Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Iam nunc quaeramus diligentius quantum dat deus quod paulo ante distulimus, utrum et singula quaeque in trinitate persona possit et per se ipsam non cum ceteris duabus dici deus aut magnus aut sapiens aut uerus aut omnipotens aut iustus et si quid aliud de deo dici potest, non relatiue sed ad se ipsum, an uero non dicantur ista nisi cum trinitas intellegitur. Hoc enim quaestionem facit quia scriptum est: Christum dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam, utrum ita sit pater sapientiae atque uirtutis suae ut hac sapientia sapiens sit quam genuit et hac uirtute potens quam genuit, et quia semper potens et sapiens, semper genuit uirtutem et sapientiam. Dixeramus enim si ita est cur non et magnitudinis suae pater sit qua magnus est et bonitatis qua bonus et iustitiae qua iustus et alia si qua sunt.

[1 1] Now let us inquire more diligently, so far as God gives, what a little before we deferred, whether each single person in the Trinity can, in and of itself and not with the other two, be said to be God or great or wise or true or omnipotent or just, and whatever else can be said of God, not relatively but with reference to itself; or rather, whether these are not said unless when the Trinity is understood. For this makes a question, because it is written: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God; whether the Father is thus the father of his own wisdom and power, that by this wisdom he is wise which he begot, and by this power powerful which he begot; and since he is always powerful and wise, he has always begotten power and wisdom. For we had said, if this is so, why is he not also the father of his own magnitude by which he is great, and of goodness by which he is good, and of justice by which he is just, and of other things, if there are any.

Aut si haec omnia pluribus uocabulis in eadem sapientia et uirtute intelleguntur ut ea sit magnitudo quae uirtus, ea bonitas quae sapientia, et ea rursus sapientia quae uirtus sicut iam tractauimus, meminerimus cum aliquid horum nomino sic accipiendum esse ac si omnia commemorem.

Or if all these things are understood, under several terms, in the same wisdom and virtue, so that that magnitude is the same as virtue, that goodness the same as wisdom, and again that wisdom the same as virtue, as we have already discussed, let us remember that when I name any of these, it is to be taken as if I were mentioning them all.

Quaeritur ergo an pater etiam singulus sit sapiens atque ipsa sibi ipse secundum, an ita sit sapiens quomodo dicens. Verbo enim quod genuit dicens est, non uerbo quod profertur et sonat et transit, sed uerbo quod erat apud deum et deus erat uerbum et omnia per ipsum facta sunt, uerbo aequali sibi quo semper atque incommutabiliter dicit se ipsum. Non est enim ipse uerbum sicut nec filius nec imago.

Therefore the question is asked whether the Father also, singly, is wise and is himself to himself the very standard, or whether he is wise in the manner of “speaking.” For by the Word which he begot he is “speaking,” not by a word that is uttered and sounds and passes away, but by the Word which was with God and the Word was God and all things were made through him, a Word equal to himself by which he always and immutably speaks himself. For he is not himself the Word, just as he is neither the Son nor the Image.

Dicens autem (exceptis illis temporalibus uocibus dei quae in creatura fiunt, nam sonant et transeunt), dicens ergo illo coaeterno uerbo non singulus intellegitur sed cum ipso uerbo sine quo non est utique dicens. Itane et sapiens sicut dicens ut ita sit sapientia sicut uerbum et hoc sit uerbum esse quod est esse sapientiam, hoc etiam esse uirtutem ut uirtus et sapientia et uerbum idem sit et relatiue dicatur sicut filius et imago, atque ille non singulus potens uel sapiens sed cum ipsa uirtute atque sapientia quam genuit sicut non singulus dicens sed eo uerbo et cum eo uerbo quod genuit, atque ita magnus ea et cum ea magnitudine quam genuit? Et si non alio magnus, alio deus, sed eo magnus quo deus quia non aliud illi est magnum esse, aliud deum esse, consequens est ut nec deus singulus sed ea et cum ea deitate quam genuit ut sic sit filius deitas patris sicut sapientia et uirtus patris et sicuti est uerbum et imago patris.

But in saying (with those temporal voices of God excepted which are made in the creature, for they sound and pass away), therefore in saying by that coeternal word he is not understood as single, but with the word itself, without which he is assuredly not speaking. Is he then also wise as he is a sayer, so that wisdom be as the word, and that to be the word be what it is to be wisdom, and this also be virtue, so that virtue and wisdom and word be the same and be said relatively, as son and image; and that he be not single as powerful or wise, but with the very virtue and wisdom which he begot, just as he is not single as a sayer but by that word and with that word which he begot, and thus great by that and with that greatness which he begot? And if he is not great by one thing and God by another, but great by that by which he is God, because it is not one thing for him to be great, another to be God, it follows that neither is he God as single, but by that and with that deity which he begot, so that the son be the deity of the father, as the wisdom and virtue of the father, and just as he is the word and image of the father.

Et quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud deum esse, ita sit etiam essentia patris filius sicuti est uerbum et imago eius. Ac per hoc etiam excepto eo quod pater est non sit aliquid pater nisi quia est ei filius ut non tantum id quod dicitur pater (quod manifestum est eum non ad se ipsum sed ad filium relatiue dici et ideo patrem quia est ei filius), sed omnino ut sit quod ad se ipsum est ideo sit quia genuit essentiam suam. Sicut enim magnus est non nisi ea quam genuit magnitudine, ita et est non nisi ea quam genuit essentia quia non aliud est illi esse, aliud magnum esse.

And because for him it is not one thing to be, another to be God, thus let the Son be also the Father’s essence, just as he is his Word and Image. And therefore also, except for the fact that he is Father, let the Father not be anything unless because there is to him a Son—so that not only that which is called “Father” (which manifestly is said of him not with respect to himself but relatively to the Son, and therefore he is Father because there is to him a Son), but altogether, that he may be what he is with respect to himself, he is for this reason, because he begot his own essence. For just as he is great only by that magnitude which he begot, so also he is only by that essence which he begot, because it is not one thing for him to be, another to be great.

Itane igitur pater est essentiae suae sicut pater est magnitudinis suae, sicut pater est uirtutis et sapientiae suae? Eadem quippe eius magnitudo quae uirtus et eadem essentia quae magnitudo.

So then, is he the father of his own essence just as he is the father of his own magnitude, just as he is the father of his own virtue and sapience? For indeed his magnitude is the same as his virtue, and his essence the same as his magnitude.

[2] Haec disputatio nata est ex eo quod scriptum est: Christum esse dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam. Quapropter in eas angustias sermo coartatur cum ineffabilia fari cupimus ut aut dicamus Christum non esse dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam atque ita impudenter et impie resistamus apostolo; aut Christum quidem dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam esse fateamur sed eius patrem non esse patrem uirtutis et sapientiae suae, quod non minus impium est (sic enim nec Christi erit pater quia Christus dei uirtus et dei sapientia est); aut non esse patrem uirtute sua potentem neque sapientia sua sapientem, quod quis audeat dicere?; aut aliud in patre intellegi esse, aliud sapientem esse ut non hoc ipso sit quo sapiens est, quod de anima intellegi solet quae alias insipiens, alias sapiens est uelut natura mutabilis et non summe perfecteque simplex; aut patrem non esse aliquid ad se ipsum et non solum quod pater est sed omnino quod est, ad filium relatiue dici. Quomodo ergo eiusdem essentiae filius cuius pater quandoquidem ad se ipsum nec essentia est, nec omnino est ad se ipsum sed etiam esse ad filium illi est?

[2] This disputation has arisen from that which is written: that Christ is the power of god and the wisdom of god. Wherefore the discourse is constrained into such straits when we desire to speak ineffable things, that either we say that Christ is not the power of god and the wisdom of god and thus shamelessly and impiously resist the apostle; or we confess indeed that Christ is the power of god and the wisdom of god, but that his father is not the father of his own power and wisdom, which is no less impious (for thus neither will he be the father of Christ, because Christ is the power of god and the wisdom of god); or that the father is not powerful by his own power nor wise by his own wisdom, which who would dare to say?; or that one thing is understood to be in the father, another to be wise, so that he is not by that very thing by which he is wise—which is wont to be understood about the soul, which at one time is foolish, at another wise, as if of a changeable nature and not supremely and perfectly simple; or that the father is not anything with respect to himself, and that not only what he is as father but absolutely what he is is said relatively to the son. How then is he the son of the same essence as the one whose father he is, since, with respect to himself, he is neither essence, nor at all is he with respect to himself, but even his very being is toward the son?

At enim multo magis unius eiusdemque essentiae quia una eademque essentia pater et filius quandoquidem patri non ad se ipsum est ipsum esse sed ad filium quam essentiam genuit et qua essentia est quidquid est. Neuter ergo ad se est, et uterque ad inuicem relatiue dicitur. An pater solus non solum quod pater dicitur sed omnino quidquid dicitur relatiue ad filium dicitur, ille autem dicitur et ad se? Et si ita est, quid dicitur ad se? An ipsa essentia?

