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Dig. 13.3.0. De condictione triticiaria.
13.2.0. On the condictio by statute.
Dig. 13.3.0. On the triticiary condictio.
Dig. 13.6.0. Commodati vel contra.
13.5.0. On money constituted.
Dig. 13.6.0. Loan for use, or the contrary.
Si condicatur servus ex causa furtiva, id venire in condictionem certum est quod intersit agentis, veluti si heres sit institutus et periculum subeat dominus hereditatis perdendae. quod et iulianus scribit. item si mortuum hominem condicat, consecuturum ait pretium hereditatis.
If a slave is demanded by condictio on a furtive cause, it is certain that that comes into the condictio which is the plaintiff’s interest—for example, if he has been instituted heir and the owner incurs the peril of the inheritance being lost. Which Julian also writes. Likewise, if he brings a condictio for a man who is dead, he says he will obtain the price of the inheritance.
Furti actio poenam petit legitimam, condictio rem ipsam. ea res facit, ut neque furti actio per condictionem neque condictio per furti actionem consumatur. is itaque, cui furtum factum est, habet actionem furti et condictionem et vindicationem, habet et ad exhibendum actionem.
The action for theft seeks the legitimate penalty, the condictio the thing itself. That circumstance brings it about that neither the action for theft is extinguished by the condictio nor the condictio by the action for theft. Accordingly, he to whom a theft has been done has the action for theft and the condictio and the vindicatio; he also has the action ad exhibendum.
Condictio rei furtivae, quia rei habet persecutionem, heredem quoque furis obligat, nec tantum si vivat servus furtivus, sed etiam si decesserit: sed et si apud furis heredem diem suum obiit servus furtivus vel non apud ipsum, post mortem tamen furis, dicendum est condictionem adversus heredem durare. quae in herede diximus, eadem erunt et in ceteris successoribus.
Because the condictio for a stolen thing, since it has a pursuit of the thing (rei persecutio), also obligates the thief’s heir, not only if the stolen slave is alive but even if he has died: and even if the stolen slave has met his day (died) in the thief’s heir’s keeping, or not in his keeping, yet after the thief’s death it must be said that the condictio endures against the heir. What we have said of the heir will be the same also for the other successors.
In re furtiva condictio ipsorum corporum competit: sed utrum tamdiu, quamdiu exstent, an vero et si desierint esse in rebus humanis? et si quidem optulit fur, sine dubio nulla erit condictio: si non optulit, durat condictio aestimationis eius: corpus enim ipsum praestari non potest.
In the case of a stolen thing, a condiction lies for the very objects themselves: but is it only so long as they exist, or even if they have ceased to be among human affairs? And if indeed the thief has tendered it, without doubt there will be no condiction; if he has not tendered it, the condiction for its valuation persists: for the body itself cannot be rendered.
Si ex causa furtiva res condicatur, cuius temporis aestimatio fiat, quaeritur. placet tamen id tempus spectandum, quo res umquam plurimi fuit, maxime cum deteriorem rem factam fur dando non liberatur: semper enim moram fur facere videtur.
If, on account of a furtive cause, a thing is brought by condiction, the question arises at what time the valuation should be made. It is, however, the accepted view that one must look to that time at which the thing was ever worth the most, especially since the thief is not discharged by giving back a thing that has been made worse; for the thief is always considered to be in delay.
Sive manifestus fur sive nec manifestus sit, poterit ei condici. ita demum autem manifestus fur condictione tenebitur, si deprehensa non fuerit a domino possessio eius: ceterum nemo furum condictione tenetur, posteaquam dominus possessionem adprehendit. et ideo iulianus, ut procedat in fure manifesto tractare de condictione, ita proponit furem deprehensum aut occidisse aut fregisse aut effudisse id quod interceperat.
Whether the thief be manifest or not manifest, a condiction can be brought against him. Only then, however, will a manifest thief be held by condiction, if his possession has not been apprehended by the owner; moreover, no thief is held by condiction after the owner has seized possession. And therefore julianus, so that treating of condiction may proceed in the case of a manifest thief, thus proposes: that the thief, when caught, has either killed, or broken, or poured out that which he had intercepted.
Unde celsus libro duodecimo digestorum scribit, si rem furtivam dominus pure legaverit furi, heredem ei condicere non posse: sed et si non ipsi furi, sed alii, idem dicendum est cessare condictionem, quia dominium facto testatoris, id est domini, discessit.
Whence Celsus writes in book 12 of the Digesta, that if the owner has unconditionally bequeathed the stolen thing to the thief, the heir cannot bring a condictio against him; and even if not to the thief himself, but to another, the same is to be said—that the condictio ceases—because the dominion, by the act of the testator, that is, of the owner, has departed.
Ex argento subrepto pocula facta condici posse fulcinius ait: ergo in condictione poculorum etiam caelaturae aestimatio fiet, quae impensa furis facta est, quemadmodum si infans subreptus adoleverit, aestimatio fit adulescentis, quamvis cura et sumptibus furis creverit.
Fulcinius says that cups made from stolen silver can be claimed by condiction: therefore, in the condiction for the cups, the valuation will also include the chasing, which was an expenditure made by the thief—just as, if an infant stolen has grown up, the valuation is made of the adolescent, although he has grown by the thief’s care and expenses.
Si servus furtivus sub condicione legatus fuerit, pendente ea heres condictionem habebit et, si lite contestata condicio exstiterit, absolutio sequi debebit, perinde ac si idem servus sub condicione liber esse iussus fuisset et lite contestata condicio exstitisset: nam nec petitoris iam interest hominem recipere et res sine dolo malo furis eius esse desiit. quod si pendente condicione iudicaretur, iudex aestimare debebit, quanti emptorem invenerit.
If a stolen slave has been bequeathed under a condition, while that is pending the heir will have a condiction; and if, after joinder of issue (litis contestatio), the condition has come about, an acquittal ought to follow, just as if the same slave had been ordered to be free under a condition and, after joinder of issue, the condition had come about: for it is no longer of concern to the petitioner to recover the man, and the thing has ceased, without fraud (dolus malus), to belong to that thief. But if judgment were to be given while the condition is pending, the judge ought to assess the value at the price at which he finds that the purchaser bought him.
Bove subrepto et occiso condictio et bovis et corii et carnis domino competit, scilicet si et corium et caro contrectata fuerint ^ fuerunt^: cornua quoque condicentur. sed si dominus condictione bovis pretium consecutus fuerit et postea aliquid eorum, de quibus supra dictum est, condicet, omnimodo exceptione summovetur. contra si corium condixerit et pretium eius consecutus bovem condicet, offerente fure pretium bovis detracto pretio corii doli mali exceptione summovebitur.
With an ox stolen and slain, a condiction for both the ox and the hide and the flesh accrues to the owner, namely if both the hide and the flesh have been handled ^ were handled^: the horns also will be condicted. But if the owner, by a condiction for the ox, shall have obtained the price and afterwards should condict any of those things of which it has been said above, he is in every way removed by an exception. Conversely, if he has condicted the hide and, having obtained its price, condicts the ox, with the thief offering the price of the ox, the price of the hide having been deducted, he will be removed by the exception of dolus malus.
Qui furtum admittit vel re commodata vel deposita utendo, condictione quoque ex furtiva causa obstringitur: quae differt ab actione commodati hoc, quod, etiamsi sine dolo malo et culpa eius interierit res, condictione tamen tenetur, cum in commodati actione non facile ultra culpam et in depositi non ultra dolum malum teneatur is, cum quo depositi agetur.
He who commits theft by using a thing lent for use or deposited is also bound by a condiction from a furtive cause: which differs from the action of commodatum in this, that, even if the thing has perished without his fraud or fault, he is nevertheless held by the condiction; whereas in the commodatum action he is not readily liable beyond fault, and in the deposit action not beyond fraud—the person against whom the deposit action is brought.
Quoniam furtum fit, cum quis indebitos nummos sciens acceperit, videndum, si procurator suos nummos solvat, an ipsi furtum fiat. et pomponius epistularum libro octavo ipsum condicere ait ex causa furtiva: sed et me condicere, si ratum habeam quod indebitum datum sit. sed altera condictione altera tollitur.
Since theft is committed when someone has knowingly accepted monies not owed, it must be considered, if an agent (procurator) pays out his own monies, whether the theft is committed against him. And Pomponius, in the eighth book of the Letters, says that he himself may bring a condictio on the ground of theft; but that I too may bring a condictio, if I ratify that what was not owed was given. But the one condictio is taken away by the other.
Licet fur paratus fuerit excipere condictionem et per me steterit, dum in rebus humanis res fuerat, condicere eam, postea autem perempta est, tamen durare condictionem veteres voluerunt, quia videtur, qui primo invito domino rem contrectaverit, semper in restituenda ea, quam nec debuit auferre, moram facere.
Although the thief may have been prepared to meet the condiction, and it depended on me, while the thing was in human affairs, to bring a condiction for it, but afterwards it perished, nevertheless the ancients wished the condiction to endure, because he who at the outset handled the thing with the owner unwilling appears always to be in delay in restoring that which he ought not to have carried off.
Qui certam pecuniam numeratam petit, illa actione utitur " si certum petetur": qui autem alias res, per triticariam condictionem petet. et generaliter dicendum est eas res per hanc actionem peti, si quae sint praeter pecuniam numeratam, sive in pondere sive in mensura constent, sive mobiles sint sive soli. quare fundum quoque per hanc actionem petimus et si vectigalis sit sive ius stipulatus quis sit, veluti usum fructum vel servitutem utrorumque praediorum.
He who seeks a determinate sum of counted money uses that action, " if a determinate thing be sought"; but he who seeks other things will sue by the triticary condiction. And generally it must be said that things are sought by this action if they are other than counted money, whether they consist in weight or in measure, whether they are movables or land. Wherefore we also claim an estate by this action even if it be vectigalian (held for rent), or if someone has stipulated a right, for example a usufruct or a servitude of either kind of estate (urban or rustic).
Sed et ei, qui vi aliquem de fundo deiecit, posse fundum condici sabinus scribit, et ita et celsus, sed ita, si dominus sit qui deiectus condicat: ceterum si non sit, possessionem eum condicere celsus ait.
But Sabinus also writes that against him who by force has cast someone out of a fundus, the fundus can be claimed by condictio; and so also Celsus. But only if the one who was ejected and brings the condictio is the owner; otherwise, if he is not, Celsus says he may claim the possession by condictio.
In hac actione si quaeratur, res quae petita est cuius temporis aestimationem recipiat, verius est, quod servius ait, condemnationis tempus spectandum: si vero desierit esse in rebus humanis, mortis tempus, sed en platei secundum celsum erit spectandum: non enim debet novissimum vitae tempus aestimari, ne ad exiguum pretium aestimatio redigatur in servo forte mortifere vulnerato. in utroque autem, si post moram deterior res facta sit, Marcellus scribit libro vicensimo habendam aestimationem, quanto deterior res facta sit: et ideo, si quis post moram servum eluscatum dederit, nec liberari eum: quare ad tempus morae in his erit reducenda aestimatio.
In this action, if it is asked at what time the thing sought should receive its valuation, the truer view is, as Servius says, that the time of condemnation is to be regarded: but if it has ceased to be among human things, the time of death—yet the market (en platei), according to Celsus, is to be regarded: for the very last moment of life ought not to be assessed, lest the valuation be reduced to a trifling price in the case of a slave perhaps mortally wounded. In either case, however, if after delay the thing has become worse, Marcellus writes in the twentieth book that an assessment must be had of how much the thing has become worse: and therefore, if someone after delay has delivered a slave made one‑eyed, he is not freed; wherefore in these matters the valuation must be brought back to the time of the delay.
