Justinian: DIGESTA

Mandatum nisi gratuitum nullum est: nam originem ex officio atque amicitia trahit, contrarium ergo est officio merces: interveniente enim pecunia res ad locationem et conductionem potius respicit.

Unless gratuitous, no mandate exists: for it draws its origin from office and friendship; a fee, therefore, is contrary to the office: for when money intervenes, the matter rather has regard to letting and hiring.

Dig. 17.1.2pr.

Digest 17.1.2 preface.

Gaius 2 cott.

Mandatum inter nos contrahitur, sive mea tantum gratia tibi mandem sive aliena tantum sive mea et aliena sive mea et tua sive tua et aliena. quod si tua tantum gratia tibi mandem. supervacuum est mandatum et ob id nulla ex eo obligatio nascitur.

A mandate is contracted between us, whether I mandate to you for my benefit only, or for another’s only, or for mine and another’s, or for mine and yours, or for yours and another’s. But if I mandate to you for your benefit only, the mandate is superfluous, and on that account no obligation arises from it.

Dig. 17.1.2.1

Digest 17.1.2.1

Gaius 2 cott.

Gaius 2 Quotidian Matters.

Mea tantum gratia intervenit mandatum, veluti si tibi mandem, ut negotia mea geras vel ut fundum mihi emeres vel ut pro me fideiubeas.

Only my interest is involved in the mandate, as for instance if I mandate to you that you manage my affairs, or that you buy me an estate, or that you stand surety on my behalf.

Dig. 17.1.2.2

Digest 17.1.2.2

Gaius 2 cott.

Aliena tantum, veluti si tibi mandem, ut titii negotia gereres vel ut fundum ei emeres vel ut pro eo fideiubeas.

Only another’s, for example, if I give you a mandate to manage Titius’s business or to buy an estate for him or to stand surety on his behalf.

Dig. 17.1.2.3

Digest 17.1.2.3

Gaius 2 cott.

Gaius book 2 of the Commentaries.

Mea et aliena, veluti si tibi mandem, ut mea et titii negotia gereres vel ut mihi et titio fundum emeres vel ut pro me et titio fideiubeas.

Mine and another’s, as, for example, if I should mandate to you that you manage my and Titius’s affairs, or that you buy an estate for me and Titius, or that you stand surety on behalf of me and Titius.

Dig. 17.1.2.4

Digest 17.1.2.4

Gaius 2 cott.

Tua et mea, veluti si mandem tibi, ut sub usuris crederes ei, qui in rem meam mutuaretur.

Yours and mine, as if I were to mandate to you that you should credit at interest one who was borrowing for my benefit.

Dig. 17.1.2.5

Digest 17.1.2.5

Gaius 2 cott.

Tua et aliena, veluti si tibi mandem, ut titio sub usuris crederes: quod si, ut sine usuris crederes, aliena tantum gratia intervenit mandatum.

Your own and another’s, as for example if I were to commission you to credit Titius under interest; but if it is so that you should credit without interest, the mandate intervenes solely for another’s favor.

Dig. 17.1.2.6

Digest 17.1.2.6

Gaius 2 cott.

Gaius 2 quotidian matters.

Tua autem gratia intervenit mandatum, veluti si mandem tibi, ut pecunias tuas potius in emptiones praediorum colloces quam faeneres, vel ex diverso ut faeneres potius quam in emptiones praediorum colloces: cuius generis mandatum magis consilium est quam mandatum et ob id non est obligatorium, quia nemo ex consilio obligatur, etiamsi non expediat ei cui dabatur, quia liberum est cuique apud se explorare, an expediat sibi consilium.

But a mandate intervening for your advantage occurs, as for instance if I mandate to you that you should place your monies rather in purchases of estates than lend at interest, or conversely that you should lend at interest rather than place them in purchases of estates: a mandate of this kind is more counsel than mandate and on that account is not obligatory, because no one is bound by counsel, even if it is not expedient for the one to whom it was given, since it is free for each person to examine with himself whether the counsel is expedient for him.

Dig. 17.1.3pr.

Digest 17.1.3 pr.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul, 32 on the Edict.

Praeterea in causa mandati etiam illud vertitur, ut interim nec melior causa mandantis fieri possit, interdum melior, deterior vero numquam.

Moreover, in the matter of mandate, this too is at issue: that at one time the mandator’s position cannot be made better, at another it can be made better, but never worse.

Dig. 17.1.3.1

Digest 17.1.3.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Et quidem si mandavi tibi, ut aliquam rem mihi emeres, nec de pretio quicquam statui tuque emisti, utrimque actio nascitur.

And indeed, if I have mandated to you that you buy some thing for me, and I set nothing as to the price, and you bought it, an action arises on both sides.

Dig. 17.1.3.2

Digest 17.1.3.2

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Quod si pretium statui tuque pluris emisti, quidam negaverunt te mandati habere actionem, etiamsi paratus esses id quod excedit remittere: namque iniquum est non esse mihi cum illo actionem, si nolit, illi vero, si velit, mecum esse.

But if I fixed the price and you purchased for a higher amount, some have denied that you have an action of mandate, even if you were ready to remit that which exceeds: for it is inequitable that I should not have an action against him, if he is unwilling, but that he, if he is willing, should have one against me.

Dig. 17.1.4

Digest 17.1.4

Gaius 2 rer. cott.

Gaius 2 On Quotidian Things.

Sed proculus recte eum usque ad pretium statutum acturum existimat, quae sententia sane benignior est.

But Proculus rightly thinks that he will sue up to the stipulated price, which opinion is indeed more benign.

Dig. 17.1.5pr.

Digest 17.1.5, at the beginning.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Diligenter igitur fines mandati custodiendi sunt:

Therefore the boundaries of the mandate are to be diligently guarded:

Dig. 17.1.5.1

Digest 17.1.5.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Nam qui excessit, aliud quid facere videtur et, si susceptum non impleverit, tenetur.

For one who has exceeded seems to be doing something different, and, if he does not fulfill what has been undertaken, he is liable.

Dig. 17.1.5.2

Digest 17.1.5.2

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus, 32 on the Edict.

Itaque si mandavero tibi, ut domum seianam centum emeres tuque titianam emeris longe maioris pretii, centum tamen aut etiam minoris, non videris implesse mandatum.

Therefore, if I have given you a mandate that you buy the Seian house for 100, and you buy the Titian house, of far greater price, yet for 100 or even for less, you do not seem to have fulfilled the mandate.

Dig. 17.1.5.3

Digest 17.1.5.3

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict.

Item si mandavero tibi, ut fundum meum centum venderes tuque eum nonaginta vendideris et petam fundum, non obstabit mihi exceptio, nisi et reliquum mihi, quod deest mandatu meo, praestes et indemnem me per omnia conserves.

Likewise, if I shall have given you a mandate that you sell my estate for 100, and you have sold it for 90, and I claim the estate, the exception will not stand against me, unless you both provide to me the remainder which is lacking under my mandate and keep me indemnified in all respects.

Dig. 17.1.5.4

Digest 17.1.5.4

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus Book 32 on the Edict.

Servo quoque dominus si praeceperit certa summa rem vendere, ille minoris vendiderit, similiter vindicare eam dominus potest nec ulla exceptione summoveri, nisi indemnitas ei praestetur.

If the master likewise has directed his slave to sell a thing for a fixed sum, and he has sold it for less, the master similarly can vindicate the thing and be removed by no exception, unless indemnity is furnished to him.

Dig. 17.1.5.5

Digest 17.1.5.5

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Melior autem causa mandantis fieri potest, si, cum tibi mandassem, ut stichum decem emeres, tu eum minoris emeris vel tantidem, ut aliud quicquam servo accederet: utroque enim casu aut non ultra pretium aut intra pretium fecisti.

But the mandator’s case can be made better, if, when I had mandated you to buy Stichus for 10, you bought him for less, or for the same amount, so that something else accrued to the slave: for in either case you have acted either not beyond the price or within the price.

Dig. 17.1.6pr.

Digest 17.1.6 preface.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si remunerandi gratia honor intervenit, erit mandati actio.

If, for the sake of remuneration, an honorarium intervenes, there will be an action on mandate.

Dig. 17.1.6.1

Digest 17.1.6.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Si cui fuerit mandatum, ut negotia administraret, hac actione erit conveniendus nec recte negotiorum gestorum cum eo agetur: nec enim ideo est obligatus, quod negotia gessit, verum idcirco quod mandatum susceperit: denique tenetur et si non gessisset.

If it has been mandated to someone to administer the affairs, he shall be sued by this action, nor will the action of negotiorum gestorum be rightly brought against him: for he is not therefore obligated because he managed the affairs, but for this reason, that he undertook the mandate; finally, he is liable even if he did not manage them.

Dig. 17.1.6.2

Digest 17.1.6.2

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the edict.

Si passus sim aliquem pro me fideiubere vel alias intervenire, mandati teneor et, nisi pro invito quis intercesserit aut donandi animo aut negotium gerens, erit mandati actio.

If I have allowed someone to be surety for me or otherwise to intervene, I am held under mandate; and, unless someone has interceded for an unwilling party or with the intention of gifting or as a manager of business, there will be an action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.6.3

Digest 17.1.6.3

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Rei turpis nullum mandatum est et ideo hac actione non agetur.

For a shameful matter, no mandate exists, and therefore one will not proceed by this action.

Dig. 17.1.6.4

Digest 17.1.6.4

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si tibi mandavero quod mea non intererat, veluti ut pro seio intervenias vel ut titio credas, erit mihi tecum mandati actio, ut celsus libro septimo digestorum scribit, et ego tibi sum obligatus.

If I have mandated to you something that did not pertain to me, for example that you intervene for seius or that you extend credit to titio, there will be for me with you an action on mandate, as Celsus writes in the seventh book of the Digest, and I am obligated to you.

Dig. 17.1.6.5

Digest 17.1.6.5

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Plane si tibi mandavero quod tua intererat, nulla erit mandati actio, nisi mea quoque interfuit: aut, si non esses facturus, nisi ego mandassem, nisi mea non interfuit, tamen erit mandati actio.

Clearly, if I have given you a mandate about something that was to your interest, there will be no action on mandate unless it was also to my interest; or, if you would not have done it unless I had mandated it, even if it was not to my interest, nevertheless there will be an action on mandate.

Dig. 17.1.6.6

Digest 17.1.6.6

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Apud iulianum libro tertio decimo digestorum quaeritur: si dominus iusserit procuratorem suum certam pecuniam sumere et faenerare periculo suo ita, ut certas usuras domino penderet dumtaxat, si pluris faenerare potuisset, ipse lucraretur, in creditam pecuniam videtur, inquit, accepisse. plane si omnium negotiorum erat ei administratio mandata, mandati quoque eum teneri, quemadmodum solet mandati teneri debitor, qui creditoris sui negotia gessit.

With Julian, in the thirteenth book of the Digest, it is asked: if the master has ordered his procurator to take a certain sum and lend it at interest at his own risk, on condition that he pay the master fixed interest only, and, if he could lend at a higher rate, he himself should profit, he is considered, he says, to have received it as money on credit. Clearly, if the administration of all affairs had been entrusted to him, he too is held under the mandate, just as a debtor is accustomed to be held under the mandate who has managed his creditor’s business.

Dig. 17.1.6.7

Digest 17.1.6.7

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Marius paulus quidam fideiusserat pro daphnide mercedem pactus ob suam fideiussionem et sub nomine alterius ex eventu litis caverat sibi certam quantitatem dari: hic a claudio saturnino praetore maiores fructus inferre iussus erat et advocationibus ei idem saturninus interdixerat. videbatur autem mihi iudicatum solvi fideiussisse et quasi redemptor litis extitisse et velle a daphnide mandati iudicio consequi, quod erat condemnatus. sed rectissime divi fratres rescripserunt nullam actionem eum propter suam calliditatem habere, quia mercede pacta accesserat ad talem redemptionem.

Marius paulus had stood as surety for daphnis, having bargained a fee on account of his suretyship, and, under another’s name, had stipulated that, from the outcome of the suit, a fixed amount be given to himself: this man was ordered by the praetor claudius saturninus to pay greater fruits (i.e., higher interest), and the same saturninus interdicted him from advocations (acting as an advocate). It seemed to me, however, that he had stood surety for the payment of the judgment and had appeared as it were a purchaser of the litigation, and that he wished by an action of mandate to obtain from daphnis what he had been condemned to pay. But most rightly the divine brothers wrote back that, on account of his cunning, he had no action, because with a fee bargained he had acceded to such a redemption.

Marcellus autem sic loquitur de eo qui pecunia accepta spopondit, ut, si quidem hoc actum est, ut suo periculo sponderet, nulla actione agat, sin vero non hoc actum est, utilis ei potius actio competat: quae sententia utilitati rerum consentanea est.

However, Marcellus speaks thus about the one who, upon receiving money, made a sponsion: namely, if indeed it was agreed that he would promise at his own risk, let him bring no action; but if this was not agreed, then rather a useful action should lie for him—which opinion is consonant with the utility of affairs.

Dig. 17.1.7

Digest 17.1.7

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinian 3 responses.

Salarium procuratori constitutum si extra ordinem peti coeperit, considerandum erit, laborem dominus remunerare voluerit atque ideo fidem adhiberi placitis oporteat an eventum litium maioris pecuniae praemio contra bonos mores procurator redemerit.

If the salary set for a procurator begins to be demanded by extraordinary procedure, it will have to be considered whether the master intended to remunerate the labor—and therefore trust ought to be given to the pacts—or whether the procurator, contrary to good morals, has purchased the outcome of the lawsuits with the premium of a larger sum of money.

Dig. 17.1.8pr.

Digest 17.1.8 pr.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si procuratorem dedero nec instrumenta mihi causae reddat, qua actione mihi teneatur? et labeo putat mandati eum teneri nec esse probabilem sententiam existimantium ex hac causa agi posse depositi: uniuscuiusque enim contractus initium spectandum et causam.

If I have appointed a procurator and he does not return to me the instruments/documents of my case, by what action is he bound to me? And Labeo thinks that he is held by the action on mandate, and that the opinion of those who consider that from this ground an action on deposit can be brought is not probable; for the inception and the cause of each contract must be looked to.

Dig. 17.1.8.1

Digest 17.1.8.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Sed et si per collusionem procuratoris absolutus sit adversarius, mandati eum teneri: sed si solvendo non sit, tunc de dolo actionem adversus reum, qui per collusionem absolutus sit, dandam ait.

But also, if the adversary has been absolved through the collusion of the procurator, he is held on the mandate: but if he is not solvent, then, he says, an action de dolo is to be given against the defendant who has been absolved through collusion.

Dig. 17.1.8.2

Digest 17.1.8.2

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Sed et de lite quam suscepit exsequenda mandati eum teneri constat.

But it is also established that he is held liable for the litigation which he undertook to prosecute in execution of the mandate.

Dig. 17.1.8.3

Digest 17.1.8.3

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si quis mandaverit alicui gerenda negotia eius, qui ipse sibi mandaverat, habebit mandati actionem, quia et ipse tenetur ( tenetur autem, quia agere potest): quamquam enim volgo dicatur procuratorem ante litem contestatam facere procuratorem non posse, tamen mandati actio est: ad agendum enim dumtaxat hoc facere non potest.

If someone has mandated to another the managing of the affairs of him who had himself given him a mandate, he will have the action of mandate, because he too is bound ( he is bound, moreover, because he can sue): for although it is commonly said that a procurator, before the suit is contested, cannot make a procurator, nevertheless there is an action of mandate: for it is only for the purpose of bringing an action that he cannot do this.

Dig. 17.1.8.4

Digest 17.1.8.4

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si tutores mandaverint contutori suo mancipium emendum pupillo et ille non emerit, an sit mandati actio, et utrum tantum mandati an vero et tutelae? et iulianus distinguit: referre enim ait, cuius generis servum tutores uni tutorum mandaverint ut emeret. nam si supervacuum servum vel etiam onerosum, mandati actione tantum eum teneri, tutelae non teneri: si vero necessarium servum, tunc et tutelae eum teneri non solum, sed et ceteros: nam et si mandassent, tenerentur tutelae, cur servum pupillo necessarium non comparaverunt: non sunt igitur excusati, quod contutori mandaverunt, quia emere debuerunt.

If tutors have commissioned their co-guardian to buy a mancipium (slave) for the ward and he has not bought it, whether there is an action on mandate, and whether only an action on mandate or indeed also one of guardianship? And Julian distinguishes: for he says it makes a difference of what kind of slave the tutors instructed one of the tutors to buy. For if it was a superfluous slave or even an onerous one, he is held only by the action on mandate, not by the action of guardianship; but if a necessary slave, then he is liable not only to the action of guardianship, but the others as well: for even if they had given the mandate, they would be held to the action of guardianship, as to why they did not procure for the ward a slave that was necessary. They are therefore not excused by the fact that they entrusted it to a co-guardian, because they ought to have bought it.

plane habebunt nihilo minus mandati actionem, quia mandato non est obtemperatum. contra quoque iulianus ait tutorem qui emit mandati actionem habere adversus contutores suos.

plainly they will nonetheless have the action of mandate, because the mandate has not been obeyed. conversely, Julianus also says that the tutor who purchased has the action of mandate against his co-tutors.

Dig. 17.1.8.5

Digest 17.1.8.5

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 On the Edict.

Si liber homo, cum bona fide serviret, mandaverit titio ut redimeretur et nummos ex eo peculio dederit, quod ipsum sequi, non apud bonae fidei emptorem relinqui debuit, titiusque pretio soluto liberum illum manumiserit, mox ingenuus pronuntiatus est, habere eum mandati actionem iulianus ait adversus eum cui se redimendum mandavit, sed hoc tantum inesse mandati iudicio, ut sibi actiones mandet, quas habet adversus eum a quo comparavit. plane si eam pecuniam dederit, quae erat ex peculio ad bonae fidei emptorem pertinente, nullae ei, inquit iulianus, mandari actiones possunt, quia nullas habet, cum ei suos nummos emptor dederit: quinimmo, inquit, ex vendito manebit obligatus, sed et haec actio inutilis est, quia quantum fuerit consecutus, tantum empti iudicio necesse habebit praestare.

If a free man, while he was serving in good faith, gave a mandate to Titius to have himself redeemed and gave monies from that peculium—which ought to follow him itself and not be left with the bona‑fide purchaser—and Titius, the price having been paid, manumitted that man as free, and he was soon declared ingenuus (freeborn), Julian says that he has an action of mandate against the one to whom he gave the mandate to redeem him; but that only this is contained in the judgment of mandate: that he assign to him the actions which he has against the person from whom he bought him. Clearly, if he gave that money which was from the peculium belonging to the bona‑fide purchaser, “no actions,” says Julian, “can be assigned to him, because he has none, since the purchaser gave him his own monies;” nay rather, he will remain obligated ex vendito, but even this action is useless, because however much he has obtained, just so much he will be compelled to render by the action on purchase (empti iudicium).

Dig. 17.1.8.6

Digest 17.1.8.6

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Mandati actio tunc competit, cum coepit interesse eius qui mandavit: ceterum si nihil interest, cessat mandati actio, et eatenus competit, quatenus interest. ut puta mandavi tibi, ut fundum emeres: si intererat mea emi, teneberis: ceterum si eundem hunc fundum ego ipse emi vel alius mihi neque interest aliquid, cessat mandati actio. mandavi, ut negotia gereres: si nihil deperierit, quamvis nemo gesserit, nulla actio est, aut si alius idonee gesserit, cessat mandati actio.

The action of mandate then lies, when it has begun to be of interest to the one who mandated; but if nothing is of interest, the action of mandate ceases, and it lies only to that extent, insofar as there is an interest. For instance, I mandated to you that you buy an estate: if it was to my interest that it be bought, you will be held; but if I myself bought this same estate or another bought it for me and nothing of interest remains, the action of mandate ceases. I mandated that you manage the affairs: if nothing has been lost, although no one managed them, there is no action; or if another has managed them suitably, the action of mandate ceases.

et in similibus hoc idem erit probandum.

and in similar cases this same thing will have to be proved.

Dig. 17.1.8.7

Digest 17.1.8.7

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si ignorantes fideiussores debitorem solvisse vel etiam acceptilatione sive pacto liberatum ex substantia debitoris solverunt, non tenebuntur mandati.

If, being unaware, the sureties paid, the debtor having paid, or even having been released by acceptilation or by pact, and they paid out of the debtor’s substance, they will not be liable under the mandate.

Dig. 17.1.8.8

Digest 17.1.8.8

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Quod et ad actionem fideiussoris pertinet. et hoc ex rescripto divorum fratrum intellegere licet, cuius verba haec sunt: " catullo iuliano. si hi, qui pro te fideiusserant, in maiorem quantitatem damnati, quam debiti ratio exigebat, scientes et prudentes auxilium appellationis omiserunt, poteris mandati agentibus his aequitate iudicis tueri te". igitur si ignoraverunt, excusata ignorantia est: si scierunt, incumbebat eis necessitas provocandi, ceterorum dolo versati sunt, si non provocaverunt.

Which also pertains to the action of a surety. And this can be understood from the rescript of the Divine Brothers, whose words are these: " catullus to julianus. If those who had stood surety for you, having been condemned in a greater amount than the reckoning of the debt required, knowingly and advisedly omitted the aid of an appeal, you can, when they bring an action on mandate, protect yourself by the equity of the judge". Therefore, if they were ignorant, their ignorance is excused; if they knew, the necessity of appealing lay upon them; they were entangled in the fraud of others, if they did not appeal.

quid tamen, si paupertas eis non permisit? excusata est eorum inopia. sed et si testato convenerunt debitorem, ut si ipse putaret appellaret, puto rationem eis constare.

What then, if poverty did not permit them? Their indigence is excused. But even if they made an attested agreement with the debtor, that, if he himself should think it, he would appeal, I think the reason holds for them.

Dig. 17.1.8.9

Digest 17.1.8.9

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 On the Edict.

Dolo autem facere videtur, qui id quod potest restituere non restituit:

However, he seems to act fraudulently, who does not restore that which he can restore:

Dig. 17.1.8.10

Digest 17.1.8.10

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Proinde si tibi mandavi, ut hominem emeres, tuque emisti, teneberis mihi, ut restituas. sed et si dolo emere neglexisti ( forte enim pecunia accepta alii cessisti ut emeret) aut si lata culpa ( forte si gratia ductus passus es alium emere), teneberis. sed et si servus quem emisti fugit, si quidem dolo tuo, teneberis, si dolus non intervenit nec culpa, non teneberis nisi ad hoc, ut caveas, si in potestatem tuam pervenerit, te restituturum.

Accordingly, if I have mandated to you that you buy a man, and you have bought, you will be bound to me to restore him. But also if you neglected to buy through fraud (for instance, because, money having been received, you ceded to another that he might buy), or through gross fault (for instance, if, led by favor, you allowed another to buy), you will be liable. And also if the slave whom you bought has fled, if indeed through your fraud, you will be liable; if neither fraud intervened nor fault, you will not be liable except to this: that you give security that, if he shall have come into your power, you will restore him.

sed et si restituas, et tradere debes. et si cautum est de evictione vel potes desiderare, ut tibi caveatur, puto sufficere, si mihi hac actione cedas, ut procuratorem me in rem meam facias, nec amplius praestes quam consecuturus sis.

but even if you restitute, you must also deliver. and if a guarantee has been given concerning eviction, or you can desiderate that a guarantee be given to you, I think it is sufficient if you cede this action to me, so that you make me procurator in my own matter, and you are not to furnish more than you are going to recover.

Dig. 17.1.9

Digest 17.1.9

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

De tuo etiam facto cavere debes.

You must also provide security concerning your own act.

Dig. 17.1.10pr.

Digest 17.1.10pr.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Idemque et in fundo, si fundum emit procurator: nihil enim amplius quam bonam fidem praestare eum oportet qui procurat.

And the same in the case of an estate as well, if a procurator buys an estate: for he who acts as procurator ought to provide nothing more than good faith.

Dig. 17.1.10.1

Digest 17.1.10.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Sed et si de sanitate servi procuratori cautum est aut caveri potest aut de ceteris vitiis, idem erit dicendum. aut si culpa caveri non curaverit, condemnabitur.

But also, if provision has been made to the procurator concerning the slave’s soundness, or provision can be made, or concerning the other defects, the same will have to be said. Or if he has not taken care that surety be given for fault, he will be condemned.

Dig. 17.1.10.2

Digest 17.1.10.2

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si ex fundo quem mihi emit procurator fructus consecutus est, hos quoque officio iudicis praestare eum oportet.

If, from the estate which my procurator bought for me, he has obtained the fruits, it is proper, by the office of the judge, that he provide these as well.

Dig. 17.1.10.3

Digest 17.1.10.3

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict

Si procurator meus pecuniam meam habeat, ex mora utique usuras mihi pendet. sed et si pecuniam meam faenori dedit usurasque consecutus est, consequenter dicemus debere eum praestare quantumcumque emolumentum sensit, sive ei mandavi sive non, quia bonae fidei hoc congruit, ne de alieno lucrum sentiat: quod si non exercuit pecuniam, sed ad usus suos convertit, in usuras convenietur, quae legitimo modo in regionibus frequentantur. denique papinianus ait etiam si usuras exegerit procurator et in usus suos convertit, usuras eum praestare debere.

If my procurator has my money, he certainly owes me interest for delay. But also, if he has given my money out at interest and has obtained interest, we will consequently say that he must render whatever emolument he has realized, whether I gave him a mandate or not, because this accords with good faith, lest he derive profit from another’s property. But if he did not employ the money, and instead converted it to his own uses, he will be sued for interest, at the rates which are lawfully customary in the regions. Finally, Papinian says that even if the procurator has collected interest and converted it to his own uses, he must render interest.

Dig. 17.1.10.4

Digest 17.1.10.4

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Si quis titio mandaverit, ut ab actoribus suis mutuam pecuniam acciperet, mandati eum non acturum papinianus libro tertio responsorum scribit, quia de mutua pecunia eum habet obligatum: et ideo usuras eum petere non posse quasi ex causa mandati, si in stipulationem deductae non sunt.

If someone has given a mandate to Titius to receive mutuum-money from his own agents, Papinian writes in the third book of his Responses that he will not bring an action of mandate, because he has him obligated on account of the mutuum; and therefore he cannot claim interest as though on the ground of mandate, if they have not been reduced into a stipulation.

Dig. 17.1.10.5

Digest 17.1.10.5

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Idem papinianus libro eodem refert fideiussori condemnato, qui ideo fideiussit, quia dominus procuratori mandaverat ut pecuniam mutuam acciperet, utilem actionem dandam quasi institoriam, quia et hic quasi praeposuisse eum mutuae pecuniae accipiendae videatur.

The same Papinian, in the same book, reports that to a surety who has been condemned—who for this reason stood surety, because the master had instructed the procurator to receive money by way of loan—a useful action should be given, as if an institorial action, since here too he seems, as it were, to have put him in charge for the taking of loan‑money.

Dig. 17.1.10.6

Digest 17.1.10.6

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si cui mandavero, ut a titio stipuletur, potero cum eo cui mandavi agere mandati, ut eum accepto liberet, si hoc velim: vel, si malim, in hoc agam, ut eum deleget mihi vel si cui alii voluero. et papinianus libro eodem scribit, si mater pro filia dotem dederit eamque mandante filia vel ilico stipulata sit vel etiam postea, mandati eam teneri, quamvis ipsa sit, quae dotem dederit.

If I have given a mandate to someone to stipulate from Titius, I shall be able to proceed by an action of mandate against the one to whom I gave the mandate, to the end that he release him by acceptilation, if I wish this; or, if I prefer, I may sue to this end, that he delegate him to me, or to whomever else I wish. And Papinian in the same book writes that, if a mother has given a dowry on behalf of her daughter and, at the daughter’s mandate, has stipulated it either immediately or even later, she is held by the action of mandate, although she herself is the one who gave the dowry.