But indeed, all the more of one and the same essence, because the Father and the Son are one and the same essence, since for the Father “being itself” is not with respect to himself but with respect to the Son—whose essence he begot, and by which essence he is whatever he is. Therefore neither is with respect to himself, and each is said relatively to the other. Or is the Father alone said relatively to the Son not only in that he is called “Father,” but whatever at all he is called; whereas that one is said also with respect to himself? And if it is so, what is he said with respect to himself? Or the essence itself?

Sed patris essentia est filius sicut patris uirtus et sapientia, sicut uerbum patris et imago patris. Aut si essentia dicitur ad se filius, pater autem non est essentia sed genitor essentiae, non est autem ad se ipsum sed hac ipsa essentia quam genuit sicut hac ipsa magnitudine magnus quam genuit, ergo et magnitudo dicitur ad se filius, ergo et uirtus et sapientia et uerbum et imago. Quid autem absurdius quam imaginem ad se dici?

But the father’s essence is the son, just as the father’s power and wisdom, just as the father’s word and the father’s image. Or if the son is said to be essence with respect to himself, while the father is not essence but the begetter of essence, and he is not with respect to himself but by this very essence which he begot, just as by this very magnitude he is great—the magnitude which he begot—therefore magnitude too is said with respect to oneself to be the son, and therefore likewise power and wisdom and word and image. But what is more absurd than that image be said with respect to oneself?

Aut si non idipsum est imago et uerbum quod est uirtus et sapientia, sed illa relatiue dicuntur, haec autem ad se non ad aliud, incipit non ea sapientia quam genuit sapiens esse pater quia non potest ipse ad eam relatiue dici et illa ad eum relatiue non dici. Omnia enim quae relatiue dicuntur ad inuicem dicuntur.

Or if the image and the word are not the very same thing as the virtue and the wisdom, but the former are said relatively, while the latter are said with respect to self and not to another, it begins to be the case that the Father is not wise by that wisdom which he begot, because he cannot himself be said relatively to it, and it not be said relatively to him. For all things which are said relatively are said with reference to one another.

Restat itaque ut etiam essentia filius relatiue dicatur ad patrem. Ex quo conficitur inopinatissimus sensus ut ipsa essentia non sit essentia, uel certe cum dicitur essentia, non essentia sed relatiuum indicetur. Quomodo cum dicitur dominus, non essentia indicatur sed relatiuum quod refertur ad seruum; cum autem homo dicitur uel aliquid tale quod ad se non ad aliud dicitur, tunc indicatur essentia; homo ergo cum dicitur dominus, ipse homo essentia est, dominus uero relatiue dicitur; homo enim ad se dicitur, dominus ad seruum.

It remains, therefore, that even the essence be said relatively with respect to the Father. From which there is wrought a most unexpected sense: that the essence itself is not essence, or at least that when “essence” is said, not essence but a relative is indicated. Just as when “lord” is said, not an essence is indicated but a relative which is referred to a servant; but when “man” is said, or something of that sort which is said with reference to itself and not to another, then an essence is indicated; therefore when a man is called “lord,” the man himself is essence, but “lord” is said relatively; for “man” is said with reference to itself, “lord” to a servant.

Hoc autem unde agimus si essentia ipsa relatiue dicitur, essentia ipsa non est essentia? Huc accedit quia omnis essentia quae relatiue dicitur est etiam aliquid excepto relatiuo sicut homo dominus et homo seruus et equus iumentum et nummus arra; homo et equus et nummus ad se dicuntur et substantiae sunt uel essentiae; dominus uero et seruus et iumentum et arra ad aliquid relatiue dicuntur. Sed si non esset homo, id est aliqua substantia, non esset qui relatiue dominus diceretur; et si non esset equus quaedam essentia, non esset quod iumentum relatiue diceretur; ita si nummus non esset aliqua substantia, nec arra posset relatiue dici.

But as to this which we are treating: if essence itself is said relatively, is essence itself not essence? To this there is added that every essence which is said relatively is also something except for the relative, as man-lord and man-slave and horse-beast-of-burden and coin-earnest-money; man and horse and coin are said with respect to themselves and are substances or essences; but lord and slave and beast-of-burden and earnest-money are said relatively to something. But if man did not exist, that is, some substance, there would not be one who would be called lord relatively; and if horse were not a certain essence, there would not be that which would be called beast-of-burden relatively; likewise, if coin were not some substance, neither could earnest-money be said relatively.

Quapropter si et pater non est aliquid ad se ipsum, non est omnino qui relatiue dicatur ad aliquid. Non enim sicut ad aliquid coloratum refertur color eius, nec omnino ad se dicitur color sed semper alicuius colorati est; illud autem cuius color est etiam si eo quod coloratum dicitur ad colorem refertur, tamen id quod corpus dicitur ad se dicitur, ullo modo ita putandum est patrem non dici aliquid ad se ipsum, sed quidquid dicitur ad filium dici; eundem uero filium et ad se ipsum dici et ad patrem, cum dicitur magnitudo magna et uirtus potens utique ad se ipsum, et magnitudo atque uirtus magni et potentis patris qua pater magnus et potens est. Non ergo ita, sed utrumque substantia et utrumque una substantia.

Wherefore, if even the Father is not something with respect to himself, there is absolutely no one who is said relatively to something. For it is not as color is referred to something colored, nor is color at all said of itself, but is always of something colored; but that of which it is the color, even if by the fact that it is called “colored” it is referred to color, nevertheless that which is called “body” is said with respect to itself. In no way, then, is it to be thought thus, that the Father is not said to be anything with respect to himself, but that whatever is said is said with respect to the Son; whereas the same Son is said both with respect to himself and with respect to the Father, when “great magnitude” and “powerful virtue” are said—surely with respect to himself—and as the magnitude and virtue of the great and potent Father, by which the Father is great and potent. Not, therefore, thus; but both are substance, and both one substance.

Sicut autem absurdum est dicere candidum non esse candorem, sic absurdum est dicere sapientem non esse sapientiam; et sicut candor ad se ipsum candidus dicitur, ita et sapientia ad se ipsam dicitur sapiens. Sed candor corporis non est essentia quoniam ipsum corpus essentia est et illa eius qualitas, unde et ab ea dicitur candidum corpus cui non hoc est esse quod candidum esse. Aliud enim ibi forma et aliud color et utrumque non in se ipso sed in aliqua mole, quae moles nec forma nec color est sed formata atque colorata.

As it is absurd to say that the white is not whiteness, so it is absurd to say that the sapient is not sapience; and as whiteness is said to be white with respect to itself, so too sapience is said to be sapient with respect to itself. But the whiteness of a body is not essence, since the body itself is essence and that is its quality, whence the body is called white by it, for which to be is not the same as to be white. For there form is one thing and color another, and both are not in themselves but in some mass, which mass is neither form nor color but formed and colored.

Sapientia uero et sapiens est et se ipsa sapiens est. Et quoniam quaecumque anima participatione sapientiae fit sapiens, si rursus desipiat, manet tamen in se sapientia; nec cum fuerit anima in stultitiam commutata, illa mutatur. Non ita est in eo qui ex ea fit sapiens quemadmodum candor in corpore quod ex illo candidum est; cum enim corpus in alium colorem fuerit commutatum, non manebit candor ille atque omnino esse desinet.

But wisdom is both wise and is itself wise. And since any soul becomes wise by participation in wisdom, if it again lapses into folly, nevertheless wisdom remains in itself; nor, when the soul has been changed into foolishness, is it changed. It is not thus in the one who becomes wise from it, as with whiteness in a body which is white from it; for when the body has been changed into another color, that whiteness will not remain and will altogether cease to be.

Quod si et pater qui genuit sapientiam ex ea fit sapiens neque hoc est illi esse quod sapere, qualitas eius est filius, non proles eius, et non ibi erit iam summa simplicitas.

But if even the father who begot wisdom becomes wise from her, and for him to be is not the same as to be wise, then his son is his quality, not his progeny, and supreme simplicity will no longer be there.

Sed absit ut ita sit quia uere ibi est summe simplex essentia; hoc ergo est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod si hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, non per illam sapientiam quam genuit sapiens est pater; alioquin non ipse illam, sed illa eum genuit. Quid enim aliud dicimus cum dicimus hoc illi est esse quod sapere nisi eo est quo sapiens est?

But far be it that it be so, because truly there there is a supremely simple essence; therefore, there, to be is the same as to be wise. And if there to be is the same as to be wise, the Father is not wise through that Wisdom which he begot; otherwise, not he begot her, but she begot him. For what else do we say when we say that for him to be is to be wise, except that he is by that by which he is wise?

Quapropter quae causa illi est ut sapiens sit, ipsa illi causa est ut sit. Proinde si sapientia quam genuit causa est illi ut sapiens sit, etiam ut sit ipsa illi causa est. Quod fieri non potest nisi gignendo eum aut faciendo.

Wherefore the cause which is to him that he be wise is itself to him the cause that he be. Accordingly, if the Wisdom which he begot is a cause to him for being wise, it is itself also to him a cause for being. This cannot come to pass except by begetting him or by making him.

