Augustine: DE TRINITATE

[I 1] Hinc iam exordiens ea dicere quae dici ut cogitantur uel ab homine aliquo uel certe a nobis non omni modo possunt, quamuis et ipsa nostra cogitatio cum de deo trinitate cogitamus longe se illi de quo cogitat imparem sentiat neque ut est eum capiat sed, ut scriptum est etiam a tantis quantum Paulus apostolus hic erat, per speculum in aenigmate uideatur, primum ab ipso domino deo nostro de quo semper cogitare debemus et de quo digne cogitare non possumus, cui laudando reddenda est omni tempore benedictio et cui enuntiando nulla competit dictio, et adiutorium ad intellegenda atque explicanda quae intendo et ueniam precor sicubi offendo. Memor enim sum non solum uoluntatis uerum etiam infirmitatis meae. Ab his etiam qui ista lecturi sunt ut ignoscant peto ubi me magis uoluisse quam potuisse dicere aduerterint quod uel ipsi melius intellegunt uel propter mei eloquii difficultatem non intellegunt, sicut ego eis ignosco ubi propter suam tarditatem intellegere non possunt.

[1 1] From here now beginning to say those things which, as they are thought, cannot in every way be said either by some man or certainly by us, although our very cogitation, when we cogitate about God the Trinity, feels itself far unequal to Him of whom it thinks, nor grasps Him as He is, but, as it is written even by one so great as the Apostle Paul here, is seen through a mirror in an enigma, first from the Lord God Himself—of whom we ought always to think and of whom we cannot think worthily, to whom in lauding blessing is to be rendered at every time and for enunciating whom no diction is fitting—both aid for understanding and explicating the things I intend, and pardon I pray for wherever I offend. For I am mindful not only of my will but also of my infirmity. From those also who are going to read these things I ask that they forgive where they shall have noticed me to have wished rather than to have been able to say what either they themselves understand better, or do not understand on account of the difficulty of my elocution, just as I forgive them where, because of their own tardity, they cannot understand.

[2] Facilius autem nobis inuicem ignoscimus si nouerimus aut certe credendo firmum tenuerimus ea quae de natura incommutabili et inuisibili summeque uiuente ac sibi sufficiente dicuntur non ex consuetudine uisibilium atque mutabilium et mortalium uel egenarum rerum esse metienda. Sed cum in his etiam quae nostris corporalibus adiacent sensibus uel quod nos ipsi in interiore homine sumus scientia comprehendendis laboremus nec sufficiamus, non tamen impudenter in illa quae supra sunt diuina et ineffabilia pietas fidelis ardescit, non quam suarum uirium inflat arrogantia sed quam gratia ipsius creatoris et saluatoris inflammat. Nam quo intellectu homo deum capit qui ipsum intellectum suum quo eum uult capere nondum capit?

[2] We more easily forgive one another if we have known, or at least have held firmly by believing, that the things said about the incommutable and invisible nature, supremely living and self‑sufficient, are not to be measured by the custom of visible and mutable and mortal or needy things. But since even in those things which are adjacent to our bodily senses, or in what we ourselves are in the inner man, we toil to have them comprehended by knowledge and are not sufficient, nevertheless faithful piety does not immodestly blaze toward those divine and ineffable things that are above—not a blaze which the arrogance of its own powers inflates, but one which the grace of the Creator and Savior himself inflames. For with what intellect does a man grasp God, who does not yet grasp even his own intellect by which he wishes to grasp Him?

Si autem hunc iam capit, attendat diligenter nihil eo esse in sua natura melius, et uideat utrum ibi uideat ulla lineamenta formarum, nitores colorum, spatiosam granditatem, partium distantiam, molis distensionem, aliquas per locorum interualla motiones uel quid eiusmodi. Nihil certe istorum inuenimus in eo quo in natura nostra nihil melius inuenimus, id est in nostro intellectu quo sapientiam capimus quantae capaces sumus. Quod ergo non inuenimus in meliore nostro non debemus in illo quaerere quod longe melius est meliore nostro, ut sic intellegamus deum si possumus, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem.

But if he now grasps this, let him attend diligently that there is nothing better than it in its own nature, and let him see whether there he sees any lineaments of forms, gleams of colors, spacious grandeur, distance of parts, distension of mass, any motions through the intervals of places, or anything of the sort. Surely we find none of these in that in which we find nothing better in our nature, that is, in our intellect by which we grasp wisdom, to the extent of which we are capable. Therefore what we do not find in our better part we ought not to seek in that which is far better than our better part, so that thus we may understand God, if we can, as much as we can: good without quality, great without quantity, creator without indigence, present without site, containing all things without habit, whole everywhere without place, everlasting without time, making mutable things without any change of himself and suffering nothing.

Quisquis deum ita cogitat etsi nondum potest omni modo inuenire quid sit, pie tamen cauet quantum potest aliquid de illo sentire quod non sit.

Whoever thus thinks about God, although he cannot yet in any way discover what He is, nevertheless piously takes care, as far as he can, to avoid conceiving anything about Him which He is not.

[II 3] Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia uel si melius hoc appellatur essentia, quam graeci *ousian uocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis est quam ille qui dixit famulo suo: Ego sum qui sum, et: Dices filiis Israhel: Qui est misit me ad uos?

[II 3] There is, however, without doubt, a substance, or, if this is better so called, an essence, which the Greeks call *ousia*. For just as from that which is “to be wise” is called sapience, and from that which is “to know” is called science, so from that which is “to be” is called essence. And who is more than He who said to His servant: “I am who am,” and: “You shall say to the sons of Israel: ‘He Who Is has sent me to you’?”

Sed aliae quae dicuntur essentiae siue substantiae capiunt accidentias quibus in eis fiat uel magna uel quantacumque mutatio; deo autem aliquid eiusmodi accidere non potest. Et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia uel essentia quae deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse unde essentia nominata est maxime ac uerissime competit. Quod enim mutatur non seruat ipsum esse, et quod mutari potest etiamsi non mutetur potest quod fuerat non esse, ac per hoc illud solum quod non tantum non mutatur uerum etiam mutari omnino non potest sine scrupulo occurrit quod uerissime dicatur esse.

But other things which are called essences or substances admit accidents, by which in them either great or any-whatever change comes about; but to God nothing of this sort can befall. And therefore the only immutable substance or essence is that which God is, to whom indeed the very “to be,” whence “essence” is named, most fittingly and most truly belongs. For that which is changed does not preserve the very being (the ipsum esse), and that which can be changed, even if it is not changed, can be not what it was; and through this, that alone which not only is not changed but also cannot be changed at all presents itself without scruple as that which is most truly said to be.

[III 4] Quamobrem ut iam etiam de his quae nec dicuntur ut cogitantur nec cogitantur ut sunt respondere incipiamus fidei nostrae aduersariis, inter multa quae arriani aduersus catholicam fidem solent disputare hoc sibi maxime callidissmum machinamentum proponere uidentur cum dicunt: 'Quidquid de deo dicitur uel intellegitur non secundum accidens sed secundum substantiam dicitur. Quapropter ingenitum esse patri secundum substantiam est, et genitum esse filio secundum substantiam est. Diuersum est autem ingenitum esse et genitum esse; diuersa est ergo substantia patris et filii.'

[3 4] Wherefore, that now also we may begin to respond, to the adversaries of our faith, about those things which are neither spoken as they are thought nor thought as they are, among the many points which the Arians are accustomed to dispute against the Catholic faith, they seem to set forth for themselves this most crafty contrivance especially when they say: 'Whatever is said or understood about God is said not according to accident but according to substance. Wherefore, to be unbegotten is, for the Father, according to substance, and to be begotten is, for the Son, according to substance. But to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different; therefore the substance of the Father and of the Son is different.'

Quibus respondemus: Si quidquid de deo dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur, ergo quod dictum est: Ego et pater unum sumus, secundum substantiam dictum est. Vna est igitur substantia patris et filii. Aut si hoc non secundum substantiam dictum est, dicitur ergo aliquid de deo non secundum substantiam, et ideo iam non cogimur secundum substantiam intellegere ingenitum et genitum.

