Caesar•LIBRI INCERTORUM AUCTORUM
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[1] Pharnace superato, Africa recepta, qui ex his proeliis cum adulescente Cn. Pompeio profugissent, cum … et ulterioris Hispaniae potitus esset, dum Caesar muneribus dandis in Italia detinetur, … quo facilius praesidia contra compararet, Pompeius in fidem uniuscuiusque civitatis confugere coepit. Ita partim precibus partim vi bene magna comparata manu provinciam vastare. Quibus in rebus non nullae civitates sua sponte auxilia mittebant, item non nullae portas contra cludebant.
[1] Pharnaces having been overcome, Africa having been recovered, those who from these battles had fled with the young Gnaeus Pompeius, when … and he had gotten possession of Further Spain, while Caesar is detained in Italy by the giving of munera, … in order that he might more easily procure garrisons in opposition, Pompeius began to take refuge in the faith of each city. Thus, partly by entreaties, partly by force, with a very great band gathered, he began to lay waste the province. In these matters some cities of their own accord were sending auxiliaries; likewise some were, on the contrary, shutting their gates.
Of these, if he had taken any towns by force, whenever there was from that community a citizen who had deserved very well of Gnaeus Pompeius, on account of the magnitude of his money another charge was brought against him, so that, he being removed from the midst, from his wealth a largess for brigands might be made. Thus, by the commodities of peace, with the enemy +incited+, greater forces were augmented. +This, with frequent messages sent into Italy, the communities opposed to Pompeius,+ were demanding auxiliaries for themselves.
[2] C. Caesar dictator tertio, designatus dictator quarto multis +iterante diebus coniectis+ cum celeri festinatione ad bellum conficiendum in Hispaniam cum venisset, legatique Cordubenses, qui a Cn. Pompelo discessissent, Caesari obviam venissent, a quibus nuntiabatur nocturno tempore oppidum Cordubam capi posse, quod nec opinantibus adversariis eius provinciae potitus esset, simulque quod tabellariis, qui a Cn. Pompeio dispositi omnibus locis essent, qui certiorem Cn. Pompeium de Caesaris adventu facerent… multa praeterea veri similia proponebant. Quibus rebus adductus quos legatos ante exercitui praefecerat Q. Pedium et Q. Fabium Maximum de suo adventu facit certiores, utque sibi equitatus qui ex provincia fuisset praesidio esset. Ad quos celerius quam ipsi opinati sunt appropinquavit neque, ut ipse voluit, equitatum sibi praesidio habuit.
[2] Gaius Caesar, dictator for the 3rd time, dictator-designate for the 4th, after many days driven together by iterated marches, when he had come with swift celerity into Spain to bring the war to a conclusion, and when envoys from Corduba, who had departed from Gnaeus Pompeius, had come to meet Caesar, from them it was announced that the town of Corduba could be taken at night-time, because, while his adversaries were not expecting it, he had gotten possession of that province, and also because the letter‑carriers who had been posted by Gnaeus Pompeius in all places, to make Gnaeus Pompeius more certain about Caesar’s advent… were being hindered; they were, moreover, proposing many other things likely to be true. Induced by these matters, he makes those legates whom earlier he had put over the army, Quintus Pedius and Quintus Fabius Maximus, more certain about his arrival, and that the cavalry which was from the province should be for a guard to him. He approached them more quickly than they themselves had supposed, nor, as he himself wished, did he have the cavalry as a guard for himself.
[3] Erat idem temporis Sex. Pompeius frater qui cum praesidio Cordubam tenebat, quod eius provinciae caput esse existimabatur; ipse autem Cn. Pompeius adulescens Uliam oppidum oppugnabat et fere iam aliquot mensibus ibi detinebatur. Quo ex oppido cognito Caesaris adventu legati clam praesidia Cn. Pompei Caesarem cum adissent, petere coeperunt uti sibi primo quoque tempore subsidium mitteret.
[3] At that same time there was Sextus Pompeius, the brother, who held Corduba with a garrison, because it was reckoned the head of that province; but Gnaeus Pompeius, an adolescent, was besieging the town of Ulia and had by now for nearly several months been detained there. From this town, when Caesar’s arrival was learned, envoys—having secretly slipped past the garrisons of Gnaeus Pompeius—when they had come to Caesar, began to ask that he send them relief at the earliest possible time.
Caesar — that commonwealth had at all times deserved most excellently of the Roman people — quickly orders six cohorts to set out at the second watch, with a like number of horsemen. Over these he placed a man well known in that province and not a little knowledgeable, L. Vibiurn Paciaecus. When he had come to the garrisons of Cn. Pompeius, it befell at that same time that he was buffeted by an adverse tempest and a vehement wind; and the force of the storm so obscured the approaches that they could scarcely recognize the man next to them.
the disadvantage of which was supplying to them the utmost utility. Thus when they came to that place, he orders horsemen in pairs to mount, and straight through the adversaries’ outposts they hasten to the town. And when they were in the midst of their outposts, when it was asked who they were, one of our men answered, “Hush—do not utter a word: for at this time they are trying to approach the wall, in order to take the town”; and partly the watchmen, hindered by the tempest, were not able to exhibit diligence, partly they were frightened off by that reply.
When they had approached the gate, on a signal given by the townspeople they were received; and the foot-soldiers, once deployed, partly remained there, while the horsemen, after raising a shout, made a sally into the adversaries’ camp. Thus in that action, since it had come upon them unawares, a very large part of the men who had been in those camps supposed that they had been almost captured.
[4] Hoc misso ad Uliam praesidio Caesar, ut Pompeium ab ea oppugnatione deducercet, ad Cordubam contendit, ex quo itinere loricatos viros fortis cum equitatu ante praemisit. Qui simul in conspectum oppidi se dederunt, cum equis recipiuntur. Hoc a Cordubensibus nequaquam poterat animadverti.
[4] With this garrison sent to Ulia, Caesar, in order to draw Pompey away from that assault, hastened to Corduba, and from that march he sent ahead cuirassed men, brave men, with the cavalry. And they, as soon as they came within the sight of the town, are admitted with their horses. This could by no means be noticed by the Cordubans.
As a very great multitude from the town went out to cut down the cavalry as they were approaching, the mail-clad men (as we have written above) dismounted from their horses and made a great battle, with the result that, out of an infinite multitude of men, few withdrew back into the town. Led by this fear, Sextus Pompeius sent letters to his brother to come quickly to him for relief, lest Caesar should seize Corduba before he himself had come thither.
[5] Caesar, cum ad flumen Bacetim venisset neque propter altitudincem fluminis transire posset, lapidibus corbis plenos demisit: insuper ponit trabes; ita ponte facto copias ad castra tripertito traduxit. Tendebat adversum oppidum e regione pontis, ut supra scripsimus, tripertito. Huc cum Pompeius cum suis copiis venisset, ex adverso pari ratione castra ponit.
[5] Caesar, when he had come to the river Baetis and could not cross on account of the depth of the river, let down baskets filled with stones; on top he places beams; thus, with a bridge made, he led his troops across to the camp in three divisions. He was extending, facing the town over against the bridge, as we have written above, in three divisions. Hither, when Pompeius had come with his forces, he pitches camp on the opposite side in a like fashion.