Sed neque genitricem neque conditricem patris ullo modo quisquam dixerit sapientiam. Quid enim est insanius? Ergo et pater ipse sapientia est, et ita dicitur filius sapientia patris quomodo dicitur lumen patris, id est ut quemadmodum lumen de lumine et utrumque unum lumen, sic intellegatur sapientia de sapientia et utrumque una sapientia.

But neither the genetrix nor the foundress of the father would anyone call wisdom in any way. For what is more insane? Therefore the father himself also is wisdom, and thus the son is called the wisdom of the father just as he is called the light of the father; that is, just as light from light, and both one light, so let wisdom be understood from wisdom, and both one wisdom.

Ergo et una essentia quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere. Quod enim est sapientiae sapere et potentiae posse, aeternitati aeternam esse, iustitiae iustam esse, magnitudini magnam esse, hoc est essentiae ipsum esse. Et quia in illa simplicitate non est aliud sapere quam esse, eadem ibi sapientia quae essentia.

Therefore there is also one essence, because there, to be is the same as to be wise. For what it is for wisdom to be wise, and for power to be able, for eternity to be eternal, for justice to be just, for magnitude to be great—this is, for essence, very being itself. And because in that simplicity there is not other thing to be wise than to be, there wisdom is the same as essence.

[II 3] Pater igitur et filius simul una essentia et una magnitudo et una ueritas et una sapientia. Sed non pater et filius simul ambo unum uerbum quia non simul ambo unus filius. Sicut enim filius ad patrem refertur, non ad se ipsum dicitur, ita et uerbum ad eum cuius uerbum est refertur cum dicitur uerbum.

[2 3] Therefore the father and the son together are one essence and one magnitude and one truth and one wisdom. But the father and the son are not together both one word, because they are not together both one son. For just as the son is referred to the father, he is not said with respect to himself, so too the word is referred to him whose word it is when it is called “word.”

Eo quippe filius quo uerbum et eo uerbum quo filius. Quoniam igitur pater et filius simul non utique unus filius, consequens est ut pater et filius simul non ambo unum uerbum. Et propterea non eo uerbum quo sapientia quia uerbum non ad se dicitur sed tantum relatiue ad eum cuius uerbum est sicut filius ad patrem; sapientia uero eo quo essentia.Et ideo quia una essentia, una sapientia.

For the son is by that by which the word is, and the word is by that by which the son is. Since therefore the father and the son together are not assuredly one son, it follows that the father and the son together are not both one word. And on that account the word is not by that by which wisdom (is), because “word” is not said with reference to itself but only relatively to him whose word it is, just as “son” [is said] to the father; but wisdom is by that by which essence.And therefore, because one essence, one wisdom.

Quoniam uero et uerbum sapientia est, sed non eo uerbum quo sapientia (uerbum enim relatiue, sapientia essentialiter intellegitur), id dici accipiamus cum dicitur uerbum ac si dicatur nata sapientia, ut sit et filius et imago. Et haec duo cum dicuntur, id est 'nata sapientia,' in uno eorum eo quod est 'nata' et uerbum et imago et filius intellegatur, et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia quia relatiue dicuntur; at in altero quod est 'sapientia,' quoniam et ad se dicitur (se ipsa enim sapiens est), etiam essentia demonstretur et hoc eius esse quod sapere. Vnde pater et filius simul una sapientia quia una essentia, et singillatim sapientia de sapientia sicut essentia de essentia.

Since indeed the Word is also Wisdom, but not the Word in the same respect as it is Wisdom (for the Word is understood relatively, Wisdom essentially), let us take it to be meant, when the Word is said, as if it were said ‘Wisdom born,’ so that it may be both Son and Image. And when these two are said, that is, ‘Wisdom born,’ let it be understood that in the one of them, that which is ‘born,’ both the Word and the Image and the Son are understood, and that in all these names the essence is not shown, because they are said relatively; but in the other, which is ‘Wisdom,’ since it is said with reference to itself as well (for she is wise by herself), the essence also is demonstrated, and this, that its being is to be wise. Whence the Father and the Son together are one Wisdom because one Essence, and severally Wisdom from Wisdom, just as Essence from Essence.

Quapropter non quia pater non est filius et filius non est pater, aut ille ingenitus, ille autem genitus, ideo non una essentia quia his nominibus relatiua eorum ostenduntur. Vterque autem simul una sapientia et una essentia ubi hoc est esse quod sapere; non autem simul uterque uerbum aut filius quia non hoc est esse quod uerbum esse aut filium esse sicut iam satis ostendimus ista relatiue dici.

Wherefore it does not follow that, because the father is not the son and the son is not the father, or that the one is unbegotten and the other begotten, therefore they are not one essence, since by these names their relative terms are shown. But both together are one wisdom and one essence, where this is to be: to be wise; yet not both together [are] word or son, because to be is not the same as to be word or to be son, as we have already sufficiently shown that these things are said relatively.

[III 4] Cur ergo in scripturis nusquam fere de sapientia quidquam dicitur nisi ut ostendatur a deo genita uel creata? Genita scilicet per quam facta sunt omnia; creata uero uel facta sicut in hominibus cum ad eam quae non creata et facta sed genita est conuertuntur et inlustrantur; in ipsis enim fit aliquid quod uocetur eorum sapientia; uel illud scripturis praenuntiantibus aut narrantibus quod uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis; hoc modo enim Christus facta sapientia est quia factus est homo. An propterea non loquitur in illis libris sapientia uel de illa dicitur aliquid nisi quod eam de deo natam ostendat aut factam, quamuis sit et pater ipsa sapientia, quia illa nobis sapientia commendanda erat et imitanda cuius imitatione formamur?

[3 4] Why, then, in the scriptures is almost nothing said about Wisdom except to show that she is begotten by God or created? Begotten, namely, through whom all things were made; but “created” or “made” as in the case of human beings, when they are converted toward that Wisdom which is not created and made but begotten, and are illumined; for in them there comes to be something that is called their wisdom; or that fact which the scriptures foretell or relate, that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us; for in this mode Christ is Wisdom “made,” because he was made man. Or is it for this reason that in those books Wisdom does not speak, or anything is said about her, except what shows her to be born from God or made—although the Father himself is Wisdom—because that Wisdom was to be commended to us and to be imitated, by the imitation of whom we are formed?

Pater enim eam dicit ut uerbum eius sit, non quomodo profertur ex ore uerbum sonans aut ante pronuntiationem cogitatur (spatiis enim temporum hoc completur, illud autem aeternum est), et inluminando dicit nobis et de se et de patre quod dicendum est hominibus. Ideoque ait: Nemo nouit filium nisi pater, et nemo nouit patrem nisi filius et cui uoluerit filius reuelare quia per filium reuelat pater, id est per uerbum suum. Si enim hoc uerbum quod nos proferimus temporale et transitorium et se ipsum ostendit et illud de quo loquimur, quanto magis uerbum dei per quod facta sunt omnia, quod ita ostendit patrem sicuti est pater quia et ipsum ita est, et hoc est quod pater secundum quod sapientia est et essentia?

For the Father calls her so that she may be his word, not in the way a sounding word is brought forth from the mouth or is thought before pronunciation (for this is completed by spans of times, but that is eternal), and by enlightening he says to us, both about himself and about the Father, what ought to be said to human beings. Therefore he says: No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son has willed to reveal—because through the Son the Father reveals, that is, through his own word. For if this word which we utter, temporal and transitory, both shows itself and that about which we speak, how much more the word of God through which all things were made, which thus shows the Father just as the Father is, because it too so is; and is this what the Father is, inasmuch as he is wisdom and essence?

Nam secundum quod uerbum non hoc est quod pater quia uerbum non est pater, et uerbum relatiue dicitur sicut filius quod utique non pater.

For, insofar as it is the word, it is not what the Father is, because the word is not the Father; and “word” is said relatively, just as “son” is—which of course is not “father.”

Et ideo Christus uirtus et sapientia dei quia de patre uirtute et sapientia etiam ipse uirtus et sapientia est sicut lumen de patre lumine et fons uitae apud deum patrem utique fontem uitae. Quoniam apud te, inquit, fons uitae, in lumine tuo uidebimus lumen, quia sicut pater habet uitam in semetipso, sic dedit filio uitam habere in semetipso; et erat lumen uerum quod inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum, et lumen hoc uerbum erat apud deum, sed et deus erat uerbum. Deus autem lumen est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae; lumen uero non corporale sed spiritale, neque ita spiritale ut inluminatione factum sit quemadmodum dictum est apostolis: Vos estis lumen mundi, sed lumen quod inluminat omnem hominem, ea ipsa et summa sapientia deus unde nunc agimus.

And therefore Christ is the power and wisdom of God, because from the Father—power and wisdom—he too is power and wisdom, as light from the Father light, and the fountain of life with God the Father, assuredly the fountain of life. For with you, he says, is the fountain of life; in your light we shall see light, because just as the Father has life in himself, so he gave to the Son to have life in himself; and there was the true light which enlightens every human coming into this world, and this light was the Word with God, and the Word was also God. But God is light, and there are no darknesses in him at all; the light, indeed, not corporeal but spiritual, nor so spiritual as to have been made by illumination, as it was said to the apostles: You are the light of the world, but rather the light that enlightens every human, that very and highest Wisdom, God, about whom we are now treating.