We respond to these things: If whatever is said about God is said according to substance, then that which was said, 'I and the Father are one,' was said according to substance. Therefore the substance of the Father and the Son is one. Or if this was not said according to substance, then something is said about God not according to substance, and therefore we are no longer compelled to understand 'unbegotten' and 'begotten' according to substance.

Item dictum est de filio: Non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis deo. Quaerimus secundum quid aequalis. Si enim non secundum substantiam dicitur aequalis, admittunt ut dicatur aliquid de deo non secundum substantiam; admittant ergo non secundum substantiam dici ingenitum et genitum.

Likewise it has been said of the Son: he did not consider it robbery to be equal to God. We ask, according to what is he equal? For if he is said to be equal not according to substance, they admit that something is said of God not according to substance; let them therefore admit that “unbegotten” and “begotten” are said not according to substance.

Quod si propterea non admittunt quia omnia de deo secundum substantiam dici uolunt, secundum substantiam filius aequalis est patri.

But if for that reason they do not admit it, because they wish everything to be said of God according to substance, then according to substance the Son is equal to the Father.

[IV 5] Accidens autem dici non solet nisi quod aliqua mutatione eius rei cui accidit amitti potest. Nam etsi quaedam dicuntur accidentia inseparabilia, quae appellantur graece *akhorista, sicuti est plumae corui color niger; amittit eum tamen non quidem quamdiu pluma est sed quia non semper est pluma. Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, et ex eo quod desinit esse illud animal uel illa pluma totumque illud corpus in terram mutatur et uertitur, amittit utique etiam illum colorem.

[4 5] However, an accident is not usually said except of something that, by some change of the thing to which it happens, can be lost. For although certain things are called inseparable accidents, which in Greek are called *akhorista, such as the black color of a raven’s plumage; yet it loses that, not indeed so long as it is plumage, but because it is not always plumage. Wherefore the matter itself is mutable, and from the fact that that animal ceases to be, or that feather, and the whole body is changed and turned into earth, it of course also loses that color.

Quamuis et accidens quod separabile dicitur non separatione sed mutatione amittatur, sicuti est capillis hominum nigritudo, quoniam dum capilli sunt possunt albescere; separabile accidens dicitur, sed diligenter intuentibus satis apparet non separatione quasi emigrare aliquid a capite dum canescit ut nigritudo inde candore succedente discedat et aliquo eat, sed illam qualitatem coloris ibi uerti atque mutari. Nihil itaque accidens in deo quia nihil mutabile aut amissibile. Quod si et illud dici accidens placet quod licet non amittatur, minuitur tamen uel augetur, sicuti est animae uita (nam et quamdiu anima est tamdiu uiuit, et quia semper anima est semper uiuit, sed quia magis uiuit cum sapit minusque dum desipit, fit etiam hic aliqua mutatio non ut desit uita sicuti deest insipienti sapientia, sed ut minus sit), nec tale aliquid in deo fit quia omnino incommutabilis manet.

Although even an accident which is called separable is lost not by separation but by mutation, as is the blackness of the hair of men, since while they are hairs they can grow white; it is called a separable accident, but to those who look carefully it is quite apparent that it is not by separation, as though something were emigrating from the head while it turns gray, so that the blackness, whiteness succeeding, departs thence and goes somewhere, but that that quality of color is there turned and changed. Therefore there is no accident in God, because there is nothing mutable or amissible. But if it also pleases to call that an accident which, although it is not lost, is nevertheless diminished or increased, as is the life of the soul (for both as long as the soul is, so long it lives, and because it is always a soul, it always lives; but because it lives more when it is wise and less when it is foolish, here too some mutation occurs, not that life is lacking as wisdom is lacking to the foolish person, but that it is less), neither does any such thing happen in God, because he remains altogether immutable.

[6] Quamobrem nihil in eo secundum accidens dicitur quia nihil ei accidit; nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. In rebus enim creatis atque mutabilibus quod non secundum substantiam dicitur restat ut secundum accidens dicatur. Omnia enim accidunt eis, quae uel amitti possunt uel minui et magnitudines et qualitates, et quod dicitur ad aliquid sicut amicitiae, propinquitates, seruitutes, similitudines, aequalitates et si qua huiusmodi et situs et habitus et loca et tempora et opera atque passiones.

[6] Wherefore nothing in Him is said according to accident, because nothing befalls Him; nor yet is everything that is said said according to substance. For in created and mutable things, what is not said according to substance remains to be said according to accident. For all things befall them which can either be lost or diminished—both magnitudes and qualities—and what is said in relation to something (ad aliquid), such as friendships, proximities (kinships), servitudes, similitudes, equalities, and if there are any things of this sort; and positions and habits, and places and times, and works and passions.

[V] In deo autem nihil quidem secundum accidens dicitur quia nihil in eo mutabile est; nec tamen omne quod dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur. Dicitur enim ad aliquid sicut pater ad filium et filius ad patrem, quod non est accidens quia et ille semper pater et ille semper filius, et non ita semper quasi ex quo natus est filius aut ex eo quod numquam desinat esse filius pater esse non desinat pater, sed ex eo quod semper natus est filius nec coepit umquam esse filius. Quod si aliquando esse coepisset aut aliquando esse desineret filius, secundum accidens diceretur.

[V] But in God, indeed, nothing is said according to accident, because nothing in him is changeable; nor, however, is everything that is said said according to substance. For it is said according to relation (ad aliquid), as father to son and son to father, which is not an accident, because the one is always father and the other always son; and not “always” in such a way as that from the time when the son was born the father is father, or that from the fact that the son never ceases to be the father does not cease to be father, but from the fact that the son is always begotten and never began to be son. Which, if the son had at some time begun to be, or at some time were to cease to be, it would be said according to accident.

Si uero quod dicitur pater ad se ipsum diceretur non ad filius, et quod dicitur filius ad se ipsum diceretur non ad patrem, secundum substantiam diceretur et ille pater et ille filius. Sed quia et pater non dicitur pater nisi ex eo quod est ei filius et filius non dicitur nisi ex eo quod habet patrem, non secundum substantiam haec dicuntur quia non quisque eorum ad se ipsum sed ad inuicem atque ad alterutrum ista dicuntur; neque secundum accidens quia et quod dicitur pater et quod dicitur filius aeternum atque incommutabile est eis. Quamobrem quamuis diuersum sit patrem esse et filium esse, non est tamen diuersa substantia quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur sed secundum relatiuum, quod tamen relatiuum non est accidens quia non est mutabile.

But if what is called father were said with respect to himself, not with respect to the son, and what is called son were said with respect to himself, not with respect to the father, both the one would be said father and the other son according to substance. But because the father is not called father except from the fact that there is to him a son, and the son is not called son except from the fact that he has a father, these are not said according to substance, because each of them is said not with reference to himself but to one another and to the other; nor according to accident, because both what is called father and what is called son are eternal and incommutable for them. Wherefore, although to be father and to be son is different, nevertheless the substance is not different, because these are said not according to substance but according to the relative—which relative, however, is not an accident because it is not mutable.

[VI 7] Si autem huic sic putant resistendum esse sermoni quod pater quidem ad filium dicitur et filius ad patrem, ingenitus tamen et genitus ad se ipsos dicuntur non ad alterutrum; non enim hoc est dicere ingenitum quod est patrem dicere quia et si filium non genuisset nihil prohiberet dicere eum ingenitum, et si gignat quisque filium non ex eo ipse est ingenitus quia geniti homines ex aliis hominibus gignunt et ipsi alios — inquiunt ergo: 'Pater ad filium dicitur et filius ad patrem; ingenitus autem ad se ipsum et genitus ad se ipsum dicitur. Et ideo si quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur; diuersum est autem ingenitum esse et genitum esse; diuersa igitur substantia est.'

