Justinian•DIGESTA
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Dig. 12.3.0. De in litem iurando.
12.2.0. On the oath, whether voluntary or necessary or judicial.
Digest 12.3.0. On the in litem oath.
Dig. 12.6.0. De condictione indebiti.
12.5.0. On the condiction on account of a shameful or unjust cause.
Dig. 12.6.0. On the condiction for what is not owed.
Quoniam igitur multa ad contractus varios pertinentia iura sub hoc titulo praetor inseruit, ideo rerum creditarum titulum praemisit: omnes enim contractus, quos alienam fidem secuti instituimus, complectitur: nam, ut libro primo quaestionum celsus ait, credendi generalis appellatio est: ideo sub hoc titulo praetor et de commodato et de pignore edixit. nam cuicumque rei adsentiamur alienam fidem secuti mox recepturi quid, ex hoc contractu credere dicimur. rei quoque verbum ut generale praetor elegit.
Since, therefore, the praetor has inserted under this title many legal rules pertaining to various contracts, for that reason he prefixed the title “of things credited”: for it embraces all contracts which we establish having followed another’s faith (credit); for, as Celsus says in the first book of the Questions, “crediting” is a general appellation: therefore under this title the praetor also issued edicts concerning commodatum and pledge. For to whatever matter we assent, having followed another’s credit, being about soon to receive something back, in respect of this contract we are said to “credit.” The praetor also chose the word “thing” as a general one.
Mutui datio consistit in his rebus, quae pondere numero mensura consistunt, quoniam eorum datione possumus in creditum ire, quia in genere suo functionem recipiunt per solutionem quam specie: nam in ceteris rebus ideo in creditum ire non possumus, quia aliud pro alio invito creditori solvi non potest.
The giving of a mutuum consists in those things which are constituted by weight, number, or measure, since by the giving of these we can go into credit, because they receive performance in their kind by payment rather than in the specific thing: for in other things, for that reason, we cannot go into credit, because one thing cannot be paid for another against an unwilling creditor.
Creditum ergo a mutuo differt qua genus a specie: nam creditum consistit extra eas res, quae pondere numero mensura continentur sic, ut, si eandem rem recepturi sumus, creditum est. item mutuum non potest esse, nisi proficiscatur pecunia, creditum autem interdum etiam si nihil proficiscatur, veluti si post nuptias dos promittatur.
A creditum therefore differs from a mutuum as genus from species: for a creditum lies beyond those things which are contained by weight, number, or measure, such that, if we are to receive the same thing back, it is a creditum. Likewise, a mutuum cannot exist unless money is disbursed; a creditum, however, sometimes [arises] even if nothing is disbursed, as for example if a dowry is promised after the nuptials.
In mutui datione oportet dominum esse dantem, nec obest, quod filius familias et servus dantes peculiares nummos obligant: id enim tale est, quale si voluntate mea tu des pecuniam: nam mihi actio adquiritur, licet mei nummi non fuerint.
In the giving of a mutuum it is proper that the giver be the owner; nor does it hinder that a filius familias and a slave, in giving, bind with coins from their peculium: for this is just as if, by my will, you were to give the money; for a right of action is acquired to me, although the coins were not mine.
Cum quid mutuum dederimus, etsi non cavimus, ut aeque bonum nobis redderetur, non licet debitori deteriorem rem, quae ex eodem genere sit, reddere, veluti vinum novum pro vetere: nam in contrahendo quod agitur pro cauto habendum est, id autem agi intellegitur, ut eiusdem generis et eadem bonitate solvatur, qua datum sit.
When we have given something as a mutuum-loan, even if we did not stipulate that an equally good thing be returned to us, it is not permitted to the debtor to return a worse thing of the same kind, for example new wine in place of old: for in contracting, what is transacted is to be held as though by a cautious person; and it is understood that what is being transacted is that the discharge be of the same kind and the same goodness with which it was given.
Si quis nec causam nec propositum faenerandi habuerit et tu empturus praedia desideraveris mutuam pecuniam nec volueris creditae nomine antequam emisses suscipere atque ita creditor, quia necessitatem forte proficiscendi habebat, deposuerit apud te hanc eandem pecuniam, ut, si emisses, crediti nomine obligatus esses, hoc depositum periculo est eius qui suscepit. nam et qui rem vendendam acceperit, ut pretio uteretur, periculo suo rem habebit.
If someone has had neither cause nor purpose of lending at interest, and you, being about to buy estates, have desired borrowed money, and you did not wish to receive it under the name of a loan before you had bought, and so the creditor, because he perhaps had the necessity of departing, has deposited with you this same money, so that, if you had bought, you would be bound under the name of a loan, this deposit is at the peril of the one who received it. For even he who has accepted a thing to be sold, that he might use the price, will hold the thing at his own peril.
Res pignori data pecunia soluta condici potest. et fructus ex iniusta causa percepti condicendi sunt: nam et si colonus post lustrum completum fructus perceperit, condici eos constat ita demum, si non ex voluntate domini percepti sunt: nam si ex voluntate, procul dubio cessat condictio.
A thing given in pledge, once the money has been paid, can be reclaimed by a condictio. And fruits taken from an unjust cause are to be demanded by condictio: for even if a tenant farmer, after a completed lustrum (five-year period), has taken the fruits, it is agreed that they are to be reclaimed only if they were not taken with the owner’s consent; for if with consent, beyond doubt the condictio ceases.
Quod te mihi dare oporteat si id postea perierit, quam per te factum erit quominus id mihi dares, tuum fore id detrimentum constat. sed cum quaeratur, an per te factum sit, animadverti debebit, non solum in potestate tua fuerit id nec ne aut dolo malo feceris quominus esset vel fuerit nec ne, sed etiam si aliqua iusta causa sit, propter quam intellegere deberes te dare oportere.
That which you ought to give to me—if it later has perished, insofar as it was through your doing that you did not give it to me, it is established that the detriment will be yours. But when it is asked whether it was brought about through you, it must be observed not only whether that was or was not in your power, or whether by dolus malus you did or did not prevent it from being or having been, but also whether there is any just cause on account of which you ought to understand that you ought to give.
Certum est, cuius species vel quantitas, quae in obligatione versatur, aut nomine suo aut ea demonstratione quae nominis vice fungitur qualis quantaque sit ostenditur. nam et pedius libro primo de stipulationibus nihil referre ait, proprio nomine res appelletur an digito ostendatur an vocabulis quibusdam demonstretur: quatenus mutua vice fungantur, quae tantundem praestent.
A certum is that whose species or quantity, which is engaged in the obligation, is shown either by its own name or by that demonstration which functions in the place of a name, showing of what sort and how great it is. For even Pedius, in the first book On Stipulations, says it makes no difference whether the thing is called by its proper name, or is pointed out with a finger, or is demonstrated by certain vocables: insofar as they discharge one another’s office in mutual vice, provided that they render just as much.
Proinde mutui datio interdum pendet, ut ex post facto confirmetur: veluti si dem tibi mutuos nummos, ut, si condicio aliqua exstiterit, tui fiant sisque mihi obligatus: item si legatam pecuniam heres crediderit, deinde legatarius eam noluit ad se pertinere, quia heredis ex die aditae hereditatis videntur nummi fuisse, ut credita pecunia peti possit. nam iulianus ait et traditiones ab herede factas ad id tempus redigi, quo hereditas adita fuerit, cum repudiatum sit legatum aut adpositum.
Accordingly, the giving of a mutuum sometimes hangs, so that it is confirmed ex post facto: as, for instance, if I give you coins by way of a mutuum, on the terms that, if some condition shall arise, they become yours and you are obligated to me; likewise, if the heir has lent money that was bequeathed, and thereafter the legatee did not wish it to pertain to himself, since the coins are deemed to have been the heir’s from the day the inheritance was entered upon, so that the money lent can be claimed. For Julian says that transfers made by the heir are also referred back to the time at which the inheritance was entered upon, when the legacy has been repudiated or accepted.
Certi condictio competit ex omni causa, ex omni obligatione, ex qua certum petitur, sive ex certo contractu petatur sive ex incerto: licet enim nobis ex omni contractu certum condicere, dummodo praesens sit obligatio: ceterum si in diem sit vel sub condicione obligatio, ante diem vel condicionem non potero agere.
The condictio for a certain thing is competent from every cause, from every obligation from which a definite (certain) thing is sought, whether it be demanded from a certain contract or from an uncertain one: for it is permitted to us from any contract to bring a condiction for a certum, provided that the obligation is present; however, if the obligation is to a day or under a condition, before the day or the condition I shall not be able to sue.
Competit haec actio etiam ex legati causa et ex lege aquilia. sed et ex causa furtiva per hanc actionem condicitur. sed et si ex senatus consulto agetur, competit haec actio, veluti si is cui fiduciaria hereditas restituta est agere volet.
This action is competent also on the ground of a legacy and under the Aquilian Law. And also on a furtive cause one proceeds by this action. And likewise, if suit is brought under a senatorial decree, this action is available, for example if the person to whom a fiduciary inheritance has been restored should wish to sue.
Numeravi tibi decem et haec alii stipulatus sum: nulla est stipulatio: an condicere decem per hanc actionem possim, quasi duobus contractibus intervenientibus, uno qui re factus est, id est numeratione, alio qui verbis, id est inutiliter, quoniam alii stipulari non potui? et puto posse.
I counted out to you ten, and I stipulated these to another: there is no stipulation: can I bring a condictio for ten by this action, as if two contracts had intervened, one which was made by the thing (re), that is, by numeration (payment), the other which was by words, that is, ineffectually, since I could not stipulate to another? And I think I can.
Si nummos meos tuo nomine dedero velut tuos absente te et ignorante, aristo scribit adquiri tibi condictionem: iulianus quoque de hoc interrogatus libro decimo scribit veram esse aristonis sententiam nec dubitari, quin, si meam pecuniam tuo nomine voluntate tua dedero, tibi adquiritur obligatio, cum cottidie credituri pecuniam mutuam ab alio poscamus, ut nostro nomine creditor numeret futuro debitori nostro.
If I give my coins in your name, as if they were yours, you being absent and unaware, Aristo writes that a condiction is acquired for you; Julianus likewise, asked about this in his tenth book, writes that Aristo’s opinion is true, and that there is no doubt that, if I have given my money in your name with your consent, an obligation is acquired for you, since every day, when we are about to lend money (mutuum), we request it from another, so that the creditor may pay out in our name to our future debtor.
Deposui apud te decem, postea permisi tibi uti: nerva proculus etiam antequam moveantur, condicere quasi mutua tibi haec posse aiunt, et est verum, ut et Marcello videtur: animo enim coepit possidere. ergo transit periculum ad eum, qui mutuam rogavit et poterit ei condici.
I deposited ten with you; afterwards I permitted you to use it: Nerva and Proculus say that even before they are moved, these can be sued for by condictio against you as if by a mutuum, and it is true, as it also seems to Marcellus: for he has begun to possess in intention. Therefore the risk passes to him who asked for the mutuum, and a condictio can be brought against him.
Rogasti me, ut tibi pecuniam crederem: ego cum non haberem, lancem tibi dedi vel massam auri, ut eam venderes et nummis utereris. si vendideris, puto mutuam pecuniam factam. quod si lancem vel massam sine tua culpa perdideris prius quam venderes, utrum mihi an tibi perierit, quaestionis est.
You asked me that I should lend you money: since I did not have it, I gave you a plate or a mass of gold, that you might sell it and use the coins. If you sell it, I think a money-loan (mutuum) has been made. But if you lose the plate or the mass without your fault before you sell, whether it has perished to me or to you is a matter of question.
It seems to me that Nerva’s distinction is most true, judging that it makes much difference whether I had this dish or ingot as vendible or not, namely that, if I had it as vendible, the loss is mine, just as if I had given it to another to be sold; but if I was not with this purpose, to sell it, but this was the cause of selling, that you might use it (the money), the loss is yours—and especially if I lent without usury.
Si fugitivus servus nummos tibi crediderit, an condicere tibi dominus possit, quaeritur. et quidem si servus meus, cui concessa est peculii administratio, crediderit tibi, erit mutua: fugitivus autem vel alius servus contra voluntatem domini credendo non facit accipientis. quid ergo?
If a fugitive slave has entrusted you with coins (money), the question is whether the master can bring a condictio against you. And indeed, if my slave, to whom the administration of his peculium has been granted, has lent to you, it will be a mutuum; but a fugitive or another slave, by lending contrary to the will of the master, does not make the recipient bound. What then?
Si a furioso, cum eum compotem mentis esse putares, pecuniam quasi mutuam acceperis eaque in rem tuam versa fuerit, condictionem furioso adquiri iulianus ait: nam ex quibus causis ignorantibus nobis actiones adquiruntur, ex isdem etiam furioso adquiri. item si is qui servo crediderat furere coeperit, deinde servus in rem domini id verterit, condici furiosi nomine posse. et si alienam pecuniam credendi causa quis dederit, deinde furere coeperit et consumpta sit ea pecunia, condictionem furioso adquiri.
If from a madman, when you supposed him to be of sound mind, you have received money as if by a mutuum-loan, and it has been turned to your own estate, Julian says that a condiction is acquired to the madman: for from those causes by which, while we are unaware, actions are acquired to us, from the same they are acquired also to the madman. Likewise, if he who had entrusted credit to a slave has begun to be mad, and then the slave has converted it to the master’s estate, a condiction can be brought in the name of the madman. And if someone has given another’s money for the sake of lending, then has begun to be mad and that money has been consumed, a condiction is acquired to the madman.
Unde papinianus libro octavo quaestionum ait: si alienos nummos tibi mutuos dedi, non ante mihi teneris, quam eos consumpseris. quod si per partes eos consumpseris, an per partes tibi condicam, quaerit: et ait condicturum, si admonitus alienos nummos fuisse ideo per partem condico, quia nondum totos consumptos compereram.
Whence Papinian, in the eighth book of his Quaestiones, says: if I have given you, by way of mutuum, coins belonging to another, you are not liable to me until you have consumed them. But if you have consumed them in parts, he asks whether I should bring a condictio against you in parts; and he says that I will bring a condictio, if, having been apprised that the coins were another’s, I therefore sue for a part, because I had not yet discovered that the whole had been consumed.
Si servus communis decem crediderit, puto, sive administratio servo concessa est, sive non et consumantur nummi, quinum competere actionem: nam et si communes tibi nummos credidero centum, posse me quinquaginta condicere libro octavo quaestionum papinianus scribit, etiamsi singula corpora communia fuerint.
If a common slave has lent ten, I think that—whether administration has been granted to the slave or not, and the coins are consumed—an action for five lies: for even if I have lent you 100 coins that are common, Papinian writes in Book 8 of the Quaestiones that I can bring a condictio for fifty, even if the individual items were common property.
Si filius familias contra senatus consultum mutuatus pecuniam solverit, patri nummos vindicanti nulla exceptio obicietur: sed si fuerint consumpti a creditore nummi, Marcellus ait cessare condictionem, quoniam totiens condictio datur, quotiens ex ea causa numerati sunt, ex qua actio esse potuisset, si dominium ad accipientem transisset: in proposito autem non esset. denique per errorem soluti contra senatus consultum crediti magis est cessare repetitionem.
If a filius familias, having borrowed money contrary to a senatorial decree (senatus consultum), pays it, no exception will be objected to the father vindicating the coins; but if the coins have been consumed by the creditor, Marcellus says the condictio ceases, since a condictio is granted only so often as the moneys were paid out from that cause out of which an action could have existed, if ownership (dominium) had passed to the recipient; but in the present case it would not have. Finally, where a loan contracted contrary to a senatorial decree has been paid through error, it is rather held that repetition ceases.
Singularia quaedam recepta sunt circa pecuniam creditam. nam si tibi debitorem meum iussero dare pecuniam, obligaris mihi, quamvis meos nummos non acceperis. quod igitur in duabus personis recipitur, hoc et in eadem persona recipiendum est, ut, cum ex causa mandati pecuniam mihi debeas et convenerit, ut crediti nomine eam retineas, videatur mihi data pecunia et a me ad te profecta.
Certain singular rules have been accepted concerning money lent. For if I have ordered my debtor to give you money, you are obligated to me, although you have not received my coins. Therefore what is accepted in two persons must also be accepted in the same person: so that, when by reason of a mandate you owe me money and it has been agreed that you retain it under the title of a loan (credit), the money is deemed to have been given to me and to have proceeded from me to you.
Si socius propriam pecuniam mutuam dedit, omnimodo creditam pecuniam facit, licet ceteri dissenserint: quod si communem numeravit, non alias creditam efficit, nisi ceteri quoque consentiant, quia suae partis tantum alienationem habuit.
If a partner has given his own money as a loan (mutuum), he in every respect makes the money a credit (loan), although the others dissented; but if he has paid out common money, he does not otherwise make it credited unless the others also consent, because he had the power of alienation only of his own share.