Dig. 17.1.10.7

Digest 17.1.10.7

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si quis ea, quae procurator suus et servi gerebant, ita demum rata esse mandavit, si interventu sempronii gesta essent, et male pecunia credita sit, sempronium, qui nihil dolo fecit, non teneri. et est verum eum, qui non animo procuratoris intervenit, sed affectionem amicalem promisit in monendis procuratoribus et actoribus et in regendis consilio, mandati non teneri, sed si quid dolo fecerit, non mandati, sed magis de dolo teneri.

If someone has mandated that those things which his procurator and his slaves were managing are to be valid only if they were done with the intervention of Sempronius, and money has been ill loaned, Sempronius, who did nothing in fraud, is not held. And it is true that one who did not intervene with the mind of a procurator, but promised friendly affection in admonishing the procurators and agents and in directing them by counsel, is not liable on mandate; but if he has done anything in fraud, he is liable not on the mandate, but rather by the action for fraud.

Dig. 17.1.10.8

Digest 17.1.10.8

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si mandavero procuratori meo, ut titio pecuniam meam credat sine usuris, isque non sine usuris crediderit, an etiam usuras mihi restituere debeat, videamus. et labeo scribit restituere eum oportere, etiamsi hoc mandaverim, ut gratuitam pecuniam daret, quamvis, si periculo suo credidisset, cessaret, inquit labeo, in usuris actio mandati.

If I have instructed my procurator to lend my money to Titius without usury, and he has lent it not without usury, let us consider whether he must also restore the usury to me. And Labeo writes that he ought to restore it, even if I have given this mandate, that he give the money gratuitously; although, if he had lent at his own risk, the action of mandate, says Labeo, would cease as to the usury.

Dig. 17.1.10.9

Digest 17.1.10.9

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Idem labeo ait et verum est reputationes quoque hoc iudicium admittere et, sicuti fructus cogitur restituere is qui procurat, ita sumptum, quem in fructus percipiendos fecit, deducere eum oportet: sed et si ad vecturas suas, dum excurrit in praedia, sumptum fecit, puto hos quoque sumptus reputare eum oportere, nisi si salariarius fuit et hoc convenit, ut sumptus de suo faceret ad haec itinera, hoc est de salario.

The same Labeo says—and it is true—that this action also admits reckonings; and, just as he who manages is compelled to restore the fruits, so he ought to deduct the expense which he incurred for perceiving (collecting) the fruits. But even if, for his own fares, while he runs out to the estates, he incurred expense, I think he ought to reckon these expenses too—unless he was a salaried man and it was agreed that he would make the expenses for these journeys out of his own, that is, out of his salary.

Dig. 17.1.10.10

Digest 17.1.10.10

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Idem ait, si quid procurator citra mandatum in voluptatem fecit, permittendum ei auferre, quod sine damno domini fiat, nisi rationem sumptus istius dominus admittit.

The same says that, if a procurator has done something outside the mandate for pleasure, he should be permitted to take it away, insofar as it can be done without loss to the master, unless the master accepts the account of that expense.

Dig. 17.1.10.11

Digest 17.1.10.11

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Fideiussores et mandatores et si sine iudicio solverint, habent actionem mandati.

Sureties and mandators, even if they have paid without a judgment, have an action on mandate.

Dig. 17.1.10.12

Digest 17.1.10.12

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Generaliter iulianus ait, si fideiussor ex sua persona omiserit exceptionem, qua reus uti non potuit, si quidem minus honestam, habere eum mandati actionem: quod si eam, qua reus uti potuit, si sciens id fecit, non habiturum mandati actionem, si modo habuit facultatem rei conveniendi desiderandique, ut ipse susciperet potius iudicium vel suo vel procuratorio nomine.

Generally Julian says that, if a surety, in his own person, has omitted an exception (defense) which the defendant could not employ—if indeed it is a less honorable one—he will have the action on mandate; but if it is one which the defendant could have employed, if he did this knowingly, he will not have the action on mandate, provided that he had the faculty of convening the defendant and of demanding that he himself should rather take up the suit, either in his own or in a procuratorial name.

Dig. 17.1.10.13

Digest 17.1.10.13

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian book 31 on the Edict.

Si fideiussori donationis causa acceptum factum sit a creditore, puto, si fideiussorem remunerari voluit creditor, habere eum mandati actionem: multo magis, si mortis causa accepto tulisset creditor vel si eam liberationem legavit.

If, for the surety, the creditor has had an entry of “received” made by reason of donation, I think that, if the creditor wished to remunerate the surety, he has an action of mandate: much more so if the creditor had entered it as “received” mortis causa, or if he bequeathed that liberation.

Dig. 17.1.11

Digest 17.1.11

Pomponius 3 ex plaut.

Pomponius Book 3 from Plautius.

Si ei, cui damnatus ex causa fideiussoria fueram, heres postea extitero, habebo mandati actionem.

If to the person to whom I had been condemned on a fideiussory (suretyship) cause I later become heir, I shall have the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.12pr.

Digest 17.1.12 preface.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si vero non remunerandi causa, sed principaliter donando fideiussori remisit actionem, mandati eum non acturum.

If, however, not for the sake of remunerating, but principally by way of a donation to the fideiussor (surety), he remitted the action, he will not bring the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.12.1

Digest 17.1.12.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Marcellus autem fatetur, si quis donaturus fideiussori pro eo solverit creditori, habere fideiussorem mandati actionem.

Marcellus, moreover, acknowledges that, if someone, intending to make a gift to the surety, has paid the creditor on his behalf, the surety has the action on mandate.

Dig. 17.1.12.2

Digest 17.1.12.2

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Plane, inquit, si filius familias vel servus fuit fideiussor et pro his solvero donaturus eis, mandati patrem vel dominum non acturos, hoc ideo, quia non patri donatum voluit.

Clearly, he says, if a filius familias or a slave was a fideiussor, and if I shall have paid on their behalf intending a donation to them, the father or the master will not bring the action of mandate (mandati); for this reason, because he did not intend the donation for the father.

Dig. 17.1.12.3

Digest 17.1.12.3

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the edict.

Plane si servus fideiussor solverit, dominum mandati acturum idem Marcellus ibidem ait.

Plainly, if a slave, as surety, has paid, the master will bring an action on mandate, the same Marcellus says in the same place.

Dig. 17.1.12.4

Digest 17.1.12.4

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 On the Edict.

Si filius familias non iussu patris fideiusserit, cessat mandati actio, si nihil sit in peculio: quod si iussu, vel ex peculio solutum est, multo magis habet pater mandati.

If a son under paternal power has stood surety not by his father’s order, the action of mandate ceases if there is nothing in the peculium; but if it was by order, or if it has been paid out of the peculium, then, a fortiori, the father has the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.12.5

Digest 17.1.12.5

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si filio familias mandavi, ut pro me solveret, patrem, sive ipse solverit sive filius ex peculio, mandati acturum neratius ait, quod habet rationem: nihil enim mea interest, quis solvat.

If I have given a mandate to a son under paternal power to pay on my behalf, Neratius says that the father will bring an action on mandate, whether he himself has paid or the son from his peculium—which has reason; for it is of no concern to me who pays.

Dig. 17.1.12.6

Digest 17.1.12.6

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict

Si filio familias mandavero, ut pro me solveret, et emancipatus solvat, verum est in factum actionem filio dandam, patrem autem post emancipationem solventem negotiorum gestorum actionem habere.

If I have given a mandate to a filius familias to pay on my behalf, and, once emancipated, he pays, it is true that an in‑fact action is to be given to the son; but the father, paying after emancipation, has the action of negotiorum gestorum.

Dig. 17.1.12.7

Digest 17.1.12.7

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the edict.

Contrario iudicio experiuntur qui mandatum susceperunt, ut puta qui rerum vel rei unius procurationem susceperunt.

Those who have undertaken a mandate proceed by the contrary action, as for instance those who have undertaken the procuration of affairs or of a single thing.

Dig. 17.1.12.8

Digest 17.1.12.8

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Inde papinianus quaerit, si patronus praedium quod emerat, pro quo pretii bessem exsolverat, iusserit liberto suo tradi, ut ille residuum pretii redderet, deinde reddito pretio vendenti fundum patrono libertus consenserit, trientis pretium an libertus possit repetere. et ait, si mandatum suscepit initio libertus, non donatum accepit, contrario iudicio posse eum pretium repetere, quod deductis mercedibus, quas medio tempore percepit, superest: quod si donationem patronus in libertum contulit, videri et postea libertum patrono donasse.

Then Papinian asks, if a patron, having purchased an estate, for which he had paid two-thirds of the price, ordered it to be delivered to his freedman so that he would pay the remainder of the price; and then, after the price had been paid, the freedman consented that the vendor convey the farm to the patron—whether the freedman can recover the price of the third. And he says: if from the beginning the freedman undertook a mandate, he did not receive it as a gift; by the contrary action he can recover the price which, after deducting the rents which he received in the meantime, remains: but if the patron conferred a donation upon the freedman, it is seen that afterwards the freedman made a donation to the patron.

Dig. 17.1.12.9

Digest 17.1.12.9

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si mihi mandaveris, ut rem tibi aliquam emam, egoque emero meo pretio, habebo mandati actionem de pretio reciperando: sed et si tuo pretio, impendero tamen aliquid bona fide ad emptionem rei, erit contraria mandati actio: aut si rem emptam nolis recipere: simili modo et si quid aliud mandaveris et in id sumptum fecero. nec tantum id quod impendi, verum usuras quoque consequar. usuras autem non tantum ex mora esse admittendas, verum iudicem aestimare debere, si exegit a debitore suo quis et solvit, cum uberrimas usuras consequeretur, aequissimum enim erit rationem eius rei haberi: aut si ipse mutuatus gravibus usuris solvit.

If you have given me a mandate to buy some thing for you, and I buy it at my own price, I shall have an action on mandate for recovering the price; but also if at your price, nevertheless I have expended something in good faith toward the purchase of the thing, there will be the counter action on mandate; or if you are unwilling to receive the thing bought; and similarly if you have mandated anything else and I have made outlay upon it. And I shall obtain not only what I expended, but interest as well. Moreover, interest is to be allowed not only for delay, but the judge ought to assess it if someone has exacted from his own debtor and has paid (the price), at a time when he would have obtained most abundant interest—for it will be most equitable that account be taken of that circumstance—or if he himself, having borrowed, has paid under heavy interest.

sed et si reum usuris non relevavit, ipsi autem et usurae absunt, vel si minoribus relevavit, ipse autem maioribus faenus accepit, ut fidem suam liberaret, non dubito debere eum mandati iudicio et usuras consequi. et ( ut est constitutum) totum hoc ex aequo et bono iudex arbitrabitur.

but also, if he has not relieved the debtor with respect to interest, and he himself too is without interest; or if he relieved him with lesser interest, but he himself accepted greater usury, in order to free his credit, I do not doubt that he ought, by the action of mandate, to obtain interest as well. and ( ut est constitutum) the judge will arbitrate all this ex aequo et bono.

Dig. 17.1.12.10

Digest 17.1.12.10

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Dedi tibi pecuniam, ut creditori meo exsolvas: non fecisti: praestabis mihi usuras, quo casu et a me creditor pecuniam debitam cum usuris recepturus sit: et ita imperator severus hadriano demonstrati rescripsit.

I gave you money, to pay off my creditor: you did not do it: you shall render me interest, in which case my creditor also will receive from me the money owed with interest: and thus the emperor severus wrote back in a rescript to hadrianus, who had set the matter forth.

Dig. 17.1.12.11

Digest 17.1.12.11

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Si adulescens luxuriosus mandet tibi, ut pro meretrice fideiubeas, idque tu sciens mandatum susceperis, non habebis mandati actionem, quia simile est, quasi perdituro pecuniam sciens credideris. sed et si ulterius directo mandaverit tibi, ut meretrici pecuniam credas, non obligabitur mandati, quasi adversus bonam fidem mandatum sit.

If a prodigal youth should commission you to stand surety on behalf of a prostitute, and you knowingly have undertaken the mandate, you will not have an action of mandate, because it is like your having knowingly given credit to one who was going to squander the money. But also, if he goes further and has directly instructed you to lend money to the prostitute, he will not be bound by an obligation of mandate, as if the mandate were against good faith.

Dig. 17.1.12.12

Digest 17.1.12.12

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Cum quidam talem epistulam scripsisset amico suo: " rogo te, commendatum habeas sextilium crescentem amicum meum", non obligabitur mandati, quia commendandi magis hominis quam mandandi causa scripta est.

When someone had written such a letter to his friend: " I ask you, have my friend Sextilius Crescens in commendation," he will not be bound by mandate, because it was written more for the purpose of recommending the man than for the purpose of mandating.

Dig. 17.1.12.13

Digest 17.1.12.13

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si quis mandaverit filio familias credendam pecuniam non contra senatus consultum accipienti, sed ex ea causa, ex qua de peculio vel de in rem verso vel quod iussu pater teneretur, erit licitum mandatum. hoc amplius dico, si, cum dubitarem, utrum contra senatus consultum acciperet an non, nec essem daturus contra senatus consultum accipienti, intercesserit qui diceret non accipere contra senatus consultum, et " periculo meo crede", dicat, " bene credis": arbitror locum esse mandato et mandati eum teneri.

If someone has given a mandate that money be entrusted to a filiusfamilias who is not receiving contrary to the senatorial decree, but for that cause on account of which the father would be held de peculio or de in rem verso or on a quod iussu, the mandate will be lawful. I say this further: if, while I was doubting whether he was receiving contrary to the senatorial decree or not, and I would not have been going to give to one receiving contrary to the senatorial decree, someone should intervene who says that he is not receiving contrary to the senatorial decree, and " periculo meo crede", says, " bene credis": I judge there is room for the mandate and that he is liable on the mandate (actio mandati).

Dig. 17.1.12.14

Digest 17.1.12.14

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si post creditam pecuniam mandavero creditori credendam, nullum esse mandatum rectissime papinianus ait. plane si, ut exspectares nec urgueres debitorem ad solutionem, mandavero tibi, ut ei des intervallum, periculoque meo pecuniam fore dicam, verum puto omne nominis periculum debere ad mandatorem pertinere.

If, after money has been lent, I have given a mandate to the creditor that it be lent, Papinian very rightly says there is no mandate. Clearly, if, so that you may wait and not urge the debtor to payment, I have mandated to you that you give him an interval, and say that the money will be at my peril, I truly think that all peril of the claim ought to pertain to the mandator.

Dig. 17.1.12.15

Digest 17.1.12.15

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Idem ait, si tutor mandet suscipi vel probari nomen quod fecerat, teneri eum mandati, scilicet quondam pupillo suo vel curatori eius.

The same says that, if a tutor orders that the claim (nomen) which he had made be taken up or approved, he is held on the action of mandate, namely by his former pupil or by that person’s curator.

Dig. 17.1.12.16

Digest 17.1.12.16

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si mandavero exigendam pecuniam, deinde voluntatem mutavero, an sit mandati actio vel mihi vel heredi meo? et ait Marcellus cessare mandati actionem, quia extinctum est mandatum finita voluntate. quod si mandaveris exigendam, deinde prohibuisti, exactamque recepisti, debitor liberabitur.

If I have given a mandate that money be exacted, and then I have changed my will, is there an action on mandate either for me or for my heir? And Marcellus says the action on mandate ceases, because the mandate is extinguished when the will (volition) is finished. But if you have mandated that it be collected, then forbade it, and you received what had been collected, the debtor will be released.

Dig. 17.1.12.17

Digest 17.1.12.17

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Idem Marcellus scribit, si, ut post mortem sibi monumentum fieret, quis mandavit, heres eius poterit mandati agere. illum vero qui mandatum suscepit, si sua pecunia fecit, puto agere mandati, si non ita ei mandatum est, ut sua pecunia faceret monumentum. potuit enim agere etiam cum eo qui mandavit, ut sibi pecuniam daret, ad faciendum, maxime si iam quaedam ad faciendum paravit.

The same Marcellus writes: if someone has given a mandate that a monument be made for him after death, his heir will be able to bring the mandate action. But as for the one who undertook the mandate, if he made it with his own money, I think he may bring the mandate action, provided it was not so mandated to him that he should make the monument with his own money. For he could also have proceeded against the mandator so that money be given to him for the making, especially if he had already prepared certain things for the making.

Dig. 17.1.13

Digest 17.1.13

Gaius 10 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 10 On the Provincial Edict.

Idem est et si mandavi tibi, ut post mortem meam heredibus meis emeres fundum.

It is the same also if I have given you a mandate that, after my death, you purchase an estate for my heirs.

Dig. 17.1.14pr.

Digest 17.1.14, preface.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Heredem fideiussoris, si solverit, habere mandati actionem dubium non est. sed si vendiderit hereditatem et emptor solverit, an habeat mandati actionem, quaeritur. et iulianus libro tertio decimo scribit idcirco heredem habere mandati actionem, quia tenetur iudicio ex empto, ut praestet actiones suas, idcircoque competere ex empto actionem, quia potest praestare.

There is no doubt that the heir of a surety, if he has paid, has the action on mandate. But if he has sold the inheritance and the purchaser has paid, it is asked whether he has the action on mandate. And Julian, in book 13, writes that for this reason the heir has the action on mandate, because he is bound by the iudicium ex empto to furnish his actions; and for this reason the action ex empto lies, because he can furnish them.

Dig. 17.1.14.1

Digest 17.1.14.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si fideiussori duo heredes extiterint et alter eorum a coherede emerit hereditatem, deinde omne quod defunctus fideiusserat stipulatori solverit, habebit aut ex stipulatu aut ex empto obligatum coheredem suum: idcirco is mandati actionem habebit.

If a surety (fideiussor) has left two heirs, and one of them has bought the inheritance from his coheir, then, after he has paid to the stipulator everything for which the deceased had stood surety, he will have his coheir bound either from the stipulation or from the purchase; therefore he will have an action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.15

Digest 17.1.15

Paulus 2 ad sab.

Paulus, 2 on Sabinus.

Si mandassem tibi, ut fundum emeres, postea scripsissem, ne emeres, tu, antequam scias me vetuisse, emisses, mandati tibi obligatus ero, ne damno adficiatur is qui suscipit mandatum.

If I had commissioned you to buy an estate, and afterwards had written that you should not buy, and you, before you knew that I had forbidden it, had bought, I shall be obligated to you under the mandate, lest the one who undertakes the mandate be affected by loss.

Dig. 17.1.16

Digest 17.1.16

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the edict.

Si quis mihi mandaverit in meo aliquid facere et fecero, quaesitum est, an sit mandati actio. et ait celsus libro septimo digestorum hoc respondisse se, cum aurelius quietus hospiti suo medico mandasse diceretur, ut in hortis eius quos ravennae habebat, in quos omnibus annis secedere solebat, sphaeristerium et hypocausta et quaedam ipsius valetudini apta sua impensa faceret: deducto igitur, quanto sua aedificia pretiosiora fecisset, quod amplius impendisset posse eum mandati iudicio persequi.

If someone has given me a mandate to do something on my own property and I have done it, the question has been asked whether there is an action of mandate. And Celsus says he answered this in book 7 of the Digest, when Aurelius Quietus was said to have mandated to his host, a physician, that in the physician’s gardens which he had at Ravenna, to which he used to withdraw every year, he should make, at his own expense, a sphaeristerium (ball-court) and hypocausts and certain things suited to his health: therefore, after deducting by how much he had made his own buildings more valuable, he could pursue by the action of mandate whatever more he had expended.

Dig. 17.1.17

Digest 17.1.17

Paulus 7 ad sab.

Paulus, 7 on Sabinus.

Si mandavero tibi, ut a titio decem exigeres, et ante exacta ea mandati tecum egero, si ante rem iudicatam exegeris, condemnandum te esse constat.

If I have mandated to you that you exact ten from Titius, and before these have been exacted I have brought an action of mandate against you, if you have exacted before the matter has been adjudged, it is established that you must be condemned.

Dig. 17.1.18

Digest 17.1.18

Ulpianus 40 ad sab.

Ulpian, 40 on Sabinus.

Qui patitur ab alio mandari, ut sibi credatur, mandare intellegitur.

Whoever permits another to mandate that credit be given to himself is understood to have mandated.

Dig. 17.1.19

Digest 17.1.19

Ulpianus 43 ad sab.

Ulpian 43 on sab.

Si servus meus de semet emendo mandaret, ut redimatur, pomponius eleganter tractat, an is, qui servum redemerit, ultro convenire possit venditorem, ut servum recipiat, quoniam mandati actio ultro citroque est. sed esse iniquissimum pomponius ait ex facto servi mei cogi me servum recipere, quem in perpetuum alienari volueram, nec magis in hunc casum debeo mandati teneri, quam ut eum tibi venderem.

If my slave were to give a mandate about buying himself, that he be redeemed, Pomponius handles elegantly whether the one who has redeemed the slave can, of his own accord, bring an action against the seller that he take the slave back, since the action on mandate is reciprocal on both sides. But Pomponius says it would be most inequitable that, from the act of my slave, I be compelled to receive back the slave whom I had intended to be alienated in perpetuity; nor ought I to be held on the mandate in this case any more than to sell him to you.

Dig. 17.1.20pr.

Digest 17.1.20pr.

Paulus 11 ad sab.

Paulus 11 on Sabinus.

Ex mandato apud eum qui mandatum suscepit nihil remanere oportet, sicuti nec damnum pati debet, si exigere faeneratam pecuniam non potuit.

From the mandate, nothing ought to remain with the mandatary, just as neither ought he to suffer loss, if he was unable to exact the money lent at interest.

Dig. 17.1.20.1

Digest 17.1.20.1

Paulus 11 ad sab.

Paulus 11 on Sabinus.

Fideiussori negotiorum gestorum est actio, si pro absente fideiusserit: nam mandati actio non potest competere, cum non antecesserit mandatum.

The surety has the action of negotiorum gestorum, if he has stood surety for an absent person: for an action on mandate cannot lie, since no mandate preceded.

Dig. 17.1.21

Digest 17.1.21

Ulpianus 47 ad sab.

Ulpian 47 on Sabinus.

Cum mandatu alieno pro te fideiusserim, non possum adversus te habere actionem mandati, quemadmodum qui alienum mandatum intuitus spopondit. sed si non utique unius, sed utriusque mandatum intuitus id fecerim, habebo mandati actionem etiam adversus te, quemadmodum, si duo mihi mandassent ut tibi crederem, utrumque haberem obligatum.

When, on another’s mandate, I have stood surety for you, I cannot have against you an action of mandate, just as one who, having regard to another’s mandate, promised. But if I did this having regard not to the mandate of one only, but of both, I shall have an action of mandate against you as well, just as, if two had mandated me to extend credit to you, I would have each bound.

Dig. 17.1.22pr.

Digest 17.1.22pr.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si mandavero tibi, ut pro me in diem fideiubeas tuque pure fideiusseris et solveris, utilius respondebitur interim non esse tibi mandati actionem, sed cum dies venerit.

If I have commissioned you to stand surety on my behalf in diem, and you have stood surety purely and have paid, it will be more usefully answered that in the interim you do not have the action of mandate, but only when the day has come.

Dig. 17.1.22.1

Digest 17.1.22.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Item tractatum est, si, cum in diem deberem, mandatu meo in diem fideiusseris et ante diem solveris, an statim habeas mandati actionem. et quidam putant praesentem quidem esse mandati actionem, sed tanti minorem, quanti mea intersit superveniente die solutum fuisse. sed melius est dici interim nec huius summae mandati agi posse, quando nonnullum adhuc commodum meum sit, ut nec hoc ante diem solvam.

Likewise it has been treated as follows: if, when I owed for a term (in diem), at my mandate you stood surety for that term and paid before the day, whether you at once have the action of mandate. And some think that the action of mandate is indeed presently available, but diminished by so much as it is of interest to me that, with the day supervening, payment should have been made then. But it is better to say that in the meantime even for this sum the action of mandate cannot be brought, since there is still some advantage of mine that I too should not pay before the day.

Dig. 17.1.22.2

Digest 17.1.22.2

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Interdum evenit, ut meum negotium geram et tamen utilem habeam mandati actionem: veluti cum debitor meus periculo suo debitorem suum mihi delegat aut cum rogatu fideiussoris cum reo experior: nam quamvis debitum meum persequar, nihilo minus et illius negotium gero: igitur quod minus servavero, consequar mandati actione.

Sometimes it happens that I conduct my own business and yet have a useful action on mandate: for instance, when my debtor, at his own peril, delegates his debtor to me, or when, at the request of a surety, I proceed against the principal debtor; for although I pursue my own debt, nonetheless I am also managing his business: therefore, whatever I shall have failed to safeguard, I shall obtain by an action on mandate.

Dig. 17.1.22.3

Digest 17.1.22.3

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus, 32 on the Edict.

Si hi, quorum res veneunt quas pignori dederunt, supposuerunt emptores et eis emendas res mandent, mandatum intellegitur, licet quantum ad meram rationem mandatum non constitit: nam cum rem tuam emas, nulla emptio est in tua persona rei tuae.

If those whose things, which they have given in pledge, are being sold have put forward purchasers and mandate to them to buy the things, a mandate is understood, although, as to mere reason, a mandate has not been constituted: for when you buy your own thing, there is no purchase, in your person, of your own thing.

Dig. 17.1.22.4

Digest 17.1.22.4

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Iulianus scripsit mandati obligationem consistere etiam in rem eius qui mandatum suscipit ex eo maxime probari, quod, si pluribus heredibus vendentibus uni mandavero, ut rem hereditariam emeret, etiam pro ea parte, qua heres sit, obligatur mandati actione et obligat: et sane si ille propter hoc extraneo rem non addixerit, quod mandatum susceperat, ex bona fide esse praestare ei pretium, quanti vendere poterat: et contra si emptor ad emptionem rei sibi necessariae idcirco non accesserat, quod heredi praecepisset se ei empturum, aequissimum esse mandati iudicio praestare quanti eius interfuit emptam rem habere.

Julian wrote that the obligation of mandate also consists in rem upon the property of the one who undertakes the mandate; this is most especially proved by the fact that, if, when several heirs are selling, I have mandated to one that he buy the hereditary thing, he is bound by the action of mandate—and he binds—even for that share in which he himself is heir. And indeed, if for this reason he did not knock the thing down to an outsider, because he had undertaken the mandate, then in bona fide it is proper to render to him the price for as much as he could have sold it; and conversely, if the buyer did not proceed to the purchase of a thing necessary to himself for the reason that he had declared to the heir that he would buy it for him, it is most equitable, by the judgment (action) of mandate, to render as much as it was to his interest to have the thing bought.

Dig. 17.1.22.5

Digest 17.1.22.5

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Is cuius bona publicata sunt mandare alicui potest, ut ea emat, et, si emerit, utilis erit mandati actio, si non praestet fidem: quod ideo receptum est, quia publicatis bonis quidquid postea adquiritur, non sequitur fiscum.

He whose goods have been publicated (i.e., confiscated) can mandate someone to buy them; and, if he buys, a useful action on mandate will lie if he does not keep faith: which has been received for this reason, because, once the goods are publicated, whatever is afterwards acquired does not follow the fisc.

Dig. 17.1.22.6

Digest 17.1.22.6

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Qui aedem sacram spoliandam, hominem vulnerandum, occidendum mandatum suscipiat, nihil mandati iudicio consequi potest propter turpitudinem mandati.

Whoever undertakes a mandate that a sacred temple be despoiled, and that a man be wounded or killed, can obtain nothing by the action on mandate, on account of the turpitude of the mandate.

