Pseudoplatonica: Demodocus

Tu me quidem iubes, o Demodoce, consilii aliquid vobis hisce de rebus afferre, de quibus consulturi convenistis: sed mihi in mentem venit considerare, quid concilium vestrum, eorumque, qui se vobis consilium posse dare putant, studium, atque suffragium, quod unusquisque vestrum ferre cogitat, possint efficere. Hoc enim quo pacto non sit ridiculum, vos, si recte et perite hisce de rebus, de quibus consulturi convenistis, dare consilium non licet, consulturos de rebus convenisse, de quibus dare consilium recte non liceat? Illud vero etiam qui non sit absurdum, convenisse vos consulturos, si recte quidem, et perite huiuscemodi de rebus dare consilium liceat, sed nulla sit scientia, ex qua recte quisquam de his dare consilium possit?

You bid me, O Demodoce, to bring some counsel to you about these matters on which you have met to deliberate: but it comes into my mind to consider what your council, and the zeal and suffrage which each of you thinks to bear, can effect. For how is it not ridiculous that you, if it is not permitted to give counsel rightly and skillfully concerning these matters about which you have met to consult, should have met to consult about matters concerning which it is not permitted to give counsel rightly? And further, how would it not be absurd that you have met to consult if indeed it is lawful to give counsel rightly and expertly about such matters, but there is no knowledge from which anyone could give counsel rightly about them?

Quod si aliqua scientia sit, qua liceat in his recte consilium dare, non necesse est, et aliquos esse, qui sciant his de rebus consilium dare? Quum vero sint aliqui, qui sciant de his consilium dare, vel nescire: vel partim quidem ex vobis scire, partim vero nescire? Si omnes igitur scitis, quid oportet vos amplius ad consulendum convenire?

But if there is any scientia by which it is lawful to give right counsel in these matters, is it not necessary that there also be some who know how to give counsel about these matters? And when there are some who know how to give counsel about them, will you be ignorant: or partly indeed will some of you know and partly not know? If therefore you all know, what need is there for you to convene further to deliberate?

unusquisque enim vestrum ad dandum consilium est idoneus. Sin omnes contra nescitis, quomodo consultare potestis: vel quid utilitatis hoc consilium afferre potest vobis, qui ne deliberare quidem possitis? Sed si ex vobis partim quidem sciunt, partim vero nesciunt, iique consilio egent, et si fieri potest, ut vir unus prudens det imperitis consilium, poterit et unus vobis, qui nescitis, consilium dare.

For each one of you is fit to give counsel. But if, on the contrary, you all are ignorant, how can you consult? Or what benefit can this counsel bring to you, who cannot even deliberate? But if from among you some indeed know and others do not, and those lack counsel, and if it is possible that one prudent man may give counsel to the unskilled, then a single man will likewise be able to give counsel to you who do not know.

An non idem, qui sciunt, dant consilium omnes? Quare vos, hoc audito, decet hinc abire. Nunc tamen hoc non facitis, sed vultis multos ex his, qui consilium, dent, audire.

Are not all who know the same in giving counsel? Wherefore you, this having been heard, ought to depart from here. Now, however, you do not do this, but wish to hear many of those who give counsel.

Non enim creditis eos, qui ad dandum consilium vobis aggrediuntur, ea nosse, de quibus dant consilium. Si enim credidissetis eos, qui dant consilium, nosse, unum vobis audire satis fuisset. Vos igitur, ut eos, qui nesciunt, audiatis, convenire, tanquam aliquid, quod operae pretium sit, facturi sitis, qui fieri potest, ut non sit absurdum?

For you do not believe those who undertake to give you counsel to know the things about which they give counsel. For if you had believed that those who give counsel knew, to hear one of them would have been sufficient for you. Therefore you are about to listen to those who do not know, as if you were going to do something worth the trouble — which it may be possible is not absurd?

Atque de vestro quidem consilio sic dubito: de illorum vero, qui vobis consilium dare posse putant, studio illud mihi dubium est. Nam si, qui iisdem de rebus dant consilium, non eadem respondeant, quo pacto pulchre omnes dare consilium possint, quum non respondeant eadem, quae respondet is, qui recte dat consilium? Vel quomodo ineptum non sit eorum studium, qui inducunt animum his de rebus consilium dare, quarum sunt imperiti?

And as for your own counsel I so doubt: but concerning those who think that they are able to give you counsel, that zeal is doubtful to me. For if those who give counsel about the same matters do not answer the same, how can all of them give counsel well, when they do not answer the same things as he who gives counsel rightly? Or how is not foolish the zeal of those who set their mind to give counsel about those matters of which they are inexperienced?

Nam periti nunquam sibi ita constituent, ut consilium non recte dare velint. Sin eadem contra respondeat, quid ipsos omnes oportet consilium dare? Unus enim ipsorum, qui eadem respondeat, sufficere poterit.

For experts will never set themselves up in such a way that they do not wish to give counsel rightly. But if one answers the same things in opposition, why ought all of them to give counsel? For one of them who answers the same will be able to suffice.

