Bacon: NOVUM ORGANUM

Qui de natura, tanquam de re explorata, pronuntiare ausi sunt, sive hoc ex animi fiducia fecerint sive ambitiose et more professorio, maximis illi philosophiam et scientias detrimentis affecere. Ut enim ad fidem faciendam validi, ita etiam ad inquisitionem extinguendam et abrumpendam efficaces fuerunt. Neque virtute propria tantum profuerunt, quantum in hoc nocuerunt, quod aliorum virtutem corruperint et perdiderint.

Those who have dared to pronounce about nature, as about a matter explored, whether they have done this out of confidence of spirit or ambitiously and in professorial fashion, have afflicted philosophy and the sciences with the greatest detriments. For as they were powerful for producing credence, so too were they effectual for extinguishing and breaking off inquiry. Nor have they benefited so much by their own virtue, as in this they have done harm: that they have corrupted and destroyed the virtue of others.

Qui autem contrariam huic viam ingressi sunt atque nihil prorsus sciri posse asseruerunt, sive ex sophistarum veterum odio sive ex animi fluctuatione aut etiam ex quadam doctrinae copia in hanc opinionem delapsi sint, certe non contemnendas ejus rationes adduxerunt; veruntamen nec a veris initiis sententiam suam derivarunt, et, studio quodam atque affectatione provecti, prorsus modum excesserunt. At antiquiores ex Graecis (quorum scripta perierunt) inter pronuntiandi jactantiam et Acatalepsiae desperationem prudentius se sustinuerunt: atque de inquisitionis difficultate et rerum obscuritate saepius querimonias et indignationes miscentes, et veluti fraenum mordentes, tamen propositum urgere atque naturae se immiscere non destiterunt; consentaneum (ut videtur) existimantes, hoc ipsum (videlicet utrum aliquid sciri possit) non disputare, sed experiri. Et tamen illi ipsi, impetu tantum intellectus usi, regulam non adhibuerunt, sed omnia in acri meditatione et mentis volutatione et agitatione perpetua posuerunt.

But those who entered the contrary road and asserted that nothing at all can be known, whether they slipped into this opinion from hatred of the ancient sophists, or from fluctuation of mind, or even from a certain abundance of doctrine, certainly brought forward reasons for it not to be despised; nevertheless they neither derived their judgment from true beginnings, and, carried on by a certain zeal and affectation, they altogether exceeded the mean. But the more ancient among the Greeks (whose writings have perished), between the boastfulness of pronouncing and the desperation of Acatalepsy, held themselves more prudently: and, often mingling complaints and indignations about the difficulty of inquiry and the obscurity of things, and as it were biting the bit, yet they did not cease to press their purpose and to immerse themselves in nature; judging it consistent (as it seems), not to dispute this very point (namely, whether anything can be known), but to make trial. And yet those very men, using only the impetus of the intellect, did not apply a rule, but placed everything in keen meditation and in the rolling and perpetual agitation of the mind.

Nostra autem ratio, ut opere ardua, ita dictu facilis est. Ea enim est, ut certitudinis gradus constituamus, sensum per reductionem quandam tueamur, sed mentis opus quod sensum subsequitur plerunque rejiciamus; novam autem et certam viam, ab ipsis sensuum perceptionibus, menti aperiamus et muniamus. Atque hoc proculdubio viderunt et illi qui tantas dialecticae partes tribuerunt.

Our method, though arduous in execution, is easy to say. It is this: that we establish degrees of certitude; that we safeguard sense by a certain reduction; but that we for the most part reject the work of the mind which follows upon sense; and that we open and fortify for the mind a new and certain way, from the very perceptions of the senses. And this, without doubt, was seen even by those who assigned so great a share to dialectic.

Ex quo liquet, illos intellectui adminicula quaesivisse, mentis autem processum nativum et sponte moventem, suspectum habuisse. Sed serum plane rebus perditis hoc adhibetur remedium; postquam mens ex quotidiana vitae consuetudine, et auditionibus et doctrinis inquinatis occupata, et vanissimis idolis obsessa fuerit. Itaque ars illa dialecticae, sero (ut diximus) cavens, neque rem ullo modo restituens, ad errores potius figendos quam ad veritatem aperiendam valuit.

