Isidore of Seville: ETYMOLOGIARVM SIVE ORIGINVM LIBRI XX

[1] Rhetorica est bene dicendi scientia in civilibus quaestionibus, eloquentia copia ad persuadendum iusta et bona. Dicta autem Rhetorica Graeca appellatione ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥητορίζειν, id est a copia locutionis. Ῥῆσις enim apud Graecos locutio dicitur, ῥήτωρ orator.

[1] Rhetoric is the science of speaking well in civic questions, an eloquent abundance for persuading to what is just and good. Moreover, it is called Rhetoric by the Greek appellation ἀπὸ τοῦ ῥητορίζειν, that is, from an abundance of locution. For ῥῆσις among the Greeks is called locution, ῥήτωρ an orator.

2 Coniuncta est autem Grammaticae arti Rhetorica. In Grammatica enim scientiam recte loquendi discimus; in Rhetorica vero percipimus qualiter ea, quae didicimus, proferamus.

2 Rhetoric, moreover, is conjoined to the art of Grammar. For in Grammar we learn the science of speaking correctly; but in Rhetoric we perceive how we should proffer those things which we have learned.

II. DE INVENTORIBVS RHETORICAE ARTIS.

2. ON THE INVENTORS OF THE ART OF RHETORIC.

[1] Haec autem disciplina a Graecis inventa est, a Gorgia, Aristotele, Hermagora, et translata in Latinum a Tullio videlicet et Quintiliano [et Titiano], sed ita copiose, ita varie, ut eam lectori admirari in promptu sit, conprehendere inpossibile.

[1] This discipline, moreover, was invented by the Greeks—by Gorgias, Aristotle, and Hermagoras—and translated into Latin by Tullius, namely, and Quintilian [and Titian]; but so copiously, so variously, that it is easy for the reader to admire it, impossible to comprehend.

[2] Nam membranis retentis quasi adhaerescit memoriae series dictionis, ac mox repositis recordatio omnis elabitur. Huius disciplinae perfecta cognitio oratorem facit.

[2] For, with the parchments retained, the series of diction, as it were, adheres to the memory, and once they are soon put away, all recollection slips away. A perfected cognition of this discipline makes an orator.

III. DE NOMINE ORATORIS ET PARTIBVS RHETORICAE.

3. ON THE NAME OF THE ORATOR AND THE PARTS OF RHETORIC.

[1] Orator est igitur vir bonus, dicendi peritus. Vir bonus consistit natura, moribus, artibus. Dicendi peritus consistit artificiosa eloquentia, quae constat partibus quinque: inventione, dispositione, elocutione, memoria, pronuntiatione, et fine officii, quod est aliquid persuadere.

[1] The orator, therefore, is a good man, skilled in speaking. The good man consists in nature, morals, and arts. The one skilled in speaking consists in artful eloquence, which consists of five parts: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, delivery, and in the end of the duty, which is to persuade.

[2] Ipsa autem peritia dicendi in tribus rebus consistit: natura, doctrina, usu. Natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, usus adsiduitate. Haec sunt enim quae non solum in oratore, sed in unoquoque homine artifice expectantur, ut aliquid efficiat.

[2] But the very expertise of speaking consists in three things: nature, doctrine, and use. Nature in inborn genius, doctrine in knowledge, use in assiduity. For these are the things expected not only in the orator, but in each man an artificer, that he may effect something.

IV. DE TRIBVS GENERIBVS CAVSARVM.

4. ON THE THREE KINDS OF CAUSES.

[1] Genera causarum tria sunt, deliberativum, demonstrativum, iudiciale. Deliberativum genus est, in quo de quibuslibet utilitatibus vitae, quid aut debeat aut non debeat fieri, tractatur. Demonstrativum, in quo laudabilis persona aut reprehensibilis ostenditur.

[1] There are three kinds of causes: deliberative, demonstrative, judicial. The deliberative kind is that in which, concerning whatever utilities/advantages of life, what ought or ought not to be done is treated. The demonstrative, in which a praiseworthy person or a blameworthy one is shown.

[2] Iudiciale, in quo de ipsius personae facto aut poenae aut praemii sententia datur. Dictum autem iudiciale eo, quod iudicet hominem, et sententia sua ostendat utrum laudabilis praemio dignus sit, aut certe reus condemnari liberarique supplicio.

[2] The judicial kind, in which, concerning the deed of the person himself, a sentence is given either of penalty or of reward. It is called “judicial” for this reason: because it judges the person, and by its sentence shows whether he is laudable and worthy of reward, or else a defendant to be condemned or to be freed from punishment.

[3] Deliberativum genus vocatur eo, quod de unaquaque re in eo deliberatur. Huius genus duplex est, suasio et dissuasio, id est de expetendo et fugiendo, id est de faciendo et non faciendo.

[3] The deliberative kind is called so because in it deliberation is made about each matter. This kind is twofold: suasion and dissuasion, that is, about what is to be sought and what is to be avoided, that is, about doing and not doing.

[4] Suasoria autem in tribus locis dividitur: honesto, utili, et possibili. Haec differt aliquid a deliberativa, quia suasoria eget alteram personam, deliberativa interdum et apud se agit. In suasoria autem duae sunt quae plus valent: spes et metus.

[4] The suasory, moreover, is divided into three places: the honorable, the useful, and the possible. This differs somewhat from the deliberative, because the suasory requires another person, while the deliberative sometimes even conducts business with oneself. In the suasory, moreover, there are two things that carry more weight: hope and fear.

[5] Demonstrativum dictum, quod unamquamque rem aut laudando aut vituperando demonstrat. Quod genus duas habet species: laudem et vituperationem. Laudis ordo tribus temporibus distinguitur: ante ipsum, in ipsum, post ipsum.

[5] It is called the demonstrative kind, because it demonstrates each thing either by lauding or by vituperating. This kind has two species: praise and vituperation. The order of praise is distinguished by three times: before the person himself, in the person himself, after the person himself.

[6] Ante ipsum, ut (Virg. Aen. 1,605):

[6] Before the person himself, as (Virgil, Aeneid 1,605):

Quae te tam laeta tulerunt
saecula?

What ages so happy have borne you forth?
ages?

In ipsum, ut (Virg. Aen. 1,597):

Against him, as (Virgil, Aeneid 1,597):

O sola infandos Troiae miserata labores.

O you alone who have pitied the unspeakable labors of Troy.

Post ipsum, ut (Virg. Aen. 1,607):

After this, as (Virg. Aen. 1,607):

In freta dum fluvii current, dum montibus umbrae lustrabunt,
semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt.

So long as rivers shall run into the seas, so long as shadows shall sweep over the mountains,
forever your honor and your name and your praises will remain.

[7] Pari ordine e contrario et in vituperatione hominis haec forma servanda est, ante hominem, in hominem, post hominem. Locus communis ad demonstrativum vituperationis genus pertinet. Quod tamen ab eo in aliquo differt.

[7] In an equal order, conversely, even in the vituperation of a man this form is to be observed: before the person, upon the person, after the person. The commonplace pertains to the demonstrative genus of vituperation. Which nevertheless differs from it in some respect.

Nam vituperatio, quae contraria est laudis, specialiter in certam facientis personam adhibetur.

For vituperation, which is contrary to praise, is specifically applied to the definite person of the doer.

[8] Communis vero locus generaliter in facti crimen praeponitur. Vnde et communis locus dicitur, quia absente persona non tam in hominem, quantum in ipsum crimen exponitur. Omne enim vitium non in uno tantum, sed etiam commune in plurimis invenitur.

[8] The commonplace, however, is generally put forward as an accusation of the deed. Whence it is also called a commonplace, because, with the person absent, it is set forth not so much against the man as against the crime itself. For every vice is found not in one only, but is also common in very many.

V. DE GEMINO STATV CAVSARVM.

5. ON THE DOUBLE STATUS OF CAUSES.

[1] Status apud Rhetores dicitur ea res, in qua causa consistit, id est constitutio. Graeci autem statum a contentione STASIN dicunt. Latini autem non solum a pugna, per quam expugnent propositionem adversarii, sed quod in eo pars utraque consistat.

[1] Status among the Rhetors is called that thing in which the cause consists, that is, the constitution. The Greeks, moreover, call the status, from contention, STASIN. The Latins, however, derive it not only from battle, by which they storm the adversary’s proposition, but because in it each party takes its stand.

Fit autem ex intentione et depulsione.

It, however, arises from the intention and the repulsion (that is, the claim and the defense).

[2] Status autem causarum sunt duo: rationalis et legalis. De rationali oriuntur coniectura, finis, qualitas, translatio. De fine iudicialis et negotialis.

[2] The statuses of causes are two: rational and legal. From the rational arise conjecture, definition, quality, and transference. From the end arise the judicial and the deliberative.

De iudiciali absoluta et adsumptiva. De adsumptiva concessio, remotio criminis, relatio criminis, conpensatio. De concessione purgatio et deprecatio.

On the judicial [issue], the absolute and the assumptive. Of the assumptive: concession, removal of the charge, referral of the charge, compensation. Of concession: purgation and deprecation.

[3] Coniecturalis status est cum factum, quod alio obicitur, ab alio pernegatur. Definitivus status est, cum id, quod obicitur, non hoc esse contenditur, sed quid illud sit adhibitis definitionibus adprobatur. Qualitas est, dum qualis res sit quaeritur: et quia de vi et genere negotii controversia agitur, constitutio generalis appellatur.

[3] The conjectural status is when a deed, which is objected by one, is flatly denied by another. The definitive status is, when that which is objected is contended not to be this, but what that thing is is established with definitions applied. Quality is, when inquiry is made of what sort the matter is; and because the controversy is conducted about the force and the kind of the business, it is called a general constitution.

[4] Translatio est cum causa ex eo pendet, quod non aut is agere videtur, quem oportet, aut non apud quos, quo tempore, qua lege, quo crimine, qua poena oporteat. Translativa constitutio, quod actio translationis et commutationis indigere videtur.

[4] Transference is when a case depends on this: that either the one acting does not seem to be the person who ought, or that it is not before those before whom, at the time at which, under the law under which, on the charge on which, with the penalty with which it ought. This is the translative constitution, because the action seems to need transference and change.

[5] Iudicialis est, in qua aequi et recti natura et praemia aut poenae ratio quaeritur. Negotialis est, in qua quid iuris ex civili more et aequitate sit consideratur. Adsumptiva est, quae ipsa ex se nihil dat firmi ad recusationem, [foris autem aliquid defensionis adsumit].

[5] The judicial is that in which the nature of the equitable and the right, and the rationale of rewards or penalties, is inquired into. The negotial is that in which what is of law from civil custom and equity is considered. The assumptive is that which of itself supplies nothing firm for a recusation, [but from outside assumes something of defense].

[6] Concessio est, cum reus non ad id, quod factum est, defendit, sed ut ignoscatur postulat. Quod nos ad poenitentes probavimus pertinere. Remotio criminis est cum id crimen, quod infertur ab se et ab sua culpa, vi et potestate in alium reus demovere conatur.

[6] Concession is, when the defendant does not defend as to that which has been done, but asks that pardon be granted. This we have proved to pertain to penitents. Removal of the charge is when the defendant tries to shift that charge which is brought, from himself and from his own fault, by force and authority onto another.

[7] Relatio criminis est, cum ideo iure factum dicitur, quod aliquis ante iniuria lacessitus sit. Conparatio est, cum aliud aliquod alterius factum honestum aut utile contenditur, quod ut fieret, illud, quod arguitur, dicitur esse conmissum.

[7] Relation of the charge is when a deed is said to have been done lawfully for this reason, that someone had previously been provoked by an injury. Comparison is when some other deed of another, honorable or useful, is maintained, and, in order that that might be brought about, that which is arraigned is said to have been committed.

[8] Purgatio est, cum factum quidem conceditur, sed culpa removetur. Haec partes habet tres: inprudentiam, casum, necessitatem. Deprecatio est, cum et peccasse et consultu peccasse reus confitetur, et tamen ut ignoscatur postulat.

[8] Purgation is, when the deed indeed is conceded, but the guilt is removed. This has three parts: imprudence, accident, necessity. Deprecation is, when the defendant confesses both that he has sinned and that he sinned deliberately, and nevertheless asks that it be forgiven.

Quod genus perraro potest accidere.

Such a kind can very rarely occur.

[9] Item ex legali statu haec oriuntur, id est scriptum et voluntas, leges contrariae, ambiguitas, collectio sive ratiocinatio et definitio legalis. Scriptum et voluntas est, quando verba ipsa videntur cum sententia scriptoris dissidere. Legis contrariae status est, quando inter se duae leges aut plures discrepare noscuntur.

[9] Likewise, from the legal status these arise, that is: the written text and will, contrary laws, ambiguity, collection or ratiocination, and legal definition. The written text and will is when the words themselves seem to disagree with the writer’s meaning. The status of contrary law is when two or more laws are known to differ among themselves.

Ambiguitas est, cum id, quod scriptum est, duas aut plures res significare videtur. Collectio vel ratiocinatio est, quando ex eo, quod scriptum est, aliud quoque, quod non scriptum est, invenitur. Definitio legalis est, cum vis quasi in definitiva constitutione, in quo posita sit, quaeritur.

Ambiguity is, when that which is written seems to signify two or more things. Collection or ratiocination is, when from that which is written there is discovered something else also which is not written. Legal definition is, when inquiry is made into where the force—so to speak, in a definitive determination—is situated.

[10] Status ergo tam rationales quam legales a quibusdam certius decem et octo connumerati sunt. Ceterum secundum Rhetoricos Tullii decem et novem reperiuntur propterea, quia translationem inter rationales principaliter adfixit status. Inde se ipse etiam Cicero reprehendens translationem legalibus statubus adplicavit.

[10] Therefore the statuses, both rational and legal, have by some been more exactly counted as eighteen. But according to the Rhetorics of Tullius, nineteen are found, for this reason: because he principally affixed “translation” among the rational statuses. Thereupon Cicero himself, reproving himself, also applied “translation” to the legal statuses.

VI. DE TRIPERTITA CONTROVERSIA.

6. ON THE TRIPARTITE CONTROVERSY.

[1] Tripertita controversia iuxta Ciceronem aut simplex est, aut iuncta. Et si iuncta erit, considerandum est utrum ex pluribus quaestionibus iuncta sit, an ex aliqua conparatione. Controversia simplex est, quae absolutam continet unam quaestionem hoc modo: Corinthiis bellum indicamus, an non?

[1] The tripartite controversy, according to Cicero, is either simple or conjoined. And if it is conjoined, it must be considered whether it is joined from multiple questions, or from some comparison. A simple controversy is that which contains one absolute question in this way: Do we declare war on the Corinthians, or not?

[2] Iuncta est ex pluribus quaestionibus, in qua plura quaeruntur hoc pacto: Vtrum Carthago diruatur, an Carthaginensibus reddatur, an eo colonia deducatur? Ex conparatione, utrum potius, aut quid potissimum quaeritur, ad hunc modum: Vtrum exercitus in Macedoniam contra Philippum mittatur, qui sociis sit auxilio, an teneatur in Italia, ut quam maximae contra Hannibalem copiae sint?

[2] It is joined from multiple questions, in which more things are asked in this fashion: Whether Carthage should be torn down, or be given back to the Carthaginians, or a colony be led thither? From comparison, where it is asked which is preferable, or what is most preferable, after this manner: Whether the army should be sent into Macedonia against Philip, to be a help to the allies, or be held in Italy, so that the forces against Hannibal may be as great as possible?

VII. DE QVATTVOR PARTIBVS ORATIONIS.

7. ON THE FOUR PARTS OF ORATION.

[1] Partes orationis in Rhetorica arte quattuor sunt: exordium, narratio, argumentatio, conclusio. Harum prima auditoris animum provocat, secunda res gestas explicat, tertia fidem adsertionibus facit, quarta finem totius orationis conplectitur.

[1] The parts of an oration in the rhetorical art are four: exordium, narration, argumentation, conclusion. Of these, the first calls forth the hearer’s mind, the second explicates the deeds done, the third establishes credibility for the assertions, the fourth embraces the end of the whole oration.

[2] Inchoandum est itaque taliter, ut benivolum, docilem, vel adtentum auditorem faciamus: benivolum precando, docilem instruendo, adtentum excitando. Narrandum est ita, ut breviter atque aperte loquamur; argumentandum est ita, ut primum nostra firmemus, dehinc adversa confringamus; concludendun ita, ut concitemus animos audientis inplere quae dicimus.

[2] Therefore one must begin in such a way as to make the listener benevolent, docile, or attentive: benevolent by entreating, docile by instructing, attentive by arousing. One must narrate thus, that we speak briefly and clearly; one must argue thus, that first we strengthen our own points, then we shatter the opposing ones; one must conclude thus, that we stir the hearer’s mind to fulfill what we say.

VIII. DE QVINQVE MODIS CAVSARVM.

8. ON THE FIVE MODES OF CAUSES.

[1] Species causarum sunt quinque: [id est] honestum, admirabile, humile, anceps, obscurum. Honestum causae genus est, cui statim sine oratione nostra favet animus auditoris. Admirabile, a quo est alienatus animus eorum, qui audituri sunt.

[1] The species of causes are five: [that is] the honorable, the admirable, the humble, the ambiguous, the obscure. The honorable kind of cause is that to which the mind of the hearer at once, without our speech, shows favor. The admirable, from which the mind of those who are going to hear is alienated.

Humile est, quod neclegitur ab auditore.

The humble is that which is neglected by the hearer.

[2] Anceps est, in quo aut iudicatio dubia est, aut causa honestatis et turpitudinis particeps, ut benivolentiam pariat et offensam. Obscurum, in quo aut tardi auditores sunt, aut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum negotiis causa cernitur inplicata.