Sapientia ergo filius de sapientia patre sicut lumen de lumine et deus de deo ut et singulus pater lumen et singulus filius lumen, et singulus pater deus et singulus filius deus; ergo et singulus pater sapientia et singulus filius sapientia. Et sicut utrumque simul unum lumen et unus deus, sic utrumque una sapientia. Sed filius factus est nobis sapientia a deo et iustitia et sanctificatio quia temporaliter nos ad illum conuertimur, id est ex aliquo tempore, ut cum illo maneamus in aeternum.

Therefore Wisdom is the Son from the Father who is Wisdom, just as light from light and God from God, so that both the individual Father is light and the individual Son is light, and the individual Father is God and the individual Son is God; therefore also the individual Father is Wisdom and the individual Son is Wisdom. But the Son has been made for us Wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification, because we turn to him temporally, that is, from a certain time, so that we may remain with him unto eternity.

Et ipse ex quodam tempore uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in nobis.

And He Himself, from a certain time, the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.

[5] Propterea igitur cum pronuntiatur in scripturis aut enarratur aliquid de sapientia , siue dicente ipsa siue cum de illa dicitur, filius nobis potissimum insinuatur. Cuius imaginis exemplo et nos non discedamus a deo quia et nos imago dei sumus, non quidem aequalis, facta quippe a patre per filium, non nata de patre sicut illa; et nos quia inluminamur lumine, illa uero quia lumen inluminans, et ideo illa sine exemplo nobis exemplum est. Neque enim imitatur praecedentem aliquem ad patrem a quo numquam est omnino separabilis quia idipsum est quod ille de quo est.

[5] Therefore, when in the Scriptures something is pronounced or enarrated about wisdom , whether she herself is speaking or when it is said about her, the Son is most of all insinuated to us. By the example of whose image let us also not depart from God, since we too are the image of God, not indeed equal, having been made by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father as she; and we, because we are illuminated by the light, but she because [she is] the light illuminating, and therefore she, without an example, is an example for us. For neither does she imitate someone preceding toward the Father, from whom she is never at all separable, because she is the selfsame as he of whom she is.

Nos autem nitentes imitamur manentem et sequimur stantem et in ipso ambulantes tendimus ad ipsum quia factus est nobis uia temporalis per humilitatem quae mansio nobis aeterna est per diuinitatem. Quoniam quippe spiritibus mundis intellectualibus qui superbia non lapsi sunt in forma dei et deo aequalis et deus praebet exemplum, ut se idem exemplum redeundi etiam lapso praeberet homini qui propter immunditiam peccatorum poenamque mortalitatis deum uidere non poterat semetipsum exinaniui non mutando diuinitatem suam sed nostram mutabilitatem assumendo, et formam serui accipiens uenit ad nos in hunc mundum qui in hoc mundo erat quia mundus per eum factus est ut exemplum sursum uidentibus deum, exemplum deorsum mirantibus hominem, exemplum sanis ad permanendum, exemplum infirmis ad conualescendum, exemplum morituris ad non timendum, exemplum mortuis ad resurgendum esset, in omnibus ipse primatum tenes. Quia enim homo ad beatitudinem sequi non debebat nisi deum et sentire non poterat deum, sequendo deum hominem factum sequeretur simul et quem sentire poterat et quem sequi debebat.

But we, striving, imitate the One who abides and follow the One who stands, and walking in him we stretch toward him, because he has been made for us a temporal way through humility, which is for us an eternal abode through divinity. For to clean, intellectual spirits who did not fall by pride, he, in the form of God and equal to God and God, offers an example; in order that the same example might also offer itself of returning for fallen man, who, on account of the uncleanness of sins and the penalty of mortality, could not see God, he emptied himself—not by changing his divinity, but by assuming our mutability—and, taking the form of a servant, came to us into this world, he who was in this world, because the world was made through him, so that he might be an example above for those seeing God, an example below for those marveling at man, an example for the healthy to remain, an example for the weak to convalesce, an example for the dying to not fear, an example for the dead to resurge; in all things you hold the primacy. For since man ought to follow to beatitude none but God, and could not perceive God, by following God made man he would together follow both him whom he could perceive and him whom he ought to follow.

Amemus ergo eum et inhaereamus illi caritate diffusa in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. Non igitur mirum si propter exemplum quod nobis ut reformemur ad imaginem dei praebet imago aequalis patri, cum de sapientia scriptura loquitur, de filio loquitur quem sequimur uiuendo sapienter, quamuis et pater sit sapientia sicut lumen et deus.

Therefore let us love him and adhere to him with charity poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. It is not, then, a marvel if, on account of the example which the Image equal to the Father provides to us that we may be re-formed to the image of God, when Scripture speaks about Wisdom, it speaks about the Son, whom we follow by living wisely, although the Father also is Wisdom, as he is Light and God.

[6] Spiritus quoque sanctus siue sit summa caritas utrumque coniungens nosque subiungens, quod ideo non indigne dicitur quia scriptum est: Deus caritas est, quomodo non est etiam ipse sapientia cum sit lumen, quoniam deus lumen est? Siue alio modo essentia spiritus sancti singillatim ac proprie nominanda est, quoniam deus est utique lumen est, et quoniam lumen est utique sapientia est. Deum autem esse spiritum sanctum scriptura clamat apud apostolum qui dicit: Nescitis quia templum dei estis?

[6] And the Holy Spirit, whether he be the highest charity joining both and subjoining us—which is therefore not said unworthily, because it is written: God is charity—how is he not also himself wisdom, since he is light, because God is light? Or, if in another way the essence of the Holy Spirit is to be named singly and properly, since he is God, assuredly he is light, and since he is light, assuredly he is wisdom. Moreover, that the Holy Spirit is God, Scripture cries out with the Apostle, who says: Do you not know that you are the temple of God?

Statimque subiecit: et spiritus dei habitat in uobis. Deus enim habitat in templo suo. Non enim tamquam minister habitat spiritus dei in templo dei cum alio loco euidentius dicat: Nescitis quia corpora uestra templum in uobis est spiritus sancti quem habetis a deo et non estis uestri?

And immediately he subjoined: and the Spirit of God dwells in you. For God dwells in his temple. For the Spirit of God does not dwell in the temple of God as a minister, since in another place he says more evidently: Do you not know that your bodies are a temple of the Holy Spirit in you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own?

Empti enim estis pretio magno. Glorificate ergo deum in corpore uestro.

For you were bought with a great price. Therefore glorify God in your body.

Quid est autem sapientia nisi lumen spiritale et incommutabile? Est enim et sol iste lumen sed corporale; est et spiritalis creatura lumen sed non incommutabile. Lumen ergo pater, lumen filius, lumen spiritus sanctus; simul autem non tria lumina sed unum lumen.

But what is wisdom, moreover, if not a spiritual and incommutable light? For this sun too is a light, but corporeal; and the spiritual creature is also a light, but not incommutable. Therefore light the Father, light the Son, light the Holy Spirit; yet together not three lights, but one light.

Et ideo sapientia pater, sapientia filius, sapientia spiritus sanctus; et simul non tres sapientiae, sed una sapientia; et quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, una essentia pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Nec aliud est ibi esse quam deum esse. Vnus ergo deus pater et filius et spiritus sanctus.

And therefore the Father is sapience, the Son is sapience, the Holy Spirit is sapience; and together not three sapiences, but one sapience; and because there to be is the same as to be sapient, one essence: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Nor is being there anything other than being God. Therefore one God: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

[IV 7] Itaque loquendi causa de ineffabilibus ut fari aliquo modo possemus quod effari nullo modo possumus dictum est a nostris graecis una essentia, tres substantiae, a latinis autem una essentia uel substantia, tres personae quia sicut iam diximus non aliter in sermone nostro, id est latino, essentia quam substantia solet intellegi. Et dum intellegatur saltem in aenigmate quod dicitur placuit ita dici ut diceretur aliquid cum quaereretur quid tria sint, quae tria esse fides uera pronuntiat cum et patrem non dicit esse filium, et spiritum sanctum quod est donum dei nec patrem dicit esse nec filium. Cum ergo quaeritur quid tria uel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inueniendum aliquod speciale uel generale nomen quo complectamur haec tria, neque occurrrit animo quia excedit supereminentia diuinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem.

[4 7] Therefore, for the sake of speaking about the ineffables, so that we might be able to speak in some way what we are in no way able to utter, it has been said by our Greeks: one essence, three substances; but by the Latins: one essence or substance, three persons—because, as we have already said, in our speech, that is, Latin, essence is not accustomed to be understood otherwise than substance. And while what is said is understood at least in an enigma, it pleased that it be said thus, so that something might be said when it was asked what the three are, which the true faith proclaims to be three, since it does not say that the Father is the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which is the gift of God, it says is neither the Father nor the Son. Therefore, when it is asked what three, or what are the three, we resort to finding some special or general name by which we may embrace these three, yet nothing occurs to the mind, because the supereminence of the divinity exceeds the capacity of customary eloquence.