Si merx aliqua, quae certo die dari debebat, petita sit, veluti vinum oleum frumentum, tanti litem aestimandam cassius ait, quanti fuisset eo die, quo dari debuit: si de die nihil convenit, quanti tunc, cum iudicium acciperetur. idemque iuris in loco esse, ut primum aestimatio sumatur eius loci, quo dari debuit, si de loco nihil convenit, is locus spectetur, quo peteretur. quod et de ceteris rebus iuris est.
If some merchandise, which ought to have been given on a certain day, is demanded—for example, wine, oil, grain—Cassius says the litigation is to be valued at as much as it would have been on the day on which it ought to have been delivered; if nothing was agreed about the day, then at as much as it was when the action was accepted. And the same law holds regarding place: first, the valuation is to be taken according to the place where it ought to have been delivered; if nothing was agreed about the place, the place is considered where it was demanded. And this is the law concerning other things as well.
Alio loco, quam in quem sibi dari quisque stipulatus esset, non videbatur agendi facultas competere. sed quia iniquum erat, si promissor ad eum locum, in quem daturum se promisisset, numquam accederet ( quod vel data opera faceret vel quia aliis locis necessario distringeretur), non posse stipulatorem ad suum pervenire, ideo visum est utilem actionem in eam rem comparare.
In a place other than that to which each had stipulated that it be given to him, the faculty of bringing an action was not thought to lie. But because it was inequitable, if the promisor should never come to the place to which he had promised that he would give (which he might do either deliberately, or because he was necessarily constrained in other places), that the stipulator could not attain what is his, therefore it seemed good to provide a useful action for that matter.
Scaevola libro quinto decimo quaestionum ait non utique ea, quae tacite insunt stipulationibus, semper in rei esse potestate, sed quid debeat, esse in eius arbitrio, an debeat, non esse. et ideo cum quis stichum aut pamphilum promittit, eligere posse quod solvat, quamdiu ambo vivunt: ceterum ubi alter decessit, extingui eius electionem, ne sit in arbitrio eius, an debeat, dum non vult vivum praestare, quem solum debet. quare et in proposito eum, qui promisit ephesi aut capuae, si fuerit in ipsius arbitrio, ubi ab eo petatur, conveniri non potuisse: semper enim alium locum electurum: sic evenire, ut sit in ipsius arbitrio, an debeat: quare putat posse ab eo peti altero loco et sine loci adiectione: damus igitur actori electionem petitionis.
Scaevola, in the fifteenth book of the Questions, says that the things which are tacitly contained in stipulations are not, to be sure, always within the power of the matter, but that what he ought to pay is in his discretion; whether he ought to owe, is not. And therefore, when someone promises Stichus or Pamphilus, he can choose which he will render so long as both live; but when one has deceased, his election is extinguished, lest it be in his discretion whether he owes, while he refuses to furnish the living one, whom alone he owes. Wherefore also in the case proposed, the one who promised at Ephesus or at Capua, if it were in his own discretion where he should be demanded from, could not have been convened; for he would always choose the other place: thus it comes about that it is in his discretion whether he owes. Therefore he thinks that he can be demanded from in either place and without any addition as to place: we accordingly give to the plaintiff the election of the petition.
and generally Scaevola defines that the plaintiff has the election where he may demand, the defendant where he may pay, namely before the demand. Accordingly, he says, when an alternation of things is mixed with an alternation of places, of necessity it brings about the plaintiff’s election, and with respect to the thing on account of the place: otherwise you take away his action, while you wish to reserve to the defendant the option.
Qui ita stipulatur " ephesi decem dari": si ante diem, quam ephesum pervenire possit, agat, perperam ante diem agi, quia et iulianus putat diem tacite huic stipulationi inesse. quare verum puto, quod iulianus ait eum, qui romae stipulatur hodie carthagine dari, inutiliter stipulari.
He who stipulates thus, " ephesi ten to be given": if he brings an action before the day on which he can reach Ephesus, it is improperly brought before the day, because Julian also thinks that a day is tacitly inherent in this stipulation. Wherefore I think true what Julian says: that he who at Rome stipulates that today it be given at Carthage stipulates ineffectually.
Idem iulianus tractat, an is, qui ephesi sibi aut titio dari stipulatus est, si alibi titio solvatur, nihilo minus possit intendere sibi dari oportere. et iulianus scribit liberationem non contigisse atque ideo posse peti quod interest. Marcellus autem et alias tractat et apud iulianum notat posse dici et si mihi alibi solvatur, liberationem contigisse, quamvis invitus accipere non cogar: plane si non contigit liberatio, dicendum ait superesse petitionem integrae summae, quemadmodum si quis insulam alibi fecisset quam ubi promiserat, in nihilum liberaretur.
The same Julianus treats whether one who has stipulated that at Ephesus it be given either to himself or to Titius, if payment is made to Titius elsewhere, can nonetheless plead that it ought to be given to himself. And Julianus writes that discharge (liberation) has not come about, and therefore that damages (quod interest) can be sought. But Marcellus both treats the matter elsewhere and notes, in Julianus, that it can also be said that, even if payment is made to me elsewhere, discharge has come about, although I am not compelled to accept against my will: plainly, if discharge has not come about, he says one must say that a claim for the entire sum remains, just as if someone had made a tenement (insula) elsewhere than where he had promised, he would not be discharged at all.
Nunc de officio iudicis huius actionis loquendum est, utrum quantitati contractus debeat servire an vel excedere vel minuere quantitatem debeat, ut, si interfuisset rei ephesi potius solvere quam eo loci quo conveniebatur, ratio eius haberetur. iulianus labeonis opinionem secutus etiam actoris habuit rationem, cuius interdum potuit interesse ephesi recipere: itaque utilitas quoque actoris veniet. quid enim si traiecticiam pecuniam dederat ^ dederit^ ephesi recepturus, ubi sub poena debebat pecuniam vel sub pignoribus, et distracta pignora sunt vel poena commissa mora tua?
Now it must be spoken about the office of the judge in this action, whether he ought to serve the quantity of the contract or ought even to exceed or to diminish the quantity, so that, if it would have been in the interest that the matter be paid at Ephesus rather than at the place where it was agreed, account of this would be had. Julian, following Labeo’s opinion, also had regard to the plaintiff, to whom it could sometimes be of interest to receive at Ephesus: and thus the utility of the plaintiff too will come in. For what if he had given ^ shall have given ^ money for transmission across the sea, to receive it at Ephesus, where he owed the money under a penalty or under pledges, and the pledges have been sold or the penalty incurred through your delay?
or something was owed to the fisc, and the stipulator’s property was sold off for a most paltry price? in this arbitrary assessment the quod interest will come in, and indeed beyond the legitimate measure of usury. what if he was accustomed to procure merchandise: shall account also be taken of lucre, not of loss alone?
Ideo in arbitrium iudicis refertur haec actio, quia scimus, quam varia sint pretia rerum per singulas civitates regionisque, maxime vini olei frumenti: pecuniarum quoque licet videatur una et eadem potestas ubique esse, tamem aliis locis facilius et levibus usuris inveniuntur, aliis difficilius et gravibus usuris.
Therefore this action is referred to the judge’s arbitrium, because we know how varied the prices of things are through the several cities and regions, especially of wine, oil, and grain: and with regard to monies also, although the one and the same power may seem to exist everywhere, nevertheless in some places they are found more easily and with light usuries, in others with more difficulty and with heavy usuries.
Interdum iudex, qui ex hac actione cognoscit, cum sit arbitraria, absolvere reum debet cautione ab eo exacta de pecunia ibi solvenda ubi promissa est. quid enim si ibi vel oblata pecunia actori dicatur vel deposita vel ex facili solvenda? nonne debebit interdum absolvere?
Sometimes the judge who takes cognizance under this action, since it is arbitrary, ought to absolve the defendant, after exacting from him a cautio (security) for the money to be paid there where it was promised. For what if it is said that there the money has either been offered to the plaintiff or deposited, or is readily payable? Ought he not sometimes to absolve?
Centum capuae dari stipulatus fideiussorem accepisti: ea pecunia ab eo similiter ut ab ipso promissore peti debebit, id est ut, si alibi quam capuae petantur, arbitraria agi debeat lisque tanti aestimetur, quanti eius vel actoris interfuerit eam summam capuae potius quam alibi solvi. nec oportebit, quod forte per reum steterit, quo minus tota centum capuae solverentur, obligationem fideiussoris augeri: neque enim haec causa recte comparabitur obligationi usurarum: ibi enim duae stipulationes sunt, hic autem una pecuniae creditae est, circa cuius exsecutionem aestimationis ratio arbitrio iudicis committitur. eiusque differentiae manifestissimum argumentum esse puto, quod, si post moram factam pars pecuniae soluta sit et reliquum petatur, officium iudicis tale esse debeat, ut aestimet, quanti actoris intersit eam dumtaxat summam quae petetur capuae solutam esse.
You stipulated that one hundred be paid at Capua and you accepted a surety: that money must be sought from him in the same way as from the promisor himself, that is, if it is demanded anywhere other than at Capua, an actio arbitraria ought to be brought, and the suit be assessed at as much as it has been in his—that is, the plaintiff’s—interest that that sum be paid at Capua rather than elsewhere. Nor will it be proper, because perhaps it was by the defendant’s doing that the full one hundred at Capua were not paid, for the obligation of the surety to be increased: for this case is not rightly compared to the obligation of interest (usurae); there, indeed, there are two stipulations, whereas here there is one, of money lent, concerning the enforcement of which the matter of valuation is committed to the discretion of the judge. And I consider the most evident proof of this difference to be that, if after mora has been incurred part of the money has been paid and the remainder is demanded, the judge’s duty ought to be of this sort: to assess how much it is in the plaintiff’s interest that only the sum now being demanded be paid at Capua.
Si post moram factam, quo minus capuae solveretur, cum arbitraria vellet agere, fideiussor acceptus sit eius actionis nomine, videamus, ne ea pecunia, quae ex sententia iudicis accedere potest, non debeatur nec sit in obligatione, adeo ut nunc quoque sorte soluta vel si capuae petatur, arbitrium iudicis cesset: nisi si quis dicat, si iudex centum et viginti condemnare debuerit, centum solutis ex universitate, tam ex sorte quam ex poena solutum videri, ut supersit petitio eius quod excedit sortem, et accedat poena pro eadem quantitate. quod non puto admittendum, tanto magis, quod creditor accipiendo pecuniam etiam remisisse poenam videtur.
If, after a delay has been caused whereby payment at Capua was prevented, when he wished to bring an arbitral action, a surety was accepted in the name of that action, let us consider whether the money which can be added by the judge’s sentence is not owed and is not in obligation, to such an extent that now too, with the principal paid, or if payment is demanded at Capua, the judge’s arbitrium ceases—unless one should say that, if the judge ought to have condemned to 120, with 100 paid out of the universality (the total), it is to be seen as paid both from the principal and from the penalty, so that there remains a claim for what exceeds the principal, and a penalty accrues for the same amount. Which I do not think should be admitted, all the more because the creditor, by accepting the money, seems also to have remitted the penalty.
An potest aliud constitui quam quod debetur, quaesitum est. sed cum iam placet rem pro re solvi posse, nihil prohibet et aliud pro debito constitui: denique si quis centum debens frumentum eiusdem pretii constituat, puto valere constitutum.
It has been asked whether something other than what is owed can be constituted. But since it is now accepted that a thing can be paid in place of a thing, nothing prevents that something else also be constituted in place of the debt: finally, if someone who owes one hundred should constitute grain of the same price, I think the constitutum is valid.
