Quintilian: INSTITUTIONES

I. Fuerant et clari quidem auctores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere (namque et adfectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia gratia ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, cum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum, sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur), II. plures vero qui nec ab illis sine dubio partibus rationem orandi summoverent, hoc tamen proprium atque praecipuum crederent opus, sua confirmare et quae (ex) adverso proponerentur refutare. III. Vtrumcumque est (neque enim hoc loco meam interpono sententiam), hic erit liber illorum opinione maxime necessarius, quo toto haec sola tractantur: quibus sane et ea quae de iudicialibus causis iam dicta sunt serviunt.

1. There had also been, indeed, famous authors to whom the orator’s sole duty seemed to be to teach (for they thought that the affections should be excluded by a double reasoning: first, because every perturbation of the mind was a vice; then, because a judge ought not to be driven away from the truth by mercy, favor, anger, and the like: and to seek the pleasure of the hearers, since speech was delivered only for the sake of conquering, they judged not only superfluous for the advocate, but scarcely even worthy of a man), 2. more, in truth, who would by no means, without doubt, remove from those parts the method of oratory, yet believed this to be the proper and principal work: to confirm one’s own points and to refute the things which were proposed on the adverse side. 3. Whatever it is (for I do not in this place interpose my own opinion), this book will, in their judgment, be most necessary, in which, throughout, these alone are treated: to which, assuredly, also the things that have already been said about judicial causes are subservient.

IV. Nam neque prohoemii neque narrationis est alius usus quam ut huic iudicem praeparent, et status nosse atque ea de quibus supra scripsimus intueri supervacuum foret nisi ad hanc perveniremus. V. Denique ex quinque quas iudicialis materiae fecimus partibus quaecumque alia potest aliquando necessaria causae non esse: lis nulla est cui probatione opus non sit. Eius praecepta sic optime divisuri videmur ut prius quae in commune ad omnis quaestiones pertinent ostendamus, deinde quae in quoque causae genere propria sunt exsequamur.

4. For neither the proem nor the narration has any other use than to prepare the judge for this, and to know the status and to consider those things about which we have written above would be superfluous unless we arrived at this point. 5. Finally, of the five parts which we have made of judicial material, any of the others can sometimes not be necessary to the case: there is no suit for which there is not need of proof. We shall seem to divide its precepts most optimally in such a way that first we show the things which pertain in common to all questions, then we pursue those which are proper to each kind of case.

[1] I. Ac prima quidem illa partitio ab Aristotele tradita consensum fere omnium meruit, alias esse probationes quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet orator, alias quas ex causa traheret ipse et quodam modo gigneret; ideoque illas atechnous, id est inartificiales, has entechnous id est artificiales, vocaverunt. II. Ex illo priore genere sunt praeiudicia, rumores, tormenta, tabulae, ius iurandum, testes, in quibus pars maxima contentionum forensium consistit. Sed ut ipsa per se carent arte, ita summis eloquentiae viribus et adlevanda sunt plerumque et refellenda.

[1] 1. And that first partition, handed down by Aristotle, earned the consent of nearly all: that there are proofs which the orator receives from outside the method of speaking, and others which he himself draws from the case and in a certain manner engenders; and so they called those atechnous, that is, inartificial, these entechnous, that is, artificial. 2. Of that former kind are precedents, rumors, tortures, records, oath, witnesses, in which the greatest part of forensic contentions consists. But as they, by themselves, lack art, so for the most part they must be both supported and refuted by the utmost powers of eloquence.

Quare mihi videntur magnopere damnandi qui totum hoc genus a praeceptis removerant. III. Nec tamen in animo est omnia quae pro his aut contra dici solent complecti.

Therefore, those seem to me to be greatly to be condemned who had removed this whole genus from the precepts. 3. Nor, however, is it my intention to encompass everything that is wont to be said for these or against them.

Non enim communes locos tradere destinamus, quod esset operis infiniti, sed viam quandam atque rationem. Quibus demonstratis non modo in exsequendo suas quisque vires debet adhibere, sed etiam inveniendo similia, ut quaeque condicio litium poscet. Neque enim de omnibus causis dicere quisquam potest saltem praeteritis, ut taceam de futuris.

For we do not intend to hand down commonplaces, which would be a work of infinite scope, but rather a certain way and method. With these demonstrated, each person must apply his own powers not only in executing but also in inventing similar things, as the condition of lawsuits shall require. For no one can speak about all causes, not even the past ones, to say nothing of the future.

[2] I. Iam praeiudiciorum vis omnis tribus in generibus versatur: rebus quae aliquando ex paribus causis sunt iudicatae, quae exempla rectius dicuntur, ut de rescissis patrum testamentis vel contra filios confirmatis: iudiciis ad ipsam causam pertinentibus, unde etiam nomen ductum est, qualia in Oppianicum facta dicuntur et a senatu adversus Milonem: aut cum de eadem causa pronuntiatum est, ut in reis deportatis et adsertione secunda et partibus centumviralium quae in duas hastas divisae sunt. II. Confirmantur praecipue duobus: auctoritate eorum qui pronuntiaverunt, et similitudine rerum de quibus quaeritur; refelluntur autem raro per contumeliam iudicum, nisi forte manifesta in iis culpa erit; vult enim cognoscentium quisque firmam esse alterius sententiam, et ipse pronuntiaturus, nec libenter exemplum quod in se fortasse reccidat facit. III.

[2] 1. Now the whole force of precedents turns on three kinds: matters which at some time have been adjudicated from like causes, which are more rightly called exempla, such as concerning fathers’ wills rescinded or confirmed against sons; judgments pertaining to the very cause itself, whence also the name is drawn, such as are said to have been made in the case of Oppianicus and by the senate against Milo; or when pronouncement has been made about the same cause, as in defendants deported, and in the second adsertion, and in the panels of the centumviral court which are divided into two “spears.” 2. They are confirmed especially by two things: the authority of those who have pronounced, and the similarity of the matters under inquiry; they are refuted, however, rarely by insult to the judges, unless perhaps there is manifest fault in them; for each of those judging wishes another’s opinion to be firm, and he himself being about to pronounce, does not willingly make an example which may perhaps recoil upon himself. 3.

Confugiendum ergo est in duobus superioribus, si res feret, ad aliquam dissimilitudinem causae, vix autem ulla est per omnia alteri similis. Si id non continget aut eadem causa erit, actionum incusanda neglegentia aut de infirmitate personarum querendum contra quas erit iudicatum, aut de gratia quae testes corruperit, aut de invidia aut de ignorantia, aut inveniendum quod causae postea accesserit. IV. Quorum si nihil erit, licet tamen dicere multos iudiciorum casus ad inique pronuntiandum valere, ideoque damnatum Rutilium, absolutos Clodium atque Catilinam, rogandi etiam iudices ut rem potius intueantur ipsam quam iuri iurando alieno suum donent.

Therefore one must take refuge in the two former [means], if the matter will bear it, to some dissimilarity of the case—yet scarcely any case is in all respects similar to another. If that does not come about, or if it will be the same case, the negligence of the actions is to be accused, or complaint must be made about the infirmity of the persons against whom judgment was rendered, or about favor which corrupted the witnesses, or about envy or ignorance, or something must be found which has afterwards accrued to the case. 4. If none of these will be present, nevertheless it is permitted to say that many contingencies of trials tend to pronouncing unjustly, and for that reason Rutilius was condemned, Clodius and Catiline absolved; and even to beg the judges to look rather at the thing itself than to bestow their own upon another’s oath.

V. adversus consulta autem senatus et decreta principum vel magistratuum remedium nullum est, nisi aut inventa quantulacumque causae differentia aut aliqua vel,eorundem vel eiusdem potestatis hominum posterior constitutio quae sit priori contraria: quae si deerunt, lis non erit.

5. But against the resolutions of the senate and the decrees of princes or magistrates there is no remedy, unless either some however small difference of the case be found, or some later constitution, either of the same men or of men of the same power, which is contrary to the earlier; if these are lacking, there will be no lawsuit.

[3] I. Famam atque rumores pars altera consensum civitatis et velut publicum testimonium vocat, altera sermonem sine ullo certo auctore dispersum, cui malignitas initium dederit, incrementum credulitas, quod nulli non etiam innocentissimo possit accidere fraude inimicorum falsa vulgantium. Exempla utrimque non deerunt:

[3] 1. Some call fame and rumors the consensus of the commonwealth and, as it were, public testimony; others [call them] discourse dispersed without any sure author, to which malignity gave the beginning, credulity the increment—something which can befall anyone, even the most innocent, through the fraud of enemies spreading falsehoods. Examples on both sides will not be lacking:

[4] I. sicut in tormentis quoque, qui est locus frequentissimus, cum pars altera quaestionem vera fatendi necessitatem vocet, altera saepe etiam causam falsa dicendi, quod aliis patientia facile mendacium faciat, aliis infirmitas necessarium. Quid attinet de his plura? Plenae sunt orationes veterum ac novorum.

[4] I. likewise in tortures too, which is the most frequent locus, while one side calls the inquest a necessity of confessing truths, the other often even a cause of speaking falsehoods, because for some endurance makes falsehood easy, for others infirmity makes it necessary. What is the point of saying more about these? The orations of the ancients and the moderns are full.

II. Quaedam tamen in hac parte erunt propria cuiusque litis. Nam sive de habenda quaestione agetur, plurimum intererit quis et quem postulet aut offerat et in quem et ex qua causa: sive iam erit habita, quis ei praefuerit, quis et quo modo sit tortus, an credibilia dixerit, an inter se constantia, perseveraverit in eo quod coeperat an aliquid dolore mutarit, prima parte quaestionis an procedente cruciatu. Quae utrimque tam infinita sunt quam ipsa rerum varietas.

2. Nevertheless, certain things in this part will be proper to each particular litigation. For whether the holding of an interrogation is in question, it will matter very much who and whom one demands or offers, and against whom and for what cause; or, if it has already been held, who presided over it, who was tortured and in what manner, whether he said things credible, whether they are mutually consistent, whether he persevered in what he had begun or changed anything because of pain—whether in the first part of the interrogation or as the torture proceeded. These considerations on both sides are as infinite as the very variety of matters.

[5] I. Contra tabulas quoque saepe dicendum est, cum eas non solum refelli sed etiam accusari sciamus usitatum esse. cum sit autem in his aut scelus signatorum aut ignorantia, tutius ac facilius id quod secundo loco diximus tractatur, quod pauciores rei fiunt. II. Sed hoc ipsum argumenta ex causa trahit, si forte aut incredibile est id actum esse quod tabulae continent, aut, ut frequentius evenit, aliis probationibus aeque inartificialibus solvitur, si aut is in quem signatum est aut aliquis signator dicitur afuisse vel prius esse defunctus, si tempora non congruunt, si vel antecedentia vel insequentia tabulis repugnant.

[5] 1. Against the documents, too, one must often speak, since we know it is customary that they be not only refuted but even accused. But since in these there is either the crime of the signers or ignorance, the second point we mentioned is handled more safely and more easily, because fewer become defendants. 2. But this very matter draws its arguments from the case, if perhaps it is unbelievable that what the documents contain was done; or, as more frequently happens, it is dissolved by other proofs equally inartificial, if either the person against whom it was signed or some signer is said to have been absent or to have died earlier; if the times do not agree; if either the antecedent or the subsequent circumstances are at odds with the documents.

Inspectio etiam ipsa saepe falsum deprendit.

Even inspection itself often detects falsehood.

[6] I. Ius iurandum litigatores aut offerunt suum aut non recipiunt oblatum aut ab adversario exigunt aut recusant cum ab ipsis exigatur. Offerre suum sine illa condicione ut vel adversarius iuret fere improbum est. II. Qui tamen id faciet, aut vita se tuebitur, ut eum non sit credibile peieraturum, aut ipsa vi religionis (in qua plus fidei consequitur si id egerit ut non cupide ad hoc descendere, sed ne hoc quidem recusare videatur), aut, si causa patietur, modo litis, propter quam devoturus se ipse non fuerit: aut praeter alia causae instrumenta adiciet ex abundanti hanc quoque conscientiae suae fiduciam.

[6] 1. Litigants either offer their own oath, or do not accept one that is proffered, or demand it from the adversary, or refuse when it is demanded from themselves. To offer one’s own without that condition that the opponent also swear is almost dishonest. 2. Whoever nevertheless will do this will either defend himself by his life, so that it is not believable that he would perjure himself, or by the very force of religion (in which he obtains more credit if he has managed that he not descend to this greedily, yet not seem to refuse even this), or, if the case permits, to the measure of the suit, on account of which he himself would not be about to devote himself: or, besides the other instruments of the case, he will add, out of abundance, this assurance also of his own conscience.

III. Qui non recipiet condicionem et a multis contemni iuris iurandi metum dicet, cum etiam philosophi quidam sint reperti qui deos agere rerum humanarum negarent: eum vero qui nullo deferente iurare sit paratus et ipsum velle de causa sua pronuntiare et quam id quod offert leve ac facile credat ostendere. IV. At is qui defert alioqui agere modeste videtur, cum litis adversarium iudicem faciat, et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat, qui profecto alieno iure iurando stari quam suo mavult.

3. He who will not accept the condition will say that the fear of an oath is held in contempt by many, since there have even been found certain philosophers who denied that the gods take care of human affairs: but that he who is ready to swear with no one tendering it shows both that he himself wishes to pronounce judgment concerning his own case, and how light and easy to believe he deems that which he offers. 4. But he who tenders (the oath) otherwise seems to act modestly, since he makes his adversary in the lawsuit the judge, and he releases from the burden him whose cognizance it is, who assuredly prefers to abide by another’s oath rather than his own.

V. Quo difficilior recusatio est, nisi forte res est ea quam credibile sit notam ipsi non esse. Quae excusatio si deerit, hoc unum relinquetur, ut invidiam sibi quaeri ab adversario dicat, atque id agi ut in causa in qua vincere non possit queri possit. Itaque hominem quidem malum occupaturum hanc condicionem fuisse, se autem probare malle quae adfirmet quam dubium cuiquam relinquere an peierarit.

V. Hence refusal is the more difficult, unless perhaps the matter is one which it is credible is not known to him. If this excuse is lacking, only this will remain: to say that ill-will is being sought against him by the adversary, and that the aim is so to arrange matters that, in a cause in which he cannot prevail, he may have ground to complain. And so, a bad man would indeed have seized upon this condition; but he himself prefers to prove what he affirms rather than leave it doubtful to anyone whether he has perjured himself.

VI. Sed nobis adulescentibus seniores in agendo facti praecipere solebant ne umquam ius iurandum deferremus, sicut neque optio iudicis adversario esset permittenda nec ex advocatis partis adversae iudex eligendus. Nam si dicere contraria turpe advocato videretur, certe turpius habendum facere quod noceat.

VI. But when we were young men, the elders seasoned in conducting cases used to instruct us never to tender an oath, just as neither should the choice of a judge be permitted to the adversary nor should a judge be chosen from among the advocates of the opposing party. For if it would seem shameful for an advocate to speak contrary things, certainly it must be held more shameful to do what harms.

[7] I. Maximus tamen patronis circa testimonia sudor est. Ea dicuntur aut per tabulas aut a praesentibus. Simplicior contra tabulas pugna; nam et minus obstitisse videtur pudor inter paucos signatores et pro diffidentia premitur absentia.

[7] 1. Nevertheless, the greatest toil for advocates is about testimonies. These are delivered either by written records or by those present. The contest against documents is simpler; for shame seems to have stood in the way less among a few signers, and their absence is pressed as a ground for distrust.

Si reprehensionem non capit ipsa persona, infamare signatores licet. II. Tacita praeterea quaedam cogitatio refragatur his omnibus, quod nemo per tabulas dat testimonium nisi sua voluntate, quo ipso non esse amicum ei se contra quem dicit fatetur. Neque tamen protinus cesserit orator quo minus et amicus pro amico et inimicus contra inimicum possit verum, si integra sit ei fides, dicere.

If the person himself does not admit of censure, it is permitted to defame the signatories. 2. Moreover, a certain tacit consideration opposes all these things, namely that no one gives testimony by documents except of his own volition, whereby he confesses by that very fact that he is not a friend to him against whom he speaks. Nor, however, should the orator straightway yield so far as to prevent both a friend on behalf of a friend and an enemy against an enemy from being able to speak the truth, if his credit remain intact.

Sed late locus uterque tractatur.

But each topic is treated at length.

III. cum praesentibus vero ingens dimicatio est, ideoque velut duplici contra eos proque iis acie confligitur actionum et interrogationum. In actionibus primum generaliter pro testibus atque in testis dici solet.

3. but with those present there is indeed a vast struggle, and therefore, as if in a double battle-line both against them and on their behalf, the conflict is waged by pleadings and by interrogations. In the pleadings, first, it is customary to speak generally both for the witnesses and against the witnesses.

IV. Est hic communis locus, cum pars altera nullam firmiorem probationem esse contendit quam quae sit hominum scientia nixa, altera ad detrahendam illis fidem omnia per quae fieri soleant falsa testimonia enumerat. V. Sequens ratio est cum specialiter quidem sed tamen multos pariter invadere patroni solent. Nam et gentium simul universarum elevata testimonia ab oratoribus scimus et tota genera testimoniorum: ut de auditionibus (non enim ipsos esse testes sed iniuratorum adferre voces), ut in causis repetundarum (qui se reo numerasse pecunias iurant, litigatorum, non testium habendos loco). VI. Interim adversus singulos derigitur actio, quod insectationis genus et permixtum defensioni legimus in orationibus plurimis et separatim editum, sicut in Vatinium testem.

4. This is a common commonplace, when the one party contends that there is no firmer proof than that which rests upon the knowledge of men, while the other, to detract credit from them, enumerates all the ways by which false testimonies are wont to be made. 5. The next method is when advocates are accustomed to attack, indeed specifically, yet many at once. For we know that testimonies of all nations together have been disparaged by orators, and entire kinds of testimonies: as about hearsays (for they themselves are not witnesses, but bring the voices of the unsworn), as in cases of extortion (those who swear that they counted out money to the defendant are to be held in the place of litigants, not of witnesses). VI. Meanwhile an attack is directed against individuals, which kind of insectation we read both intermixed with the defense in very many orations and issued separately, as in Against Vatinius, the witness.

Totum igitur excutiamus locum, quando universam institutionem adgressi sumus. VII. sufficiebant alioqui libri duo a Domitio Afro in hanc rem compositi, quem adulescentulus senem colui, ut non lecta mihi tantum ea, sed pleraque ex ipso sint cognita.

Let us therefore examine the whole locus, since we have undertaken the entire instruction. 7. Otherwise, the two books composed on this matter by Domitius Afer would have sufficed, whom, when I was a very young man, I cultivated when he was an old man, so that these things are known to me not only by reading, but for the most part from himself.

Is verissime praecepit primum esse in hac parte officium oratoris ut totam causam familiariter norit: quod sine dubio ad omnia pertinet; VIII. quomodo contingat explicabimus cum ad destinatum huic parti locum venerimus. Ea res suggeret materiam interrogationi et veluti tela ad manum subministrabit, eadem docebit ad quae iudicis animus actione sit praeparandus.

He most truly prescribed that in this part the first duty of the orator is to know the whole case familiarly: which without doubt pertains to everything; 8. how this comes about we shall explain when we have come to the place destined for this part. That matter will suggest material for interrogation and, as it were, will supply weapons to hand; the same will teach to what the judge’s mind should be prepared by the action.

Debet enim vel fieri vel detrahi testibus fides oratione perpetua, quia sic quisque dictis movetur ut est ad credendum vel non credendum ante formatus.

For credence must either be produced or withdrawn from the witnesses by a continuous oration, since each person is moved by words in such wise as he has been beforehand formed toward believing or not believing.

IX. Et quoniam duo genera sunt testium, aut voluntariorum aut eorum quibus (in) iudiciis publicis lege denuntiari solet, quorum altero pars utraque utitur, alterum accusatoribus tantum concessum est: separemus officium dantis testes et refellentis.

9. And since there are two kinds of witnesses, either voluntary or those to whom, in public trials, it is by law customary that notice be given, of which kind the one is used by both parties, the other is granted only to accusers: let us separate the duty of producing witnesses and of refuting them.