Verius enim cogitatur deus quam dicitur, et uerius est quam cogitatur.

For God is more truly conceived than he is spoken, and he is truer than he is conceived.

Cum enim dicimus non eundem esse Iacob qui est Abraham, Isaac autem nec Abraham esse nec Iacob, tres esse utique fatemur, Abraham, Isaac et Iacob. Sed cum quaeritur quid tres, respondemus tres homines nomine speciali eos pluraliter appellantes; generali autem si dicamus tria animalia (homo enim sicut ueteres definierunt animal est rationale, mortale); aut sicut scripturae nostrae loqui solent, tres animas, cum a parte meliore totum appellari placet, id est ab anima, et corpus et animam quod est totus homo. Ita quippe dictum est in Aegyptum descendisse cum Iacob animas septuaginta quinque pro tot hominibus.

When we say that Jacob is not the same as Abraham, and that Isaac is neither Abraham nor Jacob, we assuredly confess there are three—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But when it is asked “what three,” we answer “three men,” calling them in the plural by a special name; or generally, if we say “three animals” (for man, as the ancients defined, is an animal rational and mortal); or, as our Scriptures are wont to speak, “three souls,” when it pleases that the whole be named from the better part, that is, from the soul—both body and soul, which is the whole man. Thus indeed it has been said that into Egypt there descended with Jacob seventy-five souls, for so many men.

Item cum dicimus equum tuum non eum esse qui meus est et tertium alicuius alterius nec meum esse nec tuum, fatemur tres esse, et interroganti quid tres respondemus tres equos nomine speciali, generali autem animalia tria. Itemque cum dicimus bouem non esse equum, canem uero nec bouem esse nec equum, tria quaedam dicimus; et percontantibus quid tria non iam speciali nomine dicimus tres equos aut tres boues aut tres canes quia non eadem specie continentur, sed generali, tria animalia, siue superiore genere, tres substantias uel tres creaturas uel tres naturas.

Likewise, when we say that your horse is not the same as the one that is mine, and that a third belonging to someone else is neither mine nor yours, we confess there are three; and to one asking “three what?” we answer “three horses” by the special name, but by the general, “three animals.” And likewise, when we say an ox is not a horse, and a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we say certain three things; and to those inquiring “three what?” we no longer say by the special name “three horses” or “three oxen” or “three dogs,” because they are not contained under the same species, but by the general, “three animals,” or by a higher genus, “three substances” or “three creatures” or “three natures.”

Quaecumque autem plurali numero enuntiantur specialiter uno nomine etiam generaliter enuntiari possunt; non autem omnia quae generaliter nomine uno appellantur etiam specialiter appellare uno nomine possumus. Nam tres equos, quod est nomen speciale, etiam animalia tria dicimus; equum uero et bouem et canem, animalia tantum tria dicimus uel substantias, quae sunt generalia nomina, et si quid aliud de his generaliter dici potest; tres uero equos aut boues aut canes, quae specialia uocabula sunt, non ea possumus dicere. Ea quippe uno nomine quamuis pluraliter enuntiamus quae communiter habent illud quod eo nomine significatur.

But whatever things are enunciated in the plural number specifically by one name can also be enunciated generally by one name; but we cannot also appellate specifically by one name all the things which are called generally by one name. For we call three horses—which is a special name—also three animals; but a horse and an ox and a dog we call only three animals or three substances, which are general names, and whatever else can be said of these generally; but three horses or oxen or dogs, which are special vocables, we cannot say of them. For we enunciate by one name, although in the plural, those things which commonly have that which is signified by that name.

Abraham quippe et Isaac et Iacob commune habent id quod est homo, itaque dicuntur tres homines; equus quoque et bos et canis commune habent id quod est animal, dicuntur ergo tria animalia. Ita tres aliquas lauros, etiam tres arbores dicimus; laurum uero et myrtum et oleam, tantum tres arbores uel tres substantias aut naturas. Atque ita res lapides, etiam tria corpora; lapidem uero et lignum et ferrum, tantum tria corpora uel si quo etiam superiore generali nomine dici possunt.

Abraham indeed and Isaac and Jacob have in common that which is “man,” and so they are called three men; a horse too and an ox and a dog have in common that which is “animal,” therefore they are called three animals. Thus we also call three particular laurels three trees; but laurel and myrtle and olive, only three trees or three substances or natures. And so things, stones, are also three bodies; but a stone and wood and iron, only three bodies, or if they can also be said by some higher general name.

Pater ergo et filius et spiritus sanctus quoniam tres sunt, quid tres sint quaeramus, quid commune habeant. Non enim commune illis est id quod pater est ut inuicem sibi sint patres, sicut amici cum relatiue ad alterutrum dicantur, possunt dici tres amici quod inuicem sibi sunt; non autem hoc ibi quia tantum pater ibi pater, nec duorum pater sed unici filii. Nec tres filii cum pater ibi non sit filius nec spiritus sanctus.

Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they are three, let us ask what three they are, what they have in common. For what is “father” is not common to them, so that they should be fathers to one another; just as friends, when said relatively to one another, can be called three friends because they are so to one another; but not so there, because there the Father is only Father, and not the father of two but of the only Son. Nor are they three sons, since there the Father is not a son, nor the Holy Spirit.

Nec tres spiritus sancti quia et spiritus sanctus propria significatione qua etiam donum dei dicitur nec pater nec filius. Quid igitur tres? Si enim tres personae, commune est eis id quod persona est.

Nor three Holy Spirits, because the Holy Spirit also, in the proper signification in which he is likewise called the gift of God, is neither Father nor Son. What, therefore, are the three? For if [they are] three persons, that which “person” is is common to them.

Ergo speciale hoc aut generale nomen est eis si consuetudinem loquendi respicimus. Sed ubi est naturae nulla diuersitas ita generaliter enuntiantur aliqua plura ut etiam specialiter enuntiari possint. Naturae enim differentia facit ut laurus et myrtus et olea, aut equus et bos et canis non dicantur speciali nomine, istae, tres lauri, aut illi, tres boues, sed generali, et istae, tres arbores; et illa, tria animalia.

Therefore, if we regard the custom of speaking, this is for them a special or a general name. But where there is no diversity of nature, some plural things are so generally enunciated that they can also be enunciated specially. For the difference of nature makes it that laurel and myrtle and olive, or horse and ox and dog, are not said by a special name—these, three laurels, or those, three oxen—but by a general one; and these, three trees; and those, three animals.

Hic uero ubi nulla est essentiae diuersitas oportet et speciale nomen habeant haec tria, quod tamen non inuenitur. Nam persona generale nomen est in tantum ut etiam homo possit hoc dici, cum tantum intersit inter hominem et deum.

But here, where there is no diversity of essence, these three ought also to have a special name, which nevertheless is not found. For person is a general name to such an extent that even man can be called this, although there is so great a difference between man and God.

[8] Deinde in ipso generali uocabulo si propterea dicimus tres personas quia commune est eis id quod persona est (alioquin nullo modo possunt ita dici, quemadmodum non dicuntur tres filii quia non commune est eis id quod est filius), cur non etiam tres deos dicimus? Certe enim quia pater persona et filius persona et spiritus sanctus persona, ideo tres personae. Quia ergo pater deus et filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus, cur non tres dii?

[8] Then, in the very general vocable, if for this reason we say three persons because that which a person is is common to them (otherwise in no way can they be so called, just as they are not called three sons because that which a son is is not common to them), why do we not also say three gods? Surely indeed because the Father is a person and the Son a person and the Holy Spirit a person, therefore three persons. Therefore, because the Father is God and the Son God and the Holy Spirit God, why not three gods?

Aut quoniam propter ineffabilem coniunctionem haec tria simul unus deus, cur non etiam una persona ut ita non possimus dicere tres personas, quamuis singulam quamque appellemus personam, quemadmodum non possumus dicere tres deos, quamuis singulum quemque appellemus deum siue patrem siue filium siue spiritum sanctum? An quia scriptura non dicit tres deos? Sed nec tres personas alicubi scripturam commemorare inuenimus.

Or since, on account of ineffable conjunction, these three together are one God, why not also one person, so that in this way we cannot say three persons, although we call each individual a person, just as we cannot say three gods, although we call each individual a god whether Father or Son or Holy Spirit? Or because Scripture does not say “three gods”? But neither do we find Scripture anywhere to commemorate “three persons.”

An quia nec tres nec unam personam scriptura dicit haec tria (legimus enim personam domini, non personam dominum), propterea licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere non quia scriptura dicit, sed quia scriptura non contradicit, si autem diceremus tres deos, contradiceret scriptura dicens: Audi, Israhel: Dominus deus tuus, deus unus est? Cur ergo et tres essentias non licet dicere quod similiter scriptura sicut non dicit, ita nec contradicit? Nam essentia si speciale nomen est commune tribus, cur non dicantur tres essentiae sicut Abraham, Isaac et Iacob, tres homines, quia homo speciale nomen est commune omnibus hominibus?