Caesar, in order to exclude him from the town and from supply, began to lead out an arm toward the bridge; in like manner, on equal terms, Pompey does the same. Here a contention arises between the two leaders as to which should first seize the bridge; from which contention daily minute skirmishes were occurring, so that now these, sometimes those, came off superior. When the matter had come to greater contention, a fight at close quarters was begun by both sides; while, more eagerly, they strove to hold the place, they clotted together near the bridge, and as they approached the banks of the river, compressed, they were hurled headlong.
[6] Id cum animadverteret adversarios minime velle, quos +quoniam a avia+ retraxerat, ut in aequum deduceret, copiis flumine traductis noctu iubet ignis fieri magnos: ita firmissimum eius praesidium Ateguam proficiscitur. Id cum Pompeius ex perfugis rescisset, qua die facultatem… et angustias, carra complura +multosque lanistas+ retraxit et ad Cordubam se recepit. Caesar munitionibus Ateguam oppugnace et bracchia circumducere coepit.
[6] When he observed that the adversaries were by no means willing—whom, +since from the byways+, he had drawn back—to lead them down into level ground, after his forces had been led across the river by night he orders great fires to be made: thus he proceeds to Ategua, his firmest garrison. When Pompeius learned this from deserters, on the day of the opportunity… and the narrows, he drew back many carts and +many lanistae+ and withdrew to Corduba. Caesar began to besiege Ategua with fortifications and to draw encircling “arms” (bracchia) around.
When a message had been brought to him that Pompey was setting out on that day, for whose advent, for the sake of protection, Caesar had occupied several little forts, partly where the cavalry, partly where the infantry forces might be on station and on outpost to be a protection to the camp, it befell at Pompey’s arrival that in the morning time there was a very thick fog. Thus, under that obscuration, with several cohorts and squadrons of horse they surround Caesar’s cavalry and cut them down, so that scarcely a few escaped in that slaughter.
[7] Insequenti nocte castra sua incendit Pompeius et trans flumen Salsum per convallis castra inter duo oppida Ateguam et Ucubim in monte constituit. Caesar +in munitionibus ceterisque+ quae ad oppidum opus fuerunt aggerem vineasque agere instituit. Haec loca sunt montuosa et natura impedita ad rem militarem; quae planitie dividuntur, Salso flumine, proxime tamen Ateguam ut flumen sit circiter passus duo milia.
[7] On the following night Pompey set his own camp on fire and, across the Salsus River, through the valleys, he established a camp on a mountain between the two towns Ategua and Ucubi. Caesar began to construct the rampart and vineae, +in the fortifications and the rest+ which were needed for the town. These places are mountainous and by nature hindered for military operations; and they are separated by a plain; but the Salsus River is nearest to Ategua, so that the river is at about two thousand paces.
From that region of the town Pompey had his camp placed on the mountains, in sight of both towns, nor did he dare to come to the support of his own. He had the eagles and standards of 13 legions; but of these, those from which he considered he had any strength, two were native (vernacular), which had deserted from Trebonius; one was formed from the colonies that were in these regions; the fourth was Afranian, from Africa, which he had brought with him; +the rest consisted of auxiliaries from fugitives+: for in light-armed troops and in cavalry our men were far superior both in valor and in number.
[8] Accedebat hoc ut longius duceret bellum Pompeius, quod loca sunt edita et ad castrorum munitiones non parum idonea. nam fere totius ulterioris Hispaniae regio propter terrae fecundidatem inopem difficilemque habet oppugnationem et non nimis copiosam aquationem. Hic etiam propter barbarorum crebras excursiones omnia loca quae sunt ab oppidis remota, turribus et munitionibus retinentur, sicut in Africa; rudere, non tegulis teguntur.
[8] There was added this, to make Pompey draw the war out longer: that the places are elevated and not a little suitable for the fortifications of camps. For the region of almost all Further Spain, on account of the fertility of the soil, affords an impoverished and difficult oppugnation, and not an overly copious aquation. Here too, on account of the barbarians’ frequent excursions, all places that are remote from the towns are held by towers and fortifications, as in Africa; they are covered with rubble, not with tiles.
and at the same time on these they have watchtowers, and on account of the altitude they prospect broadly and far. Likewise, a great part of the towns of that province is for the most part fortified by mountains and is constituted in places excellent by nature, so that both approaches and ascents are difficult. Thus by the nature of the place they are held off from assaults (oppugnations), so that the cities of Hispania are not easily taken by the enemy.
Which is what happened in this war. For when, between Ategua and Ucubi, which towns have been written above, Pompey had his camp established in sight of the two towns, at about 4 miles from his camp there is a mound by nature prominent which is called the Castra Postumiana. There, for the sake of a garrison, Caesar had a castellum (fort) established.
[9] Quod Pompeius quod eodem iugo tegebatur loci natura et remotum erat a castris Caesaris, animadvertebat loci difficultatem et quia flumine Salso intercludebatur, non esse commissurum Caesarem ut in tanta loci difficultate ad subsidium [com]mittendum se [de]mitteret. Ita fretus opinione tertia vigilia profectus castellum oppugnare coepit [ut laborantibus succurreret nostri]. Cum adpropinquassent, clamore repentino telorumque multitudine iactus facere coeperunt, uti magnam partem hominum vulneribus adficerent. Quo facto cum ex castello repugnare coepissent maioribusque castris Caesaris nuntius esset adlatus, cum III legionibus est profectus, [ut laborantibus succurreret nostris]. Et cum ad eos adpropinquasset, fuga perterriti multi sunt interfecti, complures capti, in quibus duo [centuriones]. Multi praeterea armis exuti fugerunt, quorum scuta sunt relata LXXX.
[9] Now Pompey, because he was covered by the same ridge by the nature of the place and was distant from Caesar’s camp, noted the difficulty of the ground and, because he was cut off by the river Salsus, that Caesar would not be going to commit himself so as, in such difficulty of the place, to let himself down to send relief. Trusting therefore in this opinion, he set out at the third watch and began to assault the fort [so that he might come to the aid of our men who were in straits]. When they had approached, with a sudden shout and a multitude of missiles they began to hurl, so as to inflict wounds on a great part of the men. This having been done, when they began to fight back from the fort and a message had been brought to Caesar’s larger camp, he set out with 3 legions, [so that he might come to the aid of our men who were in straits]. And when he had approached them, many, terrified in flight, were slain, several were captured, among whom two [centurions]. Many besides, stripped of their arms, fled, and 80 of their shields were brought back.
[10] Insequenti luce Arguetius ex Italia cum equitatu venit. is signa Saguntinorum rettulit quinque quae ab oppidanis cepit. Suo loco praeteritumst quod equites ex Italia cum Asprenate ad Caesarem venissent.
[10] On the following day Arguetius came from Italy with the cavalry. He brought back five standards of the Saguntines, which he had taken from the townspeople. In its proper place it has been omitted that horsemen from Italy had come to Caesar with Asprenas.