[2] Ambivalent is that in which either the adjudication is doubtful, or the cause is a participant in both honesty and turpitude, so that it begets benevolence and offense. Obscure, in which either the hearers are slow, or the cause is discerned as entangled in affairs more difficult for cognition.

IX. DE SYLLOGISMIS.

9. ON SYLLOGISMS.

[1] Syllogismus Graece, Latine argumentatio appellatur. Argumentatio autem dicta est, quasi argutae mentis oratio, qua inventum probabile exequimur. Syllogismus igitur est propositionis et adsumptionis confirmationisque extrema conclusio aut ex ambigentis incerto, aut ex fiducia conprobantis.

[1] Syllogism in Greek, in Latin is called argumentation. And it is called argumentation, as if the discourse of an acute mind, by which we execute a probable invention. Therefore a syllogism is the final conclusion of a proposition and an assumption and a confirmation, either from the uncertainty of one who is wavering, or from the confidence of one who is proving.

[2] Constat enim tribus partibus: propositione, adsumptione, conclusione. Propositione, ut puta, "quod bonum est, turpem usum habere non potest" Consensit audiens; adsumpsit ille "pecunia turpem usum habet" Concluditur, "ergo pecunia bonum non est"

[2] For it consists of three parts: proposition, assumption, conclusion. In the proposition, for example, "what is good cannot have a base use" The hearer agreed; he assumed "money has a base use" It is concluded, "therefore money is not a good"

[3] Syllogismis autem non solum rhetores, sed maxime dialectici utuntur, licet Apostolus saepe proponat, adsumat, confirmet atque concludat: quae, ut diximus, propriae artis Dialecticae et Rhetoricae sunt.

[3] Syllogisms, moreover, are used not only by rhetors, but especially by dialecticians, although the Apostle often proposes, assumes, confirms, and concludes: which, as we have said, are proper to the art of Dialectic and of Rhetoric.

[4] Syllogismorun apud rhetores principalia genera duo sunt: inductio et ratiocinatio. Inductionis membra sunt tria: prima propositio, secunda inlatio, quae et adsumptio dicitur, tertia conclusio.

[4] Among the rhetors the principal genera of syllogisms are two: induction and ratiocination. The members of induction are three: first, proposition; second, inlation, which is also called assumption; third, conclusion.

[5] Inductio est, quae rebus non dubiis captat adsensionem eius, cum instituta est, sive inter philosophos, sive inter rhetores, sive inter sermocinantes. Propositio inductionis est, quae similitudines concedendae rei necessario unius inducit aut plurium.

[5] Induction is that which, by matters not doubtful, captures his assent when it is instituted, whether among philosophers, or among rhetors, or among conversationalists. The proposition of induction is that which necessarily introduces similitudes of the thing to be conceded, of one or of several.

[6] Inlatio inductionis est, quae et adsumptio dicitur, quae rem, de qua contenditur, et cuius causa similitudines habitae sunt, introducit. Conclusio inductionis est, quae aut concessionem inlationis confirmat, aut quid ex ea conficiatur declarat. Ratiocinatio est oratio, qua id, de quo est quaestio, conprobatur.

[6] The inlation of induction, which is also called the assumption, is that which introduces the matter about which there is contention, and for the sake of which likenesses have been employed. The conclusion of induction is that which either confirms the concession of the inlation, or declares what is effected from it. Ratiocination is discourse by which that about which there is a question is proved.

[7] Ratiocinationis modi sunt duo. Primus enthymema, qui est inperfectus syllogismus atque rhetoricus. Secundus epichirema, qui est inrhetoricus et Iatior syllogismus.

[7] The modes of ratiocination are two. The first is the enthymeme, which is an imperfect and rhetorical syllogism. The second is the epichirema, which is non-rhetorical and a broader syllogism.

[8] Enthymema igitur Latine interpretatur mentis conceptio, quem inperfectum syllogismum solent artigraphi nuncupare. Nam in duabus partibus eius argumenti forma consistit, quando id, quod ad fidem pertinet faciendam, utitur, syllogismorum lege praeterita, ut est illud: "Si tempestas vitanda est, non est igitur navigandum" Ex sola enim propositione et conclusione constat esse perfectum, unde magis rhetoribus quam dialecticis convenire iudicatum est.

[8] Enthymeme, therefore, is interpreted in Latin as a conception of the mind, which the art-writers are accustomed to call an imperfect syllogism. For the form of its argument consists in two parts, since, in what pertains to producing credence, it employs—passing over the law of syllogisms—as in this: "If a tempest must be avoided, therefore one must not sail." For from the proposition and the conclusion alone it is held to be complete, whence it has been judged to suit rhetoricians rather than dialecticians.

[9] Enthymematis membra sunt quinque: primum convincibile, secundum ostentabile, tertium sententiale, quartum exemplabile, quintum collectivum.

[9] The members of the enthymeme are five: first, the convincible; second, the ostentable; third, the sentential; fourth, the exemplable; fifth, the collective.

[10] Convincibile est, quod evidenti ratione convincitur, sicut fecit Cicero pro Milone (79): "Eius igitur mortis sedetis ultores, cuius vitam si putetis per vos restitui posse, nolitis,Ostentabile est, quod certa rei demonstratione constringit, sicut Cicero in Catilina (1,2): "Hic tamen vivit, immo etiam in senatum venit" Sententiale est, quod sententia generalis adducit, ut apud Terentium (Andr. 68):

[10] The convincible is that which is proved by evident reason, just as Cicero did in the Pro Milone (79): "Therefore you sit as avengers of his death, whose life, if you were to think it able to be restored by you, you would not wish,Ostentabile is that which constrains by a sure demonstration of the matter, just as Cicero in Catiline (1,2): "Here he nevertheless lives, nay even comes into the senate" The sentential is that which adduces a general sententia, as in Terence (Andr. 68):

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Obsequiousness begets friends, truth begets hatred.

[12] Exemplabile est, quod alicuius exempli conparatione eventum simile conminatur, sicut Cicero in Philippicis (2,1): "Te miror, Antoni, quorum exempla imitaris, eorum exitus non pertimescere"

[12] Exemplifiable is that which, by the comparison of some example, threatens a similar event, as Cicero in the Philippics (2,1): "I marvel at you, Antony, that you do not dread the outcomes of those whose examples you imitate"

[13] Collectivum est, cum in unum quae argumentata sunt colliguntur, sicut ait Cicero pro Milone (41): "Quem igitur cum gratia noluit, hunc voluit cum aliquorum querella. Quem iure, quem loco, quem tempore non est ausus: hunc iniuria, alieno tempore, cum periculo capitis non dubitavit occidere"

[13] Collective is, when the things that have been argued are gathered into one, as Cicero says in the Pro Milone (41): "Whom therefore he was unwilling to kill with favor, he wished to kill with the complaint of certain persons. Whom by right, in the proper place, at the proper time he did not dare: this man he did not hesitate to kill unjustly, at an alien time, with peril of his head."

[14] Praeterea secundum Victorinum enthymematis est altera definitio ex sola propositione, sicut iam dictum est, quae ita constat: Si tempestas vitanda est, non est navigatio requirenda.

[14] Moreover, according to Victorinus, there is another definition of the enthymeme from a single proposition, as has already been said, which consists thus: If the tempest is to be avoided, navigation is not to be sought.

[15] Ex sola adsumptione, ut est illud: Si inimicus est, occidit; inimicus autem [est]. Et quia illi deest conclusio, enthymema vocatur.

[15] From the assumption alone, as is this: If he is an enemy, he dies; however, an enemy [he is]. And because the conclusion is lacking in it, it is called an enthymeme.

[16] Sequitur epichirema, descendens de ratiocinatione latior et executior rhetoricis syllogismis, latitudine distans et productione sermonis a dialecticis syllogismis, propter quod rhetoribus datur. Hic autem constat modis tribus. Primus modus tripertitus est, secundus quadripertitus, tertius quinquepertitus.

[16] Next follows the epicheirema, descending from ratiocination, broader and more fully carried out in rhetorical syllogisms, differing in latitude and in the prolongation of discourse from dialectical syllogisms, for which reason it is given to rhetors. This, moreover, consists in three modes. The first mode is tripartite, the second quadripartite, the third five-partite.

[17] Tripertitus epichirematicus syllogismus est, qui constat membris tribus, id est propositione, adsumptione, conclusione. Quadripertitus est, qui constat ex membris quattuor: prima propositione, secunda adsumptione et una propositionis sive adsumptionis coniuncta, tertia probatione et conclusione.

[17] The tripartite epichirematic syllogism is that which consists of three members, that is: proposition, assumption, conclusion. The quadripartite is that which consists of four members: first, the proposition; second, the assumption; third, one proof conjoined either to the proposition or to the assumption; fourth, the conclusion.

[18] Quinquepartitus itaque est, qui constat ex membris quinque, id est prima propositione, secunda eius probatione, tertia adsumptione, quarta eius probatione, quinta conclusione. Hunc Cicero ita facit in arte Rhetorica (de Inv. 1,12): "Si deliberatio et demonstratio genera sunt causarum, non possunt recte partes alicuius generis causae putari.

[18] Five-part, therefore, is that which consists of five members, that is: first the proposition, second its proof, third the assumption, fourth its proof, fifth the conclusion. Cicero thus presents this in the Rhetorical Art (On Invention 1.12): "If deliberation and demonstration are genera of causes, they cannot rightly be considered parts of any genus of cause.

Eadem enim res alii genus, alii pars esse potest; eidem genus et pars non potest, vel cetera, quousque syllogismi huius membra claudantur.

For the same thing can be a genus to one, a part to another; to the same it cannot be both genus and part, or the rest, until the members of this syllogism are closed.

X. DE LEGE.

10. ON LAW.

[1] Lex est constitutio populi, quam maiores natu cum plebibus sancierunt. Nam quod Rex vel Imperator edicit, constitutio vel edictum vocatur. Institutio aequitatis duplex est, nunc in legibus, nunc in moribus.

[1] Law is the constitution of the people, which the elders together with the plebeians have sanctioned. For what the King or the Emperor proclaims is called a constitution or an edict. The institution of equity is twofold, now in laws, now in customs.

Inter legem autem et mores hoc interest, quod lex scripta est, mos vero est vetustate probata consuetudo, sive lex non scripta. Nam lex a legendo vocata, quia scripta est.

Between law, however, and mores there is this difference, that law is written, but custom is a consuetude approved by antiquity, or an unwritten law. For law (lex) is called from reading (legendo), because it is written.

[2] Mos autem longa consuetudo est, de moribus tracta tantundem. Consuetudo autem est ius quoddam moribus institutum, quod pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex; nec differt scriptura an ratione consistat, quando et legem ratio conmendet.

[2] Custom, however, is a long consuetude, drawn from mores just the same. Consuetude, moreover, is a certain right (ius) established by mores, which is received in place of law (lex) when law fails; nor does it differ whether it rests on writing or on reason, since reason commends law as well.

[3] Porro si ratione lex consistat, lex erit omne iam quod ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni congruat, quod disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat. Vocata autem consuetudo, quia in communi est usu.

[3] Moreover, if law subsists by reason, then whatever has been established by reason will now be law, provided only that it be congruent with religion, that it be suitable to discipline, that it profit salvation. It is called custom, however, because it is in common use.

[4] Omnis autem lex aut permittit aliquid, ut "vir fortis petatpraemium" aut vetat, ut "sacrarum virginum nuptias nulli petere liceat" aut punit, ut "qui caedem fecerit, capite plectatur"

[4] Every law either permits something, as "let the brave man seek a reward," or forbids, as "let it be permitted to no one to seek the nuptials of sacred virgins," or punishes, as "whoever has committed murder, let him be capitally punished."

[5] Factae sunt autem leges, ut earum metu humana coherceatur audacia, tutaque sit inter inprobos innocentia, et in ipsis inprobis formidato supplicio refrenetur nocendi facultas. Legis enim praemio aut poena vita moderatur humana.

[5] Laws, moreover, were made so that by their fear human audacity may be coerced, and innocence may be safe among the wicked, and in the wicked themselves the faculty of harming may be reined in by the dreaded punishment. For by the law’s reward or punishment human life is moderated.

[6] Erit autem lex honesta, iusta, possibilis, secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriae, loco temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis, manifesta quoque, ne aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat, nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi civium utilitate conscripta.

[6] Moreover, a law will be honorable, just, possible, according to nature, according to the custom of the fatherland, suitable to place and to time, necessary, useful, and also manifest, lest it contain anything tending to entrapment through obscurity, with no private advantage, but composed for the common utility of the citizens.

XI. DE SENTENTIA.

11. ON JUDGMENT.

[1] Sententia est dictum inpersonale, ut (Ter. Andr. 68):

[1] Sententia is an impersonal dictum, as (Ter. Andr. 68):

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Obsequiousness begets friends, truth begets hatred.

Huic si persona fuerit adiecta, chria erit, ita: "offendit Achilles Agamemnonem vera dicendo,"Metrophanes promeruit gratiam Mithridatis obsequendo"

To this, if a person is added, it will be a chria, thus: "Achilles offends Agamemnon by speaking the truth,"Metrophanes earned the favor of Mithridates by being obsequious"

[2] Nam inter chrian et sententiam hoc interest, quod sententia sine persona profertur; chria sine persona numquam dicitur. Vnde si sententiae persona adiciatur, fit chria; si detrahatur, fit sententia.

[2] For between a chria and a sententia this is the difference: a sententia is uttered without a person; a chria is never said without a person. Whence, if a person be added to the sententia, it becomes a chria; if it be taken away, it becomes a sententia.

XII. DE CATASCEVA ET ANASCEVA.

12. ON CATASCEVA AND ANASCEVA.

[1] Catasceua est confirmatio propositae rei. Anasceua autem contraria superiori est. Revincit enim non fuisse, aut non esse, quod natum, aut factum, aut dictum esse proponitur; ut si quis Chimaeram neget fuisse, aut fuisse confirmet.

[1] Catasceua is the confirmation of the proposed matter. Anasceua, however, is contrary to the former. For it disproves that what is proposed to have been begotten, or done, or said either was not or is not; as, for instance, if someone should deny that the Chimera existed, or should confirm that it existed.

[2] Inter haec et thesin hoc interesse, quod thesis, quamvis et ipsa habeat disputationem in utramque partem, tamen incertae rei quasi quaedam deliberatio vel cohortatio est. Catasceua autem et anasceua in his rebus, quae verisimiles non sunt, sed pro veris proponuntur, plerumque versantur.

[2] Between these and the thesis this is the difference: although the thesis itself also has disputation on either side, nevertheless it is a certain kind of deliberation or exhortation concerning an uncertain matter. But Catasceua and Anasceua for the most part are engaged with those matters which are not verisimilar, but are put forward as true.

[3] Anasceuae prima divisio est inconveniens et mendacium. Inconvenientis species sunt, quod inhonestum est et quod inutile. Item inhonestum tractatur aut in dictis aut in factis.

[3] The first division of the anasceua is the incongruent and the falsehood. The species of the incongruent are what is dishonorable and what is useless. Likewise, the dishonorable is treated either in words or in deeds.

In dictis, ut si qui indecora et non respondentia auctoritati dixisse dicatur; velut si aliqui infamet Catonem illum Censorium, iuventutem illum ad nequitiam et luxuriam cohortatum.

In words, for example, if someone is said to have spoken things indecorous and not corresponding to his authority; as, for instance, if someone should defame that Cato the Censor, alleging that he exhorted the youth to depravity and luxury.

[4] In factis, ut si qui abhorrens aliquid a sanctimonia et nomine suo fecisse dicatur; ut est fabula de adulterio Martis et Veneris. Mendacium tres habet species: incredibile, quod factum non esse credatur, ut adolescentem, qui de Siculo litore ingredientes Africam classes viderit.

[4] In deeds, as when someone is said to have done something abhorrent to sanctity and to his own name; as is the fable about the adultery of Mars and Venus. A lie has three species: the incredible, which is believed not to have been done, as that a youth, who from the Sicilian shore saw fleets entering Africa.

[5] Inpossibile est ut Clodius insidias Miloni fecerit et idem occisus sit a Milone. Contrarium est; nam si insidias fecit, occidit. Occisus est; non fecit insidias.

[5] It is impossible that Clodius laid an ambush for Milo and that the same man was slain by Milo. It is the contrary; for if he laid the ambush, he killed. He was killed; he did not lay the ambush.

Haec distributio in contrarium reformata catasceua prodeerit. [Vt gradus omnes constituamus, honestum, utile, verisimile, possibile, consentaneum, vel ex diverso inhonestum, inutile, parum verisimile, inpossibile, contrarium.] Oportebit tamen principia sic ordinare, ut aut credendum esse veterum auctoritati, aut fabulis fidem non habendam esse dicamus.

This distribution, recast into the contrary, will be useful for the cataskue (construction). [So that we may establish all the degrees, the honorable, the useful, the verisimilar, the possible, the consentaneous, or, conversely, the dishonorable, the useless, the less verisimilar, the impossible, the contrary.] It will nevertheless be fitting to arrange the principles thus: that we either say the authority of the ancients is to be believed, or that faith is not to be given to fables.

[6] Et ad id postremum in anasceua requiramus, ne quid aliud significare voluerint, qui ista finxerunt: ut Scyllam non marinam, sed maritimam feminam, nec succinctam canibus, sed rapacem aliquam et inhospitalem venientibus extitisse.

[6] And for that last point in the anasceua let us inquire, lest those who fashioned these things should have wished to signify something else: that Scylla was not a marine, but a maritime woman, and not girded with dogs, but some rapacious and inhospitable one to those who came.