Or because neither three nor one person does scripture call these three (for we read “the person of the Lord,” not “the person the Lord”), therefore was it permitted, by the necessity of speaking and disputing, to say three persons, not because scripture says it, but because scripture does not contradict; whereas if we were to say three gods, scripture would contradict, saying: Hear, Israel: The Lord your God is one God? Why then is it not permitted also to say three essences, which likewise scripture, just as it does not say, so neither does it contradict? For if essence is a special name common to the three, why are they not called three essences, just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are three men, because man is a special name common to all men?

Si autem speciale nomen non est essentia sed generale quia homo et pecus et arbor et sidus et angelus dicitur essentia, cur non dicuntur istae tres essentiae sicut tres equi dicuntur tria animalia et tres lauri dicuntur tres arbores et tres lapides tria corpora? Aut si propter unitatem trinitatis non dicuntur tres essentiae sed una essentia, cur non propter eandem unitatem non dicuntur tres substantiae uel tres personae, sed una substantia et una persona? Quam enim est illis commune nomen essentiae ita ut singulus quisque dicatur essentia, tam illis commune est uel substantiae uel personae uocabulum.

But if “essence” is not a special name but a general one, since man and beast and tree and star and angel are called “essence,” why are these not called three essences, just as three horses are called three animals, and three laurels are called three trees, and three stones three bodies? Or if, on account of the unity of the Trinity, they are not called three essences but one essence, why, on account of the same unity, are they not called not three substances or three persons, but one substance and one person? For just as the name of “essence” is common to them, so that each individual is called an essence, so too the term either of “substance” or of “person” is common to them.

Quod enim de personis secundum nostram, hoc de substantiis secundum graecorum consuetudinem ea quae diximus oportet intellegi. Sic enim dicunt illi tres substantias, unam essentiam, quemadmodum nos dicimus tres personas, unam essentiam uel substantiam.

For what we have said about persons according to our usage, this must be understood about substances according to the custom of the Greeks. For thus they say three substances, one essence, just as we say three persons, one essence or substance.

[9] Quid igitur restat? An ut fateamur loquendi necessitate parta haec uocabula cum opus esset copiosa disputatione aduersus insidias uel errores haereticorum? Cum enim conaretur humana inopia loquendo proferre ad hominum sensus quod in secretario mentis pro captu tenet de domino deo creatore suo siue per piam fidem siue per qualemcumque intellegentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias ne intellegeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diuersitas.

[9] What then remains? Is it that we should admit that these vocables were fashioned by the necessity of speaking, when there was need of copious disputation against the snares or errors of heretics? For when human indigence was trying, by speaking, to bring forth to the senses of men what it holds in the secret chamber of the mind, according to its capacity, about the Lord God its creator, whether through pious faith or through whatever understanding, it feared to say “three essences,” lest any diversity be understood in that highest equality.

Rursus non esse tria quaedam non poterat dicere, quod Sabellius quia dixit in haeresim lapsus est. Certissime quippe et de scripturis cognoscitur quod pie credendum est, et aspectu mentis indubitata perceptione perstringitur et patrem esse et filium esse et spiritum sanctum, nec eundem filium esse qui pater est nec spiritum sanctum eundem patrem esse uel filium. Quaesiuit quid tria diceret et dixit substantias siue personas, quibus nominibus non diuersitatem intellegi uoluit sed singularitatem noluit ut non solum ibi unitas intellegatur ex eo quod dicitur una essentia, sed et trinitas ex eo quod dicuntur tres substantiae uel personae.

Again, he could not say that there are not some three, because Sabellius, since he said that, slipped into heresy. For most certainly both from the Scriptures it is known what is to be piously believed, and by the gaze of the mind with indubitable perception it is apprehended, that there is both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and that the same one is not the Son who is the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit the same as the Father or the Son. He sought what he should call the three, and he said substances or persons, by which names he wished not diversity to be understood, yet neither did he wish singularity; so that not only unity may be understood there from the fact that one essence is said, but also Trinity from the fact that three substances or persons are said.

Nam si hoc est deo esse quod subsistere, ita non erant dicendae tres substantiae ut non dicuntur tres essentiae, quemadmodum quia hoc est deo esse quod sapere sicut non tres essentias ita nec tres sapientias dicimus. Sic enim quia hoc illi est deum esse quod est esse, tam tres essentias quam tres deo dici fas non est. Si autem aliud est deo esse, aliud subsistere, sicut aliud deo esse ,aliud patrem esse uel dominum esse (quod enim est ad se dicitur, pater autem ad filium et dominus ad seruientem creaturam dicitur; relatiue ergo subsistit sicut relatiue gignit et relatiue dominatur), ita iam substantia non erit substantia quia relatiuum erit.

For if this is for God to be, namely to subsist, then three substances ought not to be said, just as three essences are not said; in the same way, because this is for God to be, namely to be wise, just as we do not say three essences, so neither do we say three wisdoms. Thus indeed, because for him to be God is that which is to be, it is not licit to say either three essences or three God. If, however, one thing is for God to be, another to subsist, just as one thing is for God to be ,another to be Father or to be Lord (for what he is is said with reference to himself, but Father is said with reference to the Son, and Lord with reference to the serving creature; therefore he subsists relatively, just as he begets relatively and rules relatively), then substance will no longer be substance, because it will be a relative.

Sicut enim ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus. Absurdum est autem ut substantia relatiue dicatur; omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit. Quanto magis deus [V 10] si tamen dignum est ut deus dicatur subsistere?

For just as from that which is “to be” it is called essence, so from that which is “to subsist” we call substance. Yet it is absurd that substance be said relatively; for every thing subsists with respect to itself. How much more God [V 10], if indeed it is fitting that God be said to subsist?

De his enim rebus recte intellegitur in quibus subiectis sunt ea quae in aliquo subiecto esse dicuntur sicut color aut forma in corpore. Corpus enim subsistit et ideo substantia est; illa uero in subsistente atque in subiecto corpore, quae non substantiae sunt sed in substantia; et ideo si esse desinat uel ille color uel illa forma, non adimunt corpori corpus esse quia non hoc est ei esse quod illam uel illam formam coloremue retinere. Res ergo mutabiles neque simplices proprie dicuntur substantiae.

For indeed, these matters are rightly understood in those subjects in which are the things that are said to be in some subject, such as color or form in a body. For the body subsists and therefore is a substance; but those things are in the subsisting and subject body, which are not substances but in a substance; and therefore, if either that color or that form should cease to be, they do not take away from the body its being a body, because its being is not this, to retain this or that form or color. Therefore things that are mutable, being not simple, are not properly called substances.

Deus autem si subsistit ut substantia proprie dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tamquam in subiecto, et non est simplex cui hoc sit esse quod illi est quidquid aliquid de illo ad illum dicitur sicut magnus, omnipotens, bonus, et si quid huiusmodi de deo non incongrue dicitur. Nefas est autem dicere ut subsistat et subsit deus bonitati suae atque illa bonitas non substantia sit uel potius essentia, neque ipse deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tamquam in subiecto. Vnde manifestum est deum abusiue substantiam uocari ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur essentia, quod uere ac proprie dicitur ita ut fortasse solum deum dici oporteat essentiam.

But God, however, if he subsists so that he can properly be called a substance, there is something inhering in him as in a subject; and he is not simple, for whom to be is what there is to him whatever is said of him with reference to him—such as “great,” “omnipotent,” “good,” and if anything of this sort is not incongruously said of God. But it is impious to say that God both subsists and is subject to his own goodness, and that that goodness is not substance or rather essence, and that God himself is not his goodness, but that it is in him as in a subject. Whence it is manifest that God is called “substance” abusively, so that by the more usual name “essence” may be understood, which is truly and properly said, so that perhaps God alone ought to be called Essence.

Est enim uere solus quia incommutabilis est, idque suum nomen famulo suo Moysi enuntiauit cum ait: Ego sum qui sum, et: Dices ad eos: Qui est misit me ad uos. Sed tamen siue essentia dicatur quod proprie dicitur, siue substantia quod abusiue, utrumque ad se dicitur, non relatiue ad aliquid. Vnde hoc est deo esse quod subsistere, et ideo si una essentia trinitas, una etiam substantia.

For he is truly alone because he is unchangeable, and he announced even this as his name to his servant Moses when he said: I am who I am, and: You shall say to them: He Who Is has sent me to you. But nevertheless, whether it be called essence, which is properly so called, or substance, which is said in an abusive sense, both are said of himself, not relatively to something. Whence this is for God: to be is the same as to subsist; and therefore, if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one substance.

Fortassis igitur commodius dicuntur tres personae quam tres substantiae. [VI 11] Sed ne nobis uideatur suffragari hoc quoque requiramus, quamquam et illi si uellent, sicut dicunt tres substantias, *treis hypostaseis, possent dicere tres personas, *tria prosopa. Illud autem maluerunt quod forte secundum linguae suae consuetudinem aptius diceretur.

Fortassis therefore it is more suitably said “three persons” than “three substances.” [VI 11] But, lest this seem to lend support to us, let us examine this as well, although they too, if they wished, just as they say “three substances,” *treis hypostaseis, could say “three persons,” *tria prosopa. But they preferred that which perhaps, according to the usage of their language, would be said more aptly.