[11] Postero die equites nostri longius ad Cordubam versus prosecuti sunt eos qui commeatus ad castra Pompei ex oppido portabant. Ex his capti l cum iumentis ad nostra adducti sunt castra. eo die Q. Marcius, tribunus militum qui fuisset Pompei, ad nos transfugit, et noctis tertia vigilia in oppido acerrime pugnatum est, ignemque multum miserunt, sic ut omne genus [telorum consumeretur] quibus ignis per iactus solitus est mitti.
[11] On the following day our cavalry pursued farther toward Corduba those who were carrying supplies from the town to Pompey’s camp. Of these, those captured, together with the draft-animals, were led to our camp. On that day Q. Marcius, a military tribune who had been Pompey’s, defected to us; and at the third watch of the night there was very fierce fighting in the town, and they sent much fire, such that every kind [of missile was consumed] by which fire is accustomed to be sent by hurling.
[12] Postero die ex legione vernacula milites sunt capti ab equitibus nostris duo qui dixerunt se servos esse. Cum venirent, cogniti sunt a militibus qui antea cum Fabio et Pedio fuerant… et [a] Trebonio transfugerant. Eis ad ignoscendum nulla facultas est data et a militibus nostris interfecti sunt.
[12] On the next day, from the vernacular legion two soldiers were captured by our cavalry, who said that they were slaves. When they came, they were recognized by soldiers who earlier had been with Fabius and Pedius… and had deserted from [a] Trebonius. To them no opportunity for pardoning was given, and they were killed by our soldiers.
The letter-carriers captured at the same time, who had been sent from Corduba to Pompey and had by mistake come through to our camp, with their hands cut off were sent away. By a like custom, at the second watch, from the town, by throwing much fire and a multitude of missiles, they consumed a very long time and inflicted wounds on several. After a portion of the night had passed, they made a sally by force against the legion, when our men were stretched out in the work, and began to fight fiercely.
Their force was repressed by our men, although the townsmen were defending from higher ground. When they had begun to make an eruption (sally), nevertheless by the valor of our soldiers—who, although they were being pressed from lower ground—yet the adversaries, having been driven back and well afflicted with many wounds, betook themselves into the town.
[13] Postero die Pompeius ex castris suis brachium coepit ad flumen Salsum; et cum nostri equites pauci in statione fuissent a pluribus reperti, de statione sunt deiecti et occisi tres. Eo die A. Valgius senatoris filius, cuius frater in castris Pompei fuisset, omnibus suis rebus relictis equum conscendit et fugit. Speculator de legione II Pompeiana captus a militibus et interfectus.
[13] On the following day Pompey began from his camp an arm (brachium) toward the river Salsus; and when a few of our cavalry had been on picket, discovered by a larger number, they were driven from their post and three were killed. On that day A. Valgius, the son of a senator—whose brother had been in Pompey’s camp—leaving all his belongings behind, mounted a horse and fled. A speculator (scout) from the 2nd Pompeian legion was captured by the soldiers and killed.
At the same time a sling-bullet was sent, inscribed as follows: on the day when they should approach to capture the town, he would be going to set a shield in place. By this hope several, while they were hoping that they could climb the wall without danger and get possession of the town, on the next day began to work at the wall, and with a very large part of the former wall thrown down, [they entered into the town]. This having been done, by the townsmen, as if they were of their own party, they were preserved… they were begging to have the cuirassed men sent away, who had been put in charge of the town by Pompey for the sake of a garrison. To these Caesar replied that he had been accustomed to give conditions, not to receive them.
Who, when they had returned into the town, the reply having been reported and a shout raised, began to fight along the whole wall, with every kind of missiles hurled. Because of which, nearly the greater part of the men who were in our camp did not doubt that they would make an eruption—a sally—that day. Thus, with a ring drawn around, fighting was carried on for some time most vehemently, and at the same time a ballista launched by our men cast down a tower, from which five of the adversaries who had been in that tower were thrown down, and a boy who was accustomed to observe the ballista.
[14] Eius praeteriti temporis Pompeius trans flumen Salsum castellum constituit neque a nostris prohibitus falsaque illa opinione gloriatus est quod prope in nostris partibus locum tenuisset. Item insequenti die eadem consuetudine dum longius prosequitur, quo loco equites nostri stationem habuerant, aliquot turmae cum levi armatura impetu facto loco sunt deiecti et propter paucitatem nostrorum equitum simul cum levi armatura inter turmas adversariorum protriti. Hoc in conspectu utrorumque castrorum gerebatur, et maiore Pompeiani exultabant gloria [quod… ] longiusque cedentibus nostris prosequi coepissent.
[14] At that time just past, Pompey established a castellum across the river Salsus and, not prevented by our men, boasted in that false opinion that he had held a position almost within our parts. Likewise on the following day, by the same habit, while he pressed the pursuit farther, at the place where our cavalry had had a station, several squadrons together with the light-armed, a charge having been made, were cast down from the position and, on account of the paucity of our horse, together with the light-armed were crushed among the squadrons of the adversaries. This was being done in the sight of both camps, and the Pompeians exulted with greater gloria [because… ] and began to pursue farther as our men were yielding.
[15] Fere apud exercitus haec est equestris proelii consuetudo: cum eques ad dimicandum dimisso equo cum pedite congreditur, nequaquam par habetur. Id quod accidit in hoc proelio. Cum pedites levi armatura electi ad pugnam equitibus nostris necopinantibus venissent, idque in proelio animadversum esset, complures ex equis descenderunt.
[15] Generally among armies this is the custom of cavalry battle: when a horseman, with his horse dismissed, engages with a foot-soldier to contend, it is by no means held equal. Which is what happened in this battle. When infantrymen with light armature, chosen for the fight, had come upon our horsemen unawares, and this had been noticed in the battle, a good many dismounted from their horses.
Thus, in a scant time, the horseman began to wage a pedestrian battle, and the foot-soldier an equestrian battle, to such a degree that they made a slaughter proximate to the rampart. In this battle 123 of the adversaries fell, and many were stripped of their arms; many, afflicted with wounds, were brought back into the camp. Of our men 3 fell; the wounded were 12 foot-soldiers and 5 horsemen. On the time following that day, in accordance with former custom, fighting was begun before the wall.
When they had cast a very great multitude of missiles and fire upon our men as they defended, they set about an unspeakable and most cruel crime; and before our eyes they began to cut the throats of the guests who were in the town and to throw them headlong from the wall, just as among barbarians—a thing which since the memory of men has never been done.
[16] Huius diei extremo tempore a Pompeianis clam nostros ad [oppidum] tabellarius est missus, ut ea nocte turres aggeremque incenderent et tertia vigilia eruptionem facerent. Ita igne telorumque multitudine iacta cum bene magnam partem operum consumpsissent, portam quae e regione et in conspectu Pompei castrorum fuerat aperuerunt, copiaeque totae eruptionem fecerunt secumque extulerunt virgulta crates ad fossas complendas et harpagones ad casas quae stramenticiae ab nostris hibernorum causa aedificatae erant, diruendas et incendendas, praeterea argentum vestimenta, ut dum nostri in praeda detinentur, illi caede facta ad praesidia Pompei se reciperent. Nam quod existimabat eos posse conata efficere, nocta tota ultra stabat flumen Salsum in acie.