Sed et is, qui honoraria actione, non iure civili obligatus est, constituendo tenetur: videtur enim debitum et quod iure honorario debetur. et ideo et pater et dominus de peculio obstricti si constituerint, tenebuntur usque ad eam quantitatem, quae tunc fuit in peculio, cum constituebatur: ceterum si plus suo nomine constituit, non tenebitur in id quod plus est.
But even he who is obligated by an honorary action, not by civil law, is held by constituting: for even that which is owed by honorary law is considered a debt. And therefore both the father and the master bound de peculio, if they have constituted, will be liable up to that amount which was then in the peculium at the time when it was constituted; however, if he has constituted for more in his own name, he will not be liable for that which is in excess.
Si quis autem constituerit quod iure civili debebat, iure praetorio non debebat, id est per exceptionem, an constituendo teneatur, quaeritur: et est verum, ut et pomponius scribit, eum non teneri, quia debita iuribus non est pecunia quae constituta est.
But if someone has constituted what by civil law he owed, yet by praetorian law he did not owe, that is, by way of an exception, the question is whether by constituting he is held liable: and it is true, as Pomponius also writes, that he is not held, because the money that is constituted is not a debt owed in law.
Si is, qui et iure civili et praetorio debebat, in diem sit obligatus, an constituendo teneatur? et labeo ait teneri constitutum, quam sententiam et pedius probat: et adicit labeo vel propter has potissimum pecunias, quae nondum peti possunt, constituta inducta: quam sententiam non invitus probarem: habet enim utilitatem, ut ex die obligatus constituendo se eadem die soluturum teneatur.
If one who owed both by civil law and by praetorian law has been obligated for a day (at a fixed term), is he bound by constituting? And Labeo says the constitutum is binding, which opinion Pedius also approves; and Labeo adds that constituta were introduced especially on account of those sums of money which cannot yet be sued for. Which opinion I would not unwillingly approve; for it has a utility, that the one obligated from a day is, by constituting, bound to pay on that same day.
Iulianus legatum romae constituentem, quod in provincia acceperat, putat conveniri debere, quod et verum est. sed et si non cum romae esset, sed in provincia adhuc, constituit se romae soluturum, denegatur in eum actio de constituta.
Julian thinks that a legatee, making a constitutum at Rome for what he had received in the province, ought to be sued, which is true. But also, if not when he was at Rome, but while he was still in the province, he constituted that he would pay at Rome, the action de constituta is denied against him.
Si actori municipum vel tutori pupilli vel curatori furiosi vel adulescentis ita constituatur municipibus solvi vel pupillo vel furioso vel adulescenti, utilitatis gratia puto dandam municipibus vel pupillo vel furioso vel adulescenti utilem actionem.
If for the agent of the municipality or for the tutor of a pupil (ward) or for the curator of an insane person or of an adolescent it is so stipulated that payment be made to the municipality or to the pupil or to the insane person or to the adolescent, for the sake of utility I think a useful action should be given to the municipality or to the pupil or to the insane person or to the adolescent.
Hactenus igitur constitutum valebit, si quod constituitur debitum sit, etiamsi nullus apparet, qui interim debeat: ut puta si ante aditam hereditatem debitoris vel capto eo ab hostibus constituat quis se soluturum: nam et pomponius scribit valere constitutum, quoniam debita pecunia constituta est.
Thus, to this extent, the constitutum will be valid, if what is constituted is a debt, even if no one appears who meanwhile owes it: for instance, if before the debtor’s inheritance has been entered upon, or with him captured by enemies, someone undertakes that he will pay; for Pomponius also writes that the constitutum is valid, since money owed has been constituted.
Sed et si alia die offerat nec actor accipere voluit nec ulla causa iusta fuit non accipiendi, aequum est succurri reo aut exceptione aut iusta interpretatione, ut factum actoris usque ad tempus iudicii ipsi noceat: ut illa verba " neque fecisset" hoc significent, ut neque in diem in quem constituit fecerit neque postea.
But also, if he offers on another day and the plaintiff was unwilling to accept and there was no just cause for not accepting, it is equitable that aid be given to the defendant either by exception or by a just interpretation, so that the plaintiff’s act up to the time of the judgment should prejudice himself: so that those words “neque fecisset” signify this, that he has done it neither on the day which he appointed nor thereafter.
Item illa verba praetoris " neque per actorem stetisse" eandem recipiunt dubitationem. et pomponius dubitat, si forte ad diem constituti per actorem non steterit, ante stetit vel postea. et puto et haec ad diem constituti referenda.
Likewise those words of the praetor, “nor that he has stood through an agent,” admit the same doubt. And Pomponius is in doubt whether, if perchance on the appointed day he did not stand through an agent, he stood before or afterward. And I think that these too are to be referred to the appointed day.
Quod adicitur: " eamque pecuniam cum constituebatur debitam fuisse", interpretationem pleniorem exigit. nam primum illud efficit, ut, si quid tunc debitum fuit cum constitueretur, nunc non sit, nihilo minus teneat constitutum, quia retrorsum se actio refert. proinde temporali actione obligatum constituendo celsus et iulianus scribunt teneri debere, licet post constitutum dies temporalis actionis exierit.
What is added—"and that the money had been owed when it was being constituted"—requires a fuller interpretation. For first it brings about this: if something was owed then when it was constituted, though now it is not, nonetheless the constitutum holds, because the action relates back. Accordingly, by constituting one obligated by a temporal action, Celsus and Julian write that he ought to be held, although after the constitutum the day of the temporal action has elapsed.
Si sine die constituas, potest quidem dici te non teneri, licet verba edicti late pateant: alioquin et confestim agi tecum poterit, si statim ut constituisti non solvas: sed modicum tempus statuendum est non minus decem dierum, ut exactio celebretur.
If you constitute without a day fixed, it can indeed be said that you are not held liable, although the words of the edict range broadly; otherwise, one could even proceed against you forthwith, if you do not pay immediately upon constituting: but a modest time must be set, not less than ten days, so that exaction may be effected.
Constituto satis non facit, qui soluturum se constituit, si offerat satisfactionem. si quis autem constituat se satisdaturum, fideiussorem vel pignora det, non tenetur, quia nihil intersit, quemadmodum satisfaciat.
By a constitutum he does not furnish security, one who has undertaken that he will pay, even if he offers satisfaction. if, however, someone undertakes that he will furnish security, whether he gives a guarantor or pledges, he is not held, because it makes no difference in what manner he furnishes security.
Si post constitutam tibi pecuniam hereditatem ex senatus consulto trebelliano restitueris, quoniam sortis petitionem transtulisti ad alium, deneganda est tibi pecuniae constitutae actio. idem est in hereditatis possessore post evictam hereditatem. sed magis est, ut fideicommissario vel ei qui vicit decernenda esset actio.
If, after money has been constituted to you, you have restored the inheritance under the senatus consultum Trebellianum, since you have transferred the claim for the principal (sors) to another, the action on the constituted money must be denied to you. The same holds for the possessor of the inheritance after eviction of the inheritance. But rather, the better view is that the action should be decreed to the fideicommissary, or to him who prevailed.
Titius seio epistulam emisit in haec verba: " remanserunt apud me quinquaginta ex credito tuo ex contractu pupillorum meorum, quos tibi reddere debebo idibus maiis probos: quod si ad diem supra scriptum non dedero, tunc dare debebo usuras tot. " quaero, an lucius titius in locum pupillorum hac cautione reus successerit. Marcellus respondit si intercessisset stipulatio, successisse.
Titius sent to Seius an epistle in these words: “There have remained with me fifty from your credit arising from the contract of my wards, which I shall owe to return to you on the Ides of May, good and genuine; and if on the day written above I shall not have given, then I shall owe to give interest of so much.” I ask whether Lucius Titius, by this caution (security), has succeeded as debtor in the place of the wards. Marcellus replied that, if a stipulation had intervened, he has succeeded.
Si iureiurando delato deberi tibi iuraveris, cum habeas eo nomine actionem, recte de constituta agis. sed et si non ultro detulero iusiurandum, sed referendi necessitate compulsus id fecero, quia nemo dubitat modestius facere qui referat, quam ut ipse iuret, nulla distinctio adhibetur, tametsi ob tuam facilitatem ac meam verecundiam subsecuta sit referendi necessitas.
If, when the oath has been tendered, you have sworn that it is owed to you, since you have an action under that head, you rightly bring an action de constituta. But also if I did not of my own accord tender the oath, but, compelled by the necessity of referring it, I have done so, since no one doubts that he acts more modestly who refers it than that he himself should swear, no distinction is applied, although the necessity of referring followed on account of your facility and my modesty.
Quidam ad creditorem litteras eiusmodi fecit: " decem, quae lucius titius ex arca tua mutua acceperat, salva ratione usurarum habes penes me, domine. " respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur actione de constituta pecunia eum teneri.
Someone made to his creditor a letter of this sort: " ten, which lucius titius had received by loan from your chest, with the reckoning of interest preserved, you have with me, sir. " He answered that, according to the matters that were set forth, he was liable under the action on constituted money.
Utrum praesente debitore an absente constituat quis, parvi refert. hoc amplius etiam invito constituere eum posse pomponius libro trigensimo quarto scribit: unde falsam putat opinionem labeonis existimantis, si, postquam quis constituit pro alio, dominus ei denuntiet ne solvat, in factum exceptionem dandam: nec immerito pomponius: nam cum semel sit obligatus qui constituit, factum debitoris non debet eum excusare.
Whether one constitutes with the debtor present or absent, it matters little. Moreover, Pomponius writes in Book thirty-four that he can even constitute with him unwilling: whence he thinks false the opinion of Labeo, who supposed that, if, after someone has constituted for another, the master gives him notice not to pay, an exceptio in factum should be granted; and Pomponius not without reason: for since the one who has constituted is once obligated, the deed of the debtor ought not to excuse him.
Lucius titius seiorum debitor decessit: hi persuaserunt publio maevio, quod hereditas ad eum pertineret et fecerunt, ut epistulam in eos exponat debitorem sese esse quasi heredem patrui sui confitentem, qui et addidit epistulae suae, quod in rationes suas eadem pecunia pervenit. quaesitum est, cum ad publium maevium ex hereditate lucii titii nihil pervenerit, an ex scriptura proposita de constituta pecunia conveniri possit et an doli exceptione uti possit. respondit nec civilem eo nomine actionem competere: sed nec de constituta secundum ea quae proponerentur.
Lucius Titius, debtor of the Seii, died: these men persuaded Publius Maevius that the inheritance pertained to him and brought it about that he issue a letter in their favor, confessing himself to be a debtor as if the heir of his paternal uncle, and he also added to his letter that the same money had come into his accounts. It was asked, since nothing from the inheritance of Lucius Titius reached Publius Maevius, whether he could be sued on the writing put forward on the constitutum of money and whether he could use the exception of dolus (fraud). He answered that neither does a civil action lie on that head, nor even the action de constituta, according to the matters proposed.
Huius edicti interpretatio non est difficilis. unum solummodo notandum, quod qui edictum concepit commodati fecit mentionem, cum paconius utendi fecit mentionem. inter commodatum autem et utendum datum labeo quidem ait tantum interesse, quantum inter genus et speciem: commodari enim rem mobilem, non etiam soli, utendam dari etiam soli.
The interpretation of this edict is not difficult. Only one thing is to be noted: that the one who drafted the edict made mention of the commodatum, whereas Paconius made mention of “using.” Moreover, between the commodatum and a thing given for use, Labeo says there is as much difference as between genus and species: for a movable thing is commodated, not also the soil; but something may be given for use even of the soil.
Impuberes commodati actione non tenentur, quoniam nec constitit commodatum in pupilli persona sine tutoris auctoritate, usque adeo ut, etiamsi pubes factus dolum aut culpam admiserit, hac actione non tenetur, quia ab initio non constitit.