[6 7] But if they think the discourse must be resisted thus: that “father” indeed is said toward the son and “son” toward the father, yet “ingenerate” and “generate” are said toward themselves, not toward one another; for to say “ingenerate” is not to say “father,” because even if he had not begotten a son, nothing would prevent calling him ingenerate; and if someone begets a son, he himself is not on that account ingenerate, because generated men beget other men and they themselves others — they say, then: ‘Father is said toward the son and son toward the father; but ingenerate is said toward himself and generate toward himself. And therefore, if whatever is said toward itself is said according to substance; but to be ingenerate and to be generate are different; therefore the substance is different.’

Hoc si dicunt non intellegunt de ingenito quidem aliquid se dicere quod diligentius pertractandum sit, quia nec ideo quisque pater quia ingenitus nec ingenitus ideo quia pater, et propterea non ad aliquid sed ad se dici putatur ingenitus; genitum uero mira caecitate non aduertunt dici non posse nisi ad aliquid. Ideo quippe filius quia genitus et quia filius utique genitus. Sicut autem filius ad patrem sic genitus ad genitorem refertur, et sicut pater ad filium ita genitor ad genitum.

This, if they say it, they do not understand that they are indeed saying something about the Unbegotten which ought to be examined more diligently, because one is not therefore a father because he is unbegotten, nor unbegotten therefore because he is a father; and for that reason the Unbegotten is thought to be said not in relation to something but with respect to himself; but, with wondrous blindness, they do not notice that the begotten cannot be said except in relation to something. For this reason, to be sure, he is a son because he is begotten, and because he is a son, assuredly, he is begotten. And just as the son is referred to the father, so the begotten is referred to the begetter, and as the father to the son, so the begetter to the begotten.

Ideoque alia notio est quia intellegitur genitor, alia qua ingenitus. Nam quamuis de patre deo utrumque dicatur, illud tamen ad genitum, id est ad filium dicitur, quod nec illi negant; hoc autem quod ingenitus dicitur ad se ipsum dici perhibent. Dicunt ergo: 'Si aliquid ad se ipsum dicitur pater quod ad se ipsum dici non potest filius, et quidquid ad se ipsum dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur, et ad se ipsum dicitur ingenitus quod dici non potest filius, ergo secundum substantiam dicitur ingenitus quod filis quia dici non potest non est eiusdem substantiae.'

And therefore there is one notion by which he is understood as genitor, another by which as unbegotten. For although of God the Father both are said, yet the former is said with reference to the begotten, that is, to the Son—which they themselves do not deny; but this, that he is called unbegotten, they aver is said with reference to himself. They say, then: 'If something is said with reference to himself of the Father which cannot be said with reference to himself of the Son, and whatever is said with reference to himself is said according to substance, and “unbegotten” is said with reference to himself, which cannot be said of the Son, therefore “unbegotten” is said according to substance; and because it cannot be said of the Son, he is not of the same substance.'

Cui uersutiae respondetur ita ut ipsi cogantur dicere secundum quid sit aequalis filius patri, utrum secundum id quod ad se dicitur an secundum id quod ad patrem dicitur. Non enim secundum id quod ad patrem dicitur quoniam ad patrem filius dicitur; ille autem non filius sed pater est — quia non sic ad se dicuntur pater et filius quomodo amici aut uicini. Relatiue quippe amicus dicitur ad amicum, et si aequaliter se diligunt, eadem in utroque amicitia est; et relatiue uicinus dicitur ad uicinum et quia aequaliter sibi uicini sunt (quantum enim iste illi, tantum et ille huic uicinatur), eadem in utroque uicinitas.

To this craftiness the response is made in such a way that they themselves are forced to say in what respect the Son is equal to the Father, whether according to that which is said with respect to himself or according to that which is said with respect to the Father. For it is not according to that which is said with respect to the Father, since with respect to the Father he is said to be Son; but that one is not Son but Father — because Father and Son are not said with respect to themselves in the way that friends or neighbors are. For relatively, “friend” is said with reference to a friend, and if they love one another equally, the same amity is in both; and relatively, “neighbor” is said with reference to a neighbor, and because they are neighbors to each other equally (for as much as this one is neighbor to that one, so also that one neighbors this one), the same vicinity is in both.

Quia uero filius non ad filium relatiue dicitur sed ad patrem, non secundum hoc quod ad patrem dicitur aequalis est filius patri. Restat ut secundum id aequalis sit quod ad se dicitur. Quidquid autem ad se dicitur secundum substantiam dicitur.

But in truth the Son is not said relatively to a son but to the Father; therefore, according to this—namely, that he is said in relation to the Father—the Son is not equal to the Father. It remains that he be equal according to that which is said with respect to himself. Moreover, whatever is said with respect to itself is said according to substance.

Restat ergo ut secundum substantiam sit aequalis. Eadem est igitur utriusque substantia. Cum uero ingenitus dicitur pater, non quid sit sed quid non sit dicitur.

It remains, therefore, that he is equal according to substance. Therefore the substance of each is the same. But when the father is called unbegotten, what is said is not what he is, but what he is not.

Cum autem relatiuum; negatur, non secundum substantiam negatur quia ipsum relatiuum non secundum substantiam dicitur.

But when the relative is denied, it is not denied according to substance, because the relative itself is not said according to substance.

[VII 8] Hoc exemplis planum faciendum est. Ac primum uidendum est hoc significari cum dicitur genitus quod significatur cum dicitur filius. Ideo enim filius quia genitus, et quia filius utique genitus.

[7 8] This must be made plain by examples. And first it must be seen that what is signified when “begotten” is said is signified when “son” is said. For this reason he is son because begotten, and because son assuredly begotten.

Quod ergo dicitur ingenitus, hoc ostenditur quod non sit filius. Sed genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur; filius autem latine dicitur, sed 'infilius' ut dicatur non admittit loquendi consuetudo. Nihil tamen intellectui demitur si dicatur non filius quemadmodum etiam si dicatur non genitus pro eo quod dicitur ingenitus nihil aliud dicitur.

Therefore, what is said “unbegotten” shows this: that he is not a son. But “begotten” and “unbegotten” are properly said; “son,” indeed, is said in Latin, but the usage of speech does not admit that “unson” be said. Nevertheless, nothing is taken away from the intellect if one says “not a son,” just as, if one says “not begotten” in place of what is said “unbegotten,” nothing else is being said.

Sic enim et uicinus et amicus relatiue dicuntur, nec tamen potest 'inuicinus' dici quomodo dicitur inimicus. Quamobrem non est in rebus considerandum quid uel sinat uel non sinat dici usus sermonis nostri sed quis rerum ipsarum intellectus eluceat.

For thus too “neighbor” and “friend” are said relatively, nor yet can ‘un-neighbor’ be said as “enemy” is said. Wherefore, it is not in matters to be considered what the usage of our speech permits or does not permit to be said, but what understanding of the things themselves shines forth.

Non ergo iam dicamus ingenitum quamuis dici latine possit, sed pro eo dicamus non genitum quod tantum ualet. Num ergo aliud dicimus quam non filium? Negatiua porro ista particula non id efficit ut quod sine illa relatiue dicitur eadem praeposita substantialiter dicatur, sed id tantum negatur quod sine illa aiebatur sicut in ceteris praedicamentis.

Therefore let us no longer say “ingenitum,” although it can be said in Latin, but instead say “not begotten,” which amounts to the same. Are we then saying anything other than “not son”? Moreover, this negative particle does not bring it about that what without it is said relatively, with the same prefixed is said substantially; rather, only that is denied which without it was being asserted, as in the other predicaments.

Velut cum dicimus: 'Homo est,' substantiam designamus. Qui ergo dicit: 'Non homo est,' non aliud genus praedicamenti enuntiat sed tantum illud negat. Sicut ergo secundum substantiam aio: 'Homo est,' sic secundum substantiam nego cum dico: 'Non homo est.' Et cum quaeritur, quantum sit et aio: 'Quadripedalis est,' id est quattuor pedum, quid dicit: 'Non quadripedalis est,' secundum quantitatem negat.