Si ego pecuniam tibi quasi donaturus dedero, tu quasi mutuam accipias, iulianus scribit donationem non esse: sed an mutua sit, videndum. et puto nec mutuam esse magisque nummos accipientis non fieri, cum alia opinione acceperit. quare si eos consumpserit, licet condictione teneatur, tamen doli exceptione uti poterit, quia secundum voluntatem dantis nummi sunt consumpti.
If I should give money to you as if intending to make a donation, and you receive it as if a loan, Julian writes that it is not a donation; but whether it is a mutuum must be considered. And I think it is not even a mutuum, and rather that the coins do not become the recipient’s, since he received them under a different understanding. Wherefore, if he has spent them, although he is liable under a condictio, nevertheless he will be able to use the exceptio doli, because the coins were consumed according to the will of the giver.
Si ego quasi deponens tibi dedero, tu quasi mutuam accipias, nec depositum nec mutuum est: idem est et si tu quasi mutuam pecuniam dederis, ego quasi commodatam ostendendi gratia accepi: sed in utroque casu consumptis nummis condictioni sine doli exceptione locus erit.
If I, as though a depositor, should give to you, and you accept as though by way of a loan (mutuum), it is neither a deposit nor a loan: the same holds if you have given money as though a loan (mutuum), and I received it as though a commodatum for the sake of showing: but in either case, when the coins have been consumed, there will be room for a condictio without the defense of fraud (doli exceptio).
Non omnis numeratio eum qui accepit obligat, sed quotiens id ipsum agitur, ut confestim obligaretur. nam et is, qui mortis causa pecuniam donat, numerat pecuniam, sed non aliter obligabit accipientem, quam si exstitisset casus, in quem obligatio collata fuisset, veluti si donator convaluisset aut is qui accipiebat prior decessisset. et cum pecunia daretur, ut aliquid fieret, quamdiu in pendenti esset, an id futurum esset, cessabit obligatio: cum vero certum esse coepisset futurum id non esse, obligabitur qui accepisset: veluti si titio decem dedero, ut stichum intra calendas manumitteret, ante kalendas nullam actionem habebo, post kalendas ita demum agere potero, si manumissus non fuerit.
Not every counting out obligates him who has received, but only whenever that very thing is transacted, namely that he be bound forthwith. For even he who gives money mortis causa counts out the money, but he will not otherwise obligate the recipient than if the event had arisen into which the obligation had been cast, for example, if the donor had recovered or he who was receiving had died first. And when money is given in order that something be done, so long as it is pending whether that will occur, the obligation will cease; but when it has begun to be certain that that will not occur, he who received will be obligated: for example, if I shall have given ten to titio, in order that he manumit stichus before the kalends, before the kalends I shall have no action; after the kalends only then shall I be able to sue, if he has not been manumitted.
Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate crediderit aut solvendi causa dederit, consumpta pecunia condictionem habet vel liberatur non alia ratione, quam quod facto eius intellegitur ad eum qui acceperit pervenisse: quapropter si eandem pecuniam is, qui in creditum vel in solutum acceperat, alii porro in creditum vel in solutum dederit, consumpta ea et ipse pupillo obligatur vel eum a se liberabit et eum cui dederit obligatum habebit vel se ab eo liberabit. nam omnino qui alienam pecuniam credendi causa dat, consumpta ea habet obligatum eum qui acceperit: item qui in solutum dederit, liberabitur ab eo qui acceperit.
If a ward, without the authority of his guardian, has lent, or has given for the purpose of payment, then, once the money has been consumed, he has a condictio, or he is released, on no other rationale than that by his act it is understood to have come to the one who received it. Wherefore, if the same money the person who had received on credit or in payment has further given to another on credit or in payment, once it is consumed, he himself too is obligated to the ward, or he will release the ward from himself; and he will have the person to whom he gave it obligated, or he will release himself from him. For, in general, he who gives another’s money for lending’s sake, once it is consumed, has the recipient obligated; likewise, he who has given in payment will be released by the one who received it.
Si tibi pecuniam donassem, ut tu mihi eandem crederes, an credita fieret? dixi in huiusmodi propositionibus non propriis verbis nos uti, nam talem contractum neque donationem esse neque pecuniam creditam: donationem non esse, quia non ea mente pecunia daretur, ut omnimodo penes accipientem maneret: creditam non esse, quia exsolvendi causa magis daretur, quam alterius obligandi. igitur si is, qui pecuniam hac condicione accepit, ut mihi in creditum daret, acceptam dederit, non fore creditam: magis enim meum accepisse intellegi debeo.
If I had donated money to you, so that you might credit the same to me, would it become a loan? I said that in propositions of this kind we are not using proper words, for such a contract is neither a donation nor money on credit: not a donation, because the money would not be given with the intention that it should in every way remain with the recipient; not on credit, because it would be given rather for the sake of discharging than of obligating another. Therefore, if the person who received the money on this condition, that he give it to me on credit, has given what he received, it will not be on credit: rather, I ought to be understood to have received what is mine.
Quidam existimaverunt neque eum, qui decem peteret, cogendum quinque accipere et reliqua persequi, neque eum, qui fundum suum diceret, partem dumtaxat iudicio persequi: sed in utraque causa humanius facturus videtur praetor, si actorem compulerit ad accipiendum id quod offeratur, cum ad officium eius pertineat lites deminuere.
Some have judged that neither he who demands ten should be compelled to accept five and pursue the remainder, nor he who says an estate is his to pursue by suit only a part; but in both cases the praetor would seem to act more humanely if he compelled the plaintiff to accept what is offered, since it pertains to his office to diminish litigations.
Vinum, quod mutuum datum erat, per iudicem petitum est: quaesitum est, cuius temporis aestimatio fieret, utrum cum datum esset an cum litem contestatus fuisset an cum res iudicaretur. sabinus respondit, si dictum esset quo tempore redderetur, quanti tunc fuisset, si dictum non esset, quanti tunc fuisset, cum petitum esset. interrogavi, cuius loci pretium sequi oporteat.
The wine, which had been given as a mutuum loan, was claimed before a judge: the question was asked at what time the valuation should be made—whether when it had been given, or when he had joined issue, or when the matter was adjudicated. sabinus answered: if it had been stated at what time it should be returned, then for how much it was worth at that time; if it had not been stated, then for how much it was worth when it was demanded. I asked whose locality’s price ought to be followed.
Cum fundus vel homo per condictionem petitus esset, puto hoc nos iure uti, ut post iudicium acceptum causa omnis restituenda sit, id est omne, quod habiturus esset actor, si litis contestandae tempore solutus fuisset.
When a farm (fundus) or a slave was claimed by condiction, I think we employ this rule of law: that after the judgment has been accepted, the whole cause is to be restored—that is, everything which the plaintiff would have had if, at the time of the joinder of issue (litis contestatio), it had been free (solutus).
Servum tuum imprudens a fure bona fide emi: is ex peculio, quod ad te pertinebat, hominem paravit, qui mihi traditus est. sabinus cassius posse te mihi hominem condicere: sed si quid mihi abesset ex negotio quod is gessisset, invicem me tecum acturum. et hoc verum est: nam et iulianus ait videndum, ne dominus integram ex empto actionem habeat, venditor autem condicere possit bonae fidei emptori.
I, unwitting, bought in good faith your slave from a thief; he, from the peculium which pertained to you, procured a man, who was handed over to me. sabinus and cassius say that you can claim the man from me by condictio; but that, if anything were lacking to me from the business which he had transacted, I in turn would bring an action against you. And this is true: for iulianus also says it must be considered, lest the master have an undiminished action ex empto, while the seller can bring a condictio against the good‑faith buyer.
As regards the monies of the peculium, if they exist, the master can recover them by vindication; but he is liable to the seller by the action on the peculium, to pay the price. If they have been consumed, the action on the peculium vanishes. But Julian ought to have added that the seller of the slave is not otherwise held to the master by the action ex empto than if the master of the slave should provide him the full price and whatever would be owed if he had contracted with a free person. The same must be said if I had paid a good‑faith possessor, provided, however, that I am prepared to make over to the master the actions which I have against him.
Si et me et titium mutuam pecuniam rogaveris et ego meum debitorem tibi promittere iusserim, tu stipulatus sis, cum putares eum titii debitorem esse, an mihi obligaris? subsisto, si quidem nullum negotium mecum contraxisti: sed propius est ut obligari te existimem, non quia pecuniam tibi credidi ( hoc enim nisi inter consentientes fieri non potest): sed quia pecunia mea ad te pervenit, eam mihi a te reddi bonum et aequum est.
If you have asked both me and Titius for a loan of money, and I have ordered my debtor to promise to you, and you have stipulated, when you supposed him to be the debtor of Titius, are you bound to me? I hesitate, since indeed you contracted no business with me: but it is nearer that I should think you are bound, not because I lent money to you ( for this cannot be done except between consenting parties): but because my money has reached you, it is good and equitable that it be returned to me by you.
Pecuniam, quam mihi sine condicione debebas, iussu meo promisisti attio sub condicione: cum pendente condicione in eo statu sit obligatio tua adversus me, tamquam sub contrariam condicionem eam mihi spopondisti, si pendente condicione petam, an nihil acturus sum? respondit: non dubito, quin mea pecunia, quam ipse sine condicione stipulatus sum, etiam si condicio in persona atii, qui ex mea voluntate eandem pecuniam sub condicione stipulatus est, non extiterit, credita esse permaneat ( perinde est enim, ac si nulla stipulatio intervenisset): pendente autem causa condicionis idem petere non possum, quoniam, cum incertum sit, an ex ea stipulatione deberi possit, ante tempus petere videor.
The money which you owed me without condition, at my order you promised to attio under a condition: since, with the condition pending, your obligation toward me is in such a status as if you had promised it to me under the contrary condition, if I demand while the condition is pending, am I going to accomplish nothing? He answered: I do not doubt that my money, which I myself stipulated without condition, even if the condition in the person of atii, who by my will stipulated the same money under a condition, has not come to pass, remains as a credit ( perinde est enim, ac si nulla stipulatio intervenisset): however, while the cause of the condition is pending I cannot seek the same, since, as it is uncertain whether it can be owed under that stipulation, I seem to be suing before the time.
Cum ad praesens tempus condicio confertur, stipulatio non suspenditur et, si condicio vera sit, stipulatio tenet, quamvis tenere contrahentes condicionem ignorent, veluti " si rex parthorum vivit, centum mihi dari spondes?" eadem sunt et cum in praeteritum condicio confertur.
When the condition is referred to the present time, the stipulation is not suspended, and, if the condition is true, the stipulation holds, although the contracting parties are unaware that the condition holds, for example, " if the king of the parthians is alive, do you promise that a hundred will be given to me?" the same applies also when the condition is referred to the past.
Lecta est in auditorio aemilii papiniani praefecti praetorio iuris consulti cautio huiusmodi: " lucius titius scripsi me accepisse a publio maevio quindecim mutua numerata mihi de domo et haec quindecim proba recte dari kalendis futuris stipulatus est publius maevius, spopondi ego lucius titius. si die supra scripta summa publio maevio eive ad quem ea res pertinebit data soluta satisve eo nomine factum non erit, tunc eo amplius, quo post solvam, poenae nomine in dies triginta inque denarios centos denarios singulos dari stipulatus est publius maevius, spopondi ego lucius titius. convenitque inter nos, uti pro maevio ex summa supra scripta menstruos refundere debeam denarios trecenos ex omni summa ei heredive eius.
There was read in the auditorium of Aemilius Papinianus, praetorian prefect and jurist, a bond (cautio) of this kind: " lucius titius I have written that I have received from publius maevius fifteen as a loan, counted out to me at the house, and that these fifteen are to be duly and rightly given on the coming Calends; publius maevius stipulated, I, lucius titius, promised. if on the above-written day the sum shall not have been given, paid, or enough done on that account to publius maevius or to him to whom that matter shall pertain, then so much the more, the later I pay, by way of penalty, for days thirty and for each hundred denarii single denarii to be given; publius maevius stipulated, I, lucius titius, promised. and it is agreed between us, that, on behalf of maevius, out of the above-written sum I ought to refund monthly three hundred denarii out of the whole sum to him or to his heir."
" a question was asked about the obligation of interest, since the number of months that was appointed for payment had passed. I said that, because pacts made on the spot are believed to inhere in the stipulation, it is the same as if he had, for each month, stipulated a certain sum and, so long as it was paid late, had added interest: therefore, when the first month is finished, the interest on the first installment begins to run, and similarly after the second and third term the interest on the installment of money not paid accrues; nor can interest on unpaid principal be claimed before the principal itself could have been claimed. But as to the pact that is subjoined, some said that it pertains only to the payment of the principal, not also to that of the interest, which in the earlier part had simply entered into the stipulation; and that that pact avails only by way of exception (defense), and therefore, if the money is not paid in the fixed installments, interest is owed from the day of the stipulation, just as if this had been expressly stated by name."
but since the claim of the principal has been deferred, it follows that interest also accrues from the time at which he made delay, and even if, as he supposed, the pact would profit only for an exception ( although a different opinion has prevailed), nevertheless the obligation for interest will not be incurred ipso iure: for he is not in default from whom money cannot be demanded on account of the exception. but the amount which is gathered in the meantime we stipulate for, when the condition has arisen, just as it is in the case of fruits: the same can be expressed also in respect of interest, namely, that, if by the day the money is not paid, whatever is owed under the name of interest be rendered from the day of the interposed stipulation.
Eius, qui in provincia stichum servum kalendario praeposuerat, romae testamentum recitatum erat, quo idem stichus liber et ex parte heres erat scriptus: qui status sui ignarus pecunias defuncti aut exegit aut credidit, ut interdum stipularetur et pignora acciperet. consulebatur quid de his iuris esset. placebat debitores quidem ei qui solvissent liberatos esse, si modo ipsi quoque ignorassent dominum decessisse.
Of a man who, in the province, had set the slave Stichus over the kalendarium (loan-ledger), his testament had been recited at Rome, in which the same Stichus had been written as free and as heir in part: he, ignorant of his own status, either collected or lent the deceased’s monies, so that at times he would stipulate and take pledges. It was consulted what the ius was concerning these matters. It was held that the debtors who had paid to him were indeed discharged, provided only that they too had been ignorant that the master had deceased.
But as to the sums which had come to Stichus, the coheirs do not have the action for dividing the family inheritance (actio familiae herciscundae), but ought to be given the action of business transacted (actio negotiorum gestorum). As for the moneys which he himself had lent, they are not alienated in a greater share than that in which he himself is heir: for even if I gave you coins for this purpose, that you lend them to Stichus, then, I having died and you being ignorant, you gave them, you will not make him the recipient; for just as that rule is received, that debtors paying to him are freed, so this too is not received, that by lending he alienates the coins. Wherefore, if no stipulation had intervened, neither could the money lent be demanded for the coheir’s share, nor could the pledges be held.
But if he also had stipulated, he should report in what manner he had stipulated: for if perchance he had stipulated expressly that it be given to Titius, his master, now deceased, without doubt he had stipulated ineffectually. But if he had stipulated that it be given to himself, it must be said that he acquired it for the inheritance: for just as acquisition is made to ourselves from our own property through those who, whether free persons or another’s slaves, serve in good faith, so too acquisition is made to the inheritance from hereditary property. After the inheritance, however, has been entered upon by the coheirs, the same cannot equally be said, especially if they knew that he had been assigned to them as coheir, since then they cannot be deemed possessors in good faith, who would not even have the intention of possessing.
But if it be proposed that his coheirs were ignorant of this, because perhaps they too were among necessary heirs, the same answer can still be given: in which case indeed this will result, that, if this slave has coheirs of his own condition, they appear mutually to serve one another in good faith.
Si ego decem stipulatus a titio deinceps stipuler a seio, quanto minus a titio consequi possim: si decem petiero a titio, non liberatur seius, alioquin nequicquam mihi cavetur: at si iudicatum fecerit titius, nihil ultra seius tenebitur. sed si cum seio egero, quantumcumque est quo minus a titio exigere potuero eo tempore, quo iudicium inter me et seium acceptum est, tanto minus a titio postea petere possum.
If I, having stipulated for ten from Titius, thereafter stipulate from Seius, by how much less I might be able to recover from Titius: if I shall have sought ten from Titius, Seius is not discharged; otherwise security is given me to no purpose: but if Titius shall have satisfied the judgment, Seius will be held for nothing further. But if I proceed against Seius, whatever amount it is by which I was less able to exact from Titius at the time when the action between me and Seius was accepted, by so much less can I afterwards demand from Titius.
Labeo ait, cum decem dari curari stipulatus sis, ideo non posse te decem dare oportere intendere, quia etiam reum locupletiorem dando promissor liberari possit: quo scilicet significat non esse cogendum eum accipere iudicium, si reum locupletem offerat.
Labeo says that, when you have stipulated that ten be taken care to be given, therefore you cannot bring the claim that “you ought to give ten,” because the promisor can be released by providing a more wealthy defendant; whereby, namely, he signifies that he is not to be compelled to accept a trial, if he offers a solvent defendant.