Whence it is clear that they sought aids for the intellect, but held the mind’s native and spontaneously moving process in suspicion. But this remedy is plainly applied late, when things are already ruined; after the mind, from the quotidian habit of life and from polluted hearings and doctrines, has been preoccupied and besieged by the emptiest idols. Accordingly that art of dialectic, taking precautions late (as we said), and in no way restoring the matter, has availed rather for fixing errors than for opening the truth.

Restat unica salus ac sanitas, ut opus mentis universum de integro resumatur; ac mens, jam ab ipso principio, nullo modo sibi permittatur, sed perpetuo regatur; ac res veluti per machinas conficiatur. Sane si homines opera mechanica nudis manibus, absque instrumentorum vi et ope, aggressi essent, quemadmodum opera intellectualia nudis fere mentis viribus tractare non dubitarunt, parvae admodum fuissent res quas movere et vincere potuissent, licet operas enixas atque etiam conjunctas praestitissent. Atque si paulisper morari, atque in hoc ipsum exemplum, veluti in speculum, intueri velimus; exquiramus (si placet) si forte obeliscus aliquis magnitudine insignis ad triumphi vel hujusmodi magnificentiae decus transferendus esset, atque id homines nudis manibus aggrederentur, annon hoc magnae cujusdam esse dementiae spectator quispiam rei sobrius fateretur?

There remains a single safety and soundness, namely, that the entire work of the mind be taken up afresh; and that the mind, from the very beginning, be by no means left to itself, but be governed continually; and that matters be accomplished, as it were, by machines. Surely, if men had attempted mechanical works with bare hands, without the force and help of instruments, just as they have not hesitated to handle intellectual works with the almost bare powers of the mind, the things which they could have moved and overcome would have been very small indeed, though they had put forth strenuous and even united labors. And if we should pause for a little, and look into this very example as into a mirror; let us inquire (if it please) whether, if some obelisk remarkable for magnitude had to be transferred for the ornament of a triumph or of magnificence of this sort, and men were to undertake it with bare hands, would not any sober spectator of the affair confess this to be a certain great madness?

Quod si numerum augerent operariorum, atque hoc modo se valere posse confiderent, annon tanto magis? Sin autem delectum quendam adhibere vellent, atque imbecilliores separare, et robustis tantum et vigentibus uti, atque hinc saltem se voti compotes fore sperarent, annon adhuc eos impensius delirare diceret? Quin etiam si hoc ipso non contenti, artem tandem athleticam consulere statuerent, ac omnes deinceps manibus et lacertis et nervis ex arte bene unctis et medicatis adesse juberent, annon prorsus eos dare operam ut cum ratione quadam et prudentia insanirent, clamaret?

If they were to augment the number of workmen, and in this way confide that they could prevail, would not all the more? But if they should wish to apply a certain selection, and separate the weaker, and use only the robust and the vigorous, and from this at least hope that they would be in possession of their wish, would not someone say that they rave yet more vehemently? Nay even, if not content with this very thing, they should resolve at last to consult the athletic art, and then bid all to be present with hands and upper arms and sinews, well anointed and medicated according to the art, would he not cry out that they are absolutely taking pains to go mad with a kind of reason and prudence?

Atque homines tamen simili malesano impetu et conspiratione inutili feruntur in intellectualibus; dum ab ingeniorum vel multitudine et consensu vel excellentia et acumine magna sperant, aut etiam dialectica (quae quaedam athletica censeri possit) mentis nervos roborant; sed interim, licet tanto studio et conatu, (si quis vere judicaverit) intellectum nudum applicare non desinunt. Manifestissimum autem est, in omni opere magno, quod manus hominis praestat, sine instrumentis et machinis, vires nec singulorum intendi nec omnium coire posse.

And yet men are carried, in intellectual matters, by a similar unsound impulse and a useless conspiracy; while from either the multitude and consensus of wits, or from excellence and acumen, they hope for great things, or even by dialectic (which could be considered a kind of athletics) they strengthen the sinews of the mind; but meanwhile, despite such study and endeavor (if one should judge truly), they do not cease to apply a naked intellect. It is most manifest, however, that in every great work which the hand of man performs, without instruments and machines, the powers can neither be strained in individuals nor brought together in all.