X. Qui voluntarium producit scire quid is dicturus sit potest, ideoque faciliorem videtur in rogando habere rationem. Sed haec quoque pars acumen ac vigilantiam poscit, providendumque ne timidus, ne inconstans, ne inprudens testis sit: XI. turbantur enim et a patronis diversae partis inducuntur in laqueos et plus deprensi nocent quam firmi et interriti profuissent. Multum igitur domi ante versandi, variis percontationibus, quales haberi ab adversario possunt, explorandi sunt.

10. He who brings forward a voluntary witness can know what he is going to say, and therefore seems to have an easier method in questioning. But this part too demands acumen and vigilance, and it must be provided that the witness be neither timid, nor inconstant, nor imprudent: 11. for they are thrown into confusion and are led into snares by the advocates of the opposite party, and, once detected, they do more harm than they would have profited had they been firm and undismayed. Therefore they must be much rehearsed beforehand at home, by various interrogations such as can be put by the adversary, and must be tested.

Sic fit ut aut constent sibi aut, si quid titubaverint, oportuna rursus eius a quo producti sunt interrogatione velut in gradum reponantur. XII. In iis quoque adhuc qui constiterint sibi vitandae insidiae; nam frequenter subici ab adversario solent et omnia profutura polliciti diversa respondent, et auctoritatem habent non arguentium illa sed confitentium.

Thus it comes about that either they are consistent with themselves, or, if they have stumbled in anything, by an opportune interrogation again by the one by whom they were produced, they are, as it were, set back upon the step. 12. Even in the case of those who have thus far stood firm with themselves, ambushes are to be avoided; for they are frequently wont to be suborned by the adversary, and—after promising that everything will be beneficial—they give contrary answers, and they carry the authority not of accusers of those points but of confessors.

XIII. Explorandum igitur quas causas laedendi adversarium adferant, nec id sat est inimicos fuisse, sed an desierint, an per hoc ipsum reconciliari velint, ne corrupti sint, ne paenitentia propositum mutaverint. Quod cum in iis quoque qui ea quae dicturi videntur [re] vera sciunt necessarium est praecavere, (tum) multo magis in iis qui se dicturos quae falsa sunt pollicentur.

13. Therefore it must be explored what causes for injuring the adversary they bring forward; nor is it enough that they have been enemies, but whether they have ceased, whether by this very matter they wish to be reconciled, lest they be corrupted, lest by repentance they have changed their purpose. This is a precaution that must be taken even with those who seem to know in truth the things they are going to say, and much more with those who promise that they will say things that are false.

XIV. Nam et frequentior eorum paenitentia est et promissum suspectius et, si perseverarint, reprensio facilior.

14. For both their repentance is more frequent, and their promise more suspect, and, if they persist, the detection easier.

XI [De exemplo, similitudine, analogia, auctoritate.]

11 [On example, similitude, analogy, authority.]

[1] Tertium genus, ex iis quae extrinsecus adducuntur in causam, Graeci uocant παράδειγμα, quo nomine et generaliter usi sunt in omni similium adpositione et specialiter in iis quae rerum gestarum auctoritate nituntur. Nostri fere similitudinem uocare maluerunt quod ab illis parabole dicitur, hoc alterum exemplum, quamquam et hoc simile est, illud exemplum.

[1] The third genus, from those things which are brought in to the case from outside, the Greeks call παράδειγμα, a name they have used both generally for every juxtaposition of similars and specifically for those that rest on the authority of deeds done. Our writers have for the most part preferred to call “similitude” what they call parabole, and the other “example,” although this too is a likeness, that an example.

[2] Nos, quo facilius propositum explicemus, utrumque παράδειγμα esse credamus et ipsi appellemus exemplum. Nec uereor ne uidear repugnare Ciceroni, quamquam conlationem separat ab exemplo. Nam idem omnem argumentationem diuidit in duas partes, inductionem et ratiocinationem, ut plerique Graecorum in παραδείγματα et ἐπιχειρήματα, dixeruntque παράδειγμα ῥητορικὴν ἐπαγωγήν.

[2] We, that we may more easily unfold our purpose, should consider both to be παράδειγμα and ourselves call it exemplum. Nor do I fear that I may seem to oppose Cicero, although he separates comparison (conlatio) from example (exemplum). For the same man divides all argumentation into two parts, induction and ratiocination, just as most of the Greeks [divide it] into παραδείγματα and ἐπιχειρήματα, and they called παράδειγμα a rhetorical induction (ῥητορικὴ ἐπαγωγή).

[3] Nam illa, qua plurimum est Socrates usus, hanc habuit uiam,, cum plura interrogasset quae fateri aduersario necesse esset, nouissime id de quo quaerebatur inferret ut simile concessis. [Id est inductio.] Hoc in oratione fieri non potest, sed quod illic interrogatur, hic fere sumitur.

[3] For that method, which Socrates used very much, had this path,, after he had asked many things which it was necessary for the adversary to confess, he would finally infer the point about which inquiry was being made, as akin to the things conceded. [That is induction.] This cannot be done in a formal speech, but what there is asked by interrogation is here for the most part assumed.

[4] Sit igitur illa interrogatio talis: 'Quod est pomum generosissimum? Nonne quod optimum?' Concedetur. 'Quid?

[4] Let that interrogation then be such: 'What is the most noble fruit? Is it not that which is best?' It will be conceded. 'What?

equus qui generosissimus? Nonne qui optimus?' Et plura in eundum modum. Deinde, cuius rei gratia rogatum est: 'quid?

Which horse is the most high-bred? Is it not the best one?' And more in the same mode. Then, with respect to the matter for the sake of which the question was asked: 'what?

homo nonne is generosissimus qui optimus?' Fatendum erit.

'Is not the man most noble who is best?' It will have to be admitted.

[5] Hoc in testium interrogatione ualet plurimum, in oratione perpetua dissimile est: aut enim sibi ipse respondet orator: 'Quod pomum generosissimum? Puto quod optimum. Et equus?

[5] This has the greatest force in the questioning of witnesses; in continuous discourse it is otherwise: for either the orator answers himself: 'Which fruit is most noble-bred? I think the one that is best. And the horse?

Qui uelocissimus. Ita hominum non qui claritate nascendi, sed qui uirtute maxime excellet' *

Which is the swiftest. Thus, among men, not he who is distinguished by the clarity of birth, but he who most excels in virtue' *

Omnia igitur ex hoc genere sumpta necesse est aut similia esse aut dissimilia aut contraria. Similitudo adsumitur interim et ad orationis ornatum; sed illa cum res exiget, nunc ea quae ad probationem pertinent exequar.

Therefore, all things taken from this genus must be either similar, or dissimilar, or contrary. Similitude is assumed meanwhile also for the ornament of the oration; but that when the matter requires; now I will set forth those things which pertain to proof.

[6] Potentissimum autem est inter ea quae sunt huius generis quod proprie uocamus exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio. Intuendum igitur est totum simile sit an ex parte, ut aut omnia ex eo sumamus aut quae utilia erunt. Simile est: 'iure occisus est Saturninus sicut Gracchi'. Dissimile:

[6] But the most potent, among the things that are of this kind, is what we properly call an example, that is, a commemoration of a deed done, or as-if-done, useful for persuading to that which you intend. We must therefore consider whether it is wholly similar or only in part, so that we may take either everything from it or those things which will be useful. A similar one is: 'Saturninus was slain by right, just as the Gracchi.' A dissimilar one:

[7] 'Brutus occidit liberos proditionem molientis, Manlius uirtutem filii morte multauit'. Contrarium: 'Marcellus ornamenta Syracusanis hostibus restituit, Verres eadem sociis abstulit'. Et probandorum et culpandorum ex his confirmatio eosdem gradus habet.

[7] 'Brutus killed his sons who were contriving treason; Manlius punished his son’s virtue with death.' Contrary: 'Marcellus restored the ornaments to the Syracusans, though enemies; Verres took away the same from the allies.' And the confirmation both of things to be approved and of things to be blamed from these has the same stages.

[8] Etiam in iis quae futura dicemus utilis similium admonitio est, ut si quis dicens Dionysium idcirco petere custodes salutis suae ut eorum adiutus armis tyrannidem occupet, hoc referat exemplum, eadem ratione Pisistratum ad dominationem peruenisse.

[8] Also in those things which we will say are to come, the admonition of similars is useful: for example, if someone, saying that Dionysius for that reason seeks guardians of his safety, so that, aided by their arms, he may seize tyranny, should adduce this example—that by the same rationale Pisistratus arrived at domination.

[9] Sed ut sunt exempla interim tota similia, ut hoc proximum, sic interim ex maioribus ad minora, ex minoribus ad maiora ducuntur. 'Si propter matrimonia uiolata urbes euersae sunt, quid fieri adultero par est?' 'Tibicines, cum ab urbe discessissent, publice reuocati sunt: quanto magis principes ciuitatis uiri et bene de re publica meriti, cum inuidiae cesserint, ab exilio reducendi!' Ad exhortationem uero praecipue ualent inparia.

[9] But as examples are sometimes entirely similar, as this next one, so sometimes they are drawn from greater to lesser, from lesser to greater. 'If on account of violated matrimonies cities have been overthrown, what is fitting to be done to an adulterer?' 'The flute-players, when they had departed from the city, were publicly recalled: how much more ought the leading men of the civitas and men who have well deserved of the res publica, when they have yielded to envy, to be brought back from exile!' For exhortation, however, unequal things are especially potent.

[10] Admirabilior in femina quam in uiro uirtus. Quare, si ad fortiter faciendum accendatur aliquis, non tantum adferent momenti Horatius et Torquatus quantum illa mulier cuius manu Pyrrhus est interfectus, et ad moriendum non tam Cato et Scipio quam Lucretia: quod ipsum est ex maioribus ad minora.

[10] Virtue is more admirable in a woman than in a man. Wherefore, if someone is kindled to act bravely, Horatius and Torquatus will not bring as much weight as that woman by whose hand Pyrrhus was killed, and for dying, not so much Cato and Scipio as Lucretia: which very thing is an argument from the greater to the lesser.

[11] Singula igitur horum generum ex Cicerone (nam unde potius?) exempla ponamus. Simile est hoc pro Murena: 'etenim mihi ipsi accidit ut cum duobus patriciis, altero improbissimo [atque audacissimo], altero modestissimo atque optimo uiro, peterem: superaui tamen dignitate Catilinam, gratia Galbam'.

[11] Therefore let us set down examples of each of these kinds from Cicero (for whence rather?): similar is this in the Pro Murena: 'for it befell me myself that I was seeking office with two patricians, the one most reprobate [and most audacious], the other a most modest and best man: yet I surpassed Catiline in dignity, Galba in favor'.

[12] Maius minoris pro Milone: 'Negant intueri lucem esse fas ei qui a se hominem occisum esse fateatur. In qua tandem urbe hoc homines stultissimi disputant? Nempe in ea quae primum iudicium de capite uidit M. Horati, fortissimi uiri, qui nondum libera ciuitate tamen populi Romani comitiis liberatus est, cum sua manu sororem esse interfectam fateretur'. Minus maioris: 'occidi, occidi, non Spurium Maelium, qui annona leuanda iacturisque rei familiaris, quia nimis amplecti plebem uidebatur, in suspicionem incidit regni adpetendi' et cetera, deinde: 'sed eum (auderet enim dicere, cum patriam periculo liberasset) cuius nefandum adulterium in puluinaribus', et totus in Clodium locus.

[12] The greater of the lesser, in the speech For Milo: 'They say it is not permitted to gaze upon the light for him who admits that a man has been slain by himself. In what city, pray, do these most foolish men argue this? Surely in that city which saw the first capital trial, that of M. Horatius, a most brave man, who, when the commonwealth was not yet free, nevertheless was acquitted by the assemblies of the Roman people, though he confessed that his sister had been killed by his own hand.' The lesser of the greater: 'I killed him, I killed him—not Spurius Maelius, who, in relieving the grain-supply and by outlays of his private estate, because he seemed to embrace the plebs too much, fell under suspicion of aiming at kingship' and so on; then: 'but him (for he would dare to say it, since he had freed his country from peril) whose unspeakable adultery on the sacred couches,' and the whole passage against Clodius.

[13] Dissimile pluris casus habet. Fit enim genere modo tempore loco ceteris, per quae fere omnia Cicero praeiudicia quae de Cluentio uidebantur facta subuertit: contrario uero exemplo censoriam notam, laudando censorem Africanum, qui eum quem peierasse conceptis uerbis palam dixisset, testimonium etiam pollicitus si quis contra diceret, nullo accusante traducere equum passus esset: quae quia erant longiora non suis uerbis exposui.

[13] Dissimile has more cases. For it arises by genus, mode, time, place, and the rest, through almost all of which Cicero overturned the prejudgments that seemed to have been made about Cluentius; and indeed by a contrary example he [overturned] a censorial mark as well, by praising the censor Africanus, who, after he had openly declared in set terms that a certain man had forsworn himself, even promising testimony if anyone would speak against him, yet, with no accuser, had allowed him to lead across his horse: which matters, because they were longer, I have not set out in their own words.

[14] Breue autem apud Vergilium contrarii exemplum est:

[14] A brief example of the contrary is in Vergil:

at non ille, satum quo te mentiris, Achilles
talis in hoste fuit Priamo

but not that Achilles, by whom you feign yourself sown,
was such toward Priam as an enemy

[15] Quaedam autem ex iis quae gesta sunt tota narrabimus, ut Cicero pro Milone: 'pudicitiam cum eriperet militi tribunus militaris in exercitu C. Mari, propincus eius imperatoris, interfectus ab eo est cui uim adferebat: facere enim probus adulescens periculose quam perpeti turpiter maluit: atque hunc ille summus uir scelere solutum periculo liberauit';

[15] Certain of the things that were done we will narrate in full, as Cicero in the defense for Milo: 'when a military tribune in the army of Gaius Marius, a relative of that commander, was snatching a soldier’s modesty, he was killed by the man upon whom he was inflicting violence: for the upright young man preferred to act with danger rather than to endure disgracefully: and that greatest man freed this man, released from crime, from danger';

[16] quaedam significare satis erit, ut idem ac pro eodem: 'neque enim posset Ahala ille Seruilius aut P. Nasica aut L. Opimius aut me consule senatus non nefarius haberi, si sceleratos interfici nefas esset'. Haec ita dicentur prout nota erunt uel utilitas causae aut decor postulabit.

[16] It will be enough to indicate certain things, as idem ac in place of eodem: 'for neither could that Servilius Ahala or P. Nasica or L. Opimius, or, with me as consul, the senate be considered not nefarious, if it were nefas to kill criminals.' These things will be said thus as they are familiar, or as the utility of the case or decorum shall demand.

[17] Eadem ratio est eorum quae ex poeticis fabulis ducuntur, nisi quod iis minus adfirmationis adhibetur: cuius usus qualis esse deberet, idem optimus auctor ac magister eloquentiae ostendit.

[17] The same rationale obtains for those things that are drawn from poetic fables, except that less affirmation is applied to them: what their use ought to be, the same best author and master of eloquence has shown.

[18] Nam huius quoque generis eadem in oratione reperietur exemplum: 'itaque hoc, iudices, non sine causa etiam fictis fabulis doctissimi homines memoriae prodiderunt, eum qui patris ulciscendi causa matrem necauisset, uariatis hominum sententiis, non solum diuina sed sapientissimae deae sententia liberatum'.

[18] For an example of this very kind too will be found in the oration: 'and so this, judges, not without cause the most learned men have handed down to memory even in fictitious fables, that the man who, for the sake of avenging his father, had killed his mother—men’s opinions being varied—was freed not only by a divine verdict but by the verdict of the most wise goddess'.

[19] Illae quoque fabellae quae, etiam si originem non ab Aesopo acceperunt (nam uidetur earum primus auctor Hesiodus), nomine tamen Aesopi maxime celebrantur, ducere animos solent praecipue rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius quae ficta sunt audiunt, et capti uoluptate facile iis quibus delectantur consentiunt: si quidem et Menenius Agrippa plebem cum patribus in gratiam traditur reduxisse nota illa de membris humanis aduersus uentrem discordantibus fabula,

[19] Those little fables too which, even if they did not receive their origin from Aesop (for Hesiod seems to be their first author), yet are most celebrated under the name of Aesop, are wont to draw minds, especially those of rustics and the unlearned, who both more simply listen to things that are feigned and, captivated by pleasure, readily consent to those things by which they are delighted: since indeed Menenius Agrippa is related to have brought the plebs back into favor with the patricians by that well-known fable about the human members being at odds against the belly,

[20] et Horatius ne in poemate quidem humilem generis huius usum putauit in illis uersibus:

[20] and Horace did not think even in a poem that the use of this kind was humble, in those verses:

quod dixit uulpes aegroto cauta leon.

what the cautious fox said to the sick lion.

Αἶνον Graeci uocant et αἰσωπείους, ut dixi, λόγους et λιβυκούς, nostrorum quidam, non sane recepto in usum nomine, apologationem.

The Greeks call it ainos and, as I said, Aesopic logoi and Libyan ones; some of our people, with a name not really received into use, “apologation.”

[21] Cui confine est παροιμίας genus illud quod est uelut fabella breuior et per allegorian accipitur: 'non nostrum' inquit "onus: bos clitellas".

[21] Bordering on this is that kind of paroemia which is, as it were, a shorter little fable and is taken by allegory: 'not our burden,' he says, "let the ox [carry] the pack-saddles."

[22] Proximas exemplo uires habet similitudo, praecipueque illa quae ducitur citra ullam tralationum mixturam ex rebus paene paribus: 'ut qui accipere in campo consuerunt iis candidatis quorum nummos suppressos esse putant inimicissimi solent esse: sic eius modi iudices infesti tum reo uenerant.'

[22] A similitude has strength nearest to an example, and especially that which is drawn, without any mixture of transfers (tropes), from things nearly equal: 'as those who are accustomed to receive in the Campus are wont to be the most hostile to those candidates whose coins they think have been withheld: so judges of that sort had come hostile then to the defendant.'

[23] Nam parabole, quam Cicero conlationem uocat, longius res quae comparentur repetere solet. Nec hominum modo inter se opera similia spectantur (ut Cicero pro Murena facit: 'quod si e portu soluentibus qui iam in portum ex alto inuehuntur praecipere summo studio solent et tempestatum rationem et praedonum et locorum, quod natura adfert ut iis faueamus qui eadem pericula quibus nos perfuncti sumus ingrediantur: quo tandem me animo esse oportet, prope iam ex magna iactatione terram uidentem, in hunc, cui uideo maximas tempestates esse subeundas?') sed et a mutis atque etiam inanimis interim * huius modi ducitur.

[23] For the parable, which Cicero calls a comparison, is accustomed to fetch from farther afield the things that are compared. Nor are only the similar works of men among themselves considered (as Cicero does in the Pro Murena: 'for if those who are putting out from port are accustomed with the utmost zeal to give warnings to those who are already being borne into port from the deep, both about the reckoning of storms and of pirates and of places—since nature brings it about that we favor those who enter upon the same dangers which we have been through—what, then, ought my disposition of mind to be, I who, almost now after great tossing, see land, toward this man, for whom I see the greatest storms must be undergone?') but also from mute creatures and even from inanimate things at times * of this sort it is drawn.

[24] Et quoniam similium alia facies in alia ratione, admonendum est rarius esse in oratione illud genus, quod εἰκόνα Graeci uocant, quo exprimitur rerum aut personarum imago, – ut Cassius:

[24] And since similitudes have a different face under a different rationale, it should be noted that rarer in speech is that genus which the Greeks call εἰκόνα, by which the image of things or of persons is expressed,—as Cassius:

'quis istam faciem planipedis senis torquens?'

'who is distorting that face of the flat-footed old man?'

– quam id quo probabilius fit quod intendimus: ut, si animum dicas excolendum, similitudine utaris terrae, quae neglecta sentes ac dumos, culta fructus creat: aut, si ad curam rei publicae horteris, ostendas apes etiam formicasque, non modo muta sed etiam parua animalia, in commune tamen laborare.

– than this, by which what we intend becomes more probable: for example, if you say that the mind is to be cultivated, you may use the similitude of the earth, which, neglected, produces brambles and briars, but, cultivated, creates fruits; or, if you exhort to the care of the commonwealth, you may show that bees and even ants, not only mute but also small animals, nevertheless labor in common.