Ait praetor: " si is cum quo agetur condicione delata iuraverit". eum cum quo agetur accipere debemus ipsum reum. nec frustra adicitur " condicione delata": nam si reus iuraverit nemine ei iusiurandum deferente, praetor id iusiurandum non tuebitur: sibi enim iuravit: alioquin facillimus quisque ad iusiurandum decurrens nemine sibi deferente iusiurandum oneribus actionum se liberabit.
The praetor says: " if the one against whom action will be brought, with the condition tendered, shall have sworn." We ought to understand the one against whom action will be brought to be the defendant himself. Nor is " condicione delata" added in vain: for if the defendant should swear with no one tendering an oath to him, the praetor will not uphold that oath; for he has sworn to himself: otherwise anyone of the readiest sort, resorting to an oath with no one tendering an oath to him, would free himself from the burdens of actions.
Unde Marcellus scribit etiam de eo iurari posse, an praegnas sit mulier vel non sit, et iuriiurando standum: denique ait, si de possessione erat quaestio, servari oportere, si forte quasi praegnas ire in possessionem volebat et, cum ei contradiceretur, vel ipsa iuravit se praegnatem vel contra eam iuratum est: nam si ipsa, ibit in possessionem sine metu, si contra eam, non ibit, quamvis vere praegnas fuerit: proderitque, inquit Marcellus, mulieri iuranti iusiurandum, ne conveniatur quasi calumniae causa ventris nomine fuerit in possessionem neve vim patiatur in possessione. sed an iusiurandum eo usque prosit, ut post editum partum non quaeratur, ex eo editus sit an non sit cuius esse dicitur, Marcellus tractat: et ait veritatem esse quaerendam, quia iusiurandum alteri neque prodest neque nocet: matris igitur iusiurandum partui non proficiet: nec nocebit, si mater detulerit et iuretur ex eo praegnas non esse.
Whence Marcellus writes that an oath, too, can be sworn on this: whether a woman is pregnant or is not, and that the oath is to stand. Finally he says that, if the question was about possession, the following ought to be observed: if perchance, as being pregnant, she wished to enter into possession and, when this was opposed to her, either she herself swore that she was pregnant or it was sworn against her. For if she herself swore, she will go into possession without fear; if it was sworn against her, she will not go, although she was truly pregnant. And, says Marcellus, the oath will benefit the woman swearing, so that she is not proceeded against as if on a charge of calumny for having entered into possession under the title of the womb, and that she may not suffer violence in possession. But whether the oath avails so far that, after the birth has been brought forth, it is not inquired whether the one born is or is not from him of whom he is said to be, Marcellus discusses; and he says that the truth is to be sought, because an oath neither benefits nor harms another. Therefore the mother’s oath will not profit the offspring; nor will it harm, if the mother has tendered and it is sworn that she is not pregnant by him.
Remittit iusiurandum, qui deferente se cum paratus esset adversarius iurare gratiam ei facit contentus voluntate suscepti iurisiurandi. quod si non suscepit iusiurandum, licet postea parato iurare actor nolit deferre, non videbitur remissum: nam quod susceptum est remitti debet.
He remits the oath who, while he himself is tendering it and the adversary is prepared to swear, grants him favor, being content with the willingness for the oath to be undertaken. But if the oath has not been undertaken, although later, when he is ready to swear, the plaintiff is unwilling to tender it, it will not be seen as remitted: for it is that which has been undertaken that ought to be remitted.
Ait praetor: " eius rei, de qua iusiurandum delatum fuerit, neque in ipsum neque in eum ad quem ea res pertinet actionem dabo. " eius rei sic erit accipiendum, sive de tota re sive de parte sit iuratum: nam de eo quod iuratum est pollicetur se actionem non daturum neque in eum qui iuravit neque in eos qui in locum eius cui iusiurandum delatum est succedunt,
The praetor says: " of that matter, concerning which an oath shall have been tendered, I will grant an action neither against him himself nor against him to whom that matter pertains. " This phrase "of that matter" is to be understood thus, whether an oath has been sworn about the whole matter or about a part: for with respect to that which has been sworn he promises that he will not grant an action either against him who swore or against those who succeed into the place of him to whom the oath has been tendered,
Si minor viginti quinque annis detulerit et hoc ipso captum se dicat, adversus exceptionem iurisiurandi replicari debebit, ut pomponius ait. ego autem puto hanc replicationem non semper esse dandam, sed plerumque ipsum praetorem debere cognoscere, an captus sit, et sic in integrum restituere: nec enim utique qui minor est statim et circumscriptum se docuit. praeterea exceptio ista sive cognitio statutum tempus post annum vicensimum quintum non debet egredi.
If a minor under twenty-five has tendered the oath and says that by that very act he was entrapped, a replication ought to be allowed against the exception of the oath, as Pomponius says. But I think this replication is not always to be granted; rather, for the most part the praetor himself ought to inquire whether he was taken in, and so restore to the status quo ante: for indeed it is not the case that whoever is a minor has thereby at once shown himself to have been overreached. Moreover, that exception or the inquiry ought not to exceed the fixed time beyond the twenty-fifth year.
Sed et si quis in fraudem creditorum iusiurandum detulerit debitori, adversus exceptionem iurisiurandi replicatio fraudis creditoribus debet dari. praeterea si fraudator detulerit iusiurandum creditori, ut iuret sibi decem dari oportere, mox bonis eius venditis experiri volet, aut denegari debet actio aut exceptio opponitur fraudatorum creditorum.
But also, if someone, in fraud of the creditors, has tendered an oath to the debtor, then against the exception of the oath a replication of fraud ought to be given to the creditors. Furthermore, if the defrauder has tendered an oath to the creditor, that he swear that ten ought to be given to him, and soon, his goods having been sold, he wishes to proceed, either the action ought to be denied, or an exception is opposed by the creditors of the defrauder.
Iusiurandum defensoris vel procuratoris ei ab adversario delatum prodesse exceptionemque domino parere iulianus scribit. idem ergo dicendum erit et si datus ad petendum procurator reo deferente iuraverit dari mihi oportere: nam actionem mihi parit. quae sententia habet rationem.
Julian writes that the oath of a defender or procurator, when tendered to him by the adversary, profits him and produces an exception for the principal. Therefore the same must be said also if a procurator appointed for suing, the defendant tendering (it), has sworn that it ought to be given to me: for it begets for me an action. Which opinion has reason.
Si petitor iuravit possessore deferente rem suam esse, actori dabitur actio, sed hoc dumtaxat adversus eum qui iusiurandum detulit eosque qui in eius locum successerunt: ceterum adversus alium si velit praerogativa iurisiurandi uti, nihil ei proderit,
If the claimant, with the possessor tendering the oath, has sworn that the thing is his own, an action will be given to the plaintiff, but only against him who tendered the oath and those who have succeeded into his place: moreover, against another, if he should wish to use the prerogative of the oath, it will profit him nothing,
Sed si possessori fuerit iusiurandum delatum iuraverit rem petitoris non esse, quamdiu quidem possidet, adversus eum qui detulit iusiurandum, si petat, exceptione iurisiurandi utetur: si vero amiserit possessionem, actionem non habebit, ne quidem si is possideat qui ei iusiurandum detulit: non enim rem suam esse iuravit, sed eius non esse.
But if an oath has been tendered to the possessor and he has sworn that the thing is not the plaintiff’s, then, so long as he does possess, against the one who tendered the oath, if he sues, he will use the exception of the oath; but if he has lost possession, he will have no action, not even if the one who tendered the oath to him is the possessor: for he did not swear that the thing was his own, but that it was not the other’s.
Proinde si, cum possideret, deferente petitore rem suam iuravit, consequenter dicemus amissa quoque possessione, si is qui detulit iusiurandum nanctus sit possessionem, actionem in factum ei dandam. et fructus perceptos ex re, quam meam esse iuravi, restitui mihi placuit: sed et partum editum fetusque pecorum restituendos constat post iusiurandum delatum.
Accordingly, if, while he was in possession, upon the plaintiff tendering the oath he swore the thing to be his own, we shall consistently say that, even with possession lost, if the one who tendered the oath has obtained possession, an action in factum is to be granted to him. And it has been decided that the fruits gathered from a thing which I swore to be mine are to be restored to me; and it is likewise established that issue brought forth and the young of the herds are to be restored after the oath has been tendered.
Item si iuravero usum fructum alicuius rei vel meum esse vel dari mihi oportere, eatenus mihi competit actio, quatenus, si vere usum fructum haberem, duraret: quibus vero casibus amitteretur, non competit mihi actio. sed si rerum, in quibus usus fructus propter abusum constitui non potest, iuraverit usum fructum se habere vel sibi deberi, effectum iurisiurandi sequendum arbitror ideoque tunc quoque videri eum recte iurasse puto et ex eo iureiurando posse petere usum fructum cautione oblata.
Likewise, if I shall have sworn that the usufruct of some thing either is mine or ought to be given to me, the action belongs to me to this extent: in so far as, if I truly had the usufruct, it would endure; but in the cases in which it would be lost, the action does not belong to me. But if, as to things in which a usufruct cannot be constituted on account of consumption, he has sworn that he has a usufruct or that it is owed to him, I judge that the effect of the oath is to be followed, and therefore I think that then too he is seen to have sworn rightly, and from that oath he can seek the usufruct, with security offered.
Si, cum de hereditate inter me et te controversia esset, iuravero hereditatem meam esse, id consequi debeo, quod haberem, si secundum me de hereditate pronuntiatum esset. et non solum eas res restituere debes, quas tunc possidebas, sed et si quas postea coepisses possidere, perindeque haberi quod iuratum est atque si probatum esset: idcirco utilis actio mihi competit, quod si ego ex eadem hereditate possiderem tuque coepisses petere eam a me, cum adversus te iurassem, exceptione me uti debere iurisiurandi. plane si alius a me hereditatem petere coeperit, dubium non erit, ut et iulianus scribit, nihil mihi iusiurandum prodesse.
If, when there was a controversy between you and me about the inheritance, I shall have sworn that the inheritance is mine, I ought to obtain what I would have had if judgment about the inheritance had been pronounced in my favor. And you must restore not only those things which you then possessed, but also whatever you afterwards began to possess; and what has been sworn is to be regarded as if it had been proved. Therefore a utilis action is available to me; for if I were possessing from the same inheritance and you had begun to claim it from me, since I had sworn against you, I ought to use the exception of the oath. Clearly, if another begins to claim the inheritance from me, there will be no doubt, as Julian also writes, that the oath benefits me nothing.
Si duo patroni essent et libertus altero deferente iurasset se libertum eius non esse, utrum alteri totius debitae patronis portionis an vero dimidiae debitae eis partis bonorum possessio competeret? et ait, si is cui iuratum est patronus fuisset, alteri suae partis bonorum possessionem competere nec ei prodesse, quod adversus alterum libertus iurasset: multum tamen fidei et auctoritatis apud iudicem patronum habiturum, quo magis solum se patronum probaret, quod libertus iurasset alterum patronum non esse.
If there were two patrons, and the freedman, with the other denouncing, had sworn that he was not his freedman, would possession of the goods of the whole portion owed to patrons, or indeed of the half part owed to them, belong to the other? And he says that, if the one to whom the oath was made were the patron, possession of the goods of his own share would belong to the other, nor would it profit him that the freedman had sworn against the other: nevertheless the patron would have much credit and authority with the judge, so that he might the more prove that he alone is the patron, because the freedman had sworn that the other was not the patron.
Idem iulianus scribit eum, qui iuravit furtum se non fecisse, videri de toto iurasse, atque ideo neque furti neque condicticia tenetur, quia condicticia, inquit, solus fur tenetur. numquid ergo qui iuravit se furtum ne fecisse hoc solo nomine, condictione si conveniatur, exceptione utatur? ceterum si contendat qui condicit quasi cum herede se furis agere, non debet repelli et quasi monomerys condictio ei dari debet adversus furis heredem nec pati eum iudex debet, si coeperit temptare probare furem.
The same Julian writes that one who has sworn he did not commit theft is considered to have sworn as to the whole; and therefore he is held neither by the theft action nor by the condictitious action, because, he says, only the thief is held by the condictitious action. Therefore, if someone who has sworn under this single head that he did not commit theft is proceeded against by a condiction, should he use an exception? But if the one bringing the condiction contends that he is proceeding as it were against the heir of the thief, he ought not to be repelled, and a so‑called monomerys condiction ought to be granted to him against the thief’s heir; nor ought the judge to allow him, if he begins to try to prove that he is the thief.
Si quis iuraverit vendidisse me ei rem centum, ex empto agere poterit, ut ei cetera praestentur, id est res tradatur et de evictione caveatur: an tamen ad pretium consequendum ex venditio conveniri possit, videndum. et si quidem et de hoc ipso iuratum est, quod pretium solutum est, nulla pro pretio actio superest: si vero hoc non fuerit iuratum, tunc consequens est de pretio eum teneri.
If someone shall have sworn that I sold him a thing for one hundred, he will be able to sue ex empto, so that the rest be furnished to him—that is, that the thing be delivered and that caution be given against eviction: but whether nevertheless he can be convened ex vendito for obtaining the price is to be seen. And if indeed there has also been an oath on this very point, that the price has been paid, no action for the price remains: but if this has not been sworn, then it follows that he is held liable for the price.
Marcellus etiam scribit, si quis iuraverit ob decem pignori dedisse fundum, non alias eum pigneraticia agere posse, quam si decem solverit: sed et illud adici fortassis eum etiam in decem ex iureiurando suo posse conveniri, quod magis probat. cui quintus saturninus consentit argumentoque utitur eius, qui iuravit eam, quae uxor sua fuerit, rem sibi in dotem dedisse: nam et hic uxori ait utilem de dote actionem dandam. quae non esse extra aequitatem posita non negaverim.
Marcellus also writes that if someone has sworn that he has given an estate in pledge for ten, he cannot otherwise bring the pledge action unless he pays the ten; but perhaps this, too, should be added: that he can also be convened for the ten on the basis of his oath, which he approves more. Quintus Saturninus agrees with this and uses as an argument the case of a man who swore that she who had been his wife had given him a thing as a dowry; for he says that here too a useful action concerning the dowry is to be given to the wife. I would not deny that these are placed within equity.
Si quis iuraverit in re pecuniaria per genium principis dare se non oportere et peieraverit vel dari sibi oportere, vel intra certum tempus iuraverit se soluturum nec solvit: imperator noster cum patre rescripsit fustibus eum castigandum dimittere et ita ei superdici: propetws my omnue.
If anyone has sworn in a pecuniary matter by the genius of the princeps that he ought not to give and has forsworn himself, or that it ought to be given to him; or has sworn that he will pay within a fixed time and does not pay: our emperor, together with his father, rescripted to dismiss him after castigating him with cudgels, and thus to be said to him: “Do not swear rashly.”
Quotiens propter rem iuratur, nec parenti nec patrono remittitur iusiurandum: propter rem autem iusiurandum exigitur veluti de pecunia credita, cum iurat actor sibi dari oportere vel reus se dare non oportere. idem est, cum de pecunia constituta iusiurandum exigitur.
Whenever an oath is sworn on account of the matter, the oath is not remitted either to a parent or to a patron: moreover, an oath on account of the matter is exacted, for example, concerning money loaned, when the plaintiff swears that it ought to be given to him, or the defendant that he ought not to give. The same holds when an oath is exacted concerning constituted money.
Alias autem procuratorem deferentem iusiurandum non esse audiendum iulianus libro decimo digestorum scribit, ne postea reus, qui semel iuravit, a domino conveniatur: nec multum ei proficere, si fuerit ei de rato cautum: sive enim dominus petat, cogetur docere reus liquido se iurasse posita scilicet exceptione, sive ex stipulatione de rato agat, necesse habebit ipse de periurio suo docere.
Moreover Julian writes in the tenth book of the Digesta that otherwise a procurator tendering an oath is not to be heard, lest afterwards the defendant, who has once sworn, be convened by the principal: nor does it profit him much, if a cautio de rato has been given for him; for whether the principal makes a claim, the defendant will be compelled to show clearly that he has sworn, the exception, of course, having been set up; or whether he proceeds from the stipulation de rato, he will necessarily have to demonstrate his own perjury.
Si pater filium dare non oportere iuraverit, cassius respondit et patri et filio dandam exceptionem iurisiurandi: si pater iuraverit in peculio nihil esse, filius conveniri poterit: sed et pater ita convenietur, ut post adquisiti peculii ratio habeatur.
If a father has sworn that the son ought not to give (to pay), Cassius answered that the exception of the oath is to be granted to both the father and the son; if the father has sworn that there is nothing in the peculium, the son can be sued; but the father too will be sued in such a way that account is taken of peculium acquired afterwards.
Quod reus iuravit, etiam fideiussori proficit. a fideiussore exactum iusiurandum prodesse etiam reo cassius et iulianus aiunt: nam quia in locum solutionis succedit, hic quoque eodem loco habendum est: si modo ideo interpositum est iusiurandum, ut de ipso contractu et de re, non de persona iurantis ageretur.
What the defendant has sworn also profits the surety. an oath exacted from the surety, Cassius and Julian say, likewise profits the defendant: for because it succeeds to the place of payment, here too it is to be held in the same position: provided that the oath was interposed for this reason, that the matter concerned the contract itself and the thing, not the person of the swearer.
