Bacon: HISTORIA REGNI HENRICI SEPTIMI REGIS ANGLIAE

III. HUCUSQUE rex occupatus fuit in rebus domi constituendis. Verum circa hoc tempus oblata est occasio ut foras prospiceret, atque ad res exteras animum applicaret.

3. Thus far the king had been occupied with settling matters at home. But about this time an occasion was offered to look abroad, and to apply his mind to foreign affairs.

Carolus Octavus Galliarum rex virtute et fortuna patris et avi sui (Caroli Septimi et Ludovici Undecimi) regnum Franciae acceperat et opibus florentibus et ipso territorio amplius quam multis retro annis fuerat, cum redintegratio facta esset in illius membris principalibus (quae olim portiones coronae Franciae, postea autem ab ea avulsae fuissent, ita ut iam diu sub homagio tantum coronae, non in dominio, tenerentur, cum a principibus propriis iure tanquam regio administrarentur), Andegavia scilicet, Normannia, Provenza et Burgundia. Restabat tantum Britannia, quae cum corona Franciae uniretur, ut sic monarchia Franciae ad veteres terminos et limites proferretur.

Charles VIII, king of the French, had received the kingdom of France through the virtue and fortune of his father and grandfather (Charles VII and Louis XI), and with his resources flourishing and the very territory more ample than it had been for many years past, since a reintegration had been effected in its principal members (which had once been portions of the Crown of France, but afterwards had been torn from it, so that for a long time now they were held under homage to the Crown only, not in dominion, since they were administered by their own princes by a right as though royal), namely Anjou, Normandy, Provence, and Burgundy. Only Brittany remained, which, when it should be united with the Crown of France, would thus extend the monarchy of France to its ancient termini and limits.

2. Rex Carolus haud parva flagrabat ambitione et cupiditate illum ducatum recuperandi et reannectendi. Quae quidem eius ambitio prudens admodum fuit et pondus insigne habebat, minime certe similis ambitioni expeditionum suarum sequentium in Italiam. Sub initiis enim regni sui paternis consiliis regebatur (consiliis inquam, non consiliariis, cum pater eius consiliariis fere non usus sit, sed ipse sibi pro concilio esset, nec virum quenquam prudentiorem iuxta se haberet), atque illum regem patrem suum satis sciebat Carolus bellis Italicis aversum fuisse, et in Britanniam oculos suos coniecisse.

2. King Charles burned with no small ambition and desire of recovering and reannexing that duchy. Which ambition of his, indeed, was very prudent and carried notable weight—certainly by no means like the ambition of his subsequent expeditions into Italy. For at the beginnings of his reign he was governed by his father’s counsels (counsels, I say, not counselors, since his father hardly made use of counselors, but was himself for himself in place of a council, nor did he have any man more prudent at his side), and Charles knew well that that king, his father, had been averse to Italian wars, and had cast his eyes upon Brittany.

Multae erant res quae animum Caroli spe prosperi successus in hac re pascerent. Dux Britanniae aevo confectus et lethargus, et mercenariis consiliariis innitens, duarum tantum filiarum parens, ex quibus altera valetudinaria erat, nec diu susperstes futura. At Carolus in ipso aetates flore et robore iam erat, et populus regni Franciae pro ratione eius temporis bellici copiis, tam quoad duces quam quoad milites, satis instructus, viris militaribus qui in bellis Burgundicis meruerant nondum absumptis.

Many were the things that nourished Charles’s mind with hope of prosperous success in this matter. The Duke of Brittany, worn out with age and in a lethargy, leaning on mercenary counselors, was the father of only two daughters, of whom one was valetudinarian and not likely to survive long. But Charles was already in the very flower and strength of age, and the people of the kingdom of France, for the measure of that time in warlike forces, as regards commanders as well as soldiers, were well provided, the military men who had served in the Burgundian wars being not yet spent.

Pacem etiam cum omnibus vicinis principibus se colere non ignorabat. Quatenus vero ad illis qui consiliis suis perficiendis se opponere possent, Maximilianum Romanorum regem, qui sibi rivalis futurus esset (tam pro ducato quam pro nuptiis filiae) pecuniarum indigum sciebat; regem autem Henricum tam sibi nonnihil devinctum ob favores et officia eius praeterita quam domesticis turbis implicatum. Erat ei insuper praebita occasio pulchra et speciosa quae ambitionem suam tegeret et belli ansam adversus Britanniam porrigeret, eo scilicet nomine quod dux Britanniae ducem Aurelianensem et alios ex nobilitate Franciae (qui contra regem Carolum arma sumpsissent) ad se recepisset.

He was not unaware that he also cultivated peace with all the neighboring princes. But as for those who might be able to oppose the accomplishing of his counsels, he knew Maximilian, King of the Romans, who would be his rival (as much for the duchy as for the marriage of the daughter), to be in need of monies; and King Henry to be both somewhat bound to him on account of his past favors and services and entangled in domestic turmoils. Moreover, there was offered to him a fair and specious occasion to cover his ambition and to extend a pretext of war against Brittany, namely on the ground that the Duke of Brittany had received to himself the Duke of Orléans and others of the nobility of France (who had taken up arms against King Charles).

Quocirca rex Carolus, de bello Britanniae inferendo certus, satis cognoverat a nullo tam potenter sibi opponi posse quam ab Henrico (sive ratione status permoto ne regnum Franciae in nimiam potentiam excresceret, sive gratitudine quaddam adducto, quod ipse duci etiam Britanniae non minus quam sibi ob eius in rebus suis adversis merita obstrictus fuisset) si modo ille patribus se adiungere vellet. Itaque quamprimum Carolus audisset regem victoria sua in tuto collocatum, statim legatos ad eum misit qui auxilium ab eo peterent, aut saltem ut ne alterutri parti se addiceret. Legati illi regem apud Lancastriam offenderunt, et legationem in hanc sententiam declararunt.

Wherefore King Charles, resolved on bringing war upon Brittany, had well recognized that by no one could he be opposed so powerfully as by Henry (whether moved by raison d’état, lest the kingdom of France should grow into excessive power, or drawn by a certain gratitude, in that he himself had been obligated to the Duke of Brittany no less than to himself for the services rendered in his adverse affairs), if only he were willing to attach himself to the parties. And so, as soon as Charles heard that the king by his victory had been placed in safety, he immediately sent legates to him to request aid from him, or at least that he commit himself to neither party. Those legates found the king at Lancaster, and declared their embassy to this effect.

Primo regi impertiti sunt successum Caroli, quam paulo ante contra Maximilianum habuerit, in oppidis quibusdam quae invaserat Maximilianus recipiendis. Istud autem genus sermonis familiariter praemissum fuerat, acsi Carolus Henricum non pro amico aut foederato exteriore haberet, sed intimo suorumque tum affectuum tum fortunarum participe. Post istam insinuationem, ac deinde gratulationem regi ob victoriam suam in rebelles factam, ad rem de qua missi erant pervenerunt, significantes Henrico regem suum compulsum esse ad iustum contra Britanniam bellum, quod dux rebelles suos et hostes declaratos recepisset et auxiliis iuvasset.

First they imparted to the king the success of Charles, which a little before he had had against Maximilian, in the recovering of certain towns which Maximilian had seized. But that kind of discourse had been familiarly premised, as if Charles regarded Henry not as a friend or an exterior confederate, but as an intimate and a participant both of his affections and of his fortunes. After that insinuation, and then a congratulation to the king for his victory achieved over the rebels, they came to the business for which they had been sent, signifying to Henry that their king had been compelled to a just war against Brittany, because the duke had received his rebels and declared enemies and had assisted them with aids.

Non esse eos humiles aut calamitosos supplices qui in Britanniam ad auxilia imploranda aufugerint, sed tam eminentes viros ut liquido pateret consilia eorum non ad fortunarum propriarum praesidium, sed ad regis fortunas infestandas et invadendas spectare, cum caput eorum esset dux Aurelianensis, primus regii sanguinis princeps et persona ab ipso rege secunda. Ideoque si res recte perpenderetur, bellum merito iudicari posse ex parte domini sui potius defensivum quam offensivum, utpote quod omitti non poterat si status proprii conservatio sibi curae esset. Neque profecto primum ictum bellum constituere invasivum (quem princeps prudens nullus expectare vellet) sed primam provocationem, aut saltem primam praeparationem.

that those who have fled into Brittany to implore assistance are not humble or calamitous suppliants, but men so eminent that it is clearly evident their counsels look not to the safeguard of their own fortunes, but to infesting and invading the king’s fortunes, since the head of them is the Duke of Orléans, the first prince of the royal blood and the person second to the king himself. And therefore, if the matter were rightly weighed, the war could deservedly be judged on their master’s side rather defensive than offensive, inasmuch as it could not be omitted if the conservation of his own status were a care to him. Nor indeed does the first blow constitute the war as invasive (which no prudent prince would wish to await), but the first provocation, or at least the first preparation.

Imo bellum hoc magis rebellium suppressionem sapere quam bellum cum hoste legitimo, cum res huc redierit quod subditi regis proditores a duce Britanniae, regis feudatario, protegerentur. Satis scire regem Henricum quam perniciosi exempli res sit, si principes vicini rebellium patrocinia susceperent contra ius gentium et foederum. Neque tamen ignorare regem suum quod rex Henricus, in rebus suis adversis, multis et opportunis ducis Britanniae officiis nonnihil obligatus fuisset, neque ex altera parte dubitare quin rex Henricus non oblitus esset quam promptus rex suus fuisset in auxiliis ei submittendis cum dux Britanniae et consiliarii eius mercenarii eum destituissent et tantum non prodidissent.

Indeed, this war savors more of the suppression of rebels than of a war with a legitimate enemy, since the matter has come to this point: that the king’s own subjects, traitors, are being protected by the Duke of Brittany, the king’s feudatory. King Henry well knows what a pernicious precedent it is if neighboring princes should take up the patronage of rebels against the law of nations and of treaties. Nor, however, is their own king unaware that King Henry, in his adverse affairs, had been somewhat obligated by the many and timely offices of the Duke of Brittany; nor, on the other hand, do they doubt that King Henry had not forgotten how prompt their king had been in sending aids to him when the Duke of Brittany and his mercenary counselors had deserted him and all but betrayed him.