Dig. 17.1.22.7

Digest 17.1.22.7

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 On the Edict.

Si tibi centum dedero, ut ea titio dares, tuque non dederis, sed consumpseris, et mandati et furti teneri te proculus ait: aut, si ita dederim, ut quae velles dares, mandati tantummodo.

If I have given you one hundred, so that you might give them to Titius, and you have not given but have consumed them, Proculus says that you are liable both on the mandate and for theft; or, if I have given them thus, that you should give whatever you wished, then for the mandate only.

Dig. 17.1.22.8

Digest 17.1.22.8

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si mandaverim servo tuo, ut quod tibi debeam solveret meo nomine, neratius scribit, quamvis mutuatus servus pecuniam rationibus tuis quasi a me receptam intulerit, tamen, si nummos a creditore non ita acceperit, ut meo nomine daret, nec liberari me nec te mandati mecum acturum: quod si sic mutuatus sit, ut pecuniam meo nomine daret, utrumque contra esse: nec referre, alius quis an idem ipse servus nomine tuo quod pro me solvebatur acceperit. et hoc verius est, quoniam quotiens suos nummos accipit creditor, non contingit liberatio debitori.

If I have mandated your slave to pay, in my name, what I owe to you, Neratius writes that, although the slave, having borrowed, has entered the money in your accounts as if received from me, nevertheless, if he did not receive the coins from the creditor in such a way as to give them in my name, neither am I discharged nor will you proceed against me with an action of mandate; but if he borrowed on this footing, namely that he would hand over the money in my name, the contrary holds for both: and it makes no difference whether someone else or the same slave, in your name, received what was being paid on my behalf. And this is the truer, since whenever the creditor receives his own coins, discharge does not befall the debtor.

Dig. 17.1.22.9

Digest 17.1.22.9

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Fugitivus meus cum apud furem esset, pecuniam adquisiit et ex ea servos paravit eosque titius per traditionem a venditore accepit. mela ait mandati actione me consecuturum, ut restituat mihi titius, quia servus meus mandasse titio videbatur, ut per traditionem acciperet, si modo rogatu servi hoc fecerit: quod si sine voluntate eius venditor titio tradiderit, tunc posse me ex empto agere, ut mihi eos venditor traderet, venditoremque per condictionem a titio repetiturum, si servos tradiderit titio quos non debuerit, cum debere se existimaret.

My fugitive, when he was with a thief, acquired money and with it procured slaves; and Titius received them by tradition from the seller. Mela says that by the action of mandate I shall obtain that Titius restore them to me, because my slave seemed to have mandated to Titius that he receive by tradition—provided he did this at the slave’s request. But if the seller delivered to Titius without his (the slave’s) will, then I can proceed ex empto, so that the seller deliver them to me; and the seller, by condiction, will recover from Titius, if he delivered to Titius slaves which he ought not to have delivered, while supposing that he was obliged.

Dig. 17.1.22.10

Digest 17.1.22.10

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si curator bonorum venditionem quidem fecerit, pecuniam autem creditoribus non solverit, trebatius ofilius labeo responderunt his qui praesentes fuerunt competere adversus eum mandati actionem, his autem qui absentes fuerunt negotiorum gestorum actionem esse. atquin si praesentium mandatum exsecutus id egit, negotiorum gestorum actio absentibus non est nisi forte adversus eos qui mandaverunt curatori, tamquam si negotia absentium gesserint: quod si, cum soli creditores se esse existimarent, id mandaverint, in factum actio absentibus danda est in eos qui mandaverint.

If the curator of the goods has indeed made a sale, but has not paid the money to the creditors, Trebatius, Ofilius, and Labeo answered that those who were present have an action on mandate against him, but that those who were absent have an action of business-management (negotiorum gestorum). But indeed, if, having executed the mandate of those present, he did that, an action of business-management is not available to the absentees, unless perhaps against those who gave a mandate to the curator, as if they had managed the affairs of the absentees; but if, when they supposed themselves to be the sole creditors, they gave that mandate, an action in factum is to be granted to the absentees against those who gave the mandate.

Dig. 17.1.22.11

Digest 17.1.22.11

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Sicut autem liberum est mandatum non suscipere, ita susceptum consummari oportet, nisi renuntiatum sit ( renuntiari autem ita potest, ut integrum ius mandatori reservetur vel per se vel per alium eandem rem commode explicandi) aut si redundet in eum captio qui suscepit mandatum. et quidem si is cui mandatum est ut aliquid mercaretur mercatus non sit neque renuntiaverit se non empturum idque sua, non alterius culpa fecerit, mandati actione teneri eum convenit: nec amplius tenebitur, sicuti mela quoque scripsit, si eo tempore per fraudem renuntiaverit, cum iam recte emere non posset.

Just as it is free not to undertake a mandate, so, once undertaken, it ought to be consummated, unless there has been a renunciation ( renunciation, however, can be made in such a way that the entire right of the mandator is reserved to deal with the same matter conveniently either by himself or through another) or if prejudice would redound upon him who has undertaken the mandate. And indeed, if the person to whom it was mandated to purchase something has not purchased and has not given notice that he will not purchase, and has done this by his own fault, not another’s, it is agreed that he is held by the action of mandate; nor will he be held further, as Mela also wrote, if at that time he renounced by fraud, when he could no longer properly buy.

Dig. 17.1.23

Digest 17.1.23

Hermogenianus 2 iuris epit.

Hermogenianus 2 of the Epitome of Law.

Sane si valetudinis adversae vel capitalium inimicitiarium.

Indeed, if because of adverse health or of capital enmities.

Dig. 17.1.24

Digest 17.1.24

Paulus 2 sent.

Paulus 2 Sentences.

Seu ob inanes rei actiones.

Or because of empty actions in rem.

Dig. 17.1.25

Digest 17.1.25

Hermogenianus 2 iuris epit.

Hermogenianus 2 of the Epitome of Law.

Seu ob aliam iustam causam excusationes alleget, audiendus est.

Or if he alleges excuses on account of some other just cause, he is to be heard.

Dig. 17.1.26pr.

Digest 17.1.26pr.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Inter causas omittendi mandati etiam mors mandatoris est: nam mandatum solvitur morte. si tamen per ignorantiam impletum est, competere actionem utilitatis causa dicitur. iulianus quoque scripsit mandatoris morte solvi mandatum, sed obligationem aliquando durare.

Among the causes for omitting a mandate is also the death of the mandator: for the mandate is dissolved by death. If, however, it has been performed in ignorance, a useful action is said to be available for the sake of utility. Julian also wrote that by the death of the mandator the mandate is dissolved, but that the obligation sometimes endures.

Dig. 17.1.26.1

Digest 17.1.26.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si quis debitori suo mandaverit, ut titio solveret, et debitor mortuo eo, cum id ignoraret, solverit, liberari eum oportet.

If someone has mandated his debtor to pay Titius, and the debtor, after he has died, since he was unaware of it, has paid, he ought to be released (discharged).

Dig. 17.1.26.2

Digest 17.1.26.2

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Abesse intellegitur pecunia fideiussori etiam si debitor ab eo delegatus sit creditori, licet is solvendo non fuerit, quia bonum nomen facit creditor, qui admittit debitorem delegatum.

It is understood that money is lacking to the surety even if the debtor has been delegated by him to the creditor, although that person was not solvent, because the creditor makes a good claim who admits the delegated debtor.

Dig. 17.1.26.3

Digest 17.1.26.3

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si is, qui fideiussori donare vult, creditorem eius habeat debitorem suum eumque liberaverit, continuo aget fideiussor mandati, quatenus nihil intersit, utrum nummos solverit creditori an eum liberaverit.

If the one who wishes to donate to the surety has the surety’s creditor as his own debtor and has released him, at once the surety will bring an action of mandate, inasmuch as it makes no difference whether he has paid money to the creditor or has released him.

Dig. 17.1.26.4

Digest 17.1.26.4

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 on the Edict.

Praeterea sciendum est non plus fideiussorem consequi debere mandati iudicio, quam quod solverit.

Moreover, it should be known that a surety ought not to obtain by the action on mandate more than he has paid.

Dig. 17.1.26.5

Digest 17.1.26.5

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 on the Edict.

Mandatu tuo fideiussi decem et procuratori creditoris solvi: si verus procurator fuit, statim mandati agam: quod si procurator non est, repetam ab eo.

At your mandate I stood surety for 10 and paid to the creditor’s procurator: if he was a true procurator, I will immediately bring the action of mandate: but if he is not a procurator, I will recover it from him.

Dig. 17.1.26.6

Digest 17.1.26.6

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict.

Non omnia, quae impensurus non fuit mandator imputabit, veluti quod spoliatus sit a latronibus aut naufragio res amiserit vel languore suo suorumque adpraehensus quaedam erogaverit: nam haec magis casibus quam mandato imputari oportet.

Not everything which he was not going to expend will the mandator impute, for instance, that he was despoiled by robbers or lost goods by shipwreck, or, overtaken by his own illness and that of his people, he disbursed certain sums: for these ought rather to be imputed to chance than to the mandate.

Dig. 17.1.26.7

Digest 17.1.26.7

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Sed cum servus, quem mandatu meo emeras, furtum tibi fecisset, neratius ait mandati actione te consecuturum, ut servus tibi noxae dedatur, si tamen sine culpa tua id acciderit: quod si ego scissem talem esse servum nec praedixissem, ut possis praecavere, tunc quanti tua intersit, tantum tibi praestari oportet.

But when the slave whom you had bought at my mandate committed theft against you, Neratius says that by the action of mandate you will obtain that the slave be surrendered to you for noxal liability, provided, however, that this happened without your fault: but if I had known the slave to be of such a character and had not forewarned you, so that you could take precautions, then as much as it is to your interest, so much ought to be made good to you.

Dig. 17.1.26.8

Digest 17.1.26.8

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict.

Faber mandatu amici sui emit servum decem et fabricam docuit, deinde vendidit eum viginti, quos mandati iudicio coactus est solvere: mox quasi homo non erat sanus, emptori damnatus est: mela ait non praestaturum id ei mandatorem, nisi posteaquam emisset sine dolo malo eius hoc vitium habere coeperit servus. sed si iussu mandatoris eum docuerit, contra fore: tunc enim et mercedem et cibaria consecuturum, nisi si ut gratis doceret rogatus sit.

A craftsman, at the mandate of his friend, bought a slave for 10 and taught him the craft, then sold him for 20, which he was compelled to pay over by an action on mandate; soon thereafter, on the ground that the man was not sound, he was condemned in favor of the buyer. Mela says the mandator will not be bound to make that good to him, unless, after he had bought, the slave, without the mandator’s fraud, began to have this defect. But if he taught him by the order of the mandator, the contrary will be: for then he will also obtain wages and rations, unless he was asked to teach gratis.

Dig. 17.1.27pr.

Digest 17.1.27, preface.

Gaius 9 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius, Book 9, on the Provincial Edict.

Si quis alicui scripserit, ut debitorem suum liberet, seque eam pecuniam, quam is debuerit, soluturum, mandati actione tenetur.

If anyone has written to someone to release his debtor, and that he himself will pay that money which the debtor would have owed, he is held by the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.27.1

Digest 17.1.27.1

Gaius 9 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 9 on the Provincial Edict.

Si servum ea lege tibi tradidero, ut eum post mortem meam manumitteres, constitit obligatio: potest autem et in mea quoque persona agendi causa intervenire, veluti si paenitentia acta servum reciperare velim.

If I should have delivered a slave to you on this condition, that you should manumit him after my death, the obligation is established: however, a cause for suing can also intervene in my own person as well, for instance if, repentance having set in, I should wish to recover the slave.

Dig. 17.1.27.2

Digest 17.1.27.2

Gaius 9 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 9 on the Provincial Edict.

Qui mandatum suscepit, si potest id explere, deserere promissum officium non debet, alioquin quanti mandatoris intersit damnabitur: si vero intellegit explere se id officium non posse, id ipsum cum primum poterit debet mandatori nuntiare, ut is si velit alterius opera utatur: quod si, cum possit nuntiare, cessaverit, quanti mandatoris intersit tenebitur: si aliqua ex causa non poterit nuntiare, securus erit.

Whoever has undertaken a mandate, if he can fulfill it, ought not to desert the promised duty, otherwise he will be condemned in the amount of the mandator’s interest: but if he understands that he cannot fulfill that duty, he must announce this very thing to the mandator as soon as he can, so that he, if he wishes, may make use of another’s services: and if, when he can give notice, he has delayed, he will be held for as much as it is in the mandator’s interest: if for some reason he cannot give notice, he will be secure.

Dig. 17.1.27.3

Digest 17.1.27.3

Gaius 9 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 9 on the provincial edict.

Morte quoque eius cui mandatum est, si is integro adhuc mandato decesserit, solvitur mandatum et ob id heres eius, licet exsecutus fuerit mandatum, non habet mandati actionem.

By the death also of the one to whom the mandate has been entrusted, if he has died with the mandate still intact, the mandate is dissolved; and for that reason his heir, although he may have executed the mandate, does not have the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.27.4

Digest 17.1.27.4

Gaius 9 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 9 on the Provincial Edict.

Impendia mandati exsequendi gratia facta si bona fide facta sunt, restitui omnimodo debent, nec ad rem pertinet, quod is qui mandasset potuisset, si ipse negotium gereret, minus impendere.

Expenses incurred for the sake of executing the mandate, if incurred in good faith, must in every way be restored; nor does it pertain to the matter that the one who gave the mandate could have expended less, if he had managed the business himself.

Dig. 17.1.27.5

Digest 17.1.27.5

Gaius 9 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 9 on the Provincial Edict.

Si mandatu meo titio credideris et mecum mandati egeris, non aliter condemnari debeo, quam si actiones tuas, quas adversus titium habes, mihi praestiteris. sed si cum titio egeris, ego quidem non liberabor, sed in id dumtaxat tibi obligatus ero, quod a titio servare non potueris.

If at my mandate you have given credit to Titius and have proceeded with me under the mandate, I ought not to be condemned otherwise than if you have made over to me the actions which you have against Titius. But if you have proceeded against Titius, I indeed shall not be released, but I shall be obligated to you only to the extent of that which you have not been able to secure from Titius.

Dig. 17.1.28

Digest 17.1.28

Ulpianus 14 ad ed.

Ulpian, 14 on the Edict.

Papinianus libro tertio quaestionum ait mandatorem debitoris solventem ipso iure reum non liberare ( propter mandatum enim suum solvit et suo nomine) ideoque mandatori actiones putat adversus reum cedi debere.

Papinian, in the third book of the Questions, says that the mandator of the debtor, when paying, does not by the law itself release the debtor ( for he pays on account of his own mandate and in his own name) and therefore he thinks the actions ought to be ceded to the mandator against the debtor.

Dig. 17.1.29pr.

Digest 17.1.29, beginning.

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

Si fideiussor conventus, cum ignoraret non fuisse debitori numeratam pecuniam, solverit ex causa fideiussionis, an mandati iudicio persequi possit id quod solverit, quaeritur. et si quidem sciens praetermiserit exceptionem vel doli vel non numeratae pecuniae, videtur dolo versari ( dissoluta enim neglegentia prope dolum est): ubi vero ignoravit, nihil est quod ei imputetur. pari ratione et si aliqua exceptio debitori competebat, pacti forte conventi vel cuius alterius rei, et ignarus hanc exceptionem non exercebit, dici oportet mandati ei actionem competere: potuit enim atque debuit reus promittendi certiorare fideiussorem suum, ne forte ignarus solvat indebitum.

If a surety, when sued, not knowing that the money had not been counted out to the debtor, has paid by reason of the suretyship, the question is whether he can pursue by an action of mandate what he has paid. And if indeed, knowing, he has omitted the exception either of dolus or of money not counted out, he appears to be acting in dolus (for slack negligence is near to dolus): but where he was ignorant, there is nothing that can be imputed to him. By a like reasoning, also if some exception belonged to the debtor—of a pact (pactum conventum), perhaps, or of some other matter—and, being unaware, he does not employ this exception, it ought to be said that the action of mandate is available to him: for the promissor (reus promittendi) could and indeed ought to inform his surety, lest perchance, in ignorance, he pay what is not owed.

Dig. 17.1.29.1

Digest 17.1.29.1

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 disputations.

Non male tractabitur, si, cum ignoraret fideiussor inutiliter se obligatum, solverit, an mandati actionem habeat. et si quidem factum ignoravit, recipi ignorantia eius potest, si vero ius, aliud dici debet.

It will not be ill handled, if—when a surety, not knowing that he was ineffectually bound, has paid—the question is raised whether he has the action of mandate. And if indeed he was ignorant of the fact, his ignorance can be accepted; but if of the law, a different thing must be said.

Dig. 17.1.29.2

Digest 17.1.29.2

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

Si, cum debitor solvisset, ignarus fideiussor solverit, puto eum mandati habere actionem: ignoscendum est enim ei, si non divinavit debitorem solvisse: debitor enim debuit notum facere fideiussori iam se solvisse, ne forte creditor obrepat et ignorantiam eius circumveniat et excutiat ei summam, in quam fideiussit.

If, when the debtor has paid, the surety, being unaware, should pay, I think he has an action on mandate: for it is to be forgiven him if he did not divine that the debtor had paid; for the debtor ought to make it known to the surety that he has already paid, lest perhaps the creditor creep up and circumvent his ignorance and exact from him the sum for which he stood surety.

Dig. 17.1.29.3

Digest 17.1.29.3

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

Hoc idem tractari et in fideiussore potest, si, cum solvisset, non certioravit reum, sic deinde reus solvit quod solvere eum non oportebat. et credo, si, cum posset eum certiorare, non fecit, oportere mandati agentem fideiussorem repelli: dolo enim proximum est, si post solutionem non nuntiaverit debitori: cedere autem reus indebiti actione fideiussori debet, ne duplum creditor consequatur.

This same matter can be handled also in the surety, if, when he had paid, he did not notify the debtor, and so thereafter the debtor paid what he ought not to have paid. And I think that, if, when he could have notified him, he did not do so, the surety bringing the action of mandate (actio mandati) ought to be barred (repelled): for it is very near to fraud (dolus), if after the payment he did not give notice to the debtor. Moreover, the debtor ought to cede to the surety the action for what was not owed (condictio indebiti), lest the creditor obtain double.

Dig. 17.1.29.4

Digest 17.1.29.4

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 Disputations.

Quaedam tamen etsi sciens omittat fideiussor, caret fraude, ut puta si exceptionem procuratoriam omisit sive sciens sive ignarus: de bona fide enim agitur, cui non congruit de apicibus iuris disputare, sed de hoc tantum, debitor fuerit nec ne.

Nevertheless, in certain matters even if the fideiussor knowingly omits them, he is free from fraud—for example, if he omitted the procuratorial exception, whether knowing or unknowing: for it is a matter of good faith, to which it does not befit to dispute about the niceties of law, but only about this: whether he was a debtor or not.

Dig. 17.1.29.5

Digest 17.1.29.5

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian 7 disputations.

In omnibus autem visionibus, quae praepositae sunt, ubi creditor vel non numeratam pecuniam accipit vel numeratam iterum accepit, repetitio contra eum competit, nisi ex condemnatione fuerit ei pecunia soluta: tunc enim propter auctoritatem rei iudicatae repetitio quidem cessat, ipse autem stellionatus crimine propter suam calliditatem plectetur.

In all the cases set forth above, where the creditor either receives money not counted, or, having been counted, receives it a second time, a repetition (recovery) lies against him, unless the money was paid to him pursuant to a condemnation (judgment): for then, by the authority of res judicata, the repetition indeed ceases; but he himself will be punished under the crime of stellionate on account of his craftiness.

Dig. 17.1.29.6

Digest 17.1.29.6

Ulpianus 7 disp.

Ulpian book 7 of the Disputations.

Fideiussor, si solus tempore liberatus tamen solverit creditori, recte mandati habebit actionem adversus reum: quamquam enim iam liberatus solvit, tamen fidem implevit et debitorem liberavit: si igitur paratus sit defendere reum adversus creditorem, aequissimum est mandati iudicio eum quod solvit reciperare. et ita iuliano videtur.

A surety, if he alone has been released by lapse of time yet nevertheless has paid the creditor, will rightly have an action of mandate against the principal: for although he paid when already released, nevertheless he fulfilled his pledge and freed the debtor. If therefore he is prepared to defend the debtor against the creditor, it is most equitable that by the action of mandate he recover what he paid. And so it seems to Julian.

Dig. 17.1.30

Digest 17.1.30

Iulianus 13 Dig.

Julian 13 Digest

Si hominem tibi dedero, ut eum manumitteres, et postea procurator meus prohibuerit, ne manumitteres, an mandati agere possim, si tu eum manumiseris? respondi, si procurator iustam causam habuit interpellandi manumissionem servi, quem in hoc solum acceperam, ut manumitterem, veluti si compererit eum postea falsas rationes confecisse, insidias vitae prioris domini struxisse, tenebor, nisi denuntiationi procuratoris paruero: si vero nulla iusta causa procuratori fuit denuntiandi, ne servus manumitteretur, non poterit mecum agi, quamvis ad libertatem eum perduxerim.

If I should have given a man to you, in order that you might manumit him, and afterward my procurator should have prohibited you from manumitting, can I bring an action on mandate if you manumit him? I answered: if the procurator had a just cause for interposing against the manumission of the slave, whom I had received for this sole purpose—that I might manumit him—such as if he later discovered that the slave had fabricated false accounts, or had contrived ambushes against the life of his former master, I shall be liable, unless I obey the procurator’s notice; but if the procurator had no just cause for giving notice that the slave was not to be manumitted, no action can be brought against me, although I have brought him to liberty.

Dig. 17.1.31

Digest 17.1.31

Iulianus 14 Dig.

Julian 14 Digest

Si negotia mea mandavero gerenda ei, qui mihi actione in quadruplum tenebatur, post annum vero in simplum, etsi post annum cum eo mandati agam, praestare mihi quadruplum debebit: nam qui alterius negotia administranda suscipit, id praestare debet in sua persona, quod in aliorum.

If I shall have mandated my affairs to be managed to one who was bound to me by an action for the quadruple, but after a year indeed for the simple, then even if after a year I bring the action of mandate against him, he will have to render me the quadruple: for he who undertakes the administrating of another’s affairs ought to render in his own person that which he does in the case of others.

Dig. 17.1.32

Digest 17.1.32

Iulianus 3 ad urs. ferocem.

Julian Book 3 to Urseius Ferox.

Si hereditatem aliter aditurus non essem quam cautum fuisset damnum praestari et hoc mandatum intercessisset, fore mandati actionem existimo. si quis autem mandaverit alicui, ne legatum a se repellat, longe ei dissimile esse: nam legatum adquisitum numquam illi damno esse potuit: hereditas interdum damnosa est. et in summa quicumque contractus tales sunt, ut quicumque eorum nomine fideiussor obligari posset, et mandati obligationem consistere puto: neque enim multo referre, praesens quis interrogatus fideiubeat an absens vel praesens mandet.

If I would not be going to enter upon an inheritance except on the condition that security had been taken for making good the loss, and such a mandate had intervened, I consider there would be an action on mandate. But if someone were to mandate another not to repel a legacy from himself, that is far dissimilar: for a legacy, once acquired, could never be to his detriment; an inheritance is sometimes burdensome. And, in sum, whatever contracts are such that a surety could be bound in their name, I also think an obligation on mandate stands: for it makes no great difference whether someone, being questioned in person, pledges surety, or gives a mandate, whether absent or present.

praeterea volgo animadvertere licet mandatu creditorum hereditates suspectas adiri, quos mandati iudicio teneri procul dubio est.

Moreover, one may commonly observe that, at the mandate of creditors, suspect inheritances are entered upon; and these creditors are, beyond doubt, bound by an action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.33

Digest 17.1.33

Iulianus 4 ex minic.

Julian 4 from Minicius.

Rogatus ut fideiuberet si in minorem summam se obligavit, recte tenetur: si in maiorem, iulianus verius putat quod a plerisque responsum est eum, qui maiorem summam quam rogatus erat fideiussisset, hactenus mandati actionem habere, quatenus rogatus esset, quia id fecisset, quod mandatum ei est: nam usque ad eam summam, in quam rogatus erat, fidem eius spectasse videtur qui rogavit.

Asked to stand surety, if he bound himself for a lesser sum, he is rightly held; if for a greater, iulianus more truly thinks, as most have answered, that he who had stood surety for a greater sum than he had been asked would have an action on mandate only to this extent, in so far as he had been asked, because he did that which was mandated to him: for up to that sum, for which he had been asked, he who asked seems to have had regard to his credit.

Dig. 17.1.34pr.

Digest 17.1.34, preface.

Africanus 8 quaest.

Africanus 8 questions.

Qui negotia lucii titii procurabat, is, cum a debitoribus eius pecuniam exegisset, epistulam ad eum emisit, qua significaret certam summam ex administratione apud se esse eamque creditam sibi se debiturum cum usuris semissibus: quaesitum est, an ex ea causa credita pecunia peti possit et an usurae peti possint. respondit non esse creditam: alioquin dicendum ex omni contractu nuda pactione pecuniam creditam fieri posse. nec huic simile esse, quod, si pecuniam apud te depositam convenerit ut creditam habeas, credita fiat, quia tunc nummi, qui mei erant, tui fiunt: item quod, si a debitore meo iussero te accipere pecuniam, credita fiat, id enim benigne receptum est.

He who was managing the business of Lucius Titius, when he had exacted money from his debtors, sent a letter to him, to signify that a certain sum from the administration was with him and that, as a loan, he would owe it to himself with interest at the half-rate. It was asked whether from that ground money as a loan could be demanded, and whether interest could be demanded. He responded that it was not loaned; otherwise one would have to say that from every contract, by a naked pact, money could be made loaned. Nor is it similar to this case, that, if it is agreed that money deposited with you you are to have as a loan, it becomes loaned, because then the coins that were mine become yours; likewise, that, if I shall have ordered you to receive money from my debtor, it becomes loaned—for that has been favorably received.

his argumentum esse eum, qui, cum mutuam pecuniam dare vellet, argentum vendendum dedisset, nihilo magis pecuniam creditam recte petiturum: et tamen pecuniam ex argento redactam periculo eius fore, qui accepisset argentum. et in proposito igitur dicendum actione mandati obligatum fore procuratorem, ut, quamvis ipsius periculo nummi fierent tamen usuras, de quibus convenerit, praestare debeat.

from this he draws the argument that one who, when he wished to give money on loan (mutuum), had given silver to be sold would be none the more rightly entitled to claim money as loaned; and yet the money realized from the silver would be at the peril of the one who had received the silver. and therefore, in the case proposed, it must be said that the procurator would be bound by the action of mandate, so that, although the coins would be made at his peril, nevertheless he ought to render the interest that was agreed upon.

Dig. 17.1.34.1

Digest 17.1.34.1

Africanus 8 quaest.

Africanus 8 Questions.

Cum heres ex parte esses, mandavi tibi, ut praedium hereditarium mihi emeres certo pretio: emisti. pro coheredum quidem partibus non dubie mandati actio est inter nos. pro tua autem parte posse dubitari ait, utrumne ex empto an mandati agi oporteat: neque enim sine ratione quem existimaturum pro hac parte sub condicione contractam emptionem.

