Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Age nunc uideamus ubi sit quasi quoddam hominis exterioris interiorisque confinium. Quidquid enim habemus in animo commune cum pecore recte adhuc dicitur ad exterior deputabitur sed adiuncta quadam uita sua qua exterior deputabitur sed adiuncta quadam uita sua qua compages corporis et omnes sensus uigent quibus instructus est ad exteriora sentienda. Quorum sensorum imagines infixae in memoria cum recordando reuisuntur res adhuc agitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinens.

[I 1] Come now, let us see where there is, as it were, a certain boundary of the outer and the inner man. For whatever we have in the mind in common with cattle is rightly still said to be assigned to the exterior, but with a certain life of its own adjoined, by which the framework of the body and all the senses are vigorous, with which it is equipped for perceiving external things; by which the exterior will be assigned, but with a certain life of its own adjoined, by which the framework of the body and all the senses are vigorous, with which it is equipped for perceiving external things. The images of these senses, fixed in the memory, when by recalling they are revisited, the matter is still being conducted as pertaining to the outer man.

Atque in his omnibus non distamus a pecore nisi quod figura corporis non proni sed erecti sumus. Qua in re admonemur ab eo qui nos fecit ne meliore nostri parte, id est animo, similes pecoribus simus a quibus corporis erectione distamus. Non ut in ea quae sublimia sunt in corporibus animum proiciamus.

And in all these things we do not differ from cattle except that in the figure of the body we are not prone but erect. In which matter we are admonished by Him who made us, lest in our better part, that is, the mind, we be similar to cattle, from whom we differ by the body’s erection. Not so that we should project the mind into those things which are lofty in bodies.

Nam uel in talibus quietem uoluntatis appetere prosternere est animum. Sed sicut corpus ad ea quae sunt excelsa corporum, id est ad caelestia, naturaliter erectum est, sic animus quae substantia spiritalis est ad ea quae sunt in spiritalibus excelsa erigendus est non elatione superbiae sed pietate iustitiae.

For even in such matters, to seek the repose of the will is to prostrate the mind. But just as the body is naturally erected toward those things which are the lofty things of bodies, that is, toward the celestial, so the mind, which is a spiritual substance, must be raised toward those things which among things spiritual are lofty, not by the elation of pride but by the piety of justice.

[II 2] Possunt autem et pecora et sentire per corporis sensus extrinsecus corporalia et ea memoriae fixa reminisci atque in eis appetere conducibilia, fugere incommoda. Verum ea notare ac non solum naturaliter rapta sed etiam de industria memoriae commendata retinere et in obliuionem iamiamque labentia recordando atque cogitando rursus imprimere ut quemadmodum ex eo quod gerit memoria cogitatio formatur, sic et hoc ipsum quod in memoria est cogitatione firmetur, fictas etiam uisiones hinc atque inde recordata quaelibet sumendo et quasi assuendo componere, inspicere quemadmodum in hoc rerum genere quae uerisimilia sunt discernantur a ueris, non spiritalibus sed ipsis corporalibus, haec atque huiusmodi, quamuis in sensibilibus atque in eis quae inde animus per sensum corporis traxit agantur atque uersentur, non sunt tamen rationis expertia nec hominibus pecoribusque communia. Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas quae nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent, atque his nisi subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus de corporalibus iudicare.

[2 2] But even beasts are able both to perceive corporeal things from without through the body’s senses and, those things fixed in memory, to recollect, and in them to seek what is conducive and to flee incommodities. Yet to note these things, and to retain not only what is naturally snatched but also what is by design committed to memory; and, as things now already slipping into oblivion, by recalling and thinking to stamp them anew, so that just as thought is formed from what memory carries, so this very thing which is in memory may likewise be made firm by thought; to compose even feigned visions by taking whatever has been recalled from here and there and, as it were, sewing them together; to inspect how, in this genus of things, what is verisimilar is distinguished from the true—not spiritual things, but the corporeal things themselves—these and the like, although they are transacted and turned about among sensibles and among those things which the mind has drawn from there through the sense of the body, are nevertheless not devoid of reason nor common to men and beasts. But it belongs to a more sublime reason to judge of these corporeals according to incorporeal and sempiternal reasons, which, unless they were above the human mind, assuredly would not be immutable; and unless something of ours were subjoined to these, we could not judge concerning corporeals according to them.

Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex ratione dimensionum atque figurarum quam incommutabiliter manere mens nouit.

We judge, moreover, concerning corporal things from the reason (ratio) of dimensions and of figures, which the mind knows to remain incommutably.

[III 3] Illud uero nostrum quod in actione corporalium atque temporalium tractandorum ita uersatur ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore rationale est quidem, sed ex illa rationali nostrae mentis substantia qua subhaeremus intellegibili atque incommutabili ueritati tamquam ductum et inferioribus tractandis gubernandisque deputatum est. Sicut enim in omnibus pecoribus non inuentum est uiro adiutorium simile illi nisi de illo detractum in coniugium formaretur, ita menti nostrae qua supernam et internam consulimus ueritatem nullum est ad usum rerum corporalium quantum naturae hominis sat est simile adiutorium ex animae partibus quas communes cum pecoribus habemus. Et ideo quiddam rationale nostrum non ad unitatis diuortium separatum sed in auxilium societatis quasi deriuatum in sui operis dispertitur officio.

[3 3] But that part of ours which is so engaged in the action of handling corporeal and temporal things that it is not common to us with the beast is indeed rational, yet from that rational substance of our mind by which we adhere to intelligible and incommutable verity it is, as though drawn off, deputed to the handling and governing of the lower things. For just as among all the animals no help like unto him was found for the man, unless one taken from him were formed into a consort in marriage, so for our mind, by which we consult the supernal and internal truth, there is no similar help, for the use of bodily things so far as suffices for human nature, from the parts of the soul which we have in common with beasts. And therefore a certain rational element of ours, not separated to a divorce from unity but, as it were, derived for the aid of society, is apportioned to the office of its own work.

Et sicut una caro est duorum in masculo et femina, sic intellectum nostrum et actionem, uel consilium et exsecutionem, uel rationem et appetitum rationalem, uel si quo alio modo significatius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur ut quemadmodum de illis dictum est: Erunt duo in carne una, sic his dici possit: 'Duo in mente una.'

And just as there is one flesh of two in the male and the female, so our intellect and action, or counsel and execution, or reason and rational appetite, or, if they can be said more significantly in any other way, the one nature of the mind embraces, so that, just as it was said of those: 'The two shall be in one flesh,' so of these it may be said: 'Two in one mind.'

[IV 4] Cum igitur disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus, nec eam in haec duo quae commemoraui nisi per officia geminamus. Itaque cum in ea quaerimus trintatem, in tota quaerimus non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum ut tertium aliquid iam quaeramus quo trinitas impleatur. Sed in tota natura mentis ita trinitatem reperiri opus est ut si desit actio temporalium cui operi necessarium sit adiutorium propter quod ad haec inferiora administranda deriuetur aliquid mentis, in una nusquam dispertita mente trinitas inueniatur, et facta iam ista distributione in eo solo quod ad contemplationem pertinet aeternorum non solum trinitas sed etiam imago dei; in hoc autem quod deriuatum est in actione temporalium, etiamsi trinitas possit, non tamen imago dei possit inueniri.

[IV 4] Therefore, when we discourse on the nature of the human mind, we discourse about one certain thing, nor do we twin it into those two which I have mentioned except by the offices of their operations. Thus, when we seek the Trinity in it, we seek it in the whole, not separating rational action in temporals from the contemplation of eternals, so that we would now seek some third thing by which the Trinity might be fulfilled. But it is needful that in the whole nature of the mind the Trinity be found in such a way that, if the action of temporals is lacking—to whose work an aid is necessary, on account of which something of the mind is derived off for administering these lower things—the Trinity be found in the one mind nowhere partitioned; and, this distribution once made, in that alone which pertains to the contemplation of eternal things there be found not only the Trinity but also the image of God; whereas in that which has been derived into the action of temporals, even if a Trinity can (be found), nevertheless the image of God cannot be found.

[V 5] Proinde non mihi uidentur probabilem afferre sententiam qui sic arbitrantur trinitatem imaginis dei in tribus personis quod attinet ad humanam naturam posse reperiri ut in coniugio masculi et feminae atque in eorum prole compleatur, quod quasi uir ipse patris personam intimet, filii uero quod de illo ita processit ut nasceretur, atque ita tertiam personam uelut spiritus dicunt esse mulierem quae ita de uiro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut filia, quamuis ea concipiente proles nasceretur; dixit enim dominus de spiritu sancto quod a patre procedat et tamen filius non est. In huius igitur opinionis errore hoc solum probabiliter affertur quod in origine factae feminae secundum sanctae scripturae fidem satis ostenditur non omne quod de aliqua persona ita exsistit ut personam alteram faciat filium posse dici quandoquidem de uiri persona exstitit persona mulieris nec tamen eius filia dicta est. Cetera sane ita sunt absurda, immo uero ita falsa, ut facillime redarguantur.