Quodque haud parvum subesset discrimen inter officia quae rex suus et ea quae dux Britanniae praestiterat, cum ducis Britanniae consilia ex rationibus utilitatis et emolumenti manare possent, contra vero ea quae dominus suus contulerat nulli alii caussae quam amori et sincero affectui tribui possint. Eo quod, si res haec ad amussim politicam examinata essent, longe fuisset rebus suis consultius ut tyrannus in Anglia regnaret, odio populi et turbis expositus, quam talis princeps cuius virtutes non poterant non magnum et potentem eum reddere, quandocunque eum rerum suarum compotem fieri contigisset. Sed quomodocunque se res haberent quoad obligationis respectum quem rex duci Britanniae debere videretur, tamen regem suum adduci non posse ut crederet regem Henricum ab eo quod iustum est declinaturum, aut in causam tam iniquam descensurum.

And that there would be no small distinction underlying between the services which his king and those which the Duke of Brittany had rendered, since the counsels of the Duke of Brittany could flow from considerations of utility and emolument, whereas, on the contrary, those which his own lord had conferred can be attributed to no other cause than love and sincere affection. For this reason: if this matter had been examined by the exact political rule, it would have been far more expedient for his affairs that a tyrant should reign in England, exposed to the hatred of the people and to tumults, than such a prince whose virtues could not but render him great and powerful, whenever it should befall that he became master of his own affairs. But however matters might stand with respect to the obligation which the king would seem to owe to the Duke of Brittany, nevertheless his own king could not be brought to believe that King Henry would deviate from what is just, or descend into a cause so iniquitous.

Itaque, cum bellum istud quod regi suo gerendum erat nihil aliud esse quam ut se a periculis imminentibus liberaret, sperare regem suum Henricum non minore studio et affectu ad conservationem status eius concursum, quam ipse Henrico ad adeptionem regni sui concurrisset. Saltem non dubitare quin rex Henricus, pro sua in pacem propensione quam semper prae se tulerat, spectator tantum bellum futurus esset, et inter partes neutralis. Neque enim posse dominum suum, nisi iniquus foret, a rege postulare ut partem belli capesseret, qui tam nuper a seditionibus et motibus intestinis coeperat respirare.

Therefore, since that war which his king had to wage was nothing else than to liberate himself from imminent dangers, he hoped that his own King Henry would concur with no less zeal and affection for the conservation of his status than he himself had concurred for Henry in the adeption of his kingdom. At least he did not doubt that King Henry, in accordance with his propensity for peace which he had always displayed, would be a mere spectator of the war, and neutral between the parties. For indeed his lord could not, unless he were unjust, demand from the king that he should take up a side in the war, he who so recently had begun to breathe again from seditions and internal commotions.

Verum de mysterio illo reunionis Britanniae ad coronam Franciae, sive per bellum sive nuptias cum haerede Britanniae, ne verbum quidem. Legati enim hoc veluti scopulum quendam exhorruerunt, satis scientes illud postulatis suis maximum obfutrurum. Sed econtra sermonibus suis quasi obiter inseruerunt regem suum apud se omnino constituisse filiam Maximiliani in uxorem ducere.

But concerning that “mystery” of the re-union of Brittany to the crown of France, whether by war or by nuptials with the heiress of Brittany, not a word. For the legates shuddered at this as at a kind of rock, well knowing that it would be most detrimental to their postulates. But, on the contrary, they inserted into their discourse, as if in passing, that their king had altogether resolved with himself to marry Maximilian’s daughter.

Simul et Henricum credere voluerunt regem suum totum in eo esse ut expeditionem in persona propria in Italiam, ad ius ad regnum Neapolitanum armis vindicandum, susciperet. Quae omnia eo spectabant ut Henricum ab omni suspicione abducerent de bello Britannico, nisi quatenus ad restinguendam flammam, quam in regnum proprium alias grassaturam merito formidaret, conduceret.

At the same time they wanted Henry to believe that their king was wholly intent on undertaking an expedition in his own person into Italy, to vindicate by arms his right to the Neapolitan kingdom. All these things looked to this: to remove Henry from every suspicion concerning the British war, except insofar as it might conduce to extinguishing the flame which he might rightly fear would otherwise spread into his own realm.

3. Rex, negotio cum concilio suo sanctiore communicato, legatis in hunc modum responsum dedit. Primum autem (quod legati fecerant) comitatem quandam verborum praemisit, inquiens se magna laetitia affectum quod regem oppida illa e manu Maximiliani recepisse ab illis didicisset. Deinde familiariter eis commemorabat particularia nonnulla de rebus suis, quamdiu in periculo fuisset, et de victoria postea secuta.

3. The King, the business having been communicated with his more select council, gave the envoys an answer in this manner. First, however (as the envoys had done), he premised a certain comity of words, saying that he was affected with great joy that he had learned from them that the king had received those towns out of Maximilian’s hand. Then, in a familiar way, he recounted to them certain particulars of his own affairs, how long he had been in peril, and of the victory that afterwards ensued.

Quod vero ad negotium Britanniae, rex paucis respondit. Regem Galliae et ducem Britanniae duos esse viros quibus ante omnes plurimum deberet. Quodque pro magno tibi ipsi infortunio duceret, si res ita inter eos procederent ut ei non liceret gratitudinem animi sui erga utrumque demonstrare.

But as to the business of Brittany, the king answered briefly. He said that the King of France and the Duke of Brittany were two men to whom, before all others, he owed very much; and that he would count it a great misfortune to himself, if matters proceeded between them in such a way that it were not permitted him to demonstrate the gratitude of his mind toward each.

Quodque nulla alia sibi pateret via, tanquam principi Christiano et utriusque amico communi, qua fidem suam erga Deum et homines exsolveret, quam ut se pacis et concordiae inter eos intercessorem offeret. Eaque inita via, minime se dubitare quin regi eorum status et honor, minore cum periculo, minore etiam cum invidia, conservari possint quam bello. Neque ulli se impensae aut labori parsurum esse (imo se veluti in pregrinationem aliquam sacram paratum esse proficisci) ut tam pium assequeretur effectum.

And that no other way lay open to him, as a Christian prince and the common friend of both, by which he might discharge his faith toward God and men, than to offer himself as intercessor of peace and concord between them. And, this course once entered upon, he least doubted that for their king his estate and honor could be conserved with less danger, and even with less envy, than by war. Nor would he spare any expense or toil (nay, he was prepared to set out as if upon some sacred pilgrimage) that he might attain so pious an effect.

Ita autem sermonem clausit. Se in re tanti ponderis, quae sibi harebat in medullis, animum suum per legatos proprius fusius declaraturum, quos omni mora seposita ad regem Galliae in eum finem missurus esset. Ita legati Galliae domum remissi sunt.

And thus he closed the discourse: that in a matter of such weight, which clung to his very marrow, he would declare his mind more closely and more fully through envoys, whom, all delay set aside, he would send to the king of France for that end. Thus the envoys of France were sent home.

Noluit autem rex de reunione Britanniae ad coronam Franciae quicquam intelligere videri, quemadmodum et legati nullam de ea mentionem fecissent, nisi quod rex verbo illo invidia aliquid de hac re subinnuisse visus est. Res autem ita se habuet. Rex neque iudicio tam imbecilli fuit neque negligenter informatus ut regis Galliae consilium de Britannia in ditionem suam redigenda eum fugeret.

However, the king did not wish to seem to take cognizance of anything concerning the re-union of Brittany to the crown of France, just as the envoys likewise had made no mention of it—except that by that word envy the king seemed to have hinted something about this matter. But the case stood thus: the king was neither of so feeble a judgment nor so negligently informed that the counsel of the king of France for reducing Brittany into his dominion should escape him.

Sed primum (utcunque simulabat) a bello contra regem illum ineundo aversissimus fuit. Fama de eiusmodi bello ei grata erat, sed res ipsa minime. Ex altera enim cernebat se locupletiorum fore, ex altera pauperiorem.

But at first (however much he was dissembling) he was most averse to entering upon a war against that king. The rumor of such a war was pleasing to him, but the thing itself by no means. For on the one hand he perceived that he would be among the wealthier, on the other poorer.

Etiam adhuc metuebat sibi a populo suo, quem idcirco armare nolebat. Veruntamen, ut princeps prudens et animosus, non in tantum a belli consiliis abhorrebat quin decretum ei esse bellum eligere potius quam ut Gallum sibi Britanniam subiicere permitteret, quod tam amplus et opulentus fuisset ducatus, et tam opportune situs ad Angliam infestandam, sive bello, sive impediendo commercium. Sed spes has fovebat rex, quod partim negligentia (quae Gallis vulgo imputari solet), partim viribus ducatus Britanniae propriis, quae parvae non erant, praecipue autem ob potentem factionem ducis Aurelianensis in regno Galliae (qui plurimis modis motus in Gallia intestinos suscitare possit ad regis Galliae consilia circa Britanniam discutienda), postremo autem ob potentiam Maximiliani, qui ei erat rivalis, res aut ex sese solvi aut ad pacem flecti posset.

He was even still afraid for himself from his own people, whom for that reason he was unwilling to arm. Nevertheless, as a prudent and high‑spirited prince, he did not so much abhor counsels of war that it was not determined for him to choose war rather than to permit the Frenchman to subject Brittany to himself, since it was so ample and opulent a duchy, and so opportunely situated for infesting England, whether by war or by impeding commerce. But the king fostered these hopes: that partly through negligence (which is commonly imputed to the French), partly through the duchy of Brittany’s own forces, which were not small, but especially on account of the powerful faction of the Duke of Orléans in the kingdom of France (who in very many ways could stir up internal commotions in Gaul for the purpose of unsettling the king of France’s plans concerning Brittany), and finally on account of the power of Maximilian, who was his rival, the affair might either resolve itself or be bent toward peace.

In quibus omnibus rex trutina non iusta res perpendebat, ut postea patuit. Misit igitur confestim rex legatum ad regem Galliae. Is erat Christophorus Urswicus capellanus suus, vir cuius fidem et prudentiam in multis obeundis negotiis perspexerat, eum potissimum eligens quod, cum ecclesiastica persona esset, eo magis ad legationem pacificatoriam idoneus videretur.