Quis igitur non rideat, qui cupiant ea facere quae nihil utilitatis afferant? Neque igitur imperitorum studium possit non esse ineptum, quum sit huiusmodi: neque prudens unquam talia facienda suscipiant, quum sciant vel unum quemvis ipsorum, qui consilium det, ut par est, id ipsum posse praestare. Quare ego nullam rationem excogitare possum, qua studium eorum, qui se vobis consilium dare posse putant, non ridiculum esse videatur.

Who then would not laugh, who desire to do those things that bring no utility? Nor therefore can the zeal of the unskilled be anything but foolish, since it is of this sort: nor will the prudent ever undertake such doings, since they know that even any one of them who gives counsel, as is fitting, can furnish that very thing. Wherefore I can devise no reason by which the zeal of those who think themselves able to give you counsel would not seem ridiculous.

Quod vero ad suffragium, quod ferre cogitatis, pertinet, id quidnam possit, vehementer animi pendeo. Nam utrum eos, qui sciunt, ut consilium dent, decernetis? at non plus uno, neque aliter, atque aliter eadem de re consilium dabunt: quamobrem de his vos suffragium ferre non oportebit.

But as for the suffrage which you are thinking to cast, what it may be I weigh heavily in my mind. For will you decide that those who know should give consilium? Yet not more than one, nor otherwise, and others likewise will give the same consilium about the same matter: therefore it will not be fitting for you to bear suffrage concerning these things.

An imperitos, et eos, qui non, ut oportet, consilium dant, ad dandum consilium constituetis? at hi non magis quam furiosi consulendi sunt. Sed si neque de peritis, neque de imperitis sententiam feretis, quosnam ab initio ad dandum consilium idoneos esse iudicabitis?

Will you appoint the unskilled, and those who do not give counsel as they ought, to give counsel? But these are no more to be consulted than the frantic. Yet if you will make no judgment about the skilled nor about the unskilled, whom then from the outset will you judge fit to give counsel?

Qui vero prorsus convenit alios vobis consilium dare: siquidem vos haec potestis iudicare? Quod si non potestis iudicare, quid vobis suffragia possunt prodesse? vel quo pacto ridiculum non sit, vos veluti consilio egentes, nec ad id inveniendum idoneos convenisse: postquam vero conveniretis, existimare sententiam vobis esse ferendam, tanquam iudicare possitis?

But who indeed altogether thinks it fitting that others should give counsel to you, since you can judge these things? And if you cannot judge, how can your votes be of use to you? Or in what way would it not be ridiculous that you, as it were lacking counsel and not fit to have been assembled to find it, — yet after you have been assembled, should suppose that a decision must be borne by you, as if you could judge?

Non enim dicendum est, vos quidem singulos rudes fuisse, sed, postquam unum in locum convenistis, prudentes factos esse: neque praeterea vos privatim quidem dubitasse, verum simulatque huc venistis, non amplius dubitare, sed idoneos esse factos ad ea perspicienda, quae vobis facienda sunt: quum de nullo haec didiceritis, neque vos ipsi inveneritis, quod est longe omnium difficillimum. Vos enim, nisi cognoscere possitis, quae vobis facienda sint, nunquam de eo, qui vobis consilium det, an id recte faciat, iudicare poteritis. Neque praeterea unus aliquis, qui vobis det consilium, dicet, se vos, quae vobis facienda sint, ita docturum, ut et qui male, et qui bene vobis consilium dent, iudicare possitis: atque id ipsum tam brevi, et tam multos: quum praesertim hoc illo nihilo minus difficile esse videatur.

For it must not be said that you individually were unlearned, but that, after you assembled together in one place, you became prudent: nor yet that privately you doubted, but as soon as you came here you no longer doubted, but were made fit to perceive those things which are to be done by you—since you have learned nothing about any of this, nor have you yourselves found that, which is by far the most difficult of all. For unless you can know what things are to be done by you, you will never be able to judge whether he who gives you counsel does that rightly. Nor, moreover, will any one man who gives you counsel say that he will so instruct you as to enable you to judge both those who give you counsel ill and those who give it well; and this very thing seems no less difficult to so brief and to so many, especially since it appears all the more difficult for that reason.

Quod si nec concilium, nec qui vobis consilium dat, vos ad iudicandum idoneos efficiunt, quid vobis opus est suffragiis? vel qui potius concilium vestrum suffragiis, et suffragia studio eorum, qui vobis consilium dant, non maxime repugnant? Nam concilium vestrum habetur perinde quasi vos ad aliquid statuendum non sitis idonei, sed aliorum consilio egeatis: suffragia vero perinde feruntur, ac si vos non modo non egeatis consilio, sed etiam iudicare, et dare aliis consilium possitis.

But if neither the council nor he who gives you counsel make you fit to judge, what need have you of suffrages? Or rather, do not your council and your suffrages most of all conflict with the zeal of those who give you counsel? For your council is held just as if you were not fit to determine anything, but stood in need of the counsel of others; suffrages, however, are carried as if you not only did not need counsel, but were also able to judge and to give counsel to others.