Si ei, qui debitorem meum in iudicium exhibere promisit, iusiurandum detulerim isque iuraverit se omnino exhibitionem eius non promisisse, prodesse debitori meo id non debet: si vero iuraverit se nihil mihi praestare oportere, distinguendum sit et replicatione emendandum, utrum ideo iuraverit an quia post promissionem exhibuerit an vero quia solverit: quod et in fideiussorem debiti distinguendum est.
If to one who promised to produce my debtor into court I have tendered an oath, and he has sworn that he by no means promised his production, that ought not to benefit my debtor; but if he has sworn that he ought to render nothing to me, it must be distinguished and corrected by a replication whether he swore thus for that reason, or because after the promise he produced him, or indeed because he paid: which must likewise be distinguished in the case of a surety for the debt.
Exceptio iurisiurandi non tantum si ea actione quis utatur, cuius nomine exegit iusiurandum, opponi debet, sed etiam si alia, si modo eadem quaestio in hoc iudicium deducatur, forte si ob actionem mandati negotiorum gestorum societatis ceterasque similes iusiurandum exactum sit, deinde ex isdem causis certum condicatur, quia per alteram actionem altera quoque consumitur.
The exception of the oath ought to be pleaded not only if one uses that action in whose name he exacted the oath, but also if another, provided that the same question is brought into this proceeding—for instance, if on account of the action of mandate, of negotiorum gestorum (management of affairs), of partnership, and other similar actions an oath has been exacted, and thereafter from the same causes a condictio for a determinate sum is brought—because by one action the other also is consumed.
Colonus, cum quo propter succisas forte arbores agebatur ex locato, si iuraverit se non succidisse, sive e lege duodecim tabularum de arboribus succisis sive e lege aquilia damni iniuria sive interdicto quod vi aut clam postea convenietur, per exceptionem iurisiurandi defendi poterit.
The colonus (tenant-farmer), with whom an action ex locato was being pursued on account of trees perchance cut down, if he shall have sworn that he did not cut them down, whether he is later proceeded against under the Law of the Twelve Tables concerning felled trees, or under the Lex Aquilia for wrongful damage, or by the interdict quod vi aut clam, can be defended by the exceptio iurisiurandi (plea of oath).
Quae iuravit divortii causa rem se non amovisse, non debet defendi per exceptionem, si cum ea in rem agatur, et si contendat suam esse, alio iureiurando opus est: contra si iuraverit suam esse, debet in actione rerum amotarum defendi. et omnino hoc observandum est, licet per aliam actionem eadem quaestio moveatur, ut exceptio iurisiurandi locum habeat.
She who has sworn, in the cause of divorce, that she did not remove the thing, ought not to be defended by an exception, if an in rem action is brought against her; and if she contends that it is hers, another oath is needed. Conversely, if she has sworn that it is hers, she ought to be defended in the action for things removed. And in general this must be observed, although by another action the same question is raised, that the exception of the oath should have place.
Igitur si quis iuravit se non esse condemnatum, etiamsi ex stipulatu iudicatum solvi ob rem iudicatam conveniatur, defendetur per exceptionem. contra si, cum ex stipulatu iudicatum solvi conveniretur, iuravit se dare non oportere, agenti iudicati non utique obstabit exceptio: potest enim fieri, ut non sit commissa stipulatio, licet res iudicata sit: nisi ideo iurasset, quod nec damnatum se esse diceret.
Therefore, if someone has sworn that he has not been condemned, even if he is proceeded against under the stipulation “iudicatum solvi” on account of res judicata, he will be defended by an exceptio. Conversely, if, when he was being proceeded against under the stipulation “iudicatum solvi,” he swore that he ought not to give, the exceptio will not necessarily bar the plaintiff on the judgment: for it can happen that the stipulation has not been incurred, although the matter has been adjudged—unless he swore for this reason, namely that he also said he was not condemned.
Item cum ex hac parte iusiurandum et actionem et exceptionem inducat, si forte reus extra iudicium actore inferente iuraverit se dare non oportere et actor reo deferente dari sibi oportere, vel contra, posterior causa iurisiurandi potior habebitur: nec tamen praeiudicium periurio alterius fiet, quia non quaeretur, an dare eum oportet, sed an actor iuraverit.
Likewise, since on this side the oath introduces both an action and an exception, if by chance the defendant outside of judgment, with the plaintiff tendering it, has sworn that he is not obliged to give, and the plaintiff, with the defendant tendering it, (has sworn) that it ought to be given to him, or conversely, the later ground of swearing will be held the stronger; nor, however, will prejudice be done on account of the other’s perjury, because the inquiry will not be whether he ought to give, but whether the plaintiff has sworn.
Quod si iuravi te deferente non iurasse te dare tibi oportere, et adversus utilem actionem, qua hoc quaeritur, an iuraveris tibi dari oportere, opponenda est exceptio iurisiurandi perementis quaestionem actione comprehensam.
But if, with you tendering it, I swore that you had not sworn that it ought to be given to you, then, against the useful action by which this is inquired—whether you have sworn that it ought to be given to you—there must be opposed the exception of the oath, perempting the question encompassed by the action.
Eum, qui iuravit ex ea actione quae infitiando crescit aliquid sibi deberi, simpli, non dupli persecutionem sibi adquirere pedius ait: abunde enim sufficere exonerare petitorem probandi necessitate, cum omissa hac parte edicti dupli actio integra maneat: et potest dici hoc iudicio non principalem causam exerceri, sed iusiurandum actoris conservari.
He who has sworn that, from that action which grows by denial, something is owed to him, acquires for himself, as Pedius says, an action for the single, not for the double (amount): for it is amply sufficient to exonerate the claimant from the necessity of proof, since, with this part of the edict left aside, the action for the double remains intact; and it can be said that in this judgment the principal cause is not being exercised, but the plaintiff’s oath is being conserved.
Si mulier iuraverit decem dotis sibi deberi, tota ea summa praestanda est: sed si iuravit decem se dedisse in dotem, hoc solum non erit quaerendum, an data sint, sed quasi data sint, quod ex eo reddi oportet praestandum erit.
If a woman has sworn that ten of dowry are owed to her, that whole sum must be furnished; but if she has sworn that she gave ten into dowry, this alone will not be inquired—whether they were given—but, as though they had been given, that which ought to be returned therefrom will have to be furnished.
Admonendi sumus interdum etiam post iusiurandum exactum permitti constitutionibus principum ex integro causam agere, si quis nova instrumenta se invenisse dicat, quibus nunc solis usurus sit. sed hae constitutiones tunc videntur locum habere, cum a iudice aliquis absolutus fuerit ( solent enim saepe iudices in dubiis causis exacto iureiurando secundum eum iudicare qui iuraverit): quod si alias inter ipsos iureiurando transactum sit negotium, non conceditur eandem causam retractare.
We must be admonished that sometimes even after an oath has been exacted it is permitted by the emperors’ constitutions to prosecute the case anew, if someone says that he has discovered new instruments, which alone he will now make use of. But these constitutions seem to have a place when someone has been absolved by the judge ( for judges are often accustomed, in doubtful causes, after an oath has been exacted, to judge in favor of the one who has sworn): but if otherwise the matter has been transacted by an oath between the parties themselves, it is not conceded to re‑argue the same case.
Iusiurandum et ad pecunias et ad omnes res locum habet: etiam de operis iusiurandum deferri potest. nec de iniuria queri adversarius potest, cum possit iusiurandum referre. quid tamen, si ideo dicat reus se liberatum, quoniam stichum, quem promiserat, putat decessisse?
An oath has place both for monies and for all things: even an oath concerning services/works can be tendered. Nor can the adversary complain of injury, since he can refer the oath back. But what, however, if for this reason the defendant says that he has been released, because he thinks that Stichus, whom he had promised, has died?
Datur autem et alia facultas reo, ut, si malit, referat iusiurandum: et si is qui petet condicione iurisiurandi non utetur, iudicium ei praetor non dabit. aequissime enim hoc facit, cum non deberet displicere condicio iurisiurandi ei qui detulit: sed nec iusiurandum de calumnia referenti defertur, quia non est ferendus actor, si condicionis quam ipse detulit de calumnia velit sibi iurari.
Moreover, another faculty is given to the defendant, that, if he prefers, he may refer the oath back; and if he who seeks (sues) will not make use of the condition of the oath, the praetor will not grant him an action. For he does this most equitably, since the condition of the oath ought not to displease him who tendered it; but neither is the oath concerning calumny tendered to one who refers it, because the plaintiff (actor) is not to be borne, if he wishes that, from the condition which he himself tendered, an oath about calumny be sworn to his own advantage.
Non semper autem consonans est per omnia referri iusiurandum quale defertur, forsitan ex diversitate rerum vel personarum quibusdam emergentibus, quae varietatem inducunt: ideoque si quid tale inciderit, officio iudicis conceptio huiuscemodi iurisiurandi terminetur.
However, it is not always consonant that an oath be referred in all respects just as it is proffered, perhaps because, from the diversity of matters or of persons, certain things emerge which introduce variety: and therefore, if anything of this sort should occur, the conception (formulation) of such an oath is to be determined by the office of the judge.
Cum res in iusiurandum demissa sit, iudex iurantem absolvit: referentem audiet et, si actor iuret, condemnet reum: nolentem iurare reum si solvat, absolvit, non solventem condemnat: ex relatione non iurante actore absolvit reum.
When the matter has been remitted to an oath, the judge absolves the one who swears: he will hear the referrer and, if the plaintiff swears, he condemns the defendant: if the defendant, unwilling to swear, pays, he absolves him; if he does not pay, he condemns him: on the referral, if the plaintiff does not swear, he absolves the defendant.
Prodigus si deferat iusiurandum, audiendus non est: idemque in ceteris similibus ei dicendum est. nam sive pro pacto convento sive pro solutione sive pro iudicio hoc iusiurandum cedit, non ab aliis delatum probari debet, quam qui ad haec habiles sunt.
If a prodigal tenders an oath, he is not to be heard; and the same must be said in other matters similar to this. For whether this oath accrues for a pact or convention, or for a solution (payment), or for a judgment, it ought not to be approved when proffered by any others than those who are competent for these things.
Si actor deferat iusiurandum de sola constituta pecunia et reus iuraverit, exceptione utetur, si de constituta conveniatur: sed si de sorte, id est de priore obligatione conveniatur, exceptio cessabit, nisi de hac quoque iuraverit adversario deferente.
If the actor tenders an oath concerning only the constituted money, and the reus has sworn, he will use an exceptio if he is sued on the constitutum; but if he is sued for the principal (that is, on the prior obligation), the exceptio will cease, unless he has also sworn concerning this as well, the adversary tendering it.
Si non fuerit remissum iusiurandum ab eo qui detulerit, sed de calumnia non iuratur, consequens est, ut debeat denegari ei actio: sibi enim imputet, qui processit ad delationem iurisiurandi nec prius de calumnia iuravit, ut sit iste remittendi similis.
If the oath has not been remitted by him who has tendered it, but no oath concerning calumny is sworn, it follows that the action ought to be denied to him: let him impute it to himself, who proceeded to the delation of the oath and did not first swear about calumny, so that he is like one remitting it.
Si quis cum debitore suo pepigerit, ne ab eo pecunia peteretur, si iurasset se capitolium non ascendisse vel aliud quodlibet fecisse vel non fecisse, isque iuraverit, et exceptio iurisiurandi dari debebit et solutum repeti poterit: est enim iusta conventio, si quaelibet causa in condicione iurisiurandi deducta fuerit.
If anyone has bargained with his debtor that a pecuniary demand shall not be made upon him, if he should swear that he has not ascended the Capitol or has done or not done any other thing whatsoever, and he has sworn, then the exception of an oath ought to be granted, and what was paid can be reclaimed: for it is a just convention, if any cause whatsoever has been brought under the condition of the oath.
Iusiurandum a debitore exactum efficit, ut pignus liberetur: est enim hoc acceptilationi simile: perpetuam certe exceptionem parit. idcirco poenam quoque petentem creditorem exceptione summoveri oportet et solutum repeti potest, utpote cum interposito eo ab omni controversia discedatur.
An oath exacted from the debtor brings it about that the pledge is released: for this is similar to acceptilation; it certainly begets a perpetual exception. Therefore the creditor, even when seeking a penalty, ought to be repelled by the exception, and what has been paid can be reclaimed, since, that being interposed, one departs from all controversy.
Creditore, qui de mutua pecunia contra pupillum contendebat, iusiurandum deferente pupillus iuravit se dare non oportere: eandem pecuniam a fideiussore eius petit: an excludendus sit exceptione iurisiurandi? quid tibi placet, rescribe mihi. eam rem apertius explicat iulianus.
With the creditor, who was contending against a ward concerning money lent as a mutuum, tendering an oath, the ward swore that he ought not to pay; he seeks the same money from his surety: is he to be excluded by the exception of the oath? What seems good to you? Write back to me. Julian explains this matter more explicitly.
for if there is a controversy between the creditor and the pupil, whether he had at all received a loan of money, and it is agreed that all condition be departed from if the pupil should swear, and he has sworn that he ought not to pay, the natural obligation will be removed by this pact, and money that has been paid may be reclaimed. but if indeed the creditor was contending that he had given the loan, while the pupil was defending himself on this ground alone, that his tutor had not intervened, and such an oath has been interposed, in this case the praetor will not protect the surety. if however it cannot be clearly proved what was done, and it will be in obscurity ( as it generally happens), whether the controversy between the creditor and the pupil was about the fact or about the law, the creditor having tendered the oath and the pupil having sworn, we must understand that this was transacted between them: that, if he should swear that he ought not to pay, all condition was to be departed from; and thus we have judged that both money paid can be reclaimed, and that to the sureties the exceptio ought to be given.
Sed et si actore deferente defensor absentis vel praesentis iuravit eum quem defendit dare non oportere, exceptio iurisiurandi ei cuius nomine iurandum fuerit dari debebit. eadem ratio est et si fideiussoris defensor iuraverit: reo enim detur exceptio:
But also, if, with the plaintiff tendering it, the defender of an absent or present person swore that the one whom he defends ought not to give, the exception of the oath ought to be given to him in whose name the oath was sworn. The same reasoning applies also if the defender of a surety swore: for let the exception be given to the defendant:
Rem in iudicio deductam non idcirco pluris esse opinamur, quia crescere condemnatio potest ex contumacia non restituentis per iusiurandum in litem: non enim res pluris fit per hoc, sed ex contumacia aestimatur ultra rei pretium.
We do not therefore suppose that a thing brought into judgment is for that reason of greater value, because the condemnation can increase, out of the contumacy of the party not restoring, through an oath in litem: for the thing does not become worth more by this, but on account of contumacy it is appraised beyond the price of the thing.
Sive nostrum quid petamus sive ad exhibendum agatur, interdum quod intersit agentis solum aestimatur, veluti cum culpa non restituentis vel non exhibentis punitur: cum vero dolus aut contumacia non restituentis vel non exhibentis, quanti in litem iuraverit actor.
Whether we claim something that is ours or an action for exhibition is brought, sometimes only what it is in the interest of the actor is assessed, as when the fault of the non-restorer or non-exhibitor is punished; but when there is fraud or contumacy of the non-restorer or non-exhibitor, it is for as much as the actor has sworn in the suit.
Nummis depositis iudicem non oportet in litem iusiurandum deferre, ut iuret quisque quod sua interfuit, cum certa sit nummorum aestimatio. nisi forte de eo quis iuret, quod sua interfuit nummos sibi sua die redditos esse: quid enim, si sub poena pecuniam debuit? aut sub pignore, quod, quia deposita ei pecunia adnegata est, distractum est?
When coins have been deposited, the judge ought not to tender an oath in litem, that each person swear what it was to his interest, since the valuation of coins is certain—unless perhaps someone should swear to this, that it was to his interest that the coins had been returned to him on their proper day: for what, if he owed the money subject to a penalty? or under a pledge, which was sold off because, although the money had been deposited with him, it was refused?
Videamus in tutelari causa quis iurare et adversus quem possit. et quidem ipse pupillus, si impubes est, non potest: hoc enim saepissime rescriptum est. sed nec tutorem cogendum vel matrem pupilli admittendam, etsi parata esset iurare, divi fratres rescripserunt: grave enim videbatur et ignorantes et invitos tutores sub alieni compendii emolumento etiam periurium anceps subire.
Let us see, in a guardianship matter, who can swear an oath and against whom. And indeed the ward himself, if he is under the age of puberty, cannot: for this has been most frequently determined by rescript. But the Deified Brothers rescripted that neither should the tutor be compelled nor the mother of the ward be admitted, even if she were ready to swear: for it seemed grievous that tutors, both unknowing and unwilling, should, for the emolument of another’s profit, also incur the two-edged peril of perjury.
It is contained in the rescripts of our emperor and of his deified father that the curators also of a pupil or of an adolescent are not to be compelled to swear in-litem. If, however, the tutors or curators wish to render such affection to their own pupil or adolescent, the authority of the law will not gainsay it, so that an end of this kind may be applied to the proceeding which has been entered between them. For the appraisal of the oath is not to be referred to their own utility, but to that of the owner, in whose name the account of the guardianship is demanded.