Itaque ex his quae diximus praemissis, statuimus duas esse res de quibus homines plane monitos volumus, ne forte illae eos fugiant aut praetereant. Quarum prima hujusmodi est; fieri fato quodam (ut existimamus) bono, ad extinguendas et depellendas contradictiones et tumores animorum, ut et veteribus honor et reverentia intacta et imminuta maneant, et nos destinata perficere et tamen modestiae nostrae fructum percipere possimus. Nam nos, si profiteamur nos meliora afferre quam antiqui, eandem quam illi viam ingressi, nulla verborum arte efficere possimus, quin inducatur quaedam ingenii vel excellentiae vel facultatis comparatio sive contentio; non ea quidem illicita aut nova; -- quidni enim possimus pro jure nostro (neque eo ipso alio, quam omnium) si quid apud eos non recte inventum aut positum sit, reprehendere aut notare?

Therefore, with the foregoing premised, we have determined that there are two things about which we wish men to be plainly admonished, lest perchance they escape them or pass them by. Of which the first is of this sort; that it comes to pass by a certain (as we suppose) good fate, for the extinguishing and driving away of contradictions and the tumors of minds, that both honor and reverence for the ancients may remain untouched and undiminished, and that we may be able to accomplish the things destined and yet reap the fruit of our modesty. For if we were to profess that we bring better things than the ancients, having entered the same road as they, by no art of words could we bring it about that there should not be introduced a certain comparison or contention of wit or excellence or faculty; not one, to be sure, unlawful or novel; -- for why indeed should we not be able by our right (and that not other than the right of all), if anything among them has been not rightly found or set down, to reprehend or to note it?

-- sed tamen utcunque justa aut permissa, nihilominus impar fortasse fuisset ea ipsa contentio, ob virium nostrarum modum. Verum quum per nos illud agatur, ut alia omnino via intellectui aperiatur illis intentata et incognita, commutata jam ratio est; cessant studium et partes; nosque indicis tantummodo personam sustinemus, quod mediocris certe est authoritatis, et fortunae cujusdam potius quam facultatis et excellentiae. Atque haec moniti species ad personas pertinet; altera ad res ipsas.

-- but yet, however just or permitted, nevertheless that very contention would perhaps have been unequal, on account of the measure of our forces. But since through us this is being transacted, that an altogether other way be opened to the intellect, unattempted and unknown to them, the case is now altered; zeal and parties cease; and we sustain only the person of a judge, which is assuredly of moderate authority, and owing rather to a certain fortune than to faculty and excellence. And this species of monition pertains to persons; the other to the matters themselves.

Nos siquidem de deturbanda ea quae nunc floret philosophia, aut si quae alia sit aut erit hac emendatior aut auctior, minime laboramus. Neque enim officimus, quin philosophia ista recepta, et aliae id genus, disputationes alant, sermones ornent, ad professoria munera et vitae civilis compendia adhibeantur et valeant. Quin etiam aperte significamus et declaramus, eam quam nos adducimus philosophiam ad istas res admodum utilem non futuram.

We indeed do not in the least labor to overthrow the philosophy which now flourishes, nor, if there be or shall be any other more emended or more augmented than this, to cast it down. For neither do we hinder that that received philosophy, and others of that kind, should nourish disputations, adorn discourses, and be applied to and prove effective for professorial duties and the conveniences of civil life. Nay rather, we openly signify and declare that the philosophy which we bring forward will not be very useful for those matters.

Non praesto est, neque in transitu capitur, neque ex praenotionibus intellectui blanditur, neque ad vulgi captum nisi per utilitatem et effecta descendet.

It is not at hand, nor is it caught in passing, nor does it blandish the intellect by prenotions, nor will it descend to the grasp of the crowd except through utility and effects.