Since you were an heir in part, I commissioned you to buy for me the hereditary estate at a fixed price: you bought it. As to the shares of the coheirs, without doubt there is an action of mandate between us. But as to your own share, he says it can be doubted whether one ought to proceed on purchase (ex empto) or on mandate (mandati): for not without reason would someone think that, for this share, the purchase was contracted under a condition.

quod quidem maxime quaeri pertinere ait, ut, si forte prius quam emptio fieret decesserim et tu, cum scires me decessisse, propter mandatum meum alii vendere nolueris, an heres meus eo nomine tibi sit obligatus, et retro, si alii vendideris, an heredi meo tenearis. nam si quidem sub condicione emptio facta videtur, potest agi, quemadmodum si quaevis alia condicio post mortem exstitisset: sin ^ si^ vero perinde mandati agendum sit, ac si alienum fundum emi mandassem, morte insecuta, cum id scieris, resoluto mandato nullam tibi actionem cum herede meo fore. sed et si mandati agendum esset, eadem praestanda, quae praestarentur, si ex empto ageretur.

He says that what most of all pertains to be asked is this: if by chance I have died before the purchase was made, and you, though you knew I had died, were unwilling, on account of my mandate, to sell to another, whether my heir is obligated to you on that ground; and conversely, if you sold to another, whether you are held to my heir. For if indeed the purchase appears to have been made under a condition, an action can be brought just as if any other condition had arisen after death; but if, on the other hand, the matter must be pursued by an action from mandate, as if I had instructed the purchase of another’s estate, then, death having intervened, when you knew it, with the mandate dissolved, you would have no action against my heir. Yet even if one must proceed from mandate, the same things must be rendered as would be rendered if one were proceeding from purchase.

Dig. 17.1.35

Digest 17.1.35

Nerva 5 membr.

Nerva 5 parchment leaves.

Si fundum, qui ex parte tuus est, mandavi tibi ut emeres mihi, verum est mandatum posse ita consistere, ut mihi ceteris partibus redemptis etiam tuam partem praestare debeas. sed si quidem certo pretio emendas eas mandaverim, quanticumque aliorum partes redemeris, sic et tua pars coartabitur, ut non abundet mandati quantitatem, in quam tibi emendum totum mandavi: sin autem nullo certo pretio constituto emere tibi mandaverim tuque ex diversis pretiis partes ceterorum redemeris, et tuam partem viri boni arbitratu aestimato pretio dari oportet,

If an estate which is in part yours I have commissioned you to buy for me, it is true that the mandate can so consist that, once the other shares have been bought up, you must also make over your own share to me. But if indeed I have mandated you to buy them at a fixed price, at whatever amount you have redeemed the shares of the others, so too your share will be constrained, so that it does not exceed the amount of the mandate within which I mandated you to buy the whole: but if, however, with no fixed price established I have mandated you to buy and you have redeemed the parts of the others at diverse prices, your own share also ought to be given at a price estimated by the arbitration of a good man,

Dig. 17.1.36pr.

Digest 17.1.36pr.

Iavolenus 7 ex cass.

Javolenus 7 from cass.

Ita tu omnes summas maiores et minores coacervet et ita portionem ei qui mandatum suscepit praestet. quod et plerique probant.

Thus let him coacervate all sums, greater and lesser, and thus render the portion to him who undertook the mandate. Which most also approve.

Dig. 17.1.36.1

Digest 17.1.36.1

Iavolenus 7 ex cass.

Iavolenus 7 from Cassius.

Simili modo et in illa specie, ubi certo pretio tibi emere mandavi et aliarum partium nomine commode negotium gessisti et vilius emeris, pro tua parte tantum tibi praestatur, quanti interest tua, dummodo intra id pretium, quod mandato continetur. quid enim fiet, si exiguo pretio hi, cum quibus tibi communis fundus erat, rem abicere vel necessitate rei familiaris vel alia causa cogerentur? non etiam tu ad idem dispendium deduceris.

In a like manner also in that case where I mandated you to buy at a fixed price, and you have managed the business commodiously in the name of the other shares and have bought more cheaply, it is made good to you only for your own share, to the amount of your interest, provided it is within that price which is contained in the mandate. For what will happen if, at a trifling price, those with whom you had a common estate were compelled to let the property go either by the necessity of domestic affairs or for another cause? Will not you also be brought down to the same loss?

sed nec lucrum tibi ex hac causa adquirere debes, cum mandatum gratuitum esse debet: neque enim tibi concedendum est propter hoc venditionem impedire, quod animosiorem eius rei emptorem esse quam tibi mandatum est cognoveris.

but neither ought you to acquire profit for yourself from this cause, since a mandate ought to be gratuitous: nor is it to be conceded to you on this account to impede the sale, because you have learned that the purchaser of that thing is more eager than was mandated to you.

Dig. 17.1.36.2

Digest 17.1.36.2

Iavolenus 7 ex cass.

Iavolenus 7 from Cassius.

Quod si fundum, qui per partes venit, emendum tibi mandassem, sed ita, ut non aliter mandato tenear, quam si totum fundum emeres: si totum emere non potueris, in partibus emendis tibi negotium gesseris ( sive habueris in eo fundo partem sive non) et eveniet, ut is cui tale mandatum datum est periculo suo interim partes emat et, nisi totum emerit, ingratis eas retineat. nam propius est, ut cum huiusmodi incommodis mandatum suscipi possit praestarique officium et in partibus emendis perinde atque in toto debeat ab eo, qui tale mandatum sua sponte suscepit.

But if I had given you a mandate to buy an estate which comes up by parts, yet on this condition, that I am not otherwise bound by the mandate than if you were to buy the whole estate: if you could not buy the whole, you will have conducted the business for yourself in buying parts ( whether you have a share in that estate or not), and it will come about that he to whom such a mandate has been given buys the parts meanwhile at his own risk, and, unless he buys the whole, retains them though unwanted. For it is more reasonable that, with inconveniences of this kind, a mandate can be undertaken and the duty performed, and that in buying parts, just as in buying the whole, it ought to be done by him who of his own accord undertook such a mandate.

Dig. 17.1.36.3

Digest 17.1.36.3

Iavolenus 7 ex cass.

Iavolenus 7 from Cassius.

Quod si mandassem tibi, ut fundum mihi emeres, non addito eo, ut non aliter mandato tenear, quam si totum emeres, et tu partem vel quasdam partes eius emeris, tum habebimus sine dubio invicem mandati actionem, quamvis reliquas partes emere non potuisses.

But if I had commissioned you to buy an estate for me, without adding that I should be bound by the mandate only if you bought the whole, and you purchased a part or certain parts of it, then we shall, without doubt, have mutually an action on mandate, although you would not have been able to buy the remaining parts.

Dig. 17.1.37

Digest 17.1.37

Africanus 8 quaest.

Africanus 8 questions.

Hominem certum pro te dari fideiussi et solvi: cum mandati agatur, aestimatio eius ad id potius tempus, quo solutus sit, non quo agatur, referri debet, et ideo etiamsi mortuus fuerit, nihilo minus utilis ea actio est. aliter in stipulatione servatur: nam tunc id tempus spectatur quo agitur, nisi forte aut per promissorem steterit, quo minus sua die solveret, aut per creditorem, quo minus acciperet: etenim neutri eorum frustratio sua prodesse debet.

I stood surety that a specific person be given on your behalf, and I paid: when an action on mandate is brought, his valuation ought to be referred rather to the time at which payment was made, not to that at which suit is brought; and therefore even if he has died, nonetheless that action is effective. A different rule is observed in a stipulation: for then the time regarded is that when suit is brought, unless perhaps it was due either to the promisor that he did not pay on his due day, or to the creditor that he did not accept; for the frustration caused by either of them ought not to be of advantage to them.

Dig. 17.1.38pr.

Digest 17.1.38, beginning.

Marcellus l.S. resp.

Marcellus, in the Sixth Book of Responses.

Lucius titius publio maevio filio naturali domum communem permisit non donationis causa creditori filii obligare: postea maevio defuncto relicta pupilla tutores eius iudicem adversus titium acceperunt et titius de mutuis petitionibus: quaero, an domus pars, quam titius obligandam filio suo accommodavit, arbitratu iudicis liberari debeat. Marcellus respondit, an et quando debeat liberari, ex persona debitoris itemque ex eo, quod inter contrahentes actum esset, ac tempore, quo res de qua quaereretur obligata fuisset, iudicem aestimaturum:

Lucius Titius permitted Publius Maevius, his natural son, to encumber the common house to the son’s creditor not by way of donation: afterwards, Maevius having died, a girl left as a ward, her guardians obtained a judge against Titius, and Titius [obtained one] concerning claims arising from loans: I ask whether the part of the house which Titius lent to his son to be encumbered ought to be released at the judge’s arbitrament. Marcellus replied that whether and when it ought to be released the judge will evaluate from the character of the debtor, and likewise from what had been transacted between the contracting parties, and from the time at which the thing about which inquiry is made had been encumbered:

Dig. 17.1.38.1

Digest 17.1.38.1

Marcellus l.S. resp.

Marcellus in the single book, responds.

Est enim earum specierum iudicialis quaestio, per quam res expediatur, non absimilis illa, quae frequentissime agitari solet, fideiussor an et prius quam solvat agere possit, ut liberetur. nec tamen semper exspectandum est, ut solvat aut iudicio accepto condemnetur, si diu in solutione reus cessabit aut certe bona sua dissipabit, praesertim si domi pecuniam fideiussor non habebit, qua numerata creditori mandati actione reum conveniat.

For there is a judicial question of those kinds, by which the matter is expedited, not unlike that which is most frequently agitated: whether a surety can also bring an action even before he pays, in order to be released. Nor, however, must one always wait for him to pay, or to be condemned upon the suit being taken up, if the debtor should long delay in payment or indeed dissipate his goods, especially if the surety will not have money at home, with which, once paid out to the creditor, he may sue the debtor by an action on mandate.

Dig. 17.1.39

Digest 17.1.39

Nerva 7 membr.

Nerva 7 parchment leaves.

Et aristoni et celso patri placuit posse rem hac condicione deponi mandatumque suscipi, ut res periculo eius sit qui depositum vel mandatum suscepit: quod et mihi verum esse videtur.

And both Aristo and Celsus the father held that a thing can be deposited on this condition and a mandate undertaken, that the thing be at the peril of him who has undertaken the deposit or the mandate: which also seems to me to be true.

Dig. 17.1.40

Digest 17.1.40

Paulus 9 ad ed.

Paulus 9 on the edict.

Si pro te praesente et vetante fideiusserim, nec mandati actio nec negotiorum gestorum est: sed quidam utilem putant dari oportere: quibus non consentio, secundum quod et pomponio videtur.

If, on your behalf, with you present and forbidding, I have stood as surety (fideiussor), neither the action of mandate nor the action of negotiorum gestorum lies: but some think that a useful action ought to be granted; with whom I do not agree, as also seems to Pomponius.

Dig. 17.1.41

Digest 17.1.41

Gaius 3 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 3 on the provincial edict.

Potest ab una dumtaxat parte mandati iudicium dari: nam si is qui mandatum suscepit egressus fuerit mandatum, ipsi quidem mandati iudicium non competit, at ei qui mandaverit adversus eum competit.

An action of mandate can be given from only one side: for if he who undertook the mandate has gone beyond the mandate, to him indeed the action of mandate does not lie, but to the one who mandated it, it lies against him.

Dig. 17.1.42

Digest 17.1.42

Ulpianus 11 ad ed.

Ulpian 11 on the Edict.

Si mandavero tibi, ut excuteres vires hereditatis, et tu, quasi minor sit, eam a me emeris, et mandati mihi teneberis. tantundem et si tibi mandavi, ut vires excuteres eius cui eram crediturus et renuntiaveris eum idoneum esse.

If I shall have mandated to you to examine the resources of an inheritance, and you, as though it were a minor’s, have bought it from me, you will also be liable to me on the mandate. The same likewise if I have mandated to you to examine the resources of him to whom I was going to extend credit, and you have reported that he is suitable/solvent.

Dig. 17.1.43

Digest 17.1.43

Ulpianus 23 ad ed.

Ulpian 23 on the Edict.

Qui mandatum suscepit, ut pecunias in diem collocaret, isque hoc fecerit, mandati conveniendus est, ut cum dilatione temporis actionibus cedat.

He who has undertaken a mandate to place monies until a fixed day, and has done this, is to be sued on the mandate, so that he may cede the actions together with the postponement of the time.

Dig. 17.1.44

Digest 17.1.44

Ulpianus 62 ad ed.

Ulpian 62 on the Edict.

Dolus est, si quis nolit persequi quod persequi potest, aut si quis nolit quod exegerit solvere.

Fraud exists, if anyone is unwilling to pursue what he can pursue, or if anyone is unwilling to pay what he has exacted.

Dig. 17.1.45pr.

Digest 17.1.45 pr.

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paul 5 on plaut.

Si mandatu meo fundum emeris, utrum cum dederis pretium ageres mecum mandati, an et antequam des, ne necesse habeas res tuas vendere? et recte dicitur in hoc esse mandati actionem, ut suscipiam obligationem, quae adversus te venditori competit: nam et ego tecum agere possum, ut praestes mihi adversus venditorem empti actiones.

If at my mandate you buy an estate, is it only when you have paid the price that you would sue me by an action of mandate, or even before you pay it, so that you need not have to sell your own goods? And it is rightly said that in this there is an action of mandate, to the effect that I should assume the obligation which belongs to the vendor against you; for I too can sue you, so that you provide to me, against the vendor, the actions of purchase.

Dig. 17.1.45.1

Digest 17.1.45.1

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus 5 on plaut.

Sed si mandatu meo iudicium suscepisti, manente iudicio sine iusta causa non debes mecum agere, ut transferatur iudicium in me: nondum enim perfecisti mandatum.

But if by my mandate you have undertaken the judicial action, while the action remains pending you ought not, without just cause, to litigate with me so that the action be transferred onto me: for you have not yet perfected the mandate.

Dig. 17.1.45.2

Digest 17.1.45.2

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus 5 on Plautius.

Item si, dum negotia mea geris, alicui de creditoribus meis promiseris, et antequam solvas dicendum est te agere posse, ut obligationem suscipiam: aut si nolit creditor obligationem mutare, cavere tibi debeo defensurum te.

Likewise, if, while you are managing my business, you have promised to someone among my creditors, then before you pay it must be said that you can bring an action so that I may assume the obligation: or, if the creditor is unwilling to change the obligation, I ought to give security to you that I will defend you.

Dig. 17.1.45.3

Digest 17.1.45.3

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus Book 5 on Plautius.

Si iudicio te sisti promisero nec exhibuero, et antequam praestem, mandati agere possum, ut me liberes: vel si pro te reus promittendi factus sim.

If I have promised to present you in court and have not produced you, then, before I perform, I can bring the action of mandate, so that you may release me; or if I have become a promissor on your behalf.

Dig. 17.1.45.4

Digest 17.1.45.4

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus 5 on Plautius.

Sed si mandavero tibi, ut creditori meo solvas, tuque expromiseris et ex ea causa damnatus sis, humanius est et in hoc casu mandati actionem tibi competere.

But if I have given you a mandate to pay my creditor, and you have expromised and have been condemned on that account, it is more humane that even in this case the action of mandate should be available to you.

Dig. 17.1.45.5

Digest 17.1.45.5

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus 5 on Plautius.

Quotiens autem ante soltuam pecuniam mandati agi posse diximus, faciendi causa, non dandi tenebitur reus: et est aequum, sicut mandante aliquo actionem nacti cogimur eam praestare iudicio mandati, ita ex eadem causa obligatos habere mandati actionem, ut liberemur.

However often we have said that an action on mandate can be brought before the money has been paid, the defendant will be held for doing, not for giving; and it is equitable that, just as, having obtained an action at someone’s mandating, we are compelled to render it by the judgment in the action of mandate, so too those obliged from the same cause have an action of mandate, in order that we may be released.

Dig. 17.1.45.6

Digest 17.1.45.6

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus 5 on Plautius.

Si fideiussor multiplicaverit summam, in quam fideiussit, sumptibus ex iusta ratione factis, totam eam praestabit is pro quo fideiussit.

If the surety has increased the sum for which he stood surety by expenses incurred on a just rationale, the one for whom he stood surety shall make good the whole of it.

Dig. 17.1.45.7

Digest 17.1.45.7

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus 5 on Plautius.

Quod mihi debebas a debitore tuo stipulatus sum periculo tuo: posse me agere tecum mandati in id, quod minus ab illo servare potero, nerva atilicinus aiunt, quamvis id mandatum ad tuam rem pertineat, et merito: tunc enim liberatur is qui debitorem delegat, si nomen eius creditor secutus est, non cum periculo debitoris ab eo stipulatur.

What you owed me I stipulated from your debtor at your risk: Nerva and Atilicinus say that I can bring an action of mandate against you for that amount by which I shall be able to realize less from him, although that mandate pertains to your affair—and rightly: for then he who delegates a debtor is released, if the creditor has followed his name, not when he stipulates from him with the debtor’s risk.

Dig. 17.1.45.8

Digest 17.1.45.8

Paulus 5 ad plaut.

Paulus 5 on plaut.

Idem iuris est, si mandatu fideiussoris cum reo egissem, quia sequenti mandato liberaretur ex priore causa.

The same rule of law holds, if at the mandate of the surety I had brought suit against the principal debtor, because by the subsequent mandate he would be freed from the prior cause.

Dig. 17.1.46

Digest 17.1.46

Paulus 74 ad ed.

Paulus, 74 on the Edict.

Si quis pro eo spoponderit, qui ita promisit: " si stichum non dederis, centum milia dabis?" et stichum redemerit vilius et solverit, ne centum milium stipulatio committatur, constat posse eum mandati agere. igitur commodissime illa forma in mandatis servanda est, ut, quotiens certum mandatum sit, recedi a forma non debeat: at quotiens incertum vel plurium causarum, tunc, licet aliis praestationibus exsoluta sit causa mandati quam quae ipso mandato inerant, si tamen hoc mandatori expedierit, mandati erit actio.

If someone has stood surety on behalf of him who thus promised: " if you do not deliver Stichus, you will give 100,000?" and has redeemed Stichus more cheaply and has paid, lest the stipulation for 100,000 be incurred, it is settled that he can bring an action of mandate. Therefore most conveniently this form is to be observed in mandates, that, whenever the mandate is determinate, one ought not to depart from the form; but whenever it is indeterminate or of several causes, then, although the cause of the mandate has been discharged by prestations other than those which were inherent in the mandate itself, if nevertheless this has been expedient for the mandator, there will be an action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.47pr.

Digest 17.1.47 pr.

Pomponius 3 ex plaut.

Pomponius 3 from Plautius.

Iulianus ait, si fideiussori uxor doti promiserit, quod ei ex causa fideiussoria debeat, nuptiis secutis confestim mandati adversus debitorem agere eum posse, quia intellegitur abesse ei pecunia eo, quod onera matrimonii sustineret.

Julian says: if a wife has promised to a surety, as dowry, what she owes him from the suretyship cause, once the nuptials have followed he can at once bring the action of mandate against the debtor, because he is understood to be without the money, in that he was bearing the burdens of matrimony.

Dig. 17.1.47.1

Digest 17.1.47.1

Pomponius 3 ex plaut.

Pomponius book 3 from Plautius.

Si is, qui pro te hominem dare fideiussit, alienum hominem stipulatori dederit, nec ipse liberatur nec te liberat et ideo mandati actionem tecum non habet. sed si stipulator eum hominem usuceperit, dicendum esse iulianus ait liberationem contingere: eo ergo casu mandati actio post usucapionem demum tecum erit.

If the one who has stood as surety (fideiussor) to give a slave on your behalf should give to the stipulator another’s slave, neither is he himself released nor does he release you, and therefore he does not have an action on mandate against you. But if the stipulator should acquire that slave by usucapion, Julian says it must be said that release occurs: therefore, in that case, the action on mandate will lie against you only after the usucapion.

Dig. 17.1.48pr.

Digest 17.1.48, introductory paragraph.

Celsus 7 Dig.

Celsus 7 Digest.

Quintus mucius scaevola ait, si quis sub usuris creditam pecuniam fideiussisset et reus in iudicio conventus cum recusare vellet sub usuris creditam esse pecuniam et fideiussor solvendo usuras potestatem recusandi eas reo sustulisset, eam pecuniam a reo non petiturum. sed si reus fideiussori denuntiasset, ut recusaret sub usuris debitam esse nec is propter suam existimationem recusare voluisset, quod ita solverit, a reo petiturum. hoc bene censuit scaevola: parum enim fideliter facit fideiussor in superiore casu, quod potestatem eximere reo videtur suo iure uti: ceterum in posteriore casu non oportet esse noxiae fideiussori, si pepercisset pudori suo.

Quintus Mucius Scaevola says that, if someone had stood surety for money lent under interest, and the defendant, when summoned in court, wished to object that the money had been lent under interest, but the surety, by paying the interest, removed from the defendant the power of objecting to it, he would not seek that money from the defendant. But if the defendant had given notice to the surety to object that it was owed under interest, and the surety, on account of his own estimation (reputation), did not wish to object, he would seek from the defendant what he has thus paid. Scaevola judged this well: for in the former case the surety acts somewhat unfaithfully, since by taking away from the defendant the power to object he seems to be exercising his own right; whereas in the latter case the surety ought not to suffer harm, if he has spared regard for his own honor.

Dig. 17.1.48.1

Digest 17.1.48.1

Celsus 7 Dig.

Celsus 7 Digest.

Cum mando tibi, ut credendo pecuniam negotium mihi geras mihique id nomen praestes, meum in eo periculum, meum emolumentum sit, puto mandatum posse consistere.

When I give you a mandate to manage business for me by lending money on credit and to extend that credit to me, with the peril therein mine and the emolument mine, I think the mandate can stand.

Dig. 17.1.48.2

Digest 17.1.48.2

Celsus 7 Dig.

Celsus 7 Digest.

Ceterum ut tibi negotium geras, tui arbitrii sit nomen, id est ut cuivis credas, tu recipias usuras, periculum dumtaxat ad me pertineat, iam extra mandati formam est, quemadmodum si mandem, ut mihi quemvis fundum emas.

However, that you conduct the business for yourself, that the “nomen” be at your discretion—that is, that you give credit to whomever you please—that you receive the usury (interest), while the risk pertains only to me, is already outside the form of a mandate, just as if I were to mandate that you buy for me any estate whatsoever.

Dig. 17.1.49

Digest 17.1.49

Marcellus 6 Dig.

Marcellus 6 Digest.

Servum titii emi ab alio bona fide et possideo: mandatu meo eum titius vendidit, cum ignoraret suum esse, vel contra ego vendidi illius mandatu, cum forte is, cui heres exstiterit, eum emisset: de iure evicitonis et de mandatu quaesitum est. et puto titium, quamvis quasi procurator vendidisset, obstrictum emptori neque, si rem tradidisset, vindicationem ei concedendam, et idcirco mandati eum non teneri, sed contra mandati agere posse, si quid eius interfuisset, quia forte venditurus non fuerit. contra mandator, si rem ab eo vindicare velit, exceptione doli summovetur et adversus venditorem testatoris sui habet ex empto iure hereditario actionem.

I bought in good faith from another a slave of Titius and I possess him: at my mandate Titius sold him, when he did not know him to be his own; or conversely I sold at his mandate, when perchance the person whose heir he had become had bought him: there was inquiry concerning the law of eviction and concerning the mandate. And I think that Titius, although he sold as if a procurator, is bound to the buyer, nor, if he had delivered the thing, should vindication be granted to him; and therefore he is not held by the action on mandate, but on the contrary he can sue on the counter-action of mandate, if it had been of concern to him, since perhaps he would not have been about to sell. Conversely, the mandator, if he wishes to vindicate the thing from him, is repelled by the exception of fraud, and he has against the vendor of his testator an action ex empto by hereditary right.

Dig. 17.1.50pr.

Digest 17.1.50 pr.

Celsus 38 Dig.

Celsus Digest 38.

Si is qui negotia fideiussoris gerebat ita solvit stipulatori, ut reum fideiussoremque liberaret, idque utiliter fecit, negotiorum gestorum actione fideiussorem habet obligatum, nec refert, ratum habuit nec ne fideiussor. sed fideiussor etiam antequam solveret procuratori pecuniam, simul ac ratum habuisset, haberet tamen mandati actionem.

If the one who was managing the surety’s affairs so paid the stipulator as to release the principal debtor and the surety, and did this to useful effect, he has the surety bound by the action for management of affairs, nor does it matter whether the surety ratified it or not. But the surety, even before he paid the money to the procurator, as soon as he had ratified it, would nonetheless have the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.50.1

Digest 17.1.50.1

Celsus 38 Dig.

Celsus 38 Digest.

Sive, cum frumentum deberetur, fideiussor africum dedit, sive quid ex necessitate solvendi plus impendit quam est pretium solutae rei, sive stichum solvit isque decessit aut debilitate flagitiove ad nullum pretium sui redactus est, id mandati iudicio consequeretur.

Whether, when grain was owed, the surety furnished African wheat; or whether, from the necessity of paying, he expended more than the price of the thing discharged; or whether he paid Stichus and he died, or by debility or disgrace was reduced to no price of himself—he would recover that by an action on mandate.

Dig. 17.1.51

Digest 17.1.51

Iavolenus 9 ex cass.

Javolenus 9 from Cass.

Fideiussor quamvis per errorem ante diem pecuniam solverit, repetere tamen ab eo non potest ac ne mandati quidem actionem, antequam dies solvendi veniat, cum reo habebit.

A surety, although through mistake he has paid the money before the day, nevertheless cannot recover it from him; nor will he even have an action of mandate with the debtor before the day for payment comes.

Dig. 17.1.52

Digest 17.1.52

Iavolenus 1 epist.

Javolenus 1 epistles.

Fideiussorem, si sine adiectione bonitatis tritici pro altero triticum spopondit, quodlibet triticum dando reum liberare posse existimo: a reo autem non aliud triticum repetere poterit, quam quo pessimo tritico liberare se a stipulatore licuit. itaque si paratus fuerit reus, quod dando ipse creditori liberari potuit, fideiussori dare et fideiussor id quod dederit, id est melius triticum condicet, exceptione eum doli mali summoveri existimo.

If a surety, without an addition of the goodness of the wheat, has promised wheat for another, I think that by giving whatever wheat he can free the debtor; but from the debtor he will not be able to recover other wheat than that by which, with the worst wheat, it was permitted to free himself from the stipulator. And so, if the debtor was ready to give to the surety that which, by giving it, he himself could have been freed to the creditor, and the surety brings a condiction for what he has given, that is, for better wheat, I consider that he is to be put out by the exception of dolus malus.

Dig. 17.1.53

Digest 17.1.53

Papinianus 9 quaest.

Papinian Book 9 of the Questions.

Qui fide alterius pro alio fideiussit praesente et non recusante, utrosque obligatos habet iure mandati: quod si pro invito vel ignorante alterutrius mandatum secutus fideiussit, eum solum convenire potest qui mandavit, non etiam reum promittendi: nec me movet, quod pecunia fideiussoris reus liberetur: id enim contingit et si meo mandato pro alio solvas.

He who, on the faith of another, has become surety for someone else, with him present and not refusing, has both bound under the law of mandate; but if, following the mandate of either party, he became surety for one who was unwilling or unaware, he can sue only the one who gave the mandate, not also the promissory defendant; nor does it move me that the defendant is released by the surety’s money: for that likewise happens if, at my mandate, you pay on behalf of another.

Dig. 17.1.54pr.

Digest 17.1.54, preface.

Papinianus 27 quaest.

Papinian 27 questions.

Cum servus extero se mandat emendum, nullum mandatum est. sed si in hoc mandatum intercessit ut servus manumitteretur nec manumiserit, et pretium consequetur dominus ut venditor et affectus ratione mandati agetur: finge filium naturalem vel fratrem esse ( placuit enim prudentioribus affectus rationem in bonae fidei iudiciis habendam). quod si de suis nummis emptor pretium dederit ( neque enim aliter iudicio venditi liberari potest), quaeri solet, an utiliter de peculio agere possit. et verius et utilius videtur praetorem de huiusmodi contractibus servorum non cogitasse, quo se ipsi mala ratione dominis auferrent.

