?
44.

Multa dici possunt similia, sed vel unum ex iis quodlibet sufficit. Non enim hoc agimus, ut istud illi quem formamus viro saepe sit faciendum, sed ut, si talis coegerit ratio, sit tamen vera finitio oratorem esse virum bonum dicendi peritum.
XLV.

Many similar things can be said, but even any one of them suffices. For we are not aiming at this, that that thing should often be done by the man whom we are forming, but that, if such a rationale should compel, nevertheless the true definition be this: that the orator is a good man skilled in speaking.
45.

Praecipere vero ac discere quo modo etiam probatione difficilia tractentur necessarium est. Nam frequenter etiam optimae causae similes sunt malis, et innocens reus multis veri similibus premitur, quo fit ut eadem actionis ratione defendendus sit qua si nocens esset. Iam innumerabilia sunt bonis causis malisque communia, testes litterae suspiciones opiniones.

But it is necessary to prescribe and to learn how even matters difficult in proof should be handled. For frequently even the best causes are similar to bad ones, and an innocent defendant is pressed by many verisimilitudes, wherefore it comes about that he must be defended by the same method of pleading as if he were guilty. Now there are innumerable things common to good causes and bad: witnesses, letters, suspicions, opinions.

Non aliter autem veri similia quam vera et confirmantur et refelluntur. Quapropter ut res feret flectetur oratio, manente honesta voluntate.

No otherwise, moreover, are verisimilitudes than truths both confirmed and refuted. Wherefore, as the matter will bear, the oration will be bent, with honorable will remaining.

2
I. Quando igitur orator est vir bonus, is autem citra virtutem intellegi non potest, virtus, etiam si quosdam impetus ex natura sumit, tamen perficienda doctrina est: mores ante omnia oratori studiis erunt excolendi atque omnis honesti iustique disciplina pertractanda, sine qua nemo nec vir bonus esse nec dicendi peritus potest - nisi forte accedemus iis qui natura constare mores et nihil adiuvari disciplina putant, scilicet ut ea quidem quae manu fiunt atque eorum etiam contemptissima confiteantur egere doctoribus, virtutem vero, qua nihil homini quo ad deos inmortalis propius accederet datum est, obviam inlaboratam tantum quia nati simus habeamus.
II. Abstinens erit qui id ipsum quid sit abstinentia ignoret?
III.

2
1. Since therefore the orator is a good man, and he cannot be understood apart from virtue, virtue, even if it takes certain impulses from nature, must nevertheless be perfected by doctrine: before all else the orator’s morals must be cultivated by studies, and the entire discipline of the honorable and the just must be handled, without which no one can be either a good man or skilled in speaking—unless perhaps we should join those who think that morals consist by nature and are in no way helped by discipline, namely, that they admit that the things which are wrought by hand, and even the most contemptible of them, need teachers, but that virtue—than which nothing has been given to man whereby he might approach more nearly to the immortal gods—should come to meet us unlabored merely because we are born.
2. Will he be abstinent who is ignorant what abstinence itself is?
3.

Et fortis, qui metus doloris mortis superstitionis nulla ratione purgaverit? Et iustus qui aequi bonique tractatum, qui leges quaeque natura sunt omnibus datae quaeque propriae populis et gentibus constitutae, numquam eruditiore aliquo sermone tractarit? O quam istud parvum putant quibus tam facile videtur!

And will he be brave, who has by no reasoning purged the fears of pain, of death, of superstition? And will he be just, who has never treated, in some more erudite discourse, the treatment of the equitable and the good, and the laws which by nature are given to all and those which are proper, established for peoples and nations? O how small they think that, to whom it seems so easy!

IV. Sed hoc transeo, de quo neminem qui litteras vel primis, ut aiunt, labris degustarit dubitaturum puto. Ad illud sequens praevertar, ne dicendi quidem satis peritum fore qui non et naturae vim omnem penitus perspexerit et mores praeceptis ac ratione formarit.
V. Neque enim frustra in tertio de Oratore libro L. Crassus cuncta quae de aequo iusto vero bono deque iis quae sunt contra posita dicantur propria esse oratoris adfirmat, ac philosophos, cum ea dicendi viribus tuentur, uti rhetorum armis, non suis.

4. But I pass over this, about which I think no one who has even, as they say, tasted letters with the first lips would doubt. I will turn to the following point: that not even will he be sufficiently skilled in speaking who has not both thoroughly perceived the whole force of nature and shaped morals by precepts and by reason.
5. For not in vain, in the third book On the Orator, L. Crassus affirms that all things which are said about the equitable, the just, the true, the good, and about those things which are set in opposition, are proper to the orator, and that philosophers, when they defend these by the powers of speaking, use the arms of rhetors, not their own.

Idem tamen confitetur ea iam esse a philosophia petenda, videlicet quia magis haec illi videtur in possessione earum rerum fuisse.
VI. Hinc etiam illud est quod Cicero pluribus et libris et epistulis testatur, dicendi facultatem ex intimis sapientiae fontibus fluere, ideoque aliquamdiu praeceptores eosdem fuisse morum atque dicendi. Quapropter haec exhortatio mea non eo pertinet, ut esse oratorem philosophum velim, quando non alia vitae secta longius a civilibus officiis atque ab omni munere oratoris recessit.

The same man nevertheless confesses that these things are now to be sought from philosophy, namely because this seems to him to have been more in possession of those matters.
6. Hence also is that which Cicero attests in several books and epistles: that the faculty of speaking flows from the inmost fountains of sapience, and therefore that for some time the preceptors were the same for morals and for speaking. Wherefore this exhortation of mine does not tend to this, that I would wish the orator to be a philosopher, since no other sect of life has withdrawn farther from civic duties and from every function of the orator.

VII. Nam quis philosophorum aut in iudiciis frequens aut clarus in contionibus fuit? Quis denique in ipsa quam maxime plerique praecipiunt rei publicae administratione versatus est?

7. For which of the philosophers has been either frequent in the courts or illustrious in the assemblies? Who, finally, has been engaged in the very administration of the Republic, which most men in the highest degree prescribe?

Atqui ego illum quem instituo Romanum quendam velim esse sapientem, qui non secretis disputationibus sed rerum experimentis atque operibus vere civilem virum exhibeat.
VIII. Sed quia deserta ab iis qui se ad eloquentiam contulerunt studia sapientiae non iam in actu suo atque in hac fori luce versantur, sed in porticus et gymnasia primum, mox in conventus scholarum recesserunt, id quod est oratori necessarium nec a dicendi praeceptoribus traditur ab iis petere nimirum necesse est apud quos remansit: evolvendi penitus auctores qui de virtute praecipiunt, ut oratoris vita cum scientia divinarum rerum sit humanarumque coniuncta.

And yet I would wish the one whom I am training to be a certain Roman sapient, who would exhibit a truly civic man not by secluded disputations but by experiments of things and by works.
8. But because the studies of wisdom, abandoned by those who have betaken themselves to eloquence, no longer are engaged in their own proper act and in this light of the forum, but first withdrew into porticoes and gymnasia, soon into the assemblies of the schools, that which is necessary for the orator and is not handed down by the preceptors of speaking must, of course, be sought from those with whom it has remained: to peruse thoroughly the authors who give precepts concerning virtue, so that the orator’s life may be conjoined with knowledge of things divine and human.

IX. Quae ipsae quanto maiores ac pulchriores viderentur si illas ii docerent qui etiam eloqui praestantissime possent? Vtinamque sit tempus umquam quo perfectus aliquis qualem optamus orator hanc artem superbo nomine et vitiis quorundam bona eius corrumpentium invisam vindicet sibi ac velut rebus repetitis in corpus eloquentiae adducat. Quae quidem cum sit in tris divisa partis, naturalem moralem rationalem, qua tandem non est cum oratoris opere coniuncta?

9. How much greater and more beautiful would these very things seem if those taught them who also could speak most excellently? And may there ever be a time when some perfect orator, such as we desire, shall vindicate to himself this art, made odious by its proud name and by the vices of certain men corrupting its goods, and, as though after a recovery of property, bring it into the corpus of eloquence. And since it is divided into three parts—natural, moral, rational—with which, pray, is it not conjoined with the orator’s work?

Nam ut ordinem retro agamus, de ultima illa, quae tota versatur in verbis, nemo dubitaverit, si et proprietates vocis cuiusque nosse et ambigua aperire et perplexa discernere et de falsis iudicare et colligere ac resolvere quae velis oratorum est:
XI. quamquam ea non tam est minute atque concise in actionibus utendum quam in disputationibus, quia non docere modo sed movere etiam ac delectare audientis debet orator, ad quod impetu quoque ac viribus et decore est opus, ut vis amnium maior est altis ripis multoque gurgitis tractu fluentium quam tenuis aquae et obiectu lapillorum resultantis.
XII. Et ut palaestrici doctores illos quos numeros vocant non idcirco discentibus tradunt ut iis omnibus ii qui didicerint in ipso luctandi certamine utantur (plus enim pondere et firmitate et spiritu agitur), sed ut subsit copia illa, ex qua unum aut alterum cuius se occasio dederit efficiant:
XIII.

Now, to go back in order, concerning that last part, which is wholly occupied with words, no one will doubt that it belongs to orators both to know the properties of each voice, to open what is ambiguous, to distinguish what is perplexed, to judge concerning false things, and to gather and resolve what you will:
11. although that is not to be used so minutely and concisely in pleadings as in disputations, because the orator ought not only to teach but also to move and to delight the audience; for which there is need also of impetus and strength and grace, just as the force of rivers is greater, flowing with high banks and with the long sweep of a swirling current, than that of thin water rebounding by the obstruction of little stones.
12. And as the palestra’s masters do not for that reason hand down to learners those things which they call “numbers” so that those who have learned may use all of them in the very contest of wrestling (for more is achieved by weight and firmness and breath), but in order that that abundance may lie ready, from which they may effect one or another which the occasion shall have offered:
13.

ita haec pars dialectica, sive illam dicere malumus disputatricem, ut est utilis saepe et finitionibus et comprehensionibus et separandis quae sunt differentia et resolvenda ambiguitate, distinguendo dividendo inliciendo inplicando, ita, si totum sibi vindicaverit in foro certamen, obstabit melioribus et sectas ad tenuitatem suam vires ipsa subtilitate consumet.
XIV. Itaque reperias quosdam in disputando mire callidos, cum ab illa cavillatione discesserint, non magis sufficere in aliquo graviore actu quam parva quaedam animalia quae in angustis mobilia campo deprehenduntur.

thus this part, the dialectic—or, if we prefer to call it, the disputational—although it is often useful for definitions and comprehensions and for separating things that are different and for resolving ambiguity, by distinguishing, dividing, inveigling, implicating, yet, if it claims the whole contest in the forum for itself, it will stand in the way of better things, and by its very subtlety will consume the forces, cut down to its own tenuity.
14. Thus you may find certain men marvelously shrewd in disputation; when they have departed from that cavillation, they are no more sufficient in any weightier action than certain small animals which, mobile in narrow places, are taken when they reach the open field.

XV. Iam quidem pars illa moralis, quae dicitur ethice, certe tota oratori est accommodata. Nam in tanta causarum, sicut superioribus libris diximus, varietate, cum alia coniectura quaerantur, alia finitionibus concludantur, alia iure summoveantur vel transferantur, alia colligantur vel ipsa inter se concurrant vel in diversum ambiguitate ducantur, nulla fere dici potest cuius non parte in aliqua tractatus aequi ac boni reperiatur, plerasque vero esse quis nescit quae totae in sola qualitate consistant?
XVI.

15. Now indeed that moral part, which is called ethice, is certainly wholly accommodated to the orator. For in so great a variety of causes, as we said in the previous books, since some are investigated by conjecture, others are concluded by definitions, others are removed or transferred by right/law, others are gathered by inference, or themselves run together in mutual conflict, or are led apart into different directions by ambiguity, hardly any can be named in the handling of which some portion of the equitable and the good is not discovered; and who does not know that very many are such as consist wholly in quality alone?
16.

In consiliis vero quae ratio suadendi est ab honesti quaestione seposita? Quin illa etiam pars tertia, quae laudandi ac vituperandi officiis continetur, nempe in tractatu recti pravique versatur.
XVII.

In counsels indeed, what rationale of persuading is separated from the question of the honorable? Nay rather, that third part also, which is contained within the offices of praising and blaming, manifestly is occupied with the treatment of right and wrong.
XVII.

An de iustitia fortitudine abstinentia temperantia pietate non plurima dicet orator? Sed ille vir bonus, qui haec non vocibus tantum sibi nota atque nominibus aurium tenus in usum linguae perceperit, sed qui virtutes ipsas mente complexus ita sentiet, nec in cogitando laborabit sed quod sciet vere dicet.
XVIII.

Will not the orator say very many things about justice, fortitude, abstinence, temperance, piety? But that good man, who will have taken these in not merely as voices and names—only as far as the ears, for the use of the tongue—but who, having embraced the virtues themselves with his mind, will so feel them; nor will he toil in thinking, but what he knows he will speak truly.
18.

cum sit autem omnis generalis quaestio speciali potentior, quia universo pars utique continetur, non utique accedit parti quod universum est, profecto nemo dubitabit generales quaestiones in illo maxime studiorum more versatas.
XIX. Iam vero cum sint multa propriis brevibusque comprensionibus finienda, unde etiam status causarum dicitur finitivus, nonne ad id quoque instrui ab his, qui plus in hoc studii dederunt, oportet?

since, however, every general question is more potent than a special one, because the part is of course contained by the universal, while what is universal does not of course accrue to the part, surely no one will doubt that general questions have been especially handled in that manner of studies.
19. And indeed, since many things must be ended by proper and brief comprehensions (definitions), whence the “status of causes” is also called definitive, ought we not to be instructed for that too by those who have given more study to this?

Quid? non quaestio iuris omnis aut verborum proprietate aut aequi disputatione aut voluntatis coniectura continetur? Quorum pars ad rationalem, pars ad moralem tractatum redundat.

What? Is not every question of law contained either in the propriety of words, or in the disputation of equity, or in the conjecture of will? Of which, part pertains to rational, part to moral tractation.

XX. Ergo natura permixta est omnibus istis oratio, quae quidem oratio est vere. Nam ignara quidem huiusce doctrinae loquacitas erret necesse est, ut quae vel nullos vel falsos duces habeat. Pars vero naturalis, cum est ad exercitationem dicendi tanto ceteris uberior quanto maiore spiritu de divinis rebus quam humanis eloquendum est, tum illam etiam moralem, sine qua nulla esse, ut docuimus, oratio potest, totam complectitur.

20. Therefore, oration is by nature commixed with all those things, which indeed is truly oration. For loquacity ignorant of this doctrine must needs err, as having either no guides or false ones. But the natural part—since for the exercise of speaking it is so much the more abundant than the others as one must speak with a greater spirit about divine things than about human—then also embraces that moral part, without which, as we have taught, no oration can exist, in its entirety.

XXI. Nam si regitur providentia mundus, administranda certe bonis viris erit res publica: si divina nostris animis origo, tendendum ad virtutem nec voluptatibus terreni corporis serviendum. An haec non frequenter tractabit orator?

21. For if the world is governed by providence, surely the republic must be administered by good men; if there is a divine origin of our souls, one must strive toward virtue and not be enslaved to the pleasures of the earthly body. Will not the orator treat these matters frequently?

Iam de auguriis, responsis, religione denique omni, de quibus maxima saepe in senatu consilia versata sunt, non erit ei disserendum, si quidem, ut nobis placet, futurus est vir civilis idem? Quae denique intellegi saltem potest eloquentia hominis optima nescientis?
XXII.

Now, on auguries, oracular responses, and, finally, all religion—about which the greatest counsels have often been debated in the senate—will he not have to discourse, if indeed, as it pleases us, he is to be a statesman as well? What, finally, can even be understood as the best eloquence in a man who is ignorant?
22.

Haec si rationi manifesta non essent, exemplis tamen crederemus, si quidem et Periclem, cuius eloquentiae, etiam si nulla ad nos monumenta venerunt, vim tamen quandam incredibilem cum historici tum etiam liberrimum hominum genus, comici veteres tradunt, Anaxagorae physici constat auditorem fuisse, et Demosthenen, principem omnium Graeciae oratorum, dedisse operam PlatonI.
XXIII. Nam M. tullius non tantum se debere scholis rhetorum quantum Academiae spatiis frequenter ipse testatus est: neque se tanta umquam in eo fudisset ubertas si ingenium suum consaepto fori, non ipsius rerum naturae finibus terminasset.

If these things were not manifest to reason, nevertheless we would believe them on the basis of examples, since both Pericles—whose eloquence, even if no monuments have come down to us, yet a certain incredible force of it both the historians and also that freest kind of men, the old comic poets, hand down—is agreed to have been a hearer of Anaxagoras the natural philosopher (physicus); and Demosthenes, the chief of all the orators of Greece, applied himself to Plato.
CHAPTER 23. For M. Tullius has very often himself testified that he owed not so much to the schools of rhetors as to the walks of the Academy; nor would so great an abundance ever have been poured forth in him, if he had bounded his own genius by the enclosure of the forum, and not by the very boundaries of the nature of things.

Verum ex hoc alia mihi quaestio exoritur, quae secta conferre plurimum eloquentiae possit - quamquam ea non inter multas potest esse contentio;
XXIV. nam in primis nos Epicurus a se ipse dimittit, qui fugere omnem disciplinam navigatione quam velocissima iubet: neque vero Aristippus, summum in voluptate corporis bonum ponens, ad hunc nos laborem adhortetur. Pyrrhon quidem quas in hoc opere habere partis potest, cui iudices esse apud quos verba faciat, et reum pro quo loquatur, et senatum in quo sit dicenda sententia non liquebit?

But from this another question arises for me: which sect can contribute the most to eloquence — although as to that there cannot be contention among many;
24. for first of all Epicurus dismisses us from himself, who bids us to flee every discipline by a navigation as swift as possible; nor indeed would Aristippus, placing the highest good in the pleasure of the body, exhort us to this labor. As for Pyrrho, what parts can he have in this work, for whom it will not be clear that there are judges before whom he may speak, a defendant on whose behalf he may speak, and a senate in which an opinion is to be said?

XXV. Academiam quidam utilissimam credunt, quod mos in utramque partem disserendi ad exercitationem forensium causarum proxime accedat. Adiciunt loco probationis quod ea praestantissimos in eloquentia viros ediderit.

25. Some believe the Academy most useful, because the custom of disserting on either side most nearly approaches the exercise of forensic cases. They add by way of proof that it has produced the most preeminent men in eloquence.

Peripatetici studio quoque se quodam oratorio iactant: nam thesis dicere exercitationis gratia fere est ab iis institutum. Stoici, sicut copiam nitoremque eloquentiae fere praeceptoribus suis defuisse concedant necesse est, ita nullos aut probare acrius aut concludere subtilius contendunt.
XXVI.

the Peripatetics also vaunt themselves on a certain oratorial study: for to “speak theses” for the sake of exercise has for the most part been instituted by them. The Stoics, just as they must concede that copiousness and the polish of eloquence were for the most part lacking to their preceptors, so contend that none either prove more sharply or conclude more subtly.
26.