[25] Ex hoc genere dictum illud est Ciceronis: 'ut corpora nostra sine mente, ita ciuitas sine lege suis partibus, ut neruis ac sanguine et membris, uti non potest'. Sed ut hac corporis humani pro Cluentio, ita pro Cornelio equorum, pro Archia saxorum quoque usus est similitudine.

[25] From this kind is that dictum of Cicero: 'just as our bodies without mind, so a civitas without law cannot use its own parts, as nerves and blood and members.' But as he used this similitude of the human body on behalf of Cluentius, so on behalf of Cornelius he used that of horses, and on behalf of Archias he even used that of stones.

[26] Illa, ut dixi, propiora: 'ut remiges sine gubernatore, sic milites sine imperatore nihil ualere'. Solent tamen fallere similitudinum species, ideoque adhibendum est eis iudicium. Neque enim ut nauis utilior noua quam uetus, sic amicitia, uel ut laudanda quae pecuniam suam pluribus largitur, ita quae formam. Verba sunt in his similia uetustatis et largitionis, uis quidem longe diuersa [pecuniae et pudicitiae].

[26] Those, as I said, are closer at hand: 'as rowers without a helmsman, so soldiers without a commander are worth nothing'. Yet the appearances of similitudes are wont to deceive, and therefore judgment must be applied to them. For it is not the case that, as a ship is more useful new than old, so is friendship; or that, as she is to be praised who lavishes her money upon more people, so is she who lavishes her beauty. The words in these cases are similar—of antiquity and of largition—while the force is indeed far different [of money and of chastity].

[27] Itaque in hoc genere maxime quaeritur an simile sit quod infertur. Etiam in illis interrogationibus Socraticis, quarum paulo ante feci mentionem, cauendum ne incaute respondeas, ut apud Aeschinen Socraticum male respondit Aspasiae Xenophontis uxor, quod Cicero his uerbis transfert:

[27] And so in this kind the chief question is whether what is adduced is similar. Also in those Socratic interrogations, of which I made mention a little before, one must beware not to answer incautiously, as in Aeschines the Socratic Xenophon’s wife answered badly to Aspasia, which Cicero renders in these words:

[28] 'Dic mihi, quaeso, Xenophontis uxor, si uicina tua melius habeat aurum quam tu habes, utrumne illud inquit. Quid? si uestem et ceterum ornatum muliebrem pretii maioris habeat quam tu, tuumne an illius

[28] 'Tell me, please, Xenophon’s wife, if your neighbor should have gold better than what you have, which would you prefer, that she said. What? If she should have clothing and the rest of womanly adornment of greater price than you, yours or hers

respondit:="" illius=""> uero. Age sis, inquit, si uirum illa meliorem habeat quam tu habes, utrumne tuum uirum malis an illius?'

she replied: 'hers, indeed.' 'Come then, please,' he said, 'if she has a better husband than you have, would you prefer your husband or hers?'

[29] Hic mulier erubuit, merito: male enim responderat se malle alienum aurum quam suum; nam est id improbum. At si respondisset malle se aurum suum tale esse quale illud esset, potuisset pudice respondere malle se uirum suum talem esse qualis melior esset.

[29] Here the woman blushed, deservedly: for she had answered badly that she preferred another’s gold to her own; for that is improper. But if she had answered that she preferred her own gold to be such as that was, she could have modestly answered that she preferred her own husband to be such as the better one was.

[30] Scio quosdam inani diligentia per minutissimas ista partis secuisse, et esse aliquid minus simile, ut simia homini et [ut] marmora deformata prima manu, aliquid plus, ut illud 'non ouum tam simile ouo', et dissimilibus inesse simile, ut formicae et elephanto genus, quia sunt animalia, et similibus dissimile, ut 'canibus catulos et matribus haedos', differunt enim aetate:

[30] I know that certain men, with vain meticulousness, have cut these matters into the tiniest parts, and that there is something less similar, as the ape to man and [as] marbles misshapen at the first hand; something more so, as that saying, 'not an egg so like an egg'; and that in dissimilars there is something similar, as the genus common to the ant and the elephant, since they are animals; and in similars something dissimilar, as 'puppies to dogs and kids to mothers', for they differ in age:

[31] contrariorum quoque aliter accipi opposita, ut noctem luci, aliter noxia, ut frigidam febri, aliter repugnantia, ut uerum falso, aliter separata, ut dura non duris: sed quid haec ad praesens propositum magnopere pertineant, non reperio.

[31] moreover, the opposites of contraries are taken in one way, as night to light; noxious ones in another, as cold to fever; repugnant ones in another, as true to false; separated ones in another, as hard to not-hard: but how these greatly pertain to the present purpose, I do not find.

[32] Illud est adnotandum magis, argumenta duci ex iure simili, ut Cicero in Topicis: 'eum cui domus usus fructus relictus sit non restituturum heredi si corruerit, quia non restituat seruum si is decesserit'; ex contrario: 'nihil obstat quo minus iustum matrimonium sit mente coeuntium, etiam si tabulae signatae non fuerint: nihil enim proderit signasse tabulas si mentem matrimonii non fuisse constabit';

[32] This is rather to be noted: that arguments are drawn from similar law, as Cicero in the Topics: 'he to whom the usufruct of a house has been left will not restore it to the heir if it has collapsed, because he does not restore a slave if he has died'; from the contrary: 'nothing hinders that there be a just marriage by a meeting of the minds of those coming together, even if the tablets have not been signed: for it will profit nothing to have signed the tablets if it will be established that there was not the intention of marriage';

[33] ex dissimili, quale est Ciceronis pro Caecina: 'ut si qui me exire domo coegisset armis, haberem actionem, si qui introire prohibuisset, non haberem?' Dissimilia sic deprenduntur: 'non si, qui argentum omne legauit, uideri potest signatam quoque pecuniam reliquisse, ideo etiam quod est in nominibus dari uoluisse creditur'.

[33] from the dissimilar, such as Cicero’s in the Pro Caecina: ‘as, if someone had forced me to go out of the house by arms, I would have an action; if someone had forbidden me to enter, I would not have one?’ Dissimilarities are thus detected: ‘it is not the case that, if someone has bequeathed all the silver, he can be seen to have left coined money as well; for that reason it is not even believed that he wished to give what is “in the names” (i.e., on the ledgers).’

[34] Ἀναλογίαν quidam a simili separauerunt, nos eam subiectam huic generi putamus. Nam ut unum ad decem, et decem ad centum simile certe est, et ut hostis sic malus ciuis. Quamquam haec ulterius quoque procedere solent: 'si turpis dominae consuetudo cum seruo, turpis domino cum ancilla: si mutis animalibus finis uoluptas, idem homini'.

[34] Some have separated Analogy from the Similar, but we consider it subordinate to this genus. For just as one is to ten, and ten to a hundred is certainly similar, and as an enemy, so a bad citizen. Although these too are wont to proceed further: 'if the mistress’s consuetude with a slave is base, the master’s with a maidservant is base; if for mute animals the end is pleasure, the same for a human.'

[35] Cui rei facillime occurrit ex dissimilibus argumentatio: 'non idem est dominum cum ancilla coisse quod dominam cum seruo, nec, si mutis finis uoluptas, rationalibus quoque': immo ex contrario: 'quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus'.

[35] To this, an argument from dissimilars most readily occurs: 'it is not the same for a master to have had intercourse with a maidservant as for a mistress with a male slave, nor, if for mute animals the end is pleasure, for rational beings as well': nay rather, the contrary: 'because it is for the mute, therefore not for the rational.'

[36] Adhibebitur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. Haec secuti Graecos, a quibus κρίσεις dicuntur, iudicia aut iudicationes uocant, de quibus ex causa dicta sententia est (nam ea quidem in exemplorum locum cedunt), sed si quid ita uisum gentibus, populis, sapientibus uiris, claris ciuibus, inlustribus poetis referri potest.

[36] Authority too will be applied to a case from outside. Those who, following the Greeks (by whom they are called κρίσεις), call these judgments or adjudications— not those on which a verdict has been pronounced in a lawsuit (for those indeed pass into the place of examples), but whatever can be cited that has so seemed to nations, peoples, wise men, famous citizens, illustrious poets.

[37] Ne haec quidem uulgo dicta et recepta persuasione populari sine usu fuerint. Testimonia sunt enim quodam modo, uel potentiora etiam quod non causis accommodata sunt, sed liberis odio et gratia mentibus ideo tantum dicta factaque quia aut honestissima aut uerissima uidebantur.

[37] Not even these things, said commonly and received by popular persuasion, would be without use. For they are in a certain mode testimonies, or even more potent ones, because they are not accommodated to the cases, but, by minds free from hatred and favor, were said and done for this reason only, because they seemed either most honorable or most true.

[38] An uero me de incommodis uitae disserentem non adiuuabit earum persuasio nationum quae fletibus natos, laetitia defunctos prosecuntur? Aut si misericordiam commendabo iudici, nihil proderit quod prudentissima ciuitas Atheniensium non eam pro adfectu sed pro numine accepit?

[38] Or indeed, as I discourse on the incommodities of life, will not the persuasion of those nations help me who accompany the newborn with tears and the deceased with joy? Or, if I commend mercy to the judge, will it be of no avail that the most prudent city of the Athenians received it not as an affect but as a numen?

[39] Iam illa septem praecepta sapientium nonne quasdam uitae leges existimamus? Si causam ueneficii dicat adultera, non M. Catonis iudicio damnanda uideatur, qui nullam adulteram non eandem esse ueneficam dixit? Nam sententiis quidem poetarum non orationes modo sunt refertae, sed libri etiam philosophorum, qui quamquam inferiora omnia praeceptis suis ac litteris credunt, repetere tamen auctoritatem a plurimis uersibus non fastidierunt.

[39] Now those seven precepts of the wise—do we not reckon them as certain laws of life? If an adulteress stands trial on a charge of poisoning, would she not seem, by the judgment of M. Cato, to be condemnable, he who said that every adulteress is likewise a poisoner? For with the maxims of the poets not only are orations crammed, but even the books of the philosophers; who, although they hold everything else inferior to their own precepts and letters, have nevertheless not disdained to derive authority from very many verses.

[40] Neque est ignobile exemplum Megarios ab Atheniensibus, cum de Salamine contenderent, uictos Homeri uersu, qui tamen ipse non in omni editione reperitur, significans Aiacem naues suas Atheniensibus iunxisse.

[40] Nor is it an ignoble example that the Megarians, when they were contending over Salamis, were defeated by a verse of Homer—which, however, is not itself found in every edition—signifying that Ajax had joined his ships to the Athenians.

[41] Ea quoque quae uulgo recepta sunt hoc ipso, quod incertum auctorem habent, uelut omnium fiunt, quale est: 'ubi amici, ibi opes', et 'conscientia mille testes', et apud Ciceronem: 'pares autem, ut est in uetere prouerbio, cum paribus maxime congregantur'; neque enim durassent haec in aeternum nisi uera omnibus uiderentur.

[41] Those things too which are commonly received, precisely because they have an uncertain author, become, as it were, the property of all, such as: 'where friends are, there riches', and 'conscience [is] a thousand witnesses', and in Cicero: 'equals, moreover, as is in the old proverb, most of all gather with equals'; for these would not have endured forever unless they seemed true to everyone.

[42] Ponitur a quibusdam, et quidem in parte prima, deorum auctoritas, quae est ex responsis, ut 'Socraten esse sapientissimum'. Id rarum est, non sine usu tamen. Vtitur eo Cicero in libro de haruspicum responsis et in contione contra Catilinam, cum signum Iouis columnae inpositum populo ostendit, et pro Ligario, cum C. Caesaris meliorem quia hoc di iudicauerint confitetur. Quae cum propria causae sunt, diuina testimonia uocantur, cum aliunde arcessuntur, argumenta.

[42] Some place, and indeed in the first part, the authority of the gods, which is from responses, as: 'that Socrates is the wisest.' That is rare, yet not without use. Cicero employs it in the book On the Responses of the Haruspices and in the assembly against Catiline, when he showed to the people the sign of Jupiter set upon a column, and in the defense of Ligarius, when he confesses of Gaius Caesar to be better because the gods have judged this. When these are proper to the case, they are called divine testimonies; when they are fetched from elsewhere, arguments.

[43] Nonnumquam contingit iudicis quoque aut aduersarii aut eius qui ex diuerso agit dictum aliquod aut factum adsumere ad eorum quae intendimus fidem. Propter quod fuerunt qui exempla et has auctoritates inartificialium probationum esse arbitrarentur, quod ea non inueniret orator, sed acciperet.

[43] Sometimes it happens to assume some saying or deed of the judge as well, or of the adversary, or of him who pleads on the opposite side, for the credibility of the things we intend. For which reason there were those who would judge that examples and these authorities are of inartificial proofs, because the orator does not find them, but receives them.

[44] Plurimum autem refert; nam testis et quaestio et his similia de ipsa re quae in iudicio est pronuntiant: extra petita, nisi ad aliquam praesentis disceptationis utilitatem ingenio adplicantur, nihil per se ualent.

[44] But it matters very much; for the witness, the question (interrogation/torture), and things similar to these pronounce on the very matter that is in judgment: things sought from outside, unless by ingenuity they are applied to some utility of the present disputation, are of no force in themselves.

XV. Eorum vero quibus denuntiatur pars testium est quae reum laedere velit, pars quae nolit, idque interim scit accusator, interim nescit. Fingamus in praesentia scire; in utroque tamen genere summis artibus interrogantis opus est. XVI.

15. Of those, indeed, to whom notice is given, part of the witnesses is such as would wish to injure the defendant, part such as would not, and this the accuser sometimes knows, sometimes does not know. Let us suppose for the present that he knows; in both kinds, however, there is need of the highest arts of the interrogator. 16.

Nam si habet testem cupidum laedendi, cavere debet hoc ipsum, ne cupiditas eius appareat, nec statim de eo quod in iudicium venit rogare, sed aliquo circumitu ad id pervenire, ut illi quod maxime dicere voluit videatur expressum: nec nimium instare interrogationi, ne omnia respondendo testis fidem suam minuat, sed in tantum evocare eum quantum sumere ex uno satis sit. XVII. At in eo qui verum invitus dicturus est, prima felicitas interrogantis extorquere quod is noluerit.

For if he has a witness eager to wound, he ought to beware precisely this, that his eagerness not appear, and not at once to ask about that which has come into judgment, but to reach it by some circuit, so that what he most wished to say may seem to have been expressed; nor to press the interrogation too much, lest by answering everything the witness lessen his credit, but to summon him only so far as it is enough to take from a single point. 17. But in the case of one who will tell the truth unwillingly, the first felicity of the questioner is to extort what he did not wish.

Hoc non alio modo fieri potest quam longius interrogatione repetita. Respondebit enim quae nocere causae non arbitrabitur, ex pluribus deinde quae confessus erit eo perducetur ut quod dicere non vult negare non possit. XVIII.

This can be brought about in no other way than with the interrogation repeated at greater length. For he will answer the things which he will not think harm the cause, then from the several points which he has confessed he will be conducted to the point that he cannot deny what he is unwilling to say. 18.

Nam ut in oratione sparsa plerumque colligimus argumenta, quae per se nihil reum adgravare videantur, congregatione deinde eorum factum convincimus: ita huius modi testis multa de ante actis, multa de insecutis, loco tempore persona ceteris est interrogandus, ut in aliquod responsum incidat post quod illi vel fateri quae volumus necesse sit vel iis quae iam dixerit repugnare. XIX. Id si non contingit, relicum erit ut eum nolle dicere manifestum sit, protrahendusque ut in aliquo, quod vel extra causam sit, deprehendatur, tenendus etiam diutius, ut omnia ac plura quam res desiderat pro reo dicendo suspectus iudici fiat: quo non minus nocebit quam si vera in reum dixisset.

For as in a scattered speech we often gather arguments which by themselves seem to aggravate the defendant not at all, and then by their aggregation we prove the fact committed: so a witness of this kind must be questioned about many things done before, many that followed, about place, time, person, and the rest, so that he may stumble into some answer after which it is necessary for him either to confess what we want or to be inconsistent with what he has already said. 19. If that does not come about, it will remain to make it manifest that he is unwilling to speak, and he must be drawn out so that he is caught in something, even something outside the case; he must also be held longer, so that by saying everything, and more than the matter requires, in favor of the defendant, he becomes suspect to the judge: whereby he will harm no less than if he had said true things against the defendant.

XX. At si, quod secundo loco diximus, nesciet actor quid propositi testis attulerit, paulatim et, ut dicitur, pedetemptim interrogando experietur animum eius, et ad id responsum quod eliciendum erit per gradus ducet. XXI. Sed quia nonnumquam sunt hae quoque testium artes, ut primo ad voluntatem respondeant, quo maiore fide diversa postea dicant, est actoris suspectum testem dum prodest dimittere.

20. But if, as we said in the second place, the accuser does not know what design the witness has brought, little by little and, as they say, by feeling his way step by step in questioning, he will test his disposition, and he will lead him by degrees to that answer which must be elicited. 21. But because sometimes witnesses also have these arts, namely that at first they answer to one’s wish, so that later they may say different things with greater credibility, it is the accuser’s part to dismiss a suspect witness while it is advantageous.

XXII. Patronorum in parte expeditior, in parte difficilior interrogatio est. Difficilior hoc, quod raro umquam possunt ante iudicium scire quid testis dicturus sit, expeditior, quod cum interrogandus est sciunt quid dixerit.

22. The interrogation by advocates is in part more expeditious, in part more difficult. More difficult in this respect: that they can hardly ever know before the trial what the witness will say; more expeditious, in that when he is to be questioned they know what he has said.

XXIII. Itaque, quod in eo incertum est, cura et inquisitione opus est, quis reum premat, quas et quibus ex causis inimicitias habeat, eaque in oratione praedicenda atque amolienda sunt, sive odio conflatos testes sive invidia sive gratia sive pecunia videri volumus. Et si deficietur numero pars diversa, paucitatem, si abundabit, conspirationem, si humiles producet, vilitatem, si potentes, gratiam oportebit incessere.

23. Therefore, in that which is uncertain therein, there is need of care and inquisition: who is pressing the defendant, what enmities he has, and from what causes and with whom; and these things in the oration are to be proclaimed and warded off, whether we wish the witnesses to seem inflamed by hatred, or by envy, or by favor, or by money. And if the opposite party is deficient in number, their fewness must be assailed; if it abounds, a conspiracy; if it produces humble persons, their lowliness; if powerful men, their influence.

XXIV. Plus tamen proderit causas propter quas reum laedant exponere: quae sunt variae et pro condicione cuiusque litis aut litigatoris. Nam contra illa quae supra diximus simili ratione responderi locis communibus solet, quia et in paucis atque humilibus accusator simplicitate gloriari potest, quod neminem praeter eos qui possint scire quaesierit, et multos atque honestos commendare aliquanto est facilius.

24. Nevertheless, it will be more profitable to set forth the causes on account of which they injure the defendant: which are various and depend on the condition of each lawsuit or litigant. For against those points which we said above, it is customary to respond in similar fashion by commonplaces, because, both with few and humble witnesses, the accuser can boast of simplicity—that he has sought no one except those who could know—and to commend many and honorable witnesses is considerably easier.

XXV. Verum interim et singulos ut exornare, ita destruere contingit aut recitatis in actione aut testibus nominatis, quod iis temporibus quibus testis non post finitas actiones rogabatur facilius et frequentius fuit. Quid autem in quemque testium dicendum sit, sumi nisi ex ipsorum personis non potest.

25. But meanwhile it is possible both to adorn each individual and likewise to tear him down, either by the testimonies recited in the action or by the witnesses being named—something that was easier and more frequent in those times when a witness was questioned not after the pleadings had been finished. But what ought to be said about each of the witnesses can be taken only from their own persons.

XXVI. Reliquae interrogandi sunt partes: qua in re primum est nosse testem. Nam timidus terreri, stultus decipi, iracundus concitari, ambitiosus inflari, longus protrahi potest, prudens vero et constans vel tamquam inimicus et pervicax dimittendus statim, vel non interrogatione sed brevi interlocutione patroni refutandus est, aut aliquo, si continget, urbane dicto refrigerandus, aut, si quid in eius vitam dici poterit, infamia, criminum destruendus.