For example, when we say: 'He is a man,' we designate substance. Therefore, whoever says: 'He is not a man,' does not enunciate another genus of predication but only denies that. Thus, just as according to substance I affirm: 'He is a man,' so according to substance I deny when I say: 'He is not a man.' And when it is asked how great he is and I say: 'He is four-foot long,' that is, of four feet, the one who says: 'He is not four-foot long,' denies according to quantity.

'Candidus est,' secundum qualitatem aio; 'Non candidus est,' secundum qualitatem nego. 'Propinquus est,' secundum relatiuum aio; 'Non propinquus est,' secundum relatiuum nego. Secundum situm aio cum dico: 'Iacet'; secundum situm nego cum dico: 'Non iacet.' Secundum habitum aio cum dico: 'Armatus est'; secundum habitum nego cum dico: 'Non armatus est,' tantumdem autem ualet si dicam: 'Inermis est.' Secundum tempus aio cum dico: 'Hesternus est'; secundum tempus nego cum dico: 'Non hesternus est.' Et cum dico: 'Romae est,' secundum locum aio; et secundum locum nego cum dico: 'Non Romae est.' Secundum id quod est facere aio cum dico: 'Caedit'; si autem dicam: 'Non caedit,' secundum id quod est facere nego ut ostendam non hoc facere.

'He is candid (white),' I affirm according to quality; 'He is not candid,' I deny according to quality. 'He is near,' I affirm according to the relative; 'He is not near,' I deny according to the relative. According to position I affirm when I say: 'He lies'; according to position I deny when I say: 'He does not lie.' According to habit I affirm when I say: 'He is armed'; according to habit I deny when I say: 'He is not armed,' and it is equivalent if I say: 'He is unarmed.' According to time I affirm when I say: 'He is hesternal'; according to time I deny when I say: 'He is not hesternal.' And when I say: 'He is at Rome,' I affirm according to place; and according to place I deny when I say: 'He is not at Rome.' According to doing I affirm when I say: 'He strikes'; but if I say: 'He does not strike,' according to doing I deny, so as to show that he is not doing this.

Et cum dico: 'Vapulat,' secundum praedicamentum aio quod pati uocatur; et secundum id nego cum dico: 'Non uapulat.' Et omnino nullum praedicamenti genus est secundum quod aliquid aiere uolumus nisi ut secundum idipsum praedicamentum negare conuincamur si praeponere negatiuam particulam uoluerimus.

And when I say: 'He is being beaten,' I affirm according to the predicament that is called 'to suffer'; and according to it I deny when I say: 'He is not being beaten.' And altogether there is no genus of predicament according to which we wish to affirm something, unless that according to that very same predicament we are compelled to deny if we shall have wished to prefix the negative particle.

Quae cum ita sint, si substantialiter aierem dicendo 'filius'; substantialiter negarem dicendo 'non filius.' Quia uero relatiue aio cum dico: 'Filius est,' ad patrem enim refero; relatiue nego si dico: 'Non filius est,' ad parentem enim eandem negationem refero uolens ostendere quod ei parens non sit. At si quantum ualet quod dicitur 'filius,' tantundem ualet quod dicitur 'genitus' sicut praelocuti sumus, tantundem ergo ualet quod dicitur 'non genitus' quantum ualet quod dicitur 'non filius.' Relatiue autem negamus dicendo 'non filius'; relatiue igitur negamus dicendo 'non genitus.' Ingenitus porro quid est nisi non genitus? Non ergo receditur a relatiuo praedicamento cum ingenitus dicitur.

Since these things are so, if I were to affirm substantially by saying 'son,' I would deny substantially by saying 'not son.' But indeed I affirm relatively when I say: 'He is a son,' for I refer to the father; I deny relatively if I say: 'He is not a son,' for to the parent I refer the same negation, wishing to show that there is not a parent for him. But if, to the extent that what is said 'son' avails, what is said 'begotten' avails just as much, as we have spoken before, then what is said 'not begotten' avails just as much as what is said 'not son.' Yet we deny relatively by saying 'not son'; therefore we deny relatively by saying 'not begotten.' Moreover, what is 'unbegotten' if not 'not begotten'? Therefore one does not depart from the relative predicamental category when 'unbegotten' is said.

Sicut enim genitus non ad se ipsum dicitur sed quod ex genitore sit, ita cum dicitur ingenitus non ad se ipsum dicitur sed quod ex genitore non sit ostenditur. In eodem tamen praedicamento quod relatiuum uocatur utraque significatio uertitur. Quod autem relatiue pronuntiatur non indicat substantiam.

For just as “begotten” is not said with respect to himself but that he is from a begetter, so when “ingenerate” is said, it is not said with respect to himself, but it is shown that he is not from a begetter. Yet in the same predicament which is called relative, each signification is turned. But what is pronounced relatively does not indicate substance.

Ita quamuis diuersum sit genitus et ingenitus, non indicat diuersam substantiam, quia sicut filius ad patrem et non filius ad non patrem refertur, ita genitus ad genitorem et non genitus ad non genitorem referatur necesse est.

Thus, although begotten and unbegotten are diverse, they do not indicate a diverse substance, because just as son is referred to father and not-son to non-father, so it is necessary that begotten be referred to begetter and unbegotten to non-begetter.

[VIII 9] Quapropter illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et diuina sublimitas substantialiter dici; quod autem ad aliquid non substantialiter sed relatiue; tantamque uim esse eiusdem substantiae in patre et filio et spiritu sancto ut quidquid de singulis ad se ipsos dicitur non pluraliter in summa sed singulariter accipiatur. Quemadmodum enim deus est pater et filius deus est et spiritus sanctus deus est, quod secundum substantiam dici nemo dubitat, non tamen tres deos sed unum deum dicimus eam ipsam praestantissimam trinitatem. Ita magnus pater, magnus filius, magnus et spiritus sanctus; nec tamen tres magni sed unus magnus.

[8 9] Wherefore let us chiefly hold this: whatever is said with respect to itself of that most preeminent and divine sublimity is said substantially; but what is said in relation to something else, not substantially but relatively; and that there is so great a force of the same substance in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that whatever of the individuals is said with respect to themselves is not taken plurally in the aggregate but singularly. For just as the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God—which no one doubts is said according to substance—nevertheless we do not say three gods but one God, that very most preeminent Trinity. Thus the Father is great, the Son is great, and the Holy Spirit is great; and yet not three great ones, but one great.

Non enim de patre solo sicut illi peruerse sentiunt, sed de patre et filio et spiritu sancto scriptum est: Tu es solus deus, magnus. Et bonus pater, bonus filius, bonus et spiritus sanctus; nec tres boni sed unus bonus de quo dictum est: Nemo bonus nisi unus deus. Etenim dominus Iesus ne ab illo qui dixerat: Magister bone, tamquam hominem compellans secundum hominem tantummodo intellegeretur ideo non ait: 'Nemo bonus nisi solus pater,' sed: Nemo bonus nisi unus deus.

For it is not of the Father alone, as they perversely suppose, but of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit that it is written: You alone are God, great. And the Father is good, the Son good, and the Holy Spirit good; and yet not three good ones but one good, of whom it was said: No one is good except one, God. For the Lord Jesus, lest by the one who had said, “Good Teacher,” addressing him as a man, he should be understood according to man only, therefore did not say: ‘No one is good except the Father alone,’ but: No one is good except one, God.

In patris enim nomine ipse per se pater pronuntiatur, in dei uero et ipse et filius et spiritus sanctus quia trinitas unus deus.

For in the name of the Father, he himself by himself, the Father, is pronounced; but in the name of God, both he himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the Trinity is one God.

Situs uero et habitus et loca et tempora non proprie sed translate ac per similitudines dicuntur in deo. Nam et sedere super cherubim dicitur, quod ad situm dicitur; et abyssus tamquam uestimentum amictus ipsius, quod ad habitum; et: Anni tui non deficient, quod ad tempus; et: Si ascendero in caelum, tu ibi es, quod ad locum. Quod autem ad faciendum attinet fortassis de solo deo uerissime dicatur; solus enim deus facit et ipse non fit, neque patitur quantum ad eius substantiam pertinet qua deus est.