In all these matters the king was weighing things with no just balance, as later became evident. He therefore forthwith sent a legate to the king of France. This was Christopher Urswick, his chaplain, a man whose fidelity and prudence in undertaking many affairs he had observed; he chose him above all because, since he was an ecclesiastical person, he seemed all the more suitable for a pacificatory embassy.

eique etiam in mandatis dedit ut, si res Galliae tractatum pacis inire non abnueret, in Britanniam quoque ad ducem proficisceretur, tractatumque pacis utrinque ad maturitatem perduceret. Urswicus ad regem Galliae verba fecit quae cum regis Henrici ad legatos responso ut plurimum convenirent, instillando, sed molliter, nonnulla quae spectarent ad reconciliationem ducis Aurelianensis cum rege, et quaedam de concordia inter omnes partes sarcienda. At rex Galliae ex altera parte non sincere in hoc negotio versatus est, sed summo cum artificio et simulatione insigni ad eam metam collimans, ut tempus lucraretur auxiliaque Anglorum sub spe pacis retardaret donec Britanniam armis suis occupasset.

and he also gave him in his mandates that, if the state of France did not refuse to enter upon a treaty of peace, he should proceed into Brittany as well to the duke, and bring the treaty of peace on both sides to maturity. Urswick made a speech to the king of France which for the most part agreed with King Henry’s answer to the envoys, instilling, yet softly, certain points that looked to a reconciliation of the Duke of Orléans with the king, and some matters for patching up concord among all parties. But the king of France on the other side did not deal sincerely in this business, but with the highest artifice and notable simulation aiming at this goal: to gain time and to delay the English auxiliaries under the hope of peace until he had occupied Brittany with his arms.

Respondit igitur legato se prorsus in manu et potestate regis Henrici fore, eumque pacis arbitrum constiturum. Et facile ut legatus in Britanniam proficisceretur consensit, qui in hac re consensum suum declararet animumque ducis super hac re cognosceret, satis gnarus ducem Aurelianensem (cuius consilio res Britanniae omnino regebantur) secum reputantem nullis se conditionibus regi reconciliari posse, pacem prorsus disturbaturum. Itaque hoc modo sperabat se simul ambitionem suam apud omnes velaturum et existimationem iusti et moderati animi assecuturum, atque etiam gratiam apud regem Angliae summam initurum, utpote qui omnia eius arbitrio permisisset.

He therefore replied to the legate that he would be entirely in the hand and power of King Henry, and that he would appoint him arbiter of peace. And he readily consented that the legate should set out to Brittany, to declare his assent in this matter and to learn the duke’s mind on it, being well aware that the Duke of Orléans (by whose counsel the affairs of Brittany were altogether governed), reckoning with himself that he could by no terms be reconciled to the king, would utterly disrupt the peace. Accordingly, in this way he hoped at once to veil his own ambition before all and to acquire the reputation of a just and moderate spirit, and also to enter into the highest favor with the king of England, inasmuch as he had referred everything to his arbitration.

Imo (callidissimo consilio usus) fore providebat ut, licet bellum actu prosequeretur, tamen regem Angliae in opinione persisturum, eum illud solum agere ut gladium in manu ostentaret quo contrariae partis pertinaciam ad pacem recipiendam inflecteret. Atque hoc modo rex Henricus nihil prosecutione belli commoveretur, sed fore ut tractatus pacis ad ultimum usque continuaretur donec ipse rem armis confecisset.

Nay rather (employing a most cunning counsel) he foresaw that, although he was actually prosecuting the war, yet the king of England would persist in the opinion that he was doing only this: to brandish the sword in his hand so as to bend the contrary party’s pertinacity to accepting peace. And in this way King Henry would be moved in nothing by the prosecution of the war, but the negotiations of peace would be continued to the very end, until he himself had finished the matter by arms.

4. Quae cum rex Galliae recte admodum et prudenter aestimasset, omnia ex voto eius successerunt. Nam cum legatus Anglus ad aulam ducis Britaniae venisset, dux ipse vix sanae memoriae fuit, omniaque ducis Aurelianensis nutui parebant, qui legatum Urswicum mandata perferentem audivit, et quasi commotus et elato animo respondit ducem Britanniae, qui regi Henrico hospes olim fuisset, imo parentis loco, in tenera eius aetate et afflicto rerum statu, expectasse illo tempore ab Henrico (glorioso illo Anglorum rege) potius copias equitum et peditum validas quam inanem de pace legationem. Quod si rex praeterita ducis merita oblivioni mandasset, sciebat tamen regem qua erat prudentia provide consulturum et solide reputaturum quantum eius et securitatis et famae, tam apud exteros quam apud populum suum, interesset non pati ut Britanni (veteres Angliae foederati) a Gallia absorberentur, utque tot portus commodi et oppida maritima munita imperio tam potentis regis vicini, et inimici tot per saecula inveterati, adiicerentur.

4. When the king of Gaul had assessed these things quite rightly and prudently, all succeeded according to his wish. For when the English legate had come to the court of the duke of Brittany, the duke himself was scarcely of sound mind, and everything obeyed the nod of the duke of Orléans, who heard the legate Urswick bearing the mandates, and, as if stirred and with an elated spirit, replied that the duke of Brittany, who had once been a host to King Henry, nay in the place of a parent, in his tender age and afflicted state of affairs, had at that time expected from Henry (that glorious king of the English) rather strong forces of horse and foot than an empty peace-embassy. But if the king had consigned the duke’s past merits to oblivion, he nevertheless knew that the king, in accordance with his prudence, would provide and would solidly reckon how much it concerned both his security and his fame, as much among foreigners as among his own people, not to allow the Bretons (ancient allies of England) to be absorbed by Gaul, and that so many convenient ports and fortified maritime towns be added to the dominion of so powerful a neighboring king, and an enemy inveterate through so many ages.

Itaque humiliter se regem obsecrare, ut de hac re tanquam de re sua cogitaret. Atque hoc modo sermonem abrupit, et negavit se de ea re amplius tractaturum.

Therefore he humbly besought the king to think about this matter as about his own affair. And in this way he broke off the discourse, and denied that he would treat of that matter any further.

5. Urswicus primum ad regem Galliae rediit, atque ei quid in Britannia factum esset retulit. Qu i um res secundum expectationem suam cedere videret, occasionem arripuit dicendi legatum iam cernere potuisse id quod pro sua parte ipse partim praeviderat. Quando scilicet dux Britanniae in postate ducis Aurelianensis et suae factionis esset, nullm pacem sequi posse nisi ex tractatu mixto ex armis et argumentis.

5. Urswick first returned to the king of France, and reported to him what had been done in Brittany. When he saw that matters were turning according to his expectation, he seized the occasion to say that the envoy could already have discerned what he himself on his own side had in part foreseen: namely, since the Duke of Brittany was in the power of the Duke of Orléans and of his faction, no peace could ensue except from a negotiation mixed of arms and arguments.

Itaque se alteram partem suscepturum, regem autem rogare ne alteram desereret. Se utcunque sibi constare, regique fideliter promittere se semper in regis potestate futurum ut eas leges subiret in negotio pacis quas rex Angliae praescriberet. Haec quemadmodum acta essent Urswicus regi retulit, ea tamen adhibita moderatione ac si tractatus pacis pro re desperata minime haberi deberet, sed tantum horam magis propitiam praestolaretur donec malleus incudem saepius percussisset atque Britannos et eorum sequaces emmolivisset.

Therefore he said that he would undertake the one part, but begged the king not to desert the other. That, in any case, he was constant to himself, and faithfully promised the king that he would always be in the king’s power to undergo those laws (terms) in the business of peace which the king of England should prescribe. Urswicus reported to the king how these things had been transacted, yet with such moderation employed as if the negotiation of peace ought by no means to be held as a desperate matter, but only that a more propitious hour should be awaited until the hammer had struck the anvil more often and had mollified the Britons and their followers.

Ex quo factum est ut perpetuo inter reges Anglum et Gallum literae et nuncii volitarent, ab altero rege cupide sed candide, ab altero per simulationem super negotium pacis. Interea rex Gallus Britanniam cum magnis copiis invasit et urbem Nantiae arcta obsidione cinxit, atque, ut princeps non magni certe iudicii sed tamen qui simulationum artes in sinu patris optime perdidicerat, quo magis bello instabat eo magis tractatum pacis urgebat. Adeo ut durante Nantiae obsidione post multas retro citroque commeantes literas et nuncios, Gallus ad Henricum miserit Bernardum Daubemium, virum spectatum et eminentem, qui ab eo enixe peteret ut negotio pacis sub quacunque conditione finem imponeret.

From which it came about that continually between the kings of England and France letters and messengers fluttered to and fro—on the part of the one king eagerly but candidly, on the part of the other by dissimulation—over the business of peace. Meanwhile the French king invaded Brittany with great forces and ringed the city of Nantes with a close siege, and, as a prince certainly not of great judgment, yet one who had very well learned the arts of dissimulation in the bosom of his father, the more he pressed the war, the more he pressed the negotiation of peace. So much so that, during the siege of Nantes, after many letters and messengers passing to and fro, the Frenchman sent to Henry Bernard Daubeney, a tried and eminent man, to beg of him earnestly that he would set a limit to the business of peace under whatever condition.

6. Neque rex minus alacris et promptus fuit ad tractatum pacis instaurandum et accelerandum. Itaque tres legatos in Galliam misit, abbatem Abingdoniae, Richardum Tunstallum equitem auratum, et capellanum suum Urswicum quem prius miserat, mandans ut totis viribus in tractatum pacis strenue incumberent.

6. Nor was the king less eager and ready to restore and accelerate the negotiation of peace. And so he sent three envoys to France, the Abbot of Abingdon, Richard Tunstall, a knight of the golden spur, and his chaplain Urswick, whom he had previously sent, instructing them to apply themselves with all their strength, vigorously, to the negotiation of peace.

7. Circa hoc tempus baro de Woodilla (reginae avunculus), vir animosus et gloriae appetens, a rege petiit ut copias aliquas evocatorum secreto cogeret, atque absque commeatu aut fide publica in auxilium Britannorum duceret. Rex petitioni eius minime annuit (aut saltem ita credi voluit), eique pro imperio suo iniunxit ut nihil moveret, eo quod rex in iacturam honoris sui fieri putaret durante tractatu pacis auxilia summittere. Attamen baro iste (aut impetu effraeni, aut opinione temeraria regem clam ei rei favere quam tamen palam agnoscere refugiebat) secreto in Vectam insulam traiecit, quius erat praefectus, et copias electas ad numerum quadringentorum virorum coegit, et cum illis in Britanniam perrexit easque copiis ducis adiunxit.

7. Around this time the baron of Woodilla (the queen’s uncle), a spirited man and eager for glory, petitioned the king that he might secretly gather some forces of called-up men, and, without leave or public faith, lead them to the aid of the Britons. The king by no means assented to his petition (or at least he wished it so to be believed), and enjoined him by his authority to attempt nothing, because the king thought it would be to the detriment of his honor to send auxiliaries while the treaty of peace was ongoing. Nevertheless this baron (either by unbridled impulse, or by the rash opinion that the king secretly favored that affair which yet he shrank from acknowledging openly) secretly crossed over to the Isle of Wight, of which he was prefect, and gathered chosen troops to the number of four hundred men, and with them proceeded into Britain and joined them to the duke’s forces.