26. The remaining parts of interrogation are: in which matter the first thing is to know the witness. For a timid man can be terrified, a foolish man deceived, an irascible man provoked, an ambitious man inflated, a long‑winded man drawn out; but a prudent and constant man should either, as if hostile and obstinate, be dismissed at once, or be refuted not by questioning but by a brief interlocution of the advocate, or, if it happens, be cooled by some urbane remark, or, if anything can be said about his life, be overthrown by infamy, by accusations of crimes.

XXVII. Probos quosdam et verecundos non aspere incessere profuit; nam saepe qui adversus insectantem pugnassent modestia mitigantur. Omnis autem interrogatio aut in causa est aut extra causam.

27. It has been profitable not to assail harshly certain upright and modest men; for often those who would have fought against an assailant are softened by moderation. Moreover, every interrogation is either within the cause or outside the cause.

In causa, sicut accusatori praecepimus, patronus quoque altius et unde nihil suspecti sit repetita percontatione, priora sequentibus adplicando saepe eo perducit homines ut invitis quod prosit extorqueat. XXVIII. Eius rei sine dubio neque disciplina una in scholis neque exercitatio traditur, et naturali magis acumine aut usu contingit haec virtus.

In the case itself, just as we have prescribed to the accuser, the advocate too, by a deeper and repeated interrogation begun from where there is nothing suspect, by applying the former to the latter, often brings people to this point: that, though unwilling, he extorts what is of use. 28. Of this matter, without doubt neither a single discipline in the schools nor training is handed down, and this virtue comes about rather by natural acumen or by practice.

Si quod tamen exemplum ad imitationem demonstrandum sit, solum est quod ex dialogis Socraticorum maximeque Platonis duci potest: in quibus adeo scitae sunt interrogationes ut, cum plerisque bene respondeatur, res tamen ad id quod volunt efficere perveniat. XXIX. Illud fortuna interim praestat, ut aliquid quod inter se parum consentiat a teste dicatur, interim, quod saepius evenit, ut testis testi diversa dicat.

Yet if any example is to be exhibited for imitation, the only one is that which can be drawn from the dialogues of the Socratics and most of all of Plato: in them the interrogations are so skillful that, although most people answer well, the matter nevertheless comes to that which they wish to effect. 29. Fortune meanwhile sometimes provides this, that something insufficiently self-consistent is said by a witness; sometimes—what happens more often—that one witness says diverse things to another witness.

Acuta autem interrogatio ad hoc quod casu fieri solet etiam ratione perducet. XXX. Extra causam quoque multa quae prosint rogari solent, de vita testium aliorum, de sua quisque, si turpitudo, si humilitas, si amicitia accusatoris, si inimicitiae cum reo: in quibus aut dicant aliquid quod prosit, aut in mendacio vel cupiditate laedendi deprendantur.

However, a acute interrogation will by reason also bring about that which is wont to occur by chance. 30. Also outside the case many things that may profit are wont to be asked: about the life of other witnesses, each about his own—if turpitude, if humility, if friendship with the accuser, if enmities with the defendant—in which either they say something that is of use, or they are caught in a lie or in a desire to injure.

XXXI. Sed in primis interrogatio cum debet esse circumspecta, quia multa contra patronos venuste testes saepe respondent eique praecipue rei vulgo favetur, tum verbis quam maxime ex medio sumptis, ut qui rogatur (is autem saepius est imperitus) intellegat, aut ne intellegere se neget, quod interrogantis non leve frigus est. XXXII.

31. But, first of all, interrogation ought to be circumspect, because witnesses often reply wittily with many things against the advocates, and in this the defendant in particular is favored by the crowd; then, with words taken as much as possible from the common stock, so that the one questioned (and he is more often inexperienced) may understand, or at least not deny that he understands—which is no slight chill for the interrogator. 32.

Illae vero pessimae artes, testem subornatum in subsellia adversarii mittere, ut inde excitatus plus noceat vel dicendo contra reum cum quo sederit, vel, cum adiuvisse testimonio videbitur, faciendo ex industria multa inmodeste atque intemperanter, per quae non a se tantum dictis detrahat fidem, sed ceteris quoque qui profuerant auferat utilitatem: quorum mentionem habui non ut fierent sed ut vitarentur.

Those indeed are the worst stratagems: to send a suborned witness into the adversary’s benches, so that, called up from there, he may do more harm either by speaking against the defendant with whom he had sat, or, when he will seem to have aided by his testimony, by deliberately doing many things immodestly and intemperately, whereby he not only detracts credibility from his own statements, but also removes the utility of the others who had been of profit; the mention of which I have made not that they be done, but that they be avoided.

Saepe inter se collidi solent inde testatio, hinc testes. Locus utrimque: haec enim se pars iure iurando, illa consensu signantium tuetur. XXXIII.

They are often wont to collide with each other: there, the attestation; here, the witnesses. The ground lies on both sides: for this side protects itself by an oath, that by the consent of the signers. 33.

Saepe inter testes et argumenta quaesitum est. Inde scientiam in testibus et religionem, ingenia esse in argumentis dicitur: hinc testem gratia metu pecunia ira odio amicitia ambitu fieri, argumenta ex natura duci, in his iudicem sibi, in illis alii credere. XXXIV.

It has often been asked about witnesses and arguments. Hence it is said that knowledge and conscientiousness are in witnesses, and that ingenuity belongs to arguments: thus a witness is made by favor, fear, money, ire, odium, amity, ambition; arguments are drawn from nature; in these the judge trusts himself, in those he trusts another. 34.

Communia haec pluribus causis, multumque iactata sunt, semper tamen iactabuntur. Aliquando utrimque sunt testes, et quaestio sequitur ex ipsis, utri meliores viri, ex causis, utri magis credibilia dixerint, ex litigatoribus, utri gratia magis valuerint. XXXV.

These commonplaces are shared by many causes, and have been much tossed about; nevertheless they will always be tossed about. Sometimes there are witnesses on both sides, and the question follows from them, which are the better men; from the cases, which have said more credible things; from the litigants, which have prevailed more by favor. 35.

His adicere si qui volet ea quae divina testimonia vocant, ex responsis oraculis ominibus, duplicem sciat esse eorum tractatum: generalem alterum, in quo inter Stoicos et Epicuri sectam secutos pugna perpetua est regaturne providentia mundus, specialem alterum circa partis divinationum, ut quaeque in quaestionem cadet. XXXVI. Aliter enim oraculorum, aliter haruspicum augurum coniectorum mathematicorum fides confirmari aut refelli potest, cum sit rerum ipsarum ratio diversa.

To these, if anyone will, let him add those which they call divine testimonies, from responses, oracles, omens; let him know that their treatment is twofold: one general, in which between the Stoics and those who have followed the sect of Epicurus there is a perpetual contest whether the world is governed by providence, the other special concerning the parts of divination, as each falls into question. 36. For in one way the credibility of oracles, in another that of haruspices, augurs, conjecturers, mathematicians, can be confirmed or refuted, since the rationale of the things themselves is diverse.

Circa eius modi quoque instrumenta firmanda vel destruenda multum habet operis oratio, si quae sunt voces per vinum somnum dementiam emissae, vel excepta parvolorum indicia, quos pars altera nihil fingere, altera nihil iudicare dictura est.

Concerning instruments of this kind too, to be confirmed or destroyed, the oration has much work: whether there are utterances emitted by wine, sleep, or madness, or else indications taken from little children, of whom the one party will say that they feign nothing, the other that they judge nothing.

XXXVII. Nec tantum praestari hoc genus potenter, sed etiam ubi non est desiderari solet: "Pecuniam dedisti: quis numeravit? ubi?

37. Not only is this kind supplied powerfully, but even where it is not, it is wont to be desired: "You gave money: who counted it? where?

unde?" "Venenum arguis: ubi emi? a quo? quanti?

"whence?" "You charge me with poison: where did I buy it? from whom? for how much?

per quem dedi? quo conscio?" Quae fere omnia pro Cluentio Cicero in crimine veneficii excutit.

"through whom did I give it? with whose knowledge?" Cicero, on behalf of Cluentius, refutes nearly all these points in the charge of poisoning.

Haec de inartificialibus quam brevissime potui.

Thus much about the inartificial, as briefly as I could.

[8] I. Pars altera probationum, quae est tota in arte constatque rebus ad faciendam fidem adpositis, plerumque aut omnino neglegitur aut levissime attingitur ab iis qui argumenta velut horrida et confragosa vitantes amoenioribus locis desident, neque aliter quam ii qui traduntur a poetis gustu cuiusdam apud Lotophagos graminis et Sirenum cantu deleniti voluptatem saluti praetulisse, dum laudis falsam imaginem persecuntur ipsa propter quam dicitur victoria cedunt. II. Atqui cetera, quae continuo magis orationis tractu decurrunt, in auxilium atque ornamentum argumentorum comparantur, nervisque illis quibus causa continetur adiciunt inducti super corporis speciem: ut, si forte quid factum ira vel metu vel cupiditate dicatur, latius quae cuiusque adfectus natura sit prosequamur. Isdem laudamus incusamus augemus minuimus describimus deterremus querimur consolamur hortamur.

[8] 1. The second part of proofs, which is wholly within art and consists of things adduced for producing belief, is for the most part either altogether neglected or most lightly touched by those who, shunning arguments as if rough and craggy, settle down in more pleasant places; and not otherwise than those who are related by the poets, beguiled by the taste of a certain grass among the Lotus-eaters and by the song of the Sirens, to have preferred pleasure to safety, while they pursue the false image of praise, they yield the victory itself. 2. Yet the other things, which run on more in the continuous tract of speech, are prepared for the aid and ornament of arguments, and to those sinews by which the cause is held together they add a superinduced appearance of body: so that, if perhaps something is said to have been done by anger or fear or desire, we may more broadly set forth what the nature of each affect is. By these same we praise, arraign, amplify, diminish, describe, deter, complain, console, exhort.

III. Sed horum esse opera in rebus aut certis aut de quibus tamquam certis loquimur potest. Nec abnuerim esse aliquid in delectatione, multum vero in commovendis adfectibus: sed haec ipsa plus valent cum se didicisse iudex putat, quod consequi nisi argumentatione aliaque omni fide rerum non possumus.

3. But the works of these belong to matters either certain, or those about which we speak as if certain. Nor would I deny that there is something in delectation, but much indeed in stirring the affections; yet these very things have greater force when the judge thinks that he has learned them—something we cannot attain except by argumentation and by every other credibility of the facts.

IV. Quorum priusquam partior species, indicandum est esse quaedam in omni probationum genere communia. Nam neque ulla quaestio est quae non sit aut in re aut in persona, neque esse argumentorum loci possunt nisi in iis quae rebus aut personis accidunt, V. eaque aut per se inspici solent aut ad aliud referri, neque ulla confirmatio nisi aut ex consequentibus aut ex pugnantibus, et haec necesse est aut ex praeterito tempore aut ex coniuncto aut ex insequenti petere, nec ulla res probari nisi ex alia potest eaque sit oportet aut maior aut par aut minor. VI. Argumenta vero reperiuntur aut in quaestionibus, quae etiam separatae a complexu rerum personarumque spectari per se possint, aut in ipsa causa, cum invenitur aliquid in ea non ex communi ratione ductum sed eius iudicii de quo cognoscitur proprium.

4. Before I apportion the species of these, it must be indicated that there are certain things common in every kind of proofs. For there is no question which is not either about a thing or about a person, nor can there be loci of arguments except in those things which befall things or persons, 5. and these are wont either to be considered in themselves or to be referred to something else; nor is there any confirmation except either from consequents or from things that clash, and it is necessary to seek these either from past time or from what is conjoined (present) or from what follows (future); nor can any thing be proved except from another, and that must be either greater or equal or lesser. 6. Truly, arguments are found either in questions, which, even when separated from the complex of things and persons, can be viewed by themselves, or in the case itself, when something is found in it not drawn from common reasoning but proper to that judgment of which cognizance is taken.

Probationum praeterea omnium aliae sunt necessariae, aliae credibiles, aliae non repugnantes. VII. Et adhuc omnium probationum quadruplex ratio est, ut vel quia est aliquid, aliud non sit, ut: "dies est, nox non est", vel quia est aliquid, et aliud sit: "sol est super terram, dies est", vel quia aliquid non est, aliud sit: "non est nox, dies est", vel quia aliquid non est, nec aliud sit: "non est rationalis, nec homo est". His in universum praedictis partes subiciam.

Besides, among all proofs some are necessary, some credible, some non-repugnant. 7. And furthermore, there is a fourfold manner of all proofs: either because something is, another thing is not, as: "it is day, it is not night"; or because something is, and another thing is, as: "the sun is above the earth, it is day"; or because something is not, another thing is, as: "it is not night, it is day"; or because something is not, nor is the other, as: "he is not rational, nor is he a man." With these matters stated beforehand in general, I will subjoin the parts.

[9] I. Omnis igitur probatio artificialis constat aut signis aut argumentis aut exemplis. Nec ignoro plerisque videri signa partem argumentorum. Quae mihi separandi ratio haec fuit prima, quod sunt paene ex illis inartificialibus (cruenta enim vestis et clamor et livor et talia sunt instrumenta, qualia tabulae, rumores, testes, nec inveniuntur ab oratore, sed ad eum cum ipsa causa deferuntur), II. altera, quod signa, sive indubitata sunt, non sunt argumenta, quia ubi illa sunt quaestio non est, argumento autem nisi in re controversa locus esse non potest, sive dubia, non sunt argumenta sed ipsa argumentis egent.

[9] I. Therefore every artificial proof consists either of signs or of arguments or of examples. Nor am I unaware that to many people signs seem to be a part of arguments. My rationale for separating them was first this: that they belong almost among those inartificial ones (for a blood-stained garment and a clamor and a bruise and such things are instruments, like documents, rumors, witnesses, and they are not discovered by the orator, but are brought to him along with the case itself), II. the second, that signs, whether they are indubitable, are not arguments, because where those are there is no question; but for an argument there can be no place unless in a matter in controversy; or, if they are doubtful, they are not arguments but themselves stand in need of arguments.

III. Dividuntur autem in has primas duas species, quod eorum alia sunt, ut dixi, quae necessaria (sunt, alia quae non necessaria). Priora illa sunt quae aliter habere se non possunt, quae Graeci tecmeria vocant. +Quae sunt+ alyta semia: quae mihi vix pertinere ad praecepta artis videntur; nam ubi est signum insolubile, ibi ne lis quidem est.

III. But they are divided into these first two species, because some of them are, as I said, those which are necessary (are, others which are not necessary). Those prior are those which cannot be otherwise, which the Greeks call tecmeria. +Which are+ alyta semia: which seem to me scarcely to pertain to the precepts of the art; for where there is an insoluble sign, there is not even a dispute.

IV. Id autem accidit cum quid aut necesse est fieri factumve esse, aut omnino non potest fieri vel esse factum: quo in causis posito non est lis [nisi] facti. Hoc genus per omnia tempora perpendi solet: nam et coisse eam cum viro quae peperit, V. quod est praeteriti, et fluctus esse cum magna vis venti in mare incubuit, quod coniuncti, et eum mori cuius cor est vulneratum, quod futuri, necesse est. Nec fieri potest ut ibi messis sit ubi satum non est, ut quis Romae sit cum est Athenis, ut sit ferro vulneratus qui sine cicatrice est.

4. Now this happens when something either must happen or have happened, or altogether cannot happen or have happened: with this position in causes there is no dispute [except] of fact. This kind is accustomed to be weighed across all times: for both that she who has given birth has had intercourse with a man, 5. which is of the past, and that there are waves when a great force of wind has lain upon the sea, which is of the present, and that he whose heart has been wounded will die, which is of the future, is necessary. Nor can it come to pass that there is a harvest where there has not been sowing, that someone be at Rome when he is at Athens, that he be wounded by iron who is without a scar.

VI. Sed quaedam et retrorsum idem valent, ut vivere hominem qui spirat et spirare qui vivit, quaedam in contrarium non recurrunt: nec enim, quia movetur qui ingreditur, etiam ingreditur qui movetur. VII. Quare potest et coisse cum viro quae non peperit, et non esse ventus in mari cum est fluctus, neque utique cor eius vulneratum esse qui perit.

6. But certain things also hold the same backwards, as that the man who breathes lives and that he who lives breathes; certain things do not run back in the contrary direction: for not, because he who walks is in motion, does it also follow that he who is in motion walks. 7. Wherefore it can be both that she who has not borne has had intercourse with a man, and that there is no wind on the sea when there is swell, nor necessarily that the heart of him who perishes is wounded.

Ac similiter satum fuisse potest ubi non fuit messis, nec fuisse Romae qui non fuit Athenis, nec fuisse ferro vulneratus qui habet cicatricem.

And similarly, it may have been sown where there was no harvest, nor that he was at Rome who was not at Athens, nor that he who has a scar was wounded by iron.

VIII. Alia sunt signa non necessaria, quae eikota Graeci vocant: quae etiam si ad tollendam dubitationem sola non sufficiunt, tamen adiuta ceteris plurimum valent. IX. Signum vocatur, ut dixi, semeion (quamquam id quidam indicium, quidam vestigium nominaverunt): per quod alia res intellegitur, ut per sanguinem caedes.

8. There are other non-necessary signs, which the Greeks call eikota: which, even if by themselves they do not suffice to remove doubt, yet, aided by the others, avail very greatly. 9. A sign is called, as I said, semeion (although some have named it indicium, others vestigium): by which another thing is understood, as slaughter by blood.

At sanguis vel ex hostia respersisse vestem potest vel e naribus profluxisse: non utique qui vestem cruentam habuerit homicidium fecerit. X. Sed ut per se non sufficit, ita ceteris adiunctum testimonii loco ducitur, si inimicus, si minatus ante, si eodem in loco fuit: quibus signum cum accessit, efficit ut quae suspecta erant certa videantur. XI. Alioqui sunt quaedam signa utrique parti communia, ut livores tumores (nam videri possunt et veneficii et cruditatis), et vulnus in pectore sua manu et aliena perisse dicentibus in aequo est.

But blood could have spattered the garment from a victim, or have flowed out from the nostrils: by no means has everyone who has a blood-stained garment necessarily committed homicide. X. But just as it does not suffice by itself, so, when joined with the rest, it is counted in the place of testimony—if he was an enemy, if he had threatened earlier, if he was in the same place: when the sign is added to these, it brings it about that things which were suspected seem certain. XI. Otherwise, there are certain signs common to both parties, such as bruises and swellings (for they can be seen both from poisoning and from crudity/indigestion), and a wound in the breast stands on equal terms for those saying he perished by his own hand and by another’s.

Haec proinde firma habentur atque extrinsecus adiuvantur.

These, accordingly, are regarded as firm and are supported from without.

XII. Eorum autem quae signa sunt quidem sed non necessaria genus Hermagoras putat non esse virginem Atalanten quia cum iuvenibus per silvas vagetur. Quod si receperimus, vereor ne omnia quae ex facto ducuntur signa faciamus.

XII. As for the genus of those things which are indeed signs but not necessary, Hermagoras thinks it is such as the claim that the maiden Atalanta is not a virgin, because she wanders with youths through the forests. But if we receive this, I fear lest we make all things which are derived from the fact into signs.

XIII. Eadem tamen ratione qua signa tractantur. Nec mihi videntur Ariopagitae, cum damnaverint puerum, coturnicum oculos eruentem, aliud iudicasse quam id signum esse perniciosissimae mentis multisque malo futurae si adolevisset.

13. By the same reasoning, however, by which signs are handled. Nor do the Areopagites seem to me, when they condemned a boy who was tearing out the eyes of quails, to have judged anything other than that this was a sign of a most pernicious mind and one that would be an evil to many, if he had grown up.

Vnde Spuri Maeli Marcique Manli popularitas signum adfectati regni est existimatum. XIV. Sed vereor ne longe nimium nos ducat haec via.

Whence the popularity of Spurius Maelius and of Marcus Manlius was considered a sign of an attempted kingship. 14. But I fear that this path may lead us far too far.

Nam si est signum adulterae lavari cum viris, erit et convivere cum adulescentibus, deinde etiam familiariter alicuius amicitia uti: fortasse corpus vulsum, fractum incessum, vestem muliebrem dixerit mollis et parum viri signa, si cui (cum signum id proprie sit quod ex eo de quo quaeritur natum sub oculos venit) ut sanguis e caede, ita illa ex inpudicitia fluere videantur. XV. Ea quoque quae, quia plerumque observata sunt, vulgo signa creduntur, ut prognostica: "vento rubet aurea Phoebe" et "cornix plena pluviam vocat improba voce", si causas ex qualitate caeli trahunt, sane ita appellentur. Nam si vento rubet luna, signum venti est rubor: et si, ut idem poeta colligit, XVI.