XIII. DE PROSOPOEIA.

13. ON PROSOPOPOEIA.

[1] Prosopoeia est, cum inanimalium et persona et sermo fingitur. Cicero in Catilina (1,27): "Etenim si mecum patria mea, quae mihi vita mea multo est carior, loqueretur, dicens,et cetera.

[1] Prosopopoeia is when both the persona and the discourse of inanimate things are feigned. Cicero in In Catiline (1,27): "For indeed, if my fatherland, which is much dearer to me than my life, were to speak with me, saying, and so forth."

[2] Sic et montes et flumina vel arbores loquentes inducimus, personam inponentes rei quae non habet naturam loquendi; quod et tragoedis usitatum et in orationibus frequentissime invenitur.

[2] Thus also we introduce mountains and rivers, or trees, as speaking, imposing a persona upon a thing that does not have the nature of speaking; which is customary among tragedians and is found most frequently in orations.

XIV. DE ETHOPOEIA.

XIV. ON ETHOPOEIA.

[1] Ethopoeiam vero illam vocamus, in qua hominis personam fingimus pro exprimendis affectibus aetatis, studii, fortunae, laetitiae, sexus, maeroris, audaciae. Nam cum piratae persona suscipitur, audax, abrupta, temeraria erit oratio: cum feminae sermo simulatur, sexui convenire debet oratio: iam vero adolescentis et senis, et militis et imperatoris, et parasiti et rustici et philosophi diversa oratio dicenda est.

[1] But we call that ethopoeia, in which we fashion the person of a human for expressing the affections of age, pursuit, fortune, joy, sex, grief, audacity. For when the persona of a pirate is assumed, the speech will be bold, abrupt, reckless: when the speech of a woman is simulated, the speech ought to befit the sex: and moreover the youth’s and the old man’s, and the soldier’s and the commander’s, and the parasite’s and the rustic’s and the philosopher’s different speech must be spoken.

[2] Aliter enim loquitur gaudio affectus, aliter vulneratus. In quo genere dictionis illa sunt maxime cogitanda, quis loquatur et apud quem, de quo et ubi et quo tempore: quid egerit, quid acturus sit, aut quid pati possit, si haec consulta neclexerit.

[2] For one affected by joy speaks in one way, another when wounded. In this genre of diction the following are most to be cogitated: who is speaking and before whom, about what and where and at what time; what he has done, what he is about to do, or what he may be able to suffer, if he should neglect these considerations.

XV. DE GENERIBVS QVAESTIONVM.

15. ON THE KINDS OF QUESTIONS.

[1] Genera quaestionum duo sunt, quorum unum est finitum, alterum infinitum. Finitum UPOTHESIS Graece, Latine causa dicitur, ubi cum certa persona controversia est.

[1] There are two kinds of questions, of which one is finite, the other infinite. The finite is called HYPOTHESIS in Greek, in Latin “cause,” where the controversy is with a definite person.

[2] Infinitum, quod Graece THESIS, Latine propositum nominatur. Hoc personam non habet certam, nec inest [in] aliqua certa circumstantia, id est, nec locus, nec tempus. In causa vero certa omnia sunt, unde quasi pars causae est propositum.

[2] The infinite, which in Greek is called THESIS, in Latin is named propositum. This has no definite person, nor does it lie [in] any definite circumstance, that is, neither place nor time. But in a definite cause all things are definite, whence the propositum is, as it were, a part of the cause.

XVI. DE ELOCVTIONE.

16. ON ELOCUTION.

[1] Iam vero in elocutionibus illud uti oportebit, ut res, locus, tempus, persona audientis efflagitat, ne profana religiosis, ne inverecunda castis, ne levia gravibus, ne lasciva seriis, ne ridicula tristibus misceantur. Latine autem et perspicue loquendum.

[1] Now indeed in elocutions one ought to employ this: as the matter, the place, the time, and the person of the hearer demand, let not the profane be mixed with the religious, nor the immodest with the chaste, nor the light with the grave, nor the lascivious with the serious, nor the ridiculous with the sad. Moreover, one must speak in Latin and perspicuously.

[2] Latine autem loquitur, qui verba rerum vera et naturalia persequitur, nec a sermone atque cultu praesentis temporis discrepat. Huic non sit satis videre quid dicat, nisi id quoque aperte et suaviter dicere; ne id quidem tantum, nisi id quod dicat et facere.

[2] But he speaks Latin who pursues words of things that are true and natural, and does not diverge from the speech and cultivation of the present time. For him it should not be enough to see what he says, unless also to say it openly and sweetly; nor even that only, unless also to do what he says.

XVII. DE TRIMODO DICENDI GENERE.

17. ON THE THREEFOLD KIND OF SPEAKING.

[1] Dicenda sunt quoque summissa leniter, incitata graviter, inflexa moderate. Hoc est enim illud trimodum genus dicendi: humile, medium, grandiloquum. Cum enim magna dicimus, granditer proferenda sunt; cum parva dicimus, subtiliter; cum mediocria, temperate.

[1] Things must also be spoken lowered gently, incited gravely, inflected moderately. For this is that trimodal kind of speaking: humble, middle, grandiloquent. For when we say great things, they must be brought forth grandly; when we say small things, subtly; when moderate things, temperately.

[2] Nam in parvis causis nihil grande, nihil sublime dicendum est, sed leni ac pedestri more loquendum. In causis autem maioribus, ubi de Deo vel hominum salute referimus, plus magnificentiae et fulgoris est exhibendum.

[2] For in small causes nothing grand, nothing sublime ought to be said, but one should speak in a gentle and pedestrian manner. In greater causes, however, where we treat of God or of the salvation of men, more magnificence and splendor is to be exhibited.

[3] In temperatis vero causis, ubi nihil agitur ut agat, sed tantummodo ut delectetur auditor, inter utrumque moderate dicendum est: sed et quamvis de magnis rebus quisque dicat, non tamen semper granditer docere debet, sed summisse, cum docet; temperate, cum aliquid laudat vel vituperat; granditer, cum ad conversionem aversos animos provocat. Vtenda tamen verba in summisso genere sufficientia, in temperato splendentia, in grandi vehementia.

[3] In balanced causes, in truth, where nothing is being pursued to produce action, but only that the auditor be delighted, one must speak moderately between the two: yet even if someone speaks about great matters, nevertheless he ought not always to teach grandly, but submissively, when he teaches; temperately, when he lauds or vituperates something; grandly, when he provokes averse minds to conversion. The words, however, are to be used sufficient in the low style, splendent in the temperate, vehement in the grand.

XVIII. DE COLO, COMMATE, ET PERIODIS.

18. ON THE COLON, THE COMMA, AND THE PERIODS.

[1] Conponitur autem instruiturque omnis oratio verbis, comma et colo et periodo. Comma particula est sententiae. Colon membrum.

[1] Moreover, every oration is composed and arranged by words, by the comma, the colon, and the period. A comma is a particle of a sentence. A colon is a member.

Periodos ambitus vel circuitus. Fit autem ex coniunctione verborum comma, ex commate colon, ex colo periodos.

A period is an ambit or circuit. Moreover, from the conjunction of words a comma is formed; from a comma, a colon; from a colon, a period.

[2] Comma est iuncturae finitio, utputa (Cic. Mil. 1): "Etsi vereor, iudices,ecce unum comma; sequitur et aliud comma: "ne turpe sit pro fortissimo viro dicere,et factum est colon, id est membrum, quod intellectum sensui praestat; sed adhuc pendet oratio, sicque deinde ex pluribus membris fit periodos, id est extrema sententiae clausula: "ita veterem iudiciorum morem requirunt" Periodos autem longior esse non debet quam ut uno spiritu proferatur.

[2] A comma is the termination of a juncture, to wit (Cic. Mil. 1): "Although I fear, judges,ecce one comma; another comma follows: "lest it be shameful to speak on behalf of a most brave man,and a colon has been made, that is, a member, which provides understanding to the sense; but the speech still hangs, and thus thereafter from several members a period is formed, that is, the final clause of the sentence: "thus they require the ancient custom of trials" A period, moreover, ought not to be longer than to be delivered with one breath.

XIX. DE VITIIS LITTERARVM ET VERBORVM ET SENTENTIARVM CAVENDIS.

19. ON THE FAULTS OF LETTERS AND WORDS AND SENTENCES TO BE AVOIDED.

[1] Praeterea purum et honestum oratoris eloquium carere debet omnibus vitiis tam in litteris, quam in verbis, quam etiam in sententiis.

[1] Moreover, the pure and honorable eloquence of the orator ought to be free of all vices, as much in letters, as in words, as also in sentences.

[2] In litteris, ut iunctura apta et conveniens sit; et sic observandum, ne praecedentis verbi extrema vocalis in eandem vocalem primam incidat verbi sequentis, ut "feminae Aegyptiae" Quae structura melior fit, si consonantes vocalibus adplicantur. Trium quoque consonantium, quae in se incidentes stridere et quasi rixare videntur, vitanda iunctura est, id est, R, S, X, ut: "ars studiorum,"rex Xerxes,"error Romuli" Fugienda est et consonans M inlisa vocalibus, ut "verum enim"

[2] In letters, that the juncture be apt and suitable; and thus it must be observed, lest the last vowel of the preceding word fall onto the same first vowel of the following word, as "feminae Aegyptiae" Which structure becomes better if consonants are applied to vowels. The juncture of three consonants also is to be avoided, which, colliding with one another, seem to hiss and, as it were, to quarrel, that is, R, S, X, as: "ars studiorum,"rex Xerxes,"error Romuli" To be shunned, too, is the consonant M dashed against vowels, as "verum enim"

XX. DE IVNCTVRIS VERBORVM.

20. ON THE JUNCTURES OF WORDS.

[1] In verbis quoque cavenda sunt vitia, ut non inpropria verba ponantur, quae Graeci Acyrologian vocant. Amanda est ergo proprietas, sic tamen ut aliquando propter humilitatem sordidi aut spurci vocabuli translatis nominibus sit utendum, non tamen longe accitis, sed ut veris proxima et cognata videantur.

[1] In words too faults must be guarded against, so that improper words are not employed, which the Greeks call Acyrology. Propriety is therefore to be cherished, yet in such a way that sometimes, on account of the lowliness of a sordid or filthy term, one should use transferred names—not, however, fetched from far, but such as may seem near to the true ones and cognate.

[2] Fugienda etiam Hyperbata longiora, quae fieri sine aliorum sensuum confusione non possunt. Ambiguitas quoque et vitium illud cavendum, cum quidam iactatione eloquentiae ducti, quod uno aut duobus verbis significare poterant, interpositis inanibus vocibus longa et circumflexa ambage concludunt: quod vitium Perissologia[n] vocatur.

[2] Longer Hyperbata too must be avoided, which cannot be made without a confusion of other senses. Ambiguity likewise, and that vice must be guarded against, when certain people, led by a vaunting of eloquence, what they could have signified with one or two words, with inane words interposed, they conclude in a long and circuitous circumlocution: which vice is called Perissologia[n].

[3] Cui contrarium criminis vitium est et brevitatis studio etiam necessaria verba furari. Fugienda sunt quoque, sicut in litteris et verbis, ita et in sententiis vitia, quae inter prima Grammaticorum studia cognoscuntur.

[3] The contrary fault to this is a blameworthy one: out of zeal for brevity to pilfer even necessary words. Faults, too, are to be shunned, just as in letters and in words, so also in sentences, which are recognized among the first studies of the Grammarians.

[4] Sunt autem Cacemphaton, Tautologia, Ellipsis, Acyrologia, Macrologia, Perissologia, Pleonasmos et his similia. At contra orationem extollit et exornat †energia tum† Emphasis, quae plus quiddam quam dixerit intellegi facit; ut si dicas: "Ad gloriam Scipionis ascendit,et Vergilius (Aen. 2,262):

[4] There are moreover Cacemphaton, Tautology, Ellipsis, Acyrology, Macrology, Perissology, Pleonasm, and things similar to these. But on the contrary it lifts up and adorns speech, †energia then† Emphasis, which makes something more than what has been said be understood; as if you were to say: "He ascended to the glory of Scipio,"and Vergil (Aen. 2,262):

Demissum lapsi per funem.

Having slipped down by the lowered rope.

Cum enim dicit lapsi, altitudinis imaginem suggerit. Huic contraria virtus est, verbis minuere quae natura sua magna sunt.

For when he says “slipped,” he suggests an image of altitude. The contrary virtue to this is to diminish by words things that are great by their own nature.

XXI. DE FIGVRIS VERBORVM ET SENTENTIARVM.

21. ON THE FIGURES OF WORDS AND SENTENCES.

[1] Augetur et ornatur oratio etiam figuris verborum ac sententiarum. Nam quia directa et perpetua oratio fatigationem atque fastidium tam dicendi quam audiendi creat, flectenda est et in alias versanda formas, ut et dicentem reficiat, et ornatior fiat, et iudicem diverso vultu audituque deflectat. E quibus plurimae superius a Donato in schematibus artis Grammaticae adnotatae sunt.

[1] The oration is also augmented and adorned by figures of words and of sentences. For since a direct and continuous oration creates fatigue and distaste both for speaking and for hearing, it must be bent and turned into other forms, so that it may both refresh the speaker, become more ornate, and deflect the judge with a different countenance and hearing. Of these many have been noted above by Donatus in the schemata of the art of Grammar.

[2] Vnde tantum illa hic interponi oportuit, quae in poemate aut numquam aut difficulter fiunt, in oratione autem libere.

[2] Hence it was proper that only those things be interposed here which in a poem are either never done or done with difficulty, but in an oration, however, freely.

[3] [Anadiplosis est congeminatio verborum, ut (Cic. Catil. 1,2): "hic tamen vivit, vivit, etiam in senatum venit"

[3] [Anadiplosis is the congemination of words, as (Cic. Catil. 1,2): "yet this man lives, he lives, he even comes into the senate"

[4] Climax est gradatio, cum ab eo, quo sensus superior terminatur, inferior incipit, ac dehinc quasi per gradus dicendi ordo servatur, ut est illud Africani: "ex innocentia nascitur dignitas, ex dignitate honor, ex honore imperium, ex imperio libertas" Hanc figuram nonnulli catenam appellant, propter quod aliud in alio quasi nectitur nomine, atque ita res plures in geminatione verborum trahuntur. Fit autem hoc schema non solum in singulis verbis, sed etiam in contexione verborum, ut apud Gracchum: "pueritia tua adulescentiae tuae inhonestamentum fuit, adulescentia senectuti dedecoramentum, senectus reipublicae flagitium" Sic et apud Scipionem: "vi atque ingratis coactus cum illo sponsionem feci, facta sponsione ad iudicem adduxi, adductum primo coetu damnavi, damnatum ex voluntate dimisi"

[4] Climax is gradation, when from that on which the prior sense ends the subsequent begins, and thereafter, as if by steps, the order of speaking is observed, as is that saying of Africanus: "from innocence is born dignity, from dignity honor, from honor command, from command liberty." Some call this figure a chain, because one thing is, as it were, bound to another by name, and thus several things are drawn along in the gemination of words. Moreover, this schema is formed not only in single words, but also in the contexture of words, as in Gracchus: "your boyhood was a disgrace to your adolescence, your adolescence a dishonor to your old age, your old age a scandal to the commonwealth." So too in Scipio: "by force and with them unwilling, compelled, I made a sponsion with that man; the sponsion having been made, I led him to the judge; having been led, at the first session I condemned him; condemned, I released him at will."

[5] Antitheta, quae Latine contraposita appellantur: quae, dum ex adverso ponuntur, sententiae pulchritudinem faciunt, et in ornamento locutionis decentissima existunt, ut Cicero (Catil. 2,25): "ex hac parte pudor pugnat, illinc petulantia; hinc pudicitia, illinc stuprum; hinc fides, illinc fraudatio; hinc pietas, illinc scelus; hinc constantia, illinc furor; hinc honestas, illinc turpitudo; hinc continentia, illinc libido; hinc denique aequitas, temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia, virtutes omnes certant cum iniquitate, luxuria, ignavia, temeritate, cum vitiis omnibus; postremo copia cum egestate; bona ratio cum perdita; mens sana cum amentia; bona denique spes cum omnium rerum desperatione confligit" In huiusmodi certamine ac praelio, huiusmodi locutionis ornamento liber Ecclesiasticus usus est, dicens (33,15): "contra malum bonum, et contra mortem vita: sic contra pium peccator: et sic intuere in omnia opera altissimi, bina et bina, unum contra unum"

[5] Antitheta, which in Latin are called contraposita: which, when they are set from the opposite side, make the beauty of the sentence, and exist as most becoming in the ornament of locution, as in Cicero (Catil. 2,25): "on this side modesty fights, on that side petulance; here chastity, there debauchery; here faith, there defraudation; here piety, there crime; here constancy, there fury; here honor, there turpitude; here continence, there libido; here at last equity, temperance, fortitude, prudence, all the virtues contend with iniquity, luxury, sloth, temerity, with all the vices; finally plenty with poverty; good reason with ruined (reason); a sound mind with madness; good hope at last clashes with the desperation of all things." In a contest and battle of this kind, the book Ecclesiasticus used this ornament of such a locution, saying (33,15): "against evil, good, and against death, life: thus against the pious, the sinner: and thus look upon all the works of the Most High, two by two, one against one."

[6] Synonymia est, quotiens in conexa oratione pluribus verbis unam rem significamus, ut ait Cicero (Catil. 1,8): "nihil agis, nihil moliris, nihil cogitas" Et item (Catil. 1,10): "non feram, non patiar, non sinam"

[6] Synonymy is, whenever in connected discourse we signify one and the same thing by several words, as Cicero says (Catil. 1,8): "you do nothing, you undertake nothing, you think nothing." And likewise (Catil. 1,10): "I will not bear, I will not endure, I will not allow."