Situs, habit, places, and times are said in God not properly but transferred and by similitudes. For he is said also to sit upon the cherubim, which is said with respect to position; and: the abyss, as a vestment, his clothing, which with respect to habit; and: Your years will not fail, which with respect to time; and: If I shall ascend into heaven, you are there, which with respect to place. But as regards doing, perhaps this is most truly said of God alone; for God alone does/makes, and he himself is not made, nor does he suffer, insofar as it pertains to his substance whereby he is God.

Itaque omnipotens pater, omnipotens filius, omnipotens spiritus sanctus, nec tamen non quidem quamdiu pluma est sed quia non semper est per quem omnia, in quo omnia; ipsi gloria.

Therefore the omnipotent Father, the omnipotent Son, the omnipotent Holy Spirit, and yet not — [text corrupt/unclear] — through whom are all things, in whom are all things; to him be glory.

Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur deus et de singulis personis ter dicitur patre et filio et spiritu sancto, et simul de ipsa trinitate non pluraliter sed singulariter dicitur. Quoniam quippe non aliud est deo esse et aliud magnum esse, sed hoc idem illi est esse quod magnum esse, propterea sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem. Essentiam dico quae *ousia graece dicitur, quam usitatius substantiam uocamus.

Whatever, therefore, is said of God with respect to himself is said three times also of the individual persons—the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit—and at the same time of the trinity itself it is said not in the plural but in the singular. For indeed it is not one thing for God to be and another to be great, but the same thing for him is to be as to be great; therefore, just as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three magnitudes, but one essence and one magnitude. By essence I mean what in Greek is called *ousia graece dicitur, which we more commonly call substance.

[10] Dicunt quidem et illi *hypostasin, sed nescio quid uolunt interesse inter *ousian et *hypostasin ita ut plerique nostri qui haec graeco tractant eloquio dicere consuerint *mian *ousian *tres *hypostaseis, quod est latine, unam essentiam tres substantias.

[10] They indeed also say *hypostasin, but I know not what difference they wish to exist between *ousian and *hypostasin, such that most of our own who handle these matters in Greek eloquence have been accustomed to say *mian *ousian *tres *hypostaseis, which in Latin is, one essence, three substances.

[IX] Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo iam obtinuit ut hoc intellegatur cum dicimus essentiam quod intellegitur cum dicimus substantiam, non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantias, sed unam essentiam uel substantiam.

[9] But because our custom of speaking has now prevailed, so that what is understood when we say "essence" is what is understood when we say "substance," we do not dare to say "one essence, three substances," but "one essence or substance."

Tres autem personas multi latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate dixerunt cum alium modum aptiorem non inuenirent quo enuntiarent uerbis quod sine uerbis intellegebant. Reuera enim quod pater non sit filius et filius non sit pater et spiritus sanctus ille qui etiam donum dei uocatur nec pater sit nec filius, tres utique sunt. Ideoque pluraliter dictum est: Ego et pater unum sumus.

Three persons, moreover, many Latins handling these matters, and worthy of authority, have said, when they did not find another more apt mode by which to enunciate in words what they understood without words. For indeed, the fact that the father is not the son, and the son is not the father, and the holy spirit—he who is also called the gift of god—is neither father nor son, they are assuredly three. And therefore it was said in the plural: Ego et pater unum sumus.

Non enim dixit 'unum est,' quod sabelliani dicunt, sed unum sumus. Tamen cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur.

For he did not say 'it is one,' which the Sabellians say, but 'we are one.' Yet, when the question is asked, 'three what?', human eloquence labors under a truly great indigence. Nevertheless, 'three persons' has been said, not in order that that should be said, but lest we keep silence.

[X 11] Sicut ergo non dicimus tres essentias, ita non dicimus tres magnitudines neque tres magnos. In rebus enim quae participatione magnitudinis magnae sunt quibus aliud est esse, aliud magnas esse sicut magna domus et magnus mons et magnus animus, in his ergo rebus aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab ea magnitudine magnum est, et prorsus non hoc est magnitudo quod est magna domus. Sed illa est uera magnitudo qua non solum magna est domus quae magna est et qua magnus est mons quisquis magnus est, sed etiam qua magnum est quidquid aliud magnum dicitur, ut aliud sit ipsa magnitudo, aliud ea quae ab illa magna dicuntur.

[10 11] Thus, as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three magnitudes nor three great beings. For in things which are great by participation of magnitude, for which it is one thing to be, another to be great—such as a great house and a great mountain and a great mind—therefore in these things magnitude is one thing, and that which is great from that magnitude is another; and magnitude is by no means the same as a great house. But that is the true magnitude by which not only the house which is great is great, and by which a mountain, whichever is great, is great, but also by which anything else that is called great is great, so that the magnitude itself is one thing, and those things which are called great by it are another.

Quae magnitudo utique primitus magna est multoque excellentius quam ea quae participatione eius magna sunt. Deus autem quia non ea magnitudine magnus est quae non est quod ipse ut quasi particeps eius sit deus cum magnus est (alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam deus; deo autem non est aliquid maius), ea igitur magnitudine magnus est qua ipse est eadem magnitudo. Et ideo sicut non dicimus tres essentias sic nec tres magnitudines; hoc est enim deo esse quod est magnum esse.

Which magnitude is, assuredly, primarily great and by much more excellent than those things which are great by participation in it. But God, since he is not great by that magnitude which is not what he himself is—so that God would, as it were, be a participant of it when he is great (otherwise that magnitude would be greater than God; yet for God there is nothing greater)—therefore he is great by that magnitude by which he himself is the same magnitude. And thus, just as we do not say three essences, so neither three magnitudes; for to be for God is the same as to be great.

Eadem causa nec magnos tres dicimus sed unum magnum quia non participatione magnitudinis deus magnus est sed se ipso magno magnus est quia ipse sua est magnitudo. Hoc et de bonitate et de aeternitate et de omnipotentia dei dictum sit omnibusque omnino praedicamentis quae de deo posunt pronuntiari, quod ad se ipsum dicitur non translate ac per similitudinem sed proprie, si tamen de illo proprie aliquid ore hominis dici potest.

For the same cause we do not say three great ones but one great one, because God is not great by participation in magnitude, but is great by himself, great by his own self, since he himself is his magnitude. Let this be said likewise of the goodness and the eternity and the omnipotence of God, and indeed of all predicaments whatsoever that can be predicated of God: that it is said with reference to himself, not in a transferred sense and by similitude, but properly—if yet anything about him can properly be said by the mouth of man.

[XI 12] Quod autem proprie singula in eadem trinitate dicuntur nullo modo ad se ipsa sed ad inuicem aut ad creaturam dicuntur, et ideo relatiue non substantialiter ea dici manifestum est. Sicut enim trinitas unus deus dicitur magnus, bonus, aeternus, omnipotens, idemque ipse sua sic dici potest deitas, ipse sua magnitudo, ipse sua bonitas, ipse sua aeternitas, ipse sua omnipotentia; non sic dici potest trinitas pater nisi forte translate ad creaturam propter adoptionem filiorum. Quod enim scriptum est: Audi, Israhel: dominus deus tuus dominus unus est, non utique excepto filio aut excepto spiritu sancto oportet intellegi, quem unum dominum deum nostrum recte dicimus etiam patrem nostrum per gratiam suam non regenerantem.

[11 12] But the fact that the several things are said properly in the same Trinity is by no means said with reference to themselves, but to one another or to the creature; and therefore it is manifest that they are said relatively, not substantially. For just as the Trinity, one God, is called great, good, eternal, omnipotent, and the same he himself can thus be said to be his own deity, he his own magnitude, he his own goodness, he his own eternity, he his own omnipotence; so the Trinity cannot be called Father, unless perhaps translated to the creature on account of the adoption of sons. For that which is written: Hear, Israel: the Lord your God is one Lord, ought certainly not to be understood with the Son excepted or the Holy Spirit excepted, whom, as the one Lord our God, we rightly call also our Father by his grace, not regenerating.