Cuius rei nuncii postquam in aulam Franciae allati sunt, ita nonnullos iuvenili sanguine ferventes veluti Furiis conciverunt ut legati Angli non sine periculo essent ne motu aliquo repentino violarentur. Verum rex Carolus, tum quod ius legatorum inviolatum servare volebat, tum conscius sibi quod in hoc negotio pacis ad regem Angliae collatus ipse simulationis palmam mereretur, severe edixit ne ulla fieret aut verbo aut facto in Anglos legatos, aut eorum comitatum et famulitium, contumelia. Statimque a rege Henrico nuncius advolvavit qui eum de baronis Woodvillae facto purgaret, eo principali usus argumento regem minime illius facti notitiam habuisse, quod copiae tam exiguae fuissent ut neque auctoritate publica aliqua emanasse eas verisimile esset, neque res Brittanicas quicquam promovere possent.

When messengers of this affair were brought into the court of France, they so stirred certain men, boiling with youthful blood, as if by the Furies, that the English legates were not without danger lest they be violated by some sudden tumult. But King Charles, both because he wished to preserve inviolate the right of legates, and because he was conscious to himself that in this business of peace, compared with the king of England, he himself would merit the palm of dissimulation, sternly decreed that no contumely should be done, either in word or in deed, to the English legates, or to their company and household. And straightway a messenger flew from King Henry to purge him in regard to the deed of Baron Woodville, using this as the principal argument: that the king had by no means any knowledge of that act, since the forces had been so scanty that it was not likely they had issued from any public authority, nor could they promote British affairs in any degree.

Cui nuncio etsi rex Galliae non prorsus fidem adhiberet, tamen cum serenitate quadam regi respondit sibique satisfactum esse de ea re significavit. Paulo post legati illi tres domum redierunt, quorum duo etiam in Britanniam ad res inspiciendas profecti fuerant, neque negotium ullo modo in melius provectum invenerunt. Post reditum suum regem de statu rereum plene informarunt, quamque longe rex Galliae a consiliis pacis abesset edocebant.

To this message, although the king of France did not altogether lend credence, nevertheless with a certain serenity he replied to the king and signified that he was satisfied in that matter. A little later those three envoys returned home, two of whom had even set out into Britain to inspect affairs, and they found that the business had in no way been advanced for the better. After their return they fully informed the king of the state of things, and showed how far the king of France was from counsels of peace.

Itaque videndum regi ut alia quapiam via insisteret et negotium pacis desereret. Neque tamen rex in universo hoc pacis negotio tractando credulitate mera peccaret (ut vulgo ei imputabatur), verum error eius ortum habuit non tam ex facilitate credendi, quam ex copiis alterius partis (quod ante innuimus) male mensuratis.

Therefore the king had to see to it that he take his stand on some other path and abandon the business of peace. Nor, however, did the king, in treating this entire business of peace, err by mere credulity (as was commonly imputed to him); rather his error had its origin not so much from a facility of believing as from the forces of the other party (as we hinted before) being ill-measured.

8. Ita enim rex cogitaverat. Primum de rebus Britannicis indicabat eas propter urbium et oppidorum minitorum et copiarum etiam vires haud celeriter accisas fore. Etenim consilia quae a rege Galliae eo tempore caelibe et sine liberis contra regni haredem agitata essent lenta admodum et enervia futura existimabat.

8. For thus the king had thought. First, concerning British affairs, he indicated that, because of the strength of the fortified cities and towns and of the forces as well, they would not be quickly cut down. Indeed, he judged that the counsels which were being agitated by the king of France—at that time celibate and without children—against the heir of the kingdom would be exceedingly slow and enervate.

Neque etiam fieri posse quin status Galliae motibus et turbis in ducis Aurelianensis favorem conquasseretur. Maximilianum etiam regem Romanorum ut principem bellicosum et magnae potentiae aestimabat, quem ad Britannorum auxilium propere accursurem minime dubitabat. Itaque, cum rem haud parvae morae futuram putaret, eius morae usuram et fructum ad se et res suas trahere destinabat.

Nor did he think it could be otherwise than that the condition of France would be shaken by movements and tumults into the favor of the duke of Orléans. He also esteemed Maximilian, king of the Romans, as a bellicose prince of great potency, and he in no way doubted that he would hasten promptly to the aid of the Britons. Therefore, since he supposed the affair would be one of no small delay, he intended to draw the interest and fruit of that delay to himself and his own affairs.

Primo autem hoc apud ordines parlamenti sibi emolumento futurum non dubitabat, quia satis sciebat eos in favorem rerum Britannicarum propensissimos larga manu pecunias collaturos. Quos quidem thesauros, ut fama elicere potuit, ita pax secuta eos in impensas bella erogari non permissura erat. Quoniam autem norat populum suum erga res Britanniae optime affectum, prorsus videri volebat quoad praeterita se potius Gallorum artibus deceptum, et veluti in soporem coniectum, quam ex motu proprio ad bellum minus alacram fuisse, cum sciret subditos suos rationum status quae ipsum merito retardare potuerunt minus capaces esse.

First, however, he did not doubt that this would be an emolument to himself with the orders of Parliament, because he knew well enough that they, being most propense in favor of British affairs, would with a liberal hand contribute monies. Which treasuries, though rumor could elicit them, yet the peace that followed would not permit to be disbursed into the expenses of war. And since he knew his people to be most well affected toward the affairs of Britain, he was altogether desirous to seem, as regards the past, to have been rather deceived by the arts of the French, and, as it were, cast into a slumber, than to have been less eager for war from his own motion, since he knew his subjects to be less capable of the reasons of state which could with good cause have delayed him.

Itaque at haec quae animo disposuerat nihil magis conducibile iudicabat quam ut tractatum pacis perpetuo continuaret, eum intermittendo aut renovando prout rerum progressus postularet. Neque oblitus erat lucrefacturum se sibi haud levem honorem, personam beati pacificatoris assumendo. Etiam illud non infimo loco ponebat, quod prospiciebat se posse nonnullum ex invidia quae in regem Galliae propter Britanniam occuptatum redundatura esset fructum capere in novis amicis et foederatis sibi adiungendis, veluti Ferdinando Hispaniarum rege, quocum semper etiam natura et moribus sympathiam quandam habebat, Maximiliano item, cuius res manifesto agebatur.

Thus, as to these things which he had disposed in his mind, he judged nothing more conducive than to continue the treaty of peace perpetually, interrupting or renewing it as the progress of affairs should require. Nor had he forgotten that he would acquire for himself no slight honor by assuming the persona of a blessed peacemaker. He also placed no small value on this point: that he foresaw he could take some profit from the ill will that would redound upon the king of France on account of his being occupied with Britain, by joining to himself new friends and confederates—such as Ferdinand, king of Spain, with whom he always had, even by nature and by manners, a certain sympathy, and likewise Maximilian, whose cause was manifestly at stake.

Itaque in summa sibi pecunias, honorem, et decus, foederatos, et in fine pacem qualem optabat satis indulgenter promiserat. Verum istae cogitationes nimis subtiles erant quam ut fortunatae esse possent et successum in omnibus sortiri. Etenim res magnae fere magis rigidae et contumaces esse solent quam ut callidioribus consiliis fingi et affabre efformari possint.

Therefore, in sum, to himself he had rather indulgently promised moneys, honor and glory, confederates, and in the end the peace such as he desired. But those cogitations were too subtle to be able to be fortunate and to obtain success in all things. For great affairs are commonly more rigid and contumacious than that they can be molded and skillfully wrought by craftier counsels.

Rex etiam in duobus illis fundamentis iaciendis quae ei eo pro principalibus erant magnopere deceptus est. Etsi enim probabiliter iudicabat concilium Franciae magna cautione usurum ne regem in bellum contra haeredem regni proximum coniicerent, tamen oblitus fuerat Carolum a viris e concilio primariis minime regi, sed a quorundam virorum ignobiliorum consiliis pendere, qui illud maxime spectarent, sibique et honori et gratiae futurum putabant, si senatores fortes viderentur et animosa, licet perniciosa, consilia impellerent, qualia nemo e potentioribus aut prudentioribus dare aut auderet aut vellet. Quod vero ad Maximilianum attinet, maiore tum is existimatione agebat quam postea.

In laying even those two foundations which to him were for principal ones, the king was greatly deceived. For although he judged plausibly that the Council of France would use great caution not to thrust the king into war against the nearest heir of the kingdom, yet he had forgotten that Charles was in no wise ruled by the leading men of the council, but depended on the counsels of certain more ignoble men, who chiefly aimed at this, and thought it would be for their honor and favor, if the senators should appear brave and should impel spirited, albeit pernicious, counsels—such as none of the more powerful or more prudent would either dare or wish to give. But as regards Maximilian, he then stood in greater estimation than afterward.

Neque enim mores eius instabiles, et conatus ob indigentiam suam semper fere inutiles, adhuc noti erant.

For his unstable manners, and his attempts, almost always useless on account of his indigence, were not yet known.

9. Postquam cum legatis deliberasset, qui revera nihil novi ei retulerunt sed quae ipse prius secreto expectaverat (licet ab iis rem totam perdidicisse prae se ferret), parlamentum statim convocavit, et primo parlamenti die ordinibus simul ex more congregatis Britanniae caussam per cancellarium suum Mortonum, Cantuariae archiepiscopum, proposuit, qui in hunc modum locutus est.

9. After he had deliberated with the legates, who in truth reported nothing new to him but the things he himself had previously expected in secret (though he put it forward as if he had learned the whole matter from them), he immediately convened parliament, and on the first day of parliament, the orders being together assembled according to custom, he proposed the cause of Brittany through his chancellor, Morton, archbishop of Canterbury, who spoke in this manner.

10. "Domini mei et magistri, rex supremis dominus noster mihi mandavit ut vobis caussas declararem quibus adductus fuit ut ordinum hunc conventum convocaret. Quas paucis perstringam, veniam a celsitudine sua et a vobis omnibus humiliter petens si hoc pro tenuitate mea, et non pro rei dignitate, praestiterim.