Sed haec inter ipsos, qui velut sacramento rogati vel etiam superstitione constricti nefas ducunt a suscepta semel persuasione discedere: oratori vero nihil est necesse in cuiusquam iurare leges.
XXVII. Maius enim opus atque praestantius ad quod ipse tendit et cuius est velut candidatus, si quidem est futurus cum vitae tum etiam eloquentiae laude perfectus.

But these things concern those men themselves, who, as if conscripted by a sacrament (oath) or even constrained by superstition, deem it impious to depart from a persuasion once undertaken; for the orator, however, there is no need to swear to anyone’s laws.
27. For the work is greater and more preeminent toward which he himself tends and of which he is, as it were, a candidate, if indeed he is to be perfected with the praise both of life and of eloquence.

Quare in exemplum bene dicendi facundissimum quemque proponet sibi ad imitandum, moribus vero formandis quam honestissima praecepta rectissimamque ad virtutem viam deliget. Exercitatione quidem utetur omni, sed tamen erit plurimus in maximis quibusque ac natura pulcherrimis.
XXVIII.

Therefore, as an example of good speaking he will set before himself the most eloquent men for imitation; but for the forming of morals he will choose the most honorable precepts and the straightest way to virtue. He will indeed make use of every exercise, yet nevertheless he will be most occupied with those that are the greatest and by nature the most beautiful.
28.

Nam quae potest materia reperiri ad graviter copioseque dicendum magis abundans quam de virtute, de re publica, de providentia, de origine animorum, de amicitia? Haec sunt quibus mens pariter atque oratio insurgant: quae vere bona, quid mitiget metus, coerceat cupiditates, eximat nos opinionibus vulgi animumque caelestem cognatis sideribus admoveat.
XXIX.

For what subject-matter can be found more abundant for speaking gravely and copiously than about virtue, about the commonwealth, about providence, about the origin of souls, about friendship? These are the themes on which both mind and speech alike rise up: which show what things are truly good, what may mitigate fears, restrain desires, remove us from the opinions of the crowd, and bring the heavenly soul near to its kindred stars.
29.

Neque ea solum quae talibus disciplinis continentur, sed magis etiam quae sunt tradita antiquitus dicta ac facta praeclare et nosse et animo semper agitare conveniet. Quae profecto nusquam plura maioraque quam in nostrae civitatis monumentis reperientur.
XXX.

Nor only the things which are contained in such disciplines, but even more those which have been handed down from antiquity—sayings and deeds done splendidly—it will be fitting both to know and to keep ever stirring in the mind. These assuredly will nowhere be found more numerous and greater than in the monuments of our commonwealth.
30.

An fortitudinem, iustitiam, fidem, continentiam, frugalitatem, contemptum doloris ac mortis melius alii docebunt quam Fabricii, curii, Reguli, Decii, Mucii aliique innumerabiles? Quantum enim Graeci praeceptis valent, tantum Romani, quod est maius, exemplis.
XXXI.

Or will others teach fortitude, justice, fidelity, continence, frugality, contempt of pain and of death better than the Fabricii, the Curies, the Reguli, the Decii, the Mucii, and innumerable others? For as much as the Greeks are strong in precepts, so much the Romans—what is greater—in examples.
31.

[tantum quod non cognatis ide rebus admoveri] +qui non modo proximum tempus lucemque praesentem intueri satis credat,+ sed omnem posteritatis memoriam spatium vitae honestae et curriculum laudis existimet, hinc mihi ille iustitiae haustus bibat, hinc sumptam libertatem in causis atque consiliis praestet. Neque erit perfectus orator nisi qui honeste dicere et sciet et audebit.

[only this, that it not be applied to things not cognate] +one who not only deems it sufficient to behold the nearest time and the present light,+ but thinks the whole memory of posterity, the span of an honorable life, and the course of praise; from here let him drink draughts of justice, from here let him display the liberty taken up in cases and counsels. Nor will he be a perfect orator unless he both will know how to speak honorably and will dare to do so.

3
I. Iuris quoque civilis necessaria huic viro scientia est et morum ac religionum eius rei publicae quam capesset. Nam qualis esse suasor in consiliis publicis privatisve poterit tot rerum quibus praecipue civitas continetur ignarus? Quo autem modo patronum se causarum non falso dixerit qui quod est in causis potentissimum sit ab altero petiturus, paene non dissimilis iis qui poetarum scripta pronuntiant?

3
1. The knowledge of civil law, too, is necessary for this man, and of the customs and religions of that republic which he will take up. For what sort of adviser and persuader in public or private counsels will he be able to be, ignorant of so many things by which the state is chiefly held together? And how will he truthfully call himself a patron of cases, who is going to seek from another that which is most potent in cases, almost not unlike those who recite the writings of poets?

Nam quodam modo mandata perferet, et ea quae sibi a iudice credi postulaturus est aliena fide dicet, et ipse litigantium auxiliator egebit auxilio. Quod ut fieri nonnumquam minore incommodo possit cum domi praecepta et composita et sicut cetera quae in causa sunt in discendo cognita ad iudicem perfert: quid fiet in iis quaestionibus quae subito inter ipsas actiones nasci solent? Non deformiter respectet et inter subsellia minores advocatos interroget?

For in a certain manner he will deliver mandates, and those things which he is going to demand be believed by the judge on his own behalf he will say on another’s credit, and he himself, the helper of litigants, will need help. Although this may sometimes be able to be done with less inconvenience, when at home the precepts and the compositions, and, just like the other things which are in the case, learned in studying, are conveyed to the judge: what will happen in those questions which are wont to arise suddenly in the very actions? Will he not look back unbecomingly and, among the benches, question junior advocates?

III. Potest autem satis diligenter accipere quae tum audiet cum dicenda sunt, aut fortiter adfirmare aut ingenue pro suis dicere? Possit in actionibus: quid fiet in altercatione, ubi occurrendum continuo nec libera ad discendum mora est?

III. But can he receive with sufficient diligence the things which he will then hear when they must be said, and either stoutly affirm or ingenuously speak on behalf of his own? He may be able in the actions: what will happen in the altercation, where one must meet it immediately and there is no free delay for learning?

Quid si forte peritus iuris ille non aderit? Quid si quis non satis in ea re doctus falsum aliquid subiecerit? Hoc enim est maximum ignorantiae malum, quod credit eum scire qui moneat.

What if perchance that expert in law will not be present? What if someone not sufficiently instructed in that matter should subjoin something false? For this is the greatest evil of ignorance: that it believes the one who admonishes to know.

IV. Neque ego sum nostri moris ignarus oblitusve eorum qui velut ad arculas sedent et tela agentibus subministrant, neque idem Graecos quoque nescio factitasse, unde nomen his pragmaticorum datum est: sed loquor de oratore, qui non clamorem modo suum causis, sed omnia quae profutura sunt debet.
V. Itaque eum nec inutilem si ad horam forte constiterit neque in testationibus faciendis esse imperitum velim. Quis enim potius praeparabit ea quae, cum aget, esse in causa velit?

4. Nor am I ignorant of our custom or forgetful of those who, as if sitting at little chests, supply weapons to the fighters, nor do I fail to know that the Greeks too practiced the same, whence the name “pragmatici” was given to them: but I speak of the orator, who owes to his cases not only his own clamor, but everything that will be of use.
5. Therefore I would not wish him to be either useless if perchance he has halted for the moment, or unskilled in making attestations. For who rather will prepare those things which he wishes to be in the case when he pleads?

Nisi forte imperatorem quis idoneum credit in proeliis quidem strenuum et fortem et omnium quae pugna poscit artificem, sed neque dilectus agere nec copias contrahere atque instruere nec prospicere commeatus nec locum capere castris scientem: prius est enim certe parare bella quam gerere.
VI. Atqui simillimus huic sit advocatus si plura quae ad vincendum valent aliis reliquerit, cum praesertim hoc quod est maxime necessarium nec tam sit arduum quam procul intuentibus fortasse videatur. Namque omne ius, quod est certum, aut scripto aut moribus constat, dubium aequitatis regula examinandum est.

Unless perhaps someone deems a commander suitable who is, to be sure, vigorous and brave in battles and a master of everything that combat requires, but not knowledgeable to conduct levies, nor to muster and array the forces, nor to look ahead to provisions, nor to seize a place for a camp: for it is surely prior to prepare wars than to wage them.
6. And yet very similar to this would be an advocate if he were to leave to others more of the things that avail for winning, especially since this, which is most necessary, is not so arduous as it may perhaps seem to those viewing from afar. For all law, that which is certain, is established either by writing or by custom; what is doubtful must be examined by the rule of equity.

VII. Quae scripta sunt aut posita in more civitatis nullam habent difficultatem - cognitionis sunt enim, non inventionis: at quae consultorum responsis explicantur aut in verborum interpretatione sunt posita aut in recti pravique discrimine. Vim cuiusque vocis intellegere aut commune prudentium est aut proprium oratoris, aequitas optimo cuique notissima.

7. The things which are written or established in the custom of the state have no difficulty—for they are matters of cognition, not of invention; but the things that are explained by the responses of the jurisconsults are either set in the interpretation of words or in the discrimination between right and wrong. To understand the force of each word is either common to the prudent or proper to the orator; equity is best known to every man of the best sort.

VIII. Nos porro et bonum virum et prudentem in primis oratorem putamus, qui, cum se ad id quod est optimum natura derexerit, non magnopere commovebitur si quis ab eo consultus dissentiet, cum ipsis illis diversas inter se opiniones tueri concessum sit. Sed etiam si nosse quid quisque senserit volet, lectionis opus est, qua nihil est in studiis minus laboriosum.

8. We, moreover, reckon both a good man and, in the first rank, a prudent man to be an orator, who, since he has directed himself by nature toward that which is best, will not be greatly moved if someone who has consulted him should dissent from him, since even to those very men themselves it is permitted to uphold opinions diverse among themselves. But even if he should wish to know what each person has thought, there is need of reading, than which nothing is less laborious in studies.

IX. Quod si plerique desperata facultate agendi ad discendum ius declinaverunt, quam id scire facile est oratori quod discunt qui sua quoque confessione oratores esse non possunt! Verum et M. Cato cum in dicendo praestantissimus, tum iuris idem fuit peritissimus, et Scaevolae Servioque sulpicio concessa est etiam facundiae virtus,
X. et M. tullius non modo inter agendum numquam est destitutus scientia iuris, sed etiam componere aliqua de eo coeperat, ut appareat posse oratorem non discendo tantum iuri vacare sed etiam docendo.
XI. Verum ea quae de moribus excolendis studioque iuris praecipimus ne quis eo credat reprendenda quod multos cognovimus qui, taedio laboris quem ferre tendentibus ad eloquentiam necesse est, confugerint ad haec deverticula desidiae: quorum alii se ad album ac rubricas transtulerunt et formularii vel, ut Cicero ait, legulei quidam esse maluerunt, tamquam utiliora eligentes ea quorum solam facilitatem sequebantur:
XII.

9. But if very many, having despaired of the faculty of pleading, have turned aside to learning the law, how easy is it for an orator to know that which is learned by those who by their own confession cannot be orators! Moreover, both M. Cato, while most outstanding in speaking, was likewise most skilled in law, and to the Scaevolae and to Servius Sulpicius the virtue of eloquence was also conceded,
10. and M. Tullius not only was never, while pleading, left without knowledge of law, but had even begun to compose some writings about it, so that it may appear that an orator can devote himself to law not only by learning but also by teaching.
11. But as for the things which we prescribe concerning the cultivation of morals and zeal for law, let no one think they are to be censured on the ground that we have known many who, out of weariness of the labor which it is necessary to bear for those tending toward eloquence, have taken refuge in these byroads of idleness: of whom some transferred themselves to the album and rubrics and preferred to be formularies or, as Cicero says, certain “legulei,” as though choosing more useful things, when they were following only their sheer ease:
12.

alii pigritiae adrogantioris, qui, subito fronte conficta inmissaque barba, veluti despexissent oratoria praecepta paulum aliquid sederunt in scholis philosophorum ut deinde in publico tristes, domi dissoluti captarent auctoritatem contemptu ceterorum: philosophia enim simulari potest, eloquentia non potest.

others, of a more overbearing sloth, who, with a suddenly contrived brow and a beard let down, as if they had looked down upon the oratorical precepts, sat for a little while in the schools of philosophers, so that thereafter, grim in public and dissolute at home, they might court authority by contempt of the rest: for philosophy can be simulated, eloquence cannot.

4
I. In primis vero abundare debet orator exemplorum copia cum veterum tum etiam novorum, adeo ut non ea modo quae conscripta sunt historiis aut sermonibus velut per manus tradita quaeque cotidie aguntur debeat nosse, verum ne ea quidem quae sunt a clarioribus poetis ficta neglegere.
II. Nam illa quidem priora aut testimoniorum aut etiam iudicatorum optinent locum, sed haec quoque aut vetustatis fide tuta sunt aut ab hominibus magnis praeceptorum loco ficta creduntur. Sciat ergo quam plurima: unde etiam senibus auctoritas maior est, quod plura nosse et vidisse creduntur (quod Homerus frequentissime testatur). Sed non est exspectanda ultima aetas, cum studia praestent ut, quantum ad cognitionem pertinet rerum, etiam praeteritis saeculis vixisse videamur.

4
I. In the first place, indeed, the orator ought to abound with a copiousness of examples both of the ancients and also of the moderns, to such a degree that he should not only know those which have been written in histories or handed down, as it were, through hands in discourses, and those which are transacted every day, but not even neglect those which have been feigned by more illustrious poets.
II. For those former ones hold the place either of testimonies or even of judgments rendered, but these also are either safe by the trust of antiquity or are believed, as fashioned by great men, to stand in the place of precepts. Let him therefore know as many things as possible: whence even to old men there is greater authority, because they are believed to know and to have seen more (which Homer most frequently attests). But the last age is not to be awaited, since studies afford that, so far as pertains to the cognition of things, we may seem to have lived even in past ages.

5
I. Haec sunt quae me redditurum, promiseram instrumenta, non artis, ut quidam putaverunt, sed ipsius oratoris: haec arma habere ad manum, horum scientia debet esse succinctus, accedente verborum figurarumque facili copia et inventionis ratione et disponendi usu et memoriae firmitate et actionis gratia. Sed plurimum ex his valet animi praestantia quam nec metus frangat nec adclamatio terreat nec audientium auctoritas ultra debitam reverentiam tardet.
II. Nam ut abominanda sunt contraria his vitia confidentiae temeritatis inprobitatis adrogantiae, ita citra constantiam fiduciam fortitudinem nihil artes, nihil studium, nihil profectus ipse profuerit, ut si des arma timidis et inbellibus.

5
1. These are the instruments which I had promised I would render, not of the art, as some have thought, but of the orator himself: he ought to have these weapons at hand; with the knowledge of these he should be girded, with an easy abundance of words and figures added, and with a method of invention and a practice of disposition, and the firmness of memory, and the grace of delivery. But most of all among these prevails the excellence of spirit, which neither fear breaks, nor acclamation terrifies, nor the authority of the hearers slows beyond due reverence.
2. For just as the vices contrary to these—overconfidence, temerity, improbitas, arrogance—are to be abominated, so without constancy, confidence, courage, neither the arts, nor study, nor progress itself will have profited, as if you were to give weapons to the timid and unwarlike.

Invitus mehercules dico, quoniam et aliter accipi potest, ipsam verecundiam, vitium quidem sed amabile et quae virtutes facillime generet, esse inter adversa, multisque in causa fuisse ut bona ingenii studiique in lucem non prolata situ quodam secreti consumerentur.
III. Sciat autem, si quis haec forte minus adhuc peritus distinguendi vim cuiusque verbi leget, non probitatem a me reprendi, sed verecundiam, quae est timor quidam reducens animum ab iis quae facienda sunt: inde confusio et coepti paenitentia et subitum silentium.

Unwillingly, by Hercules, I say—since it can also be taken otherwise—that modesty itself, a vice indeed but lovable and one which most easily begets virtues, is among the adverse things; and that it has in many cases been the cause that the goods of ingenium and of study, not brought into the light, were consumed by a certain mould of secrecy.
3. Let it be known, however, to anyone who may read this and is as yet less skilled at distinguishing the force of each word, that it is not probity I rebuke, but modesty, which is a certain fear drawing back the mind from those things that must be done: thence come confusion, regret of the undertaking, and sudden silence.

Quis porro dubitet vitiis adscribere adfectum propter quem facere honeste pudet?
IV. Neque ego rursus nolo eum qui sit dicturus et sollicitum surgere et colore mutari et periculum intellegere, quae si non acciderent, etiam simulanda erant; sed intellectus hic sit operis, non metus, moveamurque, non concidamus. Optima est autem emendatio verecundiae fiducia et quamlibet inbecilla frons magna conscientia sustinetur.

Who, moreover, would doubt to ascribe to vices the affect on account of which it shames one to act honorably?
4. Nor, again, do I wish that the one who is going to speak should be without solicitude: rather, let him rise anxious, change color, and understand the peril—things which, if they did not befall, ought even to be simulated; but let this be an understanding of the task, not fear, and let us be moved, not collapse. The best emendation of bashfulness is confidence, and however feeble the brow, it is sustained by a great conscience.

V. sunt et naturalia, ut supra dixi, quae tamen et cura iuvantur instrumenta, vox latus decor: quae quidem tantum valent ut frequenter famam ingeni faciant. Habuit oratores aetas nostra copiosiores, sed cum diceret eminere inter aequalis Trachalus videbatur: ea corporis sublimitas erat, is ardor oculorum, frontis auctoritas, gestus praestantia, vox quidem non, ut Cicero desiderat, paene tragoedorum, sed super omnis quos ego quidem audierim tragoedos.
VI. Certe cum in basilica Iulia diceret primo tribunali, quattuor autem iudicia, ut moris est, cogerentur atque omnia clamoribus fremerent, et auditum eum et intellectum et, quod agentibus ceteris contumeliosissimum fuit, laudatum quoque ex quattuor tribunalibus meminI.

5. there are also natural endowments, as I said above, which nevertheless are aided by care: instruments—voice, chest, decor; which indeed avail so much that they frequently make a reputation for genius. Our age had more copious orators, but when he spoke, Trachalus seemed to stand out among his equals: such was the sublimity of his body, such the ardor of his eyes, the authority of his brow, the excellence of his gesture, and a voice indeed not, as Cicero desires, almost of tragedians, but beyond all tragedians that I for my part have heard.
6. Certainly, when he was speaking in the Basilica Julia from the first tribunal, while four courts, as is the custom, were being convened and everything was roaring with clamors, I remember that he was both heard and understood and—what was most contumelious to the rest who were conducting cases—praised as well from the four tribunals.