When a slave gives a mandate to an outsider to buy himself, there is no mandate. But if a mandate intervened to this effect, that the slave be manumitted, and he has not manumitted, the master will obtain the price as the seller, and, on the score of affection, an action on mandate will be brought: imagine that he is a natural son or a brother ( for it has pleased the more prudent that in judgments of good faith regard be had to the ground of affection). But if the purchaser has given the price from his own money ( for otherwise he cannot be discharged in the action venditi), it is usually asked whether he can usefully bring the de peculio action. And it seems both truer and more expedient that the praetor did not contemplate contracts of this kind made by slaves, by which they themselves, by an ill device, would carry themselves off from their masters.

Dig. 17.1.54.1

Digest 17.1.54.1

Papinianus 27 quaest.

Papinian 27 Questions.

Si liber homo bona fide serviens redimi se mandaverit idque nummis emptoris factum sit, contraria mandati actione agi posse constat, ut tamen actiones praestentur, quas habet emptor adversus venditorem: finge non manumisisse liberam personam emptorem.

If a free man, serving in good faith, has given a mandate that he be redeemed, and this has been done with the buyer’s money, it is agreed that one can proceed by the contrary action of mandate, provided, however, that the actions which the buyer has against the seller be furnished: suppose that the buyer has not manumitted the person who is free.

Dig. 17.1.55

Digest 17.1.55

Papinianus 1 resp.

Papinianus Responses, Book 1.

Procurator, qui non res inclusas subtraxit, sed traditas non reddidit, iudicio mandati, non furti tenetur.

A procurator who did not remove things shut in, but failed to return things delivered, is liable under the action of mandate, not of theft.

Dig. 17.1.56pr.

Digest 17.1.56, beginning.

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinianus 3 Responses.

Qui mutuam pecuniam dari mandavit, omisso reo promittendi et pignoribus non distractis eligi potest: quod uti liceat si litteris exprimatur, distractis quoque pignoribus ad eum creditor redire poterit: etenim quae dubitationis tollendae causa contractibus inseruntur, ius commune non laedunt.

He who has mandated that money be given as a loan, with the promissor as defendant passed over and the pledges not sold, can be proceeded against; and if it is expressed in writing that this may be availed of, the creditor will be able to return to him even with the pledges sold; for indeed provisions inserted into contracts for the purpose of removing doubt do not injure the common law.

Dig. 17.1.56.1

Digest 17.1.56.1

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinian, 3 Responses

Fideiussor qui pecuniam in iure optulit et propter aetatem eius qui petebat obsignavit ac publice deposuit, confestim agere mandati potest.

A surety who tendered the money in court and, because of the age of the one who was suing, sealed it and placed it on public deposit, can immediately sue by the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.56.2

Digest 17.1.56.2

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinian 3 responses

Non ideo minus omnis temporis bonam fidem explorari oportet, quod dominus post annos quinque de provincia reversus, mox rei publicae causa profecturus non acceptis rationibus mandatum instauraverit. cum igitur ad officium procuratoris pertinuerit quidquid ex prima negotiorum gestorum administratione debuit ad secundam rationem transferre, secundi temporis causa priorem litem suscipiet.

It is not for that reason any the less necessary that good faith for the whole period be examined, because the principal, after 5 years, returned from the province and, being about to set out at once on public business, renewed the mandate without the accounts having been received. Since therefore it pertained to the office of the procurator to transfer into the second account whatever from the first administration of the transacted affairs he ought, on account of the second period he will undertake the earlier suit.

Dig. 17.1.56.3

Digest 17.1.56.3

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinian, Responses, Book 3.

Salarium incertae pollicitationis neque extra ordinem recte petitur neque iudicio mandati, ut salarium tibi constituat.

The salary of an indeterminate promise is not rightly sought either by extraordinary procedure or by the action of mandate, so that a salary be constituted for you.

Dig. 17.1.56.4

Digest 17.1.56.4

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinianus 3 responses.

Sumptus bona fide necessario factos, etsi negotio finem adhibere procurator non potuit, iudicio mandati restitui necesse est.

Expenses necessarily incurred in good faith, even if the procurator was not able to bring the business to an end, must be restored by the action of mandate.

Dig. 17.1.57

Digest 17.1.57

Papinianus 10 resp.

Papinian 10 responses.

Mandatum distrahendorum servorum defuncto qui mandatum suscepit intercidisse constitit. quoniam tamen heredes eius errore lapsi non animo furandi, sed exsequendi, quod defunctus suae curae fecerat, servos vendiderant, eos ab emptoribus usucaptos videri placuit. sed venaliciarium ex provincia reversum publiciana actione non inutiliter acturum, cum exceptio iusti dominii causa cognita detur neque oporteat eum, qui certi hominis fidem elegit, ob errorem aut imperitiam heredum adfici damno.

It was established that the mandate for selling off the slaves had lapsed upon the death of the one who had received the mandate. Since, however, his heirs, having fallen into error, not with the intention of stealing but of carrying out what the deceased had made a matter of his care, sold the slaves, it was resolved to deem them acquired by usucapion by the purchasers. But the venaliciary, returning from the province, will not act without effect by the Publician action, since, upon inquiry into the cause, an exception of rightful ownership is granted, nor ought he who chose the credit of a particular man to be afflicted with loss on account of the error or inexperience of the heirs.

Dig. 17.1.58pr.

Digest 17.1.58 pr.

Paulus 4 quaest.

Paulus 4 Questions.

Si praecedente mandato titium defenderas quamvis mortuo eo, cum hoc ignorares, ego puto mandati actionem adversus heredem titii competere, quia mandatum morte mandatoris, non etiam mandati actio solvitur. quod si sine mandatu defensionem suscepisti, negotium quodammodo defuncti gerere institueras, et quemadmodum, si illum liberasses, competeret tibi negotiorum gestorum actio, ita potest dici et heredem eius eadem actione teneri.

If, under a preceding mandate, you had defended Titius, although he was dead, while you were ignorant of this, I think the action of mandate lies against the heir of Titius, because the mandate is dissolved by the death of the mandator, but not also the action of mandate. But if you undertook the defense without a mandate, you had in a certain way begun to manage the business of the deceased; and just as, if you had freed him, the action of the management of affairs would accrue to you, so it can be said that his heir is held by the same action.

Dig. 17.1.58.1

Digest 17.1.58.1

Paulus 4 quaest.

Paulus Questions, Book 4.

Lucius titius creditori suo mandatorem dedit: deinde defuncto debitore maiore parte creditorum consentiente a praetore decretum est, ut portionem creditores ab heredibus ferant, absente eo creditore apud quem mandator exstiterat: quaero, si mandator conveniatur, an eandem habeat exceptionem quam heres debitoris. respondi: si praesens apud praetorem ipse quoque consensisset, pactus videtur iusta ex causa eaque exceptio et fideiussori danda esset et mandatori. sed cum proponas eum afuisse, iniquum est auferri ei electionem ( sicut pignus aut privilegium), qui potuit praesens id ipsum proclamare nec desiderare decretum praetoris.

Lucius Titius gave his creditor a mandator: then, the debtor having died, with the greater part of the creditors consenting, it was decreed by the praetor that the creditors should take a portion from the heirs, the creditor being absent in whose case the mandator had existed: I ask, if the mandator is proceeded against, whether he has the same exception as the debtor’s heir. I answered: if, being present before the praetor, he also had consented, he is seen to have made a pact for a just cause, and that exception ought to be granted both to the fideiussor and to the mandator. But since you propose that he was absent, it is unjust that his choice be taken away ( sicut pignus aut privilegium), he who could, if present, proclaim that very thing and not desire the praetor’s decree.

nec enim si quis dixerit summovendum creditorem, heredi consulitur, sed mandatori vel fideiussori, quibus mandati iudicio eandem partem praestaturus est. plane si ab herede partem accepisset, an in reliquum permittendum esset creditori fideiussorem convenire, dubitatum est: sed videbitur consentire decreto conveniendo heredem.

for indeed, even if someone should say that the creditor ought to be removed, it is not the heir who is consulted, but the mandator or the fideiussor, to whom by the action on mandate he will have to make good the same share. clearly, if he has received a part from the heir, it has been doubted whether the creditor should be permitted to sue the fideiussor for the remainder; but by suing the heir he will be seen to consent to the decree.

Dig. 17.1.59pr.

Digest 17.1.59pr.

Paulus 4 resp.

Paulus 4 Responses.

Si mandatu titii calpurnius pecuniam quam titius credebat stipulatus esset non donandi animo, mandati iudicio eum ab herede titii posse conveniri, ut actiones suas praestet: idem est et si exacta est a calpurnio pecunia.

If, at the mandate of Titius, Calpurnius had stipulated for the money which Titius had credited (lent), not with a donative intent, he can be sued by Titius’s heir by the action on mandate, to furnish his actions; the same holds even if the money has been exacted by Calpurnius.

Dig. 17.1.59.1

Digest 17.1.59.1

Paulus 4 resp.

Paul 4 responses.

Paulus respondit fideiussorem, qui rem pignoris iure obligatam a creditore emit, mandati iudicio conventum ab herede debitoris oblato omni debito restituere cum fructibus cogendum neque habendum similem extraneo emptori, cum in omni contractu bonam fidem praestare debeat.

Paulus responded that a surety, who buys from the creditor a thing bound by the right of pledge, when sued by the action of mandate, must be compelled, upon the heir of the debtor tendering the whole debt, to restore it with the fruits, nor is he to be regarded as similar to a stranger purchaser, since in every contract he ought to furnish good faith.

Dig. 17.1.59.2

Digest 17.1.59.2

Paulus 4 resp.

Paul 4 Responses.

Paulus respondit die adiecto in mandato, intra quem praestaturum se lucius titius scripsit, non esse impedimento, quo minus etiam post eum diem conveniri mandati iudicio possit.

Paulus responded that the addition of a day in the mandate, within which Lucius Titius wrote that he would render performance, is not an impediment, so that he may also be convened by the action on mandate even after that day.

Dig. 17.1.59.3

Digest 17.1.59.3

Paulus 4 resp.

Paulus 4 responses.

Paulus respondit unum ex mandatoribus in solidum eligi posse, etiamsi non sit concessum in mandato: post condemnationem autem in duorum personam collatam necessario ex causa iudicati singulos pro parte dimidia conveniri posse et debere.

Paul answered that one of the mandators can be chosen to be liable in solidum, even if it has not been granted in the mandate; but after the condemnation has been entered against two persons, necessarily, on the ground of the judgment (ex causa iudicati), each individual can and ought to be sued for a half share.

Dig. 17.1.59.4

Digest 17.1.59.4

Paulus 4 resp.

Paul Book 4 of the Responses.

Creditor pignus vendidit: quaero, an, si evicta sit possessio emptori, regressum creditor ad mandatorem habere possit et an intersit, creditoris iure vendiderit an communi iure promiserit. paulus respondit, si creditor ex pretio pignorum debitum consecutus non sit, mandatorem liberum non videri. ex hoc responso apparet, si evictionis nomine non teneatur, proficere eam rem ad liberationem.

A creditor sold a pledge: I ask whether, if the possession be evicted from the buyer, the creditor can have recourse against the mandator, and whether it makes a difference whether he sold by the creditor’s right or promised according to the common law. Paul answered that, if the creditor has not obtained the debt from the price of the pledges, the mandator does not appear to be released. From this response it appears that, if he is not held on the score of eviction, that matter advances toward release.

Dig. 17.1.59.5

Digest 17.1.59.5

Paulus 4 resp.

Paul 4 Responses.

" ille illi salutem. mando tibi, ut blaesio severo adfini meo octoginta credas sub pignore illo et illo: in quam pecuniam et quidquid usurarum nomine accesserit indemnem rationem tuam me esse ex causa mandati in eum diem, quoad vixerit blaesius severus, praestaturum. " postea saepe conventus mandator non respondit: quaero, an morte debitoris liberatus sit.

" so-and-so to so-and-so, greetings. I instruct you to credit Blaesius Severus, my in-law, with eighty under such-and-such a pledge: for which money, and whatever shall have accrued in the name of interest, I will, by reason of the mandate, guarantee your account to be held harmless until the day as long as Blaesius Severus shall live. " afterward, though often summoned, the mandator did not answer: I ask whether he was released by the death of the debtor.

paulus respondit mandati obligationem perpetuam esse, licet in mandato adiectum videatur indemnem rationem tuam me esse ex causa mandati in eum diem, quoad vixerit blaesius severus, praestaturum.

Paulus responded that the obligation of mandate is perpetual, although in the mandate it may seem to have been added that, by reason of the mandate, I will provide to have your account indemnified until the day, so long as blaesius severus lives.

Dig. 17.1.59.6

Digest 17.1.59.6

Paulus 4 resp.

Paulus 4 responses.

Paulus respondit non videri mandati condicioni paritum, cum in mandato adiectum sit, ut idonea cautio a debitore exigeretur, si neque fideiussor neque pignora accepta sint.

Paulus responded that the condition of the mandate did not seem to have been complied with, since in the mandate it had been added that adequate security be demanded from the debtor, if neither a surety nor pledges have been accepted.

Dig. 17.1.60pr.

Digest 17.1.60pr.

Scaevola 1 resp.

Scaevola 1 response.

Creditor mandatorem convenit: is condemnatus provocavit: quaerendum est, an manente appellatione debitor a creditore conveniri potest. respondi posse.

The creditor sued the mandator (surety): he, having been condemned, appealed: it must be inquired whether, the appeal remaining pending, the debtor can be sued by the creditor. I answered that he can.

Dig. 17.1.60.1

Digest 17.1.60.1

Scaevola 1 resp.

Scaevola Responses, Book 1.

Ad eum qui uxorem ducturus erat litteras fecit tales: " titius seio salutem. semproniam pertinere ad animum meum cognovisti: ideoque cum ex voto meo nuptura tibi sit, velim certus sis secundum dignitatem tuam contrahere te matrimonium. et quamvis idonee repromissuram tibi titiam matrem puellae dotem sciam, tamen et ipse quo magis conciliem animum tuum domui meae, fidem meam interponere non dubito: quare scias, quodcumque ab ea ex hac causa stipulatus fueris, id me mea fide esse iussisse salvum te habiturum.

To the one who was about to take a wife he made a letter such as this: " titius to seius, greeting. You have come to know that sempronia pertains to my mind; and therefore, since in accordance with my vow she is going to be wed to you, I would have you be assured that you are contracting matrimony according to your dignity. And although I know that titia, the girl’s mother, will suitably promise you a dowry, nevertheless I also, that I may the more conciliate your goodwill toward my household, do not hesitate to interpose my pledge: wherefore know that whatever you shall have stipulated from her on this account, that I have ordered to be under my guarantee, you will have safe.

" atque ita titia, quae neque titio mandaverat neque ratum habuerat quod scripserat, dotem seio promisit. quaero, si heres titii ex causa mandati praestiterit, an actione mandati heredem titiae convenire potest. respondi secundum ea, quae proponuntur, non posse.

" and so titia, who had neither given a mandate to titio nor had ratified what he had written, promised a dowry to seio. I ask whether, if the heir of titii, by reason of the mandate, has performed, he can sue the heir of titiae by the action of mandate. I answered, according to the matters proposed, that he cannot.

item quaesitum est, an nec negotiorum gestorum. respondi nec hoc nomine iure agere posse: palam enim facere titium non tam titiae nomine, quam quod consultum vellet, mandasse. item si maritus adversus mandatorem ageret, an aliqua exceptione summoveatur?

likewise it was asked whether not even the action of negotiorum gestorum lies. I answered that not even under this head could he proceed in law: for it makes clear that Titius gave the mandate not so much in Titia’s name as because he wished the matter to be provided for. Likewise, if the husband were to sue against the mandator, would he be warded off by some exception?

respondi nihil proponi, cur summovendus sit.

I replied that nothing is put forward for which he ought to be barred.

Dig. 17.1.60.2

Digest 17.1.60.2

Scaevola 1 resp.

Scaevola 1 response.

Duobus quis mandavit negotiorum administrationem: quaesitum est, an unusquisque mandati iudicio in solidum teneatur. respondi unumquemque pro solido conveniri debere, dummodo ab utroque non amplius debito exigatur.

He entrusted to two persons the administration of business: it was asked whether each is held in solidum by the action of mandate. i answered that each ought to be sued for the whole, provided that from both not more than the debt is exacted.

Dig. 17.1.60.3

Digest 17.1.60.3

Scaevola 1 resp.

Scaevola Book 1 of Responses.

Si inter maritum et socerum id actum esset vel tacito intellectu, ut onus exhibendae uxoris ad maritum rediret praestante patre dotis usuras, nullam actionem superfore ad recipiendum quod negetur consumptum: quod si pater puellae exhibitionem mandasse se doceat, actionem mandati competere.

If between the husband and the father-in-law it had been agreed, even by tacit understanding, that the burden of the exhibition of the wife should revert to the husband, with the father furnishing the interest on the dowry, no action would remain for recovering what is said not to have been consumed; but if the girl’s father shows that he gave a mandate for the exhibition, the action of mandate would lie.

Dig. 17.1.60.4

Digest 17.1.60.4

Scaevola 1 resp.

Scaevola Responses 1.

Lucius titius fratris filio commisit rerum suarum administrationem ita: seiw teknw xairein. egw men kata fusin einai nomizw to huper patros kai twn tou patros uhiwn pragmateuesvai dixa tou tina epitropikon aitein. ei de dei kai toioutou tinos, epitrepw soi peri pantwn twn emwn hws veleis pragmateuesvai, eite pwlein veleis eite hupotivesvai eite agorazein eite hotioun prattein, hws kuriw onti twn emwn: emou panta kuria ta hupo sou ginomena hygoumenou kai myden antilegontos soi pros mydemian pracin.

Lucius titius entrusted to his brother’s son the administration of his affairs thus: to you, child, greetings. I for my part think it is according to nature to manage business on behalf of one’s father and the father’s sons without asking anyone for a power of attorney. But if there is need even of such a thing, I authorize you concerning all my things to manage business as you wish, whether you wish to sell or to mortgage or to buy or to do anything whatsoever, as being master of my property: I deem everything done by you to be valid, and I will object to you in nothing with respect to any transaction.

quaesitum est, si quid non administrandi animo, sed fraudulenter alienasset vel mandasset, an valeret. respondi eum, de quo quaereretur, plene quidem, sed quatenus res ex fide agenda esset, mandasse. item quaero, an, cum seius magistratu functus debitor exstitisset, lucius titius eo nomine conveniri possit vel res eius obligatae essent propter verba epistulae supra scripta.

It has been asked whether, if he had alienated anything not with an intent of administering, but fraudulently, or had mandated it, it would be valid. I responded that the person about whom inquiry was made had indeed given a mandate fully, but only insofar as the matter was to be conducted according to good faith. Likewise I ask whether, when Seius, having performed a magistracy, had become a debtor, Lucius Titius can be proceeded against under that head, or his goods would be obligated on account of the words of the letter written above.

respondi neque conveniri posse neque res obligatas esse.

I answered that neither could he be sued nor were his goods obligated.

Dig. 17.1.61

Digest 17.1.61

Paulus 2 ad ner.

Paulus 2 on Neratius.

Quod filio familias ut peteret mandavi, emancipatus exegit: de peculio intra annum utiliter agam. paulus: sed et cum filio agendum est.

That which I instructed a son of the household to claim, once emancipated he collected: I shall sue de peculio to good effect within a year. paulus: but one must also proceed against the son.

Dig. 17.1.62pr.

Digest 17.1.62, beginning.

Scaevola 6 Dig.

Scaevola 6 Digest.

Cum controversia esset de hereditate defunctae inter scriptum heredem et patruum maevium et amitas, maevius litteris ad sorores suas factis declaravit commune futurum, quidquid ad eum ex eventu litis hereditariae pervenisset, neque stipulatio litteras secuta est: quaesitum est, cum transegerit idem maevius cum scripto herede ita, ut praedia et aliae quaedam res ex ea transactione ad eum pervenirent, an ex litteris suis possit a sororibus conveniri. respondit posse.

When there was a controversy about the inheritance of the deceased between the written heir and the paternal uncle maevius and the paternal aunts, maevius, by a writing made to his sisters, declared that whatever had come to him from the outcome of the hereditary lawsuit would be common; and no stipulation followed the writing. It was asked, since the same maevius transacted a settlement with the written heir in such a way that landed estates and certain other things came to him from that transaction, whether he can be sued by his sisters on the basis of his writing. He answered that he can.

Dig. 17.1.62.1

Digest 17.1.62.1

Scaevola 6 Dig.

Scaevola 6 Digest

Mandavi in haec verba: " lucius titius gaio suo salutem. peto et mando tibi, ut fidem dicas pro publio maevio apud sempronium: quaeque a publio soluta tibi non fuerint, me repraesentaturum hac epistula manu mea scripta notum tibi facio. " quaero, si non fideiussisset, sed mandasset creditori et alias egisset quam quod ei mandatum esset, an actione mandati teneretur.

I gave a mandate in these words: " lucius titius to his gaius, greetings. I ask and charge you to declare surety for publius maevios before sempronius; and whatever shall not have been paid to you by publius, I make known to you that I will make it good by this epistle written in my own hand." I ask whether, if he did not become surety, but gave a mandate to the creditor and transacted otherwise than what had been mandated to him, he would be held by an action on mandate.

respondit teneri.

He answered that he was liable.

Dig. 17.2.0. Pro socio.

Digest 17.2.0. For a partner.

Dig. 17.2.1pr.

Digest 17.2.1, preface.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus book 32 on the Edict.

Societas coiri potest vel in perpetuum, id est dum vivunt, vel ad tempus vel ex tempore vel sub condicione.

A partnership can be entered either in perpetuity, that is, while they live, or for a term, or for an indefinite time, or under a condition.

Dig. 17.2.1.1

Digest 17.2.1.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

In societate omnium bonorum omnes res quae coeuntium sunt continuo communicantur,

In a partnership of all goods, all things that belong to the co-venturers are at once made common,

Dig. 17.2.2

Digest 17.2.2

Gaius 10 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 10 on the Provincial Edict.

Quia, licet specialiter traditio non interveniat, tacita tamen creditur intervenire.

Because, although delivery does not specifically intervene, nevertheless it is believed to intervene tacitly.

Dig. 17.2.3pr.

Digest 17.2.3, preface.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Ea vero, quae in nominibus erunt, manent in suo statu: sed actiones invicem praestare debent.

But those things which will be in claims remain in their own status; but the actions ought to be furnished mutually.

Dig. 17.2.3.1

Digest 17.2.3.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Cum specialiter omnium bonorum societas coita est, tunc et hereditas et legatum et quod donatum est aut quaqua ratione adquisitum communioni adquiretur.

When a partnership of all goods has been specifically concluded, then an inheritance, a legacy, and what has been donated or acquired by whatever means will accrue to the common ownership.

Dig. 17.2.3.2

Digest 17.2.3.2

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict.

De illo quaeritur, si ita sit coita societas, ut, si qua iusta hereditas alterutri obvenerit, communis sit, quae sit iusta hereditas, utrum quae iure legitimo obvenit an etiam ea quae testamento? et probabilius est ad legitimam hereditatem tantum hoc pertinere.

Concerning that, the question is raised: if a partnership has been entered into on these terms—that, if any iusta hereditas should befall either one, it shall be common—what is an iusta hereditas: whether that which comes by legitimate right, or even that which comes by testament? And it is more probable that this pertains only to the legitimate (intestate) inheritance.

Dig. 17.2.3.3

Digest 17.2.3.3

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Societas si dolo malo aut fraudandi causa coita sit, ipso iure nullius momenti est, quia fides bona contraria est fraudi et dolo.

If a partnership be entered into with malicious deceit or for the purpose of defrauding, by the law itself it is of no effect, because good faith is contrary to fraud and deceit.

Dig. 17.2.4pr.

Digest 17.2.4pr.

Modestinus 3 reg.

Modestinus book 3 of the Rules.

Societatem coire et re et verbis et per nuntium posse nos dubium non est.

We have no doubt that a partnership can be entered into both by act and by words and through a messenger.

Dig. 17.2.4.1

Digest 17.2.4.1

Modestinus 3 reg.

Modestinus book 3 of the Rules.

Dissociamur renuntiatione morte capitis minutione et egestate.

We are dissociated by renunciation, by death, by capitis deminutio, and by indigence.

Dig. 17.2.5pr.

Digest 17.2.5pr.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Societates contrahuntur sive universorum bonorum sive negotiationis alicuius sive vectigalis sive etiam rei unius.

Partnerships are contracted either of all goods, or of some business, or of a tax‑farm, or even of a single thing.

Dig. 17.2.5.1

Digest 17.2.5.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Societas autem coiri potest et valet etiam inter eos, qui non sunt aequis facultatibus, cum plerumque pauperior opera suppleat, quantum ei per comparationem patrimonii deest. donationis causa societas recte non contrahitur.

But a partnership can be entered into and is valid even between those who do not have equal means, since often the poorer party makes up by work as much as is lacking to him in comparison of patrimony. A partnership is not rightly contracted for the sake of donation.

Dig. 17.2.6

Digest 17.2.6

Pomponius 9 ad sab.

Pomponius 9 on Sabinus.

Si societatem mecum coieris ea condicione, ut partes societatis constitueres, ad boni viri arbitrium ea res redigenda est: et conveniens est viri boni arbitrio, ut non utique ex aequis partibus socii simus, veluti si alter plus operae industriae pecuniae in societatem collaturus sit.

If you have entered into a partnership with me on this condition, that you should determine the shares of the partnership, the matter must be brought to the arbitration of a good man; and it is congruent with the arbitration of a good man that we are not necessarily partners in equal shares, for instance if one is to contribute more labor, industry, or money into the partnership.

Dig. 17.2.7

Digest 17.2.7

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, 30th book on Sabinus.

Coiri societatem et simpliciter licet: et si non fuerit distinctum, videtur coita esse universorum quae ex quaestu veniunt, hoc est si quod lucrum ex emptione venditione, locatione conductione descendit.

It is permitted to enter into a partnership even simply; and if it has not been specified, the partnership is held to be of all things which come from gainful business, that is, whatever profit arises from purchase and sale, and from letting and hiring.

Dig. 17.2.8

Digest 17.2.8

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus, 6 on Sabinus.

Quaestus enim intellegitur, qui ex opera cuius descendit.

For profit is understood as that which descends from one’s work.

Dig. 17.2.9

Digest 17.2.9

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, 30 on Sabinus.

Nec adiecit sabinus hereditatem vel legatum vel donationes mortis causa sive non mortis causa, fortassis haec ideo, quia non sine causa obveniunt, sed ob meritum aliquod accedunt.

Nor did Sabinus add inheritance or legacy or donations mortis causa or not mortis causa, perhaps these for this reason: because they do not come without a cause, but accrue on account of some merit.

Dig. 17.2.10

Digest 17.2.10

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus Book 6 On Sabinus.

Et quia plerumque vel a parente vel a liberto quasi debitum nobis hereditas obvenit:

And because very often an inheritance comes to us either from a parent or from a freedman as if due:

Dig. 17.2.11

Digest 17.2.11

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Et ita de hereditate legato donatione quintus mucius scribit.

And thus concerning inheritance, legacy, and donation, Quintus Mucius writes.

Dig. 17.2.12

Digest 17.2.12

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 On Sabinus.

Sed nec aes alienum, nisi quod ex quaestu pendebit, veniet in rationem societatis.

But no debt, except that which will be outstanding from the profit (earnings), will enter into the account of the partnership.

Dig. 17.2.13

Digest 17.2.13

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 on the Edict.