10. "My lords and masters, the king, our sovereign lord, has commanded me to declare to you the causes which induced him to convoke this convocation of the Orders. These I will touch upon in few words, humbly asking pardon from his Highness and from you all, if I shall have performed this according to my own tenuity, and not according to the dignity of the matter.

11. "Celsitudo sua primo omnium vobis notum facit quam alta mente reposuerit amorem et fidelitatem quam in ultimo conventu ei egregie exhibuistis in regali sua auctoritate stabilienda, hominibus partium suarum periculo eximendis, et hostibus ac proditoribus suis ulciscendis. Quibus plura a subditus erga regem suum in unica actione cumulari non potuerunt. Hoc in tam bonam partem a vobis accepit ut apud se decreverit communicare et deliberare cum subditis, a quibus tanta ei tributa sunt amoris et fidei pignora, de omnibus negotiis (quae quidem eius generis sint ut publicari debeant) tam domi quam foras.

11. "His Highness first of all makes known to you how deeply he has laid up in mind the love and fidelity which at the last parliament you excellently exhibited to him in establishing his royal authority, in exempting the men of his party from danger, and in avenging himself upon his enemies and traitors. By which, more could not have been heaped up by subjects toward their king in a single action. He has taken this from you in so good a part that he has resolved with himself to communicate and deliberate with his subjects, by whom such great pledges of love and fidelity have been bestowed upon him, concerning all affairs (which indeed are of such a kind that they ought to be made public) both at home and abroad.

12. "Duae igitur sunt caussae praesentis conventus. Una circa negotium magni momenti in partibus exteris, altera circa reipublicae administrationem domesticam.

12. "There are therefore two causes of the present convocation. One concerning a business of great moment in foreign parts, the other concerning the domestic administration of the commonwealth.

13. "Rex Galliae (ut proculdubio audistis) bello ducem Britanniae hoc tempore acriter invadit. Exercitus eius iam Nantesiam oppugnat, et arcta obsidione premit, principalem scilicet (si minus caeremoniae et praeeminentia, at certe robore et opulentia) eius ducatus urbem. De spe eius coniectura recte capi potest quod difficillimam belli partem primo loco aggressus est.

13. "The King of France (as without doubt you have heard) is at this time vigorously making war, assailing the Duke of Brittany. His army is already attacking Nantes, and presses it with a close siege—the principal city of that duchy, namely (if less in ceremonial rank and preeminence, yet certainly in strength and opulence). From this, one may rightly infer the measure of his hope, that he has first attacked the most difficult part of the war.

Huius belli caussam ipse rex Gallus optime novit. Praetexit receptos apud Britannos ducem Aurelianensem aliosque Galliae proceres (quos rex hostium suorum loco numerat) eisque auxilia subministrata. Alii aliter divinant.

The French king himself knows full well the cause of this war. He pleads as a pretext that the Duke of Orléans and other magnates of Gaul have been received among the Britons (whom the king counts as his enemies), and that auxiliaries have been supplied to them. Others divine otherwise.

Utraque pars a rege nostro non semel per legatos suos auxilia petierunt, rex Gallus sane auxilia aut neutralitatem, dux Britannus auxilia simpliciter. Haec enim res suae postulant. Rex tanquam princeps Christianus et filius ecclesiae pius se medium interposuit, ut pax componeretur.

Both parties more than once sought aid from our king through their legates: the French king, indeed, aid or neutrality; the British duke, aid simply. For their affairs demand these things. The king, as a Christian prince and a pious son of the Church, interposed himself in the middle, so that peace might be composed.

Rex Gallus de tractatu annuit, at belli prosecutionem intermittere recusat. Britanni autem, qui pacem maxime optant, consiliis de pace minus auscultant. Non confidentia aliqua aut etiam contumacia, sed suspicione et diffidentia de regis Galli sincera intentione, cum videant bellum non refrigescere.

The French king assented to a negotiation, but refuses to intermit the prosecution of the war. The Britons, however, who most desire peace, are less attentive to counsels about peace—not from any confidence or even contumacy, but from suspicion and diffidence concerning the French king’s sincere intention, since they see the war not cooling.

Ita ut rex post tantam curam et diligentiam quantam unquam in ali re quavis insumpserat adhibitam, cum neque ex una parte bellum, neque ex altera parte suspiciones propter belli prosecutionem magis impressas, compescere posset, tractatui finem dedit, non poenitentia motus, sed plane desperatione. Itaque ex hac narratione statum quaestionis percipere postestis super qua rex a vobis consilium poscit, quae huc redit, utrum rex suscipere debeat bellum defensivum et auxiliare a parte Britannorum contra regem Gallum?

Thus, after such care and diligence as he had ever expended in any matter whatsoever, since he could restrain neither on the one side the war, nor on the other the suspicions made more deeply impressed on account of the prosecution of the war, the king gave an end to the negotiation, moved not by repentance but plainly by desperation. Accordingly, from this narration you can perceive the state of the question on which the king asks counsel from you, which comes to this: whether the king ought to undertake a defensive and auxiliary war on the part of the Britons against the French king?

14. "Atque ut iudicium vestrum melius de hoc negotio informetur, iussit ut nonnulla apud vos proponerem de personis quae in hoc negotio intercedunt, nonnulla autem de negotii consequentiis quatenus in hoc regnum reflectere possint, nonnulla denique ex exmeplo eius in genere, neque tamen in alteram partem concludendo aut iudicium faciendo donec celsitudo sua fidele et politicum consilium vestrum de hac re intellexerit.

14. "And that your judgment may be better informed about this business, he ordered that I should propose before you some things about the persons who intercede in this business, some moreover about the consequences of the business insofar as they can reflect upon this kingdom, and finally some from the example of it in general, yet concluding to neither side nor making a judgment until His Highness shall have understood your faithful and politic counsel on this matter.

15. "Primo, quantum ad regem dominum nostrum (quo persona principalis est quam in hoc negotio intueri debetis), plane profitetur celsitudo sua se ex animo et constanter cupere ut in pace regnet. Sed simul ait se neque iactura honoris sui pacem empturum, neque conditiones pacis sub foenore periculorum accepturum, sed pro felici rerum suarum conversione habiturum, si Deo visum fuerit, intestinas seditiones quibus hactenus exercitus fuit cum bello externo honorabilo commutare.

15. "First, as regards our lord the king (who is the principal person whom in this matter you ought to consider), his Highness plainly professes that from his heart and steadfastly he desires to reign in peace. But at the same time he says that he will neither purchase peace at the loss of his honor, nor accept the conditions of peace under the usury of dangers, but will rather hold it for a happy conversion of his affairs, if it shall have seemed good to God, to exchange the domestic seditions by which until now he has been harassed for an honorable external war.

16. "Quod vero attinet ad reliquas duas personas quas haec actio complectutur (regem nimirum Gallum et ducem Britanniae), celsitudo sua notum vobis facit eos esse principes quibus ex omnibus amicis suis et foederatis plurimum debet, cum alter manu sua protectrice a malitia tyranni eum conservasset, alter ei manum salutarem ad regnum suum obtinendum porrexisset. Ita ut affectus suus, quatenus ad naturalem personam suam, neutro inclinet. Atque si forte audieritis celsitudinem suam compulsam fuisse e Britannia in Galliam fugere metu proditionis, hanc rem nolle celsitudinem suam ullo modo duci Britanniae imputari, in beneficiourum ante collatorum obliterationem, quod rex plene se informaverit eam rem ad mercenarios quosdam ducis consiliarios tantum pertinere qui, cum dux ipse graviter aegrotaret, eiusmodi, duce prorsus inscio, agitarunt.

16. "But as regards the remaining two persons whom this action comprehends (namely the French king and the Duke of Brittany), his Highness makes it known to you that they are princes to whom, among all his friends and confederates, he owes the most, since the one by his protecting hand had preserved him from the malice of the tyrant, and the other had extended to him a saving hand for obtaining his kingdom. So that his disposition, inasmuch as it concerns his natural person, inclines to neither. And if perchance you have heard that his Highness was compelled to flee from Britain into Gaul for fear of treason, his Highness does not wish this matter to be imputed in any way to the Duke of Brittany, to the effacing of benefits previously conferred, because the king has fully informed himself that the matter pertains only to certain mercenary counselors of the duke, who, when the duke himself was grievously ill, agitated measures of that sort, the duke being wholly unaware."

17. "Sed utcunque istae res, celsitudinem suam, si privatam personam tantum gereret devincere possent, satis tamen novit superiorem illam obligationem, quae se ad illa procuranda quae subditis suis praesidio et commodo esse possint obstringit, se itidem inferiore hoc obligationis genere exsolvere, nisi forte hoc sibi relinquat, ut si ad bellum celsutudo sua compulsa sit, illud sine acerbitate aut ambitione prosequatur.

17. "But however these matters stand, though they could bind his Highness if he were acting only as a private person, nevertheless he well knows that higher obligation, which binds him to procure those things that may be for the safeguard and convenience of his subjects, to release himself likewise from this lower kind of obligation—unless perhaps this be left to him: that, if his Highness is compelled to war, he prosecute it without harshness or ambition.

18. "Quantum ad negotii huius consequentias quoad regni Angliae statum, eae tales esse possint quales fuerint regis Galli fines et intentiones. Quae si ulterius non tendant quam ut subditos suos in ordinem redigat, nihil ad nos. Quod si regi Gallo in animo sit (vel licet non fuerit, tamen si sponte secuturum sit) ut Britanniam in provinciae formam constituat et coronae Franciae eam reuniat, tum digna est res quae magna cum sollicitudine et anxio iudicio perpendatur, quantum scilicet haec innovatio Angliae intersit, tam propter insigne regni Francie augmentum (amplissima adiecta regione quae in oras maris nostri per tractum non parvum porrigitur) quam quod inde privetur haec natio et nudetur tam firmis et fidelibus foederatis quales Britones se semper praestiterunt.

18. "As to the consequences of this business with regard to the state of the kingdom of England, they may be such as shall have been the ends and intentions of the king of France. If these do not tend further than to reduce his subjects to order, nothing to us. But if it be the French king’s purpose (or, even if it has not been, nevertheless if he should of his own accord pursue it) to set Britain in the form of a province and reunite it to the crown of France, then it is a matter worthy to be weighed with great solicitude and anxious judgment—namely, how much this innovation concerns England—both on account of the notable augmentation of the kingdom of France (a very ample region being added, which extends along the shores of our sea for no small tract), and because this nation would thereby be deprived and stripped of allies so firm and faithful as the Britons have always shown themselves.