Sed hoc votum est et rara felicitas: quae si non adsit, sane sufficiat ab iis quibus quis dicit audiri. Talis esse debet orator, haec scire.

But this is a vow and a rare felicity: which, if it be not present, let it at any rate suffice to be heard by those to whom one speaks. Such ought the orator to be, to know these things.

6
I. Agendi autem initium sine dubio secundum vires cuiusque sumendum est. Neque ego annos definiam, cum Demosthenen puerum admodum actiones pupillares habuisse manifestum sit, Calvus Caesar Pollio multum ante quaestoriam omnes aetatem gravissima iudicia susceperint, praetextatos egisse quosdam sit traditum, Caesar Augustus duodecim natus annos aviam pro rostris laudaverit.
II. Modus mihi videtur quidam tenendus, ut neque praepropere destringatur inmatura frons et quidquid est illud adhuc acerbum proferatur (nam inde et contemptus operis innascitur et fundamenta iaciuntur impudentiae et, quod est ubique perniciosissimum, praevenit vires fiducia), nec rursus differendum est tirocinium in senectutem: nam cotidie metus crescit maiusque fit semper quod ausuri sumus, et dum deliberamus quando incipiendum sit incipere iam serum est.

6
1. The beginning of pleading, however, should without doubt be undertaken according to each one’s powers. Nor shall I define years, since it is clear that Demosthenes, a very young boy, conducted pupillary actions, that Calvus, Caesar, Pollio, all long before the quaestorian age, undertook most weighty trials, that it is handed down that certain persons pled even while praetextate (wearing the toga praetexta), that Caesar Augustus at the age of twelve delivered a laudation of his grandmother from the rostra.
2. A certain measure seems to me to be maintained, so that neither the immature brow be too hastily unsheathed and whatever that thing is, still unripe, be brought forth (for from this both a contempt of the work is inborn and the foundations of impudence are laid and, what is everywhere most pernicious, confidence outruns strength), nor, on the other hand, is the apprenticeship to be deferred into old age: for every day fear grows, and what we are about to dare always becomes greater, and while we deliberate when one should begin, to begin is already too late.

Quare fructum studiorum viridem et adhuc dulcem promi decet, dum et venia et spes est et paratus favor et audere non dedecet, et si quid desit operi supplet aetas, et si qua sunt dicta iuveniliter pro indole accipiuntur, ut totus ille Ciceronis pro Sexto Roscio locus:
IV. "quid enim tam commune quam spiritus vivis, terra mortuis, mare fluctuantibus, litus eiectis?" Quae cum sex et viginti natus annos summis audientium clamoribus dixerit, defervisse tempore et annis liquata iam senior idem fatetur. Et hercule quantumlibet secreta studia contulerint, est tamen proprius quidam fori profectus, alia lux, alia veri discriminis facies, plusque, si separes, usus sine doctrina quam citra usum doctrina valeat.
V. Ideoque nonnulli senes in schola facti stupent novitate cum in iudicia venerunt, et omnia suis exercitationibus similia desiderant.

Wherefore it is fitting to bring forth the fruit of one’s studies green and still sweet, while there is indulgence and hope and prepared favor, and to dare is no disgrace, and if anything is lacking to the work, age makes it up, and if any things are spoken youthfully, they are received according to one’s innate character—like that whole passage of Cicero in the Pro Sexto Roscio:
4. "for what is so common as breath to the living, earth to the dead, the sea to those who are wave-tossed, the shore to those cast up?" Which, though he, at twenty-six years of age, delivered with the utmost shouts of his hearers, the same man, now older, confesses to have cooled down with time and, clarified by years. And, by Hercules, however much private studies may have contributed, there is nevertheless a certain progress peculiar to the forum, a different light, a different face of true crisis; and, if you separate them, practice without learning has more strength than learning without practice.
5. And so some old men made in the school are amazed at the novelty when they have come into the courts, and they desire everything to be like their exercises.

At illic et iudex tacet et adversarius obstrepit et nihil temere dictum perit, et si quid tibi ipse sumas probandum est, et laboratam congestamque dierum ac noctium studio actionem aqua deficit, et omisso magna semper flandi tumore in quibusdam causis loquendum est, quod illi diserti minime sciunt.
VI. Itaque nonnullos reperias qui sibi eloquentiores videantur quam ut causas agant. Ceterum illum quem iuvenem tenerisque adhuc viribus nitentem in forum deduximus et incipere quam maxime facili ac favorabili causa velim, ferarum ut catuli molliore praeda saginantur, et non utique ab hoc initio continuare operam et ingenio adhuc alendo callum inducere, sed iam scientem quid sit pugna et in quam rem studendum sit refici atque renovari.

But there the judge is silent, and the adversary makes a din, and nothing said rashly is lost, and if you assume anything for yourself it must be proved, and the action carefully wrought and heaped up by the study of days and nights runs dry, and, with the great swelling of ever-puffing set aside, in certain causes one must speak plainly—a thing which those “eloquent” men least know.
6. Accordingly you will find some who seem to themselves too eloquent to plead causes. But as for that young man whom we have led into the forum, still shining with tender strength, I would wish him to begin with a cause as easy and favorable as possible, just as the whelps of wild beasts are fattened on softer prey; and not by all means to keep his effort continuous from this beginning and to form a callus while his natural talent is still to be nourished, but, once he knows what a fight is and to what matter he must apply his study, to be refreshed and renewed.

VII. Sic et tirocinii metum dum facilius est audere transierit, nec audendi facilitatem usque ad contemptum operis adduxerit. Vsus est hac ratione M. tullius, et, cum iam clarum meruisset inter patronos qui tum erant nomen, in Asiam navigavit seque et aliis sine dubio eloquentiae ac sapientiae magistris, sed praecipue tamen Apollonio Moloni, quem Romae quoque audierat, Rhodi rursus formandum ac velut recoquendum dedit.

7. Thus also let him pass beyond the fear of his tirocinio while it is easier to dare, and let him not bring the facility of daring to the point of contempt for the work. M. Tullius made use of this method; and when he had already earned an illustrious name among the advocates of that time, he sailed to Asia and entrusted himself to teachers, without doubt, of eloquence and sapience—especially, however, to Apollonius Molon, whom he had also heard at Rome—at Rhodes to be formed afresh and, as it were, retempered.

tum dignum operae pretium venit cum inter se congruunt praecepta et experimenta.

then a reward worthy of the effort comes when precepts and experiments agree among themselves.

7
I. cum satis in omne certamen virium fecerit, prima ei cura in suscipiendis causis erit: in quibus defendere quidem reos profecto quam facere vir bonus malet, non tamen ita nomen ipsum accusatoris horrebit ut nullo neque publico neque privato duci possit officio ut aliquem ad reddendam rationem vitae vocet. Nam et leges ipsae nihil valeant nisi actoris idonea voce munitae, et si poenas scelerum expetere fas non est prope est ut scelera ipsa permissa sint, et licentiam malis dari certe contra bonos est.
II. Quare neque sociorum querelas nec amici vel propinqui necem nec erupturas in rem publicam conspirationes inultas patietur orator, non poenae nocentium cupidus sed emendandi vitia corrigendique mores (nam qui ratione traduci ad meliora non possunt, solo metu continentur;
III.

7
1. when he has made sufficient provision of forces for every contest, his first care will be in undertaking causes: in which a good man will indeed prefer to defend defendants rather than to prosecute, yet he will not so dread the very name of accuser that by no duty, whether public or private, he can be led to summon someone to render an account of his life. For the laws themselves avail nothing unless fortified by the suitable voice of the actor (accuser), and if it is not right to seek the penalties of crimes, it is well‑nigh the same as that the crimes themselves be permitted; and to give license to the wicked is surely against the good.
2. Wherefore the orator will not suffer either the complaints of allies, or the murder of a friend or kinsman, or conspiracies about to burst forth upon the commonwealth, to go unavenged, not from a lust for the punishment of the guilty but for the amending of vices and the correcting of morals (for those who cannot be led by reason to better things are restrained by fear alone;
3.

itaque ut accusatoriam vitam vivere et ad deferendos reos praemio duci proximum latrocinio est, ita pestem intestinam propulsare cum propugnatoribus patriae comparandum; ideoque principes in re publica viri non detrectaverunt hanc officii partem, creditique sunt etiam clari iuvenes opsidem rei publicae dare malorum civium accusationem, quia nec odisse improbos nec simultates provocare nisi ex fiducia bonae mentis videbantur; idque cum ab Hortensio, Lucullis, sulpicio, Cicerone, Caesare, plurimis aliis, tum ab utroque Catone factum est:
IV. quorum alter appellatus est sapiens, alter nisi creditur fuisse vix scio cui reliquerit huius nominis locum): neque defendet omnis orator idem, portumque illum eloquentiae suae salutarem non etiam piratis patefaciet, duceturque in advocationem maxime causa.
V. Quoniam tamen omnis qui non improbe litigabunt, quorum certe pars est, sustinere non potest unus, aliquid et commendantium personis dabit et ipsorum qui iudicio decernent, ut optimi cuiusque voluntate moveatur: namque hos et amicissimos habebit vir bonus.
VI. summovendum vero est utrumque ambitus genus vel potentibus contra humiles venditandi operam suam vel illud etiam iactantius minores utique contra dignitatem attollendi: non enim fortuna causas vel iustas vel improbas facit.

therefore, just as to live an accusatory life and to be led by a reward to denounce defendants is next-door to brigandage, so to drive off an internal pestilence is to be compared with the champions of the fatherland; and so the leading men in the commonwealth did not shirk this part of duty, and even famous young men were believed to give, as a hostage to the commonwealth, the accusation of evil citizens, because they seemed neither to hate the wicked nor to provoke enmities except from the confidence of a good mind; and this was done by Hortensius, the Luculli, Sulpicius, Cicero, Caesar, very many others, and then by each of the two Catos:
4. of whom the one was called wise, the other—unless he is believed to have been—I scarcely know to whom he left room for this name): nor will the same orator defend everyone, nor will he throw open that harbor of his eloquence, salutary as it is, even to pirates, and he will be led into advocacy chiefly by the cause.
5. Since, however, a single man cannot sustain all who will litigate not dishonestly—of whose number he is certainly a part—he will also grant something to the persons of those recommending, and to those themselves who will decide in judgment, so that he may be moved by the good will of every excellent man; for a good man will have these as most friendly.
6. In truth, each kind of ambitus is to be removed, either that of selling one’s service to the powerful against the humble, or that even more vaunting one of raising the lesser, assuredly, against dignity: for Fortune does not make causes either just or unjust.

Neque vero pudor obstet quo minus susceptam cum melior videretur litem, cognita inter discendum iniquitate, dimittat, cum prius litigatori dixerit verum.
VII. Nam et in hoc maximum, si aequi iudices sumus, beneficium est, ut non fallamus vana spe litigantem (neque est dignus opera patroni qui non utitur consilio) et certe non convenit ei quem oratorem esse volumus iniusta tueri scientem.

Nor, truly, should modesty stand in the way to prevent him from dismissing a suit he has undertaken—though it had seemed the better—when, upon discovering during preparation its iniquity, after first telling the litigant the truth.
7. For even in this there is a very great benefaction, if we are equitable judges: that we do not deceive the litigant with empty hope (nor is he worthy of the patron’s effort who does not use counsel); and surely it does not befit him whom we wish to be an orator to defend unjust things knowingly.

Nam si ex illis quas supra diximus causis falsum tuebitur, erit tamen honestum quod ipse faciet.
VIII. Gratisne ei semper agendum sit tractari potest.

For if, for those causes which we mentioned above, he will uphold a falsehood, nevertheless what he himself does will be honorable.
8. Whether he should always plead gratis can be treated.

Quod ex prima statim fronte diiudicare inprudentium est. Nam quis ignorat quin id longe sit honestissimum ac liberalibus disciplinis et illo quem exigimus animo dignissimum non vendere operam nec elevare tanti beneficii auctoritatem, cum pleraque hoc ipso possint videri vilia, quod pretium habent?
IX. Caecis hoc, ut aiunt, satis clarum est, nec quisquam qui sufficientia sibi (modica autem haec sunt) possidebit hunc quaestum sine crimine sordium fecerit.

To adjudicate that from the very first sight is the part of the imprudent. For who is ignorant that it is by far most honorable, and most worthy of the liberal disciplines and of that spirit which we require, not to vend one’s service nor to make light of the authority of so great a benefit, since very many things can seem vile for this very reason, that they have a price?
9. This, as they say, is clear enough even to the blind, and no one who possesses sufficiency for himself (and these are modest) can make this gain without the reproach of sordidness.

At si res familiaris amplius aliquid ad usus necessarios exiget, secundum omnium sapientium leges patietur sibi gratiam referri, cum et Socrati conlatum sit ad victum et Zenon Cleanthes Chrysippus mercedes a discipulis acceptaverint.
X. Neque enim video quae iustior adquirendi ratio quam ex honestissimo labore et ab iis de quibus optime meruerint quique, si nihil invicem praestent, indigni fuerint defensione. Quod quidem non iustum modo sed necessarium etiam est, cum haec ipsa opera tempusque omne alienis negotiis datum facultatem aliter adquirendi recidant.

But if his household resources will demand something more for necessary uses, then according to the laws of all the wise he will allow gratitude to be rendered to him, since both a contribution was bestowed upon Socrates for sustenance and Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus accepted fees from their disciples.
10. For I do not see what more just method of acquiring there is than from the most honorable labor, and from those toward whom they have deserved the best—and who, if they render nothing in return, would be unworthy of defense. Which indeed is not only just but even necessary, since these very services and all the time given to others’ business cut off the capacity of acquiring by any other means.

XI. Sed tum quoque tenendus est modus, ac plurimum refert et a quo accipiat et quantum et quo usque. Paciscendi quidem ille piraticus mos et imponentium periculis pretia procul abominanda negotiatio etiam a mediocriter improbis aberit, cum praesertim bonos homines bonasque causas tuenti non sit metuendus ingratus. Quid si futurus?

11. But even then a measure must be kept, and it matters very much both from whom he receives and how much and how far. Indeed, that piratical custom of bargaining and the negotiation—abominable from afar—of those who set prices upon perils imposed will be far removed even from the moderately wicked, especially since, for one who champions good men and good causes, an ingrate is not to be feared. What if he should turn out to be one?

XII. Malo tamen ille peccet. Nihil ergo adquirere volet orator ultra quam satis erit, ac ne pauper quidem tamquam mercedem accipiet, sed mutua benivolentia utetur, cum sciet se tanto plus praestitisse: non enim, quia venire hoc beneficium non oportet, oportet perire: denique ut gratus sit ad eum magis pertinet qui debet.

12. I would rather, however, that he be at fault. Therefore the orator will wish to acquire nothing beyond what will suffice, and not even if poor will he accept it as a wage, but he will make use of mutual benevolence, since he will know that he has rendered so much more: for it is not, because this benefit ought not to be sold, that it ought to perish: finally, that he be grateful pertains more to him who owes.

8
I. Proxima discendae causae ratio, quod est orationis fundamentum. Neque enim quisquam tam ingenio tenui reperietur qui, cum omnia quae sunt in causa diligenter cognoverit, ad docendum certe iudicem non sufficiat. Sed eius rei paucissimis cura est.

8
1. The next point is the method of learning the case, which is the foundation of oration. For no one so slight in talent will be found who, when he has diligently come to know all the things that are in the case, will not suffice, at least, for instructing the judge. But the care for this matter belongs to very few.

Nam ut taceam de neglegentibus, quorum nihil refert ubi litium cardo vertatur dum sint quae vel extra causam ex personis aut communi tractatu locorum occasionem clamandi largiantur: aliquos et ambitio pervertit, qui partim tamquam occupati semperque aliud habentes quod ante agendum sit pridie ad se venire litigatorem aut eodem matutino iubent, nonnumquam etiam inter ipsa subsellia didicisse se gloriantur,
III. partim iactantia ingenii, ut res cito accepisse videantur, tenere se et intellegere prius paene quam audiant mentiti, cum multa et diserte summisque clamoribus quae neque ad iudicem neque ad litigatorem pertineant decantaverunt, bene sudantes beneque comitati per forum reducuntur.
IV. Ne illas quidem tulerim delicias eorum qui doceri amicos suos iubent, quamquam minus mali est si illi saltem recte discant recteque doceant.

For, to pass over the negligent, for whom it makes no difference where the hinge of lawsuits turns, provided there be things which, even outside the case, from the persons or by a common-place treatment of topics grant an occasion for clamoring: ambition also perverts some, who, as if busy and always having something else that must first be done, order the litigant to come to them the day before or that very morning, and sometimes even boast that they learned the case right there upon the very benches,
3. others by a vaunting of their ingenium, so that they may seem to have taken in the matter quickly, falsely claiming to hold and understand it almost before they hear it; and when they have chanted many things eloquently and with the highest shouts which pertain neither to the judge nor to the litigant, sweating handsomely and well attended they are led back through the forum.
4. Nor would I bear even those affectations of men who order their friends to be instructed, although it is the lesser evil if at least those men learn rightly and teach rightly.

Sed quis discet tam bene quam patronus? Quo modo autem sequester ille et media litium manus et quidam interpres inpendet aequo animo laborem in alienas actiones, cum dicturis tanti suae non sint?
V. Pessimae vero consuetudinis libellis esse contentum, quos componit aut litigator, qui confugit ad patronum quia liti ipse non sufficit, aut aliquis ex eo genere advocatorum qui se non posse agere confitentur, deinde faciunt id quod est in agendo difficillimum.

But who will learn as well as the patron? In what way, moreover, will that sequester and the middle hand of litigations and a certain interpreter expend with an even mind their labor upon others’ actions, when their own are not of such worth to those who are about to speak?
V. Truly it is a most pernicious custom to be content with libelli, which are composed either by the litigant, who flees to the patron because he himself is not sufficient for the suit, or by someone from that class of advocates who confess that they cannot plead; then they do that which is the most difficult in pleading.

Nam qui iudicare quid dicendum, quid dissimulandum, quid declinandum mutandum fingendum etiam sit potest cur non sit orator, quando, quod difficilius est, oratorem facit?
VI. Hi porro non tantum nocerent si omnia scriberent uti gesta sunt; nunc consilium et colores adiciunt et aliqua peiora veris, quae plerique cum acceperunt inmutare nefas habent, et velut themata in scholis posita custodiunt: deinde deprenduntur, et causam quam discere ex suis litigatoribus noluerunt ex adversariis discunt.
VII.

For he who can judge what must be said, what must be dissimulated, what must be declined, changed, even feigned—why should he not be an orator, since, which is more difficult, he fashions the orator?
6. These, moreover, would not harm so much if they wrote everything as it was transacted; now they add counsel and colors and some things worse than the truth, which most, when they have received them, hold it a sacrilege to alter, and they keep them as if themes set in the schools: then they are caught out, and the case which they were unwilling to learn from their own litigants they learn from their adversaries.
7.