For if it is a sign of an adulteress to bathe with men, it will also be to consort with young men, then even to use someone’s friendship in a familiar way: perhaps someone will call a depilated body, an affected gait, a woman’s garment, signs of softness and too little man, if to someone (since a sign is properly that which, born from that about which inquiry is made, comes under the eyes) just as blood from a slaughter, so those things seem to flow from unchastity. 15. Those things also which, because they have for the most part been observed, are commonly believed to be signs, like prognostics: “the golden Phoebe reddens with wind” and “the impudent crow, when full, calls rain with its voice”, if they draw their causes from the quality of the sky, let them indeed be so called. For if the moon reddens on account of wind, the redness is a sign of wind: and if, as the same poet gathers, 16.

densatus et laxatus aer facit ut sit inde "ille avium concentus", idem sentiemus. sunt autem signa etiam parva magnorum, ut vel haec ipsa cornix; nam maiora minorum esse nemo miratur.

compressed and loosened air brings it about that from it there is “that birds’ concent,” we shall feel the same. moreover, there are even small signs of great things, as even this very crow; for no one marvels that the greater are signs of the lesser.

[10] I. Nunc de argumentis: hoc enim nomine complectimur omnia quae Graeci enthymemata, epichiremata, apodixis vocant, quamquam apud illos est aliqua horum nominum differentia, etiam si vis eodem fere tendit. Nam enthymema (quod nos commentum sane aut commentationem interpretemur, quia aliter non possumus, Graeco melius usuri) unum intellectum habet quo omnia mente concepta significat (sed nunc non de eo loquimur), II. alterum quo sententiam cum ratione, tertium quo certam quandam argumenti conclusionem vel ex consequentibus vel ex repugnantibus: quamquam de hoc parum convenit. sunt enim qui illud prius epichirema dicant, pluresque invenias in ea opinione ut id demum quod pugna constat enthymema accipi velint, et ideo illud Cornificius contrarium appellat.

[10] 1. Now about arguments: for by this name we embrace all the things which the Greeks call enthymemes, epicheiremata, apodixis, although among them there is some difference of these names, even if the force tends almost to the same. For an enthymeme (which we might properly interpret as “comment” or “commentation,” since otherwise we cannot, though we would use the Greek better) has one meaning by which it signifies everything conceived in the mind (but we are not speaking of that now), 2. a second by which it is a sententia with a rationale, a third by which it is a certain definite conclusion of an argument either from consequents or from repugnant things: although about this there is little agreement. For there are some who call that former an epicheirema, and you will find more in the opinion that only that which consists in a contest is to be taken as an enthymeme; and therefore Cornificius calls that the “contrarium.”

III. hunc alii rhetoricum syllogismum, alii inperfectum syllogismum vocaverunt, quia (nec) distinctis nec totidem partibus concluderetur: quod sane non utique ab oratore desideratur. IV. Epichirema Valgius adgressionem vocat; verius autem iudico non nostram administrationem, sed ipsam rem quam adgredimur, id est argumentum quo aliquid probaturi sumus, etiam si nondum verbis explanatum, iam tamen mente conceptum, epichirema dici.

3. some have called this the rhetorical syllogism, others the imperfect syllogism, because it is concluded neither (nor) with distinct parts nor with the same number of parts: which indeed is by no means required of the orator. 4. Valgius calls the epichireme an “aggression”; more truly, however, I judge that not our administration, but the very thing which we address, that is, the argument by which we are going to prove something, even if not yet explained in words, yet already conceived in the mind, is called an epichireme.

V. Aliis videtur non destinata vel inchoata sed perfecta probatio hoc nomen accipere ultima specie, ideoque propria eius appellatione et maxime in usu posita significatur certa quaedam sententiae comprensio, quae ex tribus minime partibus constat. VI. Quidam epichirema rationem appellarunt, Cicero melius ratiocinationem, quamquam et ille nomen hoc duxisse magis a syllogismo videtur: nam et statum syllogisticum ratiocinativum appellat (et) exemplis utitur philosophorum. Et quoniam est quaedam inter syllogismum et epichirema vicinitas, potest videri hoc nomine recte abusus.

V. To others it seems that not an undetermined or inchoate, but a perfected proof takes this name in its last acceptation; and therefore by its proper appellation, and that chiefly in use, is signified a certain concise comprehension of a proposition, which consists of at least three parts. VI. Some have called the epichireme “reason,” Cicero better “ratiocination,” although he too seems to have derived this name rather from the syllogism: for he also calls the syllogistic status “ratiocinative,” (and) employs the philosophers’ examples. And since there is a certain affinity between the syllogism and the epichireme, he may seem not improperly to have overextended this name.

VII. Apodeixis est evidens probatio, ideoque apud geometras grammikai apodeixeis dicuntur. Hanc et ab epichiremate Caecilius putat differre solo genere conclusionis et esse apodixin inperfectum epichirema eadem causa qua diximus enthymema a syllogismo distare; nam et enthymema syllogismi pars est.

7. Apodeixis is an evident demonstration, and therefore among geometers they are called grammikai apodeixeis. Caecilius also thinks that this differs from the epichireme only in the kind of conclusion, and that the apodeixis is an imperfect epichireme for the same reason that we said the enthymeme differs from the syllogism; for the enthymeme too is a part of the syllogism.

Quidam inesse epichiremati apodixin putant et esse partem eius confirmantem. VIII. Vtrumque autem quamquam diversi auctores eodem modo finiunt, ut sit ratio per ea quae certa sunt fidem dubiis adferens: quae natura est omnium argumentorum, neque enim certa incertis declarantur.

Some think that an apodeixis is contained within the epichirema and that it is its confirming part. 8. Both, however—although by different authors—are defined in the same way: that it is a ratiocination which, through things that are certain, brings credence to doubtful matters; which is the nature of all arguments, for certainties are not clarified by uncertainties.

Haec omnia generaliter pistis appellant, quod etiam si propria interpretatione dicere fidem possumus, apertius tamen probationem interpretabimur. IX. Sed argumentum quoque plura significat. Nam et fabulae ad actum scaenarum compositae argumenta dicuntur, et (cum) orationum Ciceronis velut thema (ipse] exponit Pedianus inquit: "argumentum tale est", et ipse Cicero ad Brutum ita scribit: "veritus fortasse ne nos in Catonem nostrum transferremus illim aliquid, etsi argumentum simile non erat". Quo apparet omnem ad scribendum destinatam materiam ita appellari.

They call all these things in general pistis, which, although by proper interpretation we can call “faith,” yet we will interpret more openly as “proof.” 9. But argumentum also signifies more things. For both plots composed for the acting of scenes are called argumenta, and (when) the same Pedianus sets forth as it were the theme of Cicero’s speeches (himself], he says: “the argument is such-and-such”; and Cicero himself writes thus to Brutus: “fearing perhaps that we might transfer something from there into our Cato, although the argument was not similar.” Whence it appears that every material destined for writing is so called.

X. Nec mirum, cum id inter opifices quoque sit vulgatum, unde Vergili "argumentum ingens", vulgoque paulo numerosius opus dicitur argumentosum. Sed nunc de eo dicendum argumento est quod ad ... probationem indicium fidem adgressionem eiusdem rei nomina facit, parum distincte, ut arbitror. XI. Nam probatio et fides efficitur non tantum per haec, quae sunt rationis, sed etiam per inartificialia.

10. Nor is it a marvel, since this too is current even among craftsmen, whence Vergil’s “mighty argument,” and in common speech a work a little more “numerous” (i.e., more metrical) is called “argument-laden” (argumentosum). But now it must be said of it that “argument” is what, with regard to proof, indication, faith, approach of the same thing, makes these names—rather indistinctly, as I think. 11. For proof and faith are brought about not only through these things which belong to reason, but also through inartificial ones.

Signum autem, quod ille indicium vocat, ab argumentis iam separavi. Ergo cum sit argumentum ratio probationem praestans, qua colligitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per id quod dubium non est confirmat, necesse est esse aliquid in causa quod probatione non egeat. XII.

Moreover the sign, which he calls an indication, I have now separated from arguments. Therefore, since an argument is a reason affording probation, by which one thing is inferred through another, and which confirms what is doubtful by that which is not doubtful, it is necessary that there be something in the case which does not need probation. 12.

Alioqui nihil erit quo probemus, nisi fuerit quod aut sit verum aut videatur, ex quo dubiis fides fiat. Pro certis autem habemus primum quae sensibus percipiuntur, ut quae videmus audimus, qualia sunt signa, deinde ea (in) quae communi opinione consensum est: XIII. "deos esse", "praestandam pietatem parentibus", praeterea quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persuasione etiam si non omnium hominum, eius tamen civitatis aut gentis in qua res agitur in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque in iure non legibus sed moribus constant: si quid inter utramque partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicumque adversarius non contradicit.

Otherwise there will be nothing by which we may prove, unless there is something which either is true or seems so, from which credence may be made for doubtful matters. But as certainties we have, first, the things perceived by the senses, such as what we see and hear, such as signs; then those things upon which there is agreement by common opinion: 13. "that gods exist," "that piety must be rendered to parents"; moreover, the things that are provided for by laws; the things which, by persuasion—even if not of all men, yet of that state or nation in which the matter is conducted—have been received into morals (customs), as very many things in law stand not by statutes but by customs; if anything has been agreed between both parties; if anything has been approved; finally, whatever the adversary does not contradict.

XIV. Sic enim fiet argumentum: "cum providentia mundus regatur, administranda, res publica est: sequitur ut administranda res publica sit, si liquebit mundum providentia regi". XV. Debet etiam nota esse recte argumenta tractaturo vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum plerumque efficiat: hinc enim sunt quae icota dicuntur. XVI.

14. Thus indeed the argument will be: "since the world is governed by providence, the commonwealth is to be administered; it follows that the commonwealth is to be administered, if it shall be clear that the world is governed by providence". 15. The force and nature of all things ought also to be known by one who is going to handle arguments correctly, and what each of them for the most part effects: for from this come the things that are called eikota. 16.

Credibilium autem genera sunt tria: unum firmissimum, quia fere accidit, ut "liberos a parentibus amari", alterum velut propensius: "eum qui recte valeat in crastinum perventurum", tertium tantum non repugnans: "in domo furtum factum ab eo qui domi fuit". XVII. Ideoque Aristoteles in secundo de arte rhetorica libro diligentissime est exsecutus quid cuique rei et quid cuique homini soleret accidere, et quas res quosque homines quibus rebus aut hominibus vel conciliasset vel alienasset ipsa natura, ut divitias quid sequatur aut ambitum aut superstitionem, quid boni probent, quid mali petant, quid milites, quid rustici, quo quaeque modo res vitari vel adpeti soleat. XVIII.

But the kinds of credible things are three: one, the most firm, because it generally happens, as that "children are loved by parents"; another, as it were more propense: "that he who is in good health will arrive at tomorrow"; a third, just not repugnant: "that a theft in the house was committed by him who was at home". 17. And therefore Aristotle, in the second book On the Art of Rhetoric, very diligently set forth what is wont to happen to each thing and what to each man, and which things and which men nature itself has either conciliated or alienated to which things or men, as what follows wealth, either ambition or superstition; what good men approve, what bad men seek; what soldiers, what rustics [do]; in what manner each thing is wont to be avoided or sought. 18.

Verum hoc exsequi mitto: non enim longum tantum, sed etiam inpossibile ac potius infinitum est, praeterea positum in communi omnium intellectu. Si quis tamen desideraverit, a quo peteret ostendi. XIX.

But I pass over carrying this out: for it is not only long, but also impossible, or rather infinite; moreover, it is set in the common intellect of all. If, however, anyone should desire it, let it be shown from whom he might ask. 19.

Omnia autem credibilia, in quibus pars maxima consistit argumentationis, ex huius rhodi fontibus fluunt: "an credibile sit a filio patrem occisum, incestum cum filia commissum", et contra veneficium in noverca, adulterium in luxurioso: illa quoque, "an scelus palam factum", "an falsum propter exiguam summam", quia suos quidque horum velut mores habet, plerumque tamen, non semper: alioqui indubitata essent, non argumenta.

But all credible things, in which the greatest part of argumentation consists, flow from fountains of this sort: "whether it is credible that a father was slain by his son, that incest was committed with his daughter," and, conversely, poisoning in a stepmother, adultery in a man of luxury; those also, "whether a crime was done openly," "whether a falsehood was told for an exiguous sum," because each of these has, as it were, its own character—most often, however, not always; otherwise they would be indubitable, not arguments.

XX. Excutiamus nunc argumentorum locos, quamquam quibusdam hi quoque de quibus supra dixi videntur. Locos appello non, ut vulgo nunc intelleguntur, in luxuriem et adulterium et similia, sed sedes argumentorum, in quibus latent, ex quibus sunt petenda. XXI.

20. Let us now examine the places of arguments, although to some these too seem to be those about which I spoke above. I call them places not, as they are now commonly understood, in luxury and adultery and the like, but seats of arguments, in which they lie hidden, from which they are to be sought. 21.

Nam ut in terra non omni generantur omnia, nec avem aut feram reperias, ubi quaeque nasci aut morari soleat ignaras, et piscium quoque genera alia planis gaudent, alia saxosis, regionibus etiam litoribusque discreta sunt, nec helopem nostro mari aut scarum ducas: ita non omne argumentum undique venit ideoque non passim quaerendum est. XXII. Multus alioqui error est: exhausto labore, quod non ratione scrutabimur non poterimus invenire nisi casu.

For just as not everything is generated everywhere on earth, nor would you find a bird or a wild beast ignorant of the place where each is wont to be born or to dwell, and the kinds of fish too—some delight in level waters, others in rocky—are even divided by regions and by shores, nor would you bring the helops or the scarus into our sea: so not every argument comes from every quarter and therefore it is not to be sought indiscriminately. 22. There is otherwise much error: when our toil is exhausted, what we do not search out by method we shall not be able to find except by chance.

At si scierimus ubi quodque nascatur, cum ad locum ventum erit facile quod in eo est pervidebimus.

But if we shall have known where each thing is generated, when we have come to the place we shall easily discern what is in it.

XXIII. In primis igitur argumenta saepe a persona ducenda sunt, cum sit, ut dixi, divisio ut omnia in haec duo partiamur, res atque personas: ut causa tempus locus occasio instrumentum modus et cetera rerum sint accidentia. Personis autem non quidquid accidit exsequendum mihi est, ut plerique fecerunt, sed unde argumenta sumi possunt.

23. In the first place, therefore, arguments must often be drawn from the person, since there is, as I said, a division such that we partition everything into these two: things and persons; namely that cause, time, place, occasion, instrument, mode, and the rest are accidents of things. But as for persons, it is not my task to set forth whatever befalls them, as many have done, but those whence arguments can be taken.

XXIV. Ea porro sunt: genus, nam similes parentibus ac maioribus suis plerumque creduntur, et nonnumquam ad honeste turpiterque vivendum inde causae fluunt: natio, nam et gentibus proprii mores sunt nec idem in barbaro, Romano, Graeco probabile est: XXV. patria, quia similiter etiam civitatium leges instituta opiniones habent differentiam: sexus, ut latrocinium facilius in viro, veneficium in femina credas: aetas, quia aliud aliis annis magis convenit: educatio et disciplina, quoniam refert a quibus et quo quisque modo sit institutus: XXVI.

24. These, moreover, are: lineage, for people are generally believed to be like their parents and ancestors, and sometimes from that the causes for living honorably or disgracefully flow: nation, for peoples too have their own peculiar customs, nor is the same thing probable in a barbarian, a Roman, or a Greek: 25. fatherland, because likewise the laws, institutions, and opinions of cities have differences: sex, so that you would more readily believe brigandage of a man, poisoning of a woman: age, because different things are more fitting for different ages: upbringing and discipline, since it matters by whom and in what manner each person has been trained: 26.

habitus corporis, ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae, his contraria in diversum: fortuna, neque enim idem credibile est in divite ac paupere, propinquis amicis clientibus abundante et his omnibus destituto (condicionis etiam distantia est: nam clarus an obscurus, magistratus an privatus, pater an filius, civis an peregrinus, liber an servus, maritus an caelebs, parens liberorum an orbus sit, plurimum distat): XXVII. animi natura, etenim avaritia iracundia misericordia crudelitas severitas aliaque his similia adferunt fidem frequenter aut detrahunt, sicut victus luxuriosus an frugi an sordidus quaeritur: studia quoque, nam rusticus forensis negotiator miles navigator medicus aliud atque aliud efficiunt. XXVIII.

the bodily habitus, for indeed the appearance of libido, the strength of petulance, and their contraries to the opposite effect are frequently drawn into argument: fortune, for the same thing is not credible in a rich man and a poor man, in one abounding in relatives, friends, clients and in one destitute of all these (there is also a difference of condition: for whether he is famous or obscure, a magistrate or a private citizen, a father or a son, a citizen or a foreigner, free or a slave, a husband or unmarried, a parent of children or bereft, makes a very great difference): 27. the nature of the mind, for greed, wrath, mercy, cruelty, severity, and other things like these often confer credibility or take it away, just as one’s way of life—whether luxurious or frugal or squalid—is inquired into: pursuits also, for a rustic, a forensic advocate, a trader, a soldier, a navigator, a physician bring about different things. 28.

Intuendum etiam quid adfectet quisque, locuples videri an disertus, iustus an potens. Spectantur ante acta dictaque; ex praeteritis enim aestimari solent praesentia. His adiciunt quidam commotionem: hanc accipi volunt temporarium animi motum, sicut iram pavorem.

One must also consider what each person aims at: to seem opulent or eloquent, just or potent. Things previously done and said are watched; for the present is usually estimated from the past. Some add “commotion”: they wish this to be taken as a temporary motion of the mind, such as anger or fear.

XXIX. Consilia autem et praeteriti et praesentis et futuri temporis: quae mihi, etiam si personis accidunt, referenda tamen ad illam partem argumentorum videntur quam ex causis ducimus, sicut habitus quidam animi, quo tractatur amicus (an) inimicus. XXX.

29. But the counsels of past, present, and future time: which, to me, even if they befall persons, nevertheless seem to be referred to that part of arguments which we draw from causes, just as a certain habit of mind, by which a friend (or) an enemy is treated. 30.

Ponunt in persona et nomen: quod quidem accidere ei necesse est, sed in argumentum raro cadit, nisi cum aut ex causa datum est, ut Sapiens, Magnus, Pius, aut et ipsum alicuius cogitationis attulit causam, ut Lentulo coniurationis, quod libris Sibyllinis haruspicumque responsis dominatio dari tribus Corneliis dicebatur, seque eum tertium esse credebat post sullam Cinnamque quia et ipse Cornelius erat. XXXI. Nam et illud apud Euripiden frigidum sane, quod nomen Polynicis ut argumentum morum frater incessit.

They place under persona also the name: which indeed must befall him, but it rarely falls into argument, unless either it has been given from a cause, as “Wise,” “Great,” “Pious,” or the name itself has brought the cause of someone’s thought, as in the case of Lentulus of the conspiracy, because in the Sibylline books and in the responses of the haruspices it was being said that dominion would be given to three Cornelii, and he believed himself to be the third after Sulla and Cinna, because he too was a Cornelius. 31. For that point also in Euripides is decidedly frigid, that the brother assailed the name Polynices as an argument of character.

Iocorum tamen ex eo frequens materia, qua Cicero in Verrem non semel usus est. Haec fere circa personas sunt aut his similia; neque enim complecti omnia vel hac in parte vel in ceteris possumus, contenti rationem plura quaesituris ostendere.

Yet from this there is frequent material for jests, which Cicero used more than once against Verres. These things are for the most part around persons or similar to these; for we cannot comprehend everything either in this part or in the others, content to show the method to those who will seek more.

XXXII. Nunc ad res transeo, in quibus maxime sunt personis iuncta quae agimus, ideoque prima tractanda. In omnibus porro quae fiunt quaeritur aut quare aut ubi aut quando aut quo modo aut per quae facta sunt.

32. Now I pass to actions, in which the things we do are most closely conjoined with persons, and therefore must be treated first. Moreover, in all things that are done, inquiry is made either why, or where, or when, or in what mode, or by what means they were done.