Deferre autem iusiurandum iudicem oportet: ceterum si alius detulerit iusiurandum vel non delato iuratum sit, nulla erit religio nec ullum iusiurandum: et ita constitutionibus expressum est imperatoris nostri et divi patris eius.
Moreover, the judge ought to defer (tender) the oath; but if someone else has deferred the oath, or if, with it not having been deferred, it has been sworn, there will be no religious obligation nor any oath; and thus it has been expressly set forth in the constitutions of our emperor and of his deified father.
Iurare autem in infinitum licet. sed an iudex modum iuriiurando statuere possit, ut intra certam quantitatem iuretur, ne arrepta occasione in immensum iuretur, quaero. et quidem in arbitrio esse iudicis deferre iusiurandum nec ne constat: an igitur qui possit iusiurandum non deferre, idem possit et taxationem iuriiurando adicere, quaeritur: arbitrio tamen bonae fidei iudicis etiam hoc congruit.
To swear for an unlimited amount is permitted. But whether a judge can set a limit for the oath, so that one swear within a certain quantity, lest, the occasion having been seized, one swear to an immense amount, I ask. And indeed it is established that it is within the judge’s discretion to tender the oath or not: therefore the question is whether he who can refrain from tendering the oath can likewise add an assessment to the oath. Yet this too accords with the discretion of a good‑faith judge.
Tutor rem adulti, quam possidet, restituere ei non vult: quaero, utrum quanti res est an quanti in litem iuratum fuerit condemnari debet, respondi: non est aequum pretio, id est quanti res est, litem aestimari, cum et contumacia punienda sit et arbitrio potius domini rei pretium statuendum sit potestate petitori in litem iurandi concessa.
The tutor does not wish to restore to the adult the thing which he possesses: I ask whether he ought to be condemned for as much as the thing is worth, or for as much as has been sworn in for the suit; I replied: it is not equitable that the suit be assessed by the price, that is, by how much the thing is worth, since contumacy too is to be punished, and the price ought rather to be set at the discretion of the owner of the thing, the power having been conceded to the petitioner to swear in litem.
Dedi tibi pecuniam, ne ad iudicem iretur: quasi decidi. an possim condicere, si mihi non caveatur ad iudicem non iri? et est verum multum interesse, utrum ob hoc solum dedi, ne eatur, an ut et mihi repromittatur non iri: si ob hoc, ut et repromittatur, condici poterit, si non repromittatur: si ut ne eatur, condictio cessat quamdiu non itur.
I gave you money, so that it not be gone before the judge: as if I had settled. Whether I can bring a condictio, if I am not given security that there will not be a going before the judge? And it is true that it matters much whether I gave for this alone, that one not go, or also that it be re-promised to me that one will not go: if for this, that it also be re-promised, a condictio can be brought if it is not re-promised; if [I gave] so that one not go, the condictio is in abeyance so long as one does not go.
Si liber homo, qui bona fide serviebat, mihi pecuniam dederit, ut eum manumittam, et fecero: postea liber probatus an mihi condicere possit, quaeritur. et iulianus libro undecimo digestorum scribit competere manumisso repetitionem. neratius etiam libro membranarum refert paridem pantomimum a domitia neronis filia decem, quae ei pro libertate dederat, repetisse per iudicem nec fuisse quaesitum, an domitia sciens liberum accepisset.
If a free man, who was serving in good faith, has given me money so that I might manumit him, and I have done so: afterwards, when he is proved free, the question arises whether he can bring a condiction against me. And Julian, in the eleventh book of the Digest, writes that repetition is available to the manumitted. Neratius also, in the book Membranae, reports that Paris the pantomime recovered through a judge from Domitia, Nero’s daughter, the ten which he had given her for his freedom, and that it was not inquired whether Domitia had knowingly received a free person.
Sed si servus, qui testamento heredi iussus erat decem dare et liber esse, codicillis pure libertatem accepit et id ignorans dederit heredi decem, an repetere possit? et refert patrem suum celsum existimasse repetere eum non posse: sed ipse celsus naturali aequitate motus putat repeti posse. quae sententia verior est, quamquam constet, ut et ipse ait, eum qui dedit ea spe, quod se ab eo qui acceperit remunerari existimaret vel amiciorem sibi esse eum futurum, repetere non posse opinione falsa deceptum.
But if a slave, who by testament had been ordered to give ten to the heir and to be free, received liberty unconditionally by codicils, and, not knowing this, gave the heir ten, can he recover it? And he reports that his father Celsus thought that he could not recover; but Celsus himself, moved by natural equity, thinks that it can be recovered. Which opinion is truer, although it is agreed, as he himself says, that he who gave in the hope that he would be remunerated by the one who received, or that he would be more friendly to him in the future, cannot recover, having been deceived by a false opinion.
Suptilius quoque illud tractat, an ille, qui se statuliberum putaverit, nec fecerit nummos accipientis, quoniam heredi dedit quasi ipsius heredis nummos daturus, non quasi suos, qui utique ipsius fuerunt, adquisiti scilicet post libertatem ei ex testamento competentem. et puto, si hoc animo dedit, non fieri ipsius: nam et cum tibi nummos meos quasi tuos do, non facio tuos. quid ergo, si hic non heredi, sed alii dedit, cui putabat se iussum?
Suptilius also treats this point, whether the man who thought himself statuliber, and did not make the coins the recipient’s, since he gave to the heir as if he were going to give the heir’s coins, not as if his own—which indeed were his, acquired, namely, after the freedom due to him under the testament—And I think, if he gave with this intention, they do not become the recipient’s: for even when I give you my coins as though they were yours, I do not make them yours. What then, if he gave not to the heir, but to another, to whom he thought himself ordered?
Quamquam permissum sit statulibero etiam de peculio dare implendae condicionis causa, si tamen vult heres nummos salvos facere, potest eum vetare dare: sic enim fiet, ut et statuliber perveniat ad libertatem quasi impleta condicione cui parere prohibitus est, et nummi non peribunt. sed is, quem testator accipere voluit, adversus heredem in factum actione agere potest, ut testatori pareatur.
Although it is permitted to a statuliber even to give from his peculium for the sake of fulfilling the condition, nevertheless, if the heir wishes to keep the money safe, he can forbid him to give: for thus it will come about that both the statuliber will attain freedom as if the condition—obedience to which he was prohibited—had been fulfilled, and the coins will not perish. But the person whom the testator wished to receive it can bring an actio in factum against the heir, so that obedience may be rendered to the testator.
Si pecuniam ideo acceperis, ut capuam eas, deinde parato tibi ad proficiscendum condicio temporis vel valetudinis impedimento fuerit, quo minus proficiscereris, an condici possit, videndum: et cum per te non steterit, potest dici repetitionem cessare: sed cum liceat paenitere ei qui dedit, procul dubio repetetur id quod datum est, nisi forte tua intersit non accepisse te ob hanc causam pecuniam. nam si ita se res habeat, ut, licet nondum profectus sis, ita tamen rem composueris, ut necesse habeas proficisci, vel sumptus, qui necessarii fuerunt ad profectionem, iam fecisti, ut manifestum sit te plus forte quam accepisti erogasse, condictio cessabit: sed si minus erogatum sit, condictio locum habebit, ita tamen, ut indemnitas tibi praestetur eius quod expendisti.
If you received money for this purpose, that you go to Capua, and then, when you were prepared for departure, the condition of time or of health proved an impediment whereby you did not set out, it must be considered whether a condictio can lie: and since it did not rest with you, it can be said that repetition ceases. But since it is permitted to the giver to repent, without doubt what was given will be recovered, unless perhaps it is in your interest that you should not have received the money for this cause. For if the matter stands thus, that although you have not yet set out, nevertheless you have so arranged the affair that you must set out, or you have already made expenses which were necessary for the departure, so that it is manifest that you have perhaps expended more than you received, the condictio will cease: but if less has been expended, the condictio will have place, provided, however, that indemnity be afforded to you for what you expended.
Si servum quis tradiderit alicui ita, ut ab eo intra certum tempus manumitteretur, si paenituerit eum qui tradiderit et super hoc eum certioraverit et fuerit manumissus post paenitentiam, attamen actio propter paenitentiam competit ei qui dedit. plane si non manumiserit, constitutio succedit facitque eum liberum, si nondum paenituerat eum qui in hoc dedit.
If someone has delivered a slave to another on the understanding that he be manumitted by him within a certain time, and the one who delivered repents and notifies him of this, and the slave is manumitted after the repentance, nevertheless an action on account of the repentance is available to the one who gave. Clearly, if he does not manumit, the constitution intervenes and makes him free, provided the person who gave him for this had not yet repented.
Item si quis dederit titio decem, ut servum emat et manumittat, deinde paeniteat, si quidem nondum emptus est, paenitentia dabit condictionem, si hoc ei manifestum fecerit, ne si postea emat, damno adficietur: si vero iam sit emptus, paenitentia non facit iniuriam ei qui redemit, sed pro decem quae accepit ipsum servum quem emit restituet aut, si ante decessisse proponatur, nihil praestabit, si modo per eum factum non est. quod si fugit nec culpa eius contigit qui redemit, nihil praestabit: plane repromittere eum oportet, si in potestatem suam pervenerit, restitutum iri.
Likewise, if someone has given Titius ten, that he may buy a slave and manumit him, and then repents, if indeed he has not yet been bought, repentance will give a condictio, provided he has made this manifest to him, lest, if he buys afterward, he be affected with loss: but if he has already been bought, repentance does not work an injury to him who purchased, but, in place of the ten which he received, he shall restore the slave himself whom he bought, or, if it is alleged that he died beforehand, he shall provide nothing, provided only that it did not happen through his act. But if he has fled and it did not occur through the fault of him who purchased, he shall provide nothing: plainly, he ought to promise anew that, if he comes into his power, he will be restored.
Sed si accepit pecuniam ut servum manumittat isque fugerit prius quam manumittatur, videndum, an condici possit quod accepit. et si quidem distracturus erat hunc servum et propter hoc non distraxit, quod acceperat ut manumittat non oportet ei condici: plane cavebit, ut, si in potestatem suam pervenerit servus, restituat id quod accepit eo minus, quo vilior servus factus est propter fugam. plane si adhuc eum manumitti velit is qui dedit, ille vero manumittere nolit propter fugam offensus, totum quod accepit restituere eum oportet.
But if he received money in order to manumit a slave and the latter fled before he was manumitted, it must be considered whether what he received can be recoverable by condictio. And if indeed he was about to sell this slave and on this account did not sell him, what he had received to manumit ought not to be subject to a condictio against him: clearly, he shall give security that, if the slave comes into his power, he will restore what he received, less by as much as the slave has been made cheaper on account of the flight. Clearly, if the one who gave still wishes him to be manumitted, but the other, offended because of the flight, does not wish to manumit, he ought to restore the whole of what he received.
but if the one who gave ten chooses to obtain the slave himself, it is necessary either that the slave be delivered to him or that what he gave be restored. but if he was not about to sell him, what he received ought to be restored, unless perhaps he would have kept him more diligently if he had not received [the payment] to manumit; for then it is not equitable that he be deprived both of the slave and of the whole price.
Sed ubi accepit, ut manumitteret, deinde servus decessit, si quidem moram fecit manumissioni, consequens est, ut dicamus refundere eum quod accepit: quod si moram non fecit, sed cum profectus esset ad praesidem vel apud quem manumittere posset, servus in itinere decesserit, verius est, si quidem distracturus erat vel quo ipse usurus, oportere dici nihil eum refundere debere. enimvero si nihil eorum facturus, ipsi adhuc servum obisse: decederet enim et si non accepisset ut manumitteret: nisi forte profectio manumissionis gratia morti causam praebuit, ut vel a latronibus sit interfectus, vel ruina in stabulo oppressus, vel vehiculo obtritus, vel alio quo modo, quo non periret, nisi manumissionis causa proficisceretur.
But when he has received [money] to manumit, and thereafter the slave has died, if indeed he caused delay to the manumission, it follows that we should say he must refund what he received. But if he did not cause delay, but, when he had set out to the governor or before someone by whom he could manumit, the slave died on the journey, the truer view is that, if indeed he was about to alienate (sell) him or to use him himself, it ought to be said that he need refund nothing. However, if he was going to do none of these things, the slave died while still his [property]; for he would have died even if he had not accepted [money] to manumit—unless perhaps the departure for the sake of manumission furnished the cause of death, such that he was either slain by robbers, or crushed by a collapse in a stable, or run over by a vehicle, or in some other way, in which he would not have perished unless he had set out for the sake of manumission.
Si extraneus pro muliere dotem dedisset et pactus esset, ut, quoquo modo finitum esset matrimonium, dos ei redderetur, nec fuerint nuptiae secutae, quia de his casibus solummodo fuit conventum qui matrimonium sequuntur, nuptiae autem secutae non sint, quaerendum erit, utrum mulieri condictio an ei qui dotem dedit competat. et verisimile est in hunc quoque casum eum qui dat sibi prospicere: nam quasi causa non secuta habere potest condictionem, qui ob matrimonium dedit, matrimonio non copulato, nisi forte evidentissimis probationibus mulier ostenderit hoc eum ideo fecisse, ut ipsi magis mulieri quam sibi prospiceret. sed et si pater pro filia det et ita convenit, nisi evidenter aliud actum sit, condictionem patri competere Marcellus ait.
if an outsider had given a dowry on behalf of a woman and had stipulated that, in whatever manner the marriage were finished, the dowry be returned to him, and the nuptials did not follow, since agreement was made only about those cases which follow upon marriage, but nuptials have not followed, it will have to be inquired whether the condiction lies with the woman or with him who gave the dowry. and it is verisimilar that in this case too the giver is providing for himself: for, as for a cause not ensuing, he who gave on account of marriage, the marriage not having been coupled, can have the condiction, unless perhaps by most evident proofs the woman should show that he did this for the reason that he was looking out rather for the woman herself than for himself. but also if a father gives on behalf of his daughter and thus it is agreed, unless it is clearly established that something else was transacted, Marcellus says that the condiction belongs to the father.
Qui se debere pecuniam mulieri putabat, iussu eius dotis nomine promisit sponso et solvit: nuptiae deinde non intercesserunt: quaesitum est, utrum ipse potest repetere eam pecuniam qui dedisset, an mulier. nerva, atilicinus responderunt, quoniam putasset quidem debere pecuniam, sed exceptione doli mali tueri se potuisset, ipsum repetiturum. sed si, cum sciret se nihil mulieri debere, promisisset, mulieris esse actionem, quoniam pecunia ad eam pertineret.
He who thought that he owed money to a woman, at her order, in the name of the dowry, promised to the bridegroom and paid; then the marriage did not take place. It was asked whether he himself can recover that money who had given it, or the woman. Nerva and Atilicinus answered that, since he had indeed thought he owed the money, but could have protected himself by the exceptio doli mali (defense of fraud), he himself would recover it. But if, when he knew that he owed the woman nothing, he had promised, the action would belong to the woman, since the money pertained to her.
but if he had truly been a debtor and had paid before the nuptials, and the nuptials did not ensue, he himself can bring a condiction; the cause of the indebtedness remains intact to the woman for this sole purpose, that the debtor be compelled to nothing else except to cede to her the condictory action.
Quod servius in libro de dotibus scribit, si inter eas personas, quarum altera nondum iustam aetatem habeat, nuptiae factae sint, quod dotis nomine interim datum sit, repeti posse, sic intellegendum est, ut, si divortium intercesserit, priusquam utraque persona iustam aetatem habeat, sit eius pecuniae repetitio, donec autem in eodem habitu matrimonii permanent, non magis id repeti possit, quam quod sponsa sponso dotis nomine dederit, donec maneat inter eos adfinitas: quod enim ex ea causa nondum coito matrimonio datur, cum sic detur tamquam in dotem perventurum, quamdiu pervenire potest, repetitio eius non est.
What Servius writes in the book On Dowries—that if a marriage has been made between persons of whom one has not yet the just (lawful) age, what has meanwhile been given under the name of dowry can be reclaimed—is to be understood thus: if a divorce has intervened before both persons have the just age, there is a recovery of that money; but so long as they remain in the same condition of marriage, it can no more be reclaimed than what a bride has given to the bridegroom under the name of dowry, so long as affinity remains between them: for what for that cause is given, the marriage not yet having been consummated, since it is given as though it were going to come into the dowry, so long as it can so come, there is no recovery of it.
Si donaturus mulieri iussu eius sponso numeravi nec nuptiae secutae sunt, mulier condicet. sed si ego contraxi cum sponso et pecuniam in hoc dedi, ut, si nuptiae secutae essent, mulieri dos adquireretur, si non essent secutae, mihi redderetur, quasi ob rem datur et re non secuta ego a sponso condicam.