Sed et si adiciatur, ut et quaestus et lucri socii sint, verum est non ad aliud lucrum, quam quod ex quaestu venit, hanc quoque adiectionem pertinere.

But even if it is added that they are partners both in earnings and in profit, it is true that this addition too pertains to no profit other than that which comes from the business.

Dig. 17.2.14

Digest 17.2.14

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Si convenerit inter socios, ne intra certum tempus communis res dividatur, non videtur convenisse, ne societate abeatur. quid tamen si hoc convenit, ne abeatur, an valeat? eleganter pomponius scripsit frustra hoc convenire: nam et si non convenit, si tamen intempestive renuntietur societati, esse pro socio actionem.

If it has been agreed among partners that the common property is not to be divided within a certain time, it does not seem to have been agreed thereby that one may not depart from the partnership. But what if this is agreed, that there be no departure—does it have validity? Pomponius wrote elegantly that such an agreement is in vain: for even if it is not agreed, yet if notice is given to the partnership untimely, there is an action pro socio.

sed et si convenit, ne intra certum tempus societate abeatur, et ante tempus renuntietur, potest rationem habere renuntiatio. nec tenebitur pro socio qui ideo renuntiavit, quia condicio quaedam, qua societas erat coita, ei non praestatur: aut quid si ita iniuriosus et damnosus socius sit, ut non expediat eum pati?

but also, even if it is agreed that one shall not depart from the partnership within a fixed time, and notice is given before the time, the renunciation may have effect. nor will he be held in a pro socio action who for this reason gave notice, because a certain condition by which the partnership had been contracted is not afforded to him: or what if a partner is so injurious and damaging that it is not expedient to endure him?

Dig. 17.2.15

Digest 17.2.15

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 on Sab.

Vel quod ea re frui non liceat, cuius gratia negotiatio suscepta sit?

Or that it is not permitted to enjoy that thing, for the sake of which the negotiation has been undertaken?

Dig. 17.2.16pr.

Digest 17.2.16pr.

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian Book 30 on Sabinus.

Idemque erit dicendum, si socius renuntiaverit societati, qui rei publicae causa diu et invitus sit afuturus: quamvis nonnumquam ei obici possit, quia potuit et per alium societatem administrare vel socio committere: sed hoc non alias, nisi valde sit idoneus socius aut facilis afuturo etiam per alium societatis administratio.

The same must be said if a partner, who for the sake of the commonwealth is going to be absent for a long time and against his will, has renounced the partnership: although it can sometimes be objected to him that he could have administered the partnership through another or have committed it to his partner; but this only if the partner is very suitable, or if the administration of the partnership would be easy for one who is going to be absent even through another.

Dig. 17.2.16.1

Digest 17.2.16.1

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Qui igitur paciscitur ne dividat, nisi aliqua iusta ratio intercedat, nec vendere poterit, ne alia ratione efficiat, ut dividatur. sed sane potest dici venditionem quidem non impediri, sed exceptionem adversus emptorem locum habere, si ante dividat, quam divideret is qui vendidit.

He, therefore, who makes a pact not to divide, unless some just reason intervenes, will not even be able to sell, lest by another method he effect that it be divided. But certainly it can be said that the sale is not impeded, but that an exception has place against the buyer, if he divides sooner than the one who sold would have divided.

Dig. 17.2.17pr.

Digest 17.2.17pr.

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 on Sabinus.

Sed et socius qui alienaverit contra pactionem accipit committit et tenetur societatis aut communi dividundo iudicio.

But also a partner who has alienated contrary to the pact incurs a charge as for receipt and is held by the action of partnership or by the action for dividing common property.

Dig. 17.2.17.1

Digest 17.2.17.1

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 to sab.

Si absenti renuntiata societas sit, quoad is scierit, quod is adquisivit qui renuntiavit in commune redigi, detrimentum autem solius eius esse qui renuntiaverit: sed quod absens adquisiit, ad solum eum pertinere, detrimentum ab eo factum commune esse.

If a partnership has been renounced to an absent person, then until he knows, whatever the one who renounced has acquired is to be reduced into the common stock, but the detriment is to be that of him alone who has renounced; but what the absent man has acquired pertains to him alone, while the detriment caused by him is common.

Dig. 17.2.17.2

Digest 17.2.17.2

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 on Sabinus.

In societate autem coeunda nihil attinet de renuntiatione cavere, quia ipso iure societatis intempestiva renuntiatio in aestimationem venit.

However, in entering a partnership it is unnecessary to make provision concerning renunciation, because by the very law of partnership an untimely renunciation comes into valuation.

Dig. 17.2.18

Digest 17.2.18

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 to Sabinus.

Si servus societatem coierit, non sufficiet, si iubeatur a domino servus abire a societate, sed socio renuntiandum est.

If a slave has entered into a partnership, it will not suffice, if the slave is ordered by his master to depart from the partnership, but notice must be given to the partner.

Dig. 17.2.19

Digest 17.2.19

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on sab.

Qui admittitur socius, ei tantum socius est qui admisit, et recte: cum enim societas consensu contrahatur, socius mihi esse non potest quem ego socium esse nolui. quid ergo si socius meus eum admisit? ei soli socius est.

One who is admitted as a partner is a partner only to the one who admitted him, and rightly so: for since a partnership is contracted by consent, he cannot be my partner whom I did not wish to be a partner. What then if my partner admitted him? He is a partner to him alone.

Dig. 17.2.20

Digest 17.2.20

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

( nam socii mei socius meus socius non est)

( for the associate of my associate is not my associate)

Dig. 17.2.21

Digest 17.2.21

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, 30 on Sabinus.

Et quidquid fuerit de societate nostra consecutus, cum illo qui eum adsumpsit communicabit, nos cum eo non communicabimus. sed factum eius praestabitur societati, id est aget socius et societati praestabit quod fuerit consecutus.

And whatever he shall have obtained from our partnership, he will communicate it with the one who assumed him; we will not communicate with him. But his act will be made good to the partnership—that is, a partner will bring suit and will render to the partnership what he has obtained.

Dig. 17.2.22

Digest 17.2.22

Gaius 10 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 10 on the provincial edict.

Ex contrario factum quoque sociorum debet ei praestare sicuti suum, quia ipse adversus eos habet actionem. item certum est nihil vetare prius inter eum qui admiserit et eum qui admissus fuerit societatis iudicio agi, quam agi incipiat inter ceteros et eum qui admiserit.

Conversely, he ought also to make good to him the act of the partners as if it were his own, because he himself has an action against them. Likewise, it is certain that nothing forbids the action on partnership to be brought first between him who has admitted and him who has been admitted, before it begins to be brought between the others and him who has admitted.

Dig. 17.2.23pr.

Digest 17.2.23pr.

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, Book 30 on Sabinus.

De illo pomponius dubitat, utrum actionem eum mandare sociis sufficit, ut, si facere ille non possit, nihil ultra sociis praestet, an vero indemnes eos praestare debeat. et puto omnimodo eum teneri eius nomine, quem ipse solus admisit, quia difficile est negare culpa ipsius admissum.

Concerning that point, Pomponius is in doubt whether it suffices that he mandate the action to his partners, so that, if he cannot perform, he owes nothing further to the partners; or rather whether he ought to render them indemnes (indemnify them). And I think in every way he is held liable on account of the person whom he alone admitted, because it is difficult to deny that the admission was by his own culpa.

Dig. 17.2.23.1

Digest 17.2.23.1

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Idem quaerit, an commodum, quod propter admissum socium accessit, compensari cum damno, quod culpa praebuit, debeat, et ait compensandum. quod non est verum, nam et Marcellus libro sexto digestorum scribit, si servus unius ex sociis societati a domino praepositus neglegenter versatus sit, dominum societati qui praeposuerit praestaturum nec compensandum commodum, quod per servum societati accessit, cum damno: et ita divum marcum pronuntiasse, nec posse dici socio: " abstine commodo, quod per servum accessit, si damnum petis. "

He likewise asks whether the benefit which accrued on account of a partner’s misdemeanor ought to be set off against the loss which his fault supplied, and he says it should be set off. Which is not true; for Marcellus in the sixth book of the Digest writes that, if the slave of one of the partners, set over the partnership by his master, has conducted himself negligently, the master who appointed him to the partnership will make good to the partnership, and the benefit which accrued to the partnership through the slave is not to be set off against the loss: and thus the deified Marcus pronounced; nor can it be said to a partner: " abstain from the benefit which accrued through the slave, if you seek the loss. "

Dig. 17.2.24

Digest 17.2.24

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Plane si ambo socii servum alterius praeposuerint, non tenebitur dominus eius nomine, nisi dumtaxat de peculio: commune enim periculum esse oportet, cum ambo eum praeponamus.

Plainly, if both partners have put the other’s slave in charge, his master will not be held liable on his account, except only as to the peculium: for the risk ought to be common, since we both appoint him.

Dig. 17.2.25

Digest 17.2.25

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paul, in the sixth book on Sabinus.

Non ob eam rem minus ad periculum socii pertinet quod neglegentia eius perisset, quod in plerisque aliis industria eius societas aucta fuisset: et hoc ex appellatione imperator pronuntiavit.

It is not for that reason any the less referred to the peril of the partner that it had perished through his negligence, because in many other matters by his industry the partnership had been augmented; and the emperor pronounced this on appeal.

Dig. 17.2.26

Digest 17.2.26

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Et ideo si socius quaedam neglegenter in societate egisset, in plerisque autem societatem auxisset, non compensatur compendium cum neglegentia, ut Marcellus libro sexto digestorum scripsit.

And therefore, if a partner had done certain things negligently in the partnership, yet in most respects had augmented the partnership, the gain is not set off against the negligence, as Marcellus wrote in the sixth book of the Digests.

Dig. 17.2.27

Digest 17.2.27

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paul 6 on Sabinus.

Omne aes alienum, quod manente societate contractum est, de communi solvendum est, licet posteaquam societas distracta est solutum sit. igitur et si sub condicione promiserat et distracta societate condicio exstitit, ex communi solvendum est: ideoque si interim societas dirimatur, cautiones interponendae sunt.

Every debt which was contracted while the partnership was subsisting must be paid from the common stock, although it was paid after the partnership was broken up. therefore even if one had promised under a condition and, after the partnership was broken up, the condition came about, it must be paid from the common: and for that reason, if in the meantime the partnership is dissolved, securities must be interposed.

Dig. 17.2.28

Digest 17.2.28

Paulus 60 ad ed.

Paulus 60 on the edict.

Si socii sumus et unus ex die pecuniam debeat et dividatur societas, non debet hoc deducere socius quemadmodum praesens pure debet, sed omnes dividere et cavere, cum dies venerit, defensu iri socium.

If we are associates and one owes money payable on a fixed day, and the partnership is dissolved, the associate ought not to deduct this as though a present, pure (i.e., unconditional) debt were owed; rather, all should divide and give security that, when the day comes, the associate will be defended.

Dig. 17.2.29pr.

Digest 17.2.29pr.

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Si non fuerint partes societati adiectae, aequas eas esse constat. si vero placuerit, ut quis duas partes vel tres habeat, alius unam, an valeat? placet valere, si modo aliquid plus contulit societati vel pecuniae vel operae vel cuiuscumque alterius rei causa.

If the shares have not been appended to the partnership, it is settled that they are equal. But if it has been agreed that someone should have two parts or three, another one, does it stand? It is held to be valid, provided only that he has contributed something more to the partnership, whether for the sake of money or services or any other thing whatsoever.

Dig. 17.2.29.1

Digest 17.2.29.1

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Ita coiri societatem posse, ut nullam partem damni alter sentiat, lucrum vero commune sit, cassius putat: quod ita demum valebit, ut et sabinus scribit, si tanti sit opera, quanti damnum est: plerumque enim tanta est industria socii, ut plus societati conferat quam pecunia, item si solus naviget, si solus peregrinetur, pericula subeat solus.

Thus Cassius thinks that a partnership can be formed in such a way that one party feels no share of loss, while the profit (lucre) is common; which will be valid only then, as Sabinus also writes, if the work is worth as much as the loss is; for oftentimes so great is the industry of the partner that he contributes more to the partnership than money—likewise, if he alone sails, if he alone peregrinates abroad, he alone should undergo the perils.

Dig. 17.2.29.2

Digest 17.2.29.2

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, 30 on Sabinus.

Aristo refert cassium respondisse societatem talem coiri non posse, ut alter lucrum tantum, alter damnum sentiret, et hanc societatem leoninam solitum appellare: et nos consentimus talem societatem nullam esse, ut alter lucrum sentiret, alter vero nullum lucrum, sed damnum sentiret: iniquissimum enim genus societatis est, ex qua quis damnum, non etiam lucrum spectet.

Aristo reports that Cassius answered that such a partnership cannot be entered into, namely that one should experience only profit while the other bears loss, and that he was wont to call this a “leonine” partnership; and we agree that such a partnership is null, where one experiences profit, but the other indeed experiences no profit, rather loss: for it is the most inequitable kind of partnership, from which someone looks to loss and not also to profit.

Dig. 17.2.30

Digest 17.2.30

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 on Sabinus.

Mucius libro quarto decimo scribit non posse societatem coiri, ut aliam damni, aliam lucri partem socius ferat: servius in notatis mucii ait nec posse societatem ita contrahi, neque enim lucrum intellegitur nisi omni damno deducto neque damnum nisi omni lucro deducto: sed potest coiri societas ita, ut eius lucri, quod reliquum in societate sit omni damno deducto, pars alia feratur, et eius damni, quod similiter relinquatur, pars alia capiatur.

Mucius in the fourteenth book writes that a partnership cannot be entered into in such a way that a partner bears one share of loss and another of lucre; Servius, in the notes on Mucius, says that a partnership likewise cannot be contracted thus, for lucre is not understood except with all loss deducted, nor loss except with all lucre deducted; but a partnership can be entered into thus, that of the lucre which remains in the partnership with all loss deducted one share be borne, and of the loss which likewise remains one share be taken.

Dig. 17.2.31

Digest 17.2.31

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian book 30 on Sabinus.

Ut sit pro socio actio, societatem intercedere oportet: nec enim sufficit rem esse communem, nisi societas intercedit. communiter autem res agi potest etiam citra societatem, ut puta cum non affectione societatis incidimus in communionem, ut evenit in re duobus legata, item si a duobus simul empta res sit, aut si hereditas vel donatio communiter nobis obvenit, aut si a duobus separatim emimus partes eorum non socii futuri.

for the action for a partner to lie, a partnership must intervene: for it does not suffice that the thing be common, unless a partnership intervenes. however, a thing can be managed in common even short of a partnership, for instance when we fall into a communion (co-ownership) not by the intention of partnership, as happens in a thing bequeathed to two; likewise if a thing has been bought by two together; or if an inheritance or a donation comes to us in common; or if we separately buy from two persons their shares, we not going to be partners.

Dig. 17.2.32

Digest 17.2.32

Ulpianus 2 ad ed.

Ulpian book 2 on the edict.

Nam cum tractatu habito societas coita est, pro socio actio est, cum sine tractatu in re ipsa et negotio, communiter gestum videtur,

For when, a discussion having been held, a partnership has been entered into, the action pro socio is available; when, without discussion, in the thing itself and the business, it is deemed to have been conducted in common,

Dig. 17.2.33

Digest 17.2.33

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Ut in conductionibus publicorum, item in emptionibus: nam qui nolunt inter se contendere, solent per nuntium rem emere in commune, quod a societate longe remotum est. et ideo societate sine tutoris auctoritate coita pupillus non tenetur, attamen communiter gesto tenetur.

As in the public leases, so also in purchases: for those who do not wish to contend among themselves are wont to buy a thing in common through a messenger, which is far removed from a partnership. And therefore, a partnership entered into without the authority of a tutor does not bind a ward; nevertheless, he is bound by the act done in common.

Dig. 17.2.34

Digest 17.2.34

Gaius 10 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius Book 10 on the Provincial Edict.

Quibus casibus si quid forte unus in eam rem impenderit sive fructus mercedesve unus perceperit vel deteriorem fecerit rem, non societatis iudicio locus est, sed inter coheredes quidem familiae herciscendae iudicio agitur, inter ceteros communi dividundo. inter eos quoque, quibus hereditario iure communis res est, posse et communi dividundo agi.

In such cases, if perchance one person has expended anything upon that matter, or one alone has taken the fruits or the rents, or has made the thing deteriorated, there is no place for the action of partnership; but between coheirs the suit is brought by the action for the division of the inheritance (familiae herciscundae), between others by the action for dividing common property (communi dividundo). Also, among those for whom a thing is common by hereditary right, it is possible to proceed by the action for dividing common property.

Dig. 17.2.35

Digest 17.2.35

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Nemo potest societatem herede suo sic parere, ut ipse heres socius sit: in heredem autem socii proponitur actio, ut bonam fidem praestet.

No one can bring a partnership into being through his own heir in such a way that the heir himself is a partner; however, an action is set forth against the heir of a partner, that he render good faith.

Dig. 17.2.36

Digest 17.2.36

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paul book 6 on Sabinus.

Et acti etiam culpam, quam is praestaret in cuius locum successit, licet socius non sit.

And he is also liable for the fault which the one into whose place he has succeeded would have had to make good, although he is not a partner.

Dig. 17.2.37

Digest 17.2.37

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 to Sabinus.

Plane si hi, qui sociis heredes exstiterint, animum inierint societatis in ea hereditate, novo consensu quod postea gesserint efficitur ut in pro socio actionem deducatur.

Clearly, if those who have become heirs to partners have entered the intention of partnership in that inheritance, by a new consent whatever they have thereafter transacted is effected to be brought under a pro socio action.

Dig. 17.2.38pr.

Digest 17.2.38pr.

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paul 6 on Sabinus.

Pro socio arbiter prospicere debet cautionibus in futuro damno vel lucro pendente ex ea societate. quod sabinus in omnibus bonae fidei iudiciis existimavit, sive generalia sunt ( veluti pro socio, negotiorum gestorum, tutelae) sive specialia ( veluti mandati, commodati, depositi).

In a pro socio case the arbiter ought to make provision, by securities, for future loss or profit pending from that partnership. which Sabinus considered in all good‑faith actions, whether they are general ( veluti pro socio, of management of affairs, of guardianship) or special ( veluti of mandate, of loan for use, of deposit).

Dig. 17.2.38.1

Digest 17.2.38.1

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus book 6 on Sabinus.

Si tecum societas mihi sit et res ex societate communes, quam impensam in eas fecero quosve fructus ex his rebus ceperis, vel pro socio vel communi dividundo me consecuturum et altera actione alteram tolli proculus ait.

If I have a partnership with you and things arising from the partnership are common, whatever expenditure I have made on them, and whatever fruits you have taken from these things, I shall obtain either by the pro socio action or by the communi dividundo action; and by the one action the other is taken away, Proculus says.

Dig. 17.2.39

Digest 17.2.39

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13, book on Sabinus.

Si fundus mihi tecum communis sit et in eum mortuum intuleris, agam tecum pro socio.

If an estate is common to me with you and you have brought a dead person into it, I will bring a pro socio action against you.

Dig. 17.2.40

Digest 17.2.40

Pomponius 17 ad sab.

Pomponius 17 on Sabinus.

Heres socii quamvis socius non est, tamen ea, quae per defunctum inchoata sunt per heredem explicari debent: in quibus dolus eius admitti potest.

The heir of a partner, although he is not a partner, nevertheless those matters which were inchoated by the deceased ought to be completed by the heir: in which his fraud can be admitted.

Dig. 17.2.41

Digest 17.2.41

Ulpianus 20 ad ed.

Ulpian 20 on the Edict.

Si quis a socio poenam stipulatus sit, pro socio non aget, si tantundem in poenam sit, quantum eius interfuit.

If anyone has stipulated a penalty from a partner, he will not bring the pro socio action, if the penalty is in the same amount as his interest.

Dig. 17.2.42

Digest 17.2.42

Ulpianus 45 ad sab.

Ulpian 45 on Sabinus.

Quod si ex stipulatu eam consecutus sit, postea pro socio agendo hoc minus accipiet poena ei in sortem imputata.

But if he has obtained it by stipulation, then afterwards, by bringing a pro socio action, he will receive so much the less, the penalty having been imputed to the principal (capital).

Dig. 17.2.43

Digest 17.2.43

Ulpianus 28 ad ed.

Ulpian 28 on the Edict.

Si actum sit communi dividundo, non tollitur pro socio actio, quoniam pro socio et nominum rationem habet et adiudicationem non admittit. sed si postea pro socio agatur, hoc minus ex ea actione consequitur, quam ex prima actione consecutus est.

If it has been proceeded with by the action for dividing common property (communio dividundo), the pro socio action is not removed, since the pro socio action both takes account of debts (nomina) and does not admit adjudication. but if afterwards suit pro socio is brought, he obtains so much the less from that action than he had obtained from the first action.

Dig. 17.2.44

Digest 17.2.44

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si margarita tibi vendenda dedero, ut, si ea decem vendidisses, redderes mihi decem, si pluris, quod excedit tu haberes, mihi videtur, si animo contrahendae societatis id actum sit, pro socio esse actionem, si minus, praescriptis verbis.

If I have given you a pearl to be sold, such that, if you sold it for ten, you would render ten to me, but if for more, you would have what exceeds, it seems to me that, if this was done with the intention of contracting a partnership, the pro socio action lies; if not, the action praescriptis verbis.

Dig. 17.2.45

Digest 17.2.45

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, 30 on Sabinus.

Rei communis nomine cum socio furti agi potest, si per fallaciam dolove malo amovit vel rem communem celandi animo contrectet: sed et pro socio actione obstrictus est, nec altera actio alteram tollet. idemque in omnibus bonae fidei iudiciis dicendum est.

Under the title of common property, an action of theft can be brought against a partner, if he has removed it by deceit or malicious fraud, or handles the common thing with an intent to conceal; but he is also bound by the action pro socio, and the one action will not take away the other. And the same is to be said in all good‑faith actions.

Dig. 17.2.46

Digest 17.2.46

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 on Sabinus.

Idem est et in colono et in eo qui negotia gerit et qui mandatum nostrum exsequitur et in tutore.

The same holds for the tenant-farmer, for the one who conducts business, for the one who executes our mandate, and for the tutor.

Dig. 17.2.47pr.

Digest 17.2.47pr.

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Sed si ex causa furtiva condixero, cessabit pro socio actio, nisi si pluris mea intersit.

But if I bring a condictio on the ground of theft, the pro socio action will cease, unless my interest is of greater value.

Dig. 17.2.47.1

Digest 17.2.47.1

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, book 30 on Sabinus.

Si damnum in re communi socius dedit, aquilia teneri eum et celsus et iulianus et pomponius scribunt:

If a partner has given/inflicted damage in the common property, Celsus, Julianus, and Pomponius write that he is held under the Aquilian law:

Dig. 17.2.48

Digest 17.2.48

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 to Sabinus.

Sed nihilo minus et pro socio tenetur,

But nonetheless he is also liable pro socio,

Dig. 17.2.49

Digest 17.2.49

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si hoc facto societatem laesit, si verbi gratia negotiatorem servum vulneraverit vel occidit.

If by this act he has harmed the partnership, if, for example, he has wounded or killed a negotiator slave.

Dig. 17.2.50

Digest 17.2.50

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus book 6 on Sabinus.

Sed actione pro socio consequitur, ut altera actione contentus esse debeat, quia utraque actio ad rei persecutionem respicit, non ut furti ad poenam dumtaxat.

But by the action pro socio it is achieved that he must be content with the other action, since both actions look to the pursuit of the thing, not, as in theft, to the penalty only.

Dig. 17.2.51pr.

Digest 17.2.51, beginning.

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian book 30 on Sabinus.

Merito autem adiectum est ita demum furti actionem esse, si per fallaciam et dolo malo amovit, quia cum sine dolo malo fecit, furti non tenetur: et sane plerumque credendum est eum, qui partis dominus est, iure potius suo re uti quam furti consilium inire.

Moreover, it has been rightly added that only then does the action for theft lie, if he removed it by deception and with malicious fraud; for when he did it without malicious fraud, he is not held for theft. And indeed, for the most part it is to be believed that one who is owner of a share is rather exercising his own right in respect to the thing than entering upon a plan of theft.

Dig. 17.2.51.1

Digest 17.2.51.1

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Et ideo videbimus, an fabia teneatur. et ratio quidem facit, ne teneatur, verum si plagium fecit vel suppressit, fabia teneri.

And therefore we shall see whether he is held by the Fabia. And reason indeed brings it about that he is not held; but if he has committed plagium (kidnapping) or has suppressed (a person), he is held by the Fabia.

Dig. 17.2.52pr.

Digest 17.2.52, pr.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the edict.

Cum duobus vicinis fundus coniunctus venalis esset, alter ex his petit ab altero, ut eum fundum emeret, ita ut ea pars, quae suo fundo iuncta esset, sibi cederetur: mox ipse eum fundum ignorante vicino emit: quaeritur, an aliquam actionem cum eo vicinus habeat. iulianus scripsit implicitam esse facti quaestionem: nam si hoc solum actum est, ut fundum lucii titii vicinus emeret et mecum communicaret, adversus me qui emi nullam actionem vicino competere: si vero id actum est, ut quasi commune negotium gereretur. societatis iudicio tenebor, ut tibi deducta parte quam mandaveram reliquas partes praestem.

When an estate contiguous with two neighbors was for sale, one of them asked the other to buy that estate, on the understanding that the part which was joined to his own estate would be ceded to him; soon thereafter he himself bought that estate, the neighbor being unaware: the question is raised whether the neighbor has any action against him. Julian wrote that the question of fact is involved: for if this alone was transacted—that the neighbor of Lucius Titius should buy the estate and share it with me—no action lies for the neighbor against me, who bought; but if it was transacted that, as it were, a common business be managed, I shall be liable under the action of partnership, so that, after deducting the part which I had commissioned to you, I render the remaining shares.

Dig. 17.2.52.1

Digest 17.2.52.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 31 on the Edict.

Venit autem in hoc iudicium pro socio bona fides.

Moreover, in this pro socio action, good faith comes into play.

Dig. 17.2.52.2

Digest 17.2.52.2

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the edict.

Utrum ergo tantum dolum an etiam culpam praestare socium oporteat, quaeritur. et celsus libro septimo digestorum ita scripsit: socios inter se dolum et culpam praestare oportet. si in coeunda societate, inquit, artem operamve pollicitus est alter, veluti cum pecus in commune pascendum aut agrum politori damus in commune quaerendis fructibus, nimirum ibi etiam culpa praestanda est: pretium enim operae artis est velamentum.

Therefore the question is whether a partner ought to be answerable only for deceit or also for fault. And Celsus in the seventh book of the Digest wrote thus: partners must be answerable to one another for deceit and fault. If, he says, in forming the partnership one has promised skill or service, as when we give a herd to be pastured in common or a field to a cultivator for seeking fruits in common, plainly there even fault must be made good: for the price for the labor of the craft is a cover.

quod si rei communi socius nocuit, magis admittit culpam quoque venire.

but if a partner has harmed the common property, all the more does it admit that fault likewise comes into play.

Dig. 17.2.52.3

Digest 17.2.52.3

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, Book 31 on the Edict.

Damna quae imprudentibus accidunt, hoc est damna fatalia, socii non cogentur praestare: ideoque si pecus aestimatum datum sit et id latrocinio aut incendio perierit, commune damnum est, si nihil dolo aut culpa acciderit eius, qui aestimatum pecus acceperit: quod si a furibus subreptum sit, proprium eius detrimentum est, quia custodiam praestare debuit, qui aestimatum accepit. haec vera sunt, et pro socio erit actio, si modo societatis contrahendae causa pascenda data sunt quamvis aestimata.