Namque et in personis eadem ratio est; non enim aliud est deo esse, aliud personam esse sed omnino idem. Nam si esse ad se dicitur, persona uero relatiue. Sic dicamus tres personas patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum quemadmodum dicuntur aliqui tres amici aut tres propinqui aut tres uicini quod sint ad inuicem, non quod unusquisque eorum sit ad se ipsum.

For indeed in the case of persons the same rationale holds; for it is not one thing to be God, another to be a person, but altogether the same. For if “being” is said with reference to oneself, “person,” on the other hand, is said relatively. Thus let us say three persons—the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit—just as some three friends or three propinquos (relatives) or three neighbors are so called because they are with respect to one another, not because each of them is with respect to himself.

Quapropter quilibet ex eis amicus est duorum ceterorum, aut propinquus aut uicinus quia haec nomina relatiuam significationem habent. Quid ergo? Num placet dicamus patrem personam esse filii et spiritus sancti, aut filium personam esse patris et spiritus sancti, aut spiritum sanctum personam esse patris et filii?

Wherefore each of them is a friend of the other two, or a kinsman or a neighbor, because these names have a relative signification. What then? Does it please that we say the Father is the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or the Son the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit the person of the Father and of the Son?

Sed neque persona ita dici alicubi solet, neque in hac trinitate cum dicimus personam patris aliud dicimus quam substantiam patris. Quocirca ut substantia patris ipse pater est, non quo pater est sed quo est; ita et persona patris non aliud quam ipse pater est. Ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad filium uel spiritum sanctum; sicut ad se dicitur deus et magnus et bonus et iustus et si quid aliud huiusmodi.

But neither is “person” accustomed to be said thus anywhere, nor in this Trinity, when we say “the person of the Father,” do we say anything other than “the substance of the Father.” Wherefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not by which he is Father but by which he is; so also the person of the Father is nothing other than the Father himself. For “person” is said with respect to himself, not to the Son or the Holy Spirit; just as “God” and “great” and “good” and “just,” and anything else of this sort, are said with respect to himself.

Et quemadmodum hoc illi est esse quod deum esse, quod magnum, quod bonum esse, ita hoc illi est esse quod personam esse.

And just as this is for him to be, namely to be God, to be great, to be good, so this is for him to be, namely to be a person.

Cur ergo non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus sicut unam essentiam et unum deum, sed dicimus tres personas, cum tres deos aut tres essentias non dicamus, nisi quia uolumus uel unum aliquod uocabulum seruire huic significationi qua intellegitur trinitas ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres, cum tres esse fateremur? Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia siue persona ut nonnulli sentiunt (omitto illud quod iam dixi, oportere appellari tres essentias ut appellantur tres substantiae uel personae sicut appellantur tres equi eademque animalia tria, cum sit specie equus, animal genus. Neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta est et genus singulariter tamquam diceretur tres equi unum animal, sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine ita tria animalia nomine generali.

Why then do we not call these three together one person, as we call one essence and one god, but we say three persons, whereas we do not say three gods or three essences, unless because we wish at least some one vocabulary-word to serve this signification whereby the trinity is understood, lest we be altogether silent when interrogated “three what,” since we confess that they are three? For if essence is the genus, but substance or person the species, as some think (I pass over what I have already said, that it ought to be called three essences, as three substances or persons are called, just as three horses are called and the same three animals, since “horse” is the species, “animal” the genus. For the species is not there spoken in the plural and the genus in the singular, as though one would say “three horses, one animal,” but just as three horses by the special name, so three animals by the general name.

Quod si dicunt substantiae uel personae nomine non speciem significari sed aliquid singulare atque indiuiduum, ut substantia uel persona non ita dicatur sicut dicitur homo quod commune est omnibus hominibus, sed quomodo dicitur hic homo uelut Abraham, uelut Isaac, uelut Iacob, uel si quis alius qui etiam digito praesens demonstrari possit, sic quoque illos eadem ratio consequetur. Sicut enim dicuntur Abraham, Isaac, Iacob tria indiuidua, ita tres homines et tres animae. Cur ergo et pater et filius et spiritus sanctus si secundum genus et speciem et indiuiduum etiam ista disserimus, non ita dicuntur tres essentiae ut tres substantiae seu personae?

But if they say that by the name of substance or person the species is not signified but something singular and individual, so that substance or person is not said as man is said, which is common to all men, but as this man is said—such as Abraham, such as Isaac, such as Jacob, or anyone else who can even be pointed out as present with the finger—so too the same rationale will follow them. For as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob are called three individuals, so [are] three men and three souls. Why therefore are not the father and the son and the holy spirit, if we also discourse about these according to genus and species and individual, thus called three essences as [they are called] three substances or persons?

Sed hoc, ut dixi, omitto).

But this, as I said, I omit).

Illud dico, si essentia genus est, una essentia iam non habet species sicut quia genus est animal, unum animal iam non habet species. Non sunt ergo tres species unius essentiae pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Si autem species est essentia sicut species est homo, tres uero illae quas appellamus substantias siue personas sic eandem speciem communiter habent quemadmodum Abraham et Isaac et Iacob speciem quae homo dicitur communiter habent (non sicut homo subdiuiditur in Abraham, Isaac et Iacob, ita unus homo et in aliquos singulos homines subdiuidi potest; omnino enim non potest quia unus homo iam singulus homo est). Cur ergo una essentia in tres substantias uel personas subdiuiditur?

I say this: if essence is a genus, one essence now does not have a species, just as, because animal is a genus, one animal now does not have a species. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not three species of one essence. But if essence is a species, as man is a species, then those three which we call substances or persons in this way have the same species in common, just as Abraham and Isaac and Jacob have in common the species that is called man (not as man is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so also can one man be subdivided into some individual men; for in no way can it be, because one man is already an individual man). Why, then, is one essence subdivided into three substances or persons?

Nam si essentia species est sicut homo, sic est una essentia sicut unus homo. An sicut dicimus aliquos tres homines eiusdem sexus, eiusdem temperationis corporis, eiusdemque animi unam esse naturam (tres enim sunt homines sed una natura), sic etiam ibi dicimus tres substantias unam essentiam, aut tres personas unam substantiam uel essentiam?

For if essence is a species as man is, thus there is one essence just as there is one man. Or, as we say that certain three men, of the same sex, of the same temperament of body, and of the same mind, are one nature (for they are three men but one nature), so also there do we say three substances one essence, or three persons one substance or essence?

Hoc uero utcumque simile est quia et ueteres qui latine locuti sunt antequam haberent ista nomina, quae non diu est ut in usum uenerunt, id est essentiam uel substantiam, pro his naturam dicebant. Non itaque secundum genus et species ista dicimus sed quasi secundum communem eandemque materiem. Sicut ex eodem auro si fierent tres statuae, diceremus tres statuas unum aurum, nec tamen genus diceremus aurum, species autem statuas; nec aurum speciem, statuas uero indiuidua.

This indeed is somehow similar, because even the ancients who spoke Latin, before they had these names—which have not been long in coming into use—that is, essence or substance, used to say nature in place of these. Therefore we do not speak of these things according to genus and species, but, as it were, according to the common and selfsame matter. Just as, if three statues were made from the same gold, we would say three statues, one gold; and yet we would not call gold the genus and the statues the species; nor gold the species, but rather the statues the individuals.

Nulla quippe species indiuidua sua transgreditur ut aliquid extra comprehendat. Cum enim definiero quid sit homo, quod est nomen speciale, singuli quique homines quae sunt indiuidua eadem definitione continentur, nec aliquid ad eam pertinet quod homo non sit. Cum uero aurum definiero, non solae statuae si aureae fuerint sed et anuli et si quid aliud de auro fuerit ad aurum pertinebit.

For no species, to be sure, transgresses beyond its own individuals so as to comprehend anything outside. For when I have defined what man is, which is a special name, each and every man, who are individuals, are contained by the same definition, and nothing pertains to it which is not a man. But when I have defined gold, not statues alone, if they are golden, but also rings and whatever else is of gold will pertain to gold.

Etsi nihil inde fiat, aurum dicitur quia etiamsi non sint aureae, non ideo non erunt statuae. Item nulla species excedit definitionem generis sui. Cum enim definiero animal, quoniam generis huius species est equus, omnis equus animal est, non autem statua omnis aurum est.

Even if nothing is made from it, it is called gold, because even if they are not golden, they will not for that reason fail to be statues. Likewise, no species exceeds the definition of its genus. For when I have defined animal, since horse is a species of this genus, every horse is an animal; but not every statue is gold.

Ideo quamuis in tribus statuis aureis recte dicamus tres statuas unum aurum, non tamen ita dicimus ut genus aurum, statuas uero species intellegamus.

Therefore, although in three golden statues we rightly say three statues, one gold, yet we do not thus speak so as to understand gold as the genus, but the statues as the species.