[16] At the close of this day, by the Pompeians, unknown to our men, a tabellary courier was sent to the [town], to the effect that that night they should set fire to the towers and rampart and make an eruption at the third watch. Thus, with fire and a multitude of missiles hurled, when they had consumed a very great part of the works, they opened the gate which had been over against and in sight of Pompey’s camp, and the whole forces made a sally, and they brought out with them brushwood, crates (hurdles) for filling the ditches, and grappling-hooks for the houses which, straw-thatched and built by our men for the sake of winter-quarters, were to be torn down and set ablaze; besides, silver and garments—so that while our men were detained by the booty, they, a slaughter having been wrought, might retire to Pompey’s garrisons. For, since he judged that they could accomplish their attempts, all night he stood in battle array beyond the river Salsus.
Although this deed had been carried through while our men were unexpectant, nevertheless, relying on valor, they drove them back and, having repelled them and afflicted them with many wounds, forced them back into the town; they gained possession of their booty and arms and took some alive—who on the following day were put to death. And at the same time a deserter reported that from the town Junius, who had been in the tunnel, when the throat-cutting of the townsmen had been done, cried out that he had committed a nefarious deed and a crime; for that they had deserved nothing for which they should be afflicted with such a penalty, they who had received them to their altars and hearths, and that they had contaminated hospitality by crime; that he had said many things besides; and that by this speech they were deterred and did not commit further throat-cutting.
[17] Ita postero die Tullius legatus cum Catone Lusitano venit et apud Caesarem verba fecit: 'Utinam quidem di inmortales fecissent ut tuus potius miles quam Cn. Pompei factus essem et hanc virtutis constantiam in tua victoria, non in illius calamitate praestarem! Cuius funestae laudes quoniam ad hanc fortunam reciderunt ut cives Romani indigentes praesidii, et propter patriae luctuosam perniciem ducimur hostium numero qui neque in illius prospera acie primam fortunam neque in adversa secundam obtinuimus, vix tuarum legionum tot impetus sustentantes, nocturnis diurnisque operibus gladiorum ictus telorumque missus exceptantes, relicti et deserti a Pompeio, tua virtute superati salutem a tua clementia deposcimus petimusque ut [vitam nobis concedas'. Quibus Caesar respondit:] 'qualem gentibus me praestiti, similem in civium deditione praestabo.'
[17] Thus on the next day Tullius the legate came with Cato the Lusitanian and made a speech before Caesar: 'Would that indeed the immortal gods had brought it to pass that I had been made your soldier rather than that of Cn. Pompeius, and that I might display this constancy of virtue in your victory, not in that man’s calamity! Since his funereal glories have fallen back to this fortune, that Roman citizens, in need of protection and, on account of the mournful ruin of the fatherland, are counted in the number of enemies—who neither in his prosperous battle-line obtained the first fortune nor in the adverse the second—hardly sustaining so many onsets of your legions, by night-and-day labors catching the blows of swords and the discharges of missiles, left behind and deserted by Pompeius, overcome by your valor, we lay our safety at your clemency and seek that [you grant life to us.' To whom Caesar replied:] 'such as I have shown myself to the nations, the like I will show in the surrender of citizens.'
[18] Remissis legatis, cum ad portam venissent, [constitit] Ti. Tullius, et cum introeuntem Catonem insecutus non esset, revertit ad portam et hominem adprehendit. Quod Tiberius cum fieri animadvertit, simul pugionem eduxit et manum eius incidit. Ita refugerunt ad Caesarem.
[18] With the envoys dismissed, when they had come to the gate, [halted] Tiberius Tullius; and since he had not followed Cato as he was entering, he turned back to the gate and a man seized him. When Tiberius noticed this taking place, at once he drew a dagger and cut his hand. Thus they fled back to Caesar.
And at the same time a standard-bearer from the First Legion deserted across, and it became known that on the day the cavalry battle had been fought, 35 men of his standard had perished, and that in the camp of Gnaeus Pompeius it was not permitted to report nor to say that anyone had perished. A slave whose master had been in Caesar’s camp—he had left his wife and children in the town—slit his master’s throat and so secretly withdrew from Caesar’s garrisons into Pompey’s camp… And he sent a notice written on a sling-bullet, by which Caesar might be made more certain what things were being prepared in the town for defense. Thus, after the letters had been received, when he had returned into the town, the man who was accustomed to send the inscribed bullet… At a subsequent time two Lusitanian brothers deserted and announced that Pompey had held an assembly: since he could not come to the town’s relief, they should by night withdraw out of the adversaries’ sight toward the sea; one replied that he should rather come down to fight than display the signal of flight; the man who had spoken thus was cut down.
At the same time his couriers were apprehended as they were coming to the town. Caesar cast their letters before the townsmen, and the one who begged his life he ordered to set fire to the townsmen’s wooden tower; if he should do that, he promised that he would concede everything to him. Which was difficult to do, in that someone might ignite that tower without peril.
[19] Vigilia secunda propter multitudinem telorum turris lignea quae nostra fuisset, ab imo vitium fecit usque ad tabulatum secundum et tertium. Eodem tempore pro muro pugnarunt acerrime et turrim nostram ut superiorem incenderunt, idcirco quod ventum oppidani secundum habuerunt. Insequenti luce materfamilias de muro se deiecit et ad nos transsiliit dixitque se cum familia constitutum habuisse ut una transfugerent ad Caesarem, illam oppressam et iugulatam.
[19] In the second watch, on account of the multitude of missiles, the wooden tower which had been ours developed a defect from the bottom up to the second and even the third flooring. At the same time they fought most fiercely before the wall and, since it was the higher, they set our tower on fire, for the reason that the townspeople had the wind in their favor. At first light a mother-of-a-household hurled herself down from the wall and leaped across to us, and said that she had agreed with her household that they would desert together to Caesar—she (that woman) had been overpowered and jugulated.
With this time having passed, tablets were thrown down from the wall, in which it was found written: 'L. Munatius to Caesar. If you grant me life, since I have been deserted by Gn. Pompey, such as I showed myself to him, with such virtue and constancy I will prove that I shall be to you.' At the same time the envoys of the townsmen who had previously gone out approached Caesar: if he would grant life to themselves, they would on the following light surrender the town. To them he replied that he was Caesar and that he would make good his faith.
[20] Quod Pompeius ex perfugis cum deditionem oppidi factam esse scisset, castra movit Ucubim versus et circum ea loca castella disposuit et munitionibus se continere coepit. Caesar movit et propius castra castris contulit. Eodem tempore mane loricatus unus ex legione vernacula ad nos transfugit et nuntiavit Pompeium oppidanos Ucubenses convocasse eisque ita imperavisse ut diligentia adhibita perquirerent qui essent suarum partium itemque adversariorum victoriae fautores.
[20] When Pompey learned from defectors that the surrender of the town had been made, he moved his camp toward Ucubi and placed forts around those places, and began to keep himself within fortifications. Caesar moved and brought his camp nearer to the camp. At the same time, in the morning, one armored man from the vernacular legion came over to us and reported that Pompey had convened the Ucuban townspeople and had given them this order: that, diligence being applied, they should seek out who were of his own party and likewise supporters of the adversaries’ victory.