Those under age are not held liable by the action of commodatum, since a commodatum is not constituted in the person of a ward without the tutor’s authority; to such an extent that, even if, having become of age, he has admitted fraud (dolus) or fault (culpa), he is not held by this action, because it was not constituted from the beginning.
Si reddita quidem sit res commodata, sed deterior reddita, non videtur reddita, quae deterior facta redditur, nisi quid interest praestetur: proprie enim dicitur res non reddita, quae deterior redditur.
If the thing lent (commodatum) has indeed been returned, but returned in a worse condition, it is not considered returned, when it is returned after being made worse, unless whatever the difference is be made good: for properly a thing is said to be not returned which is returned in a worse condition.
Si filio familias servove commodatum sit, dumtaxat de peculio agendum erit: cum filio autem familias ipso et directo quis poterit. sed et si ancillae vel filiae familias commodaverit, dumtaxat de peculio erit agendum.
If a commodatum has been given to a son in paternal power or to a slave, it will have to be proceeded with only de peculio; but one can also proceed against the son in power himself directly. And likewise, if he has lent to a maidservant or to a daughter in paternal power, the action will be only de peculio.
Nunc videndum est, quid veniat in commodati actione, utrum dolus an et culpa an vero et omne periculum. et quidem in contractibus interdum dolum solum, interdum et culpam praestamus: dolum in deposito: nam quia nulla utilitas eius versatur apud quem deponitur, merito dolus praestatur solus: nisi forte et merces accessit ( tunc enim, ut est et constitutum, etiam culpa exhibetur) aut si hoc ab initio convenit, ut et culpam et periculum praestet is penes quem deponitur. sed ubi utriusque utilitas vertitur, ut in empto, ut in locato, ut in dote, ut in pignore, ut in societate, et dolus et culpa praestatur.
Now it must be considered what comes within the action on commodatum (loan for use): whether deceit (dolus), or also fault (culpa), or indeed even all peril (periculum). And indeed, in contracts we sometimes are liable for deceit alone, sometimes also for fault: for deceit in deposit (depositum); for since no utility accrues to the one with whom it is deposited, rightly deceit alone is borne—unless perhaps a fee (merces) has been added (then indeed, as is also settled, fault too is required), or if this was agreed from the beginning, that the one in whose custody it is deposited should bear both fault and peril. But where the utility of both parties is at stake, as in purchase, as in hire/lease, as in dowry, as in pledge, as in partnership, both deceit and fault are borne.
Commodatum autem plerumque solam utilitatem continet eius cui commodatur, et ideo verior est quinti mucii sententia existimantis et culpam praestandam et diligentiam et, si forte res aestimata data sit, omne periculum praestandum ab eo, qui aestimationem se praestaturum recepit.
Moreover, a commodatum for the most part contains only the utility of the one to whom it is lent; and therefore truer is the opinion of Quintus Mucius, who considers that both fault must be made good and diligence [must be exercised], and, if perchance the thing has been given on an appraisal, all peril must be made good by him who has undertaken that he will make good the appraisal.
Quod vero senectute contigit vel morbo, vel vi latronum ereptum est, aut quid simile accidit, dicendum est nihil eorum esse imputandum ei qui commodatum accepit, nisi aliqua culpa interveniat. proinde et si incendio vel ruina aliquid contigit vel aliquid damnum fatale, non tenebitur, nisi forte, cum possit res commodatas salvas facere, suas praetulit.
But if it has happened by senescence or by sickness, or it was snatched away by the force of robbers, or something similar occurred, it must be said that none of these are to be imputed to the one who received the loan for use, unless some fault intervenes. Accordingly, even if something befell by fire or by collapse or some fatal loss, he will not be held liable, unless perhaps, when he could make the things lent for use safe, he preferred his own.
Sed an etiam hominis commodati custodia praestetur, apud veteres dubitatum est. nam interdum et hominis custodia praestanda est, si vinctus commodatus est, vel eius aetatis, ut custodia indigeret: certe si hoc actum est, ut custodiam is qui rogavit praestet, dicendum erit praestare.
But whether the custody of a loaned person is also to be provided was a matter of doubt among the ancients. For sometimes even the custody of a person must be provided, if a bound man has been lent, or one of such an age as to require custody: certainly, if it has been agreed that the one who asked provide the custody, it will have to be said that he does provide it.
Sed interdum et mortis damnum ad eum qui commodatum rogavit pertinet: nam si tibi equum commodavero, ut ad villam adduceres, tu ad bellum duxeris, commodati teneberis: idem erit et in homine. plane si sic commodavi, ut ad bellum duceres, meum erit periculum. nam et si servum tibi tectorem commodavero et de machina ceciderit, periculum meum esse namusa ait: sed ego ita hoc verum puto, si tibi commodavi, ut et in machina operaretur: ceterum si ut de plano opus faceret, tu eum imposuisti in machina, aut si machinae culpa factum minus diligenter non ab ipso ligatae vel funium perticarumque vetustate, dico periculum, quod culpa contigit rogantis commodatum, ipsum praestare debere: nam et mela scripsit, si servus lapidario commodatus sub machina perierit, teneri fabrum commodati, qui neglegentius machinam colligavit.
But sometimes even the loss through death pertains to the one who asked for the commodatum: for if I have lent you a horse so that you might lead it to the country house, and you lead it to war, you will be held liable on the commodatum: the same will be in the case of a person (slave). plainly, if I lent it on such terms, that you might take it to war, the peril will be mine. for even if I have lent you a slave who is a roofer and he has fallen from the machine (scaffolding), Namusa says the peril is mine: but I think this true thus, if I lent him to you so that he might also work on the machine (scaffolding): moreover, if it was so that he should do the work from level ground, and you set him upon the machine, or if it happened by the fault of the machine—because it was not tied by him himself with sufficient diligence, or by reason of the old age of the ropes and poles—I say that the peril which befell through the fault of the one requesting the commodatum must be made good by him himself: for Mela also wrote that, if a slave lent to a stonecutter perished beneath a machine, the craftsman to whom the commodatum was made is held, who fastened the machine too negligently.
Quin immo et qui alias re commodata utitur, non solum commodati, verum furti quoque tenetur, ut iulianus libro undecimo digestorum scripsit. denique ait, si tibi codicem commodavero et in eo chirographum debitorem tuum cavere feceris egoque hoc interlevero, si quidem ad hoc tibi commodavero, ut caveretur tibi in eo, teneri me tibi contrario iudicio: si minus neque me certiorasti ibi chirographum esse scriptum, etiam teneris mihi, inquit, commodati: immo, ait, etiam furti, quoniam aliter re commodata usus es, quemadmodum qui equo, inquit, vel vestimento aliter quam commodatum est utitur, furti tenetur.
Nay rather, even he who uses a thing lent for use (commodatum) in another way is liable not only under the commodatum but also for theft, as Julian wrote in book 11 of the Digest. And finally he says: if I shall have lent you a codex, and in it you have caused your debtor to give a chirograph (a written acknowledgment), and I erase this, then, if indeed I lent it to you for this purpose, namely that a security be given to you in it, I am held to you by the contrary judgment (the counter-suit); but if not, and you did not inform me that a chirograph had been written there, you, he says, are also liable to me under the commodatum; nay, he says, even for theft, since you have used the thing lent for use otherwise—just as, he says, one who uses a horse or a garment otherwise than it was lent is liable for theft.
Interdum plane dolum solum in re commodata qui rogavit praestabit, ut puta si quis ita convenit: vel si sua dumtaxat causa commodavit, sponsae forte suae vel uxori, quo honestius culta ad se deduceretur, vel si quis ludos edens praetor scaenicis commodavit, vel ipsi praetori quis ultro commodavit.
Sometimes indeed only fraud in the matter of a thing lent for use will be answerable by the one who requested it, for instance if someone so agreed; or if he lent solely for his own sake, perhaps to his fiancée or his wife, in order that she might be conducted to him more honorably adorned; or if a praetor putting on games lent to the stage-performers; or if someone of his own accord lent to the praetor himself.
Rem tibi dedi, ut creditori tuo pignori dares: dedisti: non repigneras, ut mihi reddas. labeo ait commodati actionem locum habere, quod ego puto verum esse, nisi merces intervenit: tunc enim vel in factum vel ex locato conducto agendum erit. plane si ego pro te rem pignori dedero tua voluntate, mandati erit actio.
I gave you a thing, so that you might give it in pledge to your creditor: you gave it: you did not redeem the pledge, so as to return it to me. Labeo says the action of commodatum has a place, which I think is true, unless a fee intervened: for then one must proceed either by an actio in factum or on letting-and-hiring (ex locato conducto). Clearly, if I have given the thing in pledge on your behalf with your consent, there will be an actio mandati.
Labeo likewise says rightly: if fault is absent from me in the matter of redeeming, but the creditor is unwilling to return the pledge, there is available to you to this extent only the action of commodatum, namely that I provide to you the actions against him. Moreover, fault seems to be absent from me whether I have already paid the money or am prepared to pay. Clearly, it is equitable that the one who accepted the commodatum acknowledge the expense of the suit and the rest.
Si me rogaveris, ut servum tibi cum lance commodarem et servus lancem perdiderit, cartilius ait periculum ad te respicere, nam et lancem videri commodatam: quare culpam in eam quoque praestandam. plane si servus cum ea fugerit, eum qui commodatum accepit non teneri, nisi fugae praestitit culpam.
If you were to ask me to lend you a slave together with a platter, and the slave were to lose the platter, Cartilius says the risk falls upon you, for the platter too is seen as having been lent; therefore you must answer for fault in respect of it as well. Clearly, if the slave has fled with it, the one who received the loan (the borrower) is not held liable, unless he was at fault for the flight.
Si de me petisses, ut triclinium tibi sternerem et argentum ad ministerium praeberem, et fecero, deinde petisses, ut idem sequenti die facerem et cum commode argentum domi referre non possem, ibi hoc reliquero et perierit: qua actione agi possit et cuius esset periculum? labeo de periculo scripsit multum interesse, custodem posui an non: si posui, ad me periculum spectare, si minus, ad eum penes quem relictum est. ego puto commodati quidem agendum, verum custodiam eum praestare debere, penes quem res relictae sunt, nisi aliud nominatim convenit.
If you had asked of me that I lay out the triclinium for you and provide silver for service, and I have done so, and then you had asked that I do the same on the following day, and when I could not conveniently carry the silver back home I left it there and it perished: by what action could one proceed, and whose would be the risk? Labeo wrote concerning the risk that it makes much difference whether I placed a custodian or not: if I placed one, the risk looks to me; if not, to him with whom it was left. I think, indeed, that an action of commodatum should be brought; but that he with whom the things were left ought to furnish custody, unless something else has been expressly agreed.