Nec sic ergo trinitatem dicimus tres personas uel substantias unam essentiam et unum deum tamquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant, etiamsi quidquid illud est in his tribus explicatum sit; non enim aliquid aliud eius essentiae est praeter istam trinitatem. Tamen tres personas eiusdem essentiae uel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus; tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona sicut tres statuas ex eodem auro possumus dicere; aliud enim est illic esse aurum, aliud esse statuas. Et cum dicuntur tres homines una natura uel tres homines eiusdem naturae, possunt etiam dici tres homines ex eadem natura quoniam ex eadem natura et alii tales homines possunt exsistere; in illa uero essentia trinitatis nullo modo alia quaelibet persona ex eadem essentia potest exsistere.

Nor, therefore, do we so speak of the Trinity as three persons or substances, one essence and one God, as though out of one matter certain three were to subsist, even if whatever that is be explicated in these three; for there is not anything else of its essence apart from that Trinity. Yet we say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as though there were one thing there which is essence, another which is person, just as we can say three statues out of the same gold; for it is one thing there to be gold, another to be statues. And when three men are said to be one nature, or three men of the same nature, they also can be called three men out of the same nature, since out of the same nature other such men also can exist; but in that essence of the Trinity, in no way can any other person whatsoever exist out of the same essence.

Deinde in his rebus non tantum est unus homo quantum tres homines simul, et plus aliquid sunt homines duo quam unus homo; et in statuis aequalibus plus auri est tres simul quam singulae, et minus auri est una quam duae. At in deo non ita est; non enim maior essentia est pater et filius simul quam solus pater aut solus filius, sed tres simul illae substantiae siue personae, si ita dicendae sunt, aequales sunt singulis, quod animalis homo non percipit. Non enim potest cogitare nisi moles et spatia uel minuta uel grandia uolitantibus in animo eius phantasmatis tamquam imaginibus corporum.

Then in these matters one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man; and in equal statues there is more gold in three together than in each singly, and there is less gold in one than in two. But in God it is not so; for the Father and the Son together are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone, but the three together—those substances or persons, if they are to be so called—are equal to each single one, which the animal man does not perceive. For he is not able to think except in masses and spaces, whether minute or great, with phantasms flitting in his mind as though images of bodies.

[12] Ex qua immunditia donec purgetur credat in patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, unum deum, solum, magnum, omnipotentem, bonum, iustum, misericordem, omnium uisibilium et inuisibilium conditorem, et quidquid de illo pro humana facultate digne uereque dici potest. Neque cum audierit patrem solum deum separet inde filium aut spiritum sanctum, cum eo quippe solus deus cum quo et unus deus est quia et filium cum audimus solum deum sine ulla separatione patris aut spiritus sancti oportet accipere. Atque ita dicat unam essentiam ut non existimet aliud alio uel maius uel melius uel aliqua ex parte diuersum, non tamen ut pater ipse sit et filius et spiritus sanctus et quidquid aliud ad alterutrum singula dicuntur sicut uerbum quod non dicitur nisi filius aut donum quod non dicitur nisi spiritus sanctus.

[12] From which uncleanness, until he be cleansed, let him believe in the father and the son and the holy spirit, one god, alone, great, omnipotent, good, just, merciful, the creator of all visible and invisible things, and whatever about him can worthily and truly be said according to human capacity. Nor, when he hears that the father is the only god, let him separate from him the son or the holy spirit, for he is the only god with him with whom he is also one god; because when we hear that the son is the only god, we ought to take this without any separation of the father or of the holy spirit. And let him so affirm one essence that he not suppose one to be either greater or better than another, or different in any part; yet not as though the father himself were also the son and the holy spirit, and whatever else is said of each with respect to the other, such as the word, which is said only of the son, or the gift, which is said only of the holy spirit.

Propter quod etiam pluralem numerum admittunt sicut in euangelio scriptum est: Ego et pater unum sumus. Et unum dixit et sumus; unum secundum essentiam, quod idem deus; sumus secundum relatiuum, quod ille pater, hic filius. Aliquando et tacetur unitas essentiae et sola pluraliter relatiua commemorantur: Veniemus ad eum ego et pater et habitabimus apud eum.

For which reason they also admit the plural number, as it is written in the Gospel: I and the Father are one. And he said “one” and “we are”; “one” according to essence, in that it is the same God; “we are” according to the relative, in that that one is Father, this one Son. And sometimes the unity of essence is also kept silent, and only the relatives are commemorated in the plural: We will come to him, I and the Father, and we will dwell with him.

Veniemus et habitabimus pluralis est numerus quia praedictum est ego et pater, id est filius et pater, quae relatiue ad inuicem dicuntur. Aliquando latenter omnino sicut in genesi: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Et faciamus et nostram pluraliter dictum est et nisi ex relatiuis accipi non oportet, non enim ut facerent dii aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum, sed ut facerent pater et filius et spiritus sanctus ad imaginem ergo patris et filii et spiritus sancti ut subsisteret homo imago dei; deus autem trinitas.

“We will come and we will dwell” is a plural number because it was said beforehand “I and the Father,” that is, the Son and the Father, which are said relatively to one another. Sometimes quite covertly, as in Genesis: “Let us make man according to our image and likeness.” Both “let us make” and “our” are said in the plural, and they ought not to be taken except from relatives; for it is not that gods should make, or according to the image and likeness of gods, but that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit should make—according, therefore, to the image of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit—so that man might subsist as the image of God; but God is Trinity.

Sed quia non omnino aequalis fiebat illa imago dei tamquam non ab illo nata sed ab eo creata, huius rei significandae causa ita imago est ut ad imaginem sit, id est non aequatur parilitate sed quadam similitudine accedit. Non enim locorum interuallis sed similitudine acceditur ad deum, et dissimilitudine receditur ab eo. Sunt enim qui ita distinguunt ut imaginem uelintesse filium, hominem uero non imaginem sed ad imaginem. Refellit autem eos apostolus dicens: Vir quidem non debet uelare caput cum sit imago et gloria dei.

Sed because that image of God did not become altogether equal, as though not born from him but created by him, for the sake of signifying this matter it is thus an image as to be “according to the image,” that is, it is not equated by parity but approaches by a certain similitude. For one does not approach God by intervals of places but by similitude, and by dissimilitude one recedes from him. For there are those who distinguish thus, that they wish the Son to be the image, but man not the image, rather “according to the image.” But the Apostle refutes them, saying: A man indeed ought not to veil the head, since he is the image and glory of God.

Non dixit ad imaginem sed imago. Quae tamen imago cum alibi dicitur ad imagninem non quasi ad filium dicitur quae imago aequalis est patri; alioquin non diceret ad imaginem nostram. Quomodo enim nostram cum filius solius patris imago sit?

He did not say “according to the image” but “image.” Yet this image, when elsewhere it is said “according to the image,” is not said as if with reference to the Son, who is the Image equal to the Father; otherwise it would not say “according to our image.” For how “our,” since the Son is the image of the Father alone?

Sed propter imparem ut diximus similitudinem dictus est homo ad imaginem, et ideo nostram ut imago trinitatis esset homo, non trinitati aequalis sicut filius patri, sed accedens ut dictum est quadam similitudine sicut in distantibus significatur quaedam uicinitas non loci sed cuiusdam imitationis. Ad hoc enim et dicitur: Reformamini in nouitate mentis uestrae; quibus item dicit: Estote itaque imitatores dei sicut filii dilectissimi. Nouo enim homini dicitur: Qui renouatur in agnitionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum.

But on account of the unequal similitude, as we have said, man was called according to the image, and therefore “our,” that man might be the imago of the Trinity, not equal to the Trinity as the Son to the Father, but, as has been said, approaching by a certain similitude, as in things at a distance a certain vicinity is signified, not of place but of a certain imitation. To this end also it is said: Be reformed in the newness of your mind; to whom likewise he says: Therefore be imitators of God as most beloved sons. For to the new man it is said: who is being renewed into the cognition of God according to the image of him who created him.

Aut si iam placet propter disputandi necessitatem etiam exceptis nominibus relatiuis pluralem numerum admittere ut uno nomine respondeatur cum quaeritur quid tria, et dicere tres substantias siue personas, nullae moles aut interualla cogitentur, nulla distantia quantulaecumque dissimilitudinis aut ubi intellegatur aliud alio uel paulo minus quocumque modo minus esse aliud alio potest ut neque personarum sit confusio nec talis distinctio qua sit impar aliquid. Quod si intellectu capi non potest, fide teneatur donec inlucescat in cordibus ille qui ait per prophetam: Nisi credideritis non intellegetis.

Or, if now it pleases, on account of the necessity of disputation, even with the relational names excepted, to admit the plural number so that an answer may be given by one name when it is asked, ‘what are three?,’ and to say ‘three substances or persons,’ let no masses or intervals be conceived, no distance of however small a dissimilarity, nor any point at which it be understood that one is other than another, or a little less—wherever in any way it can be that one is less than another—so that there be neither a confusion of persons nor such a distinction by which something is unequal. But if this cannot be grasped by intellect, let it be held by faith until He shine forth in hearts, He who says through the prophet: ‘Unless you believe, you will not understand.’