If, intending to make a gift to the woman, at her order I counted out the money to her betrothed, and the nuptials did not ensue, the woman will bring a condictio. But if I contracted with the betrothed and gave the money on this basis: that, if the nuptials had ensued, a dowry would be acquired for the woman, but if they had not ensued, it would be returned to me—then, as it is given quasi “for the sake of the thing,” and the thing not ensuing, I will bring a condictio against the betrothed.
Si quis indebitam pecuniam per errorem iussu mulieris sponso eius promisisset et nuptiae secutae fuissent, exceptione doli mali uti non potest: maritus enim suum negotium gerit et nihil dolo facit nec decipiendus est: quod fit, si cogatur indotatam uxorem habere. itaque adversus mulierem condictio ei competit, ut aut repetat ab ea quod marito dedit aut ut liberetur, si nondum solverit. sed si soluto matrimonio maritus peteret, in eo dumtaxat exceptionem obstare debere, quod mulier receptura esset.
If someone, through error, had promised money not owed, at a woman’s order, to her betrothed, and the marriage had followed, he cannot employ the exception of dolus malus: for the husband is conducting his own business and does nothing by dolus, nor is he to be deceived—which is what happens if he is forced to have a wife without a dowry. Therefore a condictio lies for him against the woman, so that either he may recover from her what he gave to the husband, or that he be released if he has not yet paid. But if, the marriage having been dissolved, the husband should sue, the exception ought to obstruct only to this extent, namely, to the extent that the woman would be about to receive it.
Si mulier ei cui nuptura erat cum dotem dare vellet, pecuniam quae sibi debebatur acceptam fecit neque nuptiae insecutae sunt, recte ab eo pecunia condicetur, quia nihil interest, utrum ex numeratione pecunia ad eum sine causa an per acceptilationem pervenerit.
If a woman, to him whom she was about to marry, when she wished to give a dowry, treated as received (by acceptilation) money that was owed to herself, and the nuptials did not ensue, the money is rightly recoverable from him by an action for recovery (condictio), for it makes no difference whether the money, without cause, came to him by payment or by acceptilation.
Si procuratori falso indebitum solutum sit, ita demum a procuratore repeti non potest, si dominus ratum habuerit, sed ipse dominus tenetur, ut iulianus scribit. quod si dominus ratum non habuisset, etiamsi debita pecunia soluta fuisset, ab ipso procuratore repetetur: non enim quasi indebitum datum repetetur, sed quasi ob rem datum nec res secuta sit ratihabitione non intercedente: vel quod furtum faceret pecuniae falsus procurator, cum quo non tantum furti agi, sed etiam condici ei posse.
If an undue payment has been made to a false procurator, then only in the case that the master has ratified it can it not be reclaimed from the procurator, but the master himself is liable, as Julian writes. But if the master has not ratified, even if money that was due had been paid, it is to be reclaimed from the procurator himself: for it is not reclaimed as though an undue payment had been given, but as given on account of a thing and the thing did not ensue, since ratihabition did not intervene; or because the false procurator would be committing theft of the money, against whom not only an action for theft can be brought, but also a condictio can be brought against him.
Cum servus tuus in suspicionem furti attio venisset, dedisti eum in quaestionem sub ea causa, ut, si id repertum in eo non esset, redderetur tibi: is eum tradidit praefecto vigilum quasi in facinore deprehensum: praefectus vigilum eum summo supplicio adfecit. ages cum attio dare eum tibi oportere, quia et ante mortem dare tibi eum oportuerit. labeo ait posse etiam ad exhibendum agi, quoniam fecerit quo minus exhiberet.
When your slave had come under suspicion of theft with attio, you gave him into questioning under this condition, that, if that were not found in him, he should be returned to you: he handed him over to the prefect of the watch as though caught in a crime: the prefect of the watch inflicted the highest punishment upon him. You will sue attio that he ought to deliver him to you, since even before death he ought to have delivered him to you. labeo says that it is also possible to proceed by the action ad exhibendum, since he has done that by which he failed to exhibit him.
but Proculus says that the action for “to give” ought to lie on this footing, if you had made him his man (i.e., his slave), in which case you would not be able to sue by the action ad exhibendum; but if he had remained yours, you would also bring an action of theft against him, because he used another’s property in such a way that he knew he was using it against the owner’s will, or that he knew the owner, if he knew of it, would prohibit it.
Dedi tibi pecuniam, ut mihi stichum dares: utrum id contractus genus pro portione emptionis et venditionis est, an nulla hic alia obligatio est quam ob rem dati re non secuta? in quod proclivior sum: et ideo, si mortuus est stichus, repetere possum quod ideo tibi dedi, ut mihi stichum dares. finge alienum esse stichum, sed te tamen eum tradidisse: repetere a te pecuniam potero, quia hominem accipientis non feceris: et rursus, si tuus est stichus et pro evictione eius promittere non vis, non liberaberis, quo minus a te pecuniam repetere possim.
I gave you money, so that you would give me Stichus: whether that genus of contract is, in proportion, of purchase and sale, or whether here there is no other obligation than for the cause of a thing given, the thing not having followed? to which view I am more inclined: and therefore, if Stichus has died, I can recover what I for that reason gave you, namely that you might give me Stichus. Suppose Stichus is another’s, but you nevertheless delivered him: I shall be able to recover the money from you, because you did not make the man the recipient’s; and again, if Stichus is yours and you are unwilling to promise for eviction, you will not be freed, so as to hinder me from recovering the money from you.
Si tibi indicium dedero, ut fugitivum meum indices vel furem rerum mearum, non poterit repeti quod datum est: nec enim turpiter accepisti. quod si a fugitivo meo acceperis ne eum indicares, condicere tibi hoc quasi furi possim: sed si ipse fur indicium a me accepit vel furis vel fugitivi socius, puto condictionem locum habere.
If I should give you an informer’s reward, so that you may denounce my fugitive or the thief of my goods, what was given cannot be reclaimed: for you did not receive it shamefully. But if you have received from my fugitive so that you would not denounce him, I can sue you by condictio for this as if against a thief. Yet if the thief himself received the informer’s reward from me, or the associate of the thief or of the fugitive, I think the condictio has a place.
Si ob turpem causam promiseris titio, quamvis si petat, exceptione doli mali vel in factum summovere eum possis, tamen si solveris, non posse te repetere, quoniam sublata proxima causa stipulationis, quae propter exceptionem inanis esset, pristina causa, id est turpitudo, superesset: porro autem si et dantis et accipientis turpis causa sit, possessorem potiorem esse et ideo repetitionem cessare, tametsi ex stipulatione solutum est.
If on account of a shameful cause you have promised to Titius, although, if he should demand it, you could ward him off by an exception of dolus malus or in factum, nevertheless, if you pay, you cannot recover, since, with the proximate cause of the stipulation removed—which on account of the exception would be void—the original cause, that is, turpitude, would remain: furthermore, if the cause be shameful for both the giver and the recipient, the possessor has the superior right and therefore repetition ceases, although it was paid under the stipulation.
Si rem locatam tibi vel venditam a te vel mandatam ut redderes, pecuniam acceperis, habebo tecum ex locato vel vendito vel mandati actionem: quod si, ut id, quod ex testamento vel ex stipulatu debebas, redderes mihi, pecuniam tibi dederim, condictio dumtaxat pecuniae datae eo nomine erit. idque et pomponius scribit.
If you have received money for a thing let to you, or for a thing sold by you, or for a thing entrusted to you with a mandate to return it, I shall have against you an action ex locato or ex vendito or mandati: but if I have given you money so that you might render to me what you owed under a testament or from a stipulation, there will be only the condictio for money given under that head. And Pomponius also writes this.
Si quid ex testamento solutum sit, quod postea falsum vel inofficiosum vel irritum vel ruptum apparuerit, repetetur, vel si post multum temporis emerserit aes alienum, vel codicilli diu celati prolati, qui ademptionem continent legatorum solutorum vel deminutionem per hoc, quia aliis quoque legata relicta sunt. nam divus hadrianus circa inofficiosum et falsum testamentum rescripsit actionem dandam ei, secundum quem de hereditate iudicatum est.
If anything has been paid from a testament which later has appeared false, or inofficious, or void or revoked, it shall be reclaimed; likewise if, after a long time, a debt has emerged, or codicils long concealed are produced, which contain the revocation of legacies that have been paid, or a diminution on that account, because legacies have also been left to others. For the deified Hadrian, concerning an inofficious and a false testament, issued a rescript that an action is to be given to the person in whose favor judgment about the inheritance has been rendered.
Idem est et si solutis legatis nova et inopinata causa hereditatem abstulit, veluti nato postumo, quem heres in utero fuisse ignorabat, vel etiam ab hostibus reverso filio, quem pater obisse falso praesumpserat: nam utiles actiones postumo vel filio, qui hereditatem evicerat, dari oportere in eos, qui legatum perceperunt, imperator titus antoninus rescripsit, scilicet quod bonae fidei possessor in quantum locupletior factus est tenetur nec periculum huiusmodi nominum ad eum, qui sine culpa solvit, pertinebit.
The same is the case also if, after the legacies have been paid, a new and unexpected cause has taken away the inheritance, as, for example, when a posthumous child is born, whom the heir did not know had been in the womb, or also when a son returns from the enemy, whom the father had falsely presumed to have died: for Emperor Titus Antoninus replied by rescript that useful actions ought to be given to the posthumous child or to the son who had recovered the inheritance, against those who received the legacy, namely that a possessor of good faith is held insofar as he has been made richer, and that the risk of claims of this sort will not pertain to him who paid without fault.
Nec novum, ut quod alius solverit alius repetat. nam et cum minor viginti quinque annis inconsulte adita hereditate solutis legatis in integrum restituitur, non ipsi repetitionem competere, sed ei, ad quem bona pertinent, arrio titiano rescriptum est.
Nor is it novel that what one person has paid another should reclaim. For even when a minor under twenty-five years, having imprudently entered upon an inheritance, is restored in integrum after the legacies have been paid, it has been rescripted to Arrius Titianus that the repetition (recovery) does not belong to him himself, but to the one to whom the goods pertain.
Si procurator tuus indebitum solverit et tu ratum non habeas, posse repeti labeo libris posteriorum scripsit: quod si debitum fuisset, non posse repeti celsus: ideo, quoniam, cum quis procuratorem rerum suarum constituit, id quoque mandare videtur, ut solvat creditori, neque postea exspectandum sit, ut ratum habeat.
If your procurator pays what was not owed (an indebite payment) and you do not hold it ratified, Labeo wrote in his Later Books that it can be reclaimed; but if it had been owed, Celsus [wrote] that it cannot be reclaimed: for this reason, since when someone appoints a procurator of his affairs, he also seems to mandate that he pay the creditor, and thereafter there is no need to wait for ratification by the principal.
Celsus ait eum, qui procuratori debitum solvit, continuo liberari neque ratihabitionem considerari: quod si indebitum acceperit, ideo exigi ratihabitionem, quoniam nihil de hoc nomine exigendo mandasse videretur, et ideo, si ratum non habeatur, a procuratore repetendum.
Celsus says that he who pays a debt to a procurator is released at once and no ratification is considered; but if he has received a not‑owed payment, then ratification is demanded, since he would seem to have mandated nothing about exacting under this title, and therefore, if it is not ratified, recovery is to be sought from the procurator.
Naturaliter etiam servus obligatur: et ideo, si quis nomine eius solvat vel ipse manumissus, ut pomponius scribit, ex peculio, cuius liberam administrationem habeat, repeti non poterit: et ob id et fideiussor pro servo acceptus tenetur et pignus pro eo datum tenebitur et, si servus, qui peculii administrationem habet, rem pignori in id quod debeat dederit, utilis pigneraticia reddenda est.
Naturally a slave also is bound: and therefore, if someone pays in his name, or he himself, having been manumitted, as Pomponius writes, pays out of the peculium of which he has free administration, it cannot be reclaimed: and on that account both a surety (fideiussor) taken for the slave is held, and a pledge given for him will be held, and, if a slave who has the administration of a peculium has given a thing in pledge for what he owes, a “useful” pigneratic action is to be afforded.
Indebiti soluti condictio naturalis est et ideo etiam quod rei solutae accessit, venit in condictionem, ut puta partus qui ex ancilla natus sit vel alluvione accessit: immo et fructus, quos is cui solutum est bona fide percepit, in condictionem venient.
The condiction of what was paid though not owed is natural, and therefore even that which has acceded to the thing paid comes into the condiction, for example offspring born from a handmaid or that which has acceded by alluvion; nay rather, even the fruits which the one to whom it was paid has in good faith taken will come into the condiction.
Sed et si nummi alieni dati sint, condictio competet. ut vel possessio eorum reddatur: quemadmodum si falso existimans possessionem me tibi debere alicuius rei tradidissem, condicerem. sed et si possessionem tuam fecissem ita, ut tibi per longi temporis praescriptionem avocari non possit, etiam sic recte tecum per indebitam condictionem agerem.
But even if someone else’s coins have been given, a condiction will lie, so that either the possession of them be restored: just as, if I had, falsely supposing that I owed you the possession of some thing, delivered it to you, I would bring a condiction. But even if I had made the possession yours in such a way that it cannot be removed from you by long-time prescription, even so I would rightly proceed with you by the condictio indebiti.
Quamvis debitum sibi quis recipiat, tamen si is qui dat non debitum dat, repetitio competit: veluti si is qui heredem se vel bonorum possessorem falso existimans creditori hereditario solverit: hic enim neque verus heres liberatus erit et is quod dedit repetere poterit: quamvis enim debitum sibi quis recipiat, tamen si is qui dat non debitum dat, repetitio competit.
Although someone receives what is owed to him, nevertheless if the one who gives gives what is not owed, a recovery lies: for example, if someone, falsely thinking himself to be the heir or the possessor of the estate, has paid an hereditary creditor: for here neither will the true heir be released, and he who paid will be able to recover what he gave: for although someone receives what is owed to him, nevertheless if the one who gives gives what is not owed, a recovery lies.
Plane si duos reos non eiusdem pecuniae, sed alterius obligationis constitueris, ut puta stichi aut pamphili, et pariter duos datos, aut togam vel denaria mille, non idem dici poterit in repetitione ut partes repetant, quia nec solvere ab initio sic potuerunt. igitur hoc casu electio est creditoris, cui velit solvere, ut alterius repetitio impediatur.
Clearly, if you have constituted two debtors not for the same money, but under a different obligation—say, for Stichus or for Pamphilus—and likewise two have been stipulated, either a toga or a thousand denarii, the same cannot be said upon repetition, namely that they recover in shares, since they could not from the outset pay in that way. Therefore, in this case the choice is the creditor’s, as to which he wishes to have performance made, so that the other’s repetition is impeded.
Eleganter pomponius quaerit, si quis suspicetur transactionem factam vel ab eo cui heres est vel ab eo cui procurator est et quasi ex transactione dederit, quae facta non est, an locus sit repetitioni. et ait repeti posse: ex falsa enim causa datum est. idem puto dicendum et si transactio secuta non fuerit, propter quam datum est: sed et si resoluta sit transactio, idem erit dicendum.
Elegantly Pomponius asks whether, if someone suspects that a settlement (transactio) was made either by him whose heir he is or by him whose procurator he is, and, as if on the basis of that settlement—which in fact was not made—he has given, whether there is room for repetition (recovery). And he says it can be reclaimed: for it was given on a false cause. I think the same must be said even if the settlement did not ensue, on account of which it was given; and likewise, if the settlement has been dissolved, the same is to be said.
Si post rem iudicatam quis transegerit et solverit, repetere poterit idcirco, quia placuit transactionem nullius esse momenti: hoc enim imperator antoninus cum divo patre suo rescripsit. retineri tamen atque compensari in causam iudicati, quod ob talem transactionem solutum est, potest. quid ergo si appellatum sit vel hoc ipsum incertum sit, an iudicatum sit vel an sententia valeat?
If, after a matter has been adjudged, someone has transacted and paid, he will be able to reclaim it, because it has been settled that a transaction is of no moment: for this the emperor antoninus, together with his deified father, wrote in a rescript. Nevertheless, what was paid on account of such a transaction can be retained and set off toward the judgment. What then if an appeal has been taken, or if this very point is uncertain, whether it has been adjudged, or whether the sentence is valid?
Si quis post transactionem nihilo minus condemnatus fuerit, dolo quidem id fit, sed tamen sententia valet. potuit autem quis, si quidem ante litem contestatam transegerit, volenti litem contestari opponere doli exceptionem: sed si post litem contestatam transactum est, nihilo minus poterit exceptione doli uti post secuti: dolo enim facit, qui contra transactionem expertus amplius petit. ideo condemnatus repetere potest, quod ex causa transactionis dedit.
If anyone, after a transaction (settlement), has nonetheless been condemned, this indeed happens by deceit, yet the sentence (judgment) stands. However, a person could, if he settled before the suit was contested (before litis contestatio), oppose to one willing to contest the suit the exception of deceit (exceptio doli); but if the settlement was made after the suit was contested, nonetheless he will be able to use the exception of deceit afterwards: for he acts by deceit who, contrary to the transaction, having proceeded, demands more. Therefore, once condemned, he can recover what he gave by reason of the transaction.
indeed, to be sure, he gave on account of a cause, and what has been given on account of a cause is not usually reclaimed if the cause has followed; but here the cause does not seem to have followed, since the settlement is not abided by. therefore, when repetition (recovery) arises, the exception of the settlement has no place: for both ought not to have place—both the repetition and the exception.