[7] Epanodos, quam regressionem nostri vocant (Cic. Ligar. 19): "principium dignitas erat pene par; non par fortasse eorum, quae sequebantur"

[7] Epanodos, which our people call regression (Cic. Ligar. 19): "the dignity of the beginning was nearly equal; perhaps not equal to those things which followed"

[8] Antapodosis, quotiens media primis et ultimis conveniunt [ut est] (Cic. c. cont. Metell.

[8] Antapodosis, whenever the middle convene with the first and the last [as in] (Cic. c. cont. Metell.

frag. 5): "vestrum iam hoc factum reprehendo, patres conscripti, non meum, ac pulcherrimum quidem factum: verum, ut dixi, non meum, sed vestrum"

frag. 5): "I now censure this deed as yours, Conscript Fathers, not mine, and indeed a most beautiful deed: but, as I said, not mine, but yours"

[9] Paradiastole est, quotiens id, quod dicimus, interpretatione discernimus (cf. Rutil. Lup. 1,4): "cum te pro astuto sapientem appellas, pro inconsiderato fortem, pro inliberali diligentem"

[9] Paradiastole is, whenever we distinguish what we say by interpretation (cf. Rutil. Lup. 1,4): "when, for ‘astute’, you call yourself ‘wise’; for ‘inconsiderate’, ‘brave’; for ‘illiberal’, ‘diligent’"

[10] Antanaclasis est, quae eodem verbo contrarium exprimit sensum. Querebatur quidam de filio, cum mortem suam expectaret, respondente: "non expecto, immo peto, inquit, ut expectes"

[10] Antanaclasis is that which with the same verb expresses a contrary sense. A certain man was complaining about his son, as he was awaiting his own death, the son replying: "I do not expect it; rather I ask," he says, "that you await it."

[11] Antimetabole est conversio verborum, quae ordine mutato contrarium efficit sensum: " non ut edam vivo, sed ut vivam edo" Et illud (Cic. Phil. 4,8): "si consul Antonius, Brutus hostis: si conservator reipublicae Brutus, hostis Antonius"

[11] Antimetabole is a conversion of words, which, with the order changed, produces an opposite sense: " non that I may eat do I live, but that I may live I eat." And that one (Cic. Phil. 4,8): "if Antony is consul, Brutus is an enemy: if Brutus is the conservator of the Republic, Antony is an enemy."

[12] Exoche (Cic. Mil. 59): "Quis eos appellavit?

[12] Exoche (Cic. Mil. 59): "Who called them?

Appius. Quis produxit? Appius"

Appius. Who brought them forward? Appius"

[13] Nunc figuras sententiarum, quas operae pretium sit cognoscere, persequamur.

[13] Now let us pursue the figures of thought, which it is worth the effort to know.

[14] Sententia est dictum inpersonale, ut (Ter. Andr. 68):

[14] A sententia is an impersonal dictum, as (Ter. Andria 68):

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Obsequiousness produces friends, truth engenders hatred.

Huic si persona fuerit adiecta, Chria erit, ita: "offendit Achilles Agamemnonem vera dicendo" "Metrophanes promeruit gratiam Mithridatis obsequendo" Nam inter chriam et sententiam hoc interest, quod sententia sine persona profertur, chria sine persona numquam dicitur. Vnde si sententiae persona adiciatur, fit chria; si detrahatur, fit sententia.

To this, if a persona be added, it will be a Chria, thus: "Achilles offended Agamemnon by speaking the truth" "Metrophanes earned the favor of Mithridates by obsequing." For between a chria and a sententia this is the difference, that a sententia is uttered without a persona; a chria is never said without a persona. Whence, if a persona be added to a sententia, it becomes a chria; if it be taken away, it becomes a sententia.

[15] Sententiarum species multae. Aliae enim sunt indicativae, aliae sunt pronuntiativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 4,373):

[15] There are many species of sententiae. For some are indicative, others are pronuntiative, as (Virg. Aen. 4,373):

Nusquam tuta fides;

Faith is safe nowhere;

aliae imperativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 4,223):

others are imperative, as (Virg. Aen. 4,223):

Vade, age, nate, voca Zephyros, et labere pinnis.

Go, come now, son, call the Zephyrs, and glide on your pinions.

Aliae admirativae (Virg. Aen. 1,11):

Others are exclamatory (Virg. Aen. 1,11):

Tantaene animis caelestibus irae?

Is there so great a wrath in celestial minds?

[16] Aliae conparativae (Lucil. iv. frag.?):

[16] Other comparatives (Lucil. 4. frag.?):

Si vinco et pereo, quid ibi me vincere praestat?

If I conquer and perish, what advantage is there for me to conquer there?

Aliae superlativae, quae cum aliquo motu animi et indignatione promuntur (Virg. Aen. 3,57):

Other superlatives, which are put forth with some emotion of mind and indignation (Verg. Aen. 3,57):

Quid non mortalia pectora coges,
auri sacra fames!

To what do you not compel mortal hearts,
accursed hunger for gold!

[17] Aliae interrogativae [ut] (Virg. Aen. 8,113):

[17] Other interrogatives [as] (Virgil, Aeneid 8,113):

Iuvenes, quae causa subegit
ignotas temptare vias?

Youths, what cause compelled you
to attempt unknown ways?

Quid genus, unde domum? Pacemne huc fertis, an arma?

What is your race, whence [is your] home? Do you bring peace hither, or arms?

[18] Aliae responsivae, ut "illinc,"istinc" Aliae deprecativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 6,365):

[18] Others are responsive, as "from there,"from that side" Others are deprecative, as (Virgil, Aeneid 6,365):

Eripe me his, invicte, malis!

Snatch me from these evils, invincible one!

Aliae promissivae, ut (Virg. Aen. 1,257):

Others promissive, as (Virg. Aen. 1,257):

Parce metu, manent inmota tuorum.

Cease from fear; unmoved remain what is yours.

Aliae concessivae quae inpulsione prohibeant, ut (Virg. Aen. 4,381):

Others are concessive, which by impulsion prohibit, as (Virg. Aen. 4,381):

I, sequere Italiam ventis, pete regna per undas.

Go, follow Italy on the winds; seek the realms through the waves.

Quae tamen ne non intellecta sit persuasio, permixta sunt aliqua quae vetent latenter, ut "ventis,"per undas"

Yet, lest the persuasion not be understood, some things are mixed in which forbid covertly, as "with the winds,"through the waves"

Aliae demonstrativae, ut: "en,"ecce" Aliae optativae, ut (Virg. Aen. 8,560):

Other demonstratives, such as: "en,"ecce" Other optatives, such as (Virg. Aen. 8,560):

O mihi praeteritos referat si Iuppiter annos.

O if Jupiter would bring back to me the years gone by.

[19] Aliae derogativae, ut: "nequaquam" Aliae, quae cum exclamatione proferuntur, ut (Petron. 68):

[19] Others are derogative, as: "by no means" Others, which are uttered with exclamation, as (Petron. 68):

Quis furor, o cives, pacem convertit in arma?

What fury, O citizens, has converted peace into arms?

Et Cicero (Cat. 1,9): "O dii inmortales, ubinam gentium sumus?’

And Cicero (Cat. 1,9): "O immortal gods, where in the world are we?"

[20] Aliae exhortativae, cum ad sententiam provocamus, ut (Virg. Aen. 8,364):

[20] Other exhortatives, when we appeal to the judgment, as (Virg. Aen. 8,364):

Aude, hospes, contemnere opes.

Dare, guest, to contemn wealth.

[21] Aliae dehortativae, cum a contrario vitio peccatoque reducimus. Sunt et adfirmativae, ut: "quidni,"quippe"

[21] Others are dehortative, when we bring back from the contrary vice and sin. There are also affirmative ones, such as: "why not,"indeed"

[22] Praeceptivae, ut (cf. Virg. Georg. 1,299):

[22] Preceptive, as (cf. Virgil, Georgics 1,299):

Nudus ara, sere nudus, et habebis frigore messes.

Plough naked, sow naked, and you will have harvests in the cold.

[23] Vetativae, ut (Virg. Georg. 2,299):

[23] Prohibitives, as (Virgil, Georgics 2, 299):

Neve inter vites corylum sere, neve flagella
summa pete.

Do not sow a hazel among the vines, nor seek cuttings
from the very tops.

[24] Negativae, ut: "non,"minime" Sunt et mirativae, ut (Hieronym. epist. ad Rust.

[24] Negatives, as: "non,"minime" There are also miratives, as (Jerome, epistle to Rust.

4,6) "Papae! vivere non licet, et fornicare libet?’

4,6) "Good heavens! to live is not licit, and to fornicate is pleasing?’

[25] Dolentis, [ut] (cf. Ovid, Heroid. 5,149):

[25] Of the grieving, [as] (cf. Ovid, Heroides 5,149):

Ei mihi, quod nullus amor est sanabilis herbis.

Ah me, that no love is curable by herbs.

Flentis [ut]. Similitudinis, sic (Virg. Aen. 5,588):

Of one weeping [as]. Of similitude, thus (Virgil, Aeneid 5,588):

Vt quondam Creta fertur Labyrinthus in alta.

As once the Labyrinth is said to have been in high Crete.

Admonentis [ut]. Inridentis [ut]. Gementis [ut]. Exhortativae [ut]. Consolativae [ut]. Conmiserantis [ut]. Quorum quot sunt figurae, tot et in pronuntiando voces.

Of admonishing [as]. Of mocking [as]. Of groaning [as]. Exhortative [as]. Consolatory [as]. Of commiserating [as]. Of which, as many figures as there are, so many likewise, in delivery, are the voices.

[26] Sunt et Amphidoxae, quarum pars honesta est, pars inhonesta, ut (Ovid, Met. 2,53):

[26] There are also Amphidoxae, of which one part is honest, the other inhonest, as (Ovid, Met. 2, 53):

Non est tua tuta voluntas:
magna petis, Phaithon.

Your will is not safe:
you seek great things, Phaithon.

[27] Sunt et aliae, procatalempsis, cum id, quod nobis obici puterat, ante praesumimus ad diluendum, ut (Cic. Div. in Caec.

[27] There are others as well, procatalepsis, when that which was going to be objected against us we anticipate beforehand for refutation, as (Cic. Div. in Caec.

1): "Si quis vestrum iudices, aut eorum, qui adsunt, forte mirantur" Sunt et aporiae, dubitatio simulantis nescire se quae scit, aut quomodo dicatur.

1): "If any of you, judges, or of those who are present, happen by chance to wonder" There are also aporiae, a dubitation of one pretending not to know what he knows, or how it is to be said.

[28] Koeno(no)sis autem dicitur conmunicatio consilii cum iudicibus aut adversariis, ut si dicas: "Vos consulo, iudices, aut vos adversarii, quid me facere convenerit, aut quid vos facturi fuissetis"

[28] But Koeno(no)sis is called a communicatio of counsel with the judges or with the adversaries, as if you say: "I consult you, judges, or you, adversaries, what it would have been fitting for me to do, or what you would have done."

[29] Paradoxon est, cum dicimus inopinatum aliquid accidisse, ut Flacco Cicero (cf. Flacc. 1): "Cuius laudis praedicator esse debuerit, eius periculi deprecatorem esse factum"

[29] A paradox is when we say that something unexpected has happened, as Cicero for Flaccus (cf. Flacc. 1): "He has become the deprecator of the peril of the very man whose praise he ought to have been the herald."

[30] Epitrope, id est permissio, cum aliqua ipsis iudicibus aut adversariis permittimus aestimanda, ut Calvus in Vati[ci]nio: "Perfrica frontem, et dic te digniorem qui praetor fieres quam Catonem"

[30] Epitrope, that is, permission, is when we allow certain things to be assessed by the judges themselves or by the adversaries, as Calvus in the Vati[ci]nio: "Rub your brow, and say that you are more worthy to become praetor than Cato."

[31] Parrhesia est oratio libertatis et fiduciae plena (Cic. Mil. 72): "occidi non Spurium Maelium,et cetera.

[31] Parrhesia is an oration full of liberty and confidence (Cic. Mil. 72): "I did not kill Spurius Maelius,and the rest.

Qua figura caute utendum est, ut Cicero: praemisit enim factionem.

This figure must be used cautiously, as Cicero does: for he premised “faction.”

[32] Ethopoeia est, cum sermonem ex aliena persona inducimus, ut pro Caelio Tullius facit Appium Caecum cum Clodia loquentem.

[32] Ethopoeia is, when we introduce a discourse from another persona, as Tullius, on behalf of Caelius, makes Appius Caecus speaking with Clodia.

[33] Energia est rerum gestarum aut quasi gestarum sub oculis inductio, de qua locuti iam sumus.

[33] Energia is the induction of deeds done, or as if done, under the eyes, of which we have already spoken.

[34] Metathesis est, quae mittit animos iudicum in res praeteritas aut futuras, hoc modo: "Revocate mentis ad spectaculum expugnatae miserae civitatis, et videre vos credite incendia, caedes, rapinas, direptiones, liberorum corporum iniurias, captivitates matronarum, trucidationes senum" In futurum autem anticipatio eorum, quae dicturus est adversarius, ut Tullio pro Milone, cum mittit animos iudicum in eum reipublicae statum, (qui) futurus est, etiamsi occiso Milone Clodius viveret.

[34] Metathesis is that which sends the minds of the judges into things past or future, in this way: "Call back your minds to the spectacle of a captured, wretched city, and believe that you see conflagrations, slaughters, rapines, plunderings, injuries to the bodies of children, captivities of matrons, butcheries of old men." Into the future, however, it is an anticipation of those things which the adversary is going to say, as in Tullius on behalf of Milo, when he sends the minds of the judges into that condition of the commonwealth, (which) will be, even if, with Milo slain, Clodius were alive.

[35] Aposiopesis est, cum id, quod dicturi videbamur, silentio intercipimus (Virg. Aen. 1,135):

[35] Aposiopesis is, when that which we seemed about to say we cut off by silence (Virg. Aen. 1,135):

Quos ego, sed motos praestat conponere fluctus.

Whom I—, but it is better to compose the stirred waves.

[36] Epanalempsis est digressio: "Tulit calor me dicendi et dignitas rerum paulo longius quam volebam, sed redeo ad causam"

[36] Epanalempsis is a digression: "The heat of speaking and the dignity of the matters carried me a little farther than I wished, but I return to the cause."

[37] Anamnesis est commemoratio eius rei, quod oblitos fuisse nos fingimus.

[37] Anamnesis is the commemoration of that matter which we feign that we have forgotten.

[38] †Aparisis† est, cum id, quod in animos iudicum quasi deposueramus, opportune reposcimus.

[38] †Aparisis† is when we opportunely demand back that which we had, as it were, deposited into the minds of the judges.

[39] Aetiologia est, cum proponimus aliquid, eiusque causam et rationem reddimus.

[39] Aetiology is, when we set forth something, and give its cause and reason.

[40] Characterismus, descriptio figurae alicuius expressa, ut (Virg. Aen. 4,558):

[40] Characterismus, an expressed description of some figure, as (Virgil, Aeneid 4.558):

Omnia Mercurio similis, vocemque coloremque
et crines flavos et membra decora iuventa.

In all things like Mercury, both voice and complexion,
and blond hair and limbs comely with youth.

ATHROISMOS, cum plures sensus breviter expeditos in unum locum coacervant, et cum quadam festinatione decurrit, ut Cicero (Cic. Catil. 3,1): "Rempublicam, Quirites, vitamque omnium vestrorum, bona, fortunas, coniuges, liberosque vestros,et cetera.

ATHROISMOS, when several senses, briefly set forth, are heaped together into one place, and it runs through with a certain haste, as Cicero (Cic. Catil. 3,1): "The Republic, Quirites, and the life of all of you, your goods, fortunes, wives, and children, and the rest.

[41] Ironia est, cum per simulationem diversum quam dicit intellegi cupit. Fit autem aut cum laudamus eum quem vituperare volumus, aut vituperamus quem laudare volumus. Vtriusque exemplum erit, si dicas amatorem reipublicae Catilinam, hostem reipublicac Scipionem.

[41] Irony is, when by simulation he desires that the contrary to what he says be understood. It happens either when we praise him whom we wish to censure, or we censure him whom we wish to praise. An example of both will be, if you say Catiline a lover of the republic, Scipio an enemy of the republic.

[42] Diasyrmos ea, quae magna sunt, verbis minuit, aut minima extollit.

[42] Diasyrmos diminishes with words those things which are great, or extols the very smallest.

[43] †Efon† est, quotiens in eodem sensu diutius immoramur: "Cui tandem pepercit? cuius amicitiae fidem custodivit? cui bono inimicus non fuit?

[43] †Efon† is, whenever we linger longer on the same sense: "Whom, then, did he spare? whose friendship’s fidelity did he guard? to what good man was he not an enemy?"

quando non aut accusavit aliquem, aut verberavit, aut prodidit?’

when did he not either accuse someone, or flog, or betray?’

[44] Epangelia est promissio, qua iudicem adtentum facimus, pollicentes nos aliqua magna aut minima dicturos.

[44] Epangelia is a promise, by which we make the judge attentive, promising that we will say some things, great or small.

[45] Prosopopoeia est, cum inanimalium et persona et sermo fingitur. Cicero in Catilina (1,27): "etenim si mecum patria mea, quae mihi vita mea multo est carior, loqueretur dicens,et cetera.

[45] Prosopopoeia is when of inanimate things both the persona and the speech are feigned. Cicero in the Catilinarian (1,27): "for indeed, if my fatherland, which is by much dearer to me than my life, were to speak with me, saying,and so on."