Liberum igitur demus ante omnia iis quorum negotium erit tempus ac locum, exhortemurque ultro ut omnia quamlibet verbose et unde volent +repetito tempore* exponant: non enim tam obest audire supervacua quam ignorare necessaria.
VIII. Frequenter autem et vulnus et remedium in iis orator inveniet quae litigatori in neutram partem habere momentum videbantur.

Therefore let us grant, before all else, to those whose business it will be, free time and place, and let us furthermore exhort them to set forth everything, however verbosely, and from whatever sources they wish, +with the time repeated*: for it is not so harmful to hear superfluous things as to be ignorant of necessary ones.
8. Frequently, however, the orator will find both the wound and the remedy in those matters which to the litigant seemed to have weight in neither direction.

Nec tanta sit acturo memoriae fiducia ut subscribere audita pigeat. Nec semel audisse sit satis: cogendus eadem iterum ac saepius dicere litigator, non solum quia effugere aliqua prima expositione potuerunt, praesertim hominem, quod saepe evenit, imperitum, sed etiam ut sciamus an eadem dicat.
IX. Plurimi enim mentiuntur, et tamquam non doceant causam sed agant non ut cum patrono sed ut cum iudice locuntur.

Nor should one who is about to plead have such confidence in memory as to be vexed to set down in writing the things heard. Nor is it enough to have heard once: the litigant must be compelled to say the same things again and more often, not only because some things could have escaped in the first exposition—especially from a man, as often happens, unskilled—but also so that we may know whether he says the same things.
9. For very many lie, and, as though they were not instructing the cause but acting (pleading) it, they speak not as with a patron but as with a judge.

Quapropter numquam satis credendum est, sed agitandus omnibus modis et turbandus et evocandus.
X. Nam ut medicis non apparentia modo vitia curanda sunt, sed etiam invenienda quae latent, saepe ipsis ea qui sanandi sunt occulentibus, ita advocatus plura quam ostenduntur aspiciat. Nam cum satis in audiendo patientiae inpenderit, in aliam rursus ei personam transeundum est, agendusque adversarius, proponendum quidquid omnino excogitari contra potest, quidquid recipit in eius modi disceptatione natura.

Wherefore one must never trust sufficiently, but he must be agitated in every way and disturbed and called forth.
10. For just as for physicians not only the defects that are apparent must be cured, but also those that are latent must be discovered, often with those very persons who are to be healed concealing them, so the advocate should look at more than what is shown. For when he has expended enough patience in listening, he must pass over again into another persona, and the adversary must be acted, and whatever at all can be excogitated against must be proposed, whatever the nature of a disputation of this kind admits.

XI. Interrogandus quam infestissime ac premendus: nam dum omnia quaerimus, aliquando ad verum ubi minime exspectavimus pervenimus.
In summa optimus est in discendo patronus incredulus: promittit enim litigator omnia, testem populum, paratissimas consignationes, ipsum denique adversarium quaedam non negaturum.
XII. Ideoque opus est intueri omne litis instrumentum: quod videre non est satis, perlegendum erit.

11. He must be interrogated as most aggressively as possible and pressed hard: for while we inquire into everything, we sometimes arrive at the truth where we least expected.
In sum, the best advocate in learning is an incredulous one: for the litigant promises everything—the people as witness, the readiest consignations, and, finally, that the adversary himself will not deny certain things.
12. And so there is need to look into the whole documentary instrument of the lawsuit: merely to see it is not enough; it will have to be read through.

Nam frequentissime aut non sunt omnino quae promittebantur, aut minus continent, aut cum alio aliquo nocituro permixta sunt, aut nimia sunt et fidem hoc ipso detractura, quod non habent modum.
XIII. Denique linum ruptum aut turbatam ceram aut sine agnitore signa frequenter invenies: quae nisi domi excusseris, in foro inopinata decipient, plusque nocebunt destituta quam non promissa nocuissent.

For most very often either the things that were promised are not at all, or they contain less, or they are commixed with some other noxious thing, or they are excessive and will, by this very fact, detract from credit, because they do not have measure.
13. Finally, you will frequently find a broken cord, or disturbed (tampered) wax, or seals without a recognizer: which, unless you have examined them at home, will, unexpected, deceive in the forum, and will do more harm when found wanting than things not promised would have harmed.

Multa etiam quae litigator nihil ad causam pertinere crediderit patronus eruet, modo per omnis quos tradimus argumentorum locos eat.
XIV. Quos ut circumspectare in agendo et adtemptare singulos minime convenit propter quas diximus causas, ita in discendo rimari necessarium est quae personae, quae tempora loca instituta instrumenta cetera, ex quibus non tantum illud quod est artificiale probationis genus colligi possit, sed qui metuendi testes, quo modo sint refellendi.

Many things too which the litigant has believed to pertain nothing to the cause the advocate will unearth, provided he goes through all the loci of arguments that we hand down.
14. And whereas, in pleading, it is least fitting to survey and to attempt them one by one, for the reasons we have said, so in learning it is necessary to pry into what persons, what times, places, arrangements, documents, and the rest, out of which not only that artificial kind of proof can be gathered, but also which witnesses are to be feared, and in what way they are to be refuted.

Nam plurimum refert invidia reus an odio an contemptu laboret, quorum fere pars prima superiores, proxima pares, tertia humiliores premit.
XV. Sic causam perscrutatus, propositis ante oculos omnibus quae prosint noceantve, tertiam deinceps personam induat iudicis, fingatque apud se agi causam, et quod ipsum movisset de eadem re pronuntiaturum id potentissimum apud quemcumque agetur existimet. Sic eum raro fallet eventus, aut culpa iudicis erit.

For it matters very greatly whether the defendant labors under envy, or hatred, or contempt; of which, for the most part, the first presses upon superiors, the next upon equals, the third upon inferiors.
15. Thus, having scrutinized the case, with all things that may help or harm set before his eyes, let him next assume the third person, that of the judge, and imagine the case to be pled before himself; and let him consider that what would have moved himself to pronounce on the same matter will be the most potent with whoever it is tried before. Thus the outcome will rarely deceive him, or it will be the judge’s fault.

9
I. Quae sint in agendo servanda toto fere opere exsecuti sumus, pauca tamen propria huius loci, quae non tam dicendi arte quam officiis agentis continentur, attingam. Ante omnia ne, quod plerisque accidit, ab utilitate eum causae praesentis cupido laudis abducat.
II. Nam ut gerentibus bella non semper exercitus per plana et amoena ducendus est, sed adeundi plerumque asperi colles, expugnandae civitates quamlibet praecisis impositae rupibus aut operum mole difficiles, ita oratio gaudebit quidem occasione laetius decurrendi et aequo congressa campo totas vires populariter explicabit:
III.

9
1. What things are to be observed in conducting a case we have set forth in almost the whole work; nevertheless I will touch on a few items proper to this place, which are contained not so much by the art of speaking as by the offices of the advocate. Before all, let it not be, as happens to very many, that a desire of praise draws him away from the utility of the present case.
2. For as, to those conducting wars, the army is not always to be led through level and pleasant places, but rough hills must for the most part be approached, and cities must be stormed though set upon cliffs cut sheer or made difficult by the mass of works, so speech will indeed rejoice in an occasion of running a more cheerful course, and, having met on level ground, will unfold all its forces in a popular manner:
3.

at si iuris anfractus aut eruendae veritatis latebras adire cogetur, non obequitabit nec ivis vibrantibus concitatisque sententiis velut missilibus utetur, sed operibus et cuniculis et insidiis et occultis artibus rem geret.
IV. Quae omnia non dum fiunt laudantur, sed cum facta sunt, unde etiam cupidissimis opinionis plus fructus venit. Nam cum illa dicendi vitiosa iactatio inter plausores suos detonuit, resurgit verae virtutis fortior fama, nec iudices a quo sint moti dissimulant, et doctis creditur, nec est orationis vera laus nisi cum finita est.

but if he is compelled to enter the anfractuosities of law or the hiding-places of truth to be dug out, he will not ride about nor will he use quivering and stirred-up sentences as if missiles, but he will conduct the matter by works and mines and ambushes and occult arts.
4. All which things are not praised while they are being done, but when they have been done, whence even to those most greedy for reputation more fruit accrues. For when that vicious vaunting of speaking has thundered itself out among its applauders, the stronger fame of true virtue rises again, nor do the judges dissemble by whom they have been moved, and the learned are believed, nor is there the true praise of an oration except when it has been finished.

V. Veteribus quidem etiam dissimulare eloquentiam fuit moris, idque M. Antonius praecipit, quo plus dicentibus fidei minusque suspectae advocatorum insidiae forent. Sed illa dissimulari quae tum erat potuit: nondum enim tantum dicendi lumen accesserat ut etiam per obstantia erumperet. Quare artes quidem et consilia lateant et quidquid si deprenditur perit.

5. To the ancients indeed it was even a custom to dissimulate eloquence, and M. Antonius prescribes this, in order that there might be more faith for speakers and the snares of advocates be less suspect. But what eloquence then was could be dissimulated: for not yet had so great a light of speaking arisen as to burst forth even through obstacles. Wherefore let the arts and counsels lie hidden, since whatever, if it is detected, perishes.

Hactenus eloquentia secretum habet.
VI. Verborum quidem dilectus, gravitas sententiarum, figurarum elegantia aut non sunt aut apparent: sed vel propter hoc ipsum ostentanda non sunt, quod apparent, ac, si unum sit ex duobus eligendum, causa potius laudetur quam patronus. Finem tamen hunc praestabit orator, ut videatur optimam causam optime egisse: illud certum erit, neminem peius agere quam qui displicente causa placet: necesse est enim extra causam sit quod placet.

Thus far eloquence keeps secrecy.
6. The selection of words, the gravity of sentences (thoughts), the elegance of figures are either not present or are apparent: but even for this very reason they ought not to be ostentatiously displayed, because they are apparent; and, if one of two must be chosen, let the cause rather be praised than the patron (advocate). Nevertheless the orator will furnish this end, that he may seem to have handled the best cause in the best way: this will be certain, that no one pleads worse than he who, the cause displeasing, pleases; for of necessity what pleases is outside the cause.

VII. Nec illo fastidio laborabit orator non agendi causas minores, tamquam infra eum sint aut detractura sit opinioni minus liberalis materia. Nam et suscipiendi ratio iustissima est officium, et optandum etiam ut amici quam minimas lites habeant, et abunde dixit bene quisquis rei satisfecit.

7. Nor will the orator be troubled by that fastidiousness of not taking on lesser causes, as though they were beneath him or as though material less liberal would detract from his opinion. For the reason for undertaking them is most just—duty—and it is even to be desired that friends have as few litigations as possible; and whoever has satisfied the matter has abundantly spoken well.

VIII. At quidam, etiam si forte susceperunt negotia paulo ad a dicendum tenuiora, extrinsecus adductis ea rebus circumlinunt, ac si defecerunt alia conviciis implent vacua causarum, si contingit, veris, si minus, fictis, modo sit materia ingenii mereaturque clamorem dum dicitur. Quod ego adeo longe puto ab oratore perfecto ut eum ne vera quidem obiecturum nisi id causa exiget credam.

8. But certain men, even if by chance they have undertaken matters a little too thin for speaking, plaster them over with extrinsic things brought in; and, if other resources fail, they fill the voids of their causes with invectives—if it so happens, with true ones, if not, with fictitious—provided there be material for their genius and it may earn clamor while it is being delivered. This I deem so far from the perfect orator that I would not believe he would cast even true charges unless the cause requires it.

IX. Ea est enim prorsus "canina", ut ait Appius, "eloquentia", cognituram male dicendi subire: quod facientibus etiam male audiendi praesumenda patientia est. Nam et in ipsos fit impetus frequenter qui egerunt, et certe petulantiam patroni litigator luit. Sed haec minora sunt ipso illo vitio animi quod maledicus a malefico non distat nisi occasione.

IX. For that is outright "canine," as Appius says, "eloquence," destined to incur notoriety for evil-speaking: and for those who practice it, a patience of being ill-spoken of must also be presumed. For an onrush is frequently made even against the very men who have conducted the case, and assuredly the litigant pays for the petulance of his patron. But these are lesser than that very vice of mind, that a slanderer does not differ from a malefactor except by occasion.

X. turpis voluptas et inhumana et nulli audientium bono grata a litigatoribus quidem frequenter exigitur, qui ultionem malunt quam defensionem; sed neque alia multa ad arbitrium eorum facienda sunt: hoc quidem quis hominum liberi modo sanguinis sustineat, petulans esse ad alterius arbitrium?
XI. Atqui etiam in advocatos partis adversae libenter nonnulli invehuntur: quod, nisi si forte meruerunt, et inhumanum est respectu communium officiorum, et cum ipsi qui dicit inutile (nam idem iuris responsuris datur) tum causae contrarium, quia plane adversarii fiunt et inimici, et quantulumcumque eis virium est contumelia augetur.
XII.

10. a base pleasure, inhuman and welcome to the good of none of the hearers, is indeed frequently exacted by litigants, who prefer vengeance to defense; but neither are many other things to be done at their arbitrium: as to this, who of men of, so to speak, free blood would endure to be petulant at another’s arbitrament?
11. And yet some gladly inveigh even against the advocates of the opposing party: which, unless perchance they have deserved it, is both inhuman with respect to the common offices, and useless to the very man who speaks (for the same right in law is granted to those who will respond), and then contrary to the cause, because they plainly become adversaries and enemies, and by the contumely whatever small strength they have is increased.
12.

Super omnia perit illa quae plurimum oratori et auctoritatis et fidei adfert modestia si a viro bono in rabulam latratoremque convertitur, compositus non ad animum iudicis sed ad stomachum litigatoris.
XIII. Frequenter etiam species libertatis deducere ad temeritatem solet, non causis modo sed ipsis quoque qui dixerunt periculosam; nec inmerito Pericles solebat optare ne quod sibi verbum in mentem veniret quo populus offenderetur.

Above all, that modesty perishes which brings to the orator the most both of authority and of faith, if he is converted from a good man into a pettifogger and barker, composed not to the mind of the judge but to the stomach of the litigant.
13. Often, too, the semblance of liberty is wont to lead down into temerity, dangerous not only to the causes but also to those themselves who have spoken; and not without reason did Pericles used to wish that no word might come into his mind by which the people would be offended.

Sed quod ille de populo, id ego de omnibus sentio qui tantundem possunt nocere. Nam quae fortia dum dicuntur videbantur, stulta cum laeserunt vocantur.
XIV.

But what he said about the people, that I feel about all who can do just as much harm. For things which seemed brave while they were being said are called foolish when they have given offense.
XIV.

Nunc, quia varium fere propositum agentium fuit et quorundam cura tarditatis, quorundam facilitas temeritatis crimine laboravit, quem credam fore in hoc oratoris modum tradere non alienum videtur.
XV. Adferet ad dicendum curae semper quantum plurimum poterit: neque enim hoc solum neglegentis sed mali et in suscepta causa perfidi ac proditoris est, peius agere quam possit. Ideoque ne suscipiendae quidem sunt causae plures quam quibus suffecturum se sciat.

Now, since the purpose of those acting has for the most part been various, and the care of some has labored under the charge of slowness, the facility of others under the indictment of temerity, it seems not alien to set forth what I believe will be, in this matter, the orator’s measure.
15. He will bring to speaking as much care as ever he most can: for it is not only the mark of a negligent man, but of a bad man, and—once a case is undertaken—of a perfidious traitor and betrayer, to act worse than he is able. And therefore one ought not even to undertake more cases than those for which he knows himself to be sufficient.

XVI. Dicet scripta quam res patietur plurima, et, ut Demosthenes ait, si continget, et sculpta. Sed hoc aut primae actiones aut quae in publicis iudiciis post interiectos dies dantur permiserint: at cum protinus respondendum est, omnia parari non possunt, adeo ut paulo minus promptis etiam noceat scripsisse, si alia ex diverso quam opinati fuerint occurrerint.

16. He will speak written things as many as the matter will allow, and, as Demosthenes says, if it should happen, even sculpted. But this the first actions, or those which in public judgments are granted after interposed days, will permit; but when one must answer forthwith, all things cannot be prepared, to such a degree that for those a little less prompt it even does harm to have written, if things should occur from the opposite side other than they had supposed.

XVII. Inviti enim recedunt a praeparatis et tota actione respiciunt requiruntque num aliquid ex illis intervelli atque ex tempore dicendis inseri possit: quod si fiat non cohaeret, nec commissuris modo, ut in opere male iuncto, hiantibus sed ipsa coloris inaequalitate detegitur.
XVIII.

17. For they withdraw unwillingly from their prepared materials, and throughout the whole action they look back and inquire whether something from those can be torn out and inserted into what must be said extempore: but if this be done, it does not cohere, and it is detected not only by the joints, as in a badly joined work, gaping at the commissures, but by the very inequality of color.
18.

Ita nec liber est impetus nec cura contexta, et utrumque alteri obstat: illa enim quae scripta sunt retinent animum, non secuntur. Itaque in iis actionibus omni, ut agricolae dicunt, pede standum est.
XIX.

Thus neither is the impulse free nor is the care interwoven, and each hinders the other: for those things which are written hold the mind back; they do not follow along. And so in those actions one must, as the farmers say, stand on every foot.
19.

Nam cum in propositione ac refutatione causa consistat, quae nostrae partis sunt scripta esse possunt: quae etiam responsurum adversarium certum est (est enim aliquando certum) pari cura refelluntur. Ad alia unum paratum adferre possumus, ut causam bene noverimus, alterum ibi sumere, ut dicentem adversarium diligenter audiamus.
XX. Licet tamen praecogitare plura et animum ad omnis casus componere, idque est tutius stilo, quo facilius et omittitur cogitatio et transfertur.

For since the case consists in the proposition and the refutation, those things which belong to our side can be written; those also which it is certain the adversary will respond (for it is sometimes certain) are refuted with equal care. For the other points we can bring one thing prepared, that we know the case well, and take the other on the spot, that we listen diligently to the adversary as he is speaking.
20. Yet it is permitted to premeditate more and to compose the mind for all contingencies, and this is safer with the stylus, by which a thought is more easily both omitted and transposed.

Sed sive in respondendo fuerit subito dicendum, sive quae alia ita exegerit ratio, non oppressum se ac deprensum credet orator cui disciplina et studium et exercitatio dederit vires etiam facilitatis:
XXI. quem armatum semper ac velut in procinctu stantem non magis umquam in causis oratio quam in rebus cotidianis ac domesticis sermo deficiet, nec se umquam propter hoc oneri subtrahet, modo sit causae discendae tempus: nam cetera semper sciet.

But whether in replying it must be spoken suddenly, or if some other reason has thus required it, the orator to whom discipline and study and exercise have given strength—even of facility—will not believe himself overwhelmed and caught off guard:
21. for him, armed always and, as it were, standing in battle array, his oration in cases will no more ever fail than his speech in everyday and domestic matters; nor will he ever on this account withdraw himself from the burden, provided there is time for learning the case: for he will always know the rest.