Trinitas autem filius nullo modo dici potest. Spiritus uero sanctus secundum id quod scriptum est: Quoniam deus spiritus est, potest quidem uniuersaliter dici quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus. Itaque pater et filius et spiritus sanctus quoniam unus deus et utique deus sanctus est et deus spiritus est potest appellari trinitas et spiritus et sanctus.

But the trinity cannot in any way be called son. But the Holy Spirit, according to that which is written: “Because God is spirit,” can indeed be said universally, because both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since there is one God and of course God is holy and God is spirit, the trinity can be called both spirit and holy.

Sed tamen ille spiritus sanctus qui non trinitas sed in trinitate intellegitur in eo quod proptrie dicitur spiritus sanctus, relatiue dicitur cum et ad patrem et ad filium refertur quia spiritus sanctus et patris et filii spiritus est. Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine; apparet autem cum dicitur donum dei. Donum enim est patris et filii quia et a patre procedit, sicut dominus dicit, et quod apostolus ait: Qui spiritum Christi non habet hic non est eius, de ipso utique spiritu sancto ait.

But yet that Holy Spirit, who is not the Trinity but is understood in the Trinity, in that wherein he is properly called the Holy Spirit, is said relatively, since he is referred both to the Father and to the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son. But the relation itself does not appear in this name; it appears, however, when he is called the Gift of God. For he is the Gift of the Father and of the Son, because he also proceeds from the Father, as the Lord says; and that which the Apostle says, “Whoever does not have the Spirit of Christ, this one is not his,” he says of that very Holy Spirit.

'Donum' ergo 'donatoris' et 'donator doni' cum dicimus relatiue utrumque ad inuicem dicimus. Ergo spiritus sanctus ineffabilis quaedam patris filiique communio, et ideo fortasse sic appellatur quia patri et filio potest eadem appellatio conuenire. Nam hoc ipse proprie dicitur quod illi communiter quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus, et pater sanctus et filius sanctus.

‘Gift,’ therefore, ‘of the donor,’ and ‘donor of the gift,’ when we speak relatively, we say each with reference to the other. Therefore the Holy Spirit is a certain ineffable communion of the Father and the Son, and perhaps for that reason he is so called, because the same appellation can be fitting to the Father and to the Son. For he himself is properly called what they are called in common, since both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy.

Vt ergo ex nomine quod utrique conuenit utriusque communio significetur, uocatur donum amborum spiritus sanctus. Et haec trinitas unus deus, solus, bonus, magnus, aeternus, omnipotens; ipse sibi unitas, deitas, magnitudo, bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia.

Therefore, so that from the name which is fitting to each the communion of both may be signified, the Holy Spirit is called the gift of both. And this Trinity is one God, alone, good, great, eternal, omnipotent; he himself is to himself unity, deity, magnitude, goodness, eternity, omnipotence.

[XII 13] Nec mouere debet quoniam diximus relatiue dici spiritum sanctum (non ipsam trinitatem sed eum qui est in trinitate), quia non ei uidetur uicissim respondere uocabulum eius ad quem refertur. Non enim sicut dicimus seruum domini et dominum serui, filium patris et patrem filii quoniam ista relatiue dicuntur, ita etiam hic possumus dicere. Dicimus enim spiritum sanctum patris, sed non uicissim dicimus patre spiritus sancti ne filius eius intellegatur spiritus sanctus.

[12 13] Nor ought it to trouble that we have said the Holy Spirit is said relatively (not the Trinity itself but him who is in the Trinity), because there does not seem, in turn, to be a responding appellation of the one to whom he is referred. For just as we say the servant of the lord and the lord of the servant, the son of the father and the father of the son, since these are said relatively, so also here we cannot speak. For we do say the Holy Spirit of the Father, but we do not in turn say the Father of the Holy Spirit, lest his Son be understood to be the Holy Spirit.

Item dicimus spiritum sanctum filii, sed non dicimus filium spiritus sancti ne pater eius intellegatur spiritus sanctus. In multis enim relatiuis hoc contingit ut non inueniatur uocabulum quo sibi uicissim respondeat quae ad se referuntur. Quid enim tam manifeste relatiue dicitur quam pignus?

Likewise we say the Holy Spirit of the Son, but we do not say the son of the Holy Spirit, lest his father be understood to be the Holy Spirit. For in many relatives this happens, that no vocabulary is found by which, reciprocally, those things that are referred to it may respond back to it. For what is said more manifestly in a relative way than “pledge”?

Ad id quippe refertur cuius pignus est, et semper pignus alicuius rei pignus est. Num ergo cum dicimus pignus patris et filii possumus uicissim dicere patrem pignoris aut filium pignoris? At uero cum dicimus donum patris et filii, non quidem possumus dicere patrem doni aut filium doni, sed ut haec uicissim respondeant dicimus donum donatoris et donatorem doni quia hic potuit inueniri usitatum uocabulum, illic non potuit.

For it is referred to that of which it is a pledge, and a pledge is always the pledge of some thing. Therefore, when we say the pledge of the Father and of the Son, can we in turn say the Father of the pledge or the Son of the pledge? But indeed when we say the gift of the Father and of the Son, to be sure we cannot say the Father of the gift or the Son of the gift; but so that these may correspond reciprocally we say the gift of the donor and the donor of the gift, because here a customary term could be found, there it could not.

[XIII 14] Dicitur ergo relatiue pater idemque relatiue dicitur principium et si quid forte aliud; sed pater ad filium dicitur, principium uero ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. Item dicitur relatiue filius; relatiue dicitur et uerbum et imago, et in omnibus his uocabulis ad patrem refertur; nihil autem horum pater dicitur. Et principium dicitur filius; cum enim diceretur ei: Tu quis es?, respondit: Principium quia et loquor uobis.

[13 14] Therefore “father” is said relatively, and likewise “principle” is said relatively, and if perchance anything else; but “father” is said in relation to the son, whereas “principle” is said in relation to all things that are from him. Likewise “son” is said relatively; “Word” and “Image” are also said relatively, and in all these terms reference is made to the Father; yet the Father is called none of these. And the Son is called “Principle”; for when it was said to him, “Who are you?”, he answered: “Principle, because I also speak to you.”

Sed numquid patris principium? Creatorem se quippe ostendere uoluit cum se dixit esse principium, sicut et pater principium est creaturae quod ab ipso sunt omnia. Nam et creator relatiue dicitur ad creaturam sicut dominus ad seruum.

But is he by any chance the Father’s principle? For indeed he wished to show himself Creator when he said that he is Principle, just as the Father is the principle of creation, since all things are from him. For “creator” too is said relatively to “creation,” as “lord” to “servant.”

Et ideo cum dicimus et patrem principium et filium principium, non duo principia creaturae dicimus quia pater et filius simul ad creaturam unum principium est sicut unus creator, sicut unus deus.

And therefore, when we say both the Father a principle and the Son a principle, we do not say two principles of creation, because the Father and the Son together, with respect to creation, are one principle, just as one creator, just as one God.

Si autem quidquid in se manet et gignit aliquid uel opetur principium est ei rei quam gignit uel ei quam operatur, non possumus negare etiam spiritum sanctum recte dici principium quia non eum separamus ab appellatione creatoris. Et scriptum est de illo quod operetur, et utique in se manens operatur; non enim in aliquid eorum quae operatur ipse mutatur et uertitur. Et quae operatur uide: Vnicuique autem, inquit, datur manifestatio spiritus ad uitilitatem.

If, moreover, whatever remains in itself and begets something or operates is a principle to that thing which it begets or to that which it operates, we cannot deny that the Holy Spirit also is rightly called a principle, because we do not separate him from the appellation of creator. And it is written of him that he works, and assuredly, remaining in himself, he works; for he himself is not changed and turned into any of the things which he works. And see what he works: “To each one, he says, there is given a manifestation of the Spirit for utility.”

Alii quidem datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae; alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum; alteri autem fides in eodem spiritu; alii donatio curationum in uno spiritu; alii operationes uirtutum; alii prophetia; alii diiudicatio spirituum; alteri genera linguarum. Omnia autem haec operatur unus atque idem spiritus diuidens propria unicuique prout uult, utique sicut deus. Quis enim tanta illa potest operari nisi deus?