XXXIII. ducuntur igitur argumenta ex causis factorum vel futurorum: quarum materiam, +quam quidam hylen, alii dynamin nominaverunt+, in duo genera sed quaternas utriusque dividunt species. Nam fere versatur ratio faciendi circa bonorum adeptionem incrementum conservationem usum aut malorum evitationem liberationem inminutionem tolerantiam: quae et in deliberando plurimum valent.

33. therefore arguments are drawn from the causes of things done or to be done: the material of which, +which some have named hylē, others dynamis+, they divide into two genera, but into four species of each. For the rationale of doing generally revolves around the acquisition, increment, conservation, and use of goods, or the evitation, liberation, diminution, and tolerance of evils: which also have very great force in deliberating.

XXXIV. Sed has causas habent recta, prava contra ex falsis opinionibus veniunt. Nam est his initium ex iis quae credunt bona aut mala, inde errores existunt et pessimi adfectus, in quibus sunt ira odium invidia cupiditas spes ambitus audacia metus, cetera generis eiusdem.

34. But the right have these causes; the perverse, on the contrary, come from false opinions. For the inception for them is from those things which they believe to be good or bad; from that source there arise errors and the worst affections, among which are ire, odium, envy, cupidity, hope, ambition, audacity, fear, and the rest of the same kind.

Accedunt aliquando fortuita, ebrietas, ignorantia, quae interim ad veniam valent, interim ad probationem criminis, ut si quis dum alii insidiatur alium dicitur interemisse. XXXV. Causae porro non ad convincendum modo quod obicitur, sed ad defendendum quoque excuti solent, cum quis se recte fecisse, id est honesta causa, contendit: qua de re latius in tertio libro dictum est.

Sometimes fortuitous things, ebriety, ignorance, are added, which at one time avail for pardon, at another for the probation of the crime, as, for instance, if someone, while laying ambush for one person, is said to have slain another. 35. Moreover, causes are accustomed to be examined not only for the conviction of what is alleged, but also for defense, when someone contends that he acted rightly, that is, with an honest cause; on which matter it has been discussed more broadly in the third book.

XXXVI. Finitionis quoque quaestiones ex causis interim pendent: an tyrannicida qui tyrannum a quo deprensus in adulterio fuerat occidit, an sacrilegus sacrilegus qui ut hostes urbe expelleret arma templo adfixa detraxit. XXXVII.

36. Questions of definition also sometimes depend on causes: whether he is a tyrannicide who killed the tyrant by whom he had been caught in adultery, or a sacrilegist who, in order to expel the enemies from the city, removed the arms affixed to the temple. 37.

Ducuntur argumenta et ex loco. Spectatur enim ad fidem probationis montanus an planus, maritimus an mediterraneus, consitus an incultus, frequens an desertus, propincus an remotus, oportunus consiliis an aduersus: quam partem uidemus uehementissime pro Milone tractasse Ciceronem. XXXVIII.

Arguments are also drawn from locality. For it is considered, for the credibility of the proof, whether it is mountainous or level, maritime or mediterranean (inland), cultivated or uncultivated, frequented or deserted, near or remote, opportune to counsels or adverse: which part we see Cicero to have handled most vehemently on behalf of Milo. 38.

Et haec quidem ac similia ad coniecturam frequentius pertinent, sed interim ad ius quoque: priuatus an publicus, sacer an profanus, noster an alienus, ut in persona magistratus, pater, peregrinus. XXXIX. Hinc enim quaestiones oriuntur: 'Priuatam pecuniam sustulisti, uerum, quia de templo, non furtum sed sacrilegium est'. 'Occidisti adulteros, quod lex permittit, sed quia in lupanari, caedes est'. 'Iniuriam fecisti, sed quia magistratui, maiestatis actio est'. XL. Vel contra: 'licuit quia pater eram, quia magistratus'. Sed circa facti controuersiam argumenta praestant, circa iuris lites materiam quaestionum.

And indeed these and similar things pertain more frequently to conjecture, but at times to law as well: whether private or public, sacred or profane, ours or another’s, as in the person of a magistrate, a father, a foreigner. 39. Hence indeed questions arise: 'You removed private money—true, but because it was from a temple, it is not theft but sacrilege.' 'You killed adulterers, which the law permits, but because it was in a brothel, it is murder.' 'You committed an injury, but because it was against a magistrate, it is a charge of majesty (treason).' 40. Or conversely: 'it was permitted because I was a father, because a magistrate.' But in a controversy about the fact, arguments have the advantage; in disputes about the law, they provide the material of the questions.

Ad qualitatem quoque frequenter pertinet locus; neque enim ubique idem aut licet aut decorum est: quin etiam in qua quidque ciuitate quaeratur interest; moribus enim et legibus distant. XLI. Ad commendationem quoque et inuidiam ualet; nam et Aiax apud Ouidium 'ante rates' inquit 'agimus causam, et mecum confertur Vlixes!' et Miloni inter cetera obiectum est quod Clodius in monumentis ab eo maiorum suorum esset occisus.

The place also frequently pertains to quality; for the same thing is not everywhere either permitted or decorous: nay more, it also matters in what city each matter is inquired; for they differ in customs and in laws. 41. It also avails for commendation and for odium; for Ajax, in Ovid, says, 'before the ships we plead our case, and with me Ulysses is compared!' and against Milo, among other things, it was objected that Clodius had been slain by him in the monuments of his ancestors.

XLII. Ad suadendi momenta idem ualet, sicut tempus, cuius tractatum subiungam. Eius autem, ut alio loco iam dixi, duplex significatio est: generaliter enim et specialiter accipitur.

42. The same holds for the moments of persuading, as also for time, the treatment of which I shall subjoin. Its meaning, however, as I have already said elsewhere, is twofold: for it is taken both generally and specially.

Prius illud est 'nunc', 'olim', 'sub Alexandro', 'cum apud Ilium pugnatum est', denique praeteritum, instans, futurum. Hoc sequens habet et constituta discrimina: 'aestate', 'hieme', 'noctu', 'interdiu', et fortuita: 'in pestilentia', 'in bello', 'in conuiuio'. XLIII. Latinorum quidam satis significari putauerunt si illud generale 'tempus', hoc speciale 'tempora' uocarent.

The former includes 'nunc', 'olim', 'sub Alexandro', 'cum apud Ilium pugnatum est', in fine, past, present, future. The latter has both established distinctions: 'aestate', 'hieme', 'noctu', 'interdiu', and fortuitous ones: 'in pestilentia', 'in bello', 'in convivio'. 43. Some of the Latins thought it sufficiently signified if they called the former, in general, 'tempus', the latter, in particular, 'tempora'.

Quorum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis quidem et in illo demonstratiuo genere uersatur, sed in iudiciis frequentissima est. XLIV. Nam et iuris quaestiones facit et qualitatem distinguit et ad coniecturam plurimum confert, ut cum interim probationes inexpugnabiles adferat, quales sunt si dicatur, ut supra posui, signator qui ante diem tabularum decessit, aut commisisse aliquid uel cum infans esset uel cum omnino natus non esset: XLV.

Of which the method of both is employed both in deliberations and in that demonstrative genus, but in judicial cases it is most frequent. 44. For it both raises questions of law and distinguishes quality and contributes very greatly to conjecture, even while in the meantime it may bring forward inexpugnable proofs, such as if it be said, as I set above, a signatory who died before the date of the tablets, or that someone committed something either when he was an infant or when he was not born at all: 45.

praeter id quod omnia facile argumenta aut ex iis quae ante rem facta sunt aut ex coniunctis rei aut insequentibus ducuntur. Ex antecedentibus: 'mortem minatus es, noctu existi, proficiscentem antecessisti'. XLVI. Causae quoque factorum praeteriti sunt temporis.

besides this, that all arguments are easily derived either from those things which were done before the matter, or from things connected with the matter, or from subsequent ones. From the antecedents: 'you threatened death, you went out by night, you went before the one setting out'.
46. There are also causes of deeds that belong to past time.

Secundum tempus subtilius quidam quam necesse erat diuiserunt, ut esset iuncti 'sonus auditus est', adhaerentis 'clamor sublatus est'. Insequentis sunt illa: 'latuisti', 'profugisti', 'liuores et tumores apparuerunt'. Isdem temporum gradibus defensor utetur ad detrahendam ei quod obicitur fidem. XLVII. In his omnis factorum dictorumque ratio uersatur, sed dupliciter.

Some divided the second time more subtly than was necessary, so that there would be, of the ‘conjoined’, ‘a sound has been heard’; of the ‘adherent’, ‘a clamor has been raised’. Of the ‘subsequent’ are these: ‘you lay hidden’, ‘you fled’, ‘bruises and swellings appeared’. The defender will use the same steps of times to detract from the credibility of what is objected against him. 47. In these the whole rationale of deeds and sayings is engaged, but in a twofold way.

Nam fiunt quaedam quia aliud postea futurum est, quaedam quia aliud antea factum est: ut cum obicitur reo lenocinii, speciosae marito, quod adulterii damnatam quandam emerit, aut parricidii reo luxurioso quod dixerit patri: 'non amplius me obiurgabis'. Nam et ille non quia emit leno est, sed quia leno erat emit, nec hic quia sic erat locutus occidit, sed quia erat occisurus sic locutus est. XLVIII. Casus autem, qui et ipse praestat argumentis locum, sine dubio est ex insequentibus, sed quadam proprietate distinguitur, ut si dicam: 'melior dux Scipio quam Hannibal, uicit Hannibalem': 'bonus gubernator, numquam fecit naufragium': 'bonus agricola, magnos sustulit fructus'. Et contra: 'sumptuosus fuit, patrimonium exhausit': 'turpiter uixit, [uel] omnibus inuisus est'. XLIX.

For certain things are done because something else will later come to be, and certain because something else was previously done: as when the charge of pandering is brought against a defendant, a husband of a beautiful woman, because he bought a certain woman condemned of adultery; or against a defendant of parricide, a luxurious man, because he said to his father: ‘you will no longer upbraid me’. For that man is not a pimp because he bought, but because he was a pimp he bought; nor did this man kill because he had spoken thus, but because he was going to kill he spoke thus. 48. The Event, moreover, which itself also supplies a place for arguments, is without doubt from consequents, but is distinguished by a certain property, as if I should say: ‘Scipio was a better leader than Hannibal; he defeated Hannibal’: ‘a good helmsman, he never made shipwreck’: ‘a good farmer, he brought in great yields’. And conversely: ‘he was extravagant, he exhausted his patrimony’: ‘he lived shamefully, [or] he was hated by all’. 49.

Intuendae sunt praecipueque in coniecturis et facultates; credibilius est enim occisos a pluribus pauciores, a firmioribus inbecilliores, a uigilantibus dormientis, a praeparatis inopinatos: quorum contraria in diuersum ualent. L. Haec et in deliberando intuemur et in iudiciis ad duas res solemus referre, an uoluerit quis, an potuerit; nam et uoluntatem spes facit. Hinc illa apud Ciceronem coniectura: 'insidiatus est Clodius Miloni, non Milo Clodio: ille cum seruis robustis, hic cum mulierum comitatu, ille equis, hic in raeda, ille expeditus, hic paenula inretitus'. LI. Facultati autem licet instrumentum coniungere; sunt enim in parte facultatis et copiae.

We must take into account—and especially in conjectures—the faculties as well; for it is more credible that the fewer are slain by the more, the weaker by the stronger, the sleeping by the vigilant, the unexpecting by the prepared; and the contraries avail in the opposite direction. 50. These things we both consider in deliberating, and in judgments we are wont to refer them to two matters: whether someone willed it, and whether he was able; for even hope makes will. Hence that conjecture in Cicero: ‘Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for Clodius: the former with robust slaves, the latter with a company of women; the former with horses, the latter in a carriage; the former unencumbered, the latter entangled in a paenula (traveling-cloak).’ 51. Moreover, it is permitted to join instrument to faculty; for resources too are part of faculty.

Sed ex instrumento aliquando etiam signa nascuntur, ut spiculum in corpore inuentum. LII. His adicitur modus, quem trÒpon dicunt, quo quaeritur quem ad modum quid sit factum.

But from instrument sometimes even signs arise, as a dart found in the body. 52. To these is added the mode, which they call the trÒpon, whereby it is inquired in what manner something was done.

Idque tum ad qualitatem scriptumque pertinet, ut si negemus adulterum ueneno licuisse occidere, tum ad coniecturas quoque, ut si dicam: 'bona mente factum, ideo palam', 'mala, ideo ex insidiis, nocte, in solitudine'.

And this pertains sometimes to quality and to the written law, as when we deny that it was permitted to kill an adulterer with poison; sometimes also to conjectures, as when I say: 'done with good intent, therefore openly', 'with bad, therefore from ambush, by night, in solitude'.

LIII. In rebus autem omnibus de quarum ui ac natura quaeritur quasque etiam citra complexum personarum ceterorumque ex quibus fit causa per se intueri possumus, tria sine dubio rursus spectanda sunt: an sit, quid sit, quale sit. Sed quia sunt quidam loci argumentorum omnibus communes, diuidi haec tria genera non possunt, ideoque locis potius, ut in quosque incurrent, subicienda sunt.

53. But in all matters about whose force and nature inquiry is made, and which also, apart from the inclusion of persons and the other things out of which a case is made, we can contemplate in themselves, three things without doubt must again be considered: whether it is, what it is, what sort it is. But because there are certain topics of arguments common to all, these three kinds cannot be divided; and therefore they ought rather to be assigned to the topics, as they happen to fall under each.

LIV. Ducuntur ergo argumenta ex finitione seu fine; nam utroque modo traditur. Eius duplex ratio est: aut enim praecedente finitione quaeritur sitne hoc uirtus, aut simpliciter quid sit uirtus.

54. Arguments, therefore, are drawn from definition or from the end; for it is set forth in both ways. Its method is twofold: either, with the definition preceding, one asks whether this is virtue, or, simply, what virtue is.

Id aut uniuersum uerbis complectimur, ut 'rhetorice est bene dicendi scientia', aut per partes, ut 'rhetorice est inueniendi recte et disponendi et eloquendi cum firma memoria et cum dignitate actionis scientia'. LV. Praeterea finimus aut ui, sicut superiora, aut §tumolog¤&, ut si assiduum ab aere dando et locupletem a locorum, pecuniosum a pecorum copia. Finitioni subiecta maxime uidentur genus species differens proprium: ex iis omnibus argumenta ducuntur. LVI.

That we either embrace universally in words, as 'rhetoric is the science of speaking well', or by parts, as 'rhetoric is the science of finding rightly and of arranging and of expressing, with a firm memory and with the dignity of delivery.' 55. Moreover, we define either by force, as the foregoing, or by etymology, as when 'assiduous' is from paying bronze, and 'wealthy' from places, 'moneyed' from an abundance of cattle. To definition there seem chiefly to be subjected genus, species, differentia, proprium: from all of these arguments are drawn. 56.

Genus ad probandam speciem minimum ualet, plurimum ad refellendam. Itaque non quia est arbor platanus est, at quod non est arbor utique platanus non est: nec quod uirtus est utique iustitia est, at quod non est uirtus, utique non potest esse iustitia. Itaque a genere perueniendum est ad ultimam speciem, ut 'homo est animal' non est satis, id enim genus est: 'mortale'++etiam si est species, cum aliis tamen communis finitio: 'rationale'++nihil supererit ad demonstrandum quod uelis.

Genus is of least avail for proving the species, of the most for refuting it. And so, not because it is a tree is it a plane-tree, but what is not a tree is assuredly not a plane-tree; nor, because it is virtue, is it assuredly justice, but what is not virtue assuredly cannot be justice. Therefore one must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species, as “man is an animal” is not enough, for that is the genus; “mortal”++even if it is a species, yet it is a definition common with others; “rational”++nothing will be left over to demonstrate what you wish.

LVII. Contra species firmam probationem habet generis, infirmam refutationem. Nam quod iustitia est, utique uirtus est: quod non est iustitia, potest esse uirtus, si est fortitudo, constantia, continentia.

57. By contrast, the species has firm proof from the genus, but weak refutation. For what is justice is assuredly virtue; what is not justice can be a virtue, if it is fortitude, constancy, or continence.

Numquam itaque tolletur a specie genus, nisi ut omnes species quae sunt generi subiectae remoueantur, hoc modo: 'quod neque inmortale est neque mortale, animal non est'. LVIII. His adiciunt propria et differentia. Propriis confirmatur finitio, differentibus soluitur.

Therefore a genus will never be removed from a species, unless all the species that are subject to the genus are taken away, in this way: 'that which is neither immortal nor mortal is not an animal'. 58. To these they add properties and differences. By properties the definition is confirmed; by differences it is dissolved.

Proprium autem est aut quod soli accidit, ut homini sermo, risus, aut quidquid utique accidit, sed non soli, ut igni calfacere. Et sunt eiusdem rei plura propria, ut ipsius ignis lucere, calere. Ita quodcumque proprium deerit soluet finitionem, non utique quodcumque erit confirmabit.

A proprium (property) is either what happens to one alone, as to man speech, laughter, or whatever indeed happens, but not to him alone, as to fire to heat. And there are several properties of the same thing, as of fire itself to shine, to be hot. Thus whatever proprium is lacking will loosen the definition; yet not whatever will be present will confirm it.

LIX. Saepissime autem quid sit proprium cuiusque quaeretur, ut, si per §tumolog¤an dicatur: 'tyrannicidae proprium est tyrannum occidere', negemus: non enim si traditum sibi eum carnifex occiderit tyrannicida dicatur; nec si inprudens uel inuitus. LX. Quod autem proprium non erit, differens erit, ut aliud est seruum esse, aliud seruire, qualis esse in addictis quaestio solet: 'qui seruus est si manu mittatur, fit libertinus, non item addictus', et plura, de quibus alio loco.

59. But most often the question will be asked what the proprium of each thing is, as, if it be said by etymology: 'it is proper to a tyrant-slayer to kill a tyrant,' let us deny it: for if an executioner kills him when handed over to him, he is not thereby called a tyrant-slayer; nor if he does it unwittingly or unwillingly. 60. But what will not be a proprium will be a differentia, as it is one thing to be a slave (servum esse), another to serve (servire), the sort of question that is wont to arise in the case of the addicti: 'he who is a slave, if he is manumitted, becomes a freedman (libertinus), not so an addictus,' and many more, of which elsewhere.

LXI. Illud quoque differens uocant, cum genere in speciem deducto species ipsa discernitur. Animal genus, mortale species, terrenum uel bipes differens; nondum enim proprium est, sed iam differt a marino uel quadrupede: quod non tam ad argumentum pertinet quam ad diligentem finitionis comprensionem.

61. They also call that a differentia, when, the genus having been brought down into species, the species itself is discerned. Animal is the genus, mortal the species, earthly or biped the differentia; for it is not yet a proprium, but already it differs from marine or quadruped: which pertains not so much to argument as to the diligent comprehension of the definition.

LXII. Cicero genus et speciem, quam eandem formam uocat, a finitione diducit, et iis quae ad aliquid sunt subicit: ut, si is cui argentum omne legatum est petat signatum quoque, utatur genere: at si quis, cum legatum sit ei quae uiro mater familias esset, neget deberi ei quae in manum non conuenerit, specie, quoniam duae formae sint matrimoniorum. LXIII.

62. Cicero separates genus and species—which he calls the same as form—from definition, and assigns them to things that are relative: thus, if one to whom all the silver has been bequeathed also demands the stamped (coined) kind, he is employing the genus; but if someone, when it has been bequeathed to her who was a mater familias to her husband, denies that it is owed to one who has not come into his manus, he is employing the species, since there are two forms of marriage. 63.

Diuisione autem adiuuari finitionem docet, eamque differre a partitione quod haec sit totius in partis, illa generis in formas. Partis incertas esse, ut 'quibus constet res publica', formas certas, ut 'quot sint species rerum publicarum', quas tris accepimus: quae populi, quae paucorum, quae unius potestate regerentur. LXIV.

Moreover, he teaches that definition is aided by division, and that it differs from partition in that the latter is of a whole into parts, the former of a genus into forms. The parts are indeterminate, as in 'by whom the republic is constituted'; the forms are determinate, as in 'how many the species of republics are,' which we have received as three: those which would be ruled by the power of the people, of the few, or of one. 64.