10
I. superest ut dicam de genere orationis. Hic erat propositus a nobis in divisione prima locus tertius: nam ita promiseram, me de arte, de artifice, de opere dicturum. cum sit autem rhetorices atque oratoris opus oratio pluresque eius formae, sicut ostendam, in omnibus iis et ars est et artifex, plurimum tamen invicem differunt: nec solum specie, ut signum signo et tabula tabulae et actio actioni, sed genere ipso, ut Graecis tuscanicae statuae, ut Asianus eloquens Attico.

10
1. it remains that I speak about the genus of oration. Here, in our first division, the third place had been proposed: for thus I had promised that I would speak about the art, the artificer, the work. Since, however, the work of rhetoric and of the orator is the oration, and its forms are several, as I will show, in all these both the art is present and the artificer; yet they differ very greatly from one another: and not only in appearance, as a statue to a statue and a panel-painting to a panel-painting and delivery to delivery, but in the very genus, as to the Greeks the Tuscan (Etruscan) statues, as the Asiatic eloquence to the Attic.

II. suos autem haec operum genera quae dico ut auctores sic etiam amatores habent, atque ideo nondum est perfectus orator ac nescio an ars ulla, non solum quia aliud in alio magis eminet, sed quod non una omnibus forma placuit, partim condicione vel temporum vel locorum, partim iudicio cuiusque atque proposito.
III. Primi quorum quidem opera non vetustatis modo gratia visenda sint clari pictores fuisse dicuntur Polygnotus atque Aglaophon, quorum simplex color tam sui studiosos adhuc habet ut illa prope rudia ac velut futurae mox artis primordia maximis qui post eos extiterunt auctoribus praeferant, proprio quodam intellegendi, ut mea opinio est, ambitu.

2. moreover, these genera of works that I speak of have their own authors as well as lovers, and therefore the orator is not yet perfect, and I do not know whether any art is, not only because one thing stands out more in one than in another, but because one form has not pleased all, partly by the condition of times or of places, partly by each person’s judgment and purpose.
3. The first painters who are said to have been famous, whose works ought to be viewed not merely for the sake of their antiquity, are Polygnotus and Aglaophon, whose simple color still has devotees of itself to such a degree that they prefer those almost rude and, as it were, primordia of an art soon to be, to the greatest authors who arose after them, by a certain peculiar ambit of understanding, as my opinion is.

IV. Post Zeuxis atque Parrhasius non multum aetate distantes circa Peloponnesia ambo tempora (nam cum Parrhasio sermo Socratis apud Xenophontem invenitur) plurimum arti addiderunt. Quorum prior luminum umbrarumque invenisse rationem, secundus examinasse subtilius lineas traditur.
V. Nam Zeuxis plus membris corporis dedit, id amplius aut augustius ratus atque, ut existimant, Homerum secutus, cui validissima quaeque forma etiam in feminis placet.

4. Afterward Zeuxis and Parrhasius, not differing much in age, both about the times of the Peloponnesian War (for a dialogue of Socrates with Parrhasius is found in Xenophon), added very much to the art. Of whom the former is reported to have discovered the method of lights and shades, the latter to have examined the lines more subtly.
5. For Zeuxis gave more to the limbs of the body, thinking that more ample or more august, and, as they suppose, following Homer, to whom the most robust form pleases, even in women.

Ille vero ita circumscripsit omnia ut eum legum latorem vocent, quia deorum atque heroum effigies, quales ab eo sunt traditae, ceteri tamquam ita necesse sit secuntur.
VI. Floruit autem circa Philippum et usque ad successores Alexandri pictura praecipue, sed diversis virtutibus. Nam cura Protogenes, ratione Pamphilus ac Melanthius, facilitate Antiphilus, concipiendis visionibus quas phantasias vocant Theon Samius, ingenio et gratia, quam in se ipse maxime iactat, Apelles est praestantissimus.

That man indeed outlined all things in such a way that they call him a lawgiver, because the effigies of the gods and heroes, such as have been handed down by him, the others follow as though it must be so.
6. Painting flourished especially around Philip and up to the successors of Alexander, but with different excellences. For in care Protogenes; in reason Pamphilus and Melanthius; in facility Antiphilus; in conceiving visions, which they call phantasies, Theon the Samian; in native talent and grace, which he especially vaunts in himself, Apelles is most preeminent.

Euphranorem admirandum facit quod et ceteris optimis studiis inter praecipuos et pingendi fingendique idem mirus artifex fuit.
VII. Similis in statuis differentia.

What makes Euphranor admirable is that he was among the foremost in the other finest studies as well, and of painting and of modeling he was likewise a marvelous artificer.
7. A similar distinction in statues.

Nam duriora et tuscanicis proxima Callon atque Hegesias, iam minus rigida Calamis, molliora adhuc supra dictis Myron fecit. Diligentia ac decor in Polyclito supra ceteros, cui quamquam a plerisque tribuitur palma, tamen, ne nihil detrahatur, deesse pondus putant.
VIII.

For Callon and Hegesias are harder and closest to the Tuscanic; Calamis is already less rigid; Myron made softer things yet than those aforesaid. Diligence and decor are in Polyclitus above the rest, to whom, although the palm is awarded by most, yet, lest nothing be detracted, they think weight is lacking.
8.

Nam ut humanae formae decorem addiderit supra verum, ita non explevisse deorum auctoritatem videtur. Quin aetatem quoque graviorem dicitur refugisse, nihil ausus ultra levis genas. At quae Polyclito defuerunt, Phidiae atque Alcameni dantur.

For just as he added to the beauty of the human form beyond the true, so he seems not to have fulfilled the authority of the gods. Indeed, he is said also to have shunned a graver age, daring nothing beyond smooth cheeks. But the things that were lacking to Polyclitus are given to Phidias and Alcamenes.

IX. Phidias tamen dis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex creditur, in ebore vero longe citra aemulum vel si nihil nisi Minervam Athenis aut Olympium in Elide Iovem fecisset, cuius pulchritudo adiecisse aliquid etiam receptae religioni videtur, adeo maiestas operis deum aequavit. Ad veritatem Lysippum ac Praxitelen accessisse optime adfirmant: nam Demetrius tamquam nimius in ea reprehenditur, et fuit similitudinis quam pulchritudinis amantior.
X. In oratione vero si species intueri velis, totidem paene reperias ingeniorum quot corporum formas.

9. Phidias, however, is believed to be a better artificer for making gods than men; and in ivory, indeed, far short of any rival—even if he had made nothing except the Minerva at Athens or the Olympian Jupiter in Elis—whose beauty seems to have added something even to the received religion, so greatly did the majesty of the work equal the god. They affirm most confidently that Lysippus and Praxiteles approached the truth: for Demetrius is blamed as excessive in it, and he was more a lover of similitude than of beauty.
10. In expression, indeed, if you wish to look upon the kinds, you will find almost as many varieties of talents as of forms of bodies.

Sed fuere quaedam genera dicendi condicione temporum horridiora, alioqui magnam iam ingenii vim prae se ferentia. Hinc sint Laelii, Africani, Catones etiam Gracchique, quos tu licet Polygnotos vel Callonas appelles. XI. Mediam illam formam teneant L. Crassus, Q. Hortensius.

But there were certain kinds of speaking made rougher by the condition of the times, otherwise already displaying great force of genius. Hence belong the Laelii, the Africanuses, the Catos, and even the Gracchi, whom you may call Polygnoti or Callones. 11. Let L. Crassus, Q. Hortensius hold that middle form.

tum deinde efflorescat non multum inter se distantium tempore oratorum ingens proventus. Hic vim Caesaris, indolem Caeli, subtilitatem Calidi, diligentiam Pollionis, dignitatem Messalae, sanctitatem Calvi, gravitatem Bruti, acumen sulpici, acerbitatem Cassi reperiemus: in iis etiam quos ipsi vidimus copiam Senecae, vires Africani, maturitatem Afri, iucunditatem Crispi, sonum Trachali, elegantiam Secundi.
XII.

then next there effloresces a huge harvest of orators not far distant from one another in time. Here we shall find the force of Caesar, the inborn nature of Caelius, the subtlety of Calidius, the diligence of Pollio, the dignity of Messalla, the sanctity of Calvus, the gravity of Brutus, the acumen of Sulpicius, the acerbity of Cassius: among those too whom we ourselves have seen, the copiousness of Seneca, the strengths of Africanus, the maturity of Afer, the pleasantness of Crispus, the sound of Trachalus, the elegance of Secundus.
12.

At M. tullium non illum habemus Euphranorem circa pluris artium species praestantem, sed in omnibus quae in quoque laudantur eminentissimum. Quem tamen et suorum homines temporum incessere audebant ut tumidiorem et Asianum et redundantem et in repetitionibus nimium et in salibus aliquando frigidum et in compositione fractum, exultantem ac paene, quod procul absit, viro molliorem:
XIII. postea vero quam triumvirali proscriptione consumptus est, passim qui oderant, qui invidebant, qui aemulabantur, adulatores etiam praesentis potentiae non responsurum invaserunt.

But we do not have M. Tullius as that Euphranor outstanding in several kinds of arts, but as most eminent in all the things which are praised in each man. Whom nevertheless even men of his own times dared to assail as more tumid and Asian and redundant, and too much in repetitions, and in sallies sometimes frigid, and in composition broken, exultant and almost—far be it—softer than a man:
13. afterwards indeed, after he was consumed by the triumviral proscription, everywhere those who hated, who envied, who rivaled, and even the flatterers of the present power, attacked one who would not answer.

Ille tamen qui ieiunus a quibusdam et aridus habetur non aliter ab ipsis inimicis male audire quam nimiis floribus et ingenii adfluentia potuit. Falsum utrumque: sit tamen illa mentiendi propior occasio.
XIV.

That man, however, who by some is held jejune and arid, could not be ill-spoken of by these very enemies otherwise than for excessive flowers and an affluence of genius. Both are false: yet the latter affords a nearer occasion for lying.
14.

Praecipue vero presserunt eum qui videri Atticorum imitatores concupierant. Haec manus quasi quibusdam sacris initiata ut alienigenam et parum superstitiosum devinctumque illis legibus insequebatur: unde nunc quoque aridi et exsuci et exsangues.
XV. Hi sunt enim qui suae inbecillitati sanitatis appellationem, quae est maxime contraria, optendant: qui quia clariorem vim eloquentiae velut solem ferre non possunt, umbra magni nominis delitescunt.

But most of all he was pressed by those who had longed to seem imitators of the Attics. This band, as if initiated into certain sacred rites, would pursue him as a foreigner and as not sufficiently superstitious, and as bound to those laws: whence even now they are arid and sapless and bloodless.
15. For these are they who drape the appellation of sanity—most contrary to their condition—over their own feebleness; who, because they cannot bear the brighter force of eloquence, like the sun, skulk in the shade of a great name.

Quibus quia multa et pluribus locis Cicero ipse respondit, tutior mihi de hoc disserendi brevitas erit.
XVI. Et antiqua quidem illa divisio inter Atticos atque Asianos fuit, cum hi pressi et integri, contra inflati illi et inanes haberentur, in his nihil superflueret, illis iudicium maxime ac modus deesset.

Since Cicero himself has answered these matters often and in several places, brevity of disserting about this will be safer for me.
16. And indeed that ancient division between the Attics and the Asians existed, when these were considered pressed and integral, whereas those were considered inflated and inane; in these nothing was superfluous, to those judgment especially and measure were lacking.

Quod quidam, quorum et Santra est, hoc putant accidisse, quod paulatim sermone Graeco in proximas Asiae civitates influente nondum satis periti loquendi facundiam concupierint, ideoque ea quae proprie signari poterant circumitu coeperint enuntiare ac deinde in eo perseverarint.
XVII. Mihi autem orationis differentiam fecisse et dicentium et audientium naturae videntur, quod Attici limati quidam et emuncti nihil inane aut redundans ferebant, Asiana gens tumidior alioqui atque iactantior vaniore etiam dicendi gloria inflata est.

Some, among whom is Santra, think that this happened: that, as the Greek speech gradually flowed into the neighboring cities of Asia, men not yet sufficiently skilled in speaking coveted eloquence, and therefore began to enunciate by circumlocution those things which could be properly signified, and thereafter persisted in this.
17. But to me the difference of oratory seems to have been made by the natures both of the speakers and the hearers, since the Attics, certain polished and cleansed, would tolerate nothing empty or redundant, whereas the Asiatic people, more swollen otherwise and more vaunting, was inflated even by a more vain glory of speaking.

XVIII. Tertium mox qui haec dividebant adiecerunt genus Rhodium, quod velut medium esse atque ex utroque mixtum volunt: neque enim Attice pressi neque Asiane sunt abundantes, ut aliquid habere videantur gentis, aliquid auctoris.
XIX.

18. Soon thereafter those who were dividing these added a third genus, the Rhodian, which they wish to be as it were a medium and mixed from both: for they are neither Attically pressed nor Asianly abundant, so that they seem to have something of the nation, something of the author.
19.

Aeschines enim, qui hunc exilio delegerat locum, intulit eo studia Athenarum, quae, velut sata quaedam caelo terraque degenerant, saporem illum Atticum peregrino miscuerunt. Lenti ergo quidam ac remissi, non sine pondere tamen, neque fontibus puris neque torrentibus turbidis sed lenibus stagnis similes habentur.
XX. Nemo igitur dubitaverit longe esse optimum genus Atticorum.

For Aeschines, who had chosen this place for his exile, brought into it the studies of Athens, which, like certain sowings that degenerate by sky and soil, mixed that Attic savor with what is foreign. Some therefore are slow and relaxed, yet not without weight, and are regarded as like not pure springs nor turbid torrents but gentle pools.
20. Let no one, therefore, doubt that by far the best kind is the Attic.

In quo ut est aliquid inter ipsos commune, id est iudicium acre tersumque, ita ingeniorum plurimae formae.
XXI. Quapropter mihi falli multum videntur qui solos esse Atticos credunt tenuis et lucidos et significantis sed quadam eloquentiae frugalitate contentos ac semper manum intra pallium continentis.

In which, although there is something common among them, that is, a sharp and terse judgment, yet there are very many forms of genius.
21. Wherefore they seem to me to err greatly who believe that the Attics alone are slender, lucid, and significant—content with a certain frugality of eloquence, and always keeping the hand within the cloak.

Nam quis erit hic Atticus? Sit Lysias; hunc enim amplectuntur amatores istius nominis modum: non igitur iam usque ad Coccum et Andociden remittemur.
XXII.

For who will this Attic be? Let it be Lysias; for lovers of that name embrace his manner: therefore we shall not now be referred all the way to Coccus and Andocides.
22.

Interrogare tamen velim an Isocrates Attice dixerit: nihil enim tam est Lysiae diversum. Negabunt: at eius schola principes oratorum dedit. Quaeratur similius aliquid: Hyperides Atticus?

Yet I would like to interrogate whether Isocrates spoke Attically: for nothing is so diverse from Lysias. They will deny it: but his school produced the princes of orators. Let something more similar be sought: Hyperides Attic?

"Certe". At plus indulsit voluptati. Transeo plurimos, Lycurgum, Aristogitona et his priores Isaeum, Antiphonta: quos ut homines inter se genere similes, differentis dixeris specie.
XXIII.

"Certainly." But he gave a greater indulgence to pleasure. I pass over very many—Lycurgus, Aristogiton, and, prior to these, Isaeus, Antiphon: whom you would call, as men, similar to one another in genus, differing in species.
23.

Quid ille cuius modo fecimus mentionem Aeschines? nonne his latior et audentior et excelsior? Quid denique Demosthenes?

What of Aeschines, whom we just made mention of? Is he not broader and bolder and loftier than these? What, finally, of Demosthenes?

non cunctos illos tenues et circumspectos vi sublimitate impetu cultu compositione superavit? non insurgit locis? non figuris gaudet?

did he not surpass all those, slender and circumspect, by force, by sublimity, by impetus, by polish, by composition? does he not rise in his passages? does he not rejoice in figures?

non tralationibus nitet?
XXIV. non oratione ficta dat tacentibus vocem?

does he not shine by metaphors?
24. does he not, with fictive oration, give a voice to the silent?

non illud ius iurandum per caesos in Marathone ac Salamine propugnatores rei publicae satis manifesto docet praeceptorem eius Platonem fuisse? Quem ipsum num Asianum appellabimus plerumque instinctis divino spiritu vatibus comparandum? Quid Periclea?

Does not that sworn oath over the defenders of the commonwealth cut down at Marathon and at Salamis teach quite manifestly that his preceptor was Plato? Shall we call him himself “Asiatic,” to be compared for the most part with vatic poets inspired by a divine spirit? What of the Periclean orations?

similemne credemus Lysiacae gracilitati quem fulminibus et caelesti fragori comparant comici dum illi conviciantur?
XXV. Quid est igitur cur in iis demum qui tenui venula per calculos fluunt Atticum saporem putent, ibi demum thymum redolere dicant?

Shall we believe him similar to Lysian gracility, whom the comic poets, while railing at him, compare to thunderbolts and celestial din?
25. What, then, is the reason why they think Attic savor is found only in those who flow by a thin little vein through pebbles, and say that only there it smells of thyme?

Quos ego existimo si quod in iis finibus uberius invenerint solum fertilioremve segetem negaturos Atticam esse quod plus quam acceperit seminis reddat (quia hanc eius terrae fidem Menander eludit).
XXVI. Ita nunc si quis ad eas Demosthenis virtutes quas ille summus orator habuit +tamen+ quae defuisse ei sive ipsius natura seu lege civitatis videntur adiecerit, ut adfectus concitatius moveat, audiam dicentem "non fecit hoc Demosthenes"? Et si quid numeris exierit aptius (fortasse non possit, sed tamen si quid exierit), non erit Atticum? Melius de hoc nomine sentiant, credantque Attice dicere esse optime dicere.

Those men, I reckon, if within those bounds they should find any soil more exuberant or a crop more fertile, will deny it to be Attic on the ground that it returns more seed than it has received (for Menander makes sport of this repute of that land).
26. Thus now, if someone, to those virtues of Demosthenes which that greatest orator possessed, should add +yet+ the things which seem to have been lacking to him, whether by his own nature or by the law of the city, so that he may move the affections more stirredly, am I to hear someone saying, “Demosthenes did not do this”? And if anything should come out more apt in numbers (rhythms) (perhaps it cannot, yet if anything should come out), will it not be Attic? Let them think better about this name, and let them believe that to speak Attically is to speak optimally.

XXVII. Atque in hac tamen opinione perseverantis Graecos magis tulerim: Latina mihi facundia, ut inventione dispositione consilio, ceteris huius generis artibus, similis Graecae ac prorsus discipula eius videtur, ita circa rationem eloquendi vix habere imitationis locum. Namque est ipsis statim sonis durior, quando et iucundissimas ex Graecis litteras non habemus (vocalem alteram, alteram consonantem, quibus nullae apud eos dulcius spirant: quas mutuari solemus quotiens illorum nominibus utimur;
XXVIII.