Tum enim fore ut regnum hoc nostrum, cum olim etiam in continente potens esset primum territorio, postea affinitatibus, Burgundia scilicet et Britannia (quarum principes foederati nostri tantum erant, sed tamen foederati ex huius regni consiliis pendentes), altera iam nuper disiecta partim in augumentum potentiae Gallorum, partim Austriacorum, cedat, altera iam prope sit ut in Galliae potentiam coalescat, atque regnum hoc intra aquas salsas cohibeatur, cinctum maritimis provinciis potentissimorum monarchum.

For then it will come to pass that this our kingdom—since once it was powerful even on the Continent, first by territory, afterwards by affinities, namely Burgundy and Brittany (whose princes were only our confederates, yet confederates depending on the counsels of this realm)—the one, lately broken up, will yield partly to the augmentation of the power of the French, partly of the Austrians; the other is now almost at the point of coalescing into the power of France; and this kingdom will be confined within the salt waters, girded by the maritime provinces of the most powerful monarchs.

19. "Quantum ad exemplum quod inde promanare possit, illud (ut de consequentiis dictum est) ita se habet prout se habent regis Galli intentiones. Nam si Britanniam Gallia devoraverit, quemadmodum vulgi sermones (parati semper actionibus regum ambitionis notam inurere) divinant, dum vero res profecto esset exempli perniciosi, ut minor status a maiore opprimeretur. Ex hoc enim periculum imminere possit Scotiae ab Anglia, Lusitaniae ab Hispania, minoribus Italiae et Germaniae statibus a maioribus, imo etiam (si parva magnis componere liceat) perinde esset ac si aliquibus vobis minoris ordinis tuto vivere non liceret in vicinitate aliquorum ex his proceribus potentioribus.

19. "As to the example that might emanate therefrom, that (as was said about the consequences) stands as the French king’s intentions stand. For if France should devour Britain, as the talk of the crowd (ever ready to brand the actions of kings with the mark of ambition) divines, whereas indeed the matter would assuredly be of a pernicious precedent, that a lesser state be oppressed by a greater. From this, in fact, peril might hang over Scotland from England, Portugal (Lusitania) from Spain, the lesser states of Italy and Germany from the greater; nay even (if it be permitted to compare small things with great) it would be just as if some of you of lower order were not allowed to live safely in the neighborhood of certain of these more powerful grandees.

Huius autem exempli introductionem regi potissimum imputatam fore verisimile est, ut principi qui illud etiam cum bono reipublicae suae impedire maxime potuisset. Verum contra tam speciosus se offert ex regis Galli praetextus (at praetextus potentiae nunquam defuit) propter periculum regno suo imminens quod bellum hoc ex necessitate gerat, non ambitione, ut periculum ab exemplo nonnihil corrigat et mitiget. Siquidem periculum eius belli, quod solum in defensionem propriam suscipitur, nullum esse potest, quia penes quemlibet est illud pro libito devitare.

However, it is very likely that the introduction of this example will be imputed chiefly to the king, as to the prince who also could most have impeded it, and that too consistently with the good of his commonwealth. But, on the other hand, so specious a pretext presents itself on the part of the king of Gaul (and a pretext of potency has never been lacking): namely, because of the danger imminent to his own kingdom, that he wages this war from necessity, not from ambition—so that the danger from the example is somewhat corrected and mitigated. Since indeed the danger of that war, which is undertaken solely in one’s own defense, can be none, because it is in the power of anyone to avoid it at will.

Verum in hoc negotio universo rex se vestris gravibus et maturis consiliis permittit, in quibus acquisecere decrevit."

"Yet in this whole negotiation the king commits himself to your weighty and mature counsels, in which he has resolved to acquiesce."

20. Atque in hanc sententiam cancellarius locutus est quantum ad res Brittaniae. Rex enim ei mandarat ut tali orationis moderatione uteretur quae ordines ad Britanniae auxilium accenderet, regem autem aperta aliqua declaratione non obstringeret.

20. And to this purport the Chancellor spoke as far as concerns the affairs of Britain. For the King had instructed him to employ such moderation of speech as would kindle the orders to the aid of Britain, yet would not bind the King by any open declaration.

21. Cancellarius ad domestica orationem transtulit: "Quantum ad administrationem domesticam, rex mihi in mandatis dedit ut haec dicerem. Credere se nulli unquam regi (tam brevi regni spatio emenso) maiores et iustiores causas fuisse durarum contrariarum passionum, gaudii et doloris, quam sibi. Gaudii, ob immensos et manifestos Dei omnipotentis favores qui eum gladio regio cinxerat, eidemque gladio contra hostes suos universos semper adfuit, seque tot probis et fidelibus servis et subditis beavit qui nunquam destiterunt fidelibus consiliis, prompta obedientia, et animosa defensione eum prosequi; doloris, quod nondum Deo placuerit permittere ei ut gladium conderet (quod maxime expetebat, praeterquam in administratione iustitiae), sed quod toties compulsus sit ensem stringere ad proditorios et seditiosos subditos resecandos, quos (ut videtur) Deus reliquit (inter multos bonos aliquos malos) tanquam inter Israelitas Cananaeos, veluti spinas in lateribus suis, ad eos tentandos et probandos, etsi is semper fuerit rerum exitus (sit nomen Domini ob hoc benedictum) ut malitia eorum in caput proprium reciderit.

21. The Chancellor transferred his speech to domestic matters: "As to the domestic administration, the king gave me in mandate to say this. He believes that to no king ever (with so brief a span of reign elapsed) have there been greater and more just causes of hard contrary passions, of joy and of sorrow, than to himself. Of joy, on account of the immense and manifest favors of Almighty God who had girded him with the royal sword, and with the same sword has ever stood by him against all his enemies, and has blessed him with so many upright and faithful servants and subjects, who have never ceased to attend him with faithful counsels, prompt obedience, and spirited defense; of sorrow, that it has not yet pleased God to permit him to sheathe the sword (which he most greatly desired, except in the administration of justice), but that so often he has been compelled to draw the blade to cut away traitorous and seditious subjects, whom (as it seems) God has left (among many good, some bad) just as among the Israelites the Canaanites, like thorns in their sides, to test and to prove them, although the outcome of affairs has ever been this (blessed be the name of the Lord for this), that their malice has fallen back upon their own head.

22. "Quamobrem rex ait se iam admonitum esse quod sanguis in acie offusus neutiquam sanguini in civitate parcere possit, neque gladius martialis sit satis validus ad regnum hoc in plena pace constituendem. Sed quod vera via huc tendat ut rebellionum semina et origines sub initiis eorum comprimantur, et ad hoc obtinendum leges bonae et salubres excogitentur, confirmentur, et acuantur contra vim omnem et illicitos hominum coetus eorumque confoederationes et combinationes omnes, per vestium scilicet distinctiones, tesseras, et alia huiusmodi factionis symbola, ut pax regni talibus statutis veluti cancellis ferreis solide muniatur et stabiliatur, omnisque violentia et in aula et in agris et in domibus privatibus reprimatur. Cuius rei curam, quae ad vosmetipsos tam prope pertinet, quamque temporis ratio summopere flagitat, celsitudo sua prudentiis vestris commendat.

22. "Wherefore the king says that he has now been admonished that blood poured out in the battle-line can by no means spare blood in the city, nor is the martial sword strong enough to establish this realm in full peace. But that the true way tends to this: that the seeds and origins of rebellions be suppressed at their beginnings, and, for obtaining this, that good and healthful laws be devised, confirmed, and sharpened against every violence and the unlawful gatherings of men and all their confederations and combinations—namely through distinctions of clothing, tesserae (tokens/watchwords), and other symbols of faction of this kind—so that the peace of the realm may be solidly fortified and established by such statutes as by iron grates, and that all violence both in the court and in the fields and in private houses be repressed. The care of this matter, which pertains so closely to yourselves and which the condition of the times urgently demands, his Highness commends to your prudences."

23. "Quoniam vero regi cordi et curae est ut pax haec, in qua regnare et subditos suos tueri cupit, non tantum vobis folia producat sub quarum umbra secure recumbere possitis, verum etiam fructus vobis edat divitiarum et opulentiae, rogat vos celsitudo sua ut cogitationem suscipiatis de mercatura et commercio regulando, nec minus de manufacturis, regni promo vendis, unaque spurium illum et sterilem pecuniarum usum in foenus et illicita excambia iam erogari solitam, coerceatis, unde ad naturalem suum usum mercaturae et commercii legitimi et nobilis applicentur. Similiter, ut populo nostro copia fiat se in artibus mechanicis exercendi, quo modo regnum ex se et natibis suis mercibus subsistere possit, ut in otio non degant, atque thesaurus noster propter manufacturas forinsecas non exhauriatur. Quin et ulterius providere debetis ut quaecunque merces a partibus exteris in regnum introductae fuerint prorsus ad merces nativas nostras coemendas convertatur, unde sors regni non minuatur ex superimportatione mercium exterarum.

23. "Since indeed it is at the king’s heart and care that this peace, in which he desires to reign and to protect his subjects, should not only put forth for you leaves under whose shade you may recline securely, but also yield you fruits of riches and opulence, his Highness asks you to undertake consideration for regulating merchandize and commerce, and no less for manufactures, for the promoting of the realm; and together to restrain that spurious and sterile use of monies, now accustomed to be poured out into usury and illicit exchanges, so that they may be applied to their natural use of legitimate and noble commerce. Likewise, that there be provision for our people to have abundance of opportunity to exercise themselves in the mechanical arts, whereby the kingdom may subsist from itself and its native wares, that they may not live in idleness, and that our treasury be not exhausted on account of foreign manufactures. Nay, and you ought further to provide that whatever wares from foreign parts shall have been brought into the kingdom be altogether converted to the buying up of our native goods, whereby the stock of the realm be not diminished by the over-importation of foreign wares."

24. "Postremo, quoniam regi certo persuasum est vos eum pauperem nolle, qui vos divites esse cupit, minime dubitat quin curae vobis futurum sit ut reditus sui, tam ex vectigalibus quam alias, conserventur et augeantur, atque insuper ut subsidia pecuniaria, si postulet occasio, alacriter conferatis. Eo magis, quod satis nostris regem frugi esse, atque pro dispensatore tantum se gerere in commodum regni, quodque eae pecuniae quae a vobis conferuntur sint tantum instar vaporum qui e terra in sublime attrahuntur et in nubes coeunt, quae rursus in terram imbres refundunt. Quin et probe scitis vicina vobis regna magis magisque amplificata, atque tempora ista variis motibus obnoxia, itaque minime convenire ut regem a pecuniis imparatum offendant.