This having passed, in the town which had been taken, a slave was seized in the tunnel which we have shown above, who had slit his master’s throat; he was burned alive. At the same time 8 armored centurions went over to Caesar from the vernacular legion, and our cavalry engaged with the adversaries’ cavalry, and the light-armed killed several wounded. That night scouts were seized: 3 slaves and one man from the vernacular legion.
[21] Postero die equites cum levi armatura ex adversariorum castris ad nos transfugerunt. Et eo tempore circiter XL equites ad aquatores nostros excucurrerunt, nonnullos interfecerunt, item alios vivos abduxerunt; e quibus capti sunt equites VIII. Insequenti die Pompeius securi percussit homines LXXIIII qui dicebantur esse fautores Caesaris victoriae, reliquos versum oppidum iussit deduci.
[21] On the next day cavalrymen with light-armed troops deserted to us from the adversaries’ camp. And at that time about 40 horsemen dashed out at our water-drawers, killed some, likewise led others away alive; of these 8 horsemen were captured. On the following day Pompey struck with the axe 74 men who were said to be fautors of Caesar’s victory; he ordered the rest to be led toward the town.
[22] Hoc praeterito tempore qui in oppido Ategua Bursavonenses capti sunt, legati profecti sunt cum nostris, uti rem gestam Bursavonensibus referrent; quid sperarent de Cn. Pompeio, cum viderent hospites iugulari; praeterea multa scelera ab iis fieri qui praesidii causa ab iis reciperentur. Qui ad oppidum [cum] venissent, nostri qui fuissent equites Romani et senatores, non sunt ausi introire in oppidum, praeterquam qui eius civitatis fuissent. Quorum responsis ultro citroque acceptis et redditis cum ad nostros se reciperent qui extra oppidum fuissent illi praesidio insecuti ex Bursavone legatos iugularunt.
[22] With this time past, the Bursavonenses who had been captured in the town of Ategua set out as legates with our men, to report the affair to the Bursavonenses—what they were to hope concerning Gnaeus Pompeius, when they saw guests being jugulated; moreover, that many crimes were being perpetrated by those who were received by them for the sake of a garrison. When they had come to the town, our men who were Roman knights and senators did not dare to enter the town, except those who had been of that community. After replies had been received and returned back and forth, when they were making their way back to our men who had been outside the town, those of the garrison, having pursued, jugulated the legates from Bursavona.
Two of the remainder escaped and carried the matter done to Caesar… And they sent scouts to the town of Ategua. When these had ascertained for certain that the replies of the envoys had been transacted just as those men had reported, the townspeople, a concourse having been made, began to stone the man who had slaughtered the envoys and to menace him with their hands: that by his agency they had perished. Thus, scarcely freed from danger, he asked of the townspeople that it be permitted him to set out as an envoy to Caesar: that he would render them satisfaction.
With authority given, when he had set out from there, a garrison having been prepared, when he had raised a very large band and had been admitted into the town at night by deceit, he makes a great slaughter, and with the chiefs who had been contrary to him slain, he took the town back into his own power. At this time gone by, slave-deserters reported that the goods of the townspeople were being sold, [and an edict] that it was not permitted for anyone to go outside the rampart unless ungirded, for the reason that from the day on which the town of Ategua had been captured, many, terror-struck with fear, were fleeing to Baeturia; and that they had no hope of victory set before them, and that if any of our men should desert, he was to be thrown into the light-armed troops, and that he would receive no more than 17.
[23] Insequenti tempore Caesar castris castra contulit et brachium ad flumen Salsum ducere coepit. Hic dum in opere nostri distenti essent, complures ex superiori loco adversariorum decucurrerunt nec detinentibus nostros multis telis iniectis conplures vulneribus adfecere. Hic tum, ut ait Ennius, nostri 'cessere parumper'. Itaque praeter consuetudinem cum a nostris animadversum esset cedere, centuriones ex legione v flumen transgressi duo restituerunt aciem, acriterque eximia virtute plures cum agerent, ex superiore loco multitudine telorum alter eorum concidit.
[23] In the time that followed Caesar brought camp against camp, and began to draw an arm (causeway) to the Salsus River. Here, while our men were stretched out in the work, several of the adversaries ran down from the higher ground, and, our men not holding them off, with many missiles cast they wounded many. Here then, as Ennius says, our men “gave ground for a little.” And so, when it was noticed—contrary to custom—that our men were yielding, two centurions from legion 5, having crossed the river, restored the battle line; and, fighting sharply with exceptional valor as they were driving several back, from the higher ground, under a multitude of missiles, one of them fell.
Thus, when his counterpart had begun to engage in battle, when he had noticed that he was being surrounded on all sides, withdrawing unharmed he stumbled. At the moment of his falling, as many of the adversaries made a rush at the insignia of a brave eagle-bearer (aquilifer), our horsemen, having crossed over, began from the lower ground to drive the adversaries toward the rampart. Thus, in their eagerness, while they strove to make a slaughter within their defenses, they were cut off by the squadrons and the light-armed.
Had it not been for their utmost valor, they would have been taken alive. For by the garrison’s fortification they were so constricted that a horseman, with the space cut off, could scarcely defend himself. From both kinds of combat several were afflicted with wounds, among whom was even Clodius Arquitius.
[24] Postero die ad Soricariam utrorumque convenere copiae. Nostri brachia ducere coeperunt. Pompeius cum animadverteret castello se excludi Aspavia, quod est ab Ucubi milia passuum V, haec res necessario devocabat ut ad dimicandum descenderet.
[24] On the next day at Soricaria the forces of both sides came together. Our men began to draw out the wings. Pompeius, when he noticed that he was being shut out from the little fort Aspavia, which is 5 miles from Ucubi, this circumstance necessarily summoned him to come down to do battle.
Nor, however, was he granting an opportunity on level ground, but from a knoll… They were seizing a lofty mound, to such a point that he was necessarily compelled to enter an unfavorable place. On account of which deed, when the forces of both sides had sought the eminent mound, kept back by our men they were cast down to the plain. Which thing was making the battle favorable to our men.
with the adversaries yielding on all sides, they were engaged in no small—indeed very great—slaughter. For whom the mountain, not valor, was a salvation. With this aid [they only held out a little while, thus] that, unless it had grown toward evening, they would have been deprived of all aid by our fewer men.
[25] Insequenti die pari consuetudine cum ad eundem locum eius praesidium venisset, pristino illo suo utebantur instituto; nam praeter equites nullo loco aequo se committere audebant. Cum nostri in opere essent, equitum copiae concursus facere coeperunt, simulque vociferantibus legionariis, cum locum efflagitarent ex consuetudine insequendi, existimare posses paratissimos esse ad dimicandum. Nostri ex humili convalle bene longe sunt egressi et planitie in aequiori loco constiterunt.
[25] On the following day, with the same custom, when his garrison had come to the same place, they were using that former institution of theirs; for, except the horsemen, they did not dare to commit themselves on any level ground. While our men were at the work, bodies of cavalry began to make charges, and at the same time, with the legionaries vociferating, since they were demanding a place for pursuing according to their custom, you could suppose them most prepared for fighting. Our men went out quite far from the low little valley and took their stand on the plain in a more level place.