27. And yet in this opinion I would rather tolerate the Greeks persevering: Latin eloquence, as to invention, disposition, counsel, and the other arts of this kind, seems similar to the Greek and outright its disciple, yet as regards the method of speaking it scarcely has a place for imitation. For it is harsher straightaway in the very sounds, since also we do not have the most agreeable among the Greek letters (one vowel, another consonant, by which none among them breathe more sweetly: which we are accustomed to borrow whenever we use their names;
28.

quod cum contingit, nescio quo modo velut hilarior protinus renidet oratio, ut in "Zephyris" et "Zopyris": quae si nostris litteris scribantur, surdum quiddam et barbarum efficient) et velut in locum earum succedunt tristes et horridae, quibus Graecia caret.
XXIX. Nam et illa quae est sexta nostrarum paene non humana voce, vel omnino non voce potius, inter discrimina dentium efflanda est: quae etiam cum vocalem proxima accipit quassa quodam modo, utique quotiens aliquam consonantium frangit, ut in hoc ipso "frangit", multo fit horridior; Aeolicae quoque litterae, qua "servum" "cervum"que dicimus, etiam si forma a nobis repudiata est, vis tamen nos ipsa persequitur.

when this happens, somehow the oration straightway beams as if more cheerful, as in “Zephyris” and “Zopyris”: which, if they are written with our letters, will produce something dull and barbarous), and as it were in their place there step in sad and horrid ones, which Greece lacks.
29. For even that letter which is the sixth of ours must be breathed out between the intervals of the teeth, almost not with a human voice, or rather not with a voice at all: which also, when it has a vowel next to it, is in a certain way shaken, especially whenever it breaks one of the consonants, as in this very “frangit,” it becomes much more horrid; and the Aeolic letter too, by which we say “servum” and “cervum,” even if the form has been repudiated by us, yet the force itself pursues us.

XXX. duras et illa syllabas facit quae ad coniungendas demum subiectas sibi vocalis est utilis, alias supervacua: "equos" hac et "aequum" scribimus, cum etiam ipsae hae vocales duae efficiant sonum qualis apud Graecos nullus est ideoque scribi illorum litteris non potest.
XXXI.

30. that one also makes hard syllables, the vowel which is useful only for conjoining to itself the vowels set beneath it, otherwise superfluous: we write “equos” and “aequum” with this, since even these two vowels themselves produce a sound such as there is none among the Greeks and therefore cannot be written with their letters.
31.

Quid quod pleraque nos illa quasi mugiente littera cludimus, in quam nullum Graece verbum cadit? At illi ny iucundam et in fine praecipue quasi tinnientem illius loco ponunt, quae est apud nos rarissima in clausulis.
XXXII.

What of the fact that we close very many words with that, as it were, mooing letter, into which no Greek word falls? But they put ny, agreeable and especially at the end as if tinkling, in place of that, which with us is very rare in clausulae.
32.

Quid quod syllabae nostrae in b litteram et d innituntur adeo aspere ut plerique non antiquissimorum quidem sed tamen veterum mollire temptaverint, non solum "aversa" pro "abversis" dicendo, sed et in praepositione b litterae absonam et ipsam s subiciendo?
XXXIII. Sed accentus quoque cum rigore quodam, tum similitudine ipsa minus suaves habemus, quia ultima syllaba nec acuta umquam excitatur nec flexa circumducitur, sed in gravem vel duas gravis cadit semper.

What of the fact that our syllables lean upon the letters b and d so asperly that many—not indeed of the most ancient, yet still of the ancients—tried to mollify it, not only by saying "aversa" for "abversis," but also, in the preposition, by subjoining even the s, dissonant to the letter b itself?
33. But we have accents less suave, both from a certain rigor and from their very similitude, because the last syllable is never aroused with an acute nor led around with a circumflex, but always falls into a grave, or into two graves.

Itaque tanto est sermo Graecus Latino iucundior ut nostri poetae, quotiens dulce carmen esse voluerunt, illorum id nominibus exornent.
XXXIV. His illa potentiora, quod res plurimae carent appellationibus, ut eas necesse sit transferre aut circumire: etiam in iis quae denominata sunt summa paupertas in eadem nos frequentissime revolvit: at illis non verborum modo sed linguarum etiam inter se differentium copia est.

Therefore the Greek speech is so much more pleasant than the Latin that our poets, whenever they have wished a sweet song, adorn it with their names.
34. In these points the latter are more potent, because very many things lack appellations, so that it is necessary either to transfer them or to go around them by periphrasis: even in those which are denominated, the utmost poverty most frequently turns us back to the same ones: but for them there is copiousness not only of words but even of languages differing among themselves.

XXXV. Quare qui a Latinis exiget illam gratiam sermonis Attici, det mihi in loquendo eandem iucunditatem et parem copiam. Quod si negatum est, sententias aptabimus iis vocibus quas habemus, nec rerum nimiam tenuitatem, ut non dicam pinguioribus, fortioribus certe verbis miscebimus, ne virtus utraque pereat ipsa confusione:
XXXVI.

35. Wherefore whoever demands from the Latins that grace of Attic discourse, let him grant me in speaking the same pleasantness and an equal copia. But if that is denied, we shall adapt our sentences to the words we have, and we shall not mix an excessive tenuity of subject-matter, not to say with “fatter,” but certainly with stronger words, lest each virtue perish by the very confusion:
36.

nam quo minus adiuvat sermo, rerum inventione pugnandum est. Sensus sublimes variique eruantur: permovendi omnes adfectus erunt, oratio tralationum nitore inluminanda. Non possumus esse tam graciles, simus fortiores: subtilitate vincimur, valeamus pondere: proprietas penes illos est certior, copia vincamus.

For the less discourse aids, we must contend by the invention of things. Let lofty and various sentiments be unearthed; all affections must be thoroughly moved; the oration must be illuminated by the luster of metaphors. We cannot be so slender; let us be stronger: we are outdone in subtlety, let us prevail by weight: the surer propriety is with them, let us conquer by copiousness.

XXXVII. Ingenia Graecorum etiam minora suos portus habent, nos plerumque maioribus velis movemur: validior spiritus nostros sinus tendat. Non tamen alto semper feremur: nam et litora interim sequenda sunt.

37. Even the lesser talents of the Greeks have their own ports, we for the most part are moved with larger sails: let a more vigorous spirit stretch the bellies of our sails. Not, however, shall we always be borne upon the deep: for the shores too must meanwhile be followed.

Illis facilis per quaelibet vada accessus, ego aliquid, non multo tamen, altius in quo mea cumba non sidat inveniam.
XXXVIII. Neque enim, si tenuiora haec ac pressiora Graeci melius, in eoque vincimur solo et ideo in comoediis non contendimus, prorsus tamen omittenda pars haec orationis, sed exigenda ut optime possumus: possumus autem rerum et modo et iudicio esse similes, verborum gratia, quam in ipsis non habemus, extrinsecus condienda est.

To them there is easy access through whatever shallows; I will find something, not much, however, deeper, in which my skiff does not settle.
38. For neither, if the Greeks do these more tenuous and more compressed things better—and in that sole field we are conquered, and therefore we do not contend in comedies—must this part of oration by any means be altogether omitted, but rather exacted as best we can: moreover, we can be similar in matters and in mode and in judgment; the grace of words, which we do not have in the things themselves, must be seasoned from without.

XXXIX. An non in privatis et acutus et distinctus et non super modum elatus M. tullius? non in M. Calidio insignis haec virtus?

39. Or is not M. tullius in private cases both acute and distinct and not elevated beyond measure? Is not this virtue signal in M. Calidius?

non Scipio, Laelius, Cato in loquendo velut Attici Romanorum fuerunt? cui porro non satis est quo nihil esse melius potest?
XL. Adhuc quidam nullam esse naturalem putant eloquentiam nisi quae sit cotidiano sermoni simillima, quo cum amicis coniugibus liberis servis loquamur, contento promere animi voluntatem nihilque arcessiti et elaborati requirente: quidquid huc sit adiectum, id esse adfectationis et ambitiosae in loquendo iactantiae, remotum a veritate fictumque ipsorum gratia verborum, quibus solum natura sit officium attributum servire sensibus:
XLI.

were not Scipio, Laelius, Cato in speaking, as it were, the Attics among the Romans? and for whom, moreover, is that not sufficient, than which nothing can be better?
40. Further, some think there is no natural eloquence except that which is most similar to quotidian speech, with which we speak with friends, spouses, children, slaves, content to bring forth the will of the mind and requiring nothing fetched and elaborated: whatever is added to this, that is affectation and ambitious vaunting in speaking, removed from truth and feigned for the sake of the words themselves, to which alone nature has attributed the duty to serve the senses:
41.

sicut athletarum corpora, etiam si validiora fiant exercitatione et lege quadam ciborum, non tamen esse naturalia atque ab illa specie quae sit concessa hominibus abhorrere. Quid enim, inquiunt, attinet circumitu res ostendere et tralationibus, id est aut pluribus aut alienis verbis, cum sua cuique sint adsignata nomina?
XLII.

just as the bodies of athletes, even if they become stronger by exercise and by a certain regimen of foods, are nevertheless not natural and depart from that form which has been conceded to human beings. For what, they say, is the point of showing things by circumlocution and by transfers, that is, either with more words or with alien words, since to each thing its own names have been assigned?
42.

Denique antiquissimum quemque maxime secundum naturam dixisse contendunt: mox poetis similiores extitisse, etiam si parcius, simili tamen ratione falsa et inpropria pro virtute ducentis. Qua in disputatione nonnihil veri est, ideoque non tam procul quam fit a quibusdam recedendum a propriis atque communibus.
XLIII.

Finally, they contend that each of the most ancient spoke most according to nature: soon there arose men more similar to poets, even if more sparingly, yet by a similar rationale counting false and improper things as virtue. In which disputation there is not a little of truth, and therefore one should not recede so far as is done by some from the proper and the common.
43.

Si quis tamen, ut in loco dixi compositionis, ad necessaria, quibus nihil minus est, aliquid melius adiecerit, non erit hac calumnia reprendendus. Nam mihi aliam quandam videtur habere naturam sermo vulgaris, aliam viri eloquentis oratio: cui si res modo indicare satis esset, nihil ultra verborum proprietatem elaboraret: sed cum debeat delectare, movere, in plurimas animum audientis species inpellere, utetur his quoque adiutoriis quae sunt ab eadem nobis concessa natura:
XLIV. nam et lacertos exercitatione constringere et augere vires et colorem trahere naturale est.

If someone, however, as I said in the place on composition, should add something better to the necessaries—which are lacking in nothing—he will not be to be reprehended by this captiousness. For to me everyday speech seems to have one kind of nature, the oration of an eloquent man another: for whom, if it were enough merely to indicate the matter, he would not labor beyond the propriety of words; but since he ought to delight, to move, to impel the hearer’s mind into very many aspects, he will also use those auxiliaries which have been granted to us by the same nature:
44. for it is natural both to brace the muscles by exercise and to increase the strength and to take on color.

Ideoque in omnibus gentibus alius alio facundior habetur et loquendo dulcis magis (quod si non eveniret, omnes pares essent), et idem homines aliter de re alia locuntur et servant personarum discrimina. Ita, quo quisque plus efficit dicendo, hoc magis secundum naturam eloquentiae dicit.
XLV.

And therefore among all nations one is held more eloquent than another and sweeter in speaking (which, if it did not come to pass, all would be equal), and the same men speak differently about different matters and observe the distinctions of persons. Thus, the more each person accomplishes by speaking, by so much the more he speaks according to the nature of eloquence.
45.

Quapropter ne illis quidem nimium repugno qui dandum putant nonnihil esse temporibus atque auribus nitidius aliquid atque adfectius postulantibus. Itaque non solum ad priores Catone Gracchisque, sed ne ad hos quidem ipsos oratorem alligandum puto. Atque id fecisse M. tullium video, ut cum omnia utilitati, tum partem quandam delectationi daret, cum et suam se rem agere diceret, ageret autem maxime litigatoris: nam hoc ipso proderat, quod placebat.

Wherefore I do not even overly oppose those who think that something should be granted to the times and to the ears, when they demand something somewhat more polished and more affective. And so I think the orator ought to be bound not only to the earlier men, Cato and the Gracchi, but not even to these very men themselves. And I see that M. Tullius did this, in that, while he gave everything to utility, he nevertheless allotted a certain portion to delectation, since he would say that he was doing his own affair, while in fact he was most of all doing the litigant’s business: for by this very thing he was of benefit, that he pleased.

XLVI. Ad cuius voluptates nihil equidem quod addi possit invenio, nisi ut sensus nos quidem dicamus pluris: nempe enim fieri potest salva tractatione causae et dicendi auctoritate, si non crebra haec lumina et continua fuerint et invicem offecerint.
XLVII.

46. To whose delights I indeed find nothing that could be added, except that we might, for our part, say that the senses are to be valued more: for surely it can be done with the tractation of the case and the authority of speaking safe, if these lights be not frequent and continuous and do not hinder one another in turn.
47.

Sed me hactenus cedentem nemo insequatur ultra; do tempori, ne hirta toga sit, non ut serica, ne intonsum caput, non ut in gradus atque anulos comptum: cum eo quod, si non ad luxuriam ac libidinem referas, eadem speciosiora quoque sint quae honestiora.
XLVIII. Ceterum hoc, quod vulgo sententias vocamus, quod veteribus praecipueque Graecis in usu non fuit (apud Ciceronem enim invenio), dum rem contineant et copia non redundent et ad victoriam spectent quis utile neget?

But let no one pursue me, yielding thus far, further; I grant to the time, lest the toga be shaggy, not that it be silken; lest the head be unshorn, not that it be coiffed into tiers and rings: together with this fact, that, if you do not refer it to luxury and libido, the same things that are more honorable are also more comely.
48. Moreover, this which we commonly call “sentences”—which was not in use among the ancients, especially the Greeks (for I do find it in Cicero)—so long as they keep to the matter, do not overflow with copiousness, and look to victory, who would deny it to be useful?

Feriunt animum et uno ictu frequenter inpellunt et ipsa brevitate magis haerent et delectatione persuadent.
XLIX. At sunt qui haec excitatiora lumina, etiam si dicere permittant, a componendis tamen orationibus excludenda arbitrentur.

They strike the mind and often impel it with a single blow, and by their very brevity they stick the more, and by delectation they persuade.
49. But there are those who, even if they permit these more rousing lights to be spoken, nevertheless judge that they should be excluded from the composing of orations.

Quocirca mihi ne hic quidem locus intactus est omittendus: nam plurimi eruditorum aliam esse dicendi rationem, aliam scribendi putaverunt, ideoque in agendo clarissimos quosdam nihil posteritati mansurisque mox litteris reliquisse, ut Periclem, ut Demaden: rursus alios ad componendum optimos actionibus idoneos non fuisse, ut Isocraten;
L. praeterea in agendo plus impetus plerumque et petitas vel paulo licentius voluptates (commovendos enim esse ducendosque animos imperitorum): at quod libris dedicatum in exemplum edatur et tersum ac limatum et ad legem ac regulam compositum esse oportere, quia veniat in manus doctorum et iudices artis habeat artifices.
LI. Quin illi subtiles, ut sibi ac multis persuaserunt, magistri paradeigma dicendo, enthymema scribendo esse aptius tradiderunt. Mihi unum atque idem videtur bene dicere ac bene scribere, neque aliud esse oratio scripta quam monumentum actionis habitae; itaque non illas modo, ut opinor, debet habere virtutes * dico, non vitia: nam imperitis placere aliquando quae vitiosa sint scio.

Wherefore, not even this topic, in my judgment, should be left untouched: for very many of the learned have thought that the method of speaking is one thing, that of writing another, and therefore that in pleading some most illustrious men, like Pericles and Demades, left nothing to posterity that would remain in letters; conversely, that others, excellent for composing, were not suitable for actions, like Isocrates;
50. moreover, in pleading there is for the most part more impetus and pleasures sought perhaps a little more licentiously (for the minds of the unskilled are to be stirred and led): but what is published in books, dedicated as an exemplar, ought to be polished and filed and composed according to law and rule, because it comes into the hands of the learned and has craftsmen as judges of the art.
51. Nay, those subtle masters, as they persuaded themselves and many others, handed down that the paradeigma is more apt for speaking, the enthymema for writing. To me, to speak well and to write well seems one and the same, nor is a written oration anything other than a monument of a delivered action; and so it ought not only, as I think, to have those virtues — * I say, not vices: for I know that things which are faulty sometimes please the unskilled.

LII. Quo different igitur? Quod si mihi des consilium iudicum sapientium, perquam multa recidam ex orationibus non Ciceronis modo sed etiam eius qui est strictior multo, Demosthenis.

52. How, then, will they differ? For should you grant me the counsel of wise judges, I would cut away very many things from the orations not of Cicero only but even of him who is much stricter, Demosthenes.

Neque enim adfectus omnino movendi erunt nec aures delectatione mulcendae, cum etiam prohoemia supervacua esse apud talis Aristoteles existimet; non enim trahentur his illi sapientes: proprie et significanter rem indicare, probationes colligere satis est.
LIII. cum vero iudex detur aut populus aut ex populo laturique sententiam indocti saepius atque interim rustici, omnia quae ad optinendum quod intendimus prodesse credemus adhibenda sunt, eaque et cum dicimus promenda et cum scribimus ostendenda sunt, si modo ideo scribimus ut doceamus quo modo dici oporteat.

For neither must the affections be moved at all, nor the ears be soothed with delectation, since Aristotle even considers prooemia to be superfluous with such men; for those sages will not be drawn by these: to indicate the matter properly and significantly, to collect proofs is enough.
53. But when the judge is either the people or someone from the people, and those who are to deliver the sentence are more often unlearned and at times rustic, all things which we shall believe to be of profit for obtaining what we intend must be employed; and these must be put forward when we speak and displayed when we write, if only we write for this reason: to teach how it ought to be said.

LIV. An Demosthenes male sic egisset ut scripsit, aut Cicero? Aut eos praestantissimos oratores alia re quam scriptis cognoscimus?

54. Did Demosthenes act badly in thus pleading as he wrote, or Cicero? Or do we know those most preeminent orators by anything other than their writings?

Melius egerunt igitur an peius? Nam si peius, sic potius oportuit dici ut scripserunt, si melius, sic potius oportuit scribi ut dixerunt.
LV. Quid ergo?

Did they do better then, or worse? For if worse, it ought rather to have been said thus as they wrote; if better, it ought rather to have been written thus as they spoke.
55. What then?

semper sic aget orator ut scribet? Si licebit, semper. Sed erunt quae impediant brevitate tempora a iudice data: multum ex eo quod potuit dici recidetur, editio habebit omnia.