24. "Finally, since it is firmly persuaded to the king that you do not wish him to be poor, who desires you to be rich, he by no means doubts that it will be your care that his revenues, both from taxes and otherwise, be conserved and augmented, and moreover that pecuniary subsidies, if occasion should demand, you confer with alacrity. All the more, because it is well enough known to us that the king is frugal, and conducts himself only as a dispensator, a steward, for the advantage of the realm, and that the moneys which are contributed by you are only in the likeness of vapors which from the earth are drawn on high and cohere into clouds, which in turn pour back showers upon the earth. And indeed you know well that the kingdoms neighboring you have been more and more amplified, and that these times are liable to various commotions; and thus it is by no means fitting that they should encounter the king unprepared in respect of funds.

Plura non habeo quae dicam. Optarem autem ut quae dicta sunt melius fuissent declarata. Illud vero prudentia et benevolentia vestra supplebit.

I have no more to say. I would, however, wish that what has been said had been more clearly declared. That, indeed, your prudence and benevolence will supply.

Deus consiliis vestris aspiret." Hanc orationem cancellarius habuit, non comptam certe, sed solidam et perspicuam.

"May God favor your counsels." The chancellor delivered this oration, not adorned, to be sure, but solid and perspicuous.

25. Res difficilis non erat parlamentum ad istud Britanniae negotium disponere et afficere, tam propter aemulationem inter nationes Angliae et Galliae atque invidiam recentem quod regnum Galliae nuper incrementa acceperat, quam propter periculum quod Angliae imminere poterat si Galli tam amplam provinciam maritimam acquirerent, ut supra diximus. Commove`1atur etiam parlamentum oppressionis intuitu. Etsi enim quae afferebat rex Gallus essent satis probabilia, tamen apud multitudinem impares semper sunt congressus argumentorum et suspicionum.

25. It was not a difficult matter to arrange and effect a parliament for that British business, as much on account of the emulation between the nations of England and France and the recent envy because the kingdom of France had lately received increments, as on account of the danger which could threaten England if the French were to acquire so large a maritime province, as we said above. The parliament also is stirred at the prospect of oppression. For although the things which the French king was bringing forward were quite probable, yet among the multitude the contests of arguments and suspicions are always unequal—suspicions prevail.

Itaque consilium regi dederunt ut caussam Britanniae strenue amplecteretur et auxilia celeriter mitteret, magnaque alacritate regi amplum pecuniae subsidiariae modum concesserunt horum auxiliorum contemplatione. Verum rex, tum ut decorum servaret erga regem Gallum, cui se devinctum profitebatur, tum quod revera belli potius ostentandi quam gerendi erat cupidus, iterum solennes legatos ad regem Gallum misit, qui ei intimarent decretum ordinum et verbis dulcissimis intercessionem suam prius factam renovarent: ut scilicet rex Gallus a bello Britannico desisteret, aut si necessario bellum habendum esset, in bonam partem acciperet si populi sui precibus motus (qui caussae Britannorum tanquam veterum amicorum et foederatorum suorum impense favebant) suppetias eis mitteret, protestando nihilominus se, quo leges amicitiae et foederum cum Gallia religiose servaret, copiis suis imperare in animo habere ut Britannis quidem succurrerent, ad Gallos autem bellum minime extenderent, nisi quatenus ad possessionem Britanniae tuendam. Verum antequam ista speciosa legatio advenisset, ducis Britanniae res haud leviter perculsae sunt et manifesto declinare coeperunt.

Therefore they gave counsel to the king to embrace vigorously the cause of Brittany and to send auxiliaries speedily; and with great alacrity they granted to the king a large measure of subsidiary money in consideration of these aids. However, the king—both that he might preserve decorum toward the French king, to whom he professed himself bound, and because in truth he was eager rather for the ostentation of war than for its prosecution—again sent solemn envoys to the French king, to make known to him the decree of the estates and, in the sweetest words, to renew his prior intercession: namely, that the French king desist from the Breton war; or, if by necessity war must be had, that he take it in good part if, moved by the prayers of his people (who earnestly favored the cause of the Bretons as of their ancient friends and confederates), he should send them succor; protesting nevertheless that, in order religiously to observe the laws of amity and of treaties with France, he intended to command his forces that they should indeed succor the Bretons, but by no means extend the war to the French, except insofar as for guarding the possession of Brittany. However, before that specious legation had arrived, the affairs of the Duke of Brittany were not lightly smitten and began manifestly to decline.

Nam prope oppidum Sancti Albani in Britannia praelium commissum fuerat in quo Britanni profligati sunt, duxque Aurelianensis et princeps Aurasionsis capti, caesis ex copiis Britannorum sex millibus, atqud inter eos domino de Woodvilla et cohorte eius prope universa dum fortissime dimicarent. Ex parte autem regis Galli mille et ducenti ceciderunt cum duce suo Iacobo Galleotto viro in rebus bellicis spectato.

For near the town of St. Albans in Britain a battle had been joined, in which the Britons were routed, and the Duke of Orléans and the Prince of Orange were captured, with six thousand of the British forces cut down, and among them the Lord de Woodville and almost his entire cohort, while they were fighting most bravely. On the side, however, of the French king, 1,200 fell, together with their leader James Galeotto, a man distinguished in military affairs.

26. Postquam nova de hoc praelio in Anglia audita essent, expergefactus est rex, qui nullum iam subterfugium habebat sub quo tractatum pacis honeste continuare posset. Iam enim plane tanquam oculis cernebat Britanniam rapide perditam iri, prorus contra spes. Cum autem conscius sibi esset se tam apud populum suum quam apud exteros magnam sustinere invidiam, imo et infamiam, propter priores moras, statim auxilia quanta potuit cum celeritate in Britanniam misit.

26. After the news about this battle had been heard in England, the king was roused, who now had no subterfuge under which he could honorably continue the negotiation of peace. For already plainly, as if with his eyes, he perceived that Britain would rapidly be lost, utterly contrary to expectations. And since he was conscious that he was sustaining great ill-will—nay, even infamy—both with his own people and with foreigners, on account of his earlier delays, straightway he sent auxiliaries, as many as he could, with celerity into Britain.

Quod fecit sub ductu Roberti domini Brooki ad numerum octo milium virorum lectorum et bene armatorum, qui propitio usi vento intra paucas horas Britanniam tenuerunt et se copiarum ducis reliquiis adiunxerunt, statimque perrexerunt ad hostes atque prope eos castrametati sunt. Galli possessione victoriae sobrie utentes atque animos et alacritatem Anglorum probe cognoscentes, praesertim sub initiis militandi, se intra vallum continuerunt, castris optime munitis, certi manum non conserere. Sed interim, ut copias Anglas sursum deorsum iactarent et defatigarent, eas levis armaturae equitibus adoriebantur et vexabant, in quibus certaminibus tamen plerunque detrimenta acceperunt, potissimum per sagittarios Anglorum.

Which he did under the leadership of Robert, Lord Brooke, to the number of eight thousand chosen men and well-armed, who, using a propitious wind, within a few hours reached Britain and joined themselves to the remnants of the commander’s forces, and at once they marched on to the enemy and encamped near them. The French, using the possession of their victory soberly and well knowing the spirit and alacrity of the English, especially at the beginnings of campaigning, kept themselves within the rampart, their camp excellently fortified, resolved not to join battle. But meanwhile, so as to toss the English forces up and down and wear them out, they kept assailing and harassing them with light-armed cavalry, in which skirmishes, however, they for the most part took losses, chiefly by the English archers.

27. Verum hoc rerum statu Franciscus dux Britaniae obiit. Quod quidem accidens rex facile praevidere potuerat, et debuerat certe hoc ipsum supponere, et huic eventui consilia sua aptare, nisi quod honoris contemplatio propter nova de praelio facta allata, quae regem ad aliquid propere exequendum extimulavit, belli rationes pervertisset.

27. But with affairs in this condition, Francis, duke of Brittany, died. This occurrence the king could easily have foreseen, and he ought certainly to have supposed this very thing, and to adapt his counsels to this event—except that a consideration of honor, because of the newly reported deeds of the battle, which stimulated the king to execute something in haste, had perverted the calculations of the war.

28. Post ducis obitum primarii Britanniae viri, partim empti, partim factionibus imbuti, omnia permiscuerunt. Adeo ut Angli, nec caput nec corpus reperientes quibus se adiungerent, atque non minus a sociis quam ab hostibus sibi metuentes, hyeme iam ingruente, domum post quinque menses ab eorum traiectu redierint. Atque hoc modo praelium Sancti Albani, mors ducis Francisci, et auxiliorum Anglorum recessus Britanniam tandem perdiderunt.

28. After the duke’s death, the principal men of Brittany, partly bought and partly imbued with factions, threw everything into confusion. To such a degree that the English, finding neither head nor body to which they might attach themselves, and fearing for themselves no less from allies than from enemies, with winter now impending, returned home after five months from their crossing. And in this way the battle of Saint Alban, the death of Duke Francis, and the withdrawal of the English auxiliaries at last ruined Brittany.

Quam rem alii ut iudicii regis maculam, alii ut temporum eius infortuniam acceperunt.

Some received this matter as a blemish on the king’s judgment, others as the misfortune of his times.

29. Sed utcunque fructus parlamenti horarii circa res Britannicas male cesserant, nihilominus fructus illi durabiles et parlamentorum proprii (bonae scilicet et salubres leges) prospere se habuerunt, atque in hunc diem permanent. Nam ex monitis cancellarii eo parlamento leges nonnullae egregiae circa ea quae rex proposuerat latae fuerunt.

29. But although the fruits of the short‑lived parliament concerning British affairs had turned out badly, nonetheless those durable fruits, proper to parliaments (namely good and salutary laws), fared prosperously and remain to this day. For, on the admonitions of the chancellor, in that parliament several excellent laws were enacted concerning the matters which the king had proposed.

30. Primo, auctoritas camerae stellatae, quae antea legi regni communi tantum nitebatur in aliquibus casibus, robore statuti suffulta est. Curiamautem ista ex maxime prudentibus et generosis huius regni institutis censeri possit. Nam in distributione tribunalium regni (excepta curia suprema parlamenti) in qua curia banci regis criminibus quae contra coronam committuntur, curia banci communis litibus civilibus, curia scaccarii caussis quae ad reditus et proventus regis spectant, et curia cancellariae caussis quae mitigationem rigoris iuris, ex arbitrio boni viri, ad exemplum iuris praetorii merentur, politice admodum assignatae sunt, semper tamen reservata est magna et praeeminens iurisdictio consilio sanctiori regis in caussis quae vel exemplo vel consequentia regni statum publicum oppugnare et convellere possent.