[46] Parathesis est, cum quasi deponimus aliquid inperfectum apud memoriam iudicum, repetituros nos dicentes, cum oportunum fuerit.

[46] Parathesis is, when, as it were, we deposit something imperfect with the memory of the judges, saying that we will resume it when it shall be opportune.

[47] Peusis, id est soliloquium, cum ad interrogata ipsi nobis respondemus.

[47] Peusis, that is, soliloquy, when, to questions posed, we ourselves respond to ourselves.

[48] Synaeresis est, cum differimus aliquid, petentes ut aliud interim nos permittant dicere].

[48] Synaeresis is, when we defer something, petitioning that they permit us in the meantime to say something else].

XXII. DE DIALECTICA.

22. ON DIALECTIC.

[1] Dialectica est disciplina ad disserendas rerum causas inventa. Ipsa est philosophiae species, quae Logica dicitur, id est rationalis definiendi, quaerendi et disserendi potens. Docet enim in pluribus generibus quaestionum quemadmodum disputando vera et falsa diiudicentur.

[1] Dialectic is a discipline invented for discoursing about the causes of things. It is itself a species of philosophy, which is called Logic, that is, rational and potent for defining, inquiring, and discoursing. For it teaches, in many kinds of questions, how by disputation the true and the false are adjudged.

[2] Hanc quidam primi philosophi in suis dictionibus habuerunt; non tamen ad artis redegere peritiam. Post hos Aristoteles ad regulas quasdam huius doctrinae argumenta perduxit, et Dialecticam nuncupavit, pro eo quod in ea de dictis disputatur. Nam LEKTON dictio dicitur.

[2] Certain of the earliest philosophers had this in their discourses; yet they did not reduce it to the skill of an art. After them Aristotle brought the arguments of this doctrine to certain rules, and named it Dialectic, on the ground that in it one disputes about things said (dicta). For LEKTON is called dictio.

Ideo autem post Rhetoricam disciplinam Dialectica sequitur, quia in multis utraque communia existunt.

For this reason, moreover, after the discipline of Rhetoric, Dialectic follows, because in many respects the two have things in common.

XXIII. DE DIFFERENTIA DIALECTICAE ET RHETORICAE ARTIS.

23. ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DIALECTICAL AND RHETORICAL ART.

[1] Dialecticam et Rhetoricam Varro in novem disciplinarum libris tali similitudine definivit: "Dialectica et Rhetorica est quod in manu hominis pugnus adstrictus et palma distensa: illa verba contrahens, ista distendens"

[1] Varro defined Dialectic and Rhetoric in nine books of disciplines by such a similitude: "Dialectic and Rhetoric is that which, in a man's hand, a clenched fist and an outstretched palm are: the former contracting words, the latter distending them."

[2] Dialectica siquidem ad disserendas res acutior: Rhetorica ad illa quae nititur docenda facundior. Illa ad scholas nonnumquam venit: ista iugiter procedit in forum. Illa requirit rarissimos studiosos: haec frequenter et populos.

[2] Dialectic indeed is more acute for discussing matters: Rhetoric is more eloquent for those things it strives to teach. That one sometimes comes to the schools: this one continually proceeds into the forum. That one requires the rarest students: this one frequently even peoples.

[3] Solent autem Philosophi antequam ad isagogen veniant exponendam, definitionem Philosophiae ostendere, quo facilius ea, quae ad eam pertinent, demonstrentur.

[3] Moreover, Philosophers are accustomed, before they come to the Isagoge to be expounded, to show the definition of Philosophy, in order that those things which pertain to it may be more easily demonstrated.

XXIV. DE DEFINITIONE PHILOSOPHIAE.

24. ON THE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.

[1] Philosophia est rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio cum studio bene vivendi coniuncta. Haec duabus ex rebus constare videtur, scientia et opinatione.

[1] Philosophy is the cognition of human and divine things, conjoined with the study of living well. This seems to consist of two things, science and opinion.

[2] Scientia est, cum res aliqua certa ratione percipitur; opinatio autem, cum adhuc incerta res latet et nulla ratione firma videtur, utputa sol utrumne tantus quantus videtur, an maior sit quam omnis terra: item luna globosa sit an concava, et stellae utrumne adhaereant caelo, an per aerem libero cursu ferantur: caelum ipsum qua magnitudine, qua materia constat: utrum quietum sit et inmobile, an incredibili celeritate volvatur: quanta sit terrae crassitudo, aut quibus fundamentis librata et suspensa permaneat.

[2] Science is when some thing is grasped by a sure reasoning; opination, however, is when a thing still uncertain lies hidden and seems to have no firm reasoning, for instance whether the sun is as great as it seems, or is greater than all the earth: likewise whether the moon is globose or concave, and whether the stars adhere to the heaven, or are borne through the air with free course: by what magnitude and of what matter the heaven itself consists: whether it is quiet and immobile, or is revolved with incredible speed: how great the thickness of the earth is, or by what foundations, balanced and suspended, it remains.

[3] Ipsud autem nomen Latine interpretatum amorem sapientiae profitetur. Nam Graeci FILO- amorem, SOFIAN sapientiam dicunt. Philosophiae species tripertita est: una naturalis, quae Graece Physica appellatur, in qua de naturae inquisitione disseritur: altera moralis, quae Graece Ethica dicitur, in qua de moribus agitur: tertia rationalis, quae Graeco vocabulo Logica appellatur, in qua disputatur quemadmodum in rerum causis vel vitae moribus veritas ipsa quaeratur.

[3] The very name itself, interpreted in Latin, professes a love of wisdom. For the Greeks call FILO- “love,” SOFIAN “wisdom.” The forms of philosophy are tripartite: one is “natural,” which in Greek is called Physica, in which the inquiry of nature is discussed; another “moral,” which in Greek is called Ethica, in which conduct is treated; a third “rational,” which by the Greek term is called Logica, in which it is debated how truth itself is to be sought in the causes of things or in the morals of life.

[4] In Physica igitur causa quaerendi, in Ethica ordo vivendi, in Logica ratio intellegendi versatur. Physicam apud Graecos primus perscrutatus est Thales Milesius, unus ex septem illis sapientibus. Hic enim ante alios caeli causas atque vim rerum naturalium contemplata ratione suspexit, quam postmodum Plato in quattuor definitiones distribuit, id est Arithmeticam, Geometricam, Musicam, Astronomiam.

[4] Therefore, in Physics the business of inquiring is engaged; in Ethics, the order of living; in Logic, the method of understanding. Among the Greeks, Thales of Miletus, one of those seven sages, was the first to investigate Physics. For he, before others, by contemplative reason considered the causes of the heaven and the force of natural things, which afterward Plato distributed into four divisions, that is, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy.

[5] Ethicam Socrates primus ad corrigendos conponendosque mores instituit, atque omne studium eius ad bene vivendi disputationem perduxit, dividens eam in quattuor virtutibus animae, id est prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam.

[5] Socrates first instituted Ethics for correcting and composing morals, and he led all his study to the disputation about living well, dividing it into four virtues of the soul, that is, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance.

[6] Prudentia est in rebus, qua discernuntur a bonis mala. Fortitudo, qua adversa aequanimiter tolerantur. Temperantia, qua libido concupiscentiaque rerum frenatur.

[6] Prudence is in matters, whereby evils are discerned from goods. Fortitude, whereby adversities are endured equanimously. Temperance, whereby libido and the concupiscence of things is reined in.

Iustitia, qua recte iudicando sua cuique distribuunt.

Justice, by which, by judging rightly, they distribute to each his own.

[7] Logicam, quae rationalis vocatur, Plato subiunxit, per quam, discussis rerum morumque causis, vim earum rationabiliter perscrutatus est, dividens eam in Dialecticam et Rhetoricam. Dicta autem Logica, id est rationalis. LOGOS enim apud Graecos et sermonem significat et rationem.

[7] Logic, which is called rational, Plato subjoined, through which, the causes of things and of morals having been discussed, he scrutinized their force rationally, dividing it into Dialectic and Rhetoric. But it is called Logic, that is, rational. For LOGOS among the Greeks signifies both discourse and reason.

[8] In his quippe tribus generibus Philosophiae etiam eloquia divina consistunt. Nam aut de natura disputare solent, ut in Genesi et in Ecclesiaste: aut de moribus, ut in Proverbiis et in omnibus sparsim libris: aut de Logica, pro qua nostri Theoreticam sibi vindicant, ut in Cantico canticorum, et Evangeliis.

[8] In these three kinds of Philosophy, indeed, the divine utterances also consist. For they are accustomed to dispute about Nature, as in Genesis and in Ecclesiastes; or about Morals, as in Proverbs and in all the books here and there; or about Logic, for which our people claim the Theoretic, as in the Canticle of Canticles and in the Gospels.

[9] Item aliqui doctorum Philosophiam in nomine et partibus suis ita definierunt: Philosophia est divinarum humanarumque rerum, in quantum homini possibile est, probabilis scientia. Aliter: Philosophia est ars artium et disciplina disciplinarum. Rursus: Philosophia est meditatio mortis, quod magis convenit Christianis qui, saeculi ambitione calcata, conversatione disciplinabili, similitudine futurae patriae vivunt.

[9] Likewise some of the learned have defined Philosophy in its name and its parts thus: Philosophy is the probable knowledge of divine and human things, insofar as it is possible for a human. Otherwise: Philosophy is the art of arts and the discipline of disciplines. Again: Philosophy is meditation on death, which more befits Christians who, the ambition of the age having been trampled underfoot, with a life of discipline, live in the likeness of the future fatherland.

Philosophia dividitur in duas partes: prima inspectiva; secunda actualis.

Philosophy is divided into two parts: the first inspective; the second active.

[10] Alii definierunt Philosophiae rationem in duabus consistere partibus, quarum prima inspectiva est, secunda actualis. Inspectiva dividitur in tribus modis, id est prima in naturalem; secunda in doctrinalem; tertia in divinam. Doctrinalis dividitur in quattuor, id est, prima in Arithmeticam, secunda Musicam, tertia Geometriam, quarta Astronomiam.

[10] Others defined the rationale of Philosophy to consist in two parts, of which the first is inspective, the second actual. The inspective is divided in three modes, that is, first into the natural; second into the doctrinal; third into the divine. The doctrinal is divided into four, that is, first into Arithmetic, second into Music, third into Geometry, fourth into Astronomy.

[11] Actualis dividitur in tribus, id est, prima in moralem, secunda dispensativam, tertia civilem. Inspectiva dicitur, qua supergressi visibilia, de divinis aliquid et caelestibus contemplamur, eaque mente solummodo inspicimus, quoniam corporeum supergrediuntur obtutum.

[11] The Actual is divided into three: that is, first into moral, second dispensative, third civil. It is called “inspectiva,” by which, having gone beyond visible things, we contemplate something of the divine and the celestial, and we behold these only with the mind, since they surpass the corporeal gaze.

[12] Naturalis dicitur, ubi uniuscuiusque rei natura discutitur, quia nihil generatur in vita: sed unumquodque his usibus deputatur, in quibus a creatore definitum est, nisi forte cum voluntate Dei aliquod miraculum provenire monstratur.

[12] It is called natural, where the nature of each thing is examined, for nothing is generated in life: but each thing is deputed to those uses in which it has been defined by the Creator, unless perhaps, with the will of God, some miracle is shown to come forth.

[13] Divinalis dicitur, quando aut ineffabilem naturam Dei, aut spiritales creaturas ex aliqua parte, profundissima qualitate disserimus.

[13] It is called divinal, when we discourse either on the ineffable nature of God, or, in some respect, on spiritual creatures, in a most profound manner.

[14] Doctrinalis dicitur scientia, quae abstractam considerat quantitatem. Abstracta enim quantitas dicitur, quam intellectu a materia separantes, vel ab aliis accidentibus, ut est par, inpar, vel ab huiuscemodi, in sola ratiocinatione tractamus. Cuius species sunt quattuor: Arithmetica, Geometrica, Musica, Astronomia.

[14] That science is called doctrinal which considers quantity abstracted. For abstract quantity is said to be that which, separating by the intellect from matter, or from other accidents—such as even, odd, and the like—we treat in ratiocination alone. Its species are four: Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy.

[15] Arithmetica est disciplina quantitatis numerabilis secundum se. Geometrica est disciplina magnitudinis inmobilis et formarum. Musica est disciplina quae de numeris loquitur qui ad aliquid sunt, his qui inveniuntur in sonis. Astronomia est disciplina, quae cursus caelestium siderumque figuras contemplatur omnes, et habitudines stellarum circa se et circa terram indagabili ratione percurrit.

[15] Arithmetic is the discipline of numerable quantity in itself. Geometry is the discipline of immobile magnitude and of forms. Music is the discipline that speaks about numbers that are relative, those which are found in sounds. Astronomy is the discipline which contemplates the courses of the heavenly bodies and all the figures of the stars, and, with investigable reasoning, traverses the relations of the stars with respect to themselves and with respect to the earth.

[16] Porro actualis dicitur, quae res propositas operationibus suis explicat. Cuius partes sunt tres, moralis, dispensativa et civilis. Moralis dicitur, per quam mos vivendi honestus adpetitur, et instituta ad virtutem tendentia praeparantur.

[16] Moreover, the practical is so called, which explicates the proposed matters by its own operations. Its parts are three: the moral, the dispensative, and the civil. The moral is so called, through which an honorable mode of living is sought, and institutions tending toward virtue are prepared.

Dispensativa dicitur, cum domesticarum rerum sapienter ordo disponitur. Civilis dicitur, per quam totius civitatis utilitas administratur.

It is called dispensative, when the order of domestic affairs is wisely arranged. It is called civil, by which the utility of the whole city is administered.

XXV. DE ISAGOGIS PORPHYRII.

25. ON THE ISAGOGES OF PORPHYRY.

[1] Post Philosophiae definitiones, in quibus generaliter omnia continentur, nunc Isagogas Porphyrii expediamus. Isagoga quippe Graece, Latine introductio dicitur, eorum scilicet qui Philosophiam incipiunt: continens in se demonstrationem primarum rationum de qualibet re quid sit, suaque certa ac substantiali definitione declaretur.

[1] After the definitions of Philosophy, in which all things are contained in general, now let us set forth the Isagogae of Porphyry. For Isagoga in Greek, in Latin is called Introduction, namely for those who begin Philosophy: containing within itself a demonstration of the primary reasons concerning any thing—what it is—and that it be declared by its own certain and substantial definition.

[2] Nam posito primo genere, deinde species et alia, quae vicina esse possunt, subiungimus ac discretis communionibus separamus, tamdiu interponentes differentias, quousque ad proprium eius de quo quaerimus signata eius expressione perveniamus, ut puta: Homo est animal rationale, mortale, terrenum, bipes, risu capax.

[2] For, with the first genus posited, then we subjoin the species and the other things which can be neighboring, and we separate by distinct commonalities, interposing differences until we arrive at the proprium of that which we inquire, marked by its expression; for instance: Man is an animal rational, mortal, terrene, biped, capable of laughter.

[3] Genus animal cum dictum est, substantia hominis declarata est. Est enim ad hominem genus animal, sed quia late patebat, adiecta est species, terrenum: iam exclusum est id quod aut aethereum aut humidum [suspicabatur]. Differentia vero, ut bipes, quae propter animalia posita est quae multis pedibus innituntur. Item rationale, propter illa quae ratione egeant: mortale autem propter id quod angelus [non] est.

[3] When the genus “animal” has been stated, the substance of man has been declared. For to man the genus is “animal”; but because it lay open broadly, the species was added, “earthly”: now that which was either aetherial or humid was [suspected] and excluded. The differentia indeed, such as “biped,” which is set because of animals that are supported by many feet. Likewise “rational,” on account of those that lack reason; “mortal,” however, on account of the fact that he is [not] an angel.

[4] Postea discretis atque seclusis adiectum est proprium in parte postrema [risus capax]: est enim solum hominis, quod ridet. Sic perfecta est omni ex parte definitio ad hominem declarandum. Cuius disciplinae definitionem plenam existimaverunt Aristoteles et Tullius ex genere et differentiis consistere.

[4] Afterwards, the discrete elements having been distinguished and set apart, the proper property was added in the final part [capable of laughter]: for it belongs to man alone to laugh. Thus the definition for declaring man was perfected in every respect. Aristotle and Tullius judged that in this discipline the complete definition consists of genus and differences.

[5] Quidam postea pleniores in docendo eius perfectam substantialem definitionem in quinque partibus, veluti membris suis, dividerunt. Quarum prima est de genere, secunda de specie, tertia de differentia, quarta de proprio, quinta de accidenti.

[5] Certain persons afterwards, more copious in teaching, divided its perfect substantial definition into five parts, as it were its own members. Of which the first is concerning genus, the second concerning species, the third concerning differentia, the fourth concerning proprium, the fifth concerning accident.

[6] Genus, ut animal. Est enim vocabulum generale et commune omnium animam habentium. Species, ut homo.

[6] Genus, as animal. For it is a general and common term of all possessing a soul. Species, as man.

Est enim specialitas, qua separatur a ceteris animantibus. Differentia, ut rationale, mortale. His enim duobus differt homo a ceteris.

For it is the speciality by which it is separated from the other animate beings. The differentia, as rational, mortal. For by these two the human differs from the others.

[7] Cum enim dicitur rationale, discernitur ab inrationalibus mutis, quae non habent rationem. Cum [dicitur] mortale, discernitur ab angelis, qui nesciunt mortem. Proprium, ut risibile.

[7] For when 'rational' is said, it is distinguished from irrational mute creatures, which do not have reason. When [it is said] 'mortal', it is distinguished from the angels, who do not know death. Property, as 'laughable'.