Will the orator always act thus as he writes? If it is permitted, always. But there will be things to impede—namely, the brevity of the time allotted by the judge: much from that which could have been said will be cut off; the edition will contain everything.

Quaedam secundum naturam iudicantium dicta sunt: non ita posteris tradentur, ne videantur propositi fuisse, non temporis.
LVI. Nam id quoque plurimum refert, quo modo audire iudex velit, atque "eius vultus saepe ipse rector est dicentis", ut Cicero praecipit.

Certain things are said according to the nature of the judges: they will not be transmitted to posterity in that way, lest they seem to have been of set purpose, not of the occasion.
56. For this too matters very much, in what manner the judge wishes to listen, and “his countenance is often itself the guide of the speaker,” as Cicero prescribes.

Ideoque instandum iis quae placere intellexeris, resiliendum ab iis quae non recipientur. Sermo ipse qui facillime iudicem doceat aptandus; nec id mirum sit, cum etiam testium personis aliqua mutentur.
LVII.

Therefore one must insist on those things which you have understood to please, and resile from those which will not be received. The sermon/discourse itself, which may most easily teach the judge, must be adapted; nor let that be a wonder, since even certain things are changed according to the persons of the witnesses.
57.

Prudenter enim qui, cum interrogasset rusticum testem an Amphionem nosset, negante eo detraxit adspirationem breviavitque secundam eius nominis syllabam, et ille eum sic optime norat. Huius modi casus efficient ut aliquando dicatur aliter quam scribitur, cum dicere quo modo scribendum est non licet.
LVIII.

For wisely did the man who, when he had questioned a rustic witness whether he knew Amphion, and the fellow denied it, remove the aspiration and shorten the second syllable of that name, and thus he knew him very well. Cases of this kind will effect that sometimes it is spoken otherwise than it is written, since it is not permitted to speak in the way in which it must be written.
58.

Altera est divisio, quae in tris partis et ipsa discedit, qua discerni posse etiam recta dicendi genera inter se videntur. Namque unum subtile, quod ischnon vocant, alterum grande atque robustum, quod hadron dicunt, constituunt, tertium alii medium ex duobus, alii floridum (namque id antheron appellant) addiderunt.
LIX.

Another division is one which itself splits into three parts, by which even the correct kinds of speaking seem able to be distinguished from one another. For they constitute one subtle, which they call ischnon; another grand and robust, which they call hadron; a third some have added as the mean from the two, others as florid (for they call that antheron).
59.

Quorum tamen ea fere ratio est, ut primum docendi, secundum movendi, tertium illud, utrocumque est nomine, delectandi sive, ut alii dicunt, conciliandi praestare videatur officium, in docendo autem acumen, in conciliando lenitas, in movendo vis exigi videatur. Itaque illo subtili praecipue ratio narrandi probandique consistet, estque id etiam detractis ceteris virtutibus suo genere plenum.
LX. Medius hic modus et tralationibus crebrior et figuris erit iucundior, egressionibus amoenus, compositione aptus, sententiis dulcis, lenior tamquam amnis et lucidus quidem sed virentibus utrimque ripis inumbratus.

Of which, however, the tenor is roughly this: that the first seems to perform the office of teaching, the second of moving, the third, whatever its name, of delighting or, as others say, of conciliating; and in teaching acumen, in conciliating lenity, in moving force seems to be required. And so in that subtle style especially will the method of narrating and proving consist, and that, even with the other virtues detracted, is in its own kind full.
60. This middle mode will be more crowded with translations and more pleasant with figures, agreeable with egressions, apt in composition, sweet in sentences, gentler like a river and indeed lucid, but shaded by green banks on both sides.

LXI. At ille qui saxa devolvat et "pontem indignetur" et ripas sibi faciat multus et torrens iudicem vel nitentem contra feret, cogetque ire qua rapiet. Hic orator et defunctos excitabit ut Appium Caecum, apud hunc et patria ipsa exclamabit, aliquandoque * +Ciceronem in oratione contra Catilinam in senatu+ adloquetur.

61. But he who rolls down rocks and “disdains the bridge” and makes banks for himself, copious and torrential, will carry off the judge even though he strive against him, and will force him to go where he sweeps him. This orator will even rouse the defunct, as Appius the Blind; with this man even the fatherland itself will cry out, and sometimes he will address * +Cicero in the speech against Catiline in the senate+.

LXII. Hic et amplificationibus extollet orationem et in supralationem quoque erigetur: "quae Charybdis tam vorax?" et "Oceanus medius fidius ipse": nota sunt enim etiam studiosis haec lumina. Hic deos ipsos in congressum prope suum sermonemque deducet: "vos enim Albani tumuli atque luci, vos, inquam, Albanorum obrutae arae, sacrorum populi Romani sociae et aequales." Hic iram, hic misericordiam inspirabit: hoc dicente iudex pallebit et flebit et per omnis adfectus tractus huc atque illuc sequetur nec doceri desiderabit.

62. Here too he will exalt the oration with amplifications and will even be lifted into hyperbole: "what Charybdis is so voracious?" and "by my faith, the Ocean itself"; for even to the studious these luminaries are well known. Here he will lead down the gods themselves almost into his own encounter and conversation: "for you, Alban mounds and groves, you, I say, the buried altars of the Albans, partners and equals of the rites of the Roman people." Here he will inspire anger, here pity: with this man speaking the judge will grow pale and will weep, and, drawn through all the passions, hither and thither he will follow, nor will he desire to be taught.

LXIII. Quare si ex tribus his generibus necessario sit eligendum unum, quis dubitet hoc praeferre omnibus, et validissimum alioqui et maximis quibusque causis accommodatissimum?
LXIV.

63. Therefore, if out of these three genera it is necessary that one be chosen, who would hesitate to prefer this to all, both the most potent otherwise and the most well-accommodated to the greatest causes whatsoever?
64.

Nam et Homerus brevem quidem cum iucunditate et propriam (id enim est non deerrare verbis) et carentem supervacuis eloquentiam Menelao dedit, quae sunt virtutes generis illius primi, et ex ore Nestoris dixit dulciorem melle profluere sermonem, qua certe delectatione nihil fingi maius potest: sed summam expressurus [est] in Vlixe facundiam et magnitudinem illi vocis et vim orationis nivibus [et] copia verborum atque impetu parem tribuit.
LXV. cum hoc igitur nemo mortalium contendet, hunc ut deum homines intuebuntur.

For Homer gave to Menelaus an eloquence that is brief indeed with pleasantness and proper (for that is not to stray with words) and lacking superfluities, which are the virtues of that first kind; and he said that from the mouth of Nestor discourse flowed sweeter than honey, than which certainly no greater delectation can be imagined: but, intending to express the summit of eloquence in Ulysses, he bestowed on him facundity and magnitude of voice and a force of oration equal to snowfalls and to a copiousness of words and to impetus.
65. therefore with this man no mortal will contend; men will gaze upon him as upon a god.

Hanc vim et celeritatem in Pericle miratur Eupolis, hanc fulminibus Aristophanes comparat, haec est vere dicendi facultas.
LXVI. Sed neque his tribus quasi formis inclusa eloquentia est.

This force and swiftness in Pericles Eupolis admires, this Aristophanes compares to thunderbolts; this is truly the faculty of speaking.
66. But eloquence is not confined within these three, as it were, forms.

Nam ut inter gracile validumque tertium aliquid constitutum est, ita horum intervalla sunt atque inter haec ipsa mixtum quiddam ex duobus medium est, quoniam et subtili plenius aliquid atque subtilius et vehementi remissius atque vehementius invenitur, ut illud lene aut ascendit ad fortiora aut ad tenuiora summittitur.
LXVII. Ac sic prope innumerabiles species reperiuntur, quae utique aliquo momento inter se differant: sicut quattuor ventos generaliter a totidem mundi cardinibus accepimus flare, cum interim plurimi medii et eorum varia nomina et quidam etiam regionum ac fluminum proprii deprehenduntur.

For just as between the gracile and the valid a third something is constituted, so there are intervals of these, and between these very ones there is a certain mixed thing, a middle from the two, since both in relation to the subtle something fuller and more subtle, and in relation to the vehement something more relaxed and more vehement is found, so that that smooth thing either ascends to the stronger or is let down to the more tenuous.
67. And thus well-nigh innumerable species are discovered, which in any case differ among themselves by some measure: just as we have received that four winds generally blow from as many cardinal points of the world, while meanwhile very many intermediate ones, and their various names, and certain even proper to regions and rivers, are observed.

LXVIII. Eademque musicis ratio est, qui cum in cithara quinque constituerunt sonos, plurima deinde varietate complent spatia illa nervorum, atque his [atque huc] quos interposuerant inserunt alios, ut pauci illi transitus multos gradus habeant.
LXIX.

68. And the same principle is with musicians: when on the cithara they have established five tones, then with very great variety they fill up those intervals of the strings, and among these [and here] which they had interposed they insert others, so that those few passages have many gradations.
69.

Plures igitur etiam eloquentiae facies, sed stultissimum quaerere ad quam se recturus sit orator, cum omnis species, quae modo recta est, habeat usum, atque id ipsum non sit oratoris quod vulgo genus dicendi vocant: utetur enim, ut res exiget, omnibus, nec pro causa modo sed pro partibus causae.
LXX. Nam ut non eodem modo pro reo capitis et in certamine hereditatis et de interdictis ac sponsionibus et de certa credita dicet, sententiarum quoque in senatu et contionum et privatorum consiliorum servabit discrimina, multa ex differentia personarum locorum temporumque mutabit: ita in eadem oratione aliter concitabit, aliter conciliabit, non ex isdem haustibus iram et misericordiam petet, alias ad docendum, alias ad movendum adhibebit artis.

Therefore there are more faces of eloquence too, but it is most foolish to ask to which one the orator should direct himself, since every species which is for the moment right has its use, and that very thing is not the orator’s which people commonly call a “genus of speaking”: for he will use all, as the matter shall require, and not only for the cause as a whole but for the parts of the cause.
70. For just as he will not speak in the same mode for a defendant in a capital case and in a contest over an inheritance and about interdicts and sponsions and about a specific debt, so too he will keep the discriminations of the votes in the senate, of assemblies, and of private councils, and he will change many things according to the difference of persons, places, and times: thus in the same oration he will in one way stir up, in another conciliate, he will not seek anger and pity from the same draughts, and at one time he will employ arts for teaching, at another for moving.

LXXI. Non unus color prohoemii narrationis argumentorum egressionis perorationis servabitur. Dicet idem graviter severe acriter vehementer concitate copiose amare, idem comiter remisse subtiliter blande leniter dulciter breviter urbane, non ubique similis sed ubique par sibI.

71. Not one color will be maintained for the proem, the narration, the arguments, the digression, the peroration. The same man will speak gravely, severely, sharply, vehemently, excitedly, copiously, bitterly, and likewise affably, mildly, subtly, winningly, gently, sweetly, briefly, urbanely, not everywhere similar but everywhere equal to himself.

LXXII. Sic fiet cum id propter quod maxime repertus est usus orationis, ut dicat utiliter et ad efficiendum quod intendit potenter, tum laudem quoque, nec doctorum modo sed etiam vulgi, consequatur.
LXXIII.

72. Thus it will come about that, since that for which the use of oration was chiefly discovered is this—to speak usefully and potently for effecting what he intends—he will also obtain praise, not of the learned only but even of the vulgar.
73.

Falluntur enim plurimum qui vitiosum et corruptum dicendi genus, quod aut verborum licentia exultat aut puerilibus sententiolis lascivit aut inmodico tumore turgescit aut inanibus locis bacchatur aut casuris si leviter excutiantur flosculis nitet aut praecipitia pro sublimibus habet aut specie libertatis insanit, magis existimant populare atque plausibile.
LXXIV. Quod quidem placere multis nec infitior nec miror: est enim iucunda res ac favorabilis qualiscumque eloquentia, et ducit animos naturali voluptate vox omnis, neque aliunde illi per fora atque aggerem circuli.

For they are very much mistaken who suppose that a vicious and corrupt genus of speaking—one which either exults in a license of words, or frolics with puerile little sententiae, or swells with immoderate tumor, or raves through empty places, or shines with little blossoms that would fall if they were lightly shaken, or takes precipices for sublimities, or goes mad under the appearance of liberty—to be more popular and plausible.
LXXIV. Which indeed to please many I neither deny nor wonder at: for eloquence of whatever sort is a pleasant and favorable thing, and every voice draws minds by a natural delight; nor do those circles about them through the fora and along the embankment arise from any other source.

Quo minus mirum est quod nulli non agentium parata vulgi corona est.
LXXV. Vbi vero quid exquisitius dictum accidit auribus imperitorum, qualecumque id est, quod modo se ipsi posse desperent, habet admirationem, neque inmerito: nam ne illud quidem facile est.

Hence it is all the less a marvel that a ring of the populace is ready for every performer.
75. But when something more exquisite said befalls the ears of the unskilled—whatever it is—provided only that they despair that they themselves can achieve it, it has their admiration, and not undeservedly: for not even that is easy.

Sed evanescunt haec atque emoriuntur comparatione meliorum, ut lana tincta fuco citra purpuras placet, "at si contuleris eam Lacaenae, conspectu melioris obruatur", ut Ovidius ait.
LXXVI. Si vero iudicium his corruptis acrius adhibeas ut fucinis sulphura, iam illum quo fefellerant exuant mentitum colorem et quadam vix enarrabili foeditate pallescant.

But these things vanish and die away by comparison with better things, as wool dyed with a mere stain pleases short of purples; “but if you compare it to the Laconian, let it be overwhelmed by the sight of the better,” as Ovid says.
76. But if you apply a sharper judgment to these corrupt things, as sulphur to cosmetic dyes, then they strip off that feigned color by which they had deceived, and grow pale with a certain scarcely describable foulness.

Lucent igitur haec citra solem et ut quaedam exigua animalia igniculi videntur in tenebris. Denique mala multi probant, nemo improbat bona.
LXXVII.

Therefore these shine without the sun, and, as certain minute animals, tiny fire-sparks, are seen in the darkness. Finally, many approve evils; no one disapproves goods.
77.

Neque vero omnia ista de quibus locuti sumus orator optime tantum sed etiam facillime faciet. Neque enim vim summam dicendi et os admiratione dignum infelix usque ad ultimum sollicitudo persequitur nec oratorem macerat et coquit aegre verba vertentem et perpendendis coagmentandisque eis intabescentem.
LXXVIII.

Nor indeed will the orator do all those things about which we have spoken not only very well but also very easily. For wretched solicitude does not pursue to the very end the supreme force of speaking and an utterance worthy of admiration, nor does it wear down and cook the orator, turning words with difficulty and wasting away in perpending and coagmenting them.
78.

Nitidus ille et sublimis et locuples circumfluentibus undique eloquentiae copiis imperat: desinit enim in adversa niti qui pervenit in summum. Scandenti circa ima labor est, ceterum quantum processeris, mollior clivus ac laetius solum.
LXXIX.

That man, polished and sublime and opulent, rules with the circumfluent resources of eloquence on every side: for he ceases to strive against adversities who has arrived at the summit. For the climber there is toil around the lower slopes; but the farther you have proceeded, the gentler the incline and the more cheerful the soil.
79.

Et si haec quoque iam lenius supina perseverantibus studiis evaseris, inde fructus inlaborati offerunt sese et omnia sponte proveniunt: quae tamen cotidie nisi decerpantur arescunt. Sed et copia habeat modum, sine quo nihil nec laudabile nec salutare est, et nitor ille cultum virilem et inventio iudicium.
LXXX.

And if you also have by persevering studies now escaped these gentler declivities, then unlabored fruits offer themselves and everything springs up spontaneously: which, however, unless they are plucked daily, wither. But let copiousness have a measure, without which nothing is either laudable or salutary, and let that polish have a virile cultivation and invention judgment.
80.

Sic erunt magna non nimia, sublimia non abrupta, fortia non temeraria, severa non tristia, gravia non tarda, laeta non luxuriosa, iucunda non dissoluta, grandia non tumida. Similis in ceteris ratio est ac tutissima fere per medium via, quia utriusque ultimum vitium est.

Thus things will be great not excessive, sublime not abrupt, brave not rash, severe not sad, grave not tardy, glad not luxurious, jocund not dissolute, grand not tumid. A similar reason holds in the rest, and the safest way is almost through the middle, because the extreme of either is a vice.

11
I. His dicendi virtutibus usus orator in iudiciis consiliis contionibus senatu, in omni denique officio boni civis, finem quoque dignum et optimo viro et opere sanctissimo faciet, non quia prodesse umquam satis sit et illa mente atque illa facultate praedito non optandum operis pulcherrimi quam longissimum tempus, sed quia decet hoc quoque prospicere, ne quid peius quam fecerit faciat.
II. Neque enim scientia modo constat orator, quae augetur annis, sed voce latere firmitate: quibus fractis aut inminutis aetate seu valetudine cavendum ne quid in oratore summo desideretur, ne intersistat fatigatus, ne quae dicet parum audiri sentiat, ne se quaerat priorem.
III.

11
1. Using these virtues of speaking, the orator, in courts, councils, assemblies, the senate—in short, in every office of a good citizen—will also make an end worthy both of the best man and of the most sacred work, not because it is ever enough to benefit, nor that for one endowed with that mind and that faculty the longest time for a most beautiful work is not to be desired, but because it is fitting to look ahead to this also, lest he do anything worse than what he has done.
2. For the orator does not consist in knowledge only, which is increased by years, but in voice, chest, and firmness; and when these are broken or diminished by age or by health, care must be taken lest anything be missing in the consummate orator—lest, wearied, he break off, lest he feel that what he says is too little heard, lest he seek his former self.
3.

Vidi ego longe omnium quos mihi cognoscere contigit summum oratorem Domitium Afrum valde senem cotidie aliquid ex ea quam meruerat auctoritate perdentem, cum agente illo quem principem fuisse quondam fori non erat dubium alii, quod indignum videatur, riderent, alii erubescerent: quae occasio +illo+ fuit dicendi malle eum deficere quam desinere.
IV. Neque erant illa qualiacumque mala, sed minora. Quare antequam in has aetatis veniat insidias, receptui canet et in portum integra nave perveniet.

I myself saw—by far the greatest orator of all whom it has befallen me to know—Domitius Afer, a very old man, daily losing something of that authority which he had merited; while he was pleading—he whom it was not in doubt had once been the princeps of the forum—some, as a thing that seems unworthy, laughed, others blushed: and this occasion was for him to say that he preferred to fail than to cease.
IV. Nor were those whatever sort of evils, but lesser ones. Wherefore, before he comes into these ambushes of age, he will sound the retreat and will reach harbor with his ship intact.