Si duobus vehiculum commodatum sit vel locatum simul, celsus filius scribit ^ scripsit^ libro sexto digestorum quaeri posse, utrum unusquisque eorum in solidum an pro parte teneatur. et ait duorum quidem in solidum dominium vel possessionem esse non posse: nec quemquam partis corporis dominum esse, sed totius corporis pro indiviso pro parte dominium habere. usum autem balinei quidem vel porticus vel campi uniuscuiusque in solidum esse ( neque enim minus me uti, quod et alius uteretur): verum in vehiculo commodato vel locato pro parte quidem effectu me usum habere, quia non omnia loca vehiculi teneam. sed esse verius ait et dolum et culpam et diligentiam et custodiam in totum me praestare debere: quare duo quodammodo rei habebuntur et, si alter conventus praestiterit, liberabit alterum et ambobus competit furti actio,
If a vehicle has been lent in commodatum or leased to two persons at the same time, Celsus the son writes ^ wrote^ in the sixth book of the Digest that it can be asked whether each of them is held in solidum or for a part. And he says that ownership (dominium) or possession (possessio) in solidum of two cannot be: nor is anyone the owner of a part of the corpus, but he has ownership of the whole corpus pro indiviso for a share. However, the use (usus) of a bath or of a portico or of a field is for each one in solidum ( neque enim minus me uti, quod et alius uteretur): but in a vehicle lent or leased, in effect I have use pro parte, because I do not occupy all the places of the vehicle. But he says it is more correct that I ought to provide in toto dolus and culpa and diligence (diligentia) and custody (custodia): wherefore two will in a certain way be regarded as defendants (rei), and if, when one has been sued, he has satisfied the claim, he will release the other, and to both the action for theft (furti actio) lies,
Unde quaeritur, si alter furti egerit, an ipse solus debeat commodati conveniri. et ait celsus, si alter conveniatur qui furti non egit, et paratus sit periculo suo conveniri alterum, qui furti agendo lucrum sensit ex re commodata, debere eum audiri et absolvi.
Whence it is asked, if one of them has brought the action of theft, whether he alone ought to be sued on the commodatum. And Celsus says that if the other, who did not bring the theft action, is sued, and he is prepared, at his own peril, to have the other proceeded against—the one who, by bringing the theft action, has derived profit from the thing loaned—he ought to be heard and acquitted.
Sed si legis aquiliae adversus socium eius habuit commodator actionem, videndum erit, ne cedere debeat, si forte damnum dedit alter, quod hic qui convenitur commodati actione sarcire compellitur: nam et si adversus ipsum habuit aquiliae actionem commodator, aequissimum est, ut commodati agendo remittat actionem: nisi forte quis dixerit agendo eum e lege aquilia hoc minus consecuturum, quam ex causa commodati consecutus est: quod videtur habere rationem.
But if, under the Lex Aquilia, the lender-for-use had an action against his partner, it will have to be considered whether he ought to cede it, if perchance the other inflicted the damage, since this man who is convened by the action of commodatum is compelled to make good the loss: for even if the lender had an Aquilian action against this very person, it is most equitable that, by proceeding on commodatum, he remit the action—unless perhaps someone should say that by suing under the Lex Aquilia he would obtain less than he has obtained from the cause of commodatum: which seems to have reason.
Si rem inspectori dedi, an similis sit ei cui commodata res est, quaeritur. et si quidem mea causa dedi, dum volo pretium exquirere, dolum mihi tantum praestabit: si sui, et custodiam: et ideo furti habebit actionem. sed et si dum refertur periit, si quidem ego mandaveram per quem remitteret, periculum meum erit: si vero ipse cui voluit commisit, aeque culpam mihi praestabit, si sui causa accepit,
If I have given the thing to an inspector, the question is whether he is similar to him to whom the thing is lent by commodatum. And if indeed I gave it on my account, while I wish to ascertain the price, he will be liable to me only for dolus; if on his own account, then also for custody: and therefore he will have an action for theft. But also, if it perished while it is being returned, if indeed I had instructed through whom he should send it back, the risk will be mine; but if he entrusted it to whomever he wished, he will likewise be liable to me for fault, if he accepted it on his own account.
Si libero homini, qui mihi bona fide serviebat, quasi servo rem commodavero, videamus, an habeam commodati actionem. nam et celsus filius aiebat, si iussissem eum aliquid facere, vel mandati cum eo vel praescriptis verbis experiri me posse: idem ergo et in commodato erit dicendum. nec obstat, quod non hac mente cum eo, qui liber bona fide nobis serviret, contraheremus quasi eum obligatum habituri: plerumque enim id accidit, ut extra id quod ageretur tacita obligatio nascatur, veluti cum per errorem indebitum solvendi causa datur.
If I have lent, as a loan for use, a thing to a free man who was serving me in good faith, as though to a slave, let us see whether I have the action of commodatum. For Celsus the son also said that, if I had ordered him to do something, I could proceed against him either by the action of mandate (mandati) or by praescriptis verbis; therefore the same must be said also in commodatum. Nor does it stand in the way that we would not be contracting with one who, though free, was serving us in good faith with that intention, as though we were going to have him obligated: for very often it happens that, outside of what was being transacted, a tacit obligation arises, as when, through error, something not owed is given for the sake of payment.
Sicut autem voluntatis et officii magis quam necessitatis est commodare, ita modum commodati finemque praescribere eius est qui beneficium tribuit. cum autem id fecit, id est postquam commodavit, tunc finem praescribere et retro agere atque intempestive usum commodatae rei auferre non officium tantum impedit, sed et suscepta obligatio inter dandum accipiendumque. geritur enim negotium invicem et ideo invicem propositae sunt actiones, ut appareat, quod principio beneficii ac nudae voluntatis fuerat, converti in mutuas praestationes actionesque civiles.
Just as it belongs to will and to office more than to necessity to lend (by way of a loan-for-use, commodatum), so too to prescribe the manner of the commodatum and its limit belongs to him who confers the benefit. But when he has done that—namely, after he has lent—then to prescribe an end and to retract, and untimely to take away the use of the thing lent, impairs not only duty, but also the obligation undertaken between giving and receiving. For the negotium is conducted reciprocally, and therefore actions are set forth reciprocally, so that it may appear that what at the beginning had been a matter of beneficium and bare will is converted into mutual prestations and civil actions.
as happens in the case of one who has begun to manage the business of an absentee: for he would not, with impunity, leave things that are about to perish; for perhaps another would have undertaken it if he had not begun: for it is a matter of will to undertake a mandate, of necessity to consummate it. therefore, if you lent me writing-tablets so that my debtor might give me a guarantee, you will not act rightly by importunely demanding them back; for if you had refused, I would either have bought some or have brought witnesses. and the same holds if you lent beams for shoring up a tenement, and then pulled them away, or even knowingly lent defective ones: for we ought to be aided, not deceived, by a benefaction.
Duabus rebus commodatis recte de altera commodati agi posse vivianus scripsit: quod ita videri verum, si separatae sint, pomponius scripsit: nam eum, qui carrucam puta vel lecticam commodavit, non recte acturum de singulis partibus.
Vivianus wrote that, when two things have been lent for use, it is proper that an action on commodatum can be brought concerning one of them; Pomponius wrote that this seems true if they are separate; for one who has lent, say, a carriage or a litter will not proceed rightly regarding the individual parts.
In rebus commodatis talis diligentia praestanda est, qualem quisque diligentissimus pater familias suis rebus adhibet, ita ut tantum eos casus non praestet, quibus resisti non possit, veluti mortes servorum quae sine dolo et culpa eius accidunt, latronum hostiumve incursus, piratarum insidias, naufragium, incendium, fugas servorum qui custodiri non solent. quod autem de latronibus et piratis et naufragio diximus, ita scilicet accipiemus, si in hoc commodata sit alicui res, ut eam rem peregre secum ferat: alioquin si cui ideo argentum commodaverim, quod is amicos ad cenam invitaturum se diceret, et id peregre secum portaverit, sine ulla dubitatione etiam piratarum et latronum et naufragii casum praestare debet. haec ita, si dumtaxat accipientis gratia commodata sit res, at si utriusque, veluti si communem amicum ad cenam invitaverimus tuque eius rei curam suscepisses et ego tibi argentum commodaverim, scriptum quidem apud quosdam invenio, quasi dolum tantum praestare debeas: sed videndum est, ne et culpa praestanda sit, ut ita culpae fiat aestimatio, sicut in rebus pignori datis et dotalibus aestimari solet.
In things lent for use, such diligence is to be furnished as the most diligent paterfamilias applies to his own affairs, so that he is not liable only for those accidents to which resistance is not possible, for example, deaths of slaves which happen without his fraud or fault, incursions of robbers or enemies, ambushes of pirates, shipwreck, fire, escapes of slaves who are not wont to be kept under guard. But what we have said about robbers and pirates and shipwreck, we shall so understand, if the thing was lent to someone for this: that he carry that thing abroad with him; otherwise, if I lent someone silver for this reason, because he said he would invite friends to dinner, and he carried it abroad with him, without any doubt he ought to answer even for the case of pirates and robbers and shipwreck. These things are thus, if the thing was lent only for the recipient’s sake; but if for both, as if we invited a common friend to dinner and you had undertaken the care of that matter and I lent you silver, I find it written by some that you ought to answer only for fraud (dolus): but it must be considered whether negligence (culpa) also is to be answered for, so that there be an estimation of negligence, as estimation is accustomed to be made in things given in pledge and in dotal property.
Possunt iustae causae intervenire, ex quibus cum eo qui commodasset agi deberet: veluti de impensis in valetudinem servi factis quaeve post fugam requirendi reducendique eius causa factae essent: nam cibariorum impensae naturali scilicet ratione ad eum pertinent, qui utendum accepisset. sed et id, quod de impensis valetudinis aut fugae diximus, ad maiores impensas pertinere debet: modica enim impendia verius est, ut sicuti cibariorum ad eundem pertineant.
Just causes can intervene, on account of which suit ought to lie against him who had lent the thing for use: for instance, concerning expenses incurred for a slave’s health, or those which after his flight were made for the purpose of seeking and bringing him back; for the expenses of provisions, by natural reason, pertain to him who had received the thing for use. But even what we have said about expenses of health or of flight ought to belong to the category of greater outlays: for as to moderate outlays, it is truer that, just as with provisions, they pertain to the same person, namely the one who had received it for use.
Quod autem contrario iudicio consequi quisque potest, id etiam recto iudicio, quo cum eo agitur, potest salvum habere iure pensationis. sed fieri potest, ut amplius esset, quod invicem aliquem consequi oporteat, aut iudex pensationis rationem non habeat, aut ideo de restituenda re cum eo non agatur, quia ea res casu intercidit aut sine iudice restituta est: dicemus necessariam esse contrariam actionem.
What each person can obtain by a contrary action, that he can also keep safe in the direct action—in which he is being sued—by the right of compensation. But it can happen that the amount which someone ought reciprocally to obtain is greater, or that the judge does not take account of compensation, or that therefore there is no litigation with him for restoring the thing, because that thing has perished by chance or has been restored without a judge: we will say that the contrary action is necessary.
Rem mihi commodasti: eandem subripuisti: deinde cum commodati ageres nec a te scirem esse subreptam, iudex me condemnavit et solvi: postea comperi a te esse subreptam: quaesitum est, quae mihi tecum actio sit. respondit furti quidem non esse, sed commodati contrarium iudicium utile mihi fore.
You lent me a thing: you purloined that same thing: then, when you brought an action of loan, and I did not know it had been purloined by you, the judge condemned me and I paid: afterwards I discovered it had been purloined by you: the question was, what action I have against you. He answered that there is not, indeed, an action of theft, but that the contrary action of loan (commodatum) would be available to me as a useful remedy.
In exercitu contubernalibus vasa utenda communi periculo dedi ac deinde meus servus subreptis his ad hostes profugit et postea sine vasis receptus est. habiturum me commodati actionem cum contubernalibus constat pro cuiusque parte: sed et illi mecum furti servi nomine agere possunt, quando et noxa caput sequitur. et si tibi rem periculo tuo utendam commodavero eaque a servo meo subripiatur, agere mecum furti possis servi nomine.
In the army I gave to my tent-mates vessels to be used, at common peril; and then my slave, having surreptitiously carried them off, fled to the enemy, and afterwards was recovered without the vessels. It is established that I shall have an action of commodatum against my tent-mates according to each one’s share; but they also can proceed against me for theft in the slave’s name, since the noxal liability follows the person. And if I should lend to you a thing to be used at your own risk, and it is filched by my slave, you can bring an action of theft against me in the slave’s name.