Homo est enim quod ridet, et hoc praeter hominem nullius animalis est. Accidens, ut color in corpore, doctrina in animo.

For man is, in fact, that which laughs, and this, apart from man, belongs to no animal. An accident, as color in the body, doctrine (learning) in the mind.

[8] Haec enim temporum varietate et accidunt et mutantur: et est ex omnibus his quinque partibus oratio plenae sententiae, ita: Homo est animal rationale, mortale, risibile, boni malique capax. Sic etiam in omni oratione substantiali tamdiu interponere debemus species et differentias, quam diu seclusis omnibus, quae hoc idem esse possunt, ad id perveniatur, ut proprietas iam certa teneatur.

[8] For these, by the variation of times, both occur and are changed: and from all these five parts there is a statement of full sense, thus: Man is an animal rational, mortal, risible, capable of good and of evil. Thus also in every substantial statement we ought to interpose species and differences for so long as, with all things excluded which can be this same thing, one arrives at this: that the property is now surely held.

[9] Isagogas autem ex Graeco in Latinum transtulit Victorinus orator, commentumque eius quinque libris Boetius edidit.

[9] Victorinus the orator translated the Isagoge from Greek into Latin, and Boethius published his commentary on it in five books.

XXVI. DE CATEGORIIS ARISTOTELIS.

26. ON THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE.

[1] Sequuntur Aristotelis categoriae, quae Latine praedicamenta dicuntur: quibus per varias significationes omnis sermo conclusus est.

[1] The Categories of Aristotle follow, which in Latin are called Predicaments: by which, through various significations, all discourse is enclosed.

[2] Instrumenta categoriarum sunt tria, id est prima aequivoca; secunda univoca; tertia denominativa. Aequivoca sunt, quando multarum rerum nomen unum est, sed non eadem definitio, ut leo. Nam quantum ad nomen pertinet, et verus et pictus et caelestis leo dicitur; quantum ad definitionem pertinet, aliter verus definitur, aliter pictus, aliter caelestis.

[2] The instruments of the categories are three, that is: first, equivocal; second, univocal; third, denominative. Equivocal are when one name belongs to many things, but the definition is not the same, as “lion.” For, as far as the name pertains, both the real and the painted and the celestial lion are so called; as far as the definition pertains, the real is defined one way, the painted another, the celestial another.

[3] Vnivoca sunt, quando duarum aut plurimarum rerum unum nomen est et definitio, ut vestis. Nam et birrus et tunica et nomen vestis possunt accipere et eius definitionem. Ergo hoc univocum in generibus esse intellegitur, quia et nomen et definitionem dat formis suis.

[3] Univocal terms are those, when of two or of several things there is one name and one definition, as “garment.” For both a birrus and a tunic can receive the name “garment” and its definition. Therefore this univocal is understood to be in genera, because it gives both the name and the definition to its own forms.

[4] Denominativa, id est derivativa, dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo solo differentiae casu secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a bonitate bonus, et a malitia malus.

[4] Denominatives, that is, derivatives, are called whatever things have their appellation from some other term, with only a difference of case, according to the name, as from goodness, good, and from malice, bad.

[5] Categoriarum autem species decem sunt, id est substantia, quantitas, qualitas, relatio, situs, locus, tempus, habitus, agere et pati.

[5] Now the species of the Categories are ten, that is, substance, quantity, quality, relation, position, place, time, habit/state, acting and being acted upon.

[6] Substantia est, quae proprie et principaliter dicitur, quae neque de subiecto praedicatur, neque in subiecto est, ut aliqui homo vel aliqui equus. Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur, in quibus speciebus illae, quae principaliter substantiae primo dictae sunt, insunt atque clauduntur, ut in homine Cicero.

[6] Substance is that which is said properly and principally, which is neither predicated of a subject nor is in a subject, as some man or some horse. But second substances are said to be those species in which those things that were first called substances primarily are contained and enclosed, as Cicero in man.

[7] Quantitas est mensura, per quam aliquid vel magnum vel minus ostenditur, ut longus, brevis. Qualitas est, ut qualis sit, orator an rusticus, niger aut candidus. Relatio est, quae refertur ad aliquid.

[7] Quantity is a measure by which something is shown to be either greater or lesser, as long, short. Quality is what sort it is, whether an orator or a rustic, black or white. Relation is that which is referred to something.

Cum enim dicitur filius, demonstratur et pater. Haec relativa simul incipiunt. Namque servus ac dominus uno tempore exordium nominis sumunt, nec aliquando invenitur dominus prior servo, nec servus domino.

For when “son” is spoken, the father too is demonstrated. These relatives commence simultaneously. For servant and master take the inception of the name at one and the same time, and never is a master found prior to a servant, nor a servant to the master.

Alterum enim alteri praeesse non potest.

For the one cannot be prior to the other.

[8] Locus est ubi sit, in foro, in platea. Loci autem motus partes sex habet, dextram et sinistram, ante et retro, sursum atque deorsum. Partes quoque istae sex duo habent [id est, situm et tempus.

[8] Place is where it is: in the forum, in the plaza. But the motion of place has six parts, right and left, before and behind, upward and downward. These six parts too have two [that is, site and time.

Situm, ut] longe et prope. Tempus, ut: heri, hodie. Porro situs a positione dictus, ut quis aut stet, aut sedeat, aut iaceat.

Position, as] far and near. Time, as: yesterday, today. Furthermore, “situs” is said from “position,” as whether someone stand, or sit, or lie.

[9] Habitus ab habendo aliquid dictus, ut habere scientiam in mente, virtutem in corpore, circa corpus vestimentum, et cetera, quae ad habendi modum, designato a doctoribus numero, conprehenditur.

[9] Habit is so called from having something, as to have science in the mind, virtue in the body, a vestment around the body, and the rest, which, according to the mode of having, in the number designated by the doctors, are comprehended.

[10] Iam vero agere et pati ab agentis et patientis significatione consistunt. Nam scribo vocis actum habet, quoniam facientis rem indicat. Scribor patientis est, quoniam pati se ostendit.

[10] Now indeed, to act and to suffer consist by the signification of the agent and the patient. For “I write” has the active of the voice, since it indicates the act of the one doing; “I am written” is of the patient, since it shows itself to suffer.

In his enim novem generibus, quorum exempli gratia quaedam posita sunt, vel in ipso substantiae genere, quod est OUSIA, innumerabilia reperiuntur. Nam et ea quae intellectu capimus, id ad alterutrum horum decem praedicamentorum sermone vulgamus.

For in these nine genera, of which certain things have been set down for the sake of example, and even in the very genus of substance, which is OUSIA, innumerable things are found. For even those things which we grasp by intellection, we by speech refer to one or the other of these ten predicaments.

[11] Plena enim sententia de his ita est: Augustinus, magnus orator, filius illius, stans in templo, hodie, infulatus, disputando fatigatur. Vsia autem substantia est, id est proprium, quae ceteris subiacet; reliqua novem accidentia sunt. Substantia autem dicitur ab eo, quod omnis res ad se ipsam subsistit.

[11] For the full sentence concerning these is as follows: Augustine, a great orator, the son of that man, standing in the temple today, with a fillet, is wearied by disputing. Ousia, moreover, is substance, that is, the proper thing, which underlies the others; the remaining nine are accidents. Substance, moreover, is so called from the fact that every thing subsists by itself.

Corpus enim subsistit, et ideo substantia est.

For the body subsists, and therefore it is substance.

[12] Illa vero accidentia, quae in subsistente atque subiecto sunt, substantiae non sunt, quia non subsistunt, sed mutantur; sicut color vel forma.

[12] Those accidents, however, which are in the subsistent and subject, are not substances, because they do not subsist, but are changed; just as color or form.

[13] De subiecto autem et in subiecto quasi de ipso et in ipso. Vbi enim dicitur de subiecto, substantia est, quasi dicatur de substantia. Vbi autem dicitur in subiecto, accidentia sunt, id est, quae accidunt in substantia; ut quantitas, qualitas, vel figura.

[13] Concerning the subject, moreover, and in the subject, as it were concerning the thing itself and in the thing itself. Where indeed it is said “concerning the subject,” it is substance, as if it were said “concerning substance.” But Where it is said “in the subject,” they are accidents, that is, things which happen in substance; such as quantity, quality, or figure.

De subiecto igitur genera et species, in subiecto accidentia sunt. Ex his novem accidentibus tria intra usiam sunt, quantitas [et], qualitas et situs. Haec enim sine usia esse non possunt.

Therefore, genera and species are of the subject; accidents are in the subject. Of these nine accidents, three are within ousia: quantity [and], quality, and position. For these cannot exist without ousia.

Extra usiam vero sunt locus, tempus et habitus; intra et extra usiam sunt relatio, facere et pati.

Outside the essence, however, are place, time, and habitus; within and outside the essence are relation, acting and suffering.

[14] Appellatas autem categorias constat, quia non possunt nisi ex subiectis agnosci. Quis enim quid sit homo possit agnoscere, nisi aliquem hominem sibi ponat ante oculos, quasi subiectum nomini?

[14] But it is established that they are called categories, because they can be recognized only from subjects. For who could recognize what man is, unless he sets some man before his eyes, as it were a subject for the name?

[15] Hoc opus Aristotelis intellegendum est, quando, sicut dictum est, quidquid homo loquitur, inter decem ista praedicamenta habentur. Proficiet etiam ad libros intellegendos, qui sive Rhetoribus sive Dialecticis adplicantur.

[15] This work of Aristotle is to be understood, since, as has been said, whatever a man speaks is accounted among these ten predicaments. It will also profit for understanding the books which are applied either to the Rhetoricians or to the Dialecticians.

XXVII. DE PERIHERMENIIS.

27. ON THE PERIHERMENIAS.

[1] Sequitur dehinc liber Perihermenias subtilissimus nimis, et per varias formas iterationesque cautissimus, de quo dicitur: Aristoteles, quando Perihermenias scriptitabat, calamum in mente tinguebat.

[1] Next there follows the book Perihermenias, most subtle beyond measure, and most cautious through various forms and iterations, about which it is said: Aristotle, when he was composing the Perihermenias, used to dip his pen in his mind.

[2] Praefatio Perihermeniarum. Omnis quippe res, quae una est et uno significatur sermone, aut per nomen significatur, aut per verbum: quae duae partes orationis interpretantur totum, quidquid conceperit mens ad loquendum. Omnis enim elocutio conceptae rei mentis interpres est.

[2] Preface of the Perihermeneias. Every thing which is one and is signified by one word is signified either by a name or by a verb: which two parts of oration interpret the whole, whatever the mind has conceived for speaking. For every elocution is the interpreter of a thing conceived by the mind.

[3] Hanc Aristoteles, vir in rerum expressione et faciendis sermonibus peritissimus, Perihermeniam nominat, quam interpretationem nos appellamus; scilicet quod res mente conceptas prolatis sermonibus interpretetur per cataphasin et apophasin, id est adfirmationem et negationem. Per adfirmationem, ut homo currit; per negationem, ut homo non currit.

[3] This Aristotle, a man most skilled in the expression of things and in making discourses, names Perihermeneia, which we call interpretation; namely, because it interprets things conceived in the mind by uttered discourses through cataphasis and apophasis, that is, affirmation and negation. Through affirmation, as man runs; through negation, as man does not run.

[4] In his itaque Perihermeniis supra dictus philosophus de septem speciebus tractat, id est de nomine, de verbo, de oratione, de enuntiatione, de adfirmatione, de negatione, de contradictione.

[4] Therefore, in these Perihermeniae the above-mentioned philosopher treats of seven species, that is: of the name, of the verb, of speech, of enunciation, of affirmation, of negation, of contradiction.

[5] Nomen est vox significativa secundum placitum, sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata, ut Socrates. Verbum est, quod significat tempus, cuius pars nihil extra significat, sed semper eorum, quae de altero dicuntur, nota[t], ut cogitat, disputat. Oratio est vox significativa, cuius partium aliquid separatum significativum est, ut Socrates disputat.

[5] A name is a significant voice according to convention, without time, none of whose parts is significant when separated, as Socrates. A verb is that which signifies time, a part of which signifies nothing by itself, but always marks things that are said of another, as he thinks, he disputes. A sentence is a significant voice, of whose parts something separated is significant, as Socrates disputes.

Enuntiativa oratio est vox significativa de eo quod est aliquid vel non est, ut Socrates est, Socrates non est.

An enunciative sentence is a significative voice about that which is something or is not, as Socrates is, Socrates is not.

[6] Adfirmatio est enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo, ut Socrates est. Negatio est alicuius ab aliquo, ut Socrates non est. Contradictio est adfirmationis et negationis oppositio, ut Socrates disputat, Socrates non disputat.

[6] Affirmation is the enunciation of something of something, as Socrates is. Negation is the enunciation of something from something, as Socrates is not. Contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation, as Socrates disputes, Socrates does not dispute.

[7] [Haec omnia in libro Perihermeniarum minutissime divisa et subdivisa tractantur, quarum rerum definitiones hic breviter sufficiat intimasse, quando in ipso conpetens explanatio reperitur. Vtilitas] Perihermeniarum haec est, quod ex his interpretamentis syllogismi fiunt. Vnde et analytica pertractantur.

[7] [All these things are treated in the book On Interpretation, most minutely divided and subdivided, the definitions of which matters let it suffice to have intimated briefly here, since in that very work a competent explanation is found. Utility] of On Interpretation is this: that from these interpretations syllogisms are made. Whence also the Analytics are handled.

XXVIII. DE SYLLOGISMIS DIALECTICIS.

28. ON DIALECTICAL SYLLOGISMS.

[1] Sequuntur dehinc Dialectici syllogismi, ubi totius eius artis utilitas et virtus ostenditur; quorum conclusio plurimum lectorem adiuvat ad veritatem investigandam tantum, ut absit ille error decipiendi adversarium per sophismata falsarum conclusionum.

[1] There follow next the dialectic syllogisms, wherein the utility and the virtue of that whole art is displayed; whose conclusion greatly helps the reader to investigate truth—only, let that error be absent, of deceiving an adversary by sophisms of false conclusions.

[2] Formulae categoricorum, id est praedicativorum syllogismorum, sunt tres.

[2] The formulae of categorical, that is, predicative, syllogisms are three.

[3] Primae formulae modi sunt novem. Primus modus est, qui conducit, id est, qui colligit ex universalibus dedicativis dedicativum universale directim, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: omne honestum bonum: omne igitur iustum bonum"

[3] The modes of the first formula are nine. The first mode is that which conduces, that is, which collects from universal dedicatives a universal dedicative directly, as: "Every just thing is honorable: every honorable thing is good: therefore every just thing is good"

[4] Secundus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus dedicativis et abdicativis abdicativum universale directim, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: nullum honestum turpe: nullum igitur iustum turpe.

[4] The second mood is that which conduces from universal affirmatives and negatives to a universal negative directly, as: "Every just thing is honorable: no honorable thing is shameful: therefore no just thing is shameful.

[5] Tertius modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativis particulari et universali dedicativum particulare directim, ut: "Quoddam iustum honestum: omne honestum utile: quoddam igitur iustum utile"

[5] The third mode is that which conducts from dedicatives, a particular and a universal, a particular dedicative directly, as: "A certain just thing is honorable: every honorable thing is useful: therefore a certain just thing is useful"

[6] Quartus modus est, qui conducit ex particulari dedicativa et universali abdicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: "Quoddam iustum honestum: nullum honestum turpe: quoddam igitur iustum non est turpe"

[6] The fourth mode is that which, from a particular dedicative and a universal abdicative, leads directly to a particular abdicative, as: "Some just thing is honorable: no honorable thing is shameful: therefore some just thing is not shameful"

[7] Quintus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus dedicativis particulare dedicativum per reflexionem, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: omne honestum bonum: quoddam igitur bonum iustum"

[7] The fifth mode is, which conducts from universal dedicatives to a particular dedicative through reflection, as: "Every just thing is honorable: every honorable thing is good: therefore some good thing is just"

[8] Sextus modus est, qui conducit ex universali dedicativa et universali abdicativa abdicativum universale per reflexionem, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: nullum honestum turpe: nullum igitur turpe iustum"

[8] The sixth mode is that which conduces from a universal dedicative and a universal abdicative to a universal abdicative by reflection, as: "Every just [thing is] honest: no honest [thing is] turpid: therefore no turpid [thing is] just"

[9] Septimus modus est, qui conducit ex particulari et universali dedicativo dedicativum particulare per reflexionem, ut: "Quoddam iustum honestum: omne honestum utile: quoddam igitur utile iustum"

[9] The seventh mode is that which, from a particular and a universal dedicative, leads a particular dedicative by reflection, as: "Some just [thing is] honorable: every honorable [thing is] useful: therefore some useful [thing is] just"

[10] Octavus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus abdicativa et dedicativa particulare abdicativum per reflexionem, ut: "Nullum turpe honestum: omne honestum iustum: quoddam igitur turpe non est iustum"

[10] The eighth mode is that which, from universals—an abdicative and a dedicative—conducts a particular abdicative by reflection, as: "No shameful thing is honorable: every honorable thing is just: therefore some shameful thing is not just"

[11] Nonus modus est, qui conducit ex universali abdicativa et particulari dedicativa abdicativum particulare per reflexionem, ut: "Nullum turpe honestum: quoddam honestum iustum: quoddam igitur iustum non est turpe"

[11] The ninth mode is that which, from a universal abdicative and a particular dedicative, leads by reflection to a particular abdicative, as: "No base is honorable: some honorable is just: therefore some just is not base"