They, however, without doubt did not dare to descend to an even place to come to close combat, except for one Antistius Turpio. He, confident in his strength, began to proclaim that among the adversaries there was no one equal to himself. Then, as is reported of the encounter of Achilles and Memnon, Q. Pompeius Niger, a Roman eques of the Italicensis, advanced from our battle-line to engage.
Since the ferocity of Antistius had turned the minds of all from the work to spectating, the battle-lines were arrayed. For between the warriors and the chiefs the victory was set in doubt, so that it seemed almost that the duel of two would determine the end of warring. Thus, eager and covetous, each was esteemed according to the will of the men and favorers of his own party.
By whose brisk virtue, when they had betaken themselves onto the plain to contend, the badges of renown and the gleaming chased work of the shields… of which [contest] the fight would indeed have been [almost] broken off/decided, if not on account of the giving‑way of the cavalry, as we have shown above… he posted the light‑armed, for the sake of a guard, not far from the works [the camp]. So, as our horsemen, in retreat, were returning to the camp, the adversaries pursued more eagerly; all, a shout having been raised, delivered an onset. Thus, panic‑stricken with fear, while they were in flight, with many lost, they take themselves back into the camp.
[26] Caesar ob virtutem turmae Cassianae donavit milia XIII et praefecto torques aureos V et levi armaturae milia XII. Hoc die A. Baebius et C. Flavius et A. Trebellius equites Romani Hastenses argento prope tecti [equites] ad Caesarem transfugerunt. Qui nuntiaverunt equites Romanos coniurasse omnis qui in castris Pompei essent, ut transitionem facerent; servi indicio omnes in custodiam esse coniectos; e quibus occasione capta se transfugisse.
[26] Caesar, on account of the valor of the Cassian squadron, granted thirteen thousand, and to the prefect five golden torques, and to the light-armed troops twelve thousand. On this day A. Baebius and C. Flavius and A. Trebellius, Roman equites of the Hastenses, almost covered with silver [horsemen], defected to Caesar. They reported that the Roman equites—all who were in Pompey’s camp—had conspired to make a transition; that, by the disclosure of slaves, all had been cast into custody; and that, having seized an opportunity from among them, they themselves had gone over.
Likewise on this day letters were intercepted which Gnaeus Pompeius was sending to Ursaon: "If you are well, I rejoice; I am well. Although, as our felicity goes, the adversaries have been driven back to our satisfaction… Who, if they would grant an opportunity on equal ground, I would have finished the war more quickly than your expectation supposes. But they do not dare to lead their raw army down into the field, and, still relying up to now on our garrisons, they protract the war."
[27] Insequenti tempore cum nostri in opere distenti essent, equites in oliveto dum lignantur, interfecti sunt aliquot. Servi transfugerunt qui nuntiaverunt a. d. III Non. Mart.
[27] At a following time, when our men were stretched out at the work, several cavalrymen in the olive-grove, while they were gathering wood, were killed. Slaves deserted who reported on March 5.
Thus, with the camp moved, at Ucubi Pompey ordered the garrison which he left to set it on fire, so that, the town having been burned, they might withdraw into the larger camp. Subsequently, when he began to assault the town Ventippo, with surrender made, he made a march to Carruca and pitched camp opposite Pompey. Pompey burned the town which had closed its gates against his garrisons; and a soldier who had slit his own brother’s throat in the camp was intercepted by our men and beaten with a cudgel.
[28] Sequentique die cum iter facere Caesar cum copiis vellet, renuntiatum est a speculatoribus Pompeium de tertia vigilia in acie stetisse. Hoc nuntio adlato vexillum proposuit. Idcirco enim copias eduxerat quod Ursaonensium civitati [qui sui] fuissent fautores, antea litteras miserat Caesarem nolle in convallem descendere, quod maiorem partem exercitus tironem haberet.
[28] And on the following day, when Caesar wished to march with his forces, it was reported by the scouts that Pompey had stood in battle array from the third watch. With this message brought, he displayed the standard. For he had led out his forces for this reason: because to the civitas of the Ursaonenses, [who had been his] supporters, he had previously sent letters that Caesar was unwilling to descend into the valley, because the greater part of his army consisted of tyros.
[29] Planities inter utraque castra intercedebat circiter milia passuum V, ut auxilia Pompei duabus defenderentur rebus, oppido et excelsi loci natura. Hinc derigens proxima planities aequabatur. Cuius decursum antecedebat rivus qui ad eorum accessum summam efficiebat loci iniquitatem.
[29] A plain intervened between the two camps for about 5 miles, so that Pompey’s auxiliaries were defended by two things, the town and the nature of the lofty ground. From here, stretching out, the nearby plain was level. In front of its downward course ran a brook, which, at their approach, produced the utmost disadvantage of the place.
This was added, that the place was adorned with that evenness of the plain, and with the serenity of the day and of the sun, so that a wondrous, a to-be-desired time seemed as if granted almost by the immortal gods for joining battle. Our men rejoice, some even fear, because the situation and the fortunes of all were being brought down to that point, that whatever chance might bestow after an hour would be placed in doubt. And so our men advance to contend, the very thing which we supposed the adversaries would do.
[30] Erat acies XIII aquilis constituta, quae lateribus equitatu tegebatur, cum levi armatura milibus sex; praeterea auxiliares accedebant prope alterum tantum. Nostra praesidia LXXX cohortibus, octo milibus equitum. Ita cum in extrema planitie iniquum in locum nostri adpropinquassent, paratus hostis erat superior, ut transeundum superius iter vehementer esset periculosum.
[30] The battle-line was formed with 13 eagles, which was covered on the flanks by cavalry, together with light-armed troops to the number of 6 thousand; besides, auxiliaries were added to nearly as much again. Our forces were 80 cohorts, with 8 thousand horse. Thus, when at the far edge of the plain our men had approached into an unfavorable place, the enemy, ready and prepared, was superior, so that crossing by the upper route was exceedingly perilous.
When this had been observed by Caesar, lest anything amiss be rashly committed through fault, he began to define that place. And when this had been put before people’s ears, they took it grievously and bitterly that they were being impeded from being able to finish the battle. This delay made the adversaries more alacritous: that Caesar’s forces were hindered by fear from committing/joining battle.
Thus, by pressing forward in an unfavorable place, they were exposing themselves, so that access to them was nevertheless accounted of great peril. Here the Tenth held their place, the right horn; the left, the 3 and the 5, and likewise the rest [the auxiliary cavalry]. The battle is joined, a clamor having been raised.
[31] Hic etsi virtute nostri antecedebant, adversarii loco superiore se defendebant acerrime, et vehemens fiebat ab utrisque clamor telorumque missu concursus, sic ut nostri prope diffiderent victoriae. Congressus enim et clamor, quibus rebus maxime hostis conterretur, in conlatu pari erat condicione. Ita ex utroque genere cum parem virtutem ad bellandum contulissent, pilorum missu fixa cumulatur et concidit adversariorum multitudo.
[31] Here, although our men were ahead in virtue, the adversaries, from the higher ground, defended themselves most fiercely, and from both sides there arose a vehement clamor and a concourse with the sending of missiles, such that our men almost despaired of victory. For the congress and the clamor, things by which the enemy is especially terrified, were on equal terms in the encounter. Thus, since from both kinds they had brought equal valor for warring, by the discharge of the pila the multitude of adversaries, transfixed, is heaped up and falls.