Sint itaque (quod foelix faustumque sit utrique parti) duae doctrinarum emanationes, ac duae dispensationes; duae similiter contemplantium sive philosophantium tribus ac veluti cognationes; atque illae neutiquam inter se inimicae aut alienae, sed foederatae et mutuis auxiliis devinctae: sit denique alia scientias colendi, alia inveniendi ratio. Atque quibus prima potior et acceptior est, ob festinationem, vel vitae civilis rationes, vel quod illam alteram ob mentis infirmitatem capere et complecti non possint (id quod longe plurimis accidere necesse est), optamus ut iis foeliciter et ex voto succedat quod agunt, atque ut quod sequuntur teneant. Quod si cui mortalium cordi et curae sit, non tantum inventis haerere atque iis uti, sed ad ulteriora penetrate; atque non disputando adversarium, sed opere naturam vincere; denique, non belle et probabiliter opinari, sed certo et ostensive scire; tales, tanquam veri scientiarum filii, nobis (si videbitur) se adjungant; ut omissis naturae atriis, quae infiniti contriverunt, aditus aliquando ad interiora patefiat.

Let there be therefore (which may it be happy and auspicious for both parties) two emanations of doctrines, and two dispensations; likewise two tribes of contemplators or philosophers, and as it were cognations; and let those by no means be mutually hostile or alien, but federated and bound by mutual aids: let there be, finally, one method of cultivating the sciences, another of discovering. And for those to whom the former is weightier and more acceptable, because of haste, or the considerations of civil life, or because they cannot, on account of weakness of mind (which must needs befall by far the most), grasp and embrace the other, we wish that what they are doing may succeed happily and according to their vow, and that they may hold what they pursue. But if it be at the heart and a care to any of mortals not only to cling to inventions and to use them, but to penetrate to further things; and to conquer not an adversary by disputation, but nature by work; finally, not to opine fairly and plausibly, but to know with certainty and demonstratively; let such, as true sons of the sciences, (if it shall seem good) join themselves to us; so that, the forecourts of nature being left aside, which countless multitudes have worn down, an access at length to the inner parts may be laid open.

Atque ut melius intelligamur, utque illud ipsum quod volumus ex nominibus impositis magis familiariter occurrat, altera ratio sive via Anticipatio Mentis, altera Interpretatio Naturae, a nobis appellari consuevit.

And that we may be better understood, and that the very thing we intend may present itself more familiarly from the names imposed, the one method or way has been accustomed with us to be called the Anticipation of the Mind, the other the Interpretation of Nature.

Est etiam quod petendum videtur. Nos certe cogitationem suscepimus et curam adhibuimus, ut quae a nobis proponentur non tantum vera essent, sed etiam ad animos hominum (licet miris modis occupatos et interclusos) non incommode aut aspere accederent. Veruntamen aequum est, ut ab hominibus impetremus (in tanta praesertim doctrinarum et scientiarum restauratione) ut qui de hisce nostris aliquid, sive ex sensu proprio, sive ex authoritatum turba, sive ex demonstrationum formis (quae nunc tanquam leges quaedam judicialis invaluerunt), statuere aut existimare velit, ne id in transitu et velut aliud agendo facere se posse speret; sed ut rem pernoscat; nostram, quam describimus et munimus, viam ipse paullatim tentet; subtilitati rerum quae in experientia signata est assuescat; pravos denique atque alte haerentes mentis habitus tempestiva et quasi legitima mora corrigat; atque tum demum (si placuerit) postquam in potestate sua esse coeperit, judicio suo utatur.

There is also something that seems fit to be requested. We, for our part, have undertaken thought and applied care, that the things set forth by us be not only true, but also that they should approach the minds of men (though in wondrous ways occupied and shut in) not incommodiously or harshly. Nevertheless, it is equitable that we obtain from men (especially in so great a restoration of doctrines and sciences) that whoever wishes to determine or estimate anything about these our matters, whether from his own sense, or from the crowd of authorities, or from the forms of demonstrations (which now have prevailed as certain laws of the judicial), should not hope to be able to do this in passing and, as it were, while doing something else; but that he should come to know the matter thoroughly; that he himself should gradually try our road, which we describe and fortify; that he accustom himself to the subtlety of things which is marked in experience; that at length he correct the depraved and deeply clinging habits of mind by a timely and, as it were, legitimate delay; and then at last (if it shall please), after it has begun to be in his own power, let him use his own judgment.