[12] Formulae secundae modi sunt quattuor: Primus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus dedicativa et abdicativa abdicativum universale directim, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: nullum turpe honestum: nullum igitur turpe iustum"

[12] The formulas of the second mode are four: The first mode is that which leads from universals, a dedicative and an abdicative, to a universal abdicative directly, as: "Every just thing is honorable: no base thing is honorable: therefore no base thing is just"

[13] Secundus modus est, qui conducit ex universalibus abdicativa et dedicativa abdicativum universale directim, ut: "Nullum turpe honestum: omne iustum honestum: nullum igitur turpe iustum"

[13] The second mode is that which conducts from universals—an abdicative and a dedicative—a universal abdicative directly, as: "No shameful thing is honorable: every just thing is honorable: therefore no shameful thing is just"

[14] Tertius modus est, qui conducit ex particulari dedicativa et universali abdicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: "Quoddam iustum honestum: nullum turpe honestum: quoddam igitur iustum non est turpe"

[14] The third mode is that which leads directly a particular abdicative from a particular dedicative and a universal abdicative, as: "Some just thing is honorable: no shameful thing is honorable: therefore some just thing is not shameful"

[15] Quartus modus est, qui conducit ex particulari abdicativa et universali dedicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: "Quoddam iustum non est turpe: omne malum turpe; quoddam igitur iustum non est malum"

[15] The fourth mode is, which brings from a particular abdicative and a universal dedicative a particular abdicative directly, as: "A certain just thing is not shameful: every evil is shameful; therefore a certain just thing is not evil"

[16] Formulae tertiae modi sunt sex. Primus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativis universalibus dedicativum particulare tam directim quam reflexim, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: omne honestum iustum: omne iustum bonum: quoddam igitur honestum bonum, quoddam bonum honestum’

[16] The formulas of the third mode are six. The first mode is that which, from universal affirmatives, leads to a particular affirmative both directly and conversely, as: "Every just thing [is] honorable: every honorable [thing is] just: every just [thing is] good: therefore some honorable [thing is] good, some good [thing is] honorable’

[17] Secundus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativis particulari et universali dedicativum ex particulari directim, ut: "Quoddam iustum honestum: omne iustum bonum: quoddam igitur honestum bonum"

[17] The second mode is that which derives, from an affirmative particular and an affirmative universal, an affirmative from the particular directly, as: "Some just [thing] is honorable: every just [thing is] good: therefore some honorable [thing is] good"

[18] Tertius modus est, [qui conducit] ex dedicativis universali et particulari dedicativum particulare directim, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: quoddam iustum bonum: quoddam igitur honestum bonum"

[18] The third mode is, [which conduces] from universal and particular dedicatives a particular dedicative directly, as: "Every just thing is honorable: a certain just thing is good: therefore a certain honorable thing is good"

[19] Quartus modus est, qui conducit ex universali dedicativa et [particulari] abdicativa abdicativum particulare directim, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: nullum iustum malum: quoddam igitur honestum non est malum"

[19] The fourth mode is that which conducts, from a universal dedicative and a [particular] abdicative, a particular abdicative directly, as: "Every just [thing is] honorable: no just [thing is] evil: therefore a certain honorable [thing] is not evil"

[20] Quintus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativa particulari et abdicativa universali abdicativum particulare directim, ut: "Quoddam iustum honestum: nullum iustum malum: quoddam igitur honestum non est malum"

[20] The fifth mode is, which leads from a particular dedicative and a universal abdicative to a particular abdicative directly, as: "A certain just thing is honest: no just thing is evil: therefore a certain honest thing is not evil"

[21] Sextus modus est, qui conducit ex dedicativa universali et abdicativa particulari abdicativum particulare directim, ut: "Omne iustum honestum: quoddam iustum non est malum: quoddam igitur honestum non est malum"

[21] The sixth mode is that which, from a universal dedicative and a particular abdicative, leads directly to a particular abdicative, as: "Every just thing is honest: some just thing is not evil: therefore some honest thing is not evil"

[22] Has formulas categoricorum syllogismorum qui plene nosse desiderat, librum legat qui inscribitur Perihermenias Apulei, et quae subtilius sunt tractata cognoscet. Distincta enim atque considerata ad magnas intellegentiae vias lectorem, praestante Domino, utiliter introducunt. Nunc ad Hypotheticos syllogismos ordine sequenti veniamus.

[22] Whoever desires to know fully these formulas of categorical syllogisms, let him read the book which is entitled the Perihermenias of Apuleius, and he will learn the things that are handled more subtly. For, once distinguished and considered, they, the Lord granting aid, usefully introduce the reader to the great ways of understanding. Now let us come, in the following order, to Hypothetical syllogisms.

[23] Modi syllogismorum Hypotheticorum, qui fiunt cum aliqua conclusione, sunt septem. Primus modus est: "Si dies est, lucet: est autem dies: lucet igitur" Secundus modus est: "Si dies est, lucet: non lucet: non est igitur dies" Tertius modus est ita: "Non et dies est et non lucet: atqui dies est: lucet igitur"

[23] The modes of Hypothetical syllogisms, which are made with some conclusion, are seven. The first mode is: "If it is day, it is light: moreover it is day: therefore it is light" The second mode is: "If it is day, it is light: it is not light: therefore it is not day" The third mode is thus: "It is not both day and not light: but indeed it is day: therefore it is light"

[24] Quartus modus est ita: "Aut dies est, aut nox: atqui dies est: nox igitur non est" Quintus modus est ita: "Aut dies est, aut nox: atqui nox non est: dies igitur est" Sextus modus est ita: "Non et dies est et non lucet: dies autem [est]: nox igitur non est"

[24] The fourth mode is thus: "Either it is day, or night: but indeed it is day: therefore night is not" The fifth mode is thus: "Either it is day, or night: but indeed it is not night: therefore it is day" The sixth mode is thus: "Not both that it is day and that it does not shine: but day [is]: therefore night is not"

[25] Septimus modus est ita: "Non dies et nox: atqui nox non est: dies igitur est" Modos autem Hypotheticorum syllogismorum si quis plenius nosse desiderat, librum legat Marii Victorini qui inscribitur de Syllogismis Hypotheticis.

[25] The seventh mode is thus: "Not both day and night: and yet night is not: therefore it is day." But if anyone wishes to know more fully the modes of Hypothetical syllogisms, let him read the book of Marius Victorinus which is entitled On Hypothetical Syllogisms.

[26] Hinc ad Dialecticas definitionum species accedamus, quae tanta dignitate praecellunt ut possint indiciorum aperte manifestationes et quaedam indicia dictionum ostendere.

[26] From here let us approach the dialectical species of definitions, which excel by so great a dignity that they can show the open manifestations of indicia and certain indicia of expressions.

XXIX. DE DIVISIONE DEFINITIONVM EX MARII VICTORINI LIBRO ABBREVIATA.

29. ON THE DIVISION OF DEFINITIONS ABBREVIATED FROM THE BOOK OF MARIUS VICTORINUS.

[1] Definitio est Philosophorum, quae in rebus exprimendis explicat quid res ipsa sit, qualis sit, et quemadmodum membris suis constare debeat. Est enim oratio brevis uniuscuiusque rei naturam a communione divisam propria significatione concludens. Divisio definitionum in partes quindecim habetur.

[1] A definition, according to the Philosophers, is that which, in the expressing of things, explains what the thing itself is, of what sort it is, and in what manner it ought to be constituted by its members. For it is a brief oration, concluding by its proper signification the nature of each thing, divided from commonality. The division of definitions is held to be into fifteen parts.

[2] Prima species definitionis est OUSIODES, id est substantialis, quae proprie et vere dicitur definitio, ut est: "Homo animal rationale, mortale, sensus disciplinaeque capax" Haec enim definitio per species et differentias descendens venit ad proprium, et designat plenissime quid sit homo.

[2] The first species of definition is OUSIODES, that is, substantial, which is properly and truly called a definition, as: "Man [is] an animal rational, mortal, capable of sense and of discipline." For this definition, descending through species and differences, comes to the proper, and most fully designates what man is.

[3] Secunda species definitionis est, quae Graece ENNOEMATIKE dicitur, Latine notio nuncupatur, quam notionem communi, non proprio nomine possumus dicere. Haec isto modo semper efficitur: "Homo est, quod rationali conceptione (et) exercitio praeest animalibus cunctis" Non enim dixit quid est homo, sed quid agat, quasi quodam signo in notitiam devocato. In ista enim et in reliquis notitia rei profertur, non substantialis explicatio declaratur; et quia illa substantialis est, definitionum omnium obtinet principatum.

[3] The second species of definition is what in Greek is called ENNOEMATIKE, in Latin is named “notio” (notion), which we can call a notion by a common, not a proper, name. This is always effected in this way: “Man is that which, by rational conception (and) exercise, is preeminent over all animals.” For he did not say what man is, but what he does, as though by a certain sign summoned into notice. For in this and in the remaining kinds the notice of the thing is brought forth, not a substantial explication is declared; and because that one is substantial, it holds the primacy of all the definitions.

[4] Tertia species definitionis est, quae Graece POIOTES dicitur, Latine qualitativa vocatur: quia ex qualitate nomen accepit pro eo quod quid, quale sit id, quod sit, evidenter ostendit. Cuius exemplum tale est: "Homo est, qui ingenio valet, artibus pollet et cognitione rerum, aut quod agere debet eligit, aut animadversione quod inutile sit contemnit" His enim qualitatibus expressus ac definitus homo est.

[4] The third species of definition is what in Greek is called POIOTES, in Latin is called qualitative: because it took its name from quality, for the reason that it plainly shows what, and of what sort, that which is, is. An example of which is as follows: "Man is he who is strong in ingenium, prevails in the arts and in knowledge of things, and either chooses what he ought to do, or by animadversion contemns what is useless." For by these qualities man is expressed and defined.

[5] Quarta species definitionis est, quae Graece UPOGRAFIKE, Latine a Tullio descriptio nominatur, quae adhibita circuitione dictorum factorumque rem, quae sit, descriptione declarat. Quaeritur enim quid avarus sit, quid crudelis, quid luxuriosus, et universa luxuriosi, avari, crudelis natura describitur; ut, si luxuriosum volumus definire, dicimus: Luxuriosus est victus non necessarii, sed sumptuosi et onerosi appetens, in deliciis adfluens, in libidine promptus. Haec et alia definiunt luxuriosum, sed per descriptionem definiunt.

[5] The fourth species of definition is that which in Greek is called UPOGRAFIKE, in Latin by Tully is named descriptio, which, with a circuition of things said and done employed, declares by description the thing, what it is. For inquiry is made what the avaricious man is, what the cruel man, what the luxurious man, and the entire nature of the luxurious man, the avaricious man, the cruel man is described; as, if we wish to define the luxurious man, we say: The luxurious man is appetent of a way of living not necessary, but costly and onerous, overflowing in delights, prompt in lust. These and other things define the luxurious man, but they define by description.

Quae species definitionis oratoribus magis apta est quam Dialecticis, quia latitudines habet, quae similitudo in bonis rebus ponitur et in malis.

Which species of definition is more apt to orators than to dialecticians, because it has latitudes, a similitude which is set in good things and in bad.

[6] Quinta species definitionis est, quam Graece KATA [ANTI] LEKSIN, Latine adverb[i]um dicimus. Haec vocem illam, de cuius re quaeritur, alio sermone designat, uno ac singulari; et quodammodo quid illud sit in uno verbo positum, uno verbo alio declarat, ut: "Conticescere est tacere" Item cum terminum dicimus finem, aut populatas interpretatur esse vastatas.

[6] The fifth species of definition is what in Greek is KATA [ANTI] LEKSIN; in Latin we call it an adverb[i]um. This designates that term—about the matter of which inquiry is being made—by another discourse, one and single; and in a certain way it declares what that thing is, set in one word, by another single word; as: "To fall silent is to be silent." Likewise, when we say "terminus" we mean "end," or "plundered" is interpreted to be "devastated."

[7] Sexta species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA DIAFORAN, nos per differentiam dicimus. Scriptores vero artium de eodem et de altero nominant, ut cum quaeritur quid intersit inter regem et tyrannum, adiecta differentia, quid uterque sit definitur; id est, rex est modestus et temperans, tyrannus vero inpius et inmitis.

[7] The sixth species of definition is what the Greeks call KATA DIAFORAN, we say by difference. But the writers of the arts designate concerning both the same and the other, as when it is asked what the difference is between a king and a tyrant; the difference having been adjoined, what each is is defined: that is, a king is modest and temperate, but a tyrant is impious and harsh.

[8] Septima species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA METAFORAN, Latini per translationem dicunt, ut Cicero in Topicis (32): "Litus est, qua fluctus eludit" Hoc varie tractari potest. Modo enim ut moneat, modo ut designet, modo ut vituperet aut laudet. Vt moneat: "Nobilitas est virtutis maiorum apud posteros sarcina" Vt designet: "Apex est arx corporis" Vt laudet: "Adulescentia est flos aetatis" Vt vituperet: "Divitiae sunt brevis vitae longum viaticum"

[8] The seventh species of definition is that which the Greeks call KATA METAFORAN, the Latins say by translation, as Cicero in the Topics (32): "The shore is that along which the wave plays." This can be handled in various ways: now to admonish, now to designate, now to censure or to praise. To admonish: "Nobility is the burden of the ancestors’ virtue upon posterity." To designate: "The apex is the citadel of the body." To praise: "Adolescence is the flower of age." To censure: "Riches are a long viaticum for a short life."

[9] Octava species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA AFAIRESIN TOU ENANTIOU, Latini per privantiam contrarii eius, quod definitur, dicunt: "Bonum est, quod malum non est. Iustum est, quod iniustum non est,et his similia. Hoc autem genere definitionis uti debemus, cum contrarium notum est, ut: "Si bonum est quod prodest cum honestate, id quod tale non est malum est"

[9] The eighth species of definition is that which the Greeks call KATA AFAIRESIN TOU ENANTIOU, the Latins say by privation of the contrary of that which is defined: "Good is that which is not evil. The just is that which is not unjust,and the like." But we ought to use this kind of definition when the contrary is known, as: "If the good is that which profits with honesty, that which is not such is evil."

[10] Nona species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA UPOTUPOSIN, Latini per quandam imaginationem dicunt, ut: "Aeneas est Veneris et Anchisae filius" Haec semper in individuis versatur, quae Graeci ATOMA appellant.

[10] The ninth species of definition is what the Greeks call KATA UPOTUPOSIN, the Latins say through a certain imagination, as: "Aeneas is the son of Venus and Anchises." This always deals with individuals, which the Greeks call ATOMA.

[11] Decima species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA ANALOGIAN, Latini iuxta rationem dicunt; ut si quaeratur quid sit animal, respondeatur: "Vt homo" Rem enim quaesitam praedictum declarabit exemplum. Hoc est autem proprium definitionis, quid sit illud quad quaeritur declarare.

[11] The tenth species of definition is what the Greeks call KATA ANALOGIAN, the Latins “according to reason”; as, if it be asked what an animal is, one should answer: “As man.” For the aforesaid example will declare the thing sought. Moreover, this is proper to definition: to declare what that which is being asked is.

[12] Vndecima species definitionis est, quam Graeci KAT ELLEIPES OLOKLEROU OMOIOU GENOUS, Latini per indigentiam pleni ex eodem genere dicunt. Vt si quaeratur quid sit triens, respondeaturque: "Cui bessis deest ut sit assis"

[12] The eleventh species of definition is that which the Greeks call KAT ELLEIPES OLOKLEROU OMOIOU GENOUS, the Latins say “by indigence of the full of the same genus.” For example, if it be asked what a triens is, let the answer be: “That to which a bessis is lacking, so that it be an as.”

[13] Duodecima species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA EPAINON, id est, per laudem; ut Tullius pro Cluentio (146): "Lex est mens et animus et consilium et sententia civitatis" Et aliter (Cic. Phil. 2,113): "Pax est tranquilla libertas" Fit et per vituperationem, quam Graeci PSOGON vocant, ut (ibid.): "Servitus est postremum malorum omnium, non modo bello, sed morte quoque repellenda"

[13] The twelfth species of definition is what the Greeks call KATA EPAINON, that is, by praise; as Tullius in the Pro Cluentio (146): "Law is the mind and spirit and counsel and judgment of the commonwealth." And otherwise (Cic. Phil. 2,113): "Peace is tranquil liberty." It is also done through vituperation, which the Greeks call PSOGON, as (ibid.): "Servitude is the ultimate of all evils, to be repelled not only by war, but by death as well."

[14] Tertiadecima species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA TO PROS TI, Latini ad aliquid vocant, ut est illud: "Pater est, cui est filius" "Dominus est, cui est servus"

[14] The thirteenth species of definition is that which the Greeks call KATA TO PROS TI, the Latins call “ad aliquid,” as is this: “A father is he who has a son.” “A master is he who has a slave.”

[15] Quartadecima species definitionis est KATA TON ORON, ut Cicero in Rhetoricis (Inv. 1,42): "Genus est, quod plures amplectitur partes" Item "Pars [est], quae subest generi"

[15] The fourteenth species of definition is KATA TON ORON, as Cicero in the Rhetorics (Inv. 1,42): "Genus is that which embraces more parts." Likewise, "Part [is] that which is subordinate to the genus."

[16] Quinta decima species definitionis est, quam Graeci KATA AITIOLOGIAN, Latini secundum rei rationem vocant, ut: "Dies est sol supra terras, nox est sol sub terris" Scire autem debemus praedictas species definitionum Topicis merito esse sociatas, quoniam inter quaedam argumenta sunt positae, et nonnullis locis commemorantur in Topicis. Nunc ad Topica veniamus, quae sunt argumentorum sedes, fontes sensuum et origines dictionum.