[5 5] Accordingly, those do not seem to me to bring forward a probable opinion who so judge that the trinity of the image of God, as it pertains to human nature, can be found in three persons in such a way that in the marriage of male and female and in their offspring it is completed: as if the man himself intimates the person of the father, but the son, since he proceeded from him so as to be born; and thus they say the third person, as it were the spirit, is the woman, who proceeded from the man in such a way that she herself was not a son or a daughter, although with her conceiving offspring would be born; for the Lord said about the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from the Father and yet is not the Son. In the error of this opinion, therefore, only this is brought forward with any plausibility: that in the origin of the woman made, according to the faith of Holy Scripture, it is sufficiently shown that not everything which exists from some person so as to make another person can be called a son, since from the person of the man there existed the person of the woman, and yet she was not called his daughter. The rest, to be sure, are so absurd—nay rather so false—that they are very easily refuted.

Omitto enim quale sit spiritum sanctum matrem filii dei putare et coniugem patris. Fortassis quippe respondeatur haec in carnalibus habere offensionem dum corporei conceptus partusque cogitantur. Quamquam et haec ipsa castissime cogitent quibus mundis omnia munda sunt, immundis autem et infidelibus quorum polluta est et mens et conscientia ita nihil est mundum ut quosdam eorum etiam de uirgine secundum carnem natus Christum offendat.

I omit, indeed, what sort of thing it is to think the Holy Spirit the mother of the Son of God and the spouse of the Father. For perhaps it may be answered that these things have offense in carnal matters, while corporeal conception and parturition are being imagined. And yet even these very things are most chastely thought by those to whom, being pure, all things are pure; but to the impure and the infidels, whose mind and conscience are defiled, nothing is pure, to such an extent that even Christ, born of a virgin according to the flesh, gives offense to some of them.

Sed tamen in spiritalibus illis summis, ubi non est aliquid uiolabile aut corruptibile nec natum ex tempore nec ex informi formatum, si qua dicuntur talia ad quorum similitudinem etiam ista inferioris creaturae genera quamuis longe remotissime facta sunt, non debent cuiusquam sobriam perturbare prudentiam ne cum uanum deuitat horrorem in perniciosum incurrat errorem. Assuescat in corporibus ita spiritalium reperire uestigia ut cum inde sursum uersus duce ratione ascendere coeperit, ut ad ipsam incommutabilem ueritatem per quam facta sunt ista perueniat, non secum ad summa pertrahat quod contemnit in infimis. Nec enim erubuit quidam uxorem sibi eligere sapientiam quia nomen uxoris in prole gignenda corruptibilem concubitum ingerit cogitanti, aut uero ipsa sapientia sexu femina est quia femini generis uocabulo et in graeca et in latina lingua enuntiatur.

But yet in those supreme spiritual things, where there is nothing violable or corruptible, nor born from time nor fashioned from the unformed, if certain such things are said to the likeness of which even these genera of the lower creature, although made at a very far remove, have been made, they ought not to perturb anyone’s sober prudence, lest, while he shuns a vain horror, he run into a pernicious error. Let him become accustomed in bodies thus to discover the vestiges of spiritual things, so that, when from there he has begun to ascend upward with reason as his guide, so as to arrive at the very incommutable Truth through which these things were made, he may not drag along with himself to the heights what he despises in the lowest things. For neither did a certain one blush to choose Wisdom for himself as a wife, because the name of wife, in the begetting of offspring, thrusts upon the thinker a corruptible coition; nor is Wisdom herself female in sex because she is expressed by a word of feminine gender both in the Greek and in the Latin language.

[VI 6] Non ergo propterea respuimus istam sententiam quia timemus sanctam et inuiolabilem atque incommutabilem caritatem tamquam coniugem dei patris de illo exsistentem sed non sicut prolem ad gignendum uerbum per quod facta sunt omnia cogitare, sed quia eam falsam diuina scriptura euidenter ostendit. Dixit enim deus: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; paulo post autem dictum est: Et fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei. Nostram certe quia pluralis est numerus non recte diceretur si homo ad unius personae imaginem fieret siue patris siue filii siue spiritus sancti, sed quia fiebat ad imaginem trinitatis propterea dictum est, ad imaginem nostram.

[6 6] We do not, therefore, reject that opinion because we are afraid to think of holy and inviolate and immutable charity as, as it were, the consort of God the Father, subsisting from him, yet not as progeny for the begetting of the Word by whom all things were made, but because divine Scripture evidently shows it to be false. For God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness; but a little after it was said: And God made man to the image of God. Surely our, because the number is plural, would not be rightly said if man were made to the image of one person, whether of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was being made to the image of the Trinity, for that reason it was said, to our image.

Rursus autem ne in trinitate credendos arbitraremur tres deos cum sit eadem trinitas unus deus: Et fecit, inquit, deus hominem ad imaginem dei, pro eo ac si diceret, ad imaginem suam.

Again, however, lest we should suppose that in the Trinity three gods are to be believed, since that same Trinity is one God: “And God made man to the image of God,” he says, as if he were saying, “to his own image.”

[7] Sunt enim tales usitatae in illis litteris locutiones quas nonnulli, etiamsi catholicam fidem asserunt, non tamen diligenter aduertunt ut putent ita dictum, Fecit deus ad imaginem dei, quasi diceretur, 'Fecit pater ad imaginem filii,' sic uolentes asserere in scripturis sanctis deum dictum etiam filium quasi desint alia uerissima et manifestissima documenta ubi non solum deus sed etiam uerus deus dictus est filius. In hoc enim testimonio dum aliud soluere intendunt sic se implicant ut expedire non possint. Si enim pater fecit ad imaginem filii ita ut non sit homo imago patris sed filii, dissimilis est patri filius.Si autem pia fides docet, sicuti docet, filium esse ad aequalitatem essentiae similem patri, quod ad similitudinem filii factum est necesse est etiam ad similitudinem patris factum sit.

[7] For such customary locutions are found in those letters which some, even if they assert the Catholic faith, nevertheless do not diligently notice, so that they think it was thus said, God made to the image of God, as if it were said, 'The Father made to the image of the Son,' wishing thus to assert that in the holy Scriptures the Son also is called God, as though other most true and most manifest documents were lacking where the Son is called not only God but even true God. For in this testimony, while they intend to loosen another knot, they so entangle themselves that they cannot disentangle themselves. For if the Father made according to the image of the Son in such wise that man is not the image of the Father but of the Son, the Son is dissimilar to the Father. But if pious faith teaches—as indeed it teaches—that the Son is like the Father with respect to the equality of essence, what was made according to the likeness of the Son must necessarily also have been made according to the likeness of the Father.

Deinde si hominem pater non ad suam sed ad filii fecit imaginem, cur non ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 'tuam,' sed ait, nostram, nisi quia trinitatis imago fiebat in homine ut hoc modo esset homo imago unius ueri dei quia ipsa trinitas unus uerus deus est?

Then, if the Father made man not to his own but to the Son’s image, why does he not say: Let us make man to the image and likeness of ‘thine,’ but says, ‘ours,’ unless because the image of the Trinity was being made in man, so that in this way man might be the image of the one true God, since the Trinity itself is one true God?

Locutiones autem sunt innumerabiles tales in scripturis, sed has protulisse suffecerit. Est in psalmis ita dictum: Domini est salus, et super populum tuum benedictio tua quasi alteri dictum sit, non ei de quo dixerat, Domini est salus. Et iterum: A te, inquit, eruar a temptatione, et in deo meo transgrediar murum quasi alteri dixerit, A te eruar a temptatione.

However, there are innumerable such locutions in the scriptures, but to have adduced these will suffice. It is said thus in the psalms: “Salvation is the Lord’s, and upon your people is your blessing,” as if it were said to another, not to him of whom he had said, “Salvation is the Lord’s.” And again: “From you,” he says, “I shall be rescued from temptation, and in my God I shall overleap a wall,” as if he had said to another, “From you I shall be rescued from temptation.”

Et iterum: Populi sub te cadent in corde inimicorum regis ac si diceret, in corde inimicorum 'tuorum'; ei quippe regi dixerat, in est, domino Iesu Christo, Populi sub te cadent, quem regem intellegi uoluit cum diceret, in corde inimicorum regis. Rarius ista in noui testamenti litteris inueniuntur, sed tamen ad romanos apostolus: De filio suo, inquit, qui factus est ei ex semine Dauid secundum carnem, qui praedestinatus est filius dei in uirtute secundum spiritum sanctificationis ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi domini nostri tamquam de alio supra diceret. Quid est enim filius dei praedestinatus ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi, nisi idem Iesus Christus qui praedestinatus est filius dei?