Deinde studium eorum, qui consilium dant, adest quidem, tanquam id facere sciant: sed a vobis suffragia feruntur, tanquam nesciant. Verum si quis vos, qui suffragia fertis, et eum, qui vobis hisce de rebus quas suffragio decernitis, consilium dederit, ita roget: an scitis id futurum, cuius causa facere ea cogitatis, quae decrevistis? non credo vos dicturos, Quid autem, si fuerit illud, cuius causa facere haec cogitatis, nostis hoc utile vobis fore?

Then the zeal of those who give counsel is present indeed, as if they knew how to do it; but the votes are cast by you as if you did not know. But if anyone should put this question to you who cast the votes and to him who gives you counsel about these matters which you decide by suffrage, he would ask thus: Do you know that that will be the case for whose sake you are planning to do the things which you have decreed? I do not think you will say so. And what if that thing for whose sake you plan to do these things exists — do you know that this will be profitable to you?

Neque vos hoc dicturos, neque eum, qui vobis dat consilium, puto. Si quis praeterea de vobis ita quaerat: an esse quenquam omnium mortalium existimatis, qui horum aliquod unum faciat? Neque vos hoc concessuros arbitror.

Nor do I think that you will say this, nor him who gives you counsel. If anyone furthermore should ask you thus: do you suppose that there is any one of all mortals who would do any one of these things? I do not suppose that you will grant this.

Quum igitur illa, quae in consultationem veniunt, sint eiusmodi, ut manifesta vobis esse non possint: quumque ij, qui suffragia ferunt, atque ij, qui consilium dant, sint imperiti: iure dicetis evenire, ut et nos non credamus, et ipsos saepe earum rerum poeniteat, de quibus consulant, et de quibus suffragium ferant: quae praestantissimis viris accidere consentaneum non est. Illi enim sciunt, qualia sint illa, de quibus causa consilium dant, his, qui ab ipsis persuasi sint, certa esse, futurumque, ut neque ipsos, neque eos, qui persuasi sint, unquam poeniteat. His igitur ego de rebus existimabam dignum , eos, qui prudentes sint, consilium dare; non autem de his de quibus tu me dare consilium iubes.

Since therefore those things which come into consultation are of such a sort that they cannot be manifest to you, and since those who cast suffrages and those who give counsel are unskilled, you will rightly say that it happens that we do not believe, and that they themselves often repent of those things about which they consult and for which they cast a vote — things which it is not consonant for the most excellent men to suffer to happen. For they know what those things are of which they give counsel; to those who have been persuaded by them they are certain, and will be, so that neither they themselves nor those persuaded will ever regret. Therefore I thought it worthy to give counsel about matters to those who are prudent; not about those things concerning which you bid me give counsel.

Ex illorum enim consultatione felicitas, ex horum vero nugis infelicitas nascitur. Interfui forte, quum homo quidam amicum repraehenderet suum: propterea quod cuidam accusatori credebat, quum defensorem nondum, sed accusatorem ipsum duntaxat audisset. Dicebat itaque rem illum indignam facere, qui condemnaret hominem, cuius neque ipse res praesens vidisset, neque ex amicis, qui vidissent, quibusque par esset de illo referentibus credere, audisset: quum ne audita quidem utriusue causa, accusatori ita temere crederet: iustumque esse ab illo non minus defensorem quam accusatorem audiri prius quam absolveret, vel condemnaret.

For from the consultation of those men happiness is born, but from the trifles of these men unhappiness arises. I chanced to be present when a certain man was reproving his friend: because he believed a certain accuser, having as yet heard no defender, but only the accuser himself. He therefore said that that man acted unjustly who would condemn a man whose affairs he himself had not seen in person, nor had heard from friends who had seen and who would be of equal standing to report about him; since, without having even heard either case, he so rashly believed the accuser: and that it was just that from that man the defender be heard no less than the accuser before he would acquit or condemn.

Nam qui possit aliquis vel causam bene, vel homines probe iudicare, nisi prius utrunque litigatorem audiverit? Collatas enim rationes, et causas veluti purpuram, et aurum longe potius est iudicari. Cur enim Legislator iussisset vel tempus adversariorum utrique dari, vel iudices iurare se aequaliter utranque partem audituros, nisi iustius, meliusqe a iudicibus causas hoc modo iudicari posse existimasset?

For who can either judge a cause well or judge men rightly, unless he has first heard both litigants? For when the reasons are compared, the causes, as it were, are judged like purple and gold, and by far gold is preferred. Why then would the Legislator have ordered that time be given to each of the adversaries, or that judges swear that they will hear each party equally, unless he had thought that causes could be judged more justly and better by judges in this way?

Tu vero mihi videris ne illud quidem, quod a multis dicitur, audisse. Quidnam? inquit.

But you, it seems to me, have not even heard that which is spoken by many. "What is it?" he says.