30. First, the authority of the Star Chamber, which before had leaned only upon the common law of the realm in some cases, was propped up by the strength of a statute. This court, moreover, may be reckoned among the most prudent and noble institutions of this realm. For in the distribution of the realm’s tribunals (the supreme court of parliament excepted), in which the King’s Bench is assigned to crimes committed against the crown, the Common Pleas to civil suits, the Exchequer to causes that look to the king’s revenues and profits, and the Chancery to causes which deserve a mitigation of the rigor of the law, by the discretion of a good man, after the example of praetorian law, matters were very wisely assigned; yet a great and preeminent jurisdiction has always been reserved to the king’s more sacred council in those causes which by example or consequence might attack and tear apart the public state of the realm.

Quae si criminalia fuerint, consueuerunt consiliarii in camera (quae vocatur) stellata, sin civiles, in camera vel aula (quam vocant) alba convenire. At quemadmodum cancellaria ius praetorium ita camera stellata ius censorium (demptis tamen rebus capitalibus) imitatur. Ista autem curia camerae stellatae ex bonis composita est elementis.

If these shall have been criminal, the councillors are accustomed to assemble in the chamber (which is called) the Star-Chamber; but if civil, in the chamber or hall (which they call) the White Chamber. And just as the Chancery imitates praetorian law, so the Star-Chamber imitates censorial law (capital matters excepted). Moreover, that court of the Star-Chamber is composed of good elements.

Ex quatuor enim generibus personarum commista est, consiliariis regis, proceribus, praelatii, et iudicibus aliarum curiarum principalibus. Etiam quatuor caussarum genera praecipue tractat, vim illatam, fraudes, crimina varia stellationatus, et inchoamenta sive actus medios qui vergunt ad crimina capitalia aut alias atrocia, licet nunquam actualiter commissa et perpetrata fuerint. Sed quod praecipue in hoc statuto rex volebat erat suppressio turbarum illictarum una cum caussis earum praecipuis, hoc est multitudinis combinationibus et potentium patrociniis.

For it is compounded from four kinds of persons: the king’s councillors, the nobles, the prelates, and the principal judges of the other courts. It also chiefly handles four kinds of causes: violence inflicted, frauds, various crimes of stellionate, and inchoations or intermediate acts which verge toward capital or otherwise atrocious crimes, even though they may never actually have been committed and perpetrated. But what the king chiefly desired in this statute was the suppression of unlawful tumults together with their principal causes, that is, the combinations of the multitude and the patronages of the powerful.

31. Ab universali regni pace, descendit regis cura ad pacem aulae et famulatii ipsius regis, et securitatem consiliariorum suorum ac magistratuum eminentium. Verum hoc statutum miri cuiusdam erat temperamenti. Nam in hanc sententiam perscriptum est, ut si quis ex regio famulitio (qui tamen infra gradum baronis sit) in vitam alicuius consiliarii regis aut baronis regni coniurasset, factum est crimen, licet res peracta non fuerit, capitale.

31. From the universal peace of the realm, the king’s care descends to the peace of the court and of the very household of the king, and to the security of his councillors and eminent magistrates. Yet this statute was of a certain remarkable tempering. For it was written to this effect: that if anyone of the royal household (who nevertheless is below the rank of baron) should have conspired against the life of any councillor of the king or baron of the realm, the offense is made capital, although the deed has not been carried out.

Ista lex a cancellarii suspicionibus fluxisse existimata est, qui cum vir austerus et imperiosus esset, atque in aula regia inimicos nonnullos sibi infensissimos degere cognosceret, suae securitati prospexit invidiam suam generali legis ordinatione obruens, praesidium nempe hoc cum omnibus consiliariis et nobilibus communicando. Neque tamen ausus est legem ulterius extendere quam ad famulitium conscriptum ipsius regis, ne minori nobiitati et plebi regni nimis dura res videretur. Quae merito credere possent libertatem suam antiquam et clementiam legum Anglicarum sensim invadi, si voluntas mera, alias quam in criminibus laesae maiestatis, pro facto reputaretur.

This law was thought to have flowed from the chancellor’s suspicions, who, since he was an austere and imperious man, and perceived that in the royal court certain enemies most hostile to him were dwelling, looked to his own security, overwhelming his odium by a general ordinance of law—namely, by sharing this safeguard with all the counsellors and nobles. Nor, however, did he dare to extend the law further than to the king’s own enrolled household/retinue, lest the matter seem too harsh to the lesser nobility and the plebs (commons) of the realm. These might with good reason believe that their ancient liberty and the clemency of the English laws were being gradually encroached upon, if mere will, otherwise than in crimes of lèse-majesté, were reckoned as a deed.

Attamen caussa quae in statuto ipso inserta est (nimirum quod qui in vitam consiliariorum conspirat, merito censeri possit oblique et mediate ipsius regis mortem moliri) aeque omnibus subditis ac aulicis communis est. Verum haec legis angustia ad id quo cancellarius tenderat satis erat. Sed tamen vitam eo usque produxit ut ei etiam lege generali opus fuisset, cum non minus populo quam aulae regiae postea odio fuerit.

Nevertheless, the cause which is inserted in the statute itself (to wit, that he who conspires against the life of the counsellors may rightly be deemed to be contriving, obliquely and mediately, the death of the king himself) is equally common to all subjects and to courtiers. However, this narrowness of the law was enough for that to which the chancellor tended. But yet he prolonged his life to the point that he too would have needed a general law, since afterwards he was no less hateful to the people than to the royal court.

32. A pace aulae et familiae regiae, rursus cura regis descendit ad pacem familiarum privatarum. Lata est enim lex iusta et moralis per quam asportatio foeminarum per vim vontra voluntatem suam (exceptis pupillis femellis et ancillis) capitalis facta est, parlamento prudenter et merito censente crimen abripiendi foeminas per vim in possessionem extraneorum (licet postea per illecebras aut austutias concilietur earum assensus) nihil aliud esse quam raptum in longum productum, quia prima vis reliqua traxisse praesumitur.

32. From the peace of the court and the royal household, the king’s care descended again to the peace of private families. For a just and moral law was passed by which the carrying off of women by force against their will (with female wards and maidservants excepted) was made a capital crime, Parliament prudently and deservedly deeming that the crime of snatching away women by force into the possession of strangers (although afterwards their assent be won by allurements or crafty devices) is nothing else than rape prolonged, since the initial violence is presumed to have drawn the rest after it.

33. Sancita est alia quoque lex ad pacem subditorum in genere, et caedium et homicidiorum repressionem, atque in emendationem legum antiquarum. Ea fuit, ut cum per legem communem prosecutio homicidiorum in nomine regis annum et diem expectaret, quod spatium uxori aut haeredi occisi datum est ut nomine proprio accusationem peragerent, cumque experentia monstraret quod pars aggravata saepius pretio aut variis modis inducta, aut lite ipsa defatigata, accusationem desereret, atque eo temporis tractu res quasi in oblivionem transieret, et hoc modo prosecutio in nomine regis (quae semper flagrante crimine vivacior est) neglecta esset, ordinatum fuit prudentissime ut prosecutio in nomine regis etiam intra annum et diem admitti possit absque praeiudicio tamen prosecutionis in nomine partis laesae.

33. Another law likewise was sanctioned for the peace of the subjects in general, and for the repression of slayings and homicides, and for the emendation of ancient laws. It was this: whereas by the common law the prosecution of homicides in the king’s name waited a year and a day—the span given to the wife or the heir of the slain to carry through the accusation in their own name—and since experience showed that the aggrieved party, more often induced by a price or by various modes, or wearied by the suit itself, would abandon the accusation, and that in that tract of time the matter would, as it were, pass into oblivion, and in this way the prosecution in the king’s name (which is always more vivacious while the crime is flagrant) was neglected, it was most prudently ordained that prosecution in the king’s name may also be admitted within the year and a day, without prejudice, however, to the prosecution in the name of the injured party.

34. Tum quoque rex coepit, non minus prudenter quam iuste, cleri privilegia nonnihil amputare, facta ordinatione ut clerici capitalis criminis convicti candente ferro in manu signarentur, tum ut aliquo corporali supplicio afficerentur quam ut ignominiae notam secum ferrent. Verum huius salubris legis gratia rex postea Perkini edicto laceratus est tanquam privilegiorum sanctae ecclesiae immanis et execrabilis violator.

34. Then likewise the king began, no less prudently than justly, to abridge somewhat the privileges of the clergy, an ordinance having been made that clerics convicted of a capital crime should be marked with a glowing iron in the hand, both that they be afflicted with some corporal punishment and that they carry with them a mark of ignominy. Yet on account of this salutary law the king was afterwards torn by Perkin’s edict, as a monstrous and execrable violator of the privileges of holy Church.

35. Etiam alia lex lata fuit paci regni consulens, qua puniebantur officiarii et firmarii regis amissione officiorum et firmarum suarum, si familitiis nobilium aut aliorum, nisi domestici essent, se aggregarent aut illicitis coetibus participarent.

35. Another law also was passed, providing for the peace of the realm, whereby the king’s officers and revenue-farmers were punished with the loss of their offices and farms, if they attached themselves to the households (retinues) of nobles or of others, unless they were domestics, or took part in illicit assemblies.

36. Atque has leges ad vim et turbas reprimendas ordinatae sunt quibus tempora illa maxime indigebant. Et adeo prudenter constitutae sunt ut in hunc usque diem, temporis ipsius suffragiis confirmatae, durent.

36. And these laws were ordained for the repressing of violence and tumults, which those times especially needed. And they were so prudently constituted that, to this very day, confirmed by the suffrages of time itself, they endure.

37. Latae sunt etiam leges bonae et politicae contra foenus, quod est usus pecuniae spurius, et contra illicita excambia et contractus fictos, qui sunt item instar foenoris spurii. Aliae etiam pro securitate vectigalium regis atque conversione pecuniarum ex mercibus externis provenientum in merces regni nativas, una cum aliis minoribus momenti legibus.

37. Good and political laws were also enacted against usury, which is the spurious use of money, and against illicit exchanges and fictitious contracts, which likewise are in the likeness of spurious usury. Others also for the security of the king’s revenues and for the conversion of monies arising from foreign merchandise into the native wares of the kingdom, together with other laws of lesser moment.