And again: Peoples will fall under you in the heart of the enemies of the king, as if he were saying, in the heart of ‘your’ enemies; for to that king, that is, to the Lord Jesus Christ, he had said, Peoples will fall under you, whom he wished to be understood as the king when he said, in the heart of the enemies of the king. These are found more rarely in the letters of the New Testament; yet nevertheless in Romans the Apostle: ‘Concerning his Son,’ he says, ‘who was made for him from the seed of David according to the flesh, who was predestined Son of God in power according to the Spirit of sanctification by the resurrection of the dead, Jesus Christ our Lord,’ as though above he were speaking about another. For what is ‘the Son of God predestined from the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ,’ if not this same Jesus Christ who was predestined Son of God?

Ergo quomodo hic cum audimus filius dei in uirtute Iesu Christi, aut filius dei secundum spiritum sanctificationis Iesu Christi, aut filius dei ex resurrectione mortuorum Iesu Christi, cum dici potuisset usitate, in uirtute 'sua,' aut secundum spiritum sanctificationis 'suae,' aut ex resurrectione mortuorum 'eius' uel mortuorum 'suorum,' non cogimur intellegere aliam personam sed unam eandemque scilicet filii dei domini nostri Iesu Christi; ita cum audimus: Fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, quamuis posset usitatius dici, ad imaginem suam, non tamen cogimur aliam personam intellegere in trinitate, sed ipsam unam eandemque trinitatem qui est unus deus, ad cuius imaginem factus est homo.

Therefore, just as here when we hear “the Son of God in the power of Jesus Christ,” or “the Son of God according to the Spirit of sanctification of Jesus Christ,” or “the Son of God from the resurrection of the dead of Jesus Christ,” although it could have been said more usually, “in ‘his’ power,” or “according to ‘his’ Spirit of sanctification,” or “from the resurrection of the dead ‘of him’” or “of ‘his’ dead,” we are not forced to understand another person but one and the same, namely of the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ; so when we hear: “God made man to the image of God,” although it could more usually be said, “to ‘his’ image,” nevertheless we are not forced to understand another person in the Trinity, but the very one and the same Trinity, who is the one God, to whose image man was made.

[8] Quae cum ita sint, si eandem trinitatis imaginem non in uno sed in tribus hominibus acceperimus, patre et matre et filio, non erat ergo ad imaginem dei factus homo antequam uxor ei fieret et antequam filium propagarent quia nondum erat trinitas. An dicit aliquis: 'Iam trinitas erat quia etsi nondum forma propria, iam tamen originali natura et mulier erat in latere uiri et filius in lumbis patris'? Cur ergo cum scriptura dixisset: Fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, contexuit dicens: Fecit eum masculum et feminam, fecit eos et benedixit eos (uel si ita distinguendum est: Et fecit deus hominem, ut deinde inferatur ad imaginem dei fecit eum, et tertia subiunctio sit masculum et feminam fecit eos; quidam enim timuerunt dicere: Fecit eum masculum et feminam ne quasi monstrosum aliquid intellegeretur sicuti sunt quos hermaphroditos uocant, cum etiam sic non mendaciter possit intellegi utrumque in numero singulari propter id quod dictum est: Duo in carne una)? Cur ergo, ut dicere coeperam, in natura hominis ad imaginem dei facta praeter masculum et feminam non commemorat scriptura? Ad implendam quippe imaginem trinitatis debuit addere et filium, quamuis adhuc in lumbis patris constitutum sicut mulier erat in latere.

[8] Since these things are so, if we have taken the same image of the Trinity not in one but in three human beings, father and mother and son, then man was not made to the image of God before a wife was made for him and before they propagated a son, because the Trinity was not yet. Or does someone say: 'Already there was a Trinity, because, although not yet in its own form, yet by original nature the woman was in the side of the man and the son in the loins of the father'? Why then, when Scripture had said: God made man to the image of God, did it weave in, saying: He made him male and female, he made them and he blessed them (or if it must be distinguished thus: And God made man, so that then there be brought in, to the image of God he made him, and a third subjoining be, male and female he made them; for certain ones were afraid to say: He made him male and female, lest something monstrous be understood, such as those whom they call hermaphrodites, although even thus it can without lying be understood that both are in the singular number on account of that which was said: Two in one flesh)? Why then, as I had begun to say, does Scripture, in the nature of the human made to the image of God, not mention besides the male and the female? For to fulfill the image of the Trinity it ought to have added also the son, although as yet established in the loins of the father, just as the woman was in the side.

An forte iam facta erat et mulier, et scriptura breui complexione constrinxerat quod postea quemadmodum sit factum diligentius explicaret, et propterea filius commemorari non potuit quia nondum erat natus? Quasi et hoc non poterat ea breuitate complecti spiritus suo loco postea natum filium narraturus, sicut mulierem de uiri latere assumptam suo postmodum loco narrauit et tamen hic eam nominare non praetermisit.

Or perhaps the woman too had already been made, and Scripture had compressed in a brief compendium what it would afterwards explain more diligently as to how it was done, and for that reason the son could not be mentioned because he had not yet been born? As though the Spirit could not also encompass this with that brevity, being about, in its own place, later to narrate the son who would be born, just as it afterwards narrated, in its own place, the woman taken from the man’s side, and yet did not omit to name her here.

[VII 9] Non itaque ita debemus intellegere hominem factum ad imaginem summae trinitatis, hoc est ad imaginem dei, ut eadem imago in tribus intellegatur hominibus praesertim cum apostolus uirum dicat esse imaginem dei, et propterea uelamentum ei capitis demat quod mulieri adhibendum monet ita loquens: Vir quidem non debet uelare caput cum sit imago et gloria dei. Mulier autem gloria uiri est. Quid ergo dicemus ad haec?

[7 9] Therefore we ought not so to understand man as made to the image of the supreme Trinity, that is, to the image of God, as that the same image be understood in three human beings—especially since the Apostle says that the man is the image of God, and for that reason removes from him the covering of the head, which he advises be applied to the woman, speaking thus: A man indeed ought not to veil the head, since he is the image and glory of God. But the woman is the glory of the man. What then shall we say to these things?

Si pro sua persona mulier adimplet imaginem trinitatis, cur ea detracta de latere uiri adhuc ille imago dicitur? Aut si et una persona hominis ex tribus potest dici imago dei, sicut in ipsa summa trinitate et unaquaeque persona deus est, cur et mulier non est imago dei? Nam propterea caput uelare praecipitur quod ille quia imago dei est prohibetur.

If, in her own person, the woman fulfills the image of the Trinity, why, she having been drawn from the side of the man, is he still called the image? Or if even one person of a human being out of three can be called the image of God, just as in the very supreme Trinity each person is God, why is the woman not also the image of God? For on that account she is prescribed to veil the head, which is prohibited to him because he is the image of God.

[10] Sed uidendum est quomodo non sit contrarium quod dicit apostolus non mulierem sed uirum esse imaginem dei huic quod scriptum est in genesi: Fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei; fecit eum masculum et feminam; fecit eos et benedixit eos. Ad imaginem quippe dei naturam ipsam humanam factam dicit quae sexu utroque completur, nec ab intellegenda imagine dei separat feminam. Dicto enim quod fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, fecit eum, inquit, masculum et feminam, uel certe alia distinctione, masculum et feminam fecit eos.

[10] But we must see how what the apostle says—that not the woman but the man is the image of god—is not contrary to what is written in Genesis: God made the human being to the image of god; he made him male and female; he made them and blessed them. For he says that the very human nature was made to the image of god, which is completed by both sexes, nor does he separate the female from the image of god to be understood. For, after the statement that god made the human being to the image of god, “he made him,” he says, “male and female,” or certainly, with another distinction, “male and female he made them.”

Quomodo ergo per apostolum audiuimus uirum esse imaginem dei unde caput uelare prohibetur, mulierem autem non et ideo ipsa hoc facere iubetur nisi, credo, illud esse quod iam dixi cum de natura humanae mentis agerem, mulierem cum uiro suo esse imaginem dei ut una imago sit tota illa substantia; cum autem ad adiutorium distribuitur, quod ad eam ipsam solam attinet non est imago dei; quod autem ad uirum solum attinet imago dei est tam plena atque integra quam in unum coniuncta muliere? Sicut de natura humanae mentis diximus quia et si tota contempletur ueritatem, imago dei est, et cum ex ea distribuitur aliquid et quadam intentione deriuatur ad actionem rerum temporalium, nihilominus ex qua parte conspectam consulit ueritatem imago dei est; ex qua uero intenditur in agenda inferiora non est imago dei. Et quoniam quantumcumque se extenderit in id quod aeternum est tanto magis inde formatur ad imaginem dei, et propterea non est cohibenda ut se inde contineat ac temperet, ideo uir non debet uelare caput.