As we have shown, the decumani held the right horn. And although they were few, nevertheless on account of their virtue they were afflicting the adversaries with great fear by their effort, because from their own position they began to press the enemy vehemently, so that for a reserve, lest our men take them in flank, a legion of the adversaries began to be led over to the right. Which, as soon as it was moved, Caesar’s cavalry began to press the left horn, in such a way that, by exceptional virtue, they could make battle so that no place in the line of battle was given for coming in as a reserve.
Thus, when the clamor was intermingled with groaning and the clatter of swords presented to the ears, it hampered the minds of the inexperienced with fear. Here, as Ennius says, foot is pressed by foot, arms are worn down by arms, and our men began to drive the adversaries fighting most vehemently. To them the town was a support.
Thus on the very Liberalia they would not have survived, having been routed and put to flight, unless they had fled for refuge into that place from which they had gone out. In which battle there fell about 30 thousand men, and, if anything, more; moreover Labienus and Attius Varus, for both of whom, once they were slain, a funeral was held; likewise Roman equites, partly from the City, partly from the province, up to 3 thousand. Of ours, the missing amounted to about a thousand persons, partly infantry, partly cavalry; the wounded up to 500; of the adversaries 13 eagles were carried off and standards . . and fasces… besides this he had these…
[32]… ex fuga hac qui oppidum Mundam sibi constituissent praesidium, nostrique cogebantur necessario eos circumvallare. Ex hostium armis pro caespite cadavera conlocabantur, scuta et pila pro vallo. Insuper occisorum in gladiorum mucronibus capita hominum ordinata ad oppidum conversa.
[32]… from this flight, those who had established the town of Munda for themselves as a stronghold; and our men were compelled of necessity to circumvallate them. From the enemies’ arms the cadavers were placed in lieu of turf, the shields and javelins in place of a rampart. Moreover, the heads of the slain, arranged upon the points of swords, were turned toward the town.
They saw the enemy’s universal terror… and the insignia of valor set forth, and the adversaries were being enclosed by a rampart. Thus the Gauls, with tragulae and javelins, encompassed the town [which, with the rampart made] from the corpses of the enemy, and began to oppugn it. From this battle the young Valerius fled to Corduba with a few horsemen, Sextus.
Pompeius, who had been at Corduba, reports the action. When this affair was recognized, the cavalry that he had with him, and the money that he had with him, he distributed to them, and he told the townsmen that he was setting out to Caesar about peace, and at the second watch he departed from the town. Gnaeus Pompeius, with a few cavalry and some infantry, hastened to the naval garrison at Carteia, which town is 170 miles distant from Corduba.
When he had come to the eighth milestone, P. Caucilius, who had previously been put in charge of Pompey’s camp, sends a messenger, in his words, that he was faring rather poorly, that they should send a litter by which he could be carried into the town. After letters were sent, Pompeius is conveyed to Carteia. Those who were favorers of that party assemble in the house to which he had been brought, who supposed that he had come secretly, so that they might inquire of him whatever they wished concerning the war.
[33] Caesar ex proelio [Munda] munitione circumdata Cordubam venit. Qui ex caede eo refugerunt, pontem occuparunt. Cum eo ventum esset, conviciare coeperunt, nos ex proelio paucos superesse; quo fugeremus?
[33] Caesar, from the battle, [Munda] having been surrounded with a fortification, came to Corduba. Those who had fled thither from the slaughter seized the bridge. When we had come there, they began to heap insults, saying that only a few of us survived from the battle; where would we flee?
Thus they began to fight over the bridge. Caesar crossed the river and pitched camp. Scapula, the head of the whole sedition [of the household and the freedmen], when he had come from the battle to Corduba, called together the household and the freedmen, built a pyre for himself, ordered that the best possible dinner be brought, likewise that it be overlaid with the finest garments; he gave money and silver in the presence of the household.
[34] Oppidani autem, simul Caesar castra contra ad oppidum posuit, discordare coeperunt, usque eo ut clamor in castra nostra perveniret, [rixa orta] fere inter Caesarianos et inter Pompeianos. Erant hic legiones, quae ex perfugis conscriptae, partim oppidanorum servi qui erant a Pompeio Sexto manumissi. Qui in Caesaris adventum descendere coeperunt.
[34] The townsmen, however, as soon as Caesar pitched a camp opposite the town, began to be at variance, to the point that the clamor reached our camp, [a brawl having arisen] almost between the Caesarians and the Pompeians. There were here legions, which had been conscripted from deserters, partly slaves of the townsmen who had been manumitted by Sextus Pompeius. These, at Caesar’s advent, began to come down.
Those who, overcome by our men, were killed amounted to 22 thousand men, besides those who perished outside the wall. Thus Caesar possessed the town. While he was detained here, those from the battle whom we showed above to have been surrounded with works made an eruption (sortie), and a good many were slain; they were driven back into the town.
[35] Caesar Hispali[m] cum contendisset, legati de precatum venerunt. Ita cum ad oppidum esset ventum, Caninium cum praesidio legatum intromittit, ipse castra ad oppidum ponit. Erat bene magna manus intra Pompeianarum partium quae praesidium receptum indignaretur clam quendam Philonem, illum qui Pompeianarum partium fuisset defensor acerrimus.
[35] When Caesar had hastened to Hispalis, envoys came to sue for pardon. Thus, when they had come to the town, he admits Caninius the legate with a garrison, and he himself pitches camp by the town. There was quite a large band within the Pompeian party who were indignant that the garrison had been admitted, without the knowledge of a certain Philo, that man who had been the keenest defender of the Pompeian party.
[36] Dum haec geruntur, legati Carteienses renuntiaverunt quod Pompeium in potestatem haberent. Quod ante Caesari portas praeclusissent, illo beneficio suum maleficium existimabant se lucrificare. Lusitani Hispali pugnare nullo tempore desistebant.
[36] While these things were being transacted, envoys of the Carteienses reported that they had Pompey in their power. Because they had previously shut the gates against Caesar, they thought by that benefaction to profit their malefaction. The Lusitanians at Hispalis at no time desisted from fighting.
When Caesar adverted that, if he should strive to seize the town, he feared lest desperate men would set it ablaze and demolish the walls, thus, counsel having been held, by night he allows the Lusitanians to make a sally (an eruption); a thing which they did not think would be done by design. Thus, by breaking out, they burn the ships which had been at the River Baetis.
The people of Munda who had fled from the battle into the town, when they were besieged for a rather long time, a good many make surrender; and when they had been distributed into the legion, they conspire among themselves that, a signal having been given at night, those who had been in the town should make a sally, and they should perpetrate a slaughter in the camp. This matter having been learned, on the following night, at the third watch, the watchword having been given, all were cut down outside the rampart.
[37] Carteienses, dum Caesar in itinere reliqua oppida oppugnat, propter Pompeium dissentire coeperunt. Pars erat quae legatos ad Caesarem miserat, pars erat quae Pompeianarum partium fautores essent. Seditione concitata portas occupant.
[37] The Carteienses, while Caesar on the march assaults the remaining towns, began to dissent on account of Pompey. There was a party which had sent legates to Caesar, and a party which were supporters of the Pompeian party. A sedition having been stirred up, they seize the gates.