To one indeed there is given through the spirit a discourse of wisdom; to another a discourse of science according to the same spirit; to yet another faith in the same spirit; to another the donation of cures in one spirit; to another operations of powers; to another prophecy; to another the discernment of spirits; to yet another kinds of tongues. But all these things the one and the same spirit operates, dividing proper shares to each as he wills, assuredly just like God. For who indeed is able to operate such great things except God?

Idem autem deus qui operatur omnia in omnibus. Nam et singillatim si interrogemur de spiritu sancto, uerissime respondemus quod deus sit, et cum patre et filio simul unus deus est. Vnum ergo principium ad creaturam dicitur deus, non duo uel tria principia.

The same God, moreover, is he who works all things in all. For even if we are asked severally about the Holy Spirit, we most truly answer that he is God, and together with the Father and the Son he is at once one God. Therefore, with respect to the creature, God is said to be one principle, not two or three principles.

[XIV 15] Ad se autem inuicem in trinitate si gegnens ad id quod gignit principium est, pater ad filium principium est quia genuit eum. Vtrum autem et ad spiritum sanctum principium sit pater quoniam dictum est: De patre procedit, non parua quaestio est. Quia si ita est, non iam principium ei tantum rei erit quam gignit aut facit sed etiam ei quam dat.

[14 15] But with respect to one another in the Trinity, if the begetter is a principle with respect to that which he begets, the Father is a principle with respect to the Son, because he begot him. Whether, however, the Father is also a principle with respect to the Holy Spirit, since it has been said: “He proceeds from the Father,” is no small question. For if it is so, he will be a principle not only of that which he begets or makes, but also of that which he gives.

Vbi et illud elucescit ut potest quod solet multos mouere, cur non sit filius etiam spiritus sanctus cum et ipse a patre exeat sicut in euangelio legitur. Exit enim non quomodo natus sed quomodo datus, et ideo non dicitur filius quia neque natus est sicut unigenitus neque factus ut per gratiam in adoptionem nasceretur sicuti nos. Quod enim de patre natum est ad patrem solum refertur cum dicitur filius, et ideo filius patris est non et noster.

Where also, as far as it can, that point becomes clear which is wont to move many: why the Holy Spirit is not also a son, since he too goes forth from the Father, as is read in the Gospel. For he goes forth not in the mode of being born but in the mode of being given; and therefore he is not called son, because he is neither born as the Only-begotten nor made so as, through grace, to be born into adoption, as we are. For what is born of the Father is referred to the Father alone when it is called son, and therefore he is the son of the Father, not also ours.

Quod autem datum est et ad eum qui dedit refertur et ad eos quibus dedit; itaque spiritus sanctus non tantum patris et filii qui dederunt sed etiam noster dicitur qui accepimus, sicut dicitur domini salus qui dat salutem, eadem etiam nostra salus est qui accepimus.

But what has been given is referred both to him who gave and to those to whom he gave it; and so the Holy Spirit is said to be not only the Father’s and the Son’s, who gave him, but also ours, we who have received him—just as “the Lord’s salvation” is said of him who gives salvation; the same is also our salvation, we who have received it.

Spiritus ergo et dei qui dedit et noster qui accepimus. Non ille spiritus noster quo sumus, quia ipse spiritus est hominis qui in ipso est, sed alio modo iste noster quo dicimus et: Panem nostrum da nobis. Quamquam et illum spiritum qui hominis dicitur utique accepimus.

Spirit therefore is both God’s, who gave, and ours, who have received. Not that spirit of ours by which we exist, for that is the spirit of the man which is in him, but in another way this one is ours, by which we also say: “Give us our bread.” Although we have assuredly received even that spirit which is called the spirit of man.

Quid enim habes, inquit, quod non accepisti? Sed aliud est quod accepimus ut essemus, aliud quod accepimus ut sancti essemus. Vnde scriptum est et de Iohanne quod in spiritu et uirtute Heliae ueniret; dictus est Heliae spiritus, sed spiritus sanctus quem accepit Helias.

“For what do you have,” he says, “that you have not received?” But one thing is what we have received that we might be, another what we have received that we might be holy. Whence it is written also about John that he would come in the spirit and power of Elijah; it was called the spirit of Elijah, but it was the Holy Spirit which Elijah received.

Hoc et de Moyse intellegendum est cum ait ei dominus: Tollam de spiritu tuo et dabo eis, hoc est dabo illis de spiritu sancto quem iam tibi dedi. Si ergo et quod datur principium habet eum a quo datur quia non aliunde accepit illud quod ab ipso procedit, fatendum est patrem et filium principium esse spiritus sancti, non duo principia, sed sicut pater et filius unus deus et ad creaturam relatiue unus creator et unus dominus, sic relatiue ad spiritum sanctum unum principium; ad creaturam uero pater et filius et spiritus sanctus unum principium sicut unus creator et unus dominus.

This too is to be understood about Moses, when the Lord says to him: I will take from your spirit and I will give to them, that is, I will give to them from the Holy Spirit whom I have already given to you. If therefore even that which is given has as its principle the one by whom it is given—because it did not receive from elsewhere that which proceeds from him—it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles; but just as the Father and the Son are one God and, relatively to the creature, one Creator and one Lord, so, relatively to the Holy Spirit, one principle; but with respect to the creature, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one principle, just as one Creator and one Lord.

[XV 16] Interius autem quaeritur utrum quemadmodum filius non hoc tantum habet nascendo ut filius sit sed omnino ut sit, sic et spiritus sanctus eo quo datur habeat non tantum ut donum sit sed omnino ut sit; utrum ergo erat antequam daretur sed nondum erat donum, an eo ipso quo daturus erat eum deus iam donum erat et antequam daretur. Sed si non procedit nisi cum datur, nec procederet utique priusquam esset cui daretur. Quomodo iam erat ipsa substantia si non est nisi quia datur, sicut filius non tantum ut sit filius quod relatiue dicitur sed omnino ut sit ipsa substantia nascendo habet?

[15 16] Inwardly, however, it is asked whether, just as the Son has by being born not only that he be Son but altogether that he be, so also the Holy Spirit, by that whereby he is given, has not only that he be Gift but altogether that he be; whether, then, he was before he was given but was not yet Gift, or whether by the very fact that God was going to give him he was already Gift even before he was given. But if he does not proceed except when he is given, he would not, to be sure, proceed before there was one to whom he might be given. How, then, was the substance itself already, if it is not except because it is given—just as the Son, by being born, has not only that he be Son (which is said relatively) but altogether that he be the substance itself?

An semper procedit spiritus sanctus et non ex tempore sed ab aeternitate procedit, sed quia sic procedebat ut esset donabile, iam donum erat et antequam esset cui daretur? Aliter enim intellegitur cum dicitur donum, aliter cum dicitur donatum. Nam donum potest esse et antequam detur; donatum autem nisi datum fuerit nullo modo dici potest.

Or does the Holy Spirit always proceed, and not from time but from eternity does he proceed, but because he was thus proceeding so as to be donable, was he already a gift even before there was one to whom he might be given? For it is understood one way when it is called “donum,” another when it is called “donatum.” For a gift can exist even before it is given; but “given” can in no way be said unless it has been given.

[XVI 17] Nec moueat quod spiritus sanctus, cum sit coaeternus patri et filio, dicitur tamen aliquid ex tempore ueluti hoc ipsum quod donatum diximus. Nam sempiterne spiritus donum, temporaliter autem donatum. Nam et si dominus non dicitur nisi cum habere incipit seruum, etiam ista appellatio relatiua ex tempore est deo; non enim sempiterna creatura est cuius est ille dominus.

[16 17] Nor let it move you that the Holy Spirit, although he is coeternal with the Father and the Son, is nevertheless said to be something “from time,” as for example this very thing which we have called “given.” For eternally the Spirit is a “gift,” but temporally “given.” For even if one is not called a lord except when he begins to have a servant, even this relative appellation is “from time” for God; for the creature of which he is lord is not sempiternal.