How then, as through the Apostle we have heard that the man is the image of God, whence he is prohibited to veil the head, but the woman is not and therefore she herself is commanded to do this—unless, I believe, it is that which I already said when I was treating of the nature of the human mind: that the woman together with her husband is the image of God, so that the whole substance may be one image; but when it is distributed to auxiliary help, that which pertains to her alone is not the image of God, whereas that which pertains to the man alone is the image of God as full and entire as when, with the woman joined into one, it is one image? Just as we said about the nature of the human mind: even if, in its entirety, it contemplates the truth, it is the image of God; and when something of it is distributed and by a certain intention is derived to the action of temporal things, nonetheless, from that side from which, with the truth in view, it consults the truth, it is the image of God; but from that side from which it is aimed toward doing lower things, it is not the image of God. And since, by however much it extends itself into that which is eternal, by so much the more it is formed from thence to the image of God—and therefore it is not to be restrained, so that it should keep and temper itself back from thence—therefore a man ought not to veil the head.

Quia uero illi rationali actioni quae in rebus corporalibus temporalibusque uersatur periculosa est nimia in inferiora progressio, debet habere potestatem super caput, quod indicat uelamentum quo significatur esse cohibenda. Grata est enim sanctis angelis sacrata et pia significatio. Nam deus non ad tempus uidet, nec aliquid noui fit in eius uisione atque scientia cum aliquid temporaliter ac transitorie geritur sicut inde afficiuntur sensus uel carnales animalium et hominum uel etiam caelestes angelorum.

But because for that rational action which is engaged among corporeal and temporal things an excessive progression into the lower is perilous, she ought to have authority over the head, which the veiling indicates, by which it is signified that she must be restrained. For the consecrated and pious signification is pleasing to the holy angels. For God does not see according to time, nor does anything new come to be in his vision and knowledge when something is conducted temporally and transitorily, as the senses are affected by it—whether the carnal senses of animals and of humans, or even the celestial senses of angels.

[11] In isto quippe manifesto sexu masculi e feminae apostolus Paulus occultioris cuiusdam rei figurasse mysterium uel hinc intellegi potest quod cum alio loco dicat ueram uiduam esse desolatam sine filiis et nepotibus, et tamen eam sperare debere in domino et persistere in orationibus nocte et die, hic dicat mulierem seductam in praeuaricatione factam saluam fieri per filiorum generationem et addidit: Si permanserint in fide et dilectione et sanctificatione cum sobrietate. Quasi uero possit obesse bonae uiduae si uel filios non habuerit uel hi quos habuerit in bonis moribus permanere noluerint. Sed quia ea quae dicuntur opera bona tamquam filii sunt uitae nostrae secundum quam quaeritur cuius uitae sit quisque, id est quomodo agat haec temporalia, quam uitam graeci non *zooeen sed *bion uocant, et haec opera bona maxime in officiis misericordiae frequentari solent (opera uero misericordiae nihil prosunt siue paginis siue iudaeis qui Christo non credunt siue quibusque haereticis uel scismaticis ubi fides et dilectio et sobria sanctificatio non inuenitur), manifestum est quid apostolus significare uoluerit, ideo figurate ac mystice quia de uelando muliebri capite loquebatur, quod nisi ad aliquod secretum sacramenti referatur inane remanebit.

[11] In this manifest sex of male and female the apostle Paul can from this be understood to have figured the mystery of a certain more hidden thing: that whereas in another place he says that the true widow is desolate, without sons and grandchildren, and yet that she ought to hope in the Lord and persevere in prayers night and day, here he says that the woman, having been seduced into transgression, will be saved through the generation of children, and he added: If they continue in faith and love and sanctification with sobriety. As though, forsooth, it could harm a good widow if either she has no sons or those whom she has are unwilling to continue in good morals. But because the things that are called good works are, as it were, the sons of our life—according to which it is asked of what life each person is, that is, how he manages these temporals—which life the Greeks call not “zoēn” but “bion”; and because these good works are especially wont to be frequent in the offices of mercy (yet works of mercy profit nothing for pagans or for Jews who do not believe in Christ, or for any heretics or schismatics where faith and love and sober sanctification are not found), it is manifest what the apostle wished to signify—therefore figuratively and mystically, because he was speaking about the veiling of the woman’s head—which, unless it be referred to some secret of the sacrament, will remain empty.

[12] Sicut enim non solum ueracissima ratio sed etiam ipsius apostoli declarat auctoritas, non secundum formam corporis homo factus est ad imaginem dei sed secundum rationalem mentem. Cogitatio quippe turpiter uana est quae opinatur deum membrorum corporalium lineamentis circumscribi atque definiri. Porro autem nonne idem beatus apostolus dicit: Renouamini spiritu mentis uestrae et induite nouum hominem, eum qui secundum deum creatus est, et alibi apertius: Exuentes uos, inquit, ueterem hominem cum actibus eius induite nouum qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum?

[12] For just as not only most veracious reason but also the authority of the apostle himself declares, man was made to the image of god not according to the form of the body but according to the rational mind. For the cogitation is shamefully vain which opines that god is circumscribed and defined by the lineaments of bodily members. Moreover, does not the same blessed apostle say: “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, him who has been created according to god”; and elsewhere more openly: “Putting off,” he says, “the old man with his deeds, put on the new, who is being renewed into the recognition of god according to the image of him who created him”?

Si ergo spiritu mentis nostrae renouamur, et ipse est nouus homo qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum, nulli dubium est non secundum corpus neque secundum quamlibet animi partem sed secundum rationalem mentem ubi potest esse agnitio dei hominem factum ad imaginem eius qui creauit eum. Secundum hanc autem renouationem efficimur etiam filii dei per baptismum Christi, et induentes nouum hominem Christum utique induimus per fidem. Quis est ergo qui ab hoc consortio feminas alienet cum sint nobiscum gratiae cohaeredes et alio loco idem apostolus dicat: Omnes enim filii dei estis per fidem in Christo Iesu.

If therefore we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and he himself is the new man who is renewed into the recognition of God according to the image of him who created him, it is doubtful to none that not according to the body nor according to any part of the soul, but according to the rational mind where the recognition of God can be, man was made to the image of him who created him. According to this renewal, moreover, we are also made sons of God through the baptism of Christ, and by putting on the new man we indeed put on Christ through faith. Who then is he who would estrange women from this fellowship, since they are co-heirs of grace with us; and elsewhere the same apostle says: For you are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus.

Quicumque enim in Christo baptizati estis Christum induistis. Non est iudaeus neque graecus, non est seruus neque liber, non est masculus et femina; omnes enim uos unum estis in Christo Iesu? Numquidnam igitur fideles feminae sexum corporis amiserunt?

For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is not male and female; for you all are one in Christ Jesus. Have faithful women, then, lost the sex of the body?

Sed quia ibi renouantur ad imaginem dei ubi sexus nullus est, ibi factus est homo ad imaginem dei ubi sexus nullus est, hoc est in spiritu mentis suae. Cur ergo uir propterea non debet caput uelare quia imago est et gloria dei, mulier autem debet quia gloria uiri est, quasi mulier non renouetur spiritu mentis suae, qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum? Sed quia sexu corporis distat a uiro, rite potuit in eius corporali uelamento figurari pars illa rationis quae ad temporalia gubernanda deflectitur ut non maneat imago dei nisi ex qua parte mens hominis aeternis rationibus conspiciendis uel consulendis adhaerescit, quam non solum masculos sed etiam feminas habere manifestum est.

But because there they are renewed to the image of God where there is no sex, there the human being was made to the image of God where there is no sex—that is, in the spirit of his mind. Why, then, ought a man not for that reason to veil his head because he is the image and glory of God, but a woman ought to because she is the glory of man, as though a woman were not renewed in the spirit of her mind, who is renewed into the recognition of God according to the image of him who created him? But because by the sex of the body she differs from a man, rightly could that part of reason which is deflected to the governing of temporal things be figured in her bodily veiling, so that the image of God remains only from that side from which the mind of a human being adheres to the beholding or consulting of eternal reasons—a thing which it is manifest that not only males but also females possess.

[13] Ergo in eorum mentibus communis natura cognoscitur; in eorum uero corporibus ipsius unius mentis distributio figuratur.

[13] Therefore, in their minds the common nature is recognized; whereas in their bodies the distribution of the one same mind itself is figured.

[VIII] Ascendentibus itaque introrsus quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animae partes unde incipit aliquid occurrere quod non sit nobis commune cum bestiis, inde incipit ratio ubi iam homo interior possit agnosci. Qui etiam ipse si per illam rationem cui temporalium rerum administratio delegata est immoderato progressu nimis in exteriora prolabitur consentiente sibi capite suo, id est non eam cohibente atque refrenante illa quae in specula consilii praesidet quasi uiri portione, inueteratur inter inimicos suos uirtutis inuidos daemones cum suo principe diabolo, aeternorumque illa uisio ab ipso etiam capite cum coniuge uetitum manducante subtrahitur ut lumen oculorum eius non sit cum illo, ac sic ab illa inlustratione ueritatis ambo nudati, atque apertis oculis conscientiae ad uidendum quam inhonesti atque indecori remanserint tamquam folia dulcium fructuum sed sine ipsis fructibus, ita sine fructu boni operis bona uerba contexunt ut male uiuentes quasi bene loquendo contegant turpitudiem suam.