Si servus, quem tibi commodaverim, furtum fecerit, utrum sufficiat contraria commodati actio ( quemadmodum competit, si quid in curationem servi impendisti) an furti agendum sit, quaeritur. et furti quidem noxalem habere qui commodatum rogavit procul dubio est, contraria autem commodati tunc eum teneri, cum sciens talem esse servum ignoranti commodavit.
If the slave whom I have lent to you should commit theft, the question is whether the counter‑action of commodatum suffices (as it is available if you have expended anything for the care of the slave) or whether an action for theft should be brought. And that a noxal action of theft lies against the one who requested the commodatum is beyond doubt; but he is then held by the counter‑action of commodatum, when, knowing the slave to be of such a character, he lent him to one who was ignorant.
Si igitur contractum sit pignus nuda conventione, videamus, an, si quis aurum ostenderit quasi pignori daturus et aes dederit, obligaverit aurum pignori: et consequens est ut aurum obligetur, non autem aes, quia in hoc non consenserint.
If, then, a pledge has been contracted by naked convention, let us see whether, if someone has shown gold as though about to give it in pledge and has given bronze, he has obligated the gold in pledge: and the consequence is that the gold is obligated, but not the bronze, because they did not consent to this.
Si quis tamen, cum aes pignori daret, adfirmavit hoc aurum esse et ita pignori dederit, videndum erit, an aes pignori obligaverit et numquid, quia in corpus consensum est, pignori esse videatur: quod magis est. tenebitur tamen pigneraticia contraria actione qui dedit, praeter stellionatum quem fecit.
If someone, however, when he was giving bronze in pledge, affirmed that this was gold and thus gave it in pledge, the question will be whether he has obligated the bronze in pledge, and whether perhaps, because there was consent as to the corpus, it is to be seen as being in pledge: which is the more correct view. Nevertheless, the one who gave it will be liable to the pigneratic contraria action, besides the stellionate (swindle) which he perpetrated.
Si debitor rem pignori datam vendidit et tradidit tuque ei nummos credidisti, quos ille solvit ei creditori, cui pignus dederat, tibique cum eo convenit, ut ea res, quam iam vendiderat, pignori tibi esset, nihil te egisse constat, quia rem alienam pignori acceperis: ea enim ratione emptorem pignus liberatum habere coepisse neque ad rem pertinuisse, quod tua pecunia pignus sit liberatum.
If a debtor sold and delivered the thing given in pledge, and you lent him coins, which he paid to that creditor to whom he had given the pledge, and it was agreed between you and him that that thing, which he had already sold, should be in pledge to you, it is established that you have accomplished nothing, because you would have accepted another’s property in pledge: for on that reckoning the buyer is considered to have begun to have the pledge liberated, nor did it pertain to the matter that by your money the pledge was liberated.
Si quasi recepturus a debitore tuo comminus pecuniam reddidisti ei pignus isque per fenestram id misit excepturo eo, quem de industria ad id posuerit, labeo ait furti te agere cum debitore posse et ad exhibendum: et, si agente te contraria pigneraticia excipiat debitor de pignore sibi reddito, replicabitur de dolo et fraude, per quam nec redditum, sed per fallaciam ablatum id intellegitur.
If, as though you were about to receive the money from your debtor on the spot, you handed back to him the pledge, and he sent it out through a window to be caught by someone whom he had deliberately stationed for that purpose, Labeo says that you can sue the debtor for theft and by the action for production; and, if, when you are plaintiff, the debtor raises by way of defense the counter pigneratician action on the ground that the pledge was returned to him, a replication will be raised of dolus and fraud, by which it is understood that it was not returned, but was taken away by trickery.
Si convenit de distrahendo pignore sive ab initio sive postea, non tantum venditio valet, verum incipit emptor dominium rei habere. sed etsi non convenerit de distrahendo pignore, hoc tamen iure utimur, ut liceat distrahere, si modo non convenit, ne liceat. ubi vero convenit, ne distraheretur, creditor, si distraxerit, furti obligatur, nisi ei ter fuerit denuntiatum ut solvat et cessaverit.
If it is agreed about selling off the pledge, whether from the beginning or afterwards, not only is the sale valid, but the buyer begins to have dominion of the thing. But even if it has not been agreed about selling off the pledge, nevertheless we use this law, that it is licit to sell off, provided only that it has not been agreed that it is not licit. But where it has been agreed that it should not be sold off, the creditor, if he sells it off, is liable for theft, unless three notices have been served upon him to pay and he has been in default.
Quamvis convenerit, ut fundum pigneraticium tibi vendere liceret, nihilo magis cogendus es vendere, licet solvendo non sit is qui pignus dederit, quia tua causa id caveatur. sed atilicinus ex causa cogendum creditorem esse ad vendendum dicit: quid enim si multo minus sit quod debeatur et hodie pluris venire possit pignus quam postea? melius autem est dici eum, qui dederit pignus, posse vendere et accepta pecunia solvere id quod debeatur, ita tamen, ut creditor necessitatem habeat ostendere rem pigneratam, si mobilis sit, prius idonea cautela a debitore pro indemnitate ei praestanda.
Although it has been agreed that it should be permitted to you to sell the pledged estate, you are none the more to be compelled to sell, although the one who gave the pledge is not solvent, because this is stipulated for your benefit. But Atilicinus says that for cause the creditor must be compelled to sell: for what if what is owed is much less, and today the pledge could sell for more than later? It is better, however, to say that he who gave the pledge can sell and, upon receiving the money, pay what is owed—provided, however, that the creditor must produce the pledged thing, if it is movable, after adequate security for his indemnity has first been furnished by the debtor.
Si necessarias impensas fecerim in servum aut in fundum, quem pignoris causa acceperim, non tantum retentionem, sed etiam contrariam pigneraticiam actionem habebo: finge enim medicis, cum aegrotaret servus, dedisse me pecuniam et eum decessisse, item insulam fulsisse vel refecisse et postea deustam esse, nec habere quod possem retinere.
If I have made necessary expenses on a slave or on a farm which I have received for the sake of pledge, I shall have not only retention but also the contrary pigneratician action: for imagine that, when the slave was sick, I gave money to the physicians and he died; likewise that I shored up or repaired a tenement and afterwards it was scorched by fire, and I have nothing that I could retain.
Si pignori plura mancipia data sint, et quaedam certis pretiis ita vendiderit creditor ut evictionem eorum praestaret, et creditum suum habeat, reliqua mancipia potest retinere, donec ei caveatur, quod evictionis nomine promiserit, indemnem eum futurum.
If several slaves have been given in pledge, and the creditor has sold some at fixed prices in such a way that he would provide a warranty of eviction, and has his claim satisfied, he can retain the remaining slaves until security is furnished to him that, with respect to what he promised under the head of eviction, he will be kept indemnified.
Si annua bima trima die triginta stipulatus acceperim pignus pactusque sim, ut nisi sua quaque die pecunia soluta esset, vendere eam mihi liceret, placet, antequam omnium pensionum dies veniret, non posse me pignus vendere, quia eis verbis omnes pensiones demonstrarentur: nec verum est sua quaque die non solutam pecuniam, antequam omnes dies venirent. sed omnibus pensionibus praeteritis, etiamsi una portio soluta non sit, pignus potest venire. sed si ita scriptum sit: " si qua pecunia sua die soluta non erit", statim competit ei pacti conventio.
If, having stipulated annual, biennial, triennial, and thirty‑day payments, I have received a pledge and have agreed that, unless the money were paid on each of its own days, it would be permitted to me to sell it, the opinion is that, before the day of all the installments had come, I cannot sell the pledge, because by those words all the installments are indicated; nor is it true that money has not been paid on its respective day before all the days have come. But with all the installments fallen due, even if a single portion has not been paid, the pledge can be sold. But if it is written thus: "if any money is not paid on its day," the pact by agreement immediately operates for him.
Omnis pecunia exsoluta esse debet aut eo nomine satisfactum esse, ut nascatur pigneraticia actio. satisfactum autem accipimus, quemadmodum voluit creditor, licet non sit solutum: sive aliis pignoribus sibi caveri voluit, ut ab hoc recedat, sive fideiussoribus sive reo dato sive pretio aliquo vel nuda conventione, nascitur pigneraticia actio. et generaliter dicendum erit, quotiens recedere voluit creditor a pignore, videri ei satisfactum, si ut ipse voluit sibi cavit, licet in hoc deceptus sit.
All the money must have been paid out, or satisfaction must have been made on that account, so that a pigneratic action may arise. We take “satisfaction” to mean, as the creditor wished, even if there has not been payment: whether he wished to be secured for himself by other pledges, so as to withdraw from this one, or by sureties, or by the debtor furnished, or by some price, or by a bare convention, a pigneratic action arises. And generally it will have to be said that whenever the creditor wished to withdraw from the pledge, it is deemed that satisfaction has been made to him, if he has taken security for himself as he wished, even if in this he was deceived.
Si quasi daturus tibi pecuniam pignus accepero nec dedero, pigneraticia actione tenebor et nulla solutione facta: idemque et si accepto lata sit pecunia, vel condicio defecit, ob quam pignus contractum est, vel si pactum, cui standum est, de pecunia non petenda factum est.
If, as though about to give you money, I have accepted a pledge and did not give it, I shall be held by the pignoratitious action, even with no solution having been made: and the same holds even if, after acceptance, the money has been entered as received (in the acceptum), or the condition has failed on account of which the pledge was contracted, or if a pact, which must be abided by, has been made not to seek the money.
Si in sortem dumtaxat vel in usuras obstrictum est pignus, eo soluto propter quod obligatum est locum habet pigneraticia. sive autem usurae in stipulatum sint deductae sive non, si tamen pignus et in eas obligatum fuit, quamdiu quid ex his debetur, pigneraticia cessabit. alia causa est earum, quas quis supra licitum modum promisit: nam hae penitus illicitae sunt.
If the pledge has been obligated only for the principal or for interest, then, once that on account of which it was bound has been discharged, the pigneratic action has its place. And whether the interest has been reduced into a stipulation or not, if nevertheless the pledge was also obligated for them, so long as anything of these is owed, the pigneratic action will cease. The case is different with those which someone has promised beyond the permitted measure: for these are utterly illicit.
Solutam autem pecuniam accipiendum non solum, si ipsi, cui obligata res est, sed et si alii sit soluta voluntate eius, vel ei cui heres exstitit, vel procuratori eius, vel servo pecuniis exigendis praeposito. unde si domum conduxeris et eius partem mihi locaveris egoque locatori tuo pensionem solvero, pigneraticia adversus te potero experiri ( nam iulianus scribit solvi ei posse): et si partem tibi, partem ei solvero, tantundem erit dicendum. plane in eam dumtaxat summam invecta mea et illata tenebuntur, in quam cenaculum conduxi: non enim credibile est hoc convenisse, ut ad universam pensionem insulae frivola mea tenebuntur.
But payment of money is to be accepted not only if it has been paid to the person himself to whom the thing is obligated, but also if it has been paid to another with his will, or to him to whom he has become heir, or to his procurator, or to a slave appointed for the collection of monies. Whence, if you have rented a house and have let a part of it to me, and I pay the rent to your lessor, I will be able to proceed against you by a pignoratitious action (for Julian writes that it can be paid to him): and if I pay part to you, part to him, the same is to be said. Clearly the things that I have brought in and carried in will be held liable only up to that sum for which I rented the upper room; for it is not credible that this was agreed, that my trifles should be held for the entire rent of the tenement.