A great slaughter takes place; wounded, Pompey seizes twenty long ships and flees. Didius, who had been in command of the fleet [at] Gades… and as soon as a message was brought to him, immediately began to pursue. Partly on foot and with the cavalry they made a rapid march for the pursuit, others likewise pressing on at once.
[38] Pompeius cum paucis profugit et locum quendam munitum natura occupat. Equites et cohortes quae ad persequendum missi essent, speculatoribus ante missis certiores fiunt, diem et noctem iter faciunt. Pompeius umero et sinistro crure vehementer erat saucius.
[38] Pompey escapes with a few and occupies a certain place fortified by nature. The cavalry and the cohorts who had been sent to pursue, with scouts sent ahead, are informed, and they make a march day and night. Pompey was grievously wounded in the shoulder and in his left leg.
To this was added that he had also twisted his ankle; a circumstance that most impeded him. Thus, since he had been carried off in a litter to a certain tower, he was borne in it after the Lusitanians’ military manner. When he had been sighted by Caesar’s garrison, he is quickly encircled by the cavalry and the cohorts.
The access to the place was difficult. For for that reason [because he had been seen by his own garrison quickly to] Pompey had taken for himself a place fortified by nature, although, with a great multitude brought [so that a few] men from the higher ground could defend it. Our men approach at their advent and are driven off by missiles.
[39] Pompeius, ut supra demonstravimus, saucius et intorto talo idcirco tardabatur ad fugiendum, itemque propter loci difficultatem neque equo neque vehiculo saluti suae praesidium parare poterat. Caedes a nostris undique administrabatur. Exclusus a munitione amissisque auxiliis ad convallem exesumque locum in speluncam Pompeius se occultare coepit, ut a nostris non facile inveniretur nisi captivorum indicio.
[39] Pompey, as we have shown above, wounded and with a twisted ankle, was therefore delayed in fleeing, and likewise, on account of the difficulty of the place, he could provide no protection for his safety either by horse or by vehicle. The slaughter was being administered on every side by our men. Shut out from the fortification and, his auxiliaries lost, Pompey began to hide himself in a cave at a valley and an eroded place, so that he would not easily be found by our men except by the indication of captives.
[40] Interfecto Cn. Pompeio adulescente Didius quem supra demonstravimus, illa adfectus laetitia proximo se recepit castello nonnullasque naves ad reficiendum subduxit et quodvis essent… brachium ex utrisque partibus… Lusitani qui ex pugna superfuerunt, ad signum se receperunt et bene magna manu comparata ad Didium se reportant. Huic etsi non aberat diligentia ad naves tuendas, tamen nonnumquam ex castello propter eorum crebras excursiones eliciebatur et prope cotidianis pugnis [cum Lusitanis confligebat. tum illi] insidias ponunt et tripertito signa distribuunt.
[40] With the young Cn. Pompey slain, Didius, whom we showed above, affected with that joy, withdrew to the nearest castle and beached several ships for repairing, and whatever they were… a mole from both sides… The Lusitanians who survived the battle retired to the standard and, with a very large band well assembled, make their way back to Didius. Although diligence was not lacking to him for guarding the ships, nevertheless he was sometimes lured out from the castle on account of their frequent excursions, and in almost daily fights [he was clashing with the Lusitanians. Then they] lay ambushes and distribute the standards in three parts.
There were men prepared to set the ships on fire, and, once set ablaze, men to repel any relief; these were so disposed as [to be seen by no one. the rest, in] the sight of all, strive to join battle. Thus, when Didius had advanced from the fort with his troops to drive them back, the signal is raised by the Lusitanians, the ships are set on fire, and at the same time those who had advanced from the fort to the fight, while they pursue the fleeing brigands at that same signal, are surrounded from the rear by an ambuscade when a shout is raised.
Didius, with great valor, is slain together with several men. And some in that battle seize the skiffs which had been at the shore; likewise several, by swimming, withdraw to the ships which were in the open sea, and, the anchors weighed, began to make for the open sea by oars. This circumstance was a support to their lives.
[41] Fabius Maximus quem ad Mundam praesidium oppugnandum reliquerat, operibus adsiduis [diurnis et noc]turnis circumsedit. Interclusi inter se decernere; facta bene magna… faciunt. Nostri ad oppidum recuperandum occasionem non praetermittunt et reliquos vivos capiunt, XIIII milia.
[41] Fabius Maximus, whom he had left at Munda to attack the garrison, encircled it with assiduous works [by day and by night]. Shut in, they decide among themselves; they make very good and great arrangements… they carry them out. Our men do not let slip the opportunity to recover the town and take the rest alive, 14,000.
They set out for Ursaon. Which town was held by great fortification, such that the place itself, aided not only by work but also by nature, impeded the enemy from oppugning it. To this there was the addition that, except within the town itself, a single source of water was nowhere to be found round about nearer than 8 miles.
Which matter was a great aid to the townspeople. Then, moreover, it was added that for the rampart … and the material and timber from which they are accustomed to bring up towers, it could not be found nearer than 6 miles. This Pompey, in order to render the assault upon the town safer, piled all the timber cut down around the town inside.
[42] Dum haec ad Mundam geruntur et Ursaonem, Caesar ad Hispalim cum Gadibus se recepisset, insequenti die contione advocata: Initio quaesturae suae eam provinciam ex omnibus provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse et quae potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse. Insequente praetura ampliato honore vectigalia quae Metellus inposuisset, a senatu petisse et eius pecuniae provinciam liberasse simulque patrocinio suscepto multis legationibus ab se in senatum inductis simul publicis privatisque causis multorum inimicitiis susceptis defendisse. Suo item consulatu absentem quae potuisset commoda provinciae tribuisse.
[42] While these things were being conducted at Munda and Ursaon, when Caesar had withdrawn to Hispalis, together with Gades, on the following day, an assembly having been called, he declared: At the beginning of his quaestorship he had made that province, out of all the provinces, peculiar to himself, and had lavished whatever benefactions he had been able at that time. In the ensuing praetorship, with his honor enlarged, he had petitioned from the senate that the taxes which Metellus had imposed be remitted, and he had freed the province from that payment; and, patronage having been undertaken, with many embassies by him introduced into the senate, and with public and private causes alike, the enmities of many having been incurred, he had defended them. Likewise, in his own consulship, though absent, he had bestowed upon the province whatever advantages he had been able.
He had learned, in this war and in the time before, that of all those advantages they were both unmindful and ungrateful toward him and toward the Roman People. 'You, by the law of nations and with the institutions of Roman citizens known, after the manner of barbarians have laid hands [once] and more often upon the sacrosanct magistrates of the Roman People, and in broad daylight you wished nefariously to slay Cassius in the middle of the forum. You have always so hated peace that at no time have the legions of the Roman People ceased to be kept in this province.'
Among you, benefits are reckoned in place of malefactions, and malefactions in place of benefits. Thus you have been able at no time to retain concord in peace nor virtue in war. Gnaeus Pompeius the younger, a private man in flight, received by you, seized for himself the fasces and the imperium, and, with many citizens slain, procured auxiliaries against the Roman People, and laid waste the fields and the province at your instigation.