Losses which befall without foresight, that is, fortuitous losses, the partners will not be compelled to make good: and therefore, if livestock has been given on appraisal (aestimatum) and it has perished by brigandage or by fire, the loss is common, provided nothing by fraud or fault has happened on the part of him who received the appraised livestock; but if it has been filched by thieves, it is his own detriment, because he who received it on appraisal was bound to furnish custody. These things are true, and an action pro socio will lie, provided that the animals were given to be pastured for the purpose of contracting a partnership, although given on appraisal.

Dig. 17.2.52.4

Digest 17.2.52.4

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Quidam sagariam negotiationem coierunt: alter ex his ad merces comparandas profectus in latrones incidit suamque pecuniam perdidit, servi eius vulnerati sunt resque proprias perdidit. dicit iulianus damnum esse commune ideoque actione pro socio damni partem dimidiam adgnoscere debere tam pecuniae quam rerum ceterarum, quas secum non tulisset socius nisi ad merces communi nomine comparandas proficisceretur. sed et si quid in medicos impensum est, pro parte socium agnoscere debere rectissime iulianus probat.

Certain men entered into a cloak-trade (sagarium) business: one of them, having set out to purchase merchandise, fell among robbers and lost his money; his slaves were wounded, and he lost his own goods. Julian says the loss is common, and therefore that, by the pro-socio action, he ought to recognize a half share of the damage, both of the money and of the other things, which the partner would not have taken with him unless he were setting out to purchase merchandise in the common name. But also, if anything has been expended on physicians, Julian most rightly approves that the partner should recognize his share.

proinde et si naufragio quid periit, cum non alias merces quam navi solerent advehi, damnum ambo sentient: nam sicuti lucrum, ita damnum quoque commune esse oportet, quod non culpa socii contingit.

accordingly, even if something has perished by shipwreck, since merchandise was accustomed to be conveyed only by ship, both will experience the loss: for just as profit, so also loss ought to be common, when it occurs not through the partner’s fault.

Dig. 17.2.52.5

Digest 17.2.52.5

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Cum duo erant argentarii socii, alter eorum aliquid separatim quaesierat et lucri senserat: quaerebatur, an commune esse lucrum oporteret. et imperator severus flavio felici in haec verba rescripsit: " etiamsi maxime argentariae societas inita est, quod quisque tamen socius non ex argentaria causa quaesiit, id ad communionem non pertinere explorati iuris est".

When two bankers were partners, one of them had separately acquired something and had realized a profit: it was asked whether the profit ought to be common. And Emperor Severus wrote back to Flavius Felix in these words: " even if a banking partnership has indeed been entered into, nevertheless what any partner has acquired not from a banking cause does not pertain to the common fund; it is settled law."

Dig. 17.2.52.6

Digest 17.2.52.6

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Papinianus quoque libro tertio responsorum ait: si fratres parentium indivisas hereditates ideo retinuerunt, ut emolumentum ac damnum in his commune sentirent, quod aliunde quaesierint in commune non redigetur.

Papinian likewise, in Book Three of the Responses, says: if brothers retained the undivided inheritances of their parents for this purpose, that they might feel emolument and loss in these as common, that which they have acquired from elsewhere will not be brought into the common.

Dig. 17.2.52.7

Digest 17.2.52.7

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian book 31 On the Edict.

Item ex facto consultum respondisse se ait libro tertio responsorum: inter flavium victorem et bellicum asianum placuerat, ut locis emptis pecunia victoris monumenta fierent opera et peritia asiani, quibus distractis pecuniam victor cum certa quantitate reciperet, superfluum asianus acciperet, qui operam in societatem contulit: erit pro socio actio.

Likewise, he says that in the third book of his Responses he answered a consultation arising from an actual case: between Flavius Victor and Bellicus Asianus it had been agreed that, plots having been purchased with Victor’s money, monuments would be made by the labor and expertise of Asianus; when these were sold off, Victor would recover his money together with a fixed amount, and Asianus—who contributed his labor to the partnership—would take the surplus: there will be an action pro socio.

Dig. 17.2.52.8

Digest 17.2.52.8

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the edict.

Idem papinianus eodem libro ait, si inter fratres voluntarium consortium initum fuerit, et stipendia ceteraque salaria in commune redigi iudicio societatis, quamvis filius emancipatus haec non cogatur conferre fratri, inquit, in potestate manenti, quia et si in potestate maneret, praecipua ea haberet.

The same Papinian, in the same book, says that, if among brothers a voluntary consortium has been entered, and in the partnership action the stipends and other salaries are to be brought into the common fund, nevertheless, he says, an emancipated son is not compelled to contribute these to a brother remaining in the father’s power, because even if he were remaining in power, he would have them as items taken by preemption (praecipua).

Dig. 17.2.52.9

Digest 17.2.52.9

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Idem respondit societatem non posse ultra mortem porrigi, et ideo nec libertatem de supremis iudiciis constringere quis poterit vel cognatum ulteriorem proximioribus praeferre.

The same [jurist] replied that a partnership cannot be extended beyond death, and therefore no one will be able to constrain the freedom concerning last judgments, nor to prefer a more remote cognate to nearer ones.

Dig. 17.2.52.10

Digest 17.2.52.10

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Idem respondit: socius, qui cessantis cessantiumve portiones insulae restituerit, quamvis aut sortem cum certis usuris intra quattuor menses, postquam opus refectum erit, recipere potest exigendoque privilegio utetur aut deinceps propriam rem habebit, potest tamen pro socio agere ad hoc, ut consequatur quod sua intererat. finge enim malle eum magis suum consequi quam dominium insulae. oratio enim divi marci idcirco quattuor mensibus finit certas usuras, quia post quattuor dominium dedit.

He likewise answered: a partner who has restored the shares of one who is idle or of those who are idle in a tenement, although he can either recover the principal with fixed interest within four months after the work has been repaired and will use the privilege by exacting it, or thereafter will have the thing as his own property, nevertheless can bring a pro-socio action to this end, that he may obtain what was to his own interest. For imagine that he prefers rather to obtain what is his own than the ownership of the tenement. For the oration of the deified Marcus on that account limits the fixed interest to four months, because after four it granted ownership.

Dig. 17.2.52.11

Digest 17.2.52.11

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si qui societatem ad emendum coierint, deinde res alterius dolo vel culpa empta non sit, pro socio esse actionem constat. plane si condicio sit adiecta " si intra illum diem veniret", et dies sine culpa socii praeterierit, cessabit actio pro socio.

If any should have come together into a partnership for buying, and then the thing has not been bought through the fraud or fault of the other, it is established that there is an action for a partner (actio pro socio). Plainly, if a condition has been added " if it should come within that day", and the day has passed without the partner’s fault, the actio pro socio will cease.

Dig. 17.2.52.12

Digest 17.2.52.12

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the edict.

Item si in communem rivum reficiendum impensa facta sit, pro socio esse actionem ad reciperandum sumptum cassius scripsit.

Likewise, if expense has been incurred for repairing a common watercourse, Cassius wrote that the pro socio action exists to recover the outlay.

Dig. 17.2.52.13

Digest 17.2.52.13

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian book 31 on the Edict.

Item mela scribit, si vicini semipedes inter se contulerunt, ut ibi craticium parietem inter se aedificarent ad onera utriusque sustinenda, deinde aedificato pariete alter in eum immitti non patiatur, pro socio agendum. idemque et si aream in commune emerint, ne luminibus suis officeretur, et alteri tradita sit nec praestet alteri quod convenit, pro socio actionem esse.

Likewise Mela writes: if neighbors have contributed half‑feet between themselves, so that there they might build between them a wattle‑work wall to sustain the burdens of each, then, after the wall has been built, if one does not allow timbers to be let into it, the pro socio action must be brought. And the same also if they have bought a plot in common, in order that his lights not be obstructed, and it has been delivered to the other and he does not render to the other what was agreed, there is a pro socio action.

Dig. 17.2.52.14

Digest 17.2.52.14

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si plures sint inter eosdem societates coitae, ad omnes societates sufficere hoc unum iudicium constat.

If several partnerships have been entered into among the same persons, it is settled that this one suit suffices for all the partnerships.

Dig. 17.2.52.15

Digest 17.2.52.15

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si quis ex sociis propter societatem profectus sit, veluti ad merces emendas, eos dumtaxat sumptuum societati imputabit qui in eam rem impensi sunt: viatica igitur et meritoriorum et stabulorum, iumentorum carrulorum vecturas vel sui vel sarcinarum suarum gratia vel mercium recte imputabit.

If any one of the partners, on account of the partnership, has set out—for example, to buy merchandise—he will impute to the partnership only those expenses which were expended for that matter: accordingly, he will rightly impute travel-expenses and the hire of lodgings and stables, the carriage-fares of beasts of burden and of carts, whether for himself or for his baggage or for the wares.

Dig. 17.2.52.16

Digest 17.2.52.16

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Socium universa in societatem conferre debet neratius ait, si omnium bonorum socius sit: et ideo sive ob iniuriam sibi factam vel ex lege aquilia, sive ipsius sive filii corpori nocitum sit, conferre debere respondit.

Neratius says that a partner ought to confer everything into the partnership, if he is a partner of all goods: and therefore, whether on account of an injury done to him or under the Aquilian law, whether harm has been done to his own body or to that of his son, he replied that he must confer it.

Dig. 17.2.52.17

Digest 17.2.52.17

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Ibidem ait socium omnium bonorum non cogi conferre, quae ex prohibitis causis adquisierit.

In the same place he says that a partner in all goods is not compelled to contribute what he has acquired from prohibited causes.

Dig. 17.2.52.18

Digest 17.2.52.18

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Per contrarium quoque apud veteres tractatur, an socius omnium bonorum, si quid ob iniuriarum actionem damnatus praestiterit, ex communi consequatur ut praestet. et atilicinus sabinus cassius responderunt, si iniuria iudicis damnatus sit, consecuturum, si ob maleficium suum, ipsum tantum damnum sentire debere. cui congruit, quod servium respondisse aufidius refert, si socii bonorum fuerint, deinde unus, cum ad iudicium non adesset, damnatus sit, non debere eum de communi id consequi, si vero praesens iniuriam iudicis passus sit, de communi sarciendum.

By way of the contrary, too, it is handled among the ancients whether a partner of all goods, if, having been condemned on an action for injuries, he has paid anything, should obtain it from the common stock to the extent that he has paid. And Atilicinus, Sabinus, and Cassius answered: if he was condemned through the injustice of the judge, he will recover; if on account of his own maleficium, he ought to feel the loss himself alone. This agrees with what Aufidius reports that Servius responded: if they were partners in goods, and then one, when he was not present at the judgment, was condemned, he ought not to obtain that from the common; but if, being present, he suffered an injustice of the judge, it must be repaired from the common stock.

Dig. 17.2.53

Digest 17.2.53

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Quod autem ex furto vel ex alio maleficio quaesitum est, in societatem non oportere conferri palam est, quia delictorum turpis atque foeda communio est. plane si in medium collata sit, commune erit lucrum.

What, however, has been acquired from theft or from some other malefaction is clearly not to be contributed into the partnership, because a communion of delicts is base and foul. Plainly, if it has been brought into the common stock, the profit will be common.

Dig. 17.2.54

Digest 17.2.54

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 on Sabinus.

Quod enim ex maleficio contulerit socius, non aliter recipere debet, quam si damnatus sit.

For whatever a partner has contributed on account of a delict, he ought to recover it no otherwise than as if he had been condemned.

Dig. 17.2.55

Digest 17.2.55

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian, 30 on Sabinus.

Si igitur ex hoc conventus fuerit qui maleficium admisit, id quod contulit aut solum aut cum poena auferet: solum auferet, si mihi proponas insciente socio eum in societatis rationem hoc contulisse: quod si sciente, etiam poenam socium agnoscere oportet: aequum est enim, ut cuius participavit lucrum participet et damnum.

If therefore from this the one who committed the malfeasance should be convened, that which he contributed will be taken away from him either alone or together with a penalty: it will be taken away alone, if you should propound to me that, the partner being unaware, he contributed this into the account of the partnership; but if with the partner knowing, it is proper that the partner also acknowledge the penalty: for it is equitable that he whose lucre he shared he share also the damage.

Dig. 17.2.56

Digest 17.2.56

Paulus 6 ad sab.

Paulus 6 on Sabinus.

Nec quicquam interest, utrum manente societate praestiterit ob furtum an dissoluta ea. idemque est in omnibus turpibus actionibus, veluti iniuriarum, vi bonorum raptorum, servi corrupti et similibus, et in omnibus poenis pecuniariis quae ex publicis iudiciis accidunt.

Nor does it make any difference whether, with the partnership remaining, he has made payment on account of theft, or after it has been dissolved. And it is the same in all disgraceful actions, such as injuries, goods seized by force, corruption of a slave and the like, and in all pecuniary penalties which arise from public prosecutions.

Dig. 17.2.57

Digest 17.2.57

Ulpianus 30 ad sab.

Ulpian 30 on Sabinus.

Nec praetermittendum esse pomponius ait ita demum hoc esse verum, si honestae et licitae rei societas coita sit: ceterum si maleficii societas coita sit, constat nullam esse societatem. generaliter enim traditur rerum inhonestarum nullam esse societatem.

Nor, Pomponius says, should it be passed over that this is true only if a partnership has been formed for an honorable and licit matter: but if a partnership in malefaction has been formed, it is settled that there is no partnership. generally, indeed, it is handed down that there is no partnership in dishonorable things.

Dig. 17.2.58pr.

Digest 17.2.58pr.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si id quod quis in societatem contulit exstinctum sit, videndum, an pro socio agere possit. tractatum ita est apud celsum libro septimo digestorum ad epistulam cornelii felicis: cum tres equos haberes et ego unum, societatem coimus, ut accepto equo meo quadrigam venderes et ex pretio quartam mihi redderes. si igitur ante venditionem equus meus mortuus sit, non putare se celsus ait societatem manere nec ex pretio equorum tuorum partem deberi: non enim habendae quadrigae, sed vendendae coitam societatem.

If that which someone contributed into the partnership has been extinguished, it must be considered whether he can bring a pro socio action. It is treated thus by Celsus in the seventh book of the Digestorum, in the letter to Cornelius Felix: when you had three horses and I one, we enter into a partnership, so that, upon receiving my horse, you would sell a quadriga (four-horse team) and from the price you would return a fourth to me. Therefore, if before the sale my horse has died, Celsus says that he does not think the partnership remains, nor that a share from the price of your horses is owed: for the partnership was joined not for having a quadriga, but for selling one.

ceterum si id actum dicatur, ut quadriga fieret eaque communicaretur tuque in ea tres partes haberes, ego quartam, non dubie adhuc socii sumus.

But if it is said that it was arranged that a quadriga be made and be shared, and that you have three shares in it, I a fourth, without doubt we are still partners.

Dig. 17.2.58.1

Digest 17.2.58.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Item celsus tractat, si pecuniam contulissemus ad mercem emendam et mea pecunia perisset, cui perierit ea. et ait, si post collationem evenit, ut pecunia periret, quod non fieret, nisi societas coita esset, utrique perire, ut puta si pecunia, cum peregre portaretur ad mercem emendam, periit: si vero ante collationem, posteaquam eam destinasses, tunc perierit, nihil eo nomine consequeris, inquit, quia non societati periit.

Likewise Celsus treats the case where we had contributed money for purchasing merchandise and my money had perished—whose loss that is. And he says: if after the contribution it happens that the money perishes—which would not occur unless a partnership had been contracted—it perishes for both; for instance, if the money, when it was being carried abroad to buy merchandise, perished. But if, however, before the contribution, after you had earmarked it, it then perished, you recover nothing on that account, he says, because it did not perish in the partnership.

Dig. 17.2.58.2

Digest 17.2.58.2

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si filius familias societatem coierit, deinde emancipatus a patre fuerit, apud iulianum quaeritur, an eadem societas duret an vero alia sit, si forte post emancipationem in societatem duratum est. iulianus scripsit libro quarto decimo digestorum eandem societatem durare, initium enim in his contractibus inspiciendum: duabus autem actionibus agendum esse, una adversus patrem, altera adversus filium: cum patre de eo, cuius dies ante emancipationem cessit, nam eius temporis, quo post emancipationem societas duravit, nihil praestare patrem oportet: cum filio autem de utroque tempore, id est de tota societate, nam et si quid, inquit, socius filii post emancipationem filii dolo fecerit, eius non patri, sed filio actio danda est.

If a son in paternal power has entered into a partnership (society), and then has been emancipated by his father, the question is put with Julian whether the same partnership endures, or rather a different one exists if perchance after emancipation the partnership was continued. Julian wrote in the fourteenth book of the Digest that the same partnership endures, for in these contracts the beginning is to be looked to; but that one must proceed by two actions, one against the father, the other against the son: against the father for that which fell due before emancipation, for as to the time during which after emancipation the partnership lasted, the father ought to make good nothing; but against the son for both periods, that is, for the whole partnership. For also, he says, if the son’s partner after the son’s emancipation has done anything by dolus, the action for that is to be given not against the father, but against the son.

Dig. 17.2.58.3

Digest 17.2.58.3

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si servus meus societatem cum titio coierit et alienatus in eadem permanserit, potest dici alienatione servi et priorem societatem finitam et ex integro alteram inchoatam, atque ideo et mihi et emptori actionem pro socio competere, item tam adversus me quam adversus emptorem ex his causis quae ante alienationem inciderunt dandam actionem, ex reliquis adversus emptorem solum.

If my slave has entered into a partnership with Titius and, after being alienated, has remained in the same, it can be said that by the alienation of the slave both the prior partnership is finished and another has been begun afresh; and therefore both to me and to the purchaser the action pro socio is competent; likewise, that an action is to be given both against me and against the purchaser for those causes which arose before the alienation, but for the remaining matters against the purchaser alone.

Dig. 17.2.59pr.

Digest 17.2.59pr.

Pomponius 12 ad sab.

Pomponius book 12 on Sabinus.

Adeo morte socii solvitur societas, ut nec ab initio pacisci possimus, ut heres etiam succedat societati. haec ita in privatis societatibus ait: in societate vectigalium nihilo minus manet societas et post mortem alicuius, sed ita demum, si pars defuncti ad personam heredis eius adscripta sit, ut heredi quoque conferri oporteat: quod ipsum ex causa aestimandum est. quid enim, si is mortuus sit, propter cuius operam maxime societas coita sit aut sine quo societas administrari non possit?

So much is a partnership dissolved by the death of a partner, that we cannot even from the outset stipulate that an heir also shall succeed to the partnership. He says that this holds thus in private partnerships: in a partnership of the public revenues the partnership nonetheless remains even after someone’s death, but only if the share of the deceased has been ascribed to the person of his heir, so that contribution ought also to be made to the heir; and this itself must be assessed according to the circumstances. For what if the man has died for whose service the partnership was chiefly entered into, or without whom the partnership cannot be administered?

Dig. 17.2.59.1

Digest 17.2.59.1

Pomponius 12 ad sab.

Pomponius 12 on Sabinus.

Quod in alea aut adulterio perdiderit socius, ex medio non est laturus: si quid vero dolo nostro socius damni ceperit, a nobis repetet.

What a partner has lost at dice or in adultery he is not to take from the common fund; but if, by our fraud, the partner has sustained any loss, he shall recover it from us.

Dig. 17.2.60pr.

Digest 17.2.60, preface.

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 on Sabinus.

Socium, qui in eo, quod ex societate lucri faceret, reddendo moram adhibuit, cum ea pecunia ipse usus sit, usuras quoque eum praestare debere labeo ait, sed non quasi usuras, sed quod socii intersit moram eum non adhibuisse: sed si aut usus ea pecunia non sit aut moram non fecerit, contra esse: item post mortem socii nullam talem aestimationem ex facto heredis faciendam, quia morte socii dirimatur societas.

Labeo says that a partner who, in rendering what profit he made from the partnership, interposed delay, since he himself used that money, ought also to pay interest—yet not as interest, but because it is in the fellow-partner’s interest that he should not have delayed. But if either he did not use that money or did not cause delay, the contrary holds. Likewise, after the partner’s death, no such assessment is to be made on account of the heir’s act, because the partnership is dissolved by the partner’s death.

Dig. 17.2.60.1

Digest 17.2.60.1

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 on Sabinus.

Socius cum resisteret communibus servis venalibus ad fugam erumpentibus, vulneratus est: impensam, quam in curando se fecerit, non consecuturum pro socio actione labeo ait, quia id non in societatem, quamvis propter societatem impensum sit, sicuti si propter societatem eum heredem quis instituere desisset aut legatum praetermisisset aut patrimonium suum neglegentius administrasset: nam nec compendium, quod propter societatem ei contigisset, veniret in medium, veluti si propter societatem heres fuisset institutus aut quid ei donatum esset.

A partner, when he was resisting the jointly owned slaves-for-sale as they burst out to flee, was wounded: the expense which he has incurred in curing himself, he will not recover by the pro socio action, Labeo says, because that is not into the partnership, although it was expended on account of the partnership—just as if, on account of the partnership, someone had ceased to institute him heir or had omitted a legacy or had administered his patrimony more negligently: for neither would a compendium (profit) which had befallen him on account of the partnership be brought into the common stock, as, for example, if on account of the partnership he had been instituted heir or something had been donated to him.

Dig. 17.2.61

Digest 17.2.61

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Secundum iulianum tamen et quod medicis pro se datum est recipere potest, quod verum est.

however, according to Julian, even what has been given to physicians on his account can be recovered, which is true.

Dig. 17.2.62

Digest 17.2.62

Pomponius 13 ad sab.

Pomponius 13 on Sabinus.

Si titius cum quo mihi societas erat decesserit egoque cum putarem titii hereditatem ad seium pertinere, communiter cum eo res vendiderim et partem pecuniae ex venditione redactae ego, partem seius abstulerit, te, qui re vera titio heres es, partem ad me redactae pecuniae societatis iudicio non consecuturum neratio et aristoni placebat, quia meae dumtaxat partis pretia percepissem, neque interesse, utrum per se partes meas vendidissem an communiter cum eo, qui reliquas partes ad se pertinere diceret. alioquin eventurum, ut etiam, si duo socii rem vendiderint, unusquisque quod ad se pervenerit partem alteri societatis iudicio praestare debeat. sed nec te ex parte, quam hereditatis petitione forte a seio consecuturus sis, quicquam mihi praestare debere, quia quod ad seium pervenerit, tuarum partium pretium sit nec ad me habentem meum quicquam ex eo redire debeat.

If titius, with whom I had a partnership, has died, and I, thinking that titius’s inheritance pertained to seius, have jointly with him sold the property, and I collected part of the money realized from the sale, and seius took part, you, who are in truth the heir to titius, will not, by an action of partnership, recover from me the share of the money brought in that came to me—this pleased neratius and aristo—because I received only the price of my own share; nor does it matter whether I had sold my shares by myself or jointly with him who said the remaining shares pertained to himself; otherwise it would result that even if two partners sold a thing, each would have to furnish to the other by an action of partnership the portion that has come to him; but neither from the share which by a petition of inheritance you may perhaps recover from seius ought you to render anything to me, because what has come to seius is the price of your shares, and nothing of it ought to return to me, who hold what is mine.

Dig. 17.2.63pr.

Digest 17.2.63 preface.

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Verum est quod sabino videtur, etiamsi non universorum bonorum socii sunt, sed unius rei, attamen in id quod facere possunt quodve dolo malo fecerint quo minus possint, condemnari oportere. hoc enim summam rationem habet, cum societas ius quodammodo fraternitatis in se habeat.

It is true, as it seems to Sabinus, that even if they are not partners in all their goods, but in a single thing, nevertheless they ought to be condemned for as much as they are able to do, or for what, by malicious fraud, they have done whereby they are less able. For this has the highest rationale, since the partnership (societas) contains within itself, in a certain manner, a law of brotherhood.

Dig. 17.2.63.1

Digest 17.2.63.1

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Videndum est, an et fideiussori socii id praestari debeat an vero personale beneficium sit, quod magis verum est. sed si hic fideiussor quasi defensor socii iudicium susceperit, proderit sibi: namque iulianus libro quarto decimo digestorum scripsit defensorem socii in id quod socius facere potest condemnari oportere. idemque et in patroni defensore accipere debere ait: et utique idem erit in universis, qui in id quod facere possunt conveniuntur.

It must be seen whether that is also to be afforded to the surety of a partner, or whether rather it is a personal beneficium, which is more true. But if this surety, as a quasi-defender of the partner, has undertaken the action, it will be to his advantage: for Julian wrote in the fourteenth book of the Digest that the defender of a partner ought to be condemned up to that which the partner can perform. And he says that the same ought to be received also in the defender of a patron; and assuredly the same will be so in all cases of those who are convened to the extent that they can perform.

Dig. 17.2.63.2

Digest 17.2.63.2

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Patri autem vel domino socii, si iussu eorum societas contracta sit, non esse hanc exceptionem dandam, quia nec heredi socii ceterisque successoribus hoc praestabitur: quia nec ceterorum heredibus successoribusve, quos in id quod facere possunt convenimus, idem praestatur.

However, to the father or to the master of the partner, if the partnership was contracted at their order, this exception is not to be granted, because this will not be afforded to the partner’s heir and to his other successors: for neither is the same afforded to the heirs or successors of others, whom we sue only to the extent that they are able to perform.

Dig. 17.2.63.3

Digest 17.2.63.3

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Id quod facere socius potest quemadmodum aestimandum sit? et placuit non debere deduci aes alienum quod debetur a socio: ita et Marcellus libro septimo digestorum scripsit, nisi forte, inquit, ex ipsa societate debeatur.

How is that which a partner can do to be assessed? And it has been settled that the debt which is owed by the partner ought not to be deducted: so also Marcellus wrote in the seventh book of the Digests, unless perhaps, he says, it is owed from the partnership itself.

Dig. 17.2.63.4

Digest 17.2.63.4

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Item videndum, an cautio veniat in hoc iudicium eius quod facere socius non possit, scilicet nuda promissio: quod magis dicendum arbitror.

Likewise it must be considered whether a cautio comes into this action for that which a partner cannot do, namely a naked promise; which I think is rather to be affirmed.

Dig. 17.2.63.5

Digest 17.2.63.5

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Si, cum tres socii essent, egerit cum uno ex sociis socius et partem suam integram sit consecutus, deinde alius socius cum eodem agat et partem consequi integram non poterit, quia facere solidum non potest, an hic qui minus consecutus est cum eo agere possit qui solidum accepit ad communicandas partes inter eos, id est exaequandas, quasi iniquum sit ex eadem societate alium plus, alium minus consequi? sed magis est, ut pro socio actione consequi possit, ut utriusque portio exaequetur: quae sententia habet aequitatem.

If, when there were three partners, a partner should litigate with one of the partners and should have obtained his own share entire, then another partner should litigate with that same person and cannot obtain his share entire, because he cannot make him perform the whole (solidum), whether he who has obtained less can sue him who received the whole, for the shares to be communicated between them, that is, equalized, as though it were inequitable that from the same partnership one should obtain more, another less? But the sounder view is that he can obtain this by the pro socio action, so that the portion of each be equalized: which opinion possesses equity.

Dig. 17.2.63.6

Digest 17.2.63.6

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian 31 on the Edict.

Tempus autem spectamus quantum facere socius possit rei iudicandae.

But we consider the time, how much the partner can do for the adjudication of the matter.

Dig. 17.2.63.7

Digest 17.2.63.7

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Hoc quoque facere quis posse videtur quod dolo fecit quo minus possit: nec enim aequum est dolum suum quemquam relevare. quod et in ceteris, qui in id quod facere possunt conveniuntur, accipiendum est. si tamen non dolo, sed culpa sua facere posse desiit, dicendum est condemnari eum non debere.