[8] Therefore, as we ascend inward by certain steps of consideration through the parts of the soul, from the point where something begins to occur that is not common to us with beasts, from there reason begins, where the inner man can already be recognized. And this same man, if through that reason to which the administration of temporal things has been delegated he, by immoderate advance, slips too far into externals, with his own head consenting to it—that is, with that which, in the watchtower of counsel, presides as the “male” portion not restraining and curbing it—he grows inveterate amidst his enemies, the demons envious of virtue, with their prince the Devil; and that vision of eternal things is withdrawn even from the head itself when, with his consort eating the forbidden, so that the light of his eyes is not with him; and thus both, stripped of that illumination of truth, and with the eyes of conscience opened to see how dishonorable and indecorous they have been left, like leaves of sweet fruits but without the fruits themselves, so, without the fruit of good work, they weave together good words, so that, living badly, they by speaking well as it were cover their own turpitude.

[IX 14] Potestatem quippe suam diligens anima a communi uniuerso ad priuatam partem prolabitur, et apostatica illa superbia quod initium peccati dicitur, cum in uniuersitate creaturae deum rectorem secuta legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid uniuerso appetens atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius uniuersitate, in curam partilem truditur et sic aliquid ampliius concupiscendo minuitur, unde et auaritia dicitur radix omnium malorum; totumque illud ubi aliquid proprium contra leges quibus uniuersitas administratur agere nititur per corpus proprium gerit quod partiliter possidet, atque ita formis et motibus corporalibus defectata, quia intus ea secum non habet, cum eorum imaginibus quas memoriae fixit inuoluitur et phantastica fornicatione turpiter inquinatur omnia officia sua ad eos fines referens quibus curiose corporalia ac temporalia per corporis sensus quaerit, aut tumido fastu aliis animis corporeis sensibus deditis esse affectat excelsior, aut coenoso gurgite carnalis uoluptatis immergitur.

[9 14] The soul, loving its own power, slips from the common universal to a private part; and that apostatic pride, which is called the beginning of sin, although in the universality of creation, having followed God the rector, it could have been governed most excellently by his laws, craving something more than the universe and endeavoring to govern that by its own law—since nothing is greater than the universe—is thrust into partial care, and thus by desiring something “more,” it is diminished; whence also avarice is called the root of all evils. And the whole attempt whereby it strives to do something as its own against the laws by which the universe is administered, it carries out through its own body, which it possesses in a partial way; and thus, being destitute of corporeal forms and motions, since it does not have them within itself, it is entangled with their images which it has fixed in memory and is foully defiled by phantastic fornication, referring all its offices to those ends for which it curiously seeks bodily and temporal things through the senses of the body—either with swollen haughtiness it aspires to be higher than other souls given over to bodily senses, or it is plunged into the muddy whirlpool of carnal pleasure.

[X 15] Cum ergo bona uoluntate ad interiora ac superiora percipienda quae non priuatim sed communiter ab omnibus qui talia diligunt sine ulla angustia uel inuidia casto possidentur amplexu uel sibi uel aliis consulit, etsi fallatur in aliquo per ignorantiam temporalium quia et hoc temporaliter gerit et modum agendi non teneat quem debebat, humana temptatio est. Et magnum est hanc uitam sic degere quam uelut uiam redeuntes carpimus ut temptatio nos non apprehendat nisi humana. Hoc enim peccatum extra corpus est nec fornicationi deputatur, et propterea facillime ignoscitur.

[10 15] When, therefore, with good will he takes counsel either for himself or for others toward the apprehension of things interior and superior, which are possessed not privately but in common by all who love such things, with a chaste embrace, without any straitness or envy, even if he be mistaken in something through ignorance of temporals—since he too is acting temporally and does not hold the mode of acting which he ought—it is a human temptation. And it is a great thing to pass this life thus, which we, as returners, take up like a road, so that temptation may not seize us except as human. For this sin is outside the body and is not assigned to fornication, and therefore it is most easily forgiven.

Cum uero propter adipiscenda ea quae per corpus sentiuntur propter experiendi uel excellendi uel contrectandi cupiditatem ut in his finem boni sui ponat aliquid agit, quidquid agit turpiter agit, et fornicatur in corpus proprium peccans, et corporearum rerum fallacia simulacra introrsus rapiens et uana meditatione componens ut ei nec diuinum aliquid nisi tale uideatur, priuatim auara fetatur erroribus et priuatim prodiga inanitur uiribus. Nec ad tam turpem et miserabilem fornicationem semet ab exordia prosiliret, sed sicut scriptum est: Qui modica spernit paulatim decidet.

When, however, for the sake of acquiring those things which are perceived through the body, out of a desire of experiencing or excelling or handling, so that she may set the end of her good in these, she does anything, whatever she does she does shamefully, and she fornicates, sinning against her own body; and inwardly snatching the deceptive simulacra of corporeal things and composing them by vain meditation, so that nothing divine even appears to her except of such a sort, she, in private and avaricious, is befouled with errors, and in private and prodigal, is emptied of her powers. Nor would she from the outset have leapt forth into so shameful and miserable a fornication, but, as it is written: He who despises little things will little by little fall.

[XI 16] Quomodo enim coluber non apertis passibus sed squamarum minutissimis nisibus repit, sic lubricus deficiendi motus neglegentes minutatim occupat, et incipiens a peruerso appetitu similitudinis dei peruenit ad similitudinem pecorum. Inde est quod nudati stola prima pelliceas tunicas mortalitate meruerunt. Honor enim hominis uerus est imago et similitudo dei quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur.

[XI 16] For as the serpent creeps not with open strides but by the most minute exertions of its scales, so the slippery motion of falling-away seizes the negligent little by little; and beginning from a perverse appetite of the similitude of God, it comes to the similitude of the cattle. Hence it is that, stripped of the first stole, they by mortality deserved tunics of skins. For the true honor of man is the image and similitude of God, which is not kept except unto Him by whom it is imprinted.

Tanto magis itaque inhaeretur deo quanto minus diligitur proprium. Cupiditate uero experiendae potestatis suae quodam nutu suo ad se ipsum tamquam ad medium proruit. Ita cum uult esse sicut ille sub nullo, et ab ipsa sui medietate poenaliter ad ima propellitur, id est ad ea quibus pecora laetantur; atque ita cum sit honmor eius similitudo dei, dedecus autem eius similitudo pecoris: Homo in honore positus non intellexit; comparatus est iumentis insensatis et similis factus est eis.

Therefore by so much the more one is glued to God, by how much the less one’s own is loved. But by the cupidity of experiencing his own power, by a certain nod of his own he rushes forward to himself as to a center. Thus, when he wishes to be, like Him, under no one, from his very midpoint he is punitively driven down to the lowest things, that is, to those things in which cattle rejoice; and so, whereas his honor is the similitude of God, his disgrace, however, is the similitude of cattle: A man placed in honor did not understand; he was compared to insensate beasts of burden and was made like to them.

Qua igitur tam longe transiret a summis ad infima nisi per medium sui? Cum enim neglecta caritate sapientiae quae semper eodem modo manet concupiscitur scientia ex mutabilium temporaliumque experimento, inflat non aedificat; ita praegrauatus animus quasi pondere suo a beatitudine expellitur, et per illud suae medietatis experimentum poena sua discit quid intersit inter bonum desertum malumque commissum, nec redire potest effusis ac perditis uiribus nisi gratia conditoris sui ad poenitentiam uocantis et peccata donantis. Quis enim infelicem animam liberabit a corpore mortis huius nisi gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum?

By what way, then, would it pass so far from the highest things to the lowest unless through the mediety of itself? For when, the charity of wisdom—which always remains in the same way—being neglected, knowledge is coveted from the experiment of mutable and temporal things, it inflates, it does not edify; thus the soul, weighed down as if by its own weight, is driven out from beatitude, and through that experiment of its own mediety it learns by its own penalty what difference there is between good forsaken and evil committed; nor can it return, its powers poured out and lost, unless by the grace of its Founder, calling to penitence and granting sins. For who will free the unhappy soul from the body of this death except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord?

De qua gratia suo loco quando ipse praestiterit disseremus. [XII 17] Nunc de illa parte rationis ad quam pertinet scientia, id est cognitio rerum temporalium atque mutabilium nauandis uitae huius actionibus necessaria, susceptam considerationem quantum dominus adiuuat peragamus.

Of which grace we shall discourse in its own place when He Himself shall have granted it. [12 17] Now concerning that part of reason to which science pertains, that is, the cognition of temporal and mutable things, necessary for the activities of this life to be diligently plied, let us carry through the undertaken consideration, insofar as the Lord aids.