Per liberam autem personam pignoris obligatio nobis non adquiritur, adeo ut ne per procuratorem plerumque vel tutorem adquiratur: et ideo ipsi actione pigneraticia convenientur. sed nec mutat, quod constitutum est ab imperatore nostro posse per liberam personam possessionem adquiri: nam hoc eo pertinebit, ut possimus pignoris nobis obligati possessionem per procuratorem vel tutorem adprehendere, ipsam autem obligationem libera persona nobis non semper adquiret.
But through a free person the obligation of a pledge is not acquired for us, to such an extent that for the most part it is not even acquired through a procurator or a tutor; and therefore they themselves are proceeded against by the pigneratic action. Nor does this alter what has been established by our emperor, that possession can be acquired through a free person: for this will pertain to this effect, that we can apprehend the possession of the pledge obligated to us through a procurator or a tutor, but the obligation itself a free person will not always acquire for us.
Si, cum venderet creditor pignus, convenerit inter ipsum et emptorem, ut, si solverit debitor pecuniam pretii emptori, liceret ei recipere rem suam, scripsit iulianus et est rescriptum ob hanc conventionem pigneraticiis actionibus teneri creditorem, ut debitori mandet ex vendito actionem adversus emptorem. sed et ipse debitor aut vindicare rem poterit aut in factum actione adversus emptorem agere.
If, when the creditor was selling the pledge, it was agreed between him and the buyer that, if the debtor should pay the money of the price to the buyer, it would be permitted to him to take back his property, Julian wrote, and there is a rescript, that on account of this agreement the creditor is held by pignoratitious actions, to mandate/assign to the debtor the action ex vendito against the buyer. But the debtor himself also can either vindicate the thing or proceed against the buyer by an action in factum.
Contrariam pigneraticiam creditori actionem competere certum est: proinde si rem alienam vel alii pigneratam vel in publicum obligatam dedit, tenebitur, quamvis et stellionatus crimen committat. sed utrum ita demum, si scit, an et si ignoravit? et quantum ad crimen pertinet, excusat ignorantia: quantum ad contrarium iudicium, ignorantia eum non excusat, ut Marcellus libro sexto digestorum scribit.
It is certain that the contrary pigneratician action is competent to the creditor: accordingly, if he gave a thing belonging to another, or pledged to another, or obligated to the public, he will be liable, although he also commits the crime of stellionate. But is it only thus, if he knew, or even if he was ignorant? And, so far as the crime is concerned, ignorance excuses; so far as the contrary action is concerned, ignorance does not excuse him, as Marcellus writes in the sixth book of the Digesta.
Si convenerit, ut nomen debitoris mei pignori tibi sit, tuenda est a praetore haec conventio, ut et te in exigenda pecunia et debitorem adversus me, si cum eo experiar, tueatur. ergo si id nomen pecuniarium fuerit, exactam pecuniam tecum pensabis, si vero corporis alicuius, id quod acceperis erit tibi pignoris loco.
If it has been agreed that the claim (nomen) of my debtor shall be a pledge to you, this convention (agreement) is to be protected by the praetor, so that it may protect both you in exacting the money and the debtor against me, if I bring suit against him. Therefore, if that claim is pecuniary, you will set off with yourself the money collected; but if it is of some specific body (thing), that which you have received will be for you in the place of a pledge.
Si quis caverit, ut silva sibi pignori esset, navem ex ea materia factam non esse pignori cassius ait, quia aliud sit materia, aliud navis: et ideo nominatim in dando pignore adiciendum esse ait: " quaeque ex silva facta natave sint".
If someone has stipulated that the timber be a pledge for him, Cassius says that a ship made from that material is not under the pledge, because material is one thing, a ship another; and therefore, in giving the pledge, he says it must be added expressly: "and whatever things have been made from the timber or have been produced from it."
Si pignore subrepto furti egerit creditor, totum, quidquid percepit, debito eum imputare papinianus confitetur, et est verum, etiamsi culpa creditoris furtum factum sit. multo magis hoc erit dicendum in eo, quod ex condictione consecutus est. sed quod ipse debitor furti actione praestitit creditori vel condictione, an debito sit imputandum videamus: et quidem non oportere id ei restitui, quod ipse ex furti actione praestitit, peraeque relatum est et traditum, et ita papinianus libro nono quaestionum ait.
If, when the pledge has been filched, the creditor brings an action for theft, Papinian acknowledges that he must impute to the debt the whole of whatever he has recovered; and this is true even if the theft was brought about by the creditor’s fault. Much more must this be said of what he has obtained by a condiction. But as to what the debtor himself has rendered to the creditor by an action for theft or by condiction, let us see whether it ought to be imputed to the debt: and indeed it has been reported and handed down uniformly that what he himself has paid under the action for theft ought not to be restored to him; and so Papinian says in the ninth book of the Questions.
Idem papinianus ait et si metus causa servum pigneratum debitori tradiderit, quem bona fide pignori acceperat: nam si egerit quod metus causa factum est et quadruplum sit consecutus, nihil neque restituet ex eo quod consecutus est nec debito imputabit.
The same Papinian says that even if, by reason of fear, he delivered to the debtor a pledged slave, whom he had in good faith received in pledge: for if he brings an action for what was done by reason of fear and has obtained the quadruple, he will neither restore anything of what he has obtained nor impute it to the debt.
Si praedo rem pignori dederit, competit ei et de fructibus pigneraticia actio, quamvis ipse fructus suos non faciet ( a praedone enim fructus et vindicari extantes possunt et consumpti condici): proderit igitur ei, quod creditor bona fide possessor fuit.
If a marauder has given a thing in pledge, a pigneratician action lies to him also concerning the fruits, although he himself will not make the fruits his own ( a robber’s fruits can both be vindicated if extant and, if consumed, be claimed by condictio): it will therefore profit him that the creditor was a possessor in good faith.
Si creditor, cum venderet pignus, duplam promisit ( nam usu hoc evenerat et conventus ob evictionem erat et condemnatus), an haberet regressum pigneraticiae contrariae actionis ? et potest dici esse regressum, si modo sine dolo et culpa sic vendidit et ut pater familias diligens id gessit: si vero nullum emolumentum talis venditio attulit, sed tanti venderet, quanto vendere potuit, etiamsi haec non promisit, regressum non habere.
If the creditor, when he was selling the pledge, promised the double (for by usage this had occurred, and he had been sued on account of eviction and condemned), whether he had regress by the contrary pigneratic action ? And it can be said there is regress, if only he sold thus without fraud and fault and conducted the matter as a diligent paterfamilias: but if in truth such a sale brought no emolument, but he sold it for as much as he was able to sell it, even if he had not promised these things, he does not have regress.
Nec enim amplius a debitore quam debiti summa consequi poterit. sed si stipulatio usurarum fuerat et post quinquennium forte, quam pretium ex re obligata victus eam emptori restituit, etiam medii temporis usuras a debitore petere potest, quia nihil ei solutum esse, ut auferri non possit, palam factum est: sed si simplum praestitit, doli exceptione repellendus erit ab usurarum petitione, quia habuit usum pecuniae pretii, quod ab emptore acceperat.
For he will not be able to obtain from the debtor more than the sum of the debt. But if there had been a stipulation of interest, and perhaps after a five-year period, when, having been defeated, he restored to the purchaser the encumbered thing for which he had received the price, he can also demand from the debtor interest for the intervening time, because it has been made clear that nothing was paid to him in such a way that it cannot be taken away; but if he has made good the simple amount, he must be repelled from a claim for interest by the exception of dolus (fraud), because he had the use of the money of the price which he had received from the buyer.
Eleganter apud me quaesitum est, si impetrasset creditor a caesare, ut pignus possideret idque evictum esset, an habeat contrariam pigneraticiam. et videtur finita esse pignoris obligatio et a contractu recessum. immo utilis ex empto accommodata est, quemadmodum si pro soluto ei res data fuerit, ut in quantitatem debiti ei satisfiat vel in quantum eius intersit, et compensationem habere potest creditor, si forte pigneraticia vel ex alia causa cum eo agetur.
Elegantly it was asked before me: if a creditor had obtained from Caesar that he might possess the pledge, and this were evicted, whether he has the contrary pigneratician action. And it seems that the obligation of the pledge has been finished and there has been a withdrawal from the contract. Nay rather, a useful action on purchase (ex empto) is afforded, just as if a thing had been given to him as in payment, so that he be satisfied to the amount of the debt or to the extent of his interest; and the creditor can have compensation by set-off, if perhaps a pigneratician action or one from another cause is brought against him.
Qui reprobos nummos solvit creditori, an habet pigneraticiam actionem quasi soluta pecunia, quaeritur: et constat neque pigneraticia eum agere neque liberari posse, quia reproba pecunia non liberat solventem, reprobis videlicet nummis reddendis.
One who pays his creditor with reprobate (bad) coins—whether he has a pigneratic (pledge) action as if money had been paid—is asked: and it is settled that he can neither sue by the pigneratic action nor be released, because reprobate money does not liberate the payer, the bad coins, namely, being to be returned.
Si vendiderit quidem creditor pignus pluris quam debitum erat, nondum autem pretium ab emptore exegerit, an pigneraticio iudicio conveniri possit ad superfluum reddendum, an vero vel exspectare debeat, quoad emptor solvat, vel suscipere actiones adversus emptorem? et arbitror non esse urguendum ad solutionem creditorem, sed aut exspectare debere debitorem aut, si non exspectat, mandandas ei actiones adversus emptorem periculo tamen venditoris. quod si accepit iam pecuniam, superfluum reddit.
If indeed the creditor has sold the pledge for more than the debt amounted to, but has not yet exacted the price from the buyer, can he be convened by a pignoratitious action to render the surplus, or ought he rather either to wait until the buyer pays, or to undertake actions against the buyer? And I judge that the creditor is not to be pressed to make payment, but either the debtor ought to wait, or, if he does not wait, the actions against the buyer should be assigned to him—yet at the seller’s peril. But if he has already received the money, he returns the surplus.
In pigneraticio iudicio venit et si res pignori datas male tractavit creditor vel servos debilitavit. plane si pro maleficiis suis coercuit vel vinxit vel optulit praefecturae vel praesidi, dicendum est pigneraticia creditorem non teneri. quare si prostituit ancillam vel aliud improbatum facere coegit, ilico pignus ancillae solvitur.
In the pignoratitious action it also lies if the creditor has ill-treated the things given in pledge or has debilitated the slaves. Clearly, if on account of their misdeeds he has coerced them or bound them or has presented them to the prefecture or to the governor, it must be said that the creditor is not held under the pignoratitious action. Therefore, if he prostituted a female slave or compelled her to do some other improper act, immediately the pledge of the maidservant is dissolved.
Si servos pigneratos artificiis instruxit creditor, si quidem iam imbutos vel voluntate debitoris, erit actio contraria: si vero nihil horum intercessit, si quidem artificiis necessariis, erit actio contraria, non tamen sic, ut cogatur servis carere pro quantitate sumptuum debitor. sicut enim neglegere creditorem dolus et culpa quam praestat non patitur, ita nec talem efficere rem pigneratam, ut gravis sit debitori ad reciperandum: puta saltum grandem pignori datum ab homine, qui vix luere potest, nedum excolere, tu acceptum pignori excoluisti sic, ut magni pretii faceres. alioquin non est aequum aut quaerere me alios creditores aut cogi distrahere quod velim receptum aut tibi paenuria coactum derelinquere.
If a creditor has equipped pledged slaves with crafts, if indeed [they were] already imbued, or with the debtor’s will, there will be a counter-action; but if none of these intervened, then, if indeed with necessary crafts, there will be a counter-action, yet not in such a manner that the debtor is compelled to be without his slaves in proportion to the amount of the expenses. For just as fraud and fault, for which the creditor is answerable, do not allow the creditor to be negligent, so neither [do they allow him] to make the pledged thing such that it is burdensome for the debtor to recover: suppose a large woodland given in pledge by a man who can scarcely redeem, much less cultivate; you, having received it in pledge, have cultivated it so that you made it of great value. Otherwise it is not equitable that I should either seek out other creditors, or be compelled to sell what I would like to take back, or, constrained by penury, to leave it to you.