Et ille quidem non iis exemplis utitur, quia scribens ad Trebatium ex iure ducere ea maluit: ego apertiora posui. Propria uero ad coniecturae quoque pertinent partem, ut, quia proprium est boni recte facere, iracundi uerbis <aut manu male facere, facta haec ab ipsis> esse credantur, aut contra. Nam ut quaedam in quibusdam utique <sunt, ita quaedam in quibusdam utique> non sunt, et ratio, quamuis [ita] ex diuerso, eadem est.

And he indeed does not use those examples, because, writing to Trebatius, he preferred to derive them from law; I have set out clearer ones. “Properties” moreover also pertain to the conjectural part, as, since it is proper to a good man to do rightly, and to an irascible man to do ill with words are believed to have been done by them, or the contrary. For just as certain things are assuredly in certain people, so certain things are assuredly , and the reasoning, although [thus] from the opposite, is the same.

Diuisio et ad probandum simili uia ualet et ad refellendum. LXV. Probationi interim satis est unum habere, hoc modo: 'ut sit ciuis, aut natus sit oportet aut factus'; utrumque tollendum est: 'nec natus nec factus est'. LXVI.

Division is effective both for proving and for refuting by a similar way. 65. For the proof, meanwhile, it is enough to have one, in this way: 'that he be a citizen, it is necessary either that he be born or made'; both must be removed: 'neither born nor made'. 66.

Fit hoc et multiplex, idque est argumentorum genus ex remotione, quo modo efficitur totum falsum, modo id quod relinquitur uerum. Totum falsum est hoc modo: 'Pecuniam credidisse te dicis: aut habuisti ipse aut ab aliquo accepisti aut inuenisti aut surripuisti. Si neque domi habuisti neque ab aliquo accepisti et cetera, non credidisti'. LXVII.

This too is done in multiple ways, and it is a kind of arguments from removal, whereby sometimes the whole is rendered false, sometimes that which is left remaining is true. The whole is false in this way: 'You say you lent money: either you yourself had it, or you received it from someone, or you found it, or you filched it. If you neither had it at home nor received it from anyone, and so forth, you did not lend it.' 67.

Relicum fit uerum sic: 'hic seruus quem tibi uindicas aut uerna tuus est aut emptus aut donatus aut testamento relictus aut ex hoste captus aut alienus': deinde remotis prioribus supererit 'alienus'. Periculosum et cum cura intuendum genus, quia, si in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu quoque tota res soluitur. LXVIII. Tutius quod Cicero pro Caecina facit, cum interrogat, si haec actio non sit, quae sit (simul enim remouentur omnia): uel cum duo ponentur inter se contraria, quorum tenuisse utrumlibet sufficiet, quale Ciceronis est: 'unum quidem certe nemo erit tam inimicus Cluentio qui mihi non concedat, si constet corruptum illud esse iudicium, aut ab Habito aut ab Oppianico esse corruptum: si doceo non ab Habito, uinco ab Oppianico, si ostendo ab Oppianico, purgo Habitum'. LXIX.

What remains is made true thus: 'this slave whom you claim as yours is either your homeborn slave or bought or given or left by testament or taken from an enemy or someone else’s': then, the former alternatives being removed, 'someone else’s' will remain. A perilous kind and to be looked at with care, because if in setting it forth we omit any one whatsoever, the whole matter is undone, and with laughter too. 68. Safer is what Cicero does in behalf of Caecina, when he asks, if this action be not the one, which one is (for at the same time all are removed): or when two contraries are set over against each other, of which it will suffice to have maintained either, such as Cicero’s: 'there will indeed be no one so hostile to Cluentius who will not concede to me that, if it is established that that judgment was corrupted, it was corrupted either by Habitus or by Oppianicus: if I prove not by Habitus, I win as to Oppianicus; if I show by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus'. 69.

Fit etiam ex duobus, quorum necesse est <esse> alterum uerum, eligendi aduersario potestas, efficiturque ut utrum elegerit noceat. Facit hoc Cicero pro Oppio: 'utrum cum Cottam adpetisset an cum ipse se conaretur occidere telum e manibus ereptum est?' et pro Vareno: 'optio uobis datur, utrum uelitis casu illo itinere Varenum usum esse an huius persuasu et inductu': deinde utraque facit accusatori contraria. LXX.Interim duo ita proponuntur ut utrumlibet electum idem efficiat, quale est: 'philosophandum <est, etiam si non est philosophandum'>, et illud uulgatum: 'quo schema, si intellegitur?

It is also formed from a pair of alternatives, of which it is necessary one true, by granting the adversary the power of choosing, and it is effected that whichever he chooses hurts him. Cicero does this in defense of Oppius: 'Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had assailed Cotta, or when he himself was trying to kill himself?' and in defense of Varenius: 'You are given the option whether you prefer that on that occasion Varenius used the route by chance, or by this man’s persuasion and inducement': then he makes each of the two contrary to the accuser. 70.Meanwhile two propositions are set forth in such a way that whichever is chosen produces the same result, as in: 'one must philosophize <is the case, even if one must not philosophize'>, and that common saying: 'what is a figure for, if it is understood?'

quo, si non intellegitur?' et 'mentietur in tormentis qui dolorem pati potest, mentietur qui non potest'.

'to what end, if it is not understood?' and 'he will lie under torture who can suffer pain, he will lie who cannot'.

LXXI.Vt sunt autem tria tempora, ita ordo rerum tribus momentis consertus est: habent enim omnia <initium>, incrementum, summam, ut iurgium, deinde <rixa, tum> caedes. Est ergo hic argumentorum quoque locus inuicem probantium; nam et ex initiis summa colligitur, quale est: 'non possum togam praetextam sperare cum exordium pullum uideam', et contra: 'non dominationis causa Sullam arma sumpsisse, argumentum est dictatura deposita'. LXXII. Similiter ex incremento in utramque partem ducitur ratio cum in coniectura, tum etiam in tractatu aequitatis, an ad initium summa referenda sit, id est, an ei caedes inputanda sit a quo iurgium coepit.

71. As there are three times, so the order of things is conserted by three moments: for all things have a , an increment, a sum—like a wrangle, then slaughter. Therefore here too is a locus of arguments mutually corroborating; for from beginnings the sum is gathered, as in: 'I cannot hope for a purple-bordered toga when I see a dark beginning,' and, contrariwise: 'that Sulla did not take up arms for the sake of domination—there is an argument in the dictatorship having been laid down.' 72. Similarly from the increment the reasoning is drawn in either direction, both in conjecture and also in the tractate of equity, whether the sum ought to be referred back to the beginning—that is, whether the slaughter ought to be imputed to the one by whom the wrangle began.

LXXIII. Est argumentorum locus ex similibus: 'si continentia uirtus, utique et abstinentia': 'si fidem debet tutor, et procurator'. Hoc est ex eo genere quod §pagvgÆn Graeci uocant, Cicero inductionem. Ex dissimilibus: 'non si laetitia bonum, et uoluptas': 'non quod mulieri, idem pupillo'. Ex contrariis: 'frugalitas bonum, luxuria enim malum': 'si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax': 'si ueniam meretur qui inprudens nocuit, non meretur praemium qui inprudens profuit'. LXXIV.

LXXIII. There is a topic of arguments from similars: 'if continence is a virtue, then assuredly abstinence is as well': 'if the guardian owes fidelity, then the procurator too'. This belongs to the kind which the Greeks call epagoge, Cicero “induction.” From dissimilars: 'not that if gladness is a good, pleasure is too': 'not the same thing for a woman as for a ward'. From contraries: 'frugality is a good, for luxury is an evil': 'if war is the cause of evils, the amendment will be peace': 'if he who harmed unwittingly deserves pardon, he who benefited unwittingly does not deserve a reward'. LXXIV.

Ex pugnantibus: 'qui est sapiens, stultus non est'. Ex consequentibus siue adiunctis: 'si est bonum iustitia, recte iudicandum': 'si malum perfidia, non est fallendum': idem retro. Nec sunt his dissimilia ideoque huic loco subicienda, cum et ipsa naturaliter congruant: 'quod quis non habuit, non perdidit': 'quem quis amat, sciens non laedit': 'quem quis heredem suum esse uoluit, carum habuit, habet, habebit'. Sed cum sint indubitata, uim habent paene signorum inmutabilium. LXXV.

From contraries: 'he who is wise is not foolish'. From consequents or adjuncts: 'if justice is a good, right judgment must be made': 'if treachery is an evil, one must not deceive': the same in reverse. Nor are the following dissimilar to these and therefore to be subjoined to this topic, since they too naturally agree: 'what someone did not have, he did not lose': 'whom someone loves, he does not knowingly harm': 'him whom someone has wished to be his heir, he held dear, holds dear, will hold dear'. But since they are indubitable, they have almost the force of unchangeable signs. 75.

Sed haec consequentia dico, acolutha (est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas), illa insequentia, parepomena, quae postea facta sunt aut futura. Nec sum de nominibus anxius; uocet enim ut uoluerit quisque, dum uis rerum ipsa manifesta sit appareatque hoc temporis, illud esse naturae. LXXVI.

But I call these things consequents, acolutha (for goodness is a consequent of wisdom), those subsequents, parepomena, which have been done afterwards or are going to be. Nor am I anxious about names; let each call it as he wishes, provided that the force of the things themselves be manifest, and that it appear that this is of time, that of nature. 76.

Itaque non dubito haec quoque <uocare> consequentia, quamuis ex prioribus dent argumentum ad ea quae secuntur, quorum duas quidam species esse uoluerunt, actionis (ut pro Oppio: 'quos educere inuitos in prouinciam non potuit, eos inuitos retinere qui potuit?'), temporis, in Verrem: 'si finem praetoris edicto adferunt Kalendae Ian., cur non initium quoque edicti nascatur a Kalendis Ian.?' LXXVII. Quod utrumque exemplum tale est ut idem in diuersum, si retro agas, ualeat; consequens enim est eos, qui inuiti duci non potuerint, inuitos non potuisse retineri. LXXVIII.

Therefore I do not hesitate to <call> these also consequents, although from the prior premises they give an argument to the things that follow, of which some have wished there to be two species: of action (as in the speech for Oppius: 'those whom he could not lead out unwilling into the province, how could he keep unwilling?'), of time, in the Verrine: 'if the Kalends of Jan. bring an end to the praetor’s edict, why should not the beginning of the edict likewise arise from the Kalends of Jan.?' 77. And each example is such that the same holds in reverse, if you drive it back; for it is a consequent that those who could not be led when unwilling could not have been kept when unwilling. 78.

Illa quoque quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis uideri quidam uolunt et uocant §k t'n prÚw êllhla, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem uenientibus) fortiter consequentibus iunxerim: 'si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est, et Hermocreonti conducere', et: 'quod discere honestum, et docere'. LXXIX. Vnde illa non hac ratione dicta sed efficiens idem Domiti Afri sententia est pulchra: 'ego accusaui, uos damnastis'. Est inuicem consequens et quod ex diuersis idem ostendit, ut qui mundum nasci dicit per hoc ipsum et deficere significet, quia deficit omne quod nascitur.

I would also join stoutly to consequents those which are drawn from matters affording mutual confirmation (which some wish to seem of a distinct kind and call §k t'n prÚw êllhla, while Cicero [calls them] from things coming under the same rationale): 'if it is honorable to lease out the customs-duty to the Rhodians, it is honorable also for Hermocreon to take it on contract', and: 'what it is honorable to learn, it is honorable also to teach'. LXXIX. Whence that sentence of Domitius Afer, not said on this rationale but effecting the same, is fine: 'I prosecuted; you condemned'. In turn it is also consequent when that which shows the same from different [premises], as he who says that the world is born by this very statement signifies also that it fails, because everything that is born fails.

LXXX. Simillima est his argumentatio qua colligi solent ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuntur, aut contra, quod genus a causis uocant: haec interim necessario fiunt, interim plerumque sed non necessario. Nam corpus in lumine utique umbram facit, et umbra, ubicumque est, ibi esse corpus ostendit.

80. Most similar to these is the argumentation by which they are accustomed to gather from those things which do the things that are effected, or conversely, which genus they call from causes: these sometimes happen necessarily, sometimes for the most part but not necessarily. For a body in the light assuredly makes a shadow, and a shadow, wherever it is, shows that a body is there.

LXXXI. Alia sunt, ut dixi, non necessaria, uel utrimque uel ex altera parte: 'sol colorat: non utique qui est coloratus a sole est': 'iter puluerulentum facit, sed neque omne iter puluerem mouet, nec quisquis est puluerulentus ex itinere est'. LXXXII. Quae utique fiunt, talia sunt: 'si sapientia bonum uirum facit, bonus uir est utique sapiens', itemque: 'boni est honeste facere, mali turpiter, et qui honeste faciunt, boni, qui turpiter, mali iudicantur': recte.

81. Other things, as I said, are not necessary, either on both sides or on one side: 'the sun colors; not necessarily is whoever is colored one colored by the sun': 'a journey makes one dusty, but neither does every journey stir up dust, nor is whoever is dusty so from a journey'. 82. Those which do occur of necessity are of this sort: 'if wisdom makes a good man, a good man is necessarily wise', and likewise: 'it belongs to the good to act honorably, to the bad basely; and those who act honorably are judged good, those who act basely, bad': rightly.

At [exercitatio plerumque robustum corpus facit, sed non quisquis est robustus exercitatus, nec quisquis exercitatus robustus est] nec, quia fortitudo praestat ne mortem timeamus, quisquis mortem non timuerit uir fortis erit existimandus, nec si capitis dolorem facit inutilis hominibus sol est. LXXXIII. Haec ad exhortatiuum maxime genus pertinent: 'uirtus facit laudem, sequenda igitur: at uoluptas infamiam, fugienda igitur'. Recte autem monemur causas non utique ab ultimo esse repetendas, LXXXIV.

But [exercise for the most part makes a robust body, yet not everyone who is robust is trained, nor is everyone who is trained robust]; nor, because fortitude provides that we not fear death, must whoever has not feared death be judged a brave man; nor, if it causes a headache, is the sun useless to men. 83. These pertain most of all to the exhortative genus: 'virtue makes praise, therefore to be followed: but pleasure makes infamy, therefore to be fled'. And we are rightly warned that causes are not necessarily to be traced from the ultimate, 84.

ut Medea: 'utinam ne in nemore Pelio', quasi uero id eam fecerit miseram aut nocentem quod illic ceciderint abiegnae ad terram trabes: et Philocteta Paridi: 'si inpar esses tibi, ego nunc non essem miser': quo modo peruenire quolibet retro causas legentibus licet. LXXXV. Illud his adicere ridiculum putarem nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum uocant, ut 'eos qui rem iustam faciunt iuste facere', quod certe non eget probatione: 'quod compascuum est, compascere licere'. LXXXVI.

as Medea: 'would that not in the grove on Pelion,' as though that had made her wretched or guilty because there the fir-beams fell to the ground: and Philoctetes to Paris: 'if you were not equal to yourself, I would not now be wretched': in this way it is permitted for readers to reach back to causes however far backward they please. 85. I would think it ridiculous to add this to these, were it not that Cicero used it, what they call the conjugate, as 'those who do a just thing do it justly,' which certainly does not need proof: 'what is common-pasture, it is permitted to graze in common.' 86.

Quidam haec, quae uel ex causis uel ex efficientibus diximus, alieno nomine uocant ecbasis, id est exitus; nam nec hic aliud tractatur quam quid ex quoque eueniat.

Some call these things—which we have said are either from causes or from efficient agents—by a foreign name ecbasis, that is, “exit”; for here too nothing else is treated than what ensues from each.

LXXXVII. Adposita uel comparatiua dicuntur quae minora ex maioribus, maiora ex minoribus, paria ex paribus probant. Confirmatur coniectura ex maiore: 'si quis sacrilegium facit, faciet et furtum'; ex minore: 'qui facile ac palam mentitur, peierabit'; ex pari: 'qui ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepit, et ob dicendum falsum testimonium accipiet'. LXXXVIII.

87. Those are called adjoined or comparative which prove the lesser from the greater, the greater from the lesser, equals from equals. Conjecture is confirmed from the greater: 'if someone commits sacrilege, he will also commit theft'; from the lesser: 'he who lies easily and openly will commit perjury'; from an equal: 'he who has accepted money for judging a matter will also accept it for saying false testimony'. 88.

Iuris confirmatio est eius modi; ex maiore: 'si adulterum occidere licet, et loris caedere'; ex minore: 'si furem nocturnum occidere licet, quid latronem?'; ex pari: 'quae poena aduersus interfectorem patris iusta est, eadem aduersus matris'; quorum omnium tractatus uersatur in syllogismis. LXXXIX. Illa magis finitionibus aut qualitatibus prosunt: ~'si robur corporibus bonum non est, minus sanitas';~ 'si furtum scelus, magis sacrilegium'; 'si abstinentia uirtus, et continentia'; 'si mundus prouidentia regitur, administranda res publica'; 'si domus aedificari sine ratione non potest, quid * '; '~agenda si~ naualium cura, et armorum.' XC. Ac mihi quidem sufficeret hoc genus, sed in species secatur.

Confirmation of law is of this sort; from the greater: 'if it is permitted to kill an adulterer, then to strike with thongs as well'; from the lesser: 'if it is permitted to kill a nocturnal thief, what of a robber?'; from the equal: 'what penalty is just against the killer of a father, the same against the killer of a mother'; the handling of all these revolves around syllogisms. 89. Those are more useful by definitions or by qualities: ~'if strength is not a good for bodies, still less is health';~ 'if theft is a crime, sacrilege even more'; 'if abstinence is a virtue, then continence as well'; 'if the world is ruled by providence, the commonwealth must be administered'; 'if a house cannot be built without reason, what of * '; ''~if things are to be done~ the care of ships and of arms.' 90. And indeed this kind would suffice for me, but it is divided into species.

Nam et ex pluribus ad unum et ex uno ad plura (unde est 'quod semel, et saepius') et ex parte ad totum <et> ex genere ad speciem <et> ex eo quod continet ad id quod continetur, aut ex difficilioribus ad faciliora et ex longe positis ad propiora, et ad omnia quae contra haec sunt, eadem ratione argumenta ducuntur. XCI. Sunt enim et haec maiora et minora aut certe uim similem optinent.

For both from more numerous to one and from one to more numerous (whence is ‘what once, and more often’) and from part to whole <and> from genus to species <and> from that which contains to that which is contained, or from more difficult things to easier and from things placed far off to nearer, and to all things which are the contraries of these, arguments are drawn by the same reasoning. 91. For these too are greater and lesser, or at any rate possess a similar force.

Quae si persequamur, nullus erit ea concidendi modus: infinita est enim rerum comparatio++iucundiora grauiora, magis necessaria <minus necessaria>, honestiora utiliora: XCII. sed mittamus plura, ne in eam ipsam quam uito loquacitatem incidam. Exemplorum quoque ad haec infinitus est numerus, sed paucissima attingam.

If we pursue these, there will be no way of cutting them short: for the comparison of things is infinite++more pleasant graver, more necessary <less necessary>, more honorable more useful: 92. but let us dismiss more, lest I fall into that very loquacity which I avoid. The number also of examples for these is infinite, but I will touch upon the very few.

Ex maiore pro Caecina: 'quod exercitus armatos mouet, id aduocationem non uidebitur mouisse?' Ex faciliore in Clodium et Curionem: 'ac uide an facile fieri tu potueris, cum is factus non sit cui tu concessisti'. XCIII. Ex difficiliore: 'uide quaeso, Tubero, ut qui de meo facto non dubitem de Ligari audeam dicere'; et alibi: 'an sperandi Ligario causa non sit cum mihi apud te locus sit etiam pro altero deprecandi?' Ex minore pro Caecina: 'itane? scire esse armatos sat est ut uim factam probes, in manus eorum incidere non est satis?' XCIV.

From the greater, in the speech for Caecina: 'that which moves armed armies, will that not seem to have moved an advocation?' From the easier, against Clodius and Curio: 'and see whether you could have done it easily, when he has not done it to whom you yielded.' 93. From the more difficult: 'see, I pray, Tubero, that I, who do not hesitate about my own deed, dare to speak about Ligarius'; and elsewhere: 'is there no ground for hoping for Ligarius, since with you I have even a place for pleading on behalf of another?' From the lesser, in the speech for Caecina: 'is it so? to know that there are men under arms is enough for you to prove that violence was done; to fall into their hands is not enough?' 94.