Sicut enim in illo manifesto coniugio duorum hominum qui primi facti sunt non manducauit serpens de arbore uetita sed tantummodo manducandum persuasit, mulier autem non manducauit sola sed uiro suo dedit et simul manducauerunt, quamuis cum serpente sola locuta et ab eo sola seducta sit, ita et in hoc quod etiam in homine uno geritur et dinoscitur, occulto quodam secretoque coniugio carnalis, uel ut ita dicam qui in corporis sensus intenditur sensualis animae motus, qui nobis pecoribusque communis est, seclusus est a ratione sapientiae. Sensu quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur; aeterna uero et incommutabilia spiritalia ratione sapientiae intelleguntur. Rationi autem scientiae appetitus uicinus est quantoquidem de ipsis corporalibus quae sensu corporis sentiuntur ratiocinatur ea quae scientia dicitur actionis; si bene ut eam notitiam referat ad finem summi boni; si autem male ut eis fruatur tamquam bonis talibus in quibus falsa beatitudine conquiescat.

Just as, in that manifest conjugal union of the two human beings who were first made, the serpent did not eat from the forbidden tree but only persuaded to eat, whereas the woman did not eat alone but gave to her husband and together they ate, although she alone spoke with the serpent and alone was seduced by him, so also in this which is carried on and discerned even in a single human being, by a certain hidden and secret conjugal union, the carnal—or, so to say, the sensual motion of the soul, which is directed toward the senses of the body, which is common to us and to cattle—has been secluded from the reason of wisdom. For by the sense of the body bodily things are sensed; but eternal and incommutable spiritual things are understood by the reason of wisdom. Now to the reason of knowledge the appetite is near, inasmuch as, concerning those very bodily things which are sensed by the sense of the body, it ratiocinates those things which are called the science of action; if well, so that it may refer that acquaintance to the end of the highest good; but if badly, so that it may enjoy them as such goods in which it may rest in false beatitude.

Cum ergo huic intentioni mentis quae in rebus temporalibus et corporalibus propter actionis officium ratiocinandi uiuacitate uersatur carnalis ille sensus uel animalis ingerit quandam inlecebram fruendi se, id est tamquam bono quodam priuato et proprio non tamquam publico atque communi quod est incommutabile bonum, tunc uelut serpens alloquitur feminam. Huic autem inlecebrae consentire de ligno prohibito manducare est. Sed iste consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superioris uero auctoritate consilii ita membra retinentur ut non exhibeantur iniquitatis arma peccato, sic habendum existimo uelut cibum uetitum mulier sola comederit.

Accordingly, when to this intention of the mind—which is occupied with the vivacity of ratiocinating in temporal and corporal matters on account of the office of action—the carnal or, so to speak, animal sense thrusts in a certain allurement of enjoying itself, that is, as though it were some private and proper good, not as a public and common one, which is the incommutable good, then, as it were, the serpent addresses the woman. But to consent to this allurement is to eat of the forbidden tree. Yet if this consent is content with the delight of thought alone, while by the authority of higher counsel the members are so restrained that they are not presented as arms of iniquity to sin, I judge it is to be held thus as though the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food.

Si autem in consensione male utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum ut si potestas sit etiam corpore compleatur, intellegenda est illa mulier dedisse uiro suo secum simul edendum inlicitum cibum. Neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suauiter uerum etiam efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni nisi et illa mentis intentio penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus mouendi uel ab opere cohibendi malae actioni cedat et seruiat.

But if, in the consent to use badly the things that are perceived through the sense of the body, any given sin is thus decreed that, if the power be present, it is even completed in the body, that woman is to be understood to have given to her man the illicit food to be eaten together with her. For a sin cannot be decreed by the mind—not only to be sweetly thought upon but even to be efficaciously perpetrated—unless that intention of the mind, with whom the highest power resides for moving the members into a work or for restraining them from a work, yields and is made servant to the evil action.

[18] Nec sane cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur inlicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et uoluens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum respui debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum sed longe minus quam si et opere statuatur implendum. Et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus uenia petenda est pectusque percutiendum atque dicendum: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, faciendumque quod sequitur atque in oratione iungendum: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris. Neque enim sicut in illis duobus primis hominibus personam suam quisque portabat, et ideo si sola mulier cibum edisset inlicitum, sola utique mortis supplicio plecteretur; ita dici potest in homine uno si delectationibus inlicitis a quibus se continuo deberet auertere cogitatio libenter sola pascatur, nec facienda decernantur mala sed tantum suauiter in recordatione teneantur, quasi mulierem sine uiro posse damnari.

[18] Nor, surely, when the mind is delighted with illicit things in thought alone—indeed not decreeing that they are to be done, yet holding and willingly turning over those things which, as soon as they touched the mind, ought to have been spat out—is it to be denied that there is sin, but far less than if it were also determined to be fulfilled in deed. And therefore for such thoughts as well, pardon must be sought, and the breast struck, and it must be said: Forgive us our debts, and what follows must be done and joined in prayer: as we also forgive our debtors. For neither, as in those two first human beings, did each carry his own person, and therefore, if the woman alone had eaten the illicit food, she alone would of course be punished with the penalty of death; so can it be said, in a single human being, if thought is fed alone with illicit delights from which it ought immediately to turn itself away, and evils are not decreed to be done but are only sweetly held in recollection, as though the woman could be condemned without the man.

Absit hoc credere. Haec quippe una persona est, unus homo est, totusque damnabitur nisi haec quae sine uoluntate operandi sed tamen cum uoluntate animum talibus oblectandi solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata per mediatoris gratiam remittantur.

Far be it to believe this. For this is one person, one man, and the whole will be condemned unless these things—which, without the will of operating, yet with the will of delighting the mind with such things, are understood to be sins of thought alone—are remitted through the mediator’s grace.

[19] Haec itaque disputatio qua in mente uniuscuiusque hominis quaestiuimus quoddam rationale coniugium contemplationis et actionis, officiis per quaedam singula distributis tamen in utroque mentis unitate seruata, salua illius ueritatis historia quam de duobus primis hominibus, uiro scilicet eiusque muliere de quibus propagatum est genus humanum, diuina tradit auctoritas ad hoc tantummodo audienda est ut intellegatur apostolus imaginem dei uiro tantum tribuendo non etiam feminae, quamuis in diuerso sexu duorum hominum aliquid tamen significare uoluisse quod in uno homine quaereretur.

[19] Therefore this disputation, in which in the mind of each human being we have sought a certain rational marriage of contemplation and action, with duties distributed to certain particulars, yet with the unity of the mind preserved in both, the history of that truth remaining intact which divine authority hands down about the two first human beings—namely the man and his woman, from whom the human race was propagated—is to be listened to for this only: that it may be understood that the apostle, by attributing the image of God to the man only and not also to the woman, although in the different sex of the two human beings he nevertheless wished to signify something that was to be sought in one human being.

[XIII 20] Nec me fugit quosdam qui fuerunt ante nos egregii defensores catholicae fidei et diuini eloquii tractatores cum in homine uno cuius uniuersam animam bonam quendam paradisum esse senserunt duo ista requirerent, uirum mentem, mulierem uero dixisse corporis sensum. Et secundum hanc autem distributionem qua uir ponitur mens, sensus uero corporis mulier, uidentur apte omnia conuenire si considerata tractentur nisi quod in omnibus bestiis et uolatilibus scriptum est non esse inuentum uiro adiutorium simile illi et tunc est ei mulier facta de latere. Propter quod ego non putaui pro muliere sensum corporis esse ponendum quem uidemus nobis et bestiis esse communem, sed aliquid uolui quod bestiae non haberent, sensumque corporis magis pro serpente intellegendum existimaui qui legitur spientior omnibus pecoribus terrae.

[13 20] Nor does it escape me that certain men who were before us, distinguished defenders of the catholic faith and trattators of divine eloquence, when in one man—whose whole soul they sensed to be a certain good paradise—they were seeking these two things, said “the man” to be the mind, but “the woman” the sense of the body. And according to this distribution, wherein the man is set as the mind and the sense of the body as the woman, all things seem aptly to agree, if handled with due consideration, except that it is written with regard to all beasts and birds that there was not found for the man an aid similar to him, and then a woman was made for him from his side. On account of which I did not think the sense of the body ought to be posited for the woman—since we see it to be common to us and to beasts—but I wanted something which the beasts did not have; and I judged that the sense of the body is rather to be understood as the serpent, who is read to be more shrewd than all the cattle of the earth.

In eis quippe naturalibus bonis quae nobis et inrationabilibus animantibus uidemus esse communia uiuacitate quadam sensus excellit, non ille de quo scriptum est in epistula quae est ad hebraeos ubi legitur perfectorum esse solidum cibum qui per habitum exercitatos habent sensus ad separandum bonum a malo (illi quippe sensus naturae rationalis sunt ad intellegentiam pertinentes), sed iste sensus qui est quinquepertitus in corpore per quem non solum a nobis uerum etiam a bestiis corporalis species motusque sentitur.