[16] The fifteenth species of definition is what the Greeks call KATA AITIOLOGIAN, the Latins call according to the reason of the thing, as: "Day is the sun above the lands, night is the sun under the lands." We ought to know, moreover, that the aforesaid species of definitions are rightly associated with the Topics, since they are set among certain arguments, and in some places are mentioned in the Topics. Now let us come to the Topics, which are the seats of arguments, the fountains of senses, and the origins of words.

XXX. DE TOPICIS.

30. ON THE TOPICS.

[1] Topica est disciplina inveniendorum argumentorum. Divisio Topicorum, sive locorum ex quibus argumenta dicuntur, triplex est. Nam alia in eo ipso, de quo agitur, haerent; alia, quae dicuntur effecta, quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur; alia, quae adsumuntur extrinsecus.

[1] Topics is the discipline of finding arguments. The division of Topics, or of the places (loci) from which arguments are said to come, is threefold. For some adhere in the very thing itself that is being treated; others, which are called effects, are recognized as in a certain way drawn from other things; others are assumed from without.

Argumenta, quae in eo ipso, de quo agitur, haerent, in tribus divisa sunt. Prima, a toto; secunda, a parte; tertia, a nota.

Arguments that adhere in the very thing under discussion are divided into three. First, from the whole; second, from the part; third, from the mark (sign).

[2] Argumentum a toto, cum definitio adhibetur ad id, quod quaeritur, sicut ait Cicero (Marcell. 26): "Gloria est laus recte factorum magnorumque in republica fama meritorum"

[2] An argument from the whole is when a definition is applied to that which is being sought, as Cicero says (Marcell. 26): "Glory is praise of deeds done rightly and the fame in the republic of great merits"

[3] A partibus est argumentum, cum is, qui se defendit, aut negat factum, aut factum esse iure defendit.

[3] An argument from the parts is when the one who defends himself either denies the deed, or defends that the deed was done by right.

[4] A nota est argumentum, cum ex vi nominis argumentum aliquod eligatur, ut Cicero (Pis. 19): "Consulem, inquam, quaerebam, quem in isto maiali invenire non poteram"

[4] An argument is from the note (mark), when from the force of the name some argument is selected, as Cicero (Pis. 19): "I was seeking a consul, I say, whom I could not find in that hog."

[5] Effecta argumenta sunt, quae quodammodo ex rebus aliis tracta noscuntur. Sunt autem numero quattuordecim; id est, primum a coniugatis argumentum est, cum declinatur a nomine et fit verbum, ut Cicero Verrem dicit everrisse provinciam; vel nomen a verbo, cum latrocinari dicitur latro. Nomen est a nomine; Terentius (Andr. 218):

[5] Derived arguments are those which are recognized as in a certain way drawn from other matters. They are, moreover, fourteen in number; that is, first is the argument from conjugates, when one is derived from a noun and a verb is made, as Cicero says that Verres “swept out” the province; or a noun from a verb, when a robber is said to practice brigandage. A noun is from a noun; Terence (Andr. 218):

Interceptio est amentium, haud amantium;

Interception is the mark of the demented, not of lovers;

dummodo distet unius appellationis postremitas, in alia vocis declinatione formata.

provided that the ending of one appellation is different, formed in another declension of the word.

[6] Secundum argumentum a genere est, cum de eodem genere sententia dicitur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 4,569):

[6] The second argument is from the genus, when a statement is said about the same genus, as Vergil (Aen. 4,569):

Varium et mutabile genus.

A various and mutable kind.

[7] Tertium ab specie argumentum est, cum generali quaestioni fidem species facit, ut (Virg. Aen. 7,363):

[7] The third argument is from the species, when the species gives credence to the general question, as (Virg. Aen. 7,363):

Non sic Phrygius penetrat Lacedaemona pastor.

Not so does the Phrygian shepherd penetrate Lacedaemon.

A simili argumentum est, quando rebus aliquibus similia proferuntur (Virg. Aen. 10,333):

An argument from similitude is, when things similar are brought forward concerning certain matters (Virgil, Aeneid 10,333):

Suggere tela mihi: non ullum dextera frustra
torserit in Rutulos, steterunt quae in corpore Graium Iliacis campis.

Supply missiles to me: my right hand shall not hurl any in vain against the Rutulians, which stood in the body of the Greeks on the Iliac fields.

[8] A differentia argumentum est, quando per differentiam aliqua separantur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 10,581):

[8] An argument from difference is, when by difference certain things are separated, as Vergil (Aen. 10,581):

Non Diomedis equos, nec currum cernis Achillis.

You do not behold Diomedes’ horses, nor Achilles’ chariot.

A contrariis argumentum dicitur, quando res discrepantes sibinmet opponuntur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 9,95):

An argument from contraries is said to be, when discrepant things are opposed to one another, as Vergil (Aen. 9,95):

Mortaline manu factae inmortale carinae
fas habeant, certusque incerta pericula lustres, Aeneas?

Do keels made by a mortal hand have the right to be immortal,
and do you, certain, survey uncertain perils, Aeneas?

[9] A consequentibus argumentum dicitur, quando positam rem aliquid inevitabiliter consequitur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 1,529):

[9] An argument from consequents is said, when, a thing having been posited, something follows it inevitably, as Vergil (Aeneid 1, 529):

Non ea vis animo, nec tanta superbia victis.

No such power in my spirit, nor so great pride toward the vanquished.

Ab antecedentibus argumentum est, quando aliqua ex his, quae prius gesta sunt, conprobantur, ut Cicero pro Milone (44): "Cum non dubitaverit aperire quid cogitaverit, vos potestis dubitare quid fecerit?’

From antecedents an argument is, when certain things are corroborated from those which were previously done, as Cicero in Pro Milone (44): "Since he did not hesitate to lay open what he had intended, can you doubt what he did?"

[10] A repugnantibus argumentum est, quando illud, quod obicitur, aliqua contrarietate destruitur, ut Cicero (Deiot. 15): "Is igitur non modo de tali periculo liberatus, sed honore amplissimo ditatus, domi te interficere voluisset"

[10] An argument from repugnants is, when that which is objected is destroyed by some contrariety, as Cicero (Deiot. 15): "He then, not only freed from such a peril but enriched with a most ample honor, would have wished to kill you at home."

[11] A coniugatis argumentum est, cum contra probabiliter ostenditur quid sit ex re quaque venturum, ut Vergilius (Aen. 8,147):

[11] An argument from conjugates is, when, on the other hand, it is shown with probability what will come from each thing, as Vergil (Aen. 8,147):

Nos si pellant, nihil adfore credunt,
quis omnem Hesperiam [penitus] sua sub iuga mittant.

If they drive us out, they believe nothing will be at hand, that they will send all Hesperia [utterly] beneath their own yokes.
by whom they would send all Hesperia [utterly] under their yokes.

[12] A causis argumentum est, quando consuetudine communi res quaeque tractatur, ut Terentius (Andr. 582):

[12] An argument from causes is, when each matter is handled according to common custom, as Terentius (Andr. 582):

Ego nonnihil veritus sum dudum abs te cavere, ne faceres
quod vulgus servorum solet, dolis ut me deluderes.

I, somewhat afraid, have for some time now been on my guard against you, lest you do
what the common run of slaves is wont to do, so that by tricks you might delude me.

Ab effectis argumentum est, cum [ex] his, quae facta sunt, aliquid adprobatur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 4,13):

An argument is from effects, when [from] those things which have been done something is proved, as Vergil (Aen. 4,13):

Degeneres animos timor arguit.

Fear proves degenerate spirits.

[13] A conparatione argumentum est, quando per conlationem personarum sive causarum sententiae ratio sub inputatione formatur, ut Vergilius (Aen. 10,81):

[13] An argument is from comparison, when through the collation of persons or of causes the rationale of the judgment is formed under imputation, as Vergil (Aen. 10,81):

Tu potes Aenean manibus subducere Graium,
nos aliquid contra Rutulos iuvisse nefandum est?

You can withdraw Aeneas from the hands of the Greeks,
is it nefarious that we should have aided in any way against the Rutulians?

[14] Item argumenta quae ducuntur extrinsecus, quae Graece ATECHNOUS, id est artis expertes vocant, ut est testimonium. Testimonium vero constat re.

[14] Likewise, arguments which are drawn from outside, which in Greek they call ATECHNOUS, that is, lacking art, as is testimony. But testimony is established by the thing itself.

[15] Haec dividitur [in] quinque modis: id est, primo ex persona, secundo ex naturae auctoritate, tertio ex temporibus auctoritatum, quarto ex dictis factisque maiorum, quinto ex tormentis. Tertius ergo superior modus, qui est ex temporibus, in octo species derivatur. Prima ingenio, secunda opibus, tertia aetate, quarta fortuna, quinta arte, sexta usu, septima necessitate, octava concursione fortuitorum.

[15] These are divided [into] five modes: that is, first from the person, second from the authority of nature, third from the times of authorities, fourth from the sayings and deeds of the ancestors, fifth from tortures. Therefore the third mode above, which is from times, is derived into eight species: the first by genius (talent), the second by resources, the third by age, the fourth by fortune, the fifth by art (skill), the sixth by use (experience), the seventh by necessity, the eighth by the concurrence of fortuitous events.

Testimonium omne est, quod ab aliqua externa re sumitur ad faciendam fidem. Persona non qualiscumque est quae testimonii pondus habet ad faciendam fidem, sed morum probitate debet esse laudabilis.

Testimony is whatever is taken from some external thing to establish credence. A person is not just of any sort who has the weight of testimony for establishing credence, but ought to be praiseworthy for probity of morals.

[16] Naturae auctoritas est quae maxime virtute consistit. Testimonia multa sunt quae adferant auctoritatem: id est, ingenium, opes, aetas, fortuna, ars, usus, necessitas et concursio rerum fortuitarum. A dictis factisque maiorum petitur fides, cum priscorum dicta factaque memorantur.

[16] The authority of nature is that which consists most of all in virtue. There are many testimonies which bring authority: namely, ingenium, wealth, age, fortune, art, use, necessity, and the concourse of fortuitous things. From the sayings and deeds of the ancestors credence is sought, when the sayings and deeds of the ancients are recounted.

A tormentis fides praebetur, post quae nemo creditur velle mentiri.

From torments, credibility is afforded, after which no one is believed to wish to lie.

[17] Ea vero quae tractantur in tempore, quia suis nominibus plana sunt, definitionem non indigent. Memoriae quoque condendum est Topica oratoribus, Dialecticis, poetis et iurisperitis communiter quidem argumenta praestare; sed quando aliquid specialiter probant, ad Rhetores, poetas, iurisperitosque pertinent; quando vero generaliter disputant, ad philosophos attinere manifestum est.

[17] Those things, in truth, which are handled in time, because they are plain by their own names, have no need of definition. It should also be committed to memory that the Topics provide arguments in common to orators, dialecticians, poets, and jurists; but when they prove something in a special way, they pertain to Rhetors, poets, and jurists; whereas when they dispute generally, it is manifest that they pertain to philosophers.

[18] Mirabile plane genus operis, in unum potuisse colligi, quidquid mobilitas ac varietas humanae mentis in sensibus exquirendis per diversas causas poterat invenire, conclusum liberum ac voluntarium intellectum. Nam quocumque se verterit, quascumque cogitationes intraverit, in aliquid eorum, quae praedicta sunt, necesse est cadat ingenium.

[18] A plainly marvelous kind of work: that into one could be gathered whatever the mobility and variety of the human mind, in searching out senses/meanings through diverse causes, was able to discover, enclosing the free and voluntary intellect. For wherever it turns itself, into whatever thoughts it enters, it is necessary that ingenuity fall into something of those things which have been aforesaid.

XXXI. DE OPPOSITIS.

31. ON OPPOSITES.

[1] Contrariorum genera quattuor sunt, quae Aristoteles ANTIKEIMENA, id est opposita vocat, propter quod sibi velut ex adverso videntur obsistere, ut contraria; nec tamen omnia quae opponuntur sibi contraria sunt, sed omnia a contrario opposita sunt. Primum genus est contrariorum, quod iuxta Ciceronem diversum vocatur, pro eo quod tantum contrarie sibi opponuntur, ut non eorum sint quibus opponuntur, ut sapientia stultitia.

[1] There are four kinds of contraries, which Aristotle calls ANTIKEIMENA, that is, opposites, because they seem to stand against each other as if from opposite sides, like contraries; yet not all things that are opposed to each other are contraries, but all things that are contraries are opposites. The first kind is that of contraries, which, according to Cicero, is called “diverse,” for the reason that they are opposed to each other only by contrariety, such that they are not of the things to which they are opposed, as wisdom [and] stupidity.

[2] Quod genus in tres species dividitur. Nam sunt quaedam eius quae medium habent; et sunt quaedam quae sine medio sunt; et quaedam sunt quae habent medium et tamen sine nomine sunt, nisi utrumque ei vocabulum creet. Candidum et nigrum medium habent, quia inter eos saepe color pallidus vel fuscus invenitur.

[2] This genus is divided into three species. For there are certain of it which have a medium; and there are certain which are without a medium; and there are certain which have a medium and yet are without a name, unless one coin for it a vocable from both. White and black have a medium, because between them a pale or dusky color is often found.

[3] Sine medio sunt, quotiens unum de duobus accidit, ut sanitas vel infirmitas. Horum nihil est medium. Ea autem quorum media sine nomine sunt, ut felix infelix, medium habent non felix.

[3] They are without a middle, whenever one of two happens, as health or infirmity. Of these there is no middle. But those whose middles are without a name, as “happy” and “unhappy,” have as a middle “not happy.”

Secundum genus est relativorum, quae ita sibi opponuntur ut ad se conferantur, sicut duplum simplum.

The second genus is that of relatives, which are so opposed to one another that they are referred to each other, as double and single.

[4] Hoc solum oppositorum genus ad se refertur. Non est enim maius, nisi ad minus referatur; et simplum, nisi ad duplum. Nam relativum relativo ita opponitur ut hoc ipsum, quod opponitur, aut eius sit, cui opponitur, (aut ad id) quocumque modo referatur.

[4] Only this genus of opposites is referred to itself. For “greater” is not such unless it is referred to “less”; and “single,” unless to “double.” For a relative is opposed to a relative in such a way that this very thing which is opposed either belongs to that to which it is opposed, (or to it) is in whatever way referred.

Dimidium enim opponitur duplo, eiusque dupli medium est, sed ita illi opponitur ut eius sit, cui opponitur.

For the half is opposed to the double, and is the mean of that double; but it is so opposed to it that it belongs to that thing to which it is opposed.

[5] Sic et parvum opponitur magno, ita ut ipsud parvum ad magnum, cui opponitur, sit parvum. Nam superiora quae dicuntur contraria ita sibi opponuntur ut eorum non sint, quibus opponuntur, nec ad ea quocumque modo referantur; siquidem iniquitas iustitiae ita contraria est ut non eiusdem iustitiae iniquitas sit, aut ad illam sit iniquitas.

[5] So too the small is opposed to the great, such that the small itself, in relation to the great to which it is opposed, is small. For the aforesaid things which are called contraries are opposed to one another in such a way that they are not of those to whom they are opposed, nor are they in any way referred to them; since iniquity is so contrary to justice that the iniquity is not of that same justice, nor is iniquity referred to it.

[6] Tertium genus est oppositorum habitus vel orbatio. Quod genus Cicero privationem vocat, qua ostendit aliquid quempiam habuisse, unde privatus est. Cuius species sunt tres: quarum prima est in re, secunda in loco, tertia in tempore congruo.

[6] The third kind of opposites is habit (having) or privation. This kind Cicero calls privation, by which he shows that someone had something, of which he has been deprived. Of this the species are three: the first in the thing, the second in place, the third in fitting time.

In re, ut caecitas visio. In loco, ut caecitatis et visionis in oculis locus est. In tempore congruo, ut infantem non dicere sine dentibus eum, cui dentes adhuc aetas parva negavit.

In the thing, as blindness to vision. In the place, as the locus of blindness and of vision is in the eyes. In the congruous time, as we do not say “without teeth” of an infant, for whom small age has thus far denied teeth.

Non enim est privatus dentibus, quos nondum habuit.

For he is not deprived of teeth, which he has not yet had.

[7] Quartum vero genus ex confirmatione et negatione opponitur, ut Socrates disputat, Socrates non disputat. Haec a superioribus ideo differt, quod illa singillatim dici possunt, haec nisi conexe dici non possunt. Quod genus quartum apud Dialecticos multum habet conflictum, et appellatur ab eis valde oppositum, siquidem et tertium non recipit.

[7] The fourth kind, indeed, is opposed by affirmation and negation, as “Socrates disputes,” “Socrates does not dispute.” This differs from the preceding for this reason: because those can be said singly, whereas these cannot be said unless connected. Which fourth kind among the Dialecticians has much conflict, and is called by them “greatly opposed,” since it does not admit a third.

[8] Nam ex illis quaedam habere tertium possunt, ut in contrariis candidum et nigrum. Tertium eius nec candidum nec nigrum, sed fuscum vel pallidum. In relativis quoque, ut multa et pauca.

[8] For among those, some can have a third, as in contraries, white and black. Its third is neither white nor black, but dusky or pallid. In relatives also, as many and few.

Tertium eius nec multa nec pauca, sed mediocria. In habitu vel orbatione, ut visio et caecitas. Tertium eius, nec caecitas nec visio, sed lippitudo.

Its third is neither many nor few, but moderate. In possession or privation, as vision and blindness. Its third, neither blindness nor vision, but bleariness.

Hic ergo legit, non legit: tertium nihil habet.

Here therefore he reads, he does not read: it has no third.