Cum duo pro reo fideiussissent decem, deinde reus tria solvisset et postea fideiussores quina, placuit eum qui posterior solvit repetere tria posse: hoc merito, quia tribus a reo solutis septem sola debita supererant, quibus persolutis tria indebita soluta sunt.
When two had stood surety for the defendant for 10, then the defendant paid 3, and afterwards the sureties 5 each, it was held that the one who paid later can recover 3; rightly so, because with 3 paid by the defendant only 7 remained owed, and when these had been paid in full, 3 not owed were paid.
Si non sortem quis, sed usuras indebitas solvit, repetere non poterit, si sortis debitae solvit: sed si supra legitimum modum solvit, divus severus rescripsit ( quo iure utimur) repeti quidem non posse, sed sorti imputandum et, si postea sortem solvit, sortem quasi indebitam repeti posse. proinde et si ante sors fuerit soluta, usurae supra legitimum modum solutae quasi sors indebita repetuntur. quid si simul solverit?
If someone did not pay the principal (sors), but paid usury not owed, he will not be able to recover it, if he paid the principal that was owed; but if he paid above the lawful measure, the deified Severus issued a rescript (whose law we use) that it indeed cannot be recovered, but must be imputed to the principal, and, if afterwards he pays the principal, the principal can be recovered as if not owed. Accordingly, even if earlier the principal has been paid, usury paid above the lawful measure is recovered as if undue principal. What if he pays them at the same time?
Si centum debens, quasi ducenta deberem, fundum ducentorum solvi, competere repetitionem Marcellus libro vicensimo digestorum scribit et centum manere stipulationem: licet enim placuit rem pro pecunia solutam parere liberationem, tamen si ex falsa debiti quantitate maioris pretii res soluta est, non fit confusio partis rei cum pecunia ( nemo enim invitus compellitur ad communionem), sed et condictio integrae rei manet et obligatio incorrupta: ager autem retinebitur, donec debita pecunia solvatur.
If, owing one hundred, as though I were owing two hundred, I paid a farm of the value of two hundred, Marcellus writes in the twentieth book of the Digest that a repetition is available and that the stipulation for one hundred remains: for although it has been agreed that a thing paid in lieu of money produces liberation, nevertheless, if by a false estimate of the amount of the debt a thing of greater price has been paid, there is no confusion of a part of the thing with the money ( nemo enim invitus compellitur ad communionem), but both the condiction for the entire thing remains and the obligation uncorrupted: however, the field will be retained until the owed money is paid.
Adeo autem perpetua exceptio parit condictionem, ut iulianus libro decimo scripsit, si emptor fundi damnaverit heredem suum, ut venditorem nexu venditi liberaret, mox venditor ignorans rem tradiderit, posse eum fundum condicere: idemque et si debitorem suum damnaverit liberare et ille ignorans solverit.
Moreover, to such an extent does a perpetual exception beget a condictio, that Julian, in the tenth book, wrote: if the buyer of an estate has bound his heir to release the seller from the bond (nexus) of the sale, and then the seller, unaware, has delivered the thing, he can bring a condictio for the land; and the same holds if he has bound his debtor to release him, and that man, unaware, has paid.
Libertus cum se putaret operas patrono debere, solvit: condicere eum non posse, quamvis putans se obligatum solvit, iulianus libro decimo digestorum scripsit: natura enim operas patrono libertus debet. sed et si non operae patrono sunt solutae, sed, cum officium ab eo desideraretur, cum patrono decidit pecunia et solvit, repetere non potest. sed si operas patrono exhibuit non officiales, sed fabriles, veluti pictorias vel alias, dum putat se debere, videndum an possit condicere.
When a freedman, thinking that he owed services to his patron, paid, Julianus wrote in the tenth book of the Digesta that he cannot bring a condiction, although he paid thinking himself obligated; for by nature the freedman owes services to his patron. But also if the services were not rendered to the patron, but, when officium was being demanded from him, he reached a monetary settlement with the patron and paid, he cannot recover. But if he rendered to the patron not officium-type services, but fabril (craftsman’s) services, for example painting or others, while supposing himself to owe them, it is to be considered whether he can bring a condiction.
and Celsus, in the sixth book of the Digest, thinks this to be the causa of services, that they are neither the same, nor of the same man, nor rendered to the same person: for very often the vigor of a man, the age of time, and natural opportuneness change the causa of services, and therefore not even one who is willing can render them. but these services, he says, admit of aestimation: and sometimes, he says, although we furnish one thing, we sue for another: for example, I gave a farm (estate) not owed and I sue for the fruits; or a person (slave) not owed, and you, without fraud, sold him for a small price—surely you must refund only what you have from the price; or I made a person more valuable at my expense—must not these things be appraised? so too, in the case proposed, he says, it is possible to sue by condictio, for as much as I would have hired the services.
but if the official services have been refused by the patron, the question is raised with Marcellus in the twentieth book of the Digest. and Marcellus says that he is not held liable, unless perhaps they are in a craft (for these, at the patron’s order, are to be rendered even to another): but if a delegate has discharged the official services, he cannot bring a condictio either against the creditor to whom he paid, to whom payment was made in contemplation of another and who receives what is his own, nor against the patron, because by nature they are owed to him.
Si decem aut stichum stipulatus solvam quinque, quaeritur, an possim condicere: quaestio ex hoc descendit, an liberer in quinque: nam si liberor, cessat condictio, si non liberor, erit condictio. placuit autem, ut celsus libro sexto et Marcellus libro vicensimo digestorum scripsit, non peremi partem dimidiam obligationis ideoque eum, qui quinque solvit, in pendenti habendum, an liberaretur, petique ab eo posse reliqua quinque aut stichum et, si praestiterit residua quinque, videri eum et priora debita solvisse, si autem stichum praestitisset, quinque eum posse condicere quasi indebita. sic posterior solutio comprobabit, priora quinque utrum debita an indebita solverentur.
If, having stipulated for ten or for Stichus, I pay five, the question is asked whether I can bring a condiction: the question descends from this, whether I am released as to five; for if I am released, the condiction ceases; if I am not released, there will be a condiction. It has been decided, as Celsus in Book 6 and Marcellus in Book 20 of the Digesta wrote, that I do not extinguish one half of the obligation, and therefore he who has paid five is to be held in suspense as to whether he is released, and the remaining five or Stichus can be demanded from him; and, if he should furnish the remaining five, he is considered also to have paid the earlier debt; but if he should furnish Stichus, he can bring a condiction for the five as if not owed. Thus the later performance will confirm whether the earlier five were paid as owed or as not owed.
But also, if after the five have been paid and Stichus is delivered, and I should prefer to keep the five and return Stichus, whether I ought to be heard, Celsus inquires. And he thinks that a condiction for the five has arisen, although, if both were performed at the same time, a discretion would be given to me of retaining whichever I wished.
Idem ait et si duo heredes sint stipulatoris, non posse alteri quinque solutis alteri partem stichi solvi: idem et si duo sint promissoris heredes. secundum quae liberatio non contingit, nisi aut utrique quina aut utrique partes stichi fuerunt solutae.
He likewise says that, if there are two heirs of the stipulator, it is not possible, with five having been paid to the one, for a part of Stichus to be paid to the other; the same holds if there are two heirs of the promissor. According to which, discharge does not occur unless either five apiece have been paid to both, or parts of Stichus to both.
Interdum persona locum facit repetitioni, ut puta si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate vel furiosus vel is cui bonis interdictum est solverit: nam in his personis generaliter repetitioni locum esse non ambigitur. et si quidem exstant nummi, vindicabuntur, consumptis vero condictio locum habebit.
Sometimes the status of the person gives occasion for repetition, for instance if a ward without the guardian’s authority, or a madman, or one interdicted from his goods, has paid: for in these persons it is generally not doubted that there is room for repetition. And if the coins are still extant, they will be vindicated; but if consumed, a condictio will have place.
Fideiussor cum paciscitur, ne ab eo pecunia petatur, et per imprudentiam solverit, condicere stipulatori poterit et ideo reus quidem manet obligatus, ipse autem sua exceptione tutus est. nihil autem interest, fideiussor an heres eius solvat: quod si huic fideiussori reus heres extiterit et solverit, nec repetet et liberabitur.
When a surety stipulates by agreement that money is not to be sought from him, and through inadvertence he has paid, he will be able to bring a condiction against the stipulator; and therefore the principal debtor indeed remains obligated, but he himself is protected by his own exception. Moreover, it makes no difference whether the surety or his heir pays; but if the principal debtor has become the heir of this surety and pays, he will not recover and will be released.
Si in area tua aedificassem et tu aedes possideres, condictio locum non habebit, quia nullum negotium inter nos contraheretur: nam is, qui non debitam pecuniam solverit, hoc ipso aliquid negotii gerit: cum autem aedificium in area sua ab alio positum dominus occupat, nullum negotium contrahit. sed et si is, qui in aliena area aedificasset, ipse possessionem tradidisset, condictionem non habebit, quia nihil accipientis faceret, sed suam rem dominus habere incipiat. et ideo constat, si quis, cum existimaret se heredem esse, insulam hereditariam fulsisset, nullo alio modo quam per retentionem impensas servare posse.
If on your building-plot I had built and you possessed the house, the condiction will have no place, because no transaction would be contracted between us: for he who has paid money not owed, by that very fact conducts some business; but when the owner occupies a building set on his own plot by another, he contracts no transaction. But even if the one who had built on another’s plot himself had delivered possession, he will not have a condiction, because he would do nothing of the recipient’s, but the owner begins to have his own thing. And therefore it is agreed that if someone, when he supposed himself to be heir, had propped up an apartment-block of the inheritance, he is able to preserve his expenses in no other way than through retention.
Is cui hereditas tota per fideicommissum relicta est et praeterea fundus, si decem dedisset heredi, et heres suspectam hereditatem dixerit et eam ex trebelliano restituerit, causam dandae pecuniae non habet, et ideo quod eo nomine quasi implendae condicionis gratia dederit, condictione repetet.
He to whom the whole inheritance has been left by fideicommiss, and, besides, a farm—if he had given ten to the heir—and the heir has declared the inheritance suspect and has restored it under the Trebellian, has no cause for giving the money; and therefore what he gave under that title, as if for the sake of fulfilling the condition, he will recover by condiction.
Servus cuiusdam insciente domino magidem commodavit: is cui commodaverat pignori eam posuit et fugit: qui accepit non aliter se redditurum aiebat, quam si pecuniam accepisset: accepit a servulo et reddidit magidem: quaesitum est, an pecunia ab eo repeti possit. respondit, si is qui pignori accepisset magidem alienam scit apud se pignori deponi, furti eum se obligasse ideoque, si pecuniam a servulo accepisset redimendi furti causa, posse repeti: sed si nescisset alienam apud se deponi, non esse furem, item, si pecunia eius nomine, a quo pignus acceperat, a servo ei soluta esset, non posse ab eo repeti.
A certain man’s slave, his master being unaware, loaned a dish for use; the one to whom he had loaned it put it in pledge and fled; the person who had received it said he would not return it otherwise than if he received money; he took money from the slave‑boy and returned the dish: the question was asked whether the money could be reclaimed from him. He answered that if the one who had accepted the dish in pledge knew that another’s dish was being deposited with him as a pledge, he had obligated himself for theft and therefore, if he had received money from the slave‑boy for the purpose of redeeming the theft, it can be reclaimed; but if he did not know that another’s property was being deposited with him, he is not a thief; likewise, if the money, in the name of the one from whom he had accepted the pledge, had been paid to him by the slave, it cannot be reclaimed from him.
Frater a fratre, cum in eiusdem potestate essent, pecuniam mutuatus post mortem patris ei solvit: quaesitum est, an repetere possit. respondit utique quidem pro ea parte, qua ipse patri heres exstitisset, repetiturum, pro ea vero, qua frater heres exstiterit, ita repetiturum, si non minus ex peculio suo ad fratrem pervenisset: naturalem enim obligationem quae fuisset hoc ipso sublatam videri, quod peculii partem frater sit consecutus, adeo ut, si praelegatum filio eidemque debitori id fuisset, deductio huius debiti a fratre ex eo fieret. idque maxime consequens esse ei sententiae, quam iulianus probaret, si extraneo quid debuisset et ab eo post mortem patris exactum esset, tantum iudicio eum familiae herciscundae reciperaturum a coheredibus fuisse, quantum ab his creditor actione de peculio consequi potuisset.
A brother, having borrowed money from his brother while they were under the same potestas, paid it to him after the father’s death: the question was asked whether he can recover it. He answered that, certainly, as to that share in which he himself had become heir to the father, he will recover; but as to the share in which the brother has become heir, he will recover on this footing, if not less from his own peculium had come to the brother: for the natural obligation which had existed seems by that very fact to be removed, that the brother has obtained a portion of the peculium, to such an extent that, if it had been praelegated to the son, who is also the debtor, the deduction of this debt would be made by the brother out of that. And this is most consistent with the opinion which Julian approved: if he had owed something to a stranger and it had been exacted by him after the father’s death, he would by the action for partition of the family estate (familiae herciscundae) recover from his coheirs only so much as the creditor could have obtained from them by the action de peculio.
therefore even if, with the matter still intact (re integra), an action for dividing the inheritance (familiae herciscundae) is brought, it is equitable that the peculium be divided in such a way that, up to its amount, he be held harmless by the coheir; furthermore, the one whom it is proper to defend against a stranger must, far more, be held harmless in that which he would have owed to his brother.
Quaesitum est, si pater filio crediderit isque emancipatus solvat, an repetere possit. respondit, si nihil ex peculio apud patrem remanserit, non repetiturum: nam manere naturalem obligationem argumento esse, quod extraneo agente intra annum de peculio deduceret pater, quod sibi filius debuisset.
It was asked whether, if a father has lent to his son and he, after being emancipated, pays, he can recover it. He answered: if nothing of the peculium has remained with the father, he will not recover; for it is an argument that the natural obligation remains, that, if a stranger were suing within a year, the father would deduct from the peculium what the son had owed to himself.
Contra si pater quod filio debuisset eidem emancipato solverit, non repetet: nam hic quoque manere naturalem obligationem eodem argumento probatur, quod, si extraneus intra annum de peculio agat, etiam quod pater ei debuisset computetur. eademque erunt et si extraneus heres exheredato filio solverit id, quod ei pater debuisset.
Conversely, if a father has paid to that same son, emancipated, what he would have owed to the son, he will not reclaim: for here too it is proved by the same argument that the natural obligation remains, because, if a stranger within a year brings an action de peculio, even that which the father would have owed to him is computed. And the same will hold if an extraneous heir pays to a disinherited son that which the father would have owed to him.
Qui exceptionem perpetuam habet, solutum per errorem repetere potest: sed hoc non est perpetuum. nam si quidem eius causa exceptio datur cum quo agitur, solutum repetere potest, ut accidit in senatus consulto de intercessionibus: ubi vero in odium eius cui debetur exceptio datur, perperam solutum non repetitur, veluti si filius familias contra macedonianum mutuam pecuniam acceperit et pater familias factus solverit, non repetit.
He who has a perpetual exception can recover what was paid by mistake: but this is not universal. For if indeed the exception is given for the sake of the one with whom suit is brought, he can recover what was paid, as happens in the senatorial decree on intercessions; but where the exception is given in hostility to him to whom it is owed, a wrongly paid sum is not recovered, as for instance if a son under paternal power has received money as a loan contrary to the Macedonian decree and, having become pater familias, has paid, he does not recover.
Si pars domus, quae in diem per fideicommissum relicta est, arserit ante diem fideicommissi cedentem et eam heres sua impensa refecerit, deducendam esse impensam ex fideicommisso constat et, si sine deductione domum tradiderit, posse incerti condici, quasi plus debito dederit.
If a part of a house, which has been left by fideicommissum to take effect on a certain day, has burned before the day on which the fideicommissum vests, and the heir has restored it at his own expense, it is established that the expense is to be deducted from the fideicommissum; and, if he has delivered the house without the deduction, a condictio incerti can be brought, as though he had given more than was due.
Indebitam pecuniam per errorem promisisti: eam qui pro te fideiusserat solvit. ego existimo, si nomine tuo solverit fideiussor, te fideiussori, stipulatorem tibi obligatum fore: nec exspectandum est, ut ratum habeas, quoniam potes videri id ipsum mandasse, ut tuo nomine solveretur: sin autem fideiussor suo nomine solverit quod non debebat, ipsum a stipulatore repetere posse, quoniam indebitam iure gentium pecuniam solvit: quo minus autem consequi poterit ab eo cui solvit, a te mandati iudicio consecuturum, si modo per ignorantiam petentem exceptione non summoverit.