For in those natural goods which we see to be common to us and to irrational animals, sense excels with a certain vivacity—not that sense of which it is written in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is read that solid food is for the perfected, who by habit have senses exercised for separating good from evil (for those senses are of a rational nature, pertaining to intelligence), but this sense which is fivefold in the body, by which not only by us but also by beasts the bodily appearance and motions are perceived.

[21] Sed siue isto siue illo siue aliquo alio modo accipiendum sit quod apostolus uirum dixit imaginem et gloriam dei, mulierem autem gloriam uiri, apparet tamen cum secundum deum uiuimus, mentem nostram in inuisibilia eius intentam ex eius aeternitate, ueritate, caritate proficienter debere formari, quiddam uero rationalis intentionis nostrae, hoc est eiusdem mentis, in usum mutabilium corporaliumque rerum sine quo haec uita non agitur dirigendum, non ut conformetur huic saeculo finem constituendo in bonis talibus et in ea detorquendo beatitudinis appetitum, sed ut quidquid in usu temporalium rationabiliter facimus aeternorum adipiscendorum contemplatione faciamus per ista transeuntes, illis inhaerentes.

[21] But whether in this way or in that or in some other way it is to be taken that the apostle said the man is the image and glory of God, but the woman the glory of the man, nevertheless it appears that, when we live according to God, our mind, intent upon his invisible things, ought to be formed with advancing proficiency from his eternity, truth, charity; while a certain element of our rational intention—that is, of the same mind—must be directed to the use of changeable and bodily things, without which this life is not carried on, not so as to be conformed to this age by setting the end in such goods and by twisting the appetite of beatitude toward them, but so that whatever we do in the use of temporal things we may do with a view to the contemplation of things eternal, passing through these, cleaving to those.

[XIV] Habet enim et scientia modum suum bonum si quod in ea inflat uel inflare assolet aeternorum caritate uincatur, quae non inflat sed, ut scimus, aedificat. Sine scientia quippe nec uirtutes ipsae quibus recte uiuitur possunt haberi per quas haec uita misera sic gubernetur ut ad illam quae uere beata est perueniatur aeternam.

[14] For science too has its own good measure, if that in it which inflates or is wont to inflate is conquered by the charity of things eternal, which does not inflate but, as we know, edifies. For without science not even the virtues themselves by which one lives rightly can be had, through which this wretched life is so governed that one may arrive at that eternal life which is truly blessed.

[22] Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur. Quamuis enim et illa quae sapientia est possit scientia nuncupari sicut et apostolus loquitur ubi dicit: Nunc scio ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum, quam scientiam profecto contemplationis dei uult intellegi quod sanctorum summum erit praemium; tamen ubi dicit: Alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum, haec utique duo sine dubitatione distinguit, licet non ibi explicet quid intersit et unde possit utrumque dinosci. Verum scripturarum sanctarum multiplicem copiam scrutatus inuenio scriptum esse in libro Iob eodem sancto uiro loquente: Ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis scientia est.

[22] It differs, however, from the contemplation of eternal things, the action by which we use temporal things well; and the former is assigned to wisdom, the latter to knowledge. For although even that which is wisdom can be named knowledge, just as the apostle speaks where he says: Now I know in part, then, however, I shall know just as I have been known—which knowledge he certainly wants to be understood as the contemplation of God, which will be the highest reward of the saints—yet where he says: To one indeed is given through the Spirit a word of wisdom, to another a word of knowledge according to the same Spirit, he without doubt distinguishes these two, although he does not there explain what the difference is, and whence each can be discerned. But having scrutinized the manifold abundance of the holy scriptures I find it written in the book of Job, the same holy man speaking: Behold, piety is wisdom; but to abstain from evils is knowledge.

In hac differentia intellegendum est ad contemplationem sapientiam, ad actionem scientiam pertinere. 'Pietatem' quippe hoc loco posuit 'dei cultum,' quae graece dicitur *theosebeia; nam hoc uerbum habet ista sententia in codicibus graecis. Et quid est in aeternis excellentius quam deus cuius solius immutabilis est natura?

In this distinction it must be understood that wisdom pertains to contemplation, knowledge to action. For in this place he set down 'piety' as 'the worship of God,' which in Greek is called *theosebeia;* for this word is what the sentence has in the Greek codices. And what among eternal things is more excellent than God, whose nature alone is immutable?

Et quis cultus eius nisi amor eius quo nunc desideramus eum uidere credimusque et speramus nos esse uisuros, et quantum proficimus uidemus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem 'in manifestatione'? Hoc est enim quod ait apostolus Paulus, facie ad faciem; hoc etiam quod Iohannes: Dilectissimi, nunc filii dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quod erimus. Scimus quia cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus quoniam uidebimus eum sicuti est. De his atque huiusmodi sermo ipse mihi uidetur esse sermo sapientiae.

And what is his worship except his love, by which we now desire to see him and we believe and hope that we shall see him; and, insofar as we make progress, we now see through a mirror in an enigma, but then ‘in manifestation’? For this is what the apostle Paul says, face to face; this also what John [says]: Beloved, now we are sons of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he appears, we shall be like him, because we shall see him just as he is. Concerning these and things of this sort, the discourse itself seems to me to be a discourse of wisdom.

Abstinere autem a malis quam Iob scientiam dixit esse rerum procul dubio temporalium est quoniam secundum tempus in malis sumus, a quibus abstinere debemus ut ad illa bona aeterna ueniamus. Quamobrem quidquid prudenter, fortiter, temperanter et iuste agimus ad eam pertinet scientiam siue disciplinam qua in euitandis malis bonisque appetendis actio nostra uersatur, et quidquid propter exempla uel cauenda uel imitanda et propter quarumque rerum quae nostris adcommodata sunt usibus necessaria documenta historica cognitione colligimus.

But to abstain from evils, which Job said is knowledge, is without doubt of temporal things, since according to time we are in evils, from which we ought to abstain that we may come to those eternal goods. Wherefore whatever we do prudently, with fortitude, temperately, and justly pertains to that knowledge or discipline wherein our action is conversant in avoiding evils and in desiring goods; and whatever, on account of examples either to be shunned or to be imitated, and on account of the necessary documents of whatever things are accommodated to our uses, we gather by historical cognition.

[23] De his ergo sermo cum fit, eum scientiae sermonem puto discernendum a sermone sapientiae ad quam pertinent ea quae nec fuerunt nec futura sunt sed sunt, et propter eam aeternitatem in qua sunt et fuisse et esse et futura esse dicuntur sine ulla mutabilitate temporum. Non enim sic fuerunt ut esse desinerent aut sic futura sunt quasi nunc non sint, sed idipsum esse semper habuerunt, semper habitura sunt. Manent autem non tamquam in spatiis locorum fixa ueluti corpora, sed in natura incorporali sic intellegibilia praesto sunt mentis aspectibus sicut ista in locis uisibilia uel contrectabilia corporis sensibus.

[23] Therefore, when discourse is made about these, I think the discourse of knowledge is to be distinguished from the discourse of wisdom, to which there pertain those things which neither were nor will be but are, and on account of that eternity in which they are they are said, without any mutability of times, both to have been and to be and to be about to be. For they were not thus as to cease to be, nor are they going to be as if now they are not, but they have always had that very being, they will always have it. They remain, however, not as though fixed in the spaces of places like bodies, but in an incorporeal nature they are thus intelligible, being at hand to the aspects of the mind, just as these things in places are visible or tangible to the senses of the body.

Non autem solum rerum sensibilium in locis positarum sine spatiis localibus manent intellegibiles incorporalesque rationes, uerum etiam motionum in temporibus transeuntium sine temporali transitu stant etiam ipsae utique intellegibiles, non sensibiles. Ad quas mentis acie peruenire paucorum est, et cum peruenitur quantum fieri potest, non in eis manet ipse peruentor, sed ueluti acies ipsa reuerberata repellitur et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio. Quae tamen cogitatio transiens per disciplinas quibus eruditur animus memoriae commendatur ut sit quo redire possit quae cogitur inde transire, quamuis si ad memoriam cogitatio non rediret atque ibi quod commendauerat inuenieret, uelut rudis ad hoc sicut ducta fuerat duceretur idque inueniret ubi primum inuenerat, in illa incorporea ueritate unde rursus quasi descriptum in memoria figeretur.

Not, however, only do the intelligible and incorporeal reasons of sensible things set in places remain without local spaces, but even the reasons of motions passing in times, without temporal transit, themselves likewise stand, intelligible, not sensible. To reach these with the edge of the mind is for few; and when one reaches them as far as can be, the arriver himself does not remain in them, but, as if the very edge were reflected, is repelled, and there comes to be a transitory thought of a non-transitory thing. Yet this thought, in passing, is commended to memory through the disciplines by which the mind is educated, so that there may be somewhere to which that which is compelled to pass thence may be able to return; although, if the thought were not to return to memory and find there what it had commended, it would be led to this as if raw, just as it had been led, and would find that where it had first found it, in that incorporeal truth whence, again, as if transcribed, it would be fixed in memory.