Petenti mutuam pecuniam creditori, cum prae manu debitor non haberet, species auri dedit, ut pignori apud alium creditorem poneret. si iam solutione liberatas receptasque eas is qui susceperat tenet, exhibere iubendus est: quod si etiam nunc apud creditorem creditoris sunt, voluntate domini nexae videntur, sed ut liberatae tradantur, domino earum propria actio adversus suum creditorem competit.
To a creditor asking for a loan of money, since the debtor did not have cash at hand, he gave articles of gold, so that he might place them in pledge with another creditor. If now, after payment, the one who had undertaken the matter holds them as released and received back, he must be ordered to produce them: but if even now they are with the creditor of the creditor, they seem to be bound by the owner’s will; but in order that, once freed, they may be delivered, a proper action belongs to their owner against his own creditor.
Qui ratiario crediderat, cum ad diem pecunia non solveretur, ratem in flumine sua auctoritate detinuit: postea flumen crevit et ratem abstulit. si invito ratiario retinuisset, eius periculo ratem fuisse respondit: sed si debitor sua voluntate concessisset, ut retineret, culpam dumtaxat ei praestandam, non vim maiorem.
He who had extended credit to a raftman, when the money was not paid on the due day, detained the raft in the river by his own authority: afterwards the river rose and carried off the raft. He responded that, if he had retained it with the raftman unwilling, the raft was at his peril; but if the debtor had of his own will conceded that he should retain it, he was bound to answer for fault only, not for greater force (vis maior).
Si servus pignori datus creditori furtum faciat, liberum est debitori servum pro noxae deditione relinquere: quod si sciens furem pignori dederit, etsi paratus fuerit pro noxae dedito apud me relinquere, nihilo minus habiturum me pigneraticiam actionem, ut indemnem me praestet. eadem servanda esse iulianus ait etiam cum depositus vel commodatus servus furtum faciat.
If a slave given in pledge to a creditor commits theft, it is open to the debtor to leave the slave by way of noxal surrender; but if he knowingly has given a thief in pledge, even if he is ready to leave him with me as surrendered for the noxa, nonetheless I shall have the pignoratitious action, that he may render me indemnified. Julian says that the same is to be observed even when a deposited or loaned slave commits theft.
Titius cum credidisset pecuniam sempronio et ob eam pignus accepisset futurumque esset, ut distraheret eam creditor, quia pecunia non solveretur, petit a creditore, ut fundum certo pretio emptum haberet, et cum impetrasset, epistulam, qua se vendidisse fundum creditori significaret, emisit: quaero, an hanc venditionem debitor revocare possit offerendo sortem et usuras quae debentur. Marcellus respondit secundum ea quae proposita essent, revocare non posse.
When Titius had loaned money to Sempronius and on account of it had received a pledge, and it was going to come to pass that the creditor would sell it because the money was not being paid, the debtor asked the creditor that the farm be deemed purchased at a fixed price; and when he had obtained this, he issued a letter in which he indicated that he had sold the farm to the creditor. I inquire whether the debtor can revoke this sale (vendition) by offering the principal (sors) and the interest (usury) that are owed. Marcellus responded that, according to the facts set forth, he cannot revoke it.
Cum et sortis nomine et usurarum aliquid debetur ab eo, qui sub pignoribus pecuniam debet, quidquid ex venditione pignorum recipiatur, primum usuris, quas iam tunc deberi constat, deinde si quid superest sorti accepto ferendum est: nec audiendus est debitor, si, cum parum idoneum se esse sciat, eligit, quo nomine exonerari pignus suum malit.
When something is owed both under the name of principal and of interest by one who owes money under pledges, whatever is recovered from the sale of the pledges is to be applied first to the interest which is by then acknowledged to be owed, and then, if anything remains, it is to be credited, as received, to the principal; nor is the debtor to be heard if, knowing himself to be of inadequate means, he chooses under which head he would prefer his pledge to be exonerated.
Si quis in pignore pro auro aes subiecisset creditori, qualiter teneatur, quaesitum est. in qua specie rectissime sabinus scribit, si quidem dato auro aes subiecisset, furti teneri: quod si in dando aes subiecisset, turpiter fecisse, non furem esse. sed et hic puto pigneraticium iudicium locum habere, et ita pomponius scribit.
If someone, in a pledge, had substituted bronze in place of gold to the creditor, it has been asked how he is held liable. In which case sabinus most correctly writes: if indeed, after gold has been given, he had slipped in bronze, he is held liable for theft; but if in the very giving he had slipped in bronze, he acted disgracefully, he is not a thief. But even here I think the pigneratician action has a place, and so pomponius writes.
Sed et si quis rem alienam mihi pignori dederit sciens prudensque vel si quis alii obligatam mihi obligavit nec me de hoc certioraverit, eodem crimine plectetur. plane si ea res ampla est et ad modicum aeris fuerit pignerata, dici debebit cessare non solum stellionatus crimen, sed etiam pigneraticiam et de dolo actionem, quasi in nullo captus sit, qui pignori secundo loco accepit.
But also, if someone, knowing and deliberate, has given me another’s property in pledge, or if someone has pledged to me a thing already obligated to another and has not informed me of this, he shall be punished under the same charge. Clearly, if that thing is of large value and has been pledged for a modest sum of money, it ought to be said that not only the crime of stellionate ceases, but also the pigneratician action and the action for dolus, as though the one who received the pledge in the second place were in no way taken in.
Gaius seius ob pecuniam mutuam fundum suum lucio titio pignori dedit: postea pactum inter eos factum est, ut creditor pignus suum in compensationem pecuniae suae certo tempore possideret: verum ante expletum tempus creditor cum suprema sua ordinaret, testamento cavit, ut alter ex filiis suis haberet eum fundum et addidit " quem de lucio titio emi", cum non emisset: hoc testamentum inter ceteros signavit et gaius seius, qui fuit debitor. quaero, an ex hoc quod signavit praeiudicium aliquod sibi fecerit, cum nullum instrumentum venditionis proferatur, sed solum pactum, ut creditor certi temporis fructus caperet. herennius modestinus respondit contractui pignoris non obesse, quod debitor testamentum creditoris, in quo se emisse pignus expressit, signasse proponitur.
Gaius Seius, on account of money lent, gave his estate to Lucius Titius as a pledge; afterward a pact was made between them, that the creditor should possess his pledge in compensation for his money for a fixed time. But before the time was completed, the creditor, when arranging his last affairs, provided by will that one of his sons should have that estate, and he added, "which I bought from Lucius Titius," although he had not bought it. This testament, among others, Gaius Seius also signed, who was the debtor. I ask whether, from the fact that he signed, he made any prejudice against himself, since no instrument of sale is produced, but only a pact that the creditor should take the fruits for a certain time. Herennius Modestinus responded that it is not detrimental to the contract of pledge that the debtor is alleged to have signed the creditor’s testament in which he stated that he had bought the pledge.
Debitoris filius, qui manet in patris potestate, frustra pignus a creditore patris peculiaribus nummis comparat: et ideo si patronus debitoris contra tabulas eius possessionem acceperit, dominii partem optinebit: nam pecunia, quam filius ex re patris in pretium dedit, pignus liberatur.
The debtor’s son, who remains under the father’s power, purchases a pledge from the father’s creditor in vain with monies from his peculium: and therefore, if the debtor’s patron has received possession against his will (contra tabulas), he will obtain a share of ownership: for by the money which the son gave as the price out of his father’s property, the pledge is released.
Soluta pecunia creditor possessionem pignoris, quae corporalis apud eum fuit, restituere debet nec quicquam amplius praestare cogitur. itaque si medio tempore pignus creditor pignori dederit, domino solvente pecuniam quam debuit secundi pignoris neque persecutio dabitur neque retentio relinquetur.
Once the money has been paid, the creditor must restore the possession of the pledge, which was corporeal in his keeping, and he is not compelled to furnish anything further. And so, if in the meantime the creditor has given the pledge as a pledge, then, when the owner pays the money that he owed, with respect to the second pledge neither a right of pursuit will be afforded nor will retention be allowed.
Rem alienam pignori dedisti, deinde dominus rei eius esse coepisti: datur utilis actio pigneraticia creditori. non est idem dicendum, si ego titio, qui rem meam obligaverat sine mea voluntate, heres extitero: hoc enim modo pignoris persecutio concedenda non est creditori, nec utique sufficit ad competendam utilem pigneraticiam actionem eundem esse dominum, qui etiam pecuniam debet. sed si convenisset de pignore, ut ex suo mendacio arguatur, improbe resistit, quo minus utilis actio moveatur.
You gave another’s thing in pledge, then you began to be the owner of that thing: a useful pigneratic action is given to the creditor. The same is not to be said, if I have become heir to Titius, who had obligated my thing without my will: for in this way the pursuit of the pledge is not to be granted to the creditor, nor, at any rate, does it suffice for the useful pigneratic action to be competent that the same person is the owner who also owes the money. But if there had been an agreement about the pledge, so that he is convicted from his own mendacity, he resists wickedly, to prevent the useful action from being set in motion.
Locum purum pignori creditori obligavit eique instrumentum emptionis tradidit: et cum eum locum inaedificare vellet, mota sibi controversia a vicino de latitudine, quod alias probare non poterat, petit a creditore, ut instrumentum a se traditum auctoritatis exhiberet: quo non exhibente minorem locum aedificavit atque ita damnum passus est. quaesitum est, an, si creditor pecuniam petat vel pignus vindicet, doli exceptione posita iudex huius damni rationem habere debeat. respondit, si operam non dedisset, ut instrumenti facultate subducta debitor caperetur, posse debitorem pecunia soluta pigneraticia agere: opera autem in eo data tunc et ante pecuniam solutam in id quod interest cum creditore agi.
He bound a clear plot as a pledge to the creditor and handed over to him the instrument of purchase; and when he wished to build on that plot, a controversy was stirred up for him by a neighbor about the breadth, which he could not otherwise prove, he asked the creditor to produce, as authority, the instrument delivered by himself: when he did not produce it, he built on a smaller area and thus suffered loss. It was asked whether, if the creditor demands the money or vindicates the pledge, with an exception of fraud interposed, the judge ought to take account of this damage. He answered: if he did not take pains to have the debtor caught, the availability of the instrument having been withdrawn, the debtor, the money having been paid, can bring the pigneratic action; but if effort was expended in that, then even before the money is paid one may proceed against the creditor for what the interest amounts to.
Titius cum pecuniam mutuam accepit a gaio seio sub pignore culleorum: istos culleos cum seius in horreo haberet, missus ex officio annonae centurio culleos ad annonam sustulit ac postea instantia gaii seii creditoris reciperati sunt: quaero, intertrituram, quae ex operis facta est, utrum titius debitor an seius creditor adgnosecere debeat. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur ob id, quod eo nomine intertrimenti adcidisset, non teneri.
Titius, when he received a money-loan from Gaius Seius under a pledge of sacks, while Seius had those sacks in a granary, a centurion sent from the office of the annona carried off the sacks for the grain-supply, and afterwards, by the insistence of Gaius Seius the creditor, they were recovered: I ask, as to the wear-and-tear (intertritura) which was caused by the working/usage, whether Titius the debtor or Seius the creditor ought to acknowledge it. He answered that, according to the facts proposed, on the ground that loss (intertrimentum) had occurred under that head, he is not liable.