You promised money not owed through error: the one who had gone surety for you paid it. I think that, if the surety paid in your name, you will be bound to the surety, and the stipulator will be bound to you; nor is it necessary to wait for you to ratify, since you can be seen to have given that very mandate, that payment be made in your name. But if the surety paid in his own name what he did not owe, he himself can reclaim it from the stipulator, since he paid money not owed by the law of nations; and whatever he is less able to obtain from the person to whom he paid, he will obtain from you by an action on mandate—provided only that he has not repelled the claimant, suing in ignorance, by an exception (defense).
Damus aut ob causam aut ob rem: ob causam praeteritam, veluti cum ideo do, quod aliquid a te consecutus sum vel quia aliquid a te factum est, ut, etiamsi falsa causa sit, repetitio eius pecuniae non sit: ob rem vero datur, ut aliquid sequatur, quo non sequente repetitio competit.
We give either on account of a cause or on account of a thing: on account of a past cause, for example when I give for this reason, that I have obtained something from you or because something has been done by you, so that, even if the cause is false, there is no repetition of that money; but it is given on account of a thing, so that something may follow, and if that does not follow, repetition is available.
Dominus testamento servo suo libertatem dedit, si decem det: servo ignorante id testamentum non valere data sunt mihi decem: quaeritur, quis repetere potest. proculus respondit: si ipse servus peculiares nummos dedit, cum ei a domino id permissum non esset, manent nummi domini eosque non per condictionem, sed in rem actione petere debet. si autem alius rogatu servi suos nummos dedit, facti sunt mei eosque dominus servi, cuius nomine dati sunt, per condictionem petere potest: sed tam benignius quam utilius est recta via ipsum qui nummos dedit suum recipere.
By his testament the master gave his slave liberty, if he should give ten: the slave, not knowing that that testament was not valid, ten were given to me: the question is, who can recover. Proculus responded: if the slave himself gave coins of his peculium, when this had not been permitted to him by the master, the coins remain the master’s, and he ought to demand them not by condiction, but by an action in rem. But if another, at the slave’s request, gave his own coins, they became mine, and the master of the slave, in whose name they were given, can demand them by condiction: but both more benignly and more usefully it is the straight way that the very one who gave the coins should recover what is his.
Si urbana praedia locaverit praedo, quod mercedis nomine ceperit, ab eo qui solvit non repetetur, sed domino erit obligatus. idemque iuris erit in vecturis navium, quas ipse locaverit aut exercuerit, item mercedibus servorum, quorum operae per ipsum fuerint locatae. nam si servus non locatus mercedem ut domino praedoni rettulit, non fiet accipientis pecunia.
If a robber has leased out urban estates, what he has taken under the name of rent shall not be recovered from the one who paid, but he will be bound to the owner. And the same law will obtain in the freight-charges of ships, which he himself has leased or has operated, likewise in the hire-wages of slaves, whose services have been let out through him. For if a slave not hired out has rendered the wage to the robber as to his master, it will not become the recipient’s money.
but if he has received the freights of ships which the owner had leased out, likewise the rents of the insulae, he will be held liable on account of an undue (payment) to the one who has not been released by his paying. therefore what is commonly said—that fruits can be recovered by condiction from the robber—has a place then, when they were the owner’s fruits.
Sufficit ad causam indebiti incertum esse, temporaria sit an perpetua exceptionis defensio. nam si qui, ne conveniatur, donec titius consul fiat, paciscatur, quia potest titio decedente perpetua fieri exceptio, quae ad tempus est titio consulatum ineunte, summa ratione dicetur, quod interim solvitur, repeti: ut enim pactum, quod in tempus certum collatum est, non magis inducit condictionem, quam si ex die debitor solvit, ita prorsum defensio iuris, quae causam incertam habet, condictionis instar optinet.
It suffices for the action for a not‑owed payment that it be uncertain whether the defense by exception is temporary or perpetual. For if someone, so that he not be sued, should make a pact until Titius becomes consul, since the exception which is for a time—until Titius enters upon the consulship—can become perpetual if Titius dies, with the best reason it will be said that what is paid in the meantime may be reclaimed. For just as a pact that is referred to a fixed term no more induces a condiction than if a debtor under a term pays before the day, so likewise a defense in law that has an uncertain basis has the effect of a condiction.
Creditor, ut procuratori suo debitum redderetur, mandavit: maiore pecunia soluta procurator indebiti causa convenietur: quod si nominatim, ut maior pecunia solveretur, delegavit, indebiti cum eo qui delegavit erit actio, quae non videtur perempta, si frustra cum procuratore lis fuerit instituta.
The creditor mandated that the debt be repaid to his procurator: if a greater sum was paid, the procurator will be sued on account of the not‑owed (indebitum): but if he specifically delegated that a greater sum be paid, the action for the not‑owed will be with the one who delegated, which is not considered extinguished if a suit has been instituted in vain against the procurator.
Si fideiussor iure liberatus solverit errore pecuniam, repetenti non oberit: si vero reus promittendi per errorem et ipse postea pecuniam solverit, non repetet, cum prior solutio, quae fuit irrita, naturale vinculum non dissolvit, nec civile, si reus promittendi tenebatur.
If a surety, lawfully released, should pay the money by mistake, it will not prejudice the one reclaiming it; but if the defendant-promisor, through mistake, himself thereafter pays the money, he will not recover, since the prior payment, which was ineffectual, did not dissolve the natural bond, nor the civil one, if the defendant-promisor was bound.
Iulianus verum debitorem post litem contestatam manente adhuc iudicio negabat solventem repetere posse, quia nec absolutus nec condemnatus repetere posset: licet enim absolutus sit, natura tamen debitor permanet: similemque esse ei dicit, qui ita promisit, sive navis ex asia venerit sive non venerit, quia ex una causa alterius solutionis origo proficiscitur.
Julian denied that a true debtor, after issue had been joined and with the proceeding still pending, could, upon paying, recover (by repetition), because neither, if absolved nor if condemned, could he recover: for although he be absolved, by nature he remains a debtor; and he says it is similar to the case of one who thus promised, whether the ship has come from Asia or has not come, because from a single cause the origin of either payment proceeds.
Ubi autem quis quod pure debet sub condicione novandi animo promisit, plerique putant pendente novatione solutum repetere posse, quia ex qua obligatione solvat, adhuc incertum sit: idemque esse etiam, si diversas personas ponas eandem pecuniam pure et sub condicione novandi animo promisisse. sed hoc dissimile est: in stipulatione enim pura et condicionali eundem debiturum certum est.
Where, however, someone, as to what he purely owes, has promised under a condition with the intention of novating, most think that, while the novation is pending, he can reclaim what has been paid, because it is still uncertain from which obligation he pays; and that it is the same even if you suppose different persons to have promised the same money, one purely and the other under a condition with the intention of novating. But this is dissimilar: for in a pure and a conditional stipulation it is certain that the same person will be debtor.
Tutores pupilli quibusdam creditoribus patris ex patrimonio paterno solverunt, sed postea non sufficientibus bonis pupillum abstinuerunt: quaeritur, an quod amplius creditoribus per tutores pupilli solutum est vel totum quod acceperunt restituere debeant. respondi, si nihil dolo factum esset, tutori quidem vel pupillo non deberi, creditoribus autem aliis in id, quod amplius sui debiti solutum est, teneri.
The guardians of a ward paid, to certain creditors of the father, out of the paternal patrimony; but afterward, the assets being insufficient, they caused the ward to abstain: it is asked whether the creditors ought to restore what was paid to them in excess by the ward’s guardians, or the whole that they received. I answered that, if nothing was done by fraud, nothing is owed to the guardian or to the ward; but other creditors may hold those creditors liable to the extent that more than their own debt was paid.
Neratius casum refert, ut quis id quod solverit repetere non possit, quasi debitum dederit, nec tamen liberetur: velut si is, qui cum certum hominem deberet, statuliberum dederit: nam ideo eum non liberari, quod non in plenum stipulatoris hominem fecerit, nec tamen repetere eum posse, quod debitum dederit.
Neratius reports a case, namely, that someone cannot recover what he has paid, as if he had given it as a debt, and yet is not released: for example, if one who, when he owed a specific person (a certain slave), gave a statuliber (a slave to be freed upon a condition); for he is therefore not released, because he has not made the stipulator’s man into full ownership, and yet he cannot recover it, because he gave what was owed.
Si quod dominus servo debuit, manumisso solvit, quamvis existimans ei aliqua teneri actione, tamen repetere non poterit, quia naturale adgnovit debitum: ut enim libertas naturali iure continetur et dominatio ex gentium iure introducta est, ita debiti vel non debiti ratio in condictione naturaliter intellegenda est.
If a master pays, to a manumitted slave, what he had owed to the slave, although supposing himself to be held to him by some action, nevertheless he will not be able to recover it, because he acknowledged a natural debt: for just as liberty is contained under natural law and dominion was introduced by the law of nations, so the rationale of “owed” or “not owed” in the condictio is to be understood naturally.
Et quidem quod transactionis nomine datur, licet res nulla media fuerit, non repetitur: nam si lis fuit, hoc ipsum, quod a lite disceditur, causa videtur esse. sin autem evidens calumnia detegitur et transactio imperfecta est, repetitio dabitur.
And indeed what is given under the name of a settlement, even though no intervening matter existed, is not recoverable: for if there was a suit, this very fact—that one departs from the suit—seems to be the cause. But if evident calumny is detected and the settlement is imperfect, recovery will be granted.
Sed agere per condictionem propter condicionem legati vel hereditatis, sive non sit mihi legatum sive ademptum legatum, possum, ut repetam quod dedi, quoniam non contrahendi animo dederim, quia causa, propter quam dedi, non est secuta. idem et si hereditatem adire nolui vel non potui. non idem potest dici, si servus meus sub condicione heres institutus sit et ego dedero, deinde manumissus adierit: nam hoc casu secuta res est.
But I can proceed by condictio on account of the condition of a legacy or of an inheritance, whether no legacy has been left to me or the legacy has been taken away, so that I may reclaim what I gave, since I gave not with an intent to contract, because the cause on account of which I gave did not ensue. The same [holds] also if I did not wish, or was not able, to enter upon the inheritance. The same cannot be said if my slave was instituted heir under a condition and I gave, and then, after being manumitted, he entered upon it: for in this case the event ensued.
Stichus testamento eius, quem dominum suum arbitrabatur, libertate accepta, si decem annis ex die mortis annuos decem heredibus praestitisset, per octo annos praefinitam quantitatem ut iussus erat dedit, postmodum se ingenuum comperit nec reliquorum annorum dedit et pronuntiatus est ingenuus: quaesitum est, an pecuniam, quam heredibus dedit, ut indebitam datam repetere et qua actione possit. respondit, si eam pecuniam dedit, quae neque ex operis suis neque ex re eius, cui bona fide serviebat, quaesita sit, posse repeti.
Stichus, by the testament of him whom he supposed to be his master, having received liberty on condition that for ten years from the day of death he should furnish ten each year to the heirs, for eight years gave the pre‑fixed amount as he had been ordered; afterward he discovered himself to be freeborn and did not give for the remaining years, and he was pronounced freeborn: it was asked whether he may reclaim as not‑due the money which he gave to the heirs, and by what action he might. He answered that, if he gave money which had been acquired neither from his own services nor from the property of him whom he was serving in good faith, it can be recovered.
Titius cum multos creditores haberet, in quibus et seium, bona sua privatim facta venditione maevio concessit, ut satis creditoribus faceret: sed maevius solvit pecuniam seio tamquam debitam, quae iam a titio fuerat soluta: quaesitum est, cum postea repperiantur apochae apud titium debitorem partim solutae pecuniae, cui magis repetitio pecuniae indebitae solutae competit, titio debitori an maevio, qui in rem suam procurator factus est. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur ei, qui postea solvisset.
Titius, when he had many creditors, among whom also seius, by a sale made privately conveyed his goods to maevius, in order to satisfy the creditors: but maevius paid money to seius as if owed, which had already been paid by titius: the question was asked, when later receipts (apochae) are found with titius the debtor for part of the money paid, to whom does the repetition of money not owed but paid more properly belong, to titius the debtor or to maevius, who was made a procurator in his own interest. he answered: according to the things that were proposed, to the one who had paid later.
Lucius titius gaio seio minori annis viginti quinque pecuniam certam credidit et ab eo aliquantum usurarum nomine accepi, et gaii seii minoris heres adversus publium maevium a praeside provinciae in integrum restitutus est, ne debitum hereditarium solveret, et nec quicquam de usuris eiusdem sortis, quas seius minor annis viginti quinque exsolveret, repetendis tractatum apud praesidem aut ab eo est pronuntiatum: quaero, an usuras, quas gaius seius minor annis viginti quinque quoad viveret creditori exsolveret, heres eius repetere possit. respondit secundum ea quae proponerentur condici id, quod usurarum nomine defunctus solvisset, non posse. item quaero, si existimes repeti non posse, an ex alio debito heres retinere eas possit.
Lucius Titius lent a determinate sum of money to Gaius Seius, a minor under twenty-five years, and from him he received some amount under the name of interest; and the heir of Gaius Seius the minor was restored in integrum by the provincial praeses against Publius Maevius, so that he should not pay the hereditary debt; and nothing about reclaiming the interest on the same principal, which Seius, a minor under twenty-five years, had paid out, was argued before the praeses or pronounced by him: I ask whether the heir can recover the interest which Gaius Seius, a minor under twenty-five years, paid out to the creditor so long as he lived. He responded that, according to the matters proposed, that which the deceased had paid under the name of interest could not be condicted (recovered by condiction). Likewise I ask, if you think it cannot be reclaimed, whether the heir can retain them from another debt.
Si fullo vestimenta lavanda conduxerit, deinde amissis eis domino pretium ex locato conventus praestiterit posteaque dominus invenerit vestimenta, qua actione debeat consequi pretium quod dedit? et ait cassius eum non solum ex conducto agere, verum condicere domino posse: ego puto ex conducto omnimodo eum habere actionem: an autem et condicere possit, quaesitum est, quia non indebitum dedit: nisi forte quasi sine causa datum sic putamus condici posse: etenim vestimentis inventis quasi sine causa datum videtur.
If a fuller has taken on garments to be washed under hire, then, the garments having been lost, has paid to the owner the price agreed under the locatio, and afterward the owner has found the garments, by what action ought he to recover the price that he gave? And Cassius says that he can not only sue ex conducto, but indeed can also bring a condictio against the owner. I think that in every way he has the action ex conducto; but whether he can also bring a condictio has been questioned, because he did not give something not due: unless perhaps we think it can be condicted as though given sine causa; for indeed, with the garments found, it seems to have been given as if without cause.
Qui sine causa obligantur, incerti condictione consequi possunt ut liberentur: nec refert, omnem quis obligationem sine causa suscipiat an maiorem quam suscipere eum oportuerit, nisi quod alias condictione id agitur, ut omni obligatione liberetur, alias ut exoneretur: veluti qui decem promisit, nam si quidem nullam causam promittendi habuit, incerti condictione consequitur, ut tota stipulatio accepto fiat, at si, cum quinque promittere deberet, decem promisit, incerti consequetur, ut quinque liberetur.
Those who are obligated without cause can obtain by the condictio incerti to be set free; and it makes no difference whether one undertakes an obligation wholly without cause or one greater than he ought to have undertaken, except that in one case by the condictio the aim is that he be freed from every obligation, in another that he be relieved: for example, one who has promised ten; for if indeed he had no cause for promising, he obtains by the condictio incerti that the whole stipulation be discharged by acceptilation; but if, when he ought to have promised five, he promised ten, he will obtain by the condictio incerti that he be freed as to five.
Avunculo nuptura pecuniam in dotem dedit neque nupsit: an eandem repetere possit, quaesitum est. dixi, cum ob turpem causam dantis et accipientis pecunia numeretur, cessare condictionem et in delicto pari potiorem esse possessorem: quam rationem fortassis aliquem secutum respondere non habituram mulierem condictionem: sed recte defendi non turpem causam in proposito quam nullam fuisse, cum pecunia quae daretur in dotem converti nequiret: non enim stupri, sed matrimonii gratia datam esse.
About to marry her maternal uncle, she gave money as a dowry and did not marry: the question was asked whether she could recover the same. I said that, when money is paid on account of a shameful cause on the part of both giver and receiver, the condiction does not lie, and, in equal delict, the possessor has the stronger position. Following this reasoning, someone perhaps would answer that the woman would not have a condiction. But it is rightly maintained that in the case proposed the cause was not shameful, but rather none, since the money that was to be given could not be converted into a dowry: for it was given not for stuprum (illicit intercourse), but for the sake of matrimony.
Noverca privigno, nurus socero pecuniam dotis nomine dedit neque nupsit. cessare condictio prima facie videtur, quoniam iure gentium incestum committitur: atquin vel magis in ea specie nulla causa dotis dandae fuit, condictio igitur competit.
A stepmother to a stepson, a daughter-in-law to a father-in-law, gave money under the name of a dowry and did not marry. the condictio seems to cease prima facie, since by the law of nations incest is committed: but rather, all the more in that case there was no cause for giving a dowry, therefore the condictio is available.