Neque enim minores eum cum id fecerit studiorum fructus prosequentur: aut ille monumenta rerum posteris aut, ut L. Crassus [aut] in libris Ciceronis destinat, iura quaerentibus reddet aut eloquentiae componet artem aut pulcherrimis vitae praeceptis dignum os dabit.
V. Frequentabunt vero eius domum optimi iuvenes more veterum et vere dicendi viam velut ex oraculo petent. Hos ille formabit quasi eloquentiae parens, et ut vetus gubernator litora et portus et quae tempestatium signa, quid secundis flatibus quid adversis ratio poscat docebit, non humanitatis solum communi ductus officio, sed amore quodam operis:
VI. nemo enim minui velit id in quo maximus fuit.

Nor indeed will lesser fruits of studies attend him when he has done this: either he will set up monuments of matters for posterity, or, as L. Crassus [or] as he purposes in the books of Cicero, he will render law to those seeking it, or he will compose the art of eloquence, or he will give a mouth worthy of the most beautiful precepts of life.
5. In truth, the best young men will frequent his house after the custom of the ancients, and will seek the way of speaking truly as if from an oracle. He will shape these, as a parent of eloquence, and, like an old helmsman, he will teach the shores and harbors and what are the signs of storms, what in fair winds and what in adverse the method requires, led not only by the common office of humanity, but by a certain love of the work:
6. for no one wishes that to be diminished in which he has been greatest.

Quid porro est honestius quam docere quod optime scias? Sic ad se Caelium deductum a patre Cicero profitetur, sic Pansam, Hirtium, Dolabellam ad morem praeceptoris exercuit cotidie dicens audiensque.
VII.

What moreover is more honorable than to teach what you know best? Thus Cicero professes that Caelius was conducted to him by his father; thus he trained Pansa, Hirtius, and Dolabella in the manner of a preceptor, daily speaking and listening.
7.

Ac nescio an eum tum beatissimum credi oporteat fore cum iam secretus et consecratus, liber invidia, procul contentionibus famam in tuto conlocarit et sentiet vivus eam quae post fata praestari magis solet [et] venerationem et quid apud posteros futurus sit videbit.
VIII. Conscius sum mihi, quantum mediocritate valui, quaeque antea scierim quaeque operis huiusce gratia potuerim inquirere candide me atque simpliciter in notitiam eorum, si qui forte cognoscere voluissent, protulisse.

And I do not know but that he ought then to be accounted most blessed, when, now withdrawn and consecrated, free from envy, far from contentions, he shall have placed his fame in safe-keeping, and alive he will feel that veneration which is more wont to be bestowed after death, [and] he will see what he is going to be among posterity.
8. I am conscious to myself that, so far as I have availed in mediocrity, both what I had previously known and what for the sake of this work I was able to inquire, I have brought forth candidly and simply into the knowledge of those who perchance might have wished to learn.

Atque id viro bono satis est, docuisse quod scierit.
IX. Vereor tamen ne aut magna nimium videar exigere, qui eundem virum bonum esse et dicendi peritum velim, aut multa, qui tot artibus in pueritia discendis morum quoque praecepta et scientiam iuris civilis praeter ea quae de eloquentia tradebantur adiecerim, quique haec operi nostro necessaria esse crediderint velut moram rei perhorrescant et desperent ante experimentum.
X. [tu] Qui primum renuntient sibi quanta sit humani ingenii vis, quam potens efficiendi quae velit, cum maria transire, siderum cursus numerosque cognoscere, mundum ipsum paene dimetiri minores sed difficiliores artes potuerint.

And that is enough for a good man: to have taught what he knew.
9. Yet I fear lest I may seem either to exact too great things—since I would have the same man be both a good man and skilled in speaking—or too many things—since to the so many arts to be learned in boyhood I have added the precepts of morals as well and the knowledge of civil law, besides those that were handed down concerning eloquence—and that those who shall have believed these to be necessary to our work shudder at them as a delay of the matter and despair before an experiment.
10. [you] Let them first report back to themselves how great is the force of human ingenuity, how potent for effecting what it wills, since lesser but more difficult arts have been able to cross the seas, to learn the courses and numbers of the stars, to measure almost the world itself.

tum cogitent quantam rem petant quamque nullus sit hoc proposito praemio labor recusandus.
XI. Quod si mente conceperint, huic quoque parti facilius accedent, ut ipsum iter neque inpervium neque saltem durum putent. Nam id quod prius quodque maius est, ut boni viri simus, voluntate maxime constat: quam qui vera fide induerit, facile eas idem quae virtutem docent artis accipiet.

then let them consider what a great thing they seek, and that no labor is to be refused with this prize set before them.
11. But if they have conceived this in mind, they will more easily approach this part too, so that they consider the very journey neither impassable nor even hard. For the thing which is prior and greater—that we be good men—depends chiefly on will: which whoever shall have assumed with true faith will readily receive the same disciplines that teach virtue.

XII. Neque enim aut tam perplexa aut tam numerosa sunt quae +praemuntur+ ut non paucorum admodum annorum intentione discantur. Longam [in] eam facit operam quod repugnamus: brevis est institutio vitae honestae beataeque, si credas; natura enim nos ad mentem optimam genuit, adeoque discere meliora volentibus promptum est ut vere intuenti mirum sit illud magis, malos esse tam multos.

12. For the things that are put forward are neither so perplexing nor so numerous that they may not be learned by the concentrated application of very few years. What makes the effort toward it long is that we resist: the instruction of an honorable and happy life is brief, if you will believe it; for nature begot us for the best mind, and to such a degree is it prompt for those willing to learn better things that, to one truly looking, it is rather a marvel that there are so many wicked people.

XIII. Nam ut aqua piscibus, ut sicca terrenis, circumfusus nobis spiritus volucribus convenit, ita certe facilius esse oportebat secundum naturam quam contra eam vivere. Cetera vero, etiam si aetatem nostram non spatio senectutis sed tempore adulescentiae metiamur, abunde multos ad discendum annos habent: omnia enim breviora reddet ordo et ratio et modus.

13. For as water suits fishes, as the dry suits terrestrial creatures, and the surrounding spirit (air) suits birds, so surely it ought to be easier to live according to nature than against it. As for the rest, even if we measure our age not by the span of old age but by the time of adolescence, they have abundantly many years for learning: for order and reason and measure will render all things briefer.

XIV. Sed culpa est in praeceptoribus prima, qui libenter detinent quos occupaverunt, partim cupiditate diutius exigendi mercedulas, partim ambitione, quo difficilius videatur esse quod pollicentur, partim etiam inscientia tradendi vel neglegentia: proxima in nobis, qui morari in eo quod novimus quam discere quae nondum scimus melius putamus.
XV. Nam ut de nostris potissimum studiis dicam, quid attinet tam multis annis quam in more est plurimorum, ut de iis a quibus magna in hoc pars aetatis absumitur taceam, declamitare in schola et tantum laboris in rebus falsis consumere, cum satis sit modico tempore imaginem veri discriminis et dicendi leges comperisse?

14. But the first fault is in the preceptors, who readily detain those whom they have seized, partly from the greed of exacting their little fees for a longer time, partly from ambition, so that what they promise may seem more difficult, partly also from ignorance of teaching or from negligence; the next is in us, who think it better to linger in what we know than to learn what we do not yet know.
15. For, to speak chiefly of our own studies, what is the use—so many years as is the custom of the majority (to say nothing of those by whom a great part of life is consumed in this)—of declaiming in the school and spending so much toil on fictitious matters, when it is enough, in a moderate time, to have learned the likeness of the true issue and the laws of speaking?

XVI. Quod non eo dico quia sit umquam omittenda dicendi exercitatio, sed quia non in una sit eius specie consenescendum. * cognoscere et praecepta vivendi perdiscere et in foro nos experiri potuimus dum scholastici sumus.

16. I do not say this for the reason that the exercise of speaking ought ever to be omitted, but because one ought not to grow old in a single species of it. * to come to know and to learn thoroughly the precepts of living, and to try ourselves in the forum, we have been able while we are students.

Discendi ratio talis ut non multos poscat annos: quaelibet enim ex iis partibus quarum habui mentionem in paucos libros contrahi solet, adeo non est infinito spatio ad traditionem opus. Reliqua est exercitatio, quae vires cito facit, cum fecit tuetur.
XVII.

The method of learning is such that it does not require many years: for each of those parts of which I have made mention is wont to be compressed into a few books, so that there is no need of an infinite span for instruction. What remains is practice, which quickly produces ability and, once it has produced it, preserves it.
17.

Rerum cognitio cotidie crescit; et tamen quam multorum ad eam librorum necessaria lectio est, quibus aut rerum exempla ab historicis aut dicendi ab oratoribus petuntur, philosophorum quoque consultorumque opiniones, si utilia velimus legere, non, quod ne fieri quidem potest, omnia.
XVIII. Sed breve nobis tempus nos fecimus: quantulum enim studiis partimur?

The cognition of things grows quotidianly; and yet how necessary to it is the reading of very many books, from which either examples of matters are sought from historians or of speaking from orators, and the opinions of philosophers and jurisconsults as well—if we wish to read what is useful, not, since it cannot even be done, everything.
18. But we have made our time brief for ourselves: how little, indeed, do we apportion to studies?

Alias horas vanus salutandi labor, alias datum fabulis otium, alias spectacula, alias convivia trahunt. Adice tot genera ludendi et insanam corporis curam, peregrinationes, rura, calculorum anxiam sollicitudinem, invitamenta libidinum et vinum et fractis omni genere voluptatum animis ne ea quidem tempora idonea quae supersunt.
XIX.

At one time the vain labor of paying salutations drags away hours, at another leisure given to stories, at another spectacles, at another banquets. Add so many kinds of playing and the insane care of the body, peregrinations, rural retreats, the anxious solicitude of calculations, the enticements of lusts and wine; and, with minds broken by every sort of pleasures, not even the times which remain are suitable.
19.

Quae si omnia studiis inpenderentur, iam nobis longa aetas et abunde satis ad discendum spatii videretur vel diurna tantum computantibus tempora, ut nihil noctes, quarum bona pars omni somno longior est, adiuvarent. Nunc computamus annos non quibus studuimus sed quibus viximus.
XX. Nec vero si geometrae et musici et grammatici ceterarumque artium professores omnem suam vitam, quamlibet longa fuerit, in singulis artibus consumpserunt, sequitur ut pluris quasdam vitas ad plura discenda desideremus.

Which things, if all were expended upon studies, already a long lifetime would seem to us, and abundantly sufficient space for learning, even to those computing only the daytime hours, so that the nights, a good part of which is longer than any sleep, would not even help. Now we compute the years not in which we studied but in which we lived.
20. Nor indeed, if geometers and musicians and grammarians and the professors of the other arts have consumed their whole life, however long it has been, upon individual arts, does it follow that we should desire several lives for learning more things.

Neque enim illi didicerunt haec usque in senectutem, sed ea sola didicisse contenti fuerunt ac tot annos non in percipiendo exhauserunt sed in praecipiendo.
XXI. Ceterum, ut de Homero taceam, in quo nullius non artis aut opera perfecta aut certe non dubia vestigia reperiuntur, ut Elium Hippian transeam, qui non liberalium modo disciplinarum prae se scientiam tulit, sed vestem et anulum crepidasque quae omnia manu sua fecerat in usu habuit, atque ita se praeparavit ne cuius alterius ope egeret: inlusisse tot malis quot summa senectus habet universae Graeciae credimus Gorgian, qui quaerere auditores de quo quisque vellet iubebat.

For they did not learn these things all the way into old age, but were content to have learned those alone, and they did not exhaust so many years in receiving but in giving precepts.
21. Moreover—to be silent about Homer, in whom either perfected works of every art, or at least unmistakable vestiges, are found; to pass over Hippias of Elis, who not only paraded before himself knowledge of the liberal disciplines, but had in use a garment and a ring and sandals—all of which he had made with his own hand—and so prepared himself that he needed the aid of no one else: we believe that Gorgias made sport of as many ills as extreme old age has, before all Greece, he who used to bid his auditors to ask him about whatever each one wished.

XXII. Quae tandem ars digna litteris Platoni defuit? Quot saeculis Aristoteles didicit ut non solum quae ad philosophos atque oratores pertinent scientia complecteretur, sed animalium satorumque naturas omnis perquireret?

22. What art, worthy of letters, pray, was lacking to Plato? For how many ages did Aristotle learn, so that he might not only encompass by science the things that pertain to philosophers and orators, but also investigate the natures of all animals and of things sown?

Illis haec invenienda fuerunt, nobis cognoscenda sunt. Tot nos praeceptoribus, tot exemplis instruxit antiquitas, ut possit videri nulla sorte nascendi aetas felicior quam nostra, cui docendae priores elaborarunt.
XXIII.

For them these things had to be discovered; for us they are to be learned. Antiquity has furnished us with so many preceptors, so many examples, that it can seem that no age, by the lot of being born, is happier than our own, for whose teaching our predecessors have labored.
23.

M. igitur Cato, idem summus imperator, idem sapiens, idem orator, idem historiae conditor, idem iuris, idem rerum rusticarum peritissimus fuit; inter tot operas militiae, tantas domi contentiones rudi saeculo litteras Graecas aetate iam declinata didicit, ut esset hominibus documento ea quoque percipi posse quae senes concupissent.
XXIV. Quam multa, paene omnia tradidit Varro!

Marcus Cato, therefore, was at once a supreme commander, a wise man, an orator, an author of history, a jurist, and most expert in rustic affairs; amid so many labors of military service, amid such great contentions at home, in a rude age he learned Greek letters when his age was already in decline, so that he might be for people a proof that even those things too can be grasped which old men had desired.
24. How many things—almost everything—did Varro hand down!

Quod instrumentum dicendi M. tullio defuit? Quid plura? cum etiam Cornelius Celsus, mediocri vir ingenio, non solum de his omnibus conscripserit artibus, sed amplius rei militaris et rusticae et medicinae praecepta reliquerit, dignus vel ipso proposito ut eum scisse omnia illa credamus.

What instrument of speaking was lacking to M. tullius? What more? since even Cornelius Celsus, a man of middling talent, not only has written about all these arts, but in addition has left precepts of military and rustic (agricultural) affairs and of medicine, worthy even by his very purpose that we should believe him to have known all those things.

XXVI. At perficere tantum opus arduum, et nemo perfecit. Ante omnia sufficit ad exhortationem studiorum capere id rerum naturam, nec quidquid non est factum ne fieri quidem posse, cum omnia quae magna sunt atque admirabilia tempus aliquod quo primum efficerentur habuissent:
XXVI.

26. But to perfect so great a work is arduous, and no one has perfected it. Before all, it suffices for the exhortation of studies to apprehend this of the nature of things: that not whatever has not been done is therefore not even able to be done, since all things which are great and admirable have had some time at which they were first effected:
26.

nam et poesis ab Homero et Vergilio tantum fastigium accepit et eloquentia a Demosthene atque Cicerone, denique quidquid est optimum ante non fuerat. Verum etiam si qui summa desperet (quod cur faciat cui ingenium valetudo facultas praeceptores non deerunt?), tamen est, ut Cicero ait, pulchrum in secundis tertiisque consistere.
XXVII.

for both poetry received so great a pinnacle from Homer and Vergil, and eloquence from Demosthenes and Cicero; in fine, whatever is best had not existed before. But even if someone should despair of the highest (why should he do so, for whom talent, health, resources, and teachers will not be lacking?), still, as Cicero says, it is beautiful to take one’s stand in second and even third places.
27.

Neque enim si quis Achillis gloriam in rebus bellicis consequi non potest, Aiacis aut Diomedis laudem aspernabitur, nec qui Homeri non fuerunt * Quin immo si hanc cogitationem homines habuissent, ut nemo se meliorem fore eo qui optimus fuisset arbitraretur, ii ipsi qui sunt optimi non fuissent, nec post Lucretium ac Macrum Vergilius nec post Crassum et Hortensium Cicero, sed nec illi qui post eos fuerunt.
XXVIII. Verum ut transeundi spes non sit, magna tamen est dignitas subsequendi.

For neither, if someone cannot attain the glory of Achilles in military matters, will he spurn the praise of an Ajax or a Diomedes; nor those who have not been Homers* Nay rather, if men had held this thought—that no one should deem himself about to be better than him who has been the best—those very men who are best would not have been, nor Vergil after Lucretius and Macer, nor Cicero after Crassus and Hortensius, nor yet those who were after them.
28. But even if there be no hope of surpassing, nevertheless great is the dignity of following close.

An Pollio et Messala, qui iam Cicerone arcem tenente eloquentiae agere coeperunt, parum in vita dignitatis habuerunt, parum ad posteros gloriae tradiderunt? Alioqui pessime de rebus humanis perductae in summum artes mererentur, si quod optimum, idem ultimum fuisset.
XXIX.

Or did Pollio and Messala, who, with Cicero already holding the citadel of eloquence, began to plead, have too little dignity in life, did they hand down too little glory to posterity? Otherwise the arts, brought to the summit, would deserve the worst of human affairs, if what was best had been the same as what was last.
29.

Adde quod magnos modica quoque eloquentia parit fructus, ac si quis haec studia utilitate sola metiatur, paene illi perfectae par est. Neque erat difficile vel veteribus vel novis exemplis palam facere non abunde maiores opes honores amicitias, laudem praesentem futuram hominibus contigisse, nisi indignum litteris esset ab opere pulcherrimo, cuius tractatus atque ipsa possessio plenissimam studiis gratiam refert, hanc minorem exigere mercedem, more eorum qui a se non virtutes sed voluptatem quae fit ex virtutibus peti dicunt.
XXX.

Add, moreover, that even moderate eloquence begets great fruits, and if someone measures these pursuits by utility alone, it is almost equal to the perfect. Nor would it be difficult, by either old or new examples, to make it plain that greater wealth, honors, friendships, present and future praise have very abundantly befallen men—unless it were unworthy of letters, from a most beautiful work, the handling and the very possession of which brings back to studies the fullest grace, to exact this lesser wage, after the manner of those who say that from themselves there are sought not virtues but the pleasure that arises from virtues.
30.

Ipsam igitur orandi maiestatem, qua nihil di inmortales melius homini dederunt et qua remota muta sunt omnia et luce praesenti ac memoria posteritatis carent, toto animo petamus, nitamurque semper ad optima, quod facientes aut evademus in summum aut certe multos infra nos videbimus.
XXXI. Haec erant, Marcelle Vitori, quibus praecepta dicendi pro virili parte adiuvari posse per nos videbantur, quorum cognitio studiosis iuvenibus si non magnam utilitatem adferet, at certe, quod magis petimus, bonam voluntatem.

Therefore let us seek with our whole soul the very majesty of oratory, than which the immortal gods have given nothing better to man, and without which all things are mute and lack present light and the memory of posterity; and let us strive always toward the best, and by doing so we shall either come out at the summit, or at least we shall see many beneath us.
31. These were, Marcelle Vitori, the things by which the precepts of speaking seemed to us able, on our part, to be aided to the extent of our powers; the knowledge of which, if it brings not great utility to studious youths, yet certainly—what we seek more—good will.