Quomodo ergo obtinebimus nec ipsa relatiua esse accidentia, quoniam nihil accidit deo temporaliter quia non est mutabilis sicut in exordio huius disputationis tractauimus?

How then shall we maintain that not even the relatives themselves are accidents, since nothing happens to God temporally, because he is not mutable, as we treated in the exordium of this disputation?

Ecce dominum esse non sempiternum habet ne cogamur etiam creaturam sempiternam dicere, quia ille sempiterne non dominaretur nisi etiam ista sempiterne famularetur. Sicut autem non potest esse seruus qui non habet dominum, sic nec dominus qui non habet seruum. Et quisquis exstiterit qui aeternum quidem deum solum dicat, tempora autem non esse aeterna propter uarietatem et mutabilitatem, sed tamen tempora non in tempore esse coepisse (non enim erat tempus antequam inciperent tempora, et ideo non in tempore accidit deo ut dominus esset quia ipsorum temporum dominus erat quae utique non in tempore factus est cuius utique dominus de homine qui in tempore factus est cuius utique dominus non erat antequam esset cui esset?

Behold, it holds that “to be lord” is not sempiternal, lest we be compelled even to call the creature sempiternal; for he would not be lord sempiternally unless that also were serving sempiternally. And as there cannot be a servant who does not have a lord, so neither a lord who does not have a servant. And whoever should arise who says that God alone is eternal, but that times are not eternal on account of variety and mutability, yet nevertheless that times did not begin to be in time (for there was not time before times began, and therefore it did not befall God in time that he should be lord, because he was the lord of those very times, which indeed was not made in time, of which of course he is lord, of man who was made in time, of whom, to be sure, he was not lord before there was one of whom he should be lord?

Certe uel ut dominus hominis esset ex tempore accidit deo, et ut omnis auferri uideatur controuersia, certe ut tuus dominus esset aut meus qui modo esse coepimus ex tempore accidit deo. Aut si et hoc propter obscuram quaestionem animae uidetur incertum, quid ut esset dominus populi Israhel? Quia etsi iam erat animae natura quam ille populus habebat — quomodo non quaerimus — tamen ille populus nondum erat et quando esse coepit apparet.

Certainly, at least that He should be lord of man befell God in time as an accident; and, that all controversy may seem to be removed, certainly that He should be your lord or mine—who only now have begun to be—befell God in time. Or if even this seems uncertain on account of the obscure question of the soul, what then of His being lord of the people of Israel? For although the nature of the soul which that people possessed already existed—how, we do not inquire—nonetheless that people itself did not yet exist, and when it began to exist is apparent.

Postremo ut dominus esset huius arboris et huius segetis ex tempore accidit quae modo esse coeperunt. Quia etsi materies ipsa iam erat, aliud est tamen dominum esse materiae, aliud esse dominum iam factae naturae. Alio enim tempore est etiam homo dominus ligni et alio tempore est dominus arcae quamuis ex ipso ligno fabricatae, quod utique non erat cum ligni dominus iam esset.

Finally, that he should be lord of this tree and of this crop befell in time, which only just began to be. For although the material itself already existed, yet it is one thing to be lord of the material, another to be lord of a nature already made. For at one time a man is lord of the wood, and at another time he is lord of the chest, although fabricated from that very wood, which assuredly did not exist when he was already lord of the wood.

Quomodo igitur obtinebimus nihil secundum accidens dici deum nisi quia ipsius naturae nihil accidit quo mutetur, ut ea sint accidentia relatiua quae cum aliqua mutatione rerum de quibus dicuntur accidunt? Sicut amicus relatiue dicitur, neque enim esse incipit nisi cum amare coeperit; fit ergo aliqua mutatio uoluntatis ut amicus dicatur. Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium relatiue dicitur, nec tamen mutatus est cum esse coepit pretium neque cum dicitur pignus et si qua similia.

How then shall we maintain that nothing according to accident is said of God, except because nothing befalls his nature whereby it is changed, so that the accidental predicates are relative ones which occur with some mutation of the things of which they are said? Just as “friend” is said relatively; for he does not begin to be except when he has begun to love; therefore some mutation of will comes about so that he is called a friend. But a coin, when it is called a “price,” is said relatively, and yet it has not been changed when it began to be a price, nor when it is called a pledge, and suchlike.

Si ergo nummus potest nulla sui mutatione totiens dici relatiue ut neque cum incipit dici neque cum desinit aliquid in eius natura uel forma qua nummus est mutationis fiat, quanto facilius de illa incommutabili dei substantia debemus accipere ut ita dicatur relatiue aliquid ad creaturam ut, quamuis temporaliter incipiat dici, non tamen ipsi substantiae dei accidisse intellegatur sed illi creaturae ad quam dicitur? Domine, inquit, refugium factus es nobis. Refugium ergo nostrum deus relatiue dicitur; ad nos enim refertur; et tunc refugium nostrum fit cum ad eum refugimus.

If, therefore, a coin can, with no mutation of itself, be so often said relatively that neither when it begins to be so called nor when it ceases does anything of mutation take place in its nature or form by which it is a coin, how much more easily ought we to take it concerning that immutable substance of God, that something is said relatively to the creature in such a way that, although it begins to be said temporally, nevertheless it is understood not to have befallen to the substance of God itself, but to that creature to which it is said? “Lord,” he says, “you have been made a refuge for us.” Therefore God is called our refuge relatively; for it is referred to us; and He then becomes our refuge when we take refuge to Him.

Numquid tunc fit aliquid in eius natura quod antequam ad eum refugeremus non erat? In nobis ergo fit aliqua mutatio; deteriores enim fuimus antequam ad eum refugeremus, et efficimur ad eum refugiendo meliores; in illo autem nulla. Sic et pater noster esse incipit cum per eius gratiam regeneramur quoniam dedit nobis potestatem filios dei fieri.

Does anything then come to be in his nature which, before we had fled to him for refuge, was not? In us, therefore, some mutation takes place; for we were worse before we fled to him, and by fleeing to him we are made better; but in him, none. Thus also he begins to be our Father when through his grace we are regenerated, since he has given us the power to become sons of God.

Substantia itaque nostra mutatur in melius cum filii eius efficimur; simul et ille pater noster esse incipit, sed nulla suae commutatione substantiae. Quod ergo temporaliter dici incipit deus quod antea non dicebatur manifestum est relatiue dici, non tamen secundum accidens dei quod ei aliquid acciderit, sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod dici aliquid deus incipit relatiue. Et quod amicus dei iustus esse incipit ipse mutatur; deus autem absit ut temporaliter aliquem diligat quasi noua dilectione quae in ipso ante non erat apud quem nec praeterita transierunt et futura iam facta sunt.

Therefore our substance is changed for the better when we are made his sons; at the same time he begins to be our father, but with no commutation of his substance. Therefore, what God begins to be said temporally, which previously was not said, is manifestly said relatively, yet not according to an accident of God, as though something had happened to him, but plainly according to the accident of that to which God begins to be said relatively. And when a just friend of God begins to be, he himself is changed; but far be it that God should love someone temporally, as by a new love which was not previously in him, with whom neither have past things passed away nor are future things already done.

Itaque omnes sanctos suos ante mundi constitutionem dilexit sicut praedestinauit, sed cum conuertuntur et inueniunt illum, tunc incipere ab eo diligi dicuntur ut eo modo dicatur quo potest humano affectu capi quod dicitur. Sic etiam cum iratus malis dicitur et placidus bonis, illi mutantur non ipse; sicut lux infirmis oculis aspera, firmis lenis est, ipsorum scilicet mutatione non sua.

Therefore he loved all his saints before the constitution of the world, just as he predestinated; but when they are converted and find him, then they are said to begin to be loved by him, so that it may be said in such a mode as what is said can be grasped by human affect. So also when he is said to be wrathful toward the wicked and placid toward the good, they are changed, not he; just as light is rough to weak eyes, gentle to strong ones—by their mutation, namely, not its own.