Neque enim sicut manet uerbi gratia quadrati corporis incorporalis et immutabilis ratio sic in ea manet hominis cogitatio, si tamen ad eam sine phantasia spatii localis potuit peruenire. Aut si alicuius artificiosi et musici soni per moras temporis transeuntis numerositas comprehendatur sine tempore stans in quodam secreto altoque silentio, tamdiu saltem cogitari potest quamdiu potest ille cantus audiri; tamen quod inde rapuerit etsi transiens mentis aspectus et quasi glutiens in uentre ita in memoria reposuerit, poterit recordando quodam modo ruminare et in disciplinam quod sic didicerit traicere. Quod si fuerit omnimoda obliuione deletum, rursus doctrina duce ad id uenietur quod penitus exciderat et sic inuenietur ut erat.

For neither does human cogitation remain in it as, for example, the incorporeal and immutable ratio of the square body remains, if indeed it has been able to arrive at it without a phantasy of local space. Or if the numerosity of some artful and musical sound, as it passes through the delays of time, be comprehended as standing without time in a certain secret and lofty silence, it can at least be thought as long as that song can be heard; yet whatever the passing gaze of the mind has snatched thence, and, as if gulping it into the belly, has thus laid up in memory, it will be able by recollecting to ruminate, as it were, and to translate what it has thus learned into discipline. But if it has been deleted by total oblivion, again with doctrine as guide one will come to that which had utterly fallen out, and thus it will be found as it was.

[XV 24] Vnde Plato ille philosophus nobilis persuadere conatus est uixisse hic animas hominum et antequam ista corpora gererent, et hinc esse quod ea quae discuntur reminiscuntur potius cognita quam cognoscuntur noua. Retulit enim puerum quendam nescio quae de geometrica interrogatum sic respondisse tamquam esset illius peritissimusdisciplinae. Gradatim quippe atque artificiose interrogatus uidebat quod uidendum erat dicebatque quod uiderat.

[15 24] Whence that noble philosopher Plato tried to persuade that the souls of men lived here even before they bore these bodies, and that hence it is that the things which are learned are rather remembered as already known than known as new. For he reported that a certain boy, questioned I know not what about geometry, answered in such a way as though he were most expert in that discipline. For, questioned step by step and artfully, he would see what was to be seen and would say what he had seen.

Sed si recordatio haec esset rerum antea cognitarum, non utique omnes uel pene omnes cum illo modo interrogarentur hoc possent; non enim omnes in priore uita geometrae fuerunt cum tam rari sint in genere humano ut uix possit aliquis inueniri. Sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam ut rebus intellegibilibus naturali ordine disponente conditore subiuncta sic ista uideat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea quemadmodum oculus carnis uidet quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus. Non enim et ipse ideo sine magistro alba et nigra discernit quia ista iam nouerat antequam in hac carne crearetur.

But if this were a recollection of things previously known, surely not all, or almost all, when questioned in that manner, could do this; for not all were geometers in a former life, since such men are so rare in the human race that scarcely anyone can be found. Rather, it is to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind has been constituted in such a way that, being subordinated to intelligible things by the natural order as disposed by the Creator, it thus sees these in a certain light of its own kind, incorporeal, just as the eye of flesh sees the things that lie around in this corporeal light, being created capable of that light and congruent with it. For neither does that eye therefore distinguish white and black without a teacher because it had already known these before it was created in this flesh.

Denique cur de solis rebus intellegibilibus id fieri potest ut bene interrogatus quisque respondeat quod ad quamque pertinet disciplinam etiamsi eius ignarus est? Cur hoc facere de rebus sensibilibus nullus potest nisi quas isto uidit in corpore constitutus aut eis qui nouerant indicantibus credidit seu litteris cuiusque seu uerbis? Non enim adquiescendum est eis qui samium Pythagoram ferunt recordatum fuisse talia nonnulla quae fuerat expertus cum hic alio iam fuisset in corpore; et alios nonnullos narrant alii eiusmodi aliquid in suis mentibus passos.

Finally, why is it only about intelligible things that it can come to pass that anyone, being well questioned, answers what pertains to each discipline, even if he is ignorant of it? Why can no one do this about sensible things, unless he has seen them in this body in which he is constituted, or has believed them from those who knew, whether by each one’s letters or by their words? For we must not acquiesce in those who report that the Samian Pythagoras recalled certain such things which he had experienced when he had been here already in another body; and some relate that others have undergone something of this sort in their own minds.

Quas falsas fuisse memorias quales plerumque experimur in somnis quando nobis uidemur reminisci quasi egerimus aut uiderimus quod nec egimus omnino nec uidimus, et eo modo affectas esse illorum mentes etiam uigilantium instinctu spirituum malignorum atque fallacium quibus curae est de reuolutionibus animarum falsam opinionem ad decipiendos homines firmare uel serere, ex hoc conici potest quia si uere illa recordarentur quae hic in aliis antea positi corporibus uiderant, multis ac pene omnibus id contingeret quandoquidem ut de uiuis mortuos, ita de mortuis uiuos tamquam de uigilantibus dormientes et de dormientibus uigilantes sine cessatione fieri suspicantur.

That these were false memories, such as we very often experience in dreams, when we seem to ourselves to remember as though we had done or seen what we have in no way done nor seen; and that in like manner the minds of those persons, even while awake, are affected by the instigation of malign and fallacious spirits, whose care it is to establish or to sow a false opinion concerning the revolutions of souls for the deceiving of men, can be conjectured from this: because if in truth they were recalling those things which they had seen here when formerly placed in other bodies, this would befall many and almost all, since they suspect that, just as from the living the dead, so from the dead the living, and as from the waking the sleeping and from the sleeping the waking, happens without cessation.

[25] Si ergo haec est sapientiae et scientiae recta distinctio ut ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis, ad scientiam uero temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis, quid cui praeponendum siue postponendum sit non est difficile iudicare. Si autem alia est adhibenda discretio qua dinoscantur haec duo quae procul dubio distare apostolus docet dicens: Alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundum spiritum, tamen etiam istorum duorum quae nos posuimus euidentissima differentia est quod alia sit intellectualis cognitio aeternarum rerum, alia rationalis temporalium, et huic illam praeferendam esse ambigit nemo. Relinquentibus itaque nobis ea quae exterioris sunt hominis et ab eis quae communia cum pecoribus habemus introrsum ascendere cupientibus, antequam ad cognitionem rerum intellegebilium atque summarum quae sempiternae sunt ueniremus, temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis occurrit.

[25] If, therefore, this is the right distinction of wisdom and science, that to wisdom pertains the intellectual cognition of eternal things, but to science the rational cognition of temporal things, it is not difficult to judge what ought to be preferred and what postponed. But if another discretion is to be applied by which these two may be discerned—which the Apostle teaches without doubt to differ, saying: To one indeed is given through the Spirit a discourse of wisdom, to another a discourse of science according to the same Spirit—yet even of these two which we have set forth there is a most evident difference, namely, that the intellectual cognition of eternal things is one thing, the rational [cognition] of temporal things another; and that the former is to be preferred to the latter no one disputes. Therefore, as we leave the things that belong to the outer man, and, desiring to ascend inward from those which we have in common with cattle, before we should come to the cognition of intelligible and supreme things which are sempiternal, the rational cognition of temporal things presents itself.

Etiam in hac igitur inueniamus si possumus aliquam trinitatem sicut inueniebamus in sensibus corporis et in his quae per eos in animam uel spiritum nostrum imaginaliter intrauerunt, ut pro corporalibus rebus quas corporeo foris positas attingimus sensu intus corporum similitudines haberemus impressas memoriae ex quibus cogitatio formabatur tertia uoluntate utrumque iungente, sicut formabatur foris acies oculorum quam uoluntas ut uisio fieret adhibebat rei uisibili et utrumque iungebat etiam illic ipsa se admouens tertiam. Sed non est hoc coartandum in hunc libum ut in eo qui sequitur si deus adiuuerit conuenienter possit inquiri et quod inuentum fuerit explicari.

Therefore, let us find in this too, if we can, some trinity, just as we were finding in the senses of the body and in those things which through them entered imaginally into the soul or our spirit, so that, in place of the corporeal things which we touch with bodily sense as set outside, we might have within likenesses of bodies impressed upon memory, from which cogitation was being formed, with the will as a third joining the two—just as outside there was being formed the acies of the eyes, which the will, in order that there might be vision, applied to the visible thing, and joined both there as well, it itself coming up as the third. But this is not to be cramped into this book, so that in the one which follows, if God shall aid, it may be able fittingly to be inquired into and what has been found may be explained.