Ergo, ut breuiter contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a personis causis locis tempore (cuius tres partes diximus, praecedens coniunctum insequens), facultatibus (quibus instrumentum subiecimus), modo (id est, ut quidque sit factum), finitione, genere specie differentibus propriis, remotione, diuisione, initio incremento summa, similibus dissimilibus, pugnantibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, euentis, iugatis, comparatione (quae in pluris diducitur species).

Therefore, to contract the sum briefly, arguments are drawn from persons, causes, places, time (of which we have said there are three parts: the preceding, the conjoined, the following), faculties (to which we have subjoined instrument), mode (that is, how each thing has been done), definition, genus, species, differences, proprieties, remotion, division, beginning, increment, sum, similar and dissimilar things, things that conflict, consequents, efficient causes, effects, events, yoked things, comparison (which is divided into several kinds).

XCV. Illud adiciendum uidetur, duci argumenta non a confessis tantum sed etiam a fictione, quod Graeci cat' hypothesin uocant, et quidem ex omnibus isdem locis quibus superiora, quia totidem species esse possunt fictae quot uerae. XCVI.

95. It seems that this should be added: that arguments are drawn not only from admitted matters but also from fiction, which the Greeks call kat' hypothesin, and indeed from all the same places as the foregoing, because there can be just as many fictitious species as true. 96.

Nam fingere hoc loco [hoc] est proponere aliquid quod, si uerum sit, aut soluat quaestionem aut adiuuet, deinde id de quo quaeritur facere illi simile. Id quo facilius accipiant iuuenes nondum scholam egressi, primo familiaribus magis ei aetati exemplis ostendam. XCVII.

For to feign in this place [this] is to propose something which, if it be true, either would solve the question or would aid it, and then to make that, about which inquiry is made, similar to it. In order that the youths not yet gone forth from school may the more easily receive this, first I shall show with examples more familiar to that age. 97.

Lex: 'qui parentes non aluerit, uinciatur'. Non alit quis, et uincula nihilo minus recusat. Vtitur fictione, si miles, si infans sit, si rei publicae causa absit. Et illa contra optionem fortium: 'si tyrannidem petas, si templorum euersionem'. XCVIII.

Law: 'he who has not maintained his parents, let him be bound in chains'. Someone does not maintain them, and nonetheless refuses the chains. He makes use of a fiction, if he be a soldier, if an infant, if he be absent for the sake of the commonwealth. And those that run counter to the privilege of the brave: 'if you seek tyranny, if the overthrow of temples'. XCVIII.

Plurimum ea res uirium habet contra scriptum. Vtitur his Cicero pro Caecina: 'Vnde tu aut familia aut procurator tuus. Si me uilicus tuus solus deiecisset . . . si uero ne habeas quidem seruum praeter eum qui me deiecerit', et alia in eodem libro plurima.

That expedient has the greatest force against the written law. Cicero uses these in the Pro Caecina: 'From where you, or your household, or your procurator. If your estate-manager alone had ejected me . . . if indeed you have not even a slave except the one who has ejected me', and very many other things in the same book.

XCIX. Verum eadem fictio ualet et ad qualitates: 'si L. Catilina cum suo consilio nefariorum hominum quos secum eduxit hac de re posset iudicare, condemnaret L. Murenam'; et <ad> amplificationem: 'si hoc tibi inter cenam et in illis inmanibus poculis tuis accidisset'. Sic et: 'si res publica uocem haberet'.

99. But the same fiction avails also for qualities: 'if L. Catiline, with his council of nefarious men whom he led out with him, could judge about this matter, he would condemn L. Murena'; and amplification: 'if this had happened to you during dinner and amid those immense goblets of yours'. So too: 'if the Republic had a voice'.

C. Has fere sedes accepimus probationum in uniuersum, quas neque generatim tradere sat est, cum ex qualibet earum innumerabilis argumentorum copia oriatur, neque per singulas species exequi patitur natura rerum: quod qui sunt facere conati, duo pariter subierunt incommoda, ut et nimium dicerent nec tamen totum. CI. Vnde plurimi, cum in hos inexplicabiles laqueos inciderunt, omnem, etiam quem ex ingenio suo potuerant habere, conatum uelut adstricti certis legum uinculis perdiderunt et magistrum respicientes naturam ducem sequi desierunt. CII.

100. We have accepted these, for the most part, as the seats of proofs in general, which it is not enough to hand down by kinds, since from each of them a countless abundance of arguments arises, nor does the nature of things allow them to be carried out through the individual species: and those who have tried to do this have undergone two inconveniences alike, namely, that they both said too much and yet not the whole. 101. Whence very many, when they have fallen into these inextricable snares, lost every endeavor—even that which they might have had from their own native talent—as though bound fast by certain chains of laws, and, looking to nature as teacher, ceased to follow her as leader. 102.

Nam ut per se non sufficiet scire omnes probationes aut a personis aut a rebus peti, quia utrumque in plura diuiditur, ita ex antecedentibus et iunctis et insequentibus trahenda esse argumenta qui acceperit num protinus in hoc sit instructus, ut quid in quaque causa ducendum sit ex his sciat?++CIII. praesertim cum plurimae probationes in ipso causarum complexu reperiantur, ita ut sint cum alia lite nulla communes, eaeque sint et potentissimae et minime obuiae, quia communia ex praeceptis accepimus, propria inuenienda sunt. CIV.

For, since by itself it will not suffice to know that all proofs are sought either from persons or from things, because each is divided into many parts, so if someone has received that arguments must be drawn from antecedents, from things joined, and from things subsequent, is he forthwith thereby instructed, so as to know from these what in each case ought to be drawn?++103. especially since very many proofs are found in the very complex of cases, such that they have nothing in common with any other suit, and are both most powerful and least obvious, because we have received the common matters from precepts, but the proper ones must be found. 104.

Hoc genus argumentorum sane dicamus ex circumstantia, quia per¤stasin dicere aliter non possumus, uel ex iis quae cuiusque causae propria sunt: ut in illo adultero sacerdote, qui lege qua unius seruandi potestatem habebat se ipse seruare uoluit, proprium controuersiae est dicere: 'non unum nocentem seruabas, quia te dimisso adulteram occidere non licebat'; hoc enim argumentum lex facit, quae prohibet adulteram sine adultero occidere. CV. Et illa, in qua lex est ut argentarii dimidium ex eo quod debebant soluerent, creditum suum totum exigerent. Argentarius ab argentario solidum petit.

Let us indeed call this kind of arguments from circumstance, since we cannot otherwise say peristasis, or from those things which are proper to each case: as in that adulterous priest, who, under a law by which he had the power of saving one, wished to save himself, it is proper to the controversy to say: 'you were not saving one guilty person, because, with you dismissed, it was not permitted to kill the adulteress'; for the law makes this argument, which prohibits killing the adulteress without the adulterer. 105. And that case, in which the law is that bankers should pay half of what they owed, yet they exacted their credit in full. A banker demands the whole from a banker.

Proprium ex materia est argumentum creditoris, idcirco adiectum esse in lege ut argentarius totum exigeret: aduersus alios enim non opus fuisse lege, cum omnes praeterquam ab argentariis totum exigendi ius haberent. CVI. Cum multa autem nouantur in omni genere materiae, tum praecipue in iis quaestionibus quae scripto constant, quia uocum et in singulis ambiguitas frequens et adhuc in coniunctis magis.

A subject-matter-proper argument is that of the creditor, namely, that on that account it was added in the law that the banker should exact the whole: for against others there was no need of a law, since all had the right of exacting the whole, except from bankers. 106. And although many things are innovated in every genus of material, yet especially in those questions which are established by writing, because ambiguity of words is frequent both in single terms and even more in their combinations.

CVII. Et haec ipsa plurium legum aliorumue scriptorum uel congruentium uel repugnantium complexu uarientur necesse est, cum res rei aut ius iuris quasi signum est. 'Non debui tibi pecuniam: numquam me appellasti, usuram non accepisti, ultro a me mutuatus es'. 'Lex est: qui patri proditionis reo non adfuerit, exheres sit.

107. And these very matters must necessarily be varied by the complex of multiple laws or of other writings either congruent or repugnant, since one matter is, as it were, a sign for another, and one right for another. 'I did not owe you money: you never called me to account, you did not receive interest, you of your own accord borrowed from me.' 'There is a law: whoever has not been present to his father, defendant for treason, let him be disinherited.'

Negat filius, nisi si pater absolutus sit'. Quid signi? Lex altera: 'proditionis damnatus cum aduocato exulet'. CVIII. 'Cicero pro Cluentio P. Popilium et Tiberium Guttam dicit non iudicii corrupti sed ambitus esse damnatos'. Quid signi?

'The son denies it, unless the father has been acquitted.' What sign? Another law: 'one condemned of treason shall go into exile with an advocate.' 108. 'Cicero, in the case for Cluentius, says that Publius Popilius and Tiberius Gutta were condemned not for a corrupted trial but for ambitus (electoral bribery).' What sign?

Quod accusatores eorum, qui erant ipsi ambitus damnati, e lege sint post hanc uictoriam restituti. CIX. Nec minus in hoc curae debet adhiberi, quid proponendum, quam quo modo sit quod proposueris probandum: hic immo uis inuentionis maior, certe prior.

That the accusers of those who were themselves condemned for ambitus have, by law, after this victory been restored. 109. No less care ought to be applied in this—what is to be proposed—than in the way that what you have proposed is to be proved: here indeed the force of invention is greater, certainly prior.

Nam ut tela superuacua sunt nescienti quid petat, sic argumenta, nisi prouideris cui rei adhibenda sint. Hoc est quod comprendi arte non possit. CX. Ideoque, cum plures eadem didicerint, generibus argumentorum similibus utentur: alius alio plura quibus utatur inueniet.

For as weapons are superfluous to one who does not know what he aims at, so are arguments, unless you have foreseen to what matter they should be applied. This is what cannot be comprehended by art. 110. And therefore, since many have learned the same things, they will employ similar kinds of arguments: one will find more than another things to use.

Sit exempli gratia proposita controuersia quae minime communes cum aliis quaestiones habet: CXI. 'Cum Thebas euertisset Alexander, inuenit tabulas quibus centum talenta mutua Thessalis dedisse Thebanos continebatur. Has, quia erat usus commilitio Thessalorum, donauit his ultro: postea restituti a Casandro Thebani reposcunt Thessalos.

Let, for example, a controversy be proposed which has questions least in common with others: 111. 'When Alexander had overthrown Thebes, he found tablets on which it was contained that the Thebans had given the Thessalians a hundred talents as a loan. These, because he had made use of the comradeship-in-arms of the Thessalians, he donated to them unasked; afterwards, the Thebans, restored by Cassander, reclaim from the Thessalians.'

Apud Amphictyonas agitur'. Centum talenta et credidisse eos constat et non recepisse. CXII. Lis omnis ex eo quod Alexander ea Thessalis donasse dicitur pendet.

It is being tried before the Amphictyons'. It is agreed both that they lent a hundred talents and that they did not get them back. 112. The whole lawsuit hangs on the fact that Alexander is said to have donated them to the Thessalians.

Constat illud quoque, non esse iis ab Alexandro pecuniam datam: quaeritur ergo, an proinde sit quod datum est ac si pecuniam dederit? Quid proderunt argumentorum loci nisi haec prius uidero, nihil eum egisse donando, non potuisse donare, non donasse? Et prima quidem actio facilis ac fauorabilis repetentium iure quod ui sit ablatum: sed hinc aspera et uehemens quaestio exoritur de iure belli, dicentibus Thessalis hoc regna, populos, fines gentium atque urbium contineri.

It is also agreed that money was not given to them by Alexander: the question therefore is, whether what has been given amounts to the same as if he had given money? What will the topics of argument avail unless I first consider these points, that he accomplished nothing by donating, that he could not donate, that he did not donate? And indeed the first action is easy and favorable to those seeking restitution, by the right for what has been taken away by force; but from here a harsh and vehement question arises concerning the law of war, the Thessalians saying that by this are contained kingdoms, peoples, the boundaries of nations and of cities.

CXIV. Inueniendum contra est quo distet haec causa a ceteris quae in potestatem uictoris uenirent, nec circa probationem res haeret, sed circa propositionem. Dicamus in primis: in eo quod in iudicium deduci potest nihil ualere ius belli, nec armis erepta nisi armis posse retineri.

114. It must be found on the contrary wherein this case differs from the others which would come into the power of the victor, and the matter does not hang upon proof, but upon the proposition. Let us say first: in that which can be brought into judgment the law of war avails nothing, nor can things snatched by arms be retained except by arms.

Itaque, ubi illa ualeant, non esse iudicem: ubi iudex sit, illa nihil ualere. CXV. Hoc inueniendum est, ut adhiberi possit argumentum: ideo captiuos, si in patriam suam redierint, liberos esse quia bello parta non nisi eadem ui possideantur.

Therefore, where those prevail, there is no judge; where there is a judge, those have no force. 115. This must be found, so that the argument may be applied: therefore captives, if they return to their own fatherland, are free, because things acquired by war are possessed only by the same force.

Proprium et illud causae, quod Amphictyones iudicant, ut alia apud centumuiros, alia apud priuatum iudicem in isdem quaestionibus ratio. CXVI. Tum secundo gradu, non potuisse donari a uictore ius, quia id demum sit eius quod teneat: ius, quod sit incorporale, adprendi manu non posse.

Peculiar to the case is also this, that the Amphictyons are judging, such that one rationale applies before the centumviri, another before a private judge, in the same questions. 116. Then, at the second stage, that a right could not have been donated by the victor, because only that is his which he holds: a right, since it is incorporeal, cannot be grasped by the hand.

Hoc reperire est difficilius quam cum inueneris argumentis adiuuare, ut alia sit condicio heredis, alia uictoris, quia ad illum ius, ad hunc res transeat. CXVII. Proprium deinde materiae, ius publici crediti transire ad uictorem non potuisse, quia quod populus crediderit omnibus debeatur, et, quamdiu quilibet unus superfuerit, esse eum totius summae creditorem, Thebanos autem non omnis in Alexandri manu fuisse.

This is harder to discover than, once you have discovered it, to aid with arguments: that the condition of the heir is one thing, that of the victor another, because to that man the right passes, to this one the thing. 117. Then, a point proper to the material, that the right of public credit could not have passed to the victor, because what the people has credited is owed to all, and, so long as any single one survives, he is the creditor of the whole sum; but the Thebans were not all in Alexander’s hand.

CXVIII. Hoc non extrinsecus probatur, quae uis est argumenti, sed ipsum per se ualet. Tertii loci pars prior magis uulgaris, non in tabulis esse ius, itaque multis argumentis defendi potest.

118. This is not proved extrinsically—such is the force of the argument—but is valid by itself. The prior part of the third locus is more vulgar, that the law is not in the tablets; and so it can be defended by many arguments.

Mens quoque Alexandri duci debet in dubium, honorarit eos an deceperit. Illud iam rursus proprium materiae et uelut nouae controuersiae, quod restitutione recepisse ius, etiam si quod amiserint, Thebani uidentur. Hic et quid Casander uelit quaeritur.

The mind, too, of Alexander the leader ought to be brought into doubt, whether he honored them or deceived them. That now again is proper to the subject, and, as it were, to a new controversy: namely, that by restitution the Thebans seem to have recovered the right, even if they had lost something. Here too the question is raised what Cassander intends.

Sed uel potentissima apud Amphictyonas aequi tractatio est.

But even the most powerful is the treatment of equity among the Amphictyons.

CXIX. Haec non idcirco dico quod inutilem horum locorum ex quibus argumenta ducuntur cognitionem putem, alioqui nec tradidissem, sed ne se qui cognouerint ista, si cetera neglegant, perfectos protinus atque consummatos putent et nisi in ceteris quae mox praecipienda sunt elaborauerint mutam quandam scientiam consecutos intellegant. CXX.

119. I do not say these things for this reason, that I think the knowledge of those loci from which arguments are drawn useless—otherwise I would not have handed them down—but lest those who have learned these things, if they neglect the rest, immediately think themselves perfect and consummate; and let them understand that, unless they have labored in the other matters which are soon to be prescribed, they have attained a certain mute knowledge. 120.

Neque enim artibus editis factum est ut argumenta inueniremus, sed dicta sunt omnia antequam praeciperentur, mox ea scriptores obseruata et collecta ediderunt. Cuius rei probatio est quod exemplis eorum ueteribus utuntur et ab oratoribus illa repetunt, ipsi nullum nouum et quod dictum non sit inueniunt. CXXI.

For it was not by published treatises that we discovered arguments, but all things were spoken before they were prescribed; soon writers, having observed and collected them, published them. Proof of this matter is that they use the examples of those ancients and fetch them again from the orators; they themselves discover nothing new and that has not been said. 121.

Artifices ergo illi qui dixerunt. Sed habenda his quoque gratia est, per quos labor nobis detractus est. Nam quae priores beneficio ingenii singula inuenerunt, nobis et non sunt requirenda et notata omnia.

The craftsmen, then, are those who have spoken. But thanks are due to these as well, through whom labor has been taken from us. For the things which the former, by the benefit of their ingenuity, invented one by one do not need to be sought by us, and all have been noted.

Sed non magis hoc sat est quam palaestram didicisse nisi corpus exercitatione, continentia, cibis, ante omnia natura iuuatur, sicut contra ne illa quidem satis sine arte profuerint. CXXII. Illud quoque studiosi eloquentiae cogitent, neque omnibus in causis ea quae demonstrauimus cuncta posse reperiri, neque, cum proposita fuerit materia dicendi, scrutanda singula et uelut ostiatim pulsanda, ut sciant an ad probandum id quod intendimus forte respondeant: nisi cum discunt et adhuc usu carent.

But this is no more enough than to have learned the palaestra, unless the body is helped by exercise, continence, foods, and above all by nature; just as, conversely, not even those things would have sufficiently profited without art. 122. Let devotees of eloquence consider this as well: that not in all causes can all the things which we have demonstrated be found; nor, when the material for speaking has been set forth, are the particulars to be scrutinized and, as it were, knocked at door by door, so that they may know whether perchance they answer for proving that which we intend: except when they are learning and still lack practice.

CXXIII. Infinitam enim faciat ista res dicendi tarditatem, si semper necesse sit ut, temptantes unum quodque eorum, quod sit aptum atque conueniens experiendo noscamus: nescio an etiam impedimento futura sit nisi et animi quaedam ingenita natura et studio exercitata uelocitas recta nos ad ea quae conueniant causae ferant. CXXIV.

123. For this matter would make an infinite slowness in speaking, if it were always necessary that, trying each individual one of those things, we should learn by experience which is apt and congruent: I do not know whether it would even be a hindrance, unless both a certain inborn nature of mind and a speed trained by study carry us straight to those things that suit the case. 124.

Nam ut cantus uocis plurimum iuuat sociata neruorum concordia, si tamen tardior manus, nisi inspectis dimensisque singulis, quibus quaeque uox fidibus iungenda sit dubitet, potius fuerit esse contentum eo quo simplex canendi natura tulerit: ita huius modi praeceptis debet quidem aptata esse et citharae modo intenta ratio doctrinae, sed hoc exercitatione multa consequendum, CXXV. ut, quem ad modum illorum artificum, etiam si alio spectant, manus tamen ipsa consuetudine ad grauis, acutos, mediosque horum sonos fertur, sic oratoris cogitationem nihil moretur haec uarietas argumentorum et copia, sed quasi offerat se et occurrat, et, ut litterae syllabaeque scribentium cogitationem non exigunt, sic orationem sponte quadam sequantur.

For as the concord of the strings, when joined, greatly helps the song of the voice, yet if a slower hand, unless it has inspected and measured each particular, hesitates as to which note of the voice ought to be joined to which strings, it would rather be better to be content with that to which the simple nature of singing has borne one: so by precepts of this kind the plan of instruction ought indeed to be fitted and, in the manner of the cithara, tuned; but this must be achieved by much practice, 125. that, in the same way as the hands of those craftsmen, even if they are looking elsewhere, are yet by habit borne to the low, the high, and the middle sounds of these, so this variety and abundance of arguments should delay the orator’s thought in nothing, but as it were offer itself and come to meet him; and, just as letters and syllables do not exact the thought of those who are writing, so let them follow the speech with a certain spontaneity.