It also seems that a person is to be deemed able to do this, who by his own deceit made it so that he could not; for it is not equitable that anyone be relieved by his own dolus. This is likewise to be accepted in other cases, in which those who are convened for that which they can do are sued. If, however, he ceased to be able to do it not by deceit but by his own fault (culpa), it must be said that he ought not to be condemned.

Dig. 17.2.63.8

Digest 17.2.63.8

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

In heredem quoque socii pro socio actio competit, quamvis heres socius non sit: licet enim socius non sit, attamen emolumenti successor est. et circa societates vectigalium ceterorumque idem observamus, ut heres socius non sit nisi fuerit adscitus, verumtamen omne emolumentum societatis ad eum pertineat, simili modo et damnum adgnoscat quod contingit, sive adhuc vivo socio vectigalis sive postea: quod non similiter in voluntaria societate observatur.

The action pro socio lies against the heir of a partner as well, although the heir is not himself a partner: for although he is not a partner, nevertheless he is the successor of the emolument. And concerning societies of tax-revenues and the others we observe the same, that the heir is not a partner unless he has been co-opted; nevertheless every emolument of the partnership pertains to him, and in like manner let him acknowledge liability for the loss that occurs, whether with the tax-farming partner still alive or afterwards: which is not observed in the same way in a voluntary partnership.

Dig. 17.2.63.9

Digest 17.2.63.9

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Si servo communi legatum sine libertate unus ex dominis reliquit, hoc ad solum socium pertinet: an tamen pro socio iudicio communicari debeat cum herede socii, quaeritur. et ait iulianus sextum pomponium referre sabinum respondentem non communicari, et posse hanc sententiam defendi iulianus ait: non enim propter communionem hoc adquisitum est, sed ob suam partem, nec oportet id communicari, quod quis non propter societatem, sed propter suam partem adquisierit.

If to a common slave a legacy without freedom was left by one of the owners, this pertains to the partner alone: yet it is asked whether, by the pro socio action, it ought to be shared with the partner’s heir. And iulianus says that Sextus Pomponius reports Sabinus answering that it is not to be shared, and iulianus says that this opinion can be defended: for this was not acquired on account of the communion, but on account of his own share, nor ought that to be shared which someone has acquired not by reason of the partnership, but on account of his own share.

Dig. 17.2.63.10

Digest 17.2.63.10

Ulpianus 31 ad ed.

Ulpian, 31 on the Edict.

Societas solvitur ex personis, ex rebus, ex voluntate, ex actione. ideoque sive homines sive res sive voluntas sive actio interierit, distrahi videtur societas. intereunt autem homines quidem maxima aut media capitis deminutione aut morte: res vero, cum aut nullae relinquantur aut condicionem mutaverint, neque enim eius rei quae iam nulla sit quisquam socius est neque eius quae consecrata publicatave sit.

A partnership is dissolved on account of persons, things, will, and action. And so, if either the persons or the things or the will or the action has perished, the partnership is considered to be broken up. Now persons cease by greatest or middle capitis deminutio or by death; but things, when either none are left or they have changed their condition—for no one is a partner in a thing which no longer exists, nor in one that has been consecrated or made public.

voluntate distrahitur societas renuntiatione.

by will the partnership is dissolved by renunciation.

Dig. 17.2.64

Digest 17.2.64

Callistratus 1 quaest.

Callistratus 1 Questions.

Itaque cum separatim socii agere coeperint et unusquisque eorum sibi negotietur, sine dubio ius societatis dissolvitur.

Therefore, when the partners begin to act separately and each of them conducts business for himself, without doubt the right of the partnership is dissolved.

Dig. 17.2.65pr.

Digest 17.2.65, beginning.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Actione distrahitur, cum aut stipulatione aut iudicio mutata sit causa societatis. proculus enim ait hoc ipso quod iudicium ideo dictatum est, ut societas distrahatur, renuntiatam societatem, sive totorum bonorum sive unius rei societas coita sit.

It is dissolved by an action, when either by stipulation or by judgment the cause of the partnership has been altered. For Proculus says that by the very fact that the judgment was for that purpose pronounced, that the partnership be dissolved, the partnership is considered renounced, whether a partnership of all goods or of a single thing has been entered into.

Dig. 17.2.65.1

Digest 17.2.65.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 on the Edict.

Item bonis a creditoribus venditis unius socii distrahi societatem labeo ait.

Likewise, Labeo says that the partnership is broken up when the goods of one partner have been sold by creditors.

Dig. 17.2.65.2

Digest 17.2.65.2

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 on the Edict.

Si in rem certam emendam conducendamve coita sit societas, tunc etiam post alicuius mortem quidquid lucri detrimentive factum sit, commune esse labeo ait.

If a partnership has been contracted for a specific thing to be bought or to be hired, then even after someone’s death whatever profit or detriment has been made is common, Labeo says.

Dig. 17.2.65.3

Digest 17.2.65.3

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Diximus dissensu solvi societatem: hoc ita est, si omnes dissentiunt. quid ergo, si unus renuntiet? cassius scripsit eum qui renuntiaverit societati a se quidem liberare socios suos, se autem ab illis non liberare.

We have said that the partnership is dissolved by dissent: this is so, if all dissent. what then, if one gives notice? cassius wrote that the one who has given notice to the partnership does indeed release his partners from himself, but does not release himself from them.

quod utique observandum est, si dolo malo renuntiatio facta sit, veluti si, cum omnium bonorum societatem inissemus, deinde cum obvenisset uni hereditas, propter hoc renuntiavit: ideoque si quidem damnum attulerit hereditas, hoc ad eum qui renuntiavit pertinebit, commodum autem communicare cogetur actione pro socio. quod si quid post renuntiationem adquisierit, non erit communicandum, quia nec dolus admissus est in eo.

which assuredly must be observed, if the renunciation has been made with dolus malus (malicious fraud), for example, if, when we had entered into a partnership of all goods, then, when an inheritance had fallen to one, he renounced on that account: and therefore, if indeed the inheritance has brought loss, this will pertain to him who renounced; but he will be compelled to share the benefit by an action pro socio. But if he should acquire anything after the renunciation, it will not have to be shared, because no dolus has been admitted in that.

Dig. 17.2.65.4

Digest 17.2.65.4

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus book 32 on the Edict.

Item si societatem ineamus ad aliquam rem emendam, deinde solus volueris eam emere ideoque renuntiaveris societati, ut solus emeres, teneberis quanti interest mea: sed si ideo renuntiaveris, quia emptio tibi displicebat, non teneberis, quamvis ego emero, quia hic nulla fraus est: eaque et iuliano placent.

Likewise, if we enter into a partnership for the purpose of buying some item, and then you wish to buy it alone and for that reason you renounce the partnership, so that you may buy it by yourself, you will be liable for the amount of my interest; but if you renounced for this reason, that the purchase displeased you, you will not be liable, although I buy it, because here there is no fraud; and these positions also please Julian.

Dig. 17.2.65.5

Digest 17.2.65.5

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 On the Edict.

Labeo autem posteriorum libris scripsit, si renuntiaverit societati unus ex sociis eo tempore, quo interfuit socii non dirimi societatem, committere eum in pro socio actione: nam si emimus mancipia inita societate, deinde renunties mihi eo tempore, quo vendere mancipia non expedit, hoc casu, quia deteriorem causam meam facis, teneri te pro socio iudicio. proculus hoc ita verum esse ait, si societatis non intersit dirimi societatem: semper enim non id, quod privatim interest unius ex sociis, servari solet, sed quod societati expedit. haec ita accipienda sunt, si nihil de hoc in coeunda societate convenit.

Labeo, moreover, wrote in his later books that, if one of the partners has renounced the partnership at a time when it was in the interest of the partner that the partnership not be severed, he incurs liability in the pro socio action: for if we purchased slaves after the partnership was entered, and then you renounce to me at a time when it is not expedient to sell the slaves, in this case, because you make my position worse, you are held in the pro socio suit. proculus says that this is true thus, if it is not in the interest of the partnership to dissolve the partnership: for it is not always what privately is the interest of one of the partners that is accustomed to be observed, but what is expedient for the partnership. These things are to be taken thus, if nothing about this was agreed upon when the partnership was being formed.

Dig. 17.2.65.6

Digest 17.2.65.6

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Item qui societatem in tempus coit, eam ante tempus renuntiando socium a se, non se a socio liberat: itaque si quid compendii postea factum erit, eius partem non fert, at si dispendium, aeque praestabit portionem: nisi renuntiatio ex necessitate quadam facta sit. quod si tempus finitum est, liberum est recedere, quia sine dolo malo id fiat.

Likewise, he who enters into a partnership for a term, by renouncing it before the term, frees the partner from himself, not himself from the partner: and so, if any profit is afterwards made, he does not bear his share of it, but if there is a loss, he will likewise make good his portion—unless the renunciation has been made out of some necessity. But if the time has ended, it is free to withdraw, because that is done without bad faith.

Dig. 17.2.65.7

Digest 17.2.65.7

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict.

Renuntiare societati etiam per alios possumus: et ideo dictum est procuratorem quoque posse renuntiare societati. sed utrum de eo dictum sit, cui omnium bonorum administratio concessa est, an de eo, cui hoc ipsum nominatim mandatum est, videamus, an vero per utrumque recte renuntietur? quod est verius, nisi si prohibuerit eum dominus specialiter renuntiare.

We can also renounce a partnership through others: and therefore it has been said that a procurator too can renounce the partnership. But whether this was said of the one to whom the administration of all the goods has been granted, or of the one to whom this very thing has been expressly mandated, let us consider; or indeed whether it is rightly renounced through either? Which is the truer view, unless the principal has specifically prohibited him from renouncing.

Dig. 17.2.65.8

Digest 17.2.65.8

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 On the Edict.

Item scriptum est posse procuratori quoque meo socium meum renuntiare. quod servius apud alfenum ita notat: esse in potestate domini, cum procuratori eius renuntiatum est, an velit ratam habere renuntiationem. igitur is cuius procuratori renuntiatum est liberatus esse videbitur: an autem ipse quoque qui renuntiavit procuratori liberetur, in potestate eius erit, quemadmodum diximus in eo, qui socio renuntiat.

Likewise it is written that one can also renounce my partner to my procurator. Servius notes this, as reported by Alfenus, thus: it is in the power of the master, when renunciation has been made to his procurator, whether he wishes to hold the renunciation ratified. Therefore he, to whose procurator renunciation has been made, will be seen to be released: whether, however, he himself also who has renounced to the procurator is released, will be in his power, just as we have said in the case of one who renounces to a partner.

Dig. 17.2.65.9

Digest 17.2.65.9

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict

Morte unius societas dissolvitur, etsi consensu omnium coita sit, plures vero supersint, nisi in coeunda societate aliter convenerit. nec heres socii succedit: sed quod ex re communi postea quaesitum est, item dolus et culpa in eo quod ex ante gesto pendet tam ab herede quam heredi praestandum est.

By the death of one, the partnership is dissolved, even if it was entered into by the consent of all, though several survive, unless otherwise was agreed when the partnership was being formed. Nor does the heir of a partner succeed; but what has thereafter been acquired from the common enterprise, likewise fraud and fault in so far as they depend on prior transactions, must be made good both by the heir and to the heir.

Dig. 17.2.65.10

Digest 17.2.65.10

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 On the Edict.

Item si alicuius rei societas sit et finis negotio impositus, finitur societas: quod si integris omnibus manentibus alter decesserit, deinde tunc sequatur res, de qua societatem coierunt, tunc eadem distinctione utemur, qua in mandato, ut si quidem ignota fuerit mors alterius, valeat societas, si nota, non valeat.

Likewise, if there is a partnership concerning some particular thing and an end is imposed upon the business, the partnership is finished; but if, with all things remaining intact, one of them has died, and then thereafter the matter ensues for which they entered into partnership, we shall use the same distinction as in mandate: that is, if the death of the other was unknown, let the partnership stand; if known, let it not stand.

Dig. 17.2.65.11

Digest 17.2.65.11

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict.

Societas quemadmodum ad heredes socii non transit, ita nec ad adrogatorem, ne alioquin invitus quis socius efficiatur cui non vult. ipse autem adrogatus socius permanet: nam et si filius familias emancipatus fuerit, permanebit socius.

Just as a partnership does not pass to a partner’s heirs, so neither to the adrogator, lest otherwise someone be made a partner against his will with one with whom he does not wish. The adrogated person himself, however, remains a partner: for even if a son under paternal power has been emancipated, he will remain a partner.

Dig. 17.2.65.12

Digest 17.2.65.12

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Publicatione quoque distrahi societatem diximus. quod videtur spectare ad universorum bonorum publicationem, si socii bona publicentur: nam cum in eius locum alius succedat, pro mortuo habetur.

We have said that a partnership is also dissolved by publication (confiscation). This seems to pertain to a publication of all the goods, if the partner’s goods are published: for when another succeeds in his place, he is considered as dead.

Dig. 17.2.65.13

Digest 17.2.65.13

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si post distractam societatem aliquid in rem communem impenderit socius, actione pro socio id non consequitur, quia non est verum pro socio communiterve id gestum esse. sed communi dividundo iudicio huius quoque rei ratio habebitur: nam etsi distracta esset societas, nihilo minus divisio rerum superest.

If, after the partnership has been dissolved, a partner has expended something upon the common property, he does not obtain it by the action pro socio, because it is not true that the matter was transacted pro socio or in common. But in the iudicium communi dividundo (the action for partition of common property), account will be taken of this matter as well: for even if the partnership had been dissolved, nonetheless the division of the things remains.

Dig. 17.2.65.14

Digest 17.2.65.14

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the edict.

Si communis pecunia penes aliquem sociorum sit et alicuius sociorum quid absit, cum eo solo agendum, penes quem ea pecunia sit: qua deducta de reliquo, quod cuique debeatur, omnes agere possunt.

If the common money is in the hands of one of the partners and something is lacking to any one of the partners, one must proceed against that one alone in whose hands that money is: with that deducted, as to the remainder—what is owed to each—all can bring suit.

Dig. 17.2.65.15

Digest 17.2.65.15

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Nonnumquam necessarium est et manente societate agi pro socio, veluti cum societas vectigalium causa coita est propterque varios contractus neutri expediat recedere a societate nec refertur in medium quod ad alterum pervenerit.

Sometimes it is necessary, even with the partnership remaining, to bring a pro socio action, for instance when a partnership has been formed for the sake of tax revenues, and on account of various contracts it is not expedient for either to withdraw from the partnership, and what has come to one is not being brought into the common stock.

Dig. 17.2.65.16

Digest 17.2.65.16

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 on the Edict.

Si unus ex sociis maritus sit et distrahatur societas manente matrimonio, dotem maritus praecipere debet, quia apud eum esse debet qui onera sustinet: quod si iam dissoluto matrimonio societas distrahatur, eadem die recipienda est dos, qua et solvi debet.

If one of the partners is a husband and the partnership is dissolved while the matrimony remains, the husband ought to pre-capture the dowry, because it ought to be with him who sustains the burdens; but if, the matrimony already dissolved, the partnership is broken up, the dowry is to be received on the same day on which it also ought to be paid.

Dig. 17.2.66

Digest 17.2.66

Gaius 10 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 10 on the provincial edict.

Quod si eo tempore quo dividitur societas in ea causa dos sit, ut certum sit eam vel partem eius reddi non oportere, dividere eam inter socios iudex debet.

But if, at the time when the partnership is divided, the dowry is in such a case that it is certain that it, or a part of it, ought not to be returned, the judge ought to divide it among the partners.

Dig. 17.2.67pr.

Digest 17.2.67, beginning.

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si unus ex sociis rem communem vendiderit consensu sociorum, pretium dividi debet ita, ut ei caveatur indemnem eum futurum. quod si iam damnum passus est, hoc ei praestabitur. sed si pretium communicatum sit sine cautione et aliquid praestiterit is qui vendidit, an, si non omnes socii solvendo sint, quod a quibusdam servari non potest a ceteris debeat ferre?

If one of the partners has sold the common property with the consent of the partners, the price ought to be divided in such a way that security is taken that he will remain indemnified. But if he has already suffered loss, this shall be made good to him. But if the price has been shared without security and the one who sold has paid out something, the question is whether, if not all the partners are solvent, he ought to take from the others what cannot be recovered from some?

sed proculus putat hoc ad ceterorum onus pertinere quod ab aliquibus servari non potest, rationeque defendi posse, quoniam, societas cum contrahitur, tam lucri quam damni communio initur.

but proculus thinks that this pertains to the burden of the rest, that which cannot be recovered from some, and that it can be defended by reason, since, when a partnership is contracted, a communion of both profit and loss is entered into.

Dig. 17.2.67.1

Digest 17.2.67.1

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si unus ex sociis, qui non totorum bonorum socii erant, communem pecuniam faeneraverit usurasque perceperit, ita demum usuras partiri debet, si societatis nomine faeneraverit: nam si suo nomine, quoniam sortis periculum ad eum pertinuerit, usuras ipsum retinere oportet.

If one of the partners, who were not partners in all goods, has lent at interest the common money and has received interest, only then must he divide the interest, if he lent in the name of the partnership: for if in his own name, since the risk of the principal pertained to him, he ought himself to retain the interest.

Dig. 17.2.67.2

Digest 17.2.67.2

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paulus 32 on the Edict.

Si quid unus ex sociis necessario de suo impendit in communi negotio: iudicio societatis servabit et usuras, si forte mutuatus sub usuris dedit: sed et si suam pecuniam dedit, non sine causa dicetur, quod usuras quoque percipere debeat, quas possit habere, si alii mutuum dedisset.

If one of the partners has necessarily expended something of his own in a common business: by the action of partnership he will recover it and the interest, if perchance he paid out money borrowed at interest; but even if he advanced his own money, it will not without cause be said that he ought also to receive interest, which he could have had if he had given a loan to another.

Dig. 17.2.67.3

Digest 17.2.67.3

Paulus 32 ad ed.

Paul 32 on the Edict.

Non alias socius in id quod facere potest condemnatur, quam si confitetur se socium fuisse.

A partner is not otherwise condemned to the extent of what he can perform, than if he confesses that he was a partner.

Dig. 17.2.68pr.

Digest 17.2.68 beginning.

Gaius 10 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 10 on the provincial edict.

Nemo ex sociis ^ socis^ plus parte sua potest alienare, etsi totorum bonorum socii sint.

No one from among the partners ^ socis^ can alienate more than his own share, even if they are partners in all the goods.

Dig. 17.2.68.1

Digest 17.2.68.1

Gaius 10 ad ed. provinc.

Gaius 10 on the provincial edict.

Illud quaeritur, utrum is demum facere videtur quo minus facere possit, qui erogat bona sua in fraudem futurae actionis, an et qui occasione adquirendi non utitur. sed verius est de eo sentire proconsulem, qui erogat bona sua, idque ex interdictis colligere possumus, in quibus ita est: " quod dolo fecisti, ut desineres possidere. "

The question is whether it is only he who is deemed to be acting so as to render himself less able to act, who expends his goods in fraud of a future action, or also he who does not use an opportunity of acquiring. But it is more correct for the proconsul to hold this in regard to him who expends his goods; and we can gather this from the interdicts, in which it is thus: " what you did by fraud, in order that you might cease to possess. "

Dig. 17.2.69

Digest 17.2.69

Ulpianus 32 ad ed.

Ulpian 32 on the edict.

Cum societas ad emendum coiretur et conveniret, ut unus reliquis nundinas id est epulas praestaret eosque a negotio dimitteret, si eas eis non solverit, et pro socio et ex vendito cum eo agendum est.

When a partnership was entered into for buying and it was agreed that one should furnish to the others the nundinae, that is, banquets, and dismiss them from the business, if he has not paid these to them, both the pro socio and the ex vendito action are to be brought against him.

Dig. 17.2.70

Digest 17.2.70

Paulus 33 ad ed.

Paulus, Book 33 on the Edict.

Nulla societatis in aeternum coitio est.

No association of partnership is for eternity.

Dig. 17.2.71pr.

Digest 17.2.71 pr.

Paulus 3 epit. alf. Dig.

Paulus book 3 of the Epitome of Alfenus, Digest.

Duo societatem coierunt, ut grammaticam docerent et quod ex eo artificio quaestus fecissent, commune eorum esset: de ea re quae voluerunt fieri in pacto convento societatis proscripserunt, deinde inter se his verbis stipulati sunt: " haec, quae supra scripta sunt, ea ita dari fieri neque adversus ea fieri? si ea ita data facta non erunt, tum viginti milia dari?" quaesitum est, an, si quid contra factum esset, societatis actione agi posset. respondet, si quidem pacto convento inter eos de societate facto ita stipulati essent, " haec ita dari fieri spondes?", futurum fuisse, ut, si novationis causa id fecissent, pro socio agi non possit, sed tota res in stipulationem translata videretur.

Two men entered into a partnership, to teach grammar, and that whatever profit they had made from that craft should be common to them: concerning that matter which they wished to be done they wrote up in the pact-convention of partnership; then between themselves they stipulated in these words: " haec, quae supra scripta sunt, ea ita dari fieri neque adversus ea fieri? si ea ita data facta non erunt, tum twenty thousand to be given?" It was asked whether, if anything had been done contrary, it could be proceeded by the partnership action. He responds that, if indeed in the pact-convention made between them about the partnership they had so stipulated, " haec ita dari fieri spondes?", it would have come about that, if they had done this for the cause of novation, the pro socio action could not be brought, but the whole matter would seem to have been transferred into the stipulation.

sed quoniam non ita essent stipulati " ea ita dari fieri spondes?" sed " si ea ita facta non essent, decem dari?" non videri sibi rem in stipulationem pervenisse, sed dumtaxat poenam ( non enim utriusque rei promissorem obligari, ut ea daret faceret et, si non fecisset, poenam sufferret) et ideo societatis iudicio agi posse.

but since they had not stipulated thus, “do you promise that these things shall be given and done so?” but rather, “if these things shall not have been so done, that ten be given?” it does not seem to him that the matter had come into stipulation, but only the penalty (for the promisor is not bound to both things, that he should give and do those things and, if he should not have done them, should suffer a penalty), and therefore it can be proceeded with by the action of partnership.

Dig. 17.2.71.1

Digest 17.2.71.1

Paulus 3 epit. alf. Dig.

Paulus, Book 3 of the Epitomes of Alfenus, Digest.

Duo colliberti societatem coierunt lucri quaestus compendii, postea unus ex his a patrono heres institutus est, alteri legatum datum est. neutrum horum in medium referre debere respondit.

Two co‑freedmen entered into a partnership for lucre, gain, and profit; afterwards one of them was instituted heir by his patron, to the other a legacy was given. He replied that neither of these ought to be brought into the common fund.

Dig. 17.2.72

Digest 17.2.72

Gaius 2 cott. rer.

Gaius 2 of Everyday Matters

Socius socio etiam culpae nomine tenetur, id est desidiae atque neglegentiae. culpa autem non ad exactissimam diligentiam dirigenda est: sufficit etenim talem diligentiam communibus rebus adhibere, qualem suis rebus adhibere solet, quia qui parum diligentem sibi socium adquirit, de se queri debet.

A partner is also held to his partner under the name of culpa, that is, of sloth and negligence. But culpa is not to be directed to the most exact diligence: for it suffices to apply to the common affairs such diligence as he is accustomed to apply to his own affairs, since he who acquires for himself a partner of too little diligence ought to complain of himself.

Dig. 17.2.73

Digest 17.2.73

Ulpianus 1 resp.

Ulpian 1 Responses

Maximino respondit, si societatem universarum fortunarum coierint, id est earum quoque rerum, quae postea cuique adquirentur, hereditatem cuivis eorum delatam in commune redigendam. idem maximae respondit, si societatem universarum fortunarum ita coierint, ut quidquid erogetur vel quaereretur communis lucri atque impendii esset, ea quoque, quae in honorem alterius liberorum erogata sunt, utrisque imputanda.

He responded to Maximinus that, if they have entered into a partnership of all fortunes—that is, of those things also which thereafter would be acquired by each—an inheritance devolved upon any one of them must be reduced into the common stock. The same man responded to Maxima that, if they have thus entered into a partnership of all fortunes, so that whatever is disbursed or acquired is of common profit and expense, those things also which have been disbursed in honor of the other’s children are to be imputed to both.

Dig. 17.2.74

Digest 17.2.74

Paulus 62 ad ed.

Paul 62 on the Edict.

Si quis societatem contraxerit, quod emit ipsius fit, non commune: sed societatis iudicio cogitur rem communicare.

If anyone has contracted a partnership, what he buys becomes his own, not common; but by the partnership action he is compelled to make the thing common.

Dig. 17.2.75

Digest 17.2.75

Celsus 15 Dig.

Celsus 15 Digest.

Si coita sit societas ex his partibus, quas titius arbitratus fuerit, si titius antequam arbitraretur decesserit, nihil agitur: nam id ipsum actum est, ne aliter societas sit, quam ut titius arbitratus sit.

If a partnership has been entered into on the basis of those shares which Titius shall have determined, if Titius dies before he has determined, nothing is effected: for that very point was stipulated, that the partnership not exist otherwise than as Titius shall have determined.

Dig. 17.2.76

Digest 17.2.76

Proculus 5 epist.

Proculus 5 epistles.

Societatem mecum coisti ea condicione, ut nerva amicus communis partes societatis constitueret: nerva constituit, ut tu ex triente socius esses, ego ex besse: quaeris, utrum ratum id iure societatis sit an nihilo minus ex aequis partibus socii simus. existimo autem melius te quaesiturum fuisse, utrum ex his partibus socii essemus quas is constituisset, an ex his quas virum bonum constituere oportuisset. arbitrorum enim genera sunt duo, unum eiusmodi, ut sive aequum sit sive iniquum, parere debeamus ( quod observatur, cum ex compromisso ad arbitrum itum est), alterum eiusmodi, ut ad boni viri arbitrium redigi debeat, etsi nominatim persona sit comprehensa, cuius arbitratu fiat.

You entered into a partnership with me on this condition, that nerva, a mutual friend, should determine the shares of the partnership: nerva determined that you should be partner from a third, I from a bes (two-thirds): you ask whether that is valid by the law of partnership, or whether nonetheless we are partners in equal shares. I think, however, that you would have done better to ask whether we are partners on those shares which he fixed, or on those which it would have behooved a good man to fix. For there are two kinds of arbitrators: one of such a sort that, whether it be equitable or inequitable, we ought to obey ( quod observatur, cum ex compromisso ad arbitrum itum est), the other of such a sort that it ought to be referred to the judgment of a good man, even if a person has been expressly named, at whose arbitrament it is to be done.

Dig. 17.2.77

Digest 17.2.77

Paulus 4 quaest.

Paul 4 questions.

( veluti cum lege locationis comprehensum est, ut opus arbitrio locatoris fiat):

( for instance, when by the law of the letting it has been included, that the work be done at the arbitrament of the locator):

Dig. 17.2.78

Digest 17.2.78

Proculus 5 epist.

Proculus 5 epistle.

In proposita autem quaestione arbitrium viri boni existimo sequendum esse, eo magis quod iudicium pro socio bonae fidei est.

In the question proposed, however, I consider that the arbitrament of a good man is to be followed, all the more because the pro socio action is of good faith.

Dig. 17.2.79

Digest 17.2.79

Paulus 4 quaest.

Paulus 4 Questions.

Unde si nervae arbitrium ita pravum est, ut manifesta iniquitas eius appareat, corrigi potest per iudicium bonae fidei.

Whence, if Nerva’s arbitrament is so depraved that its manifest iniquity appears, it can be corrected through a judgment of good faith.

Dig. 17.2.80

Digest 17.2.80

Proculus 5 epist.

Proculus 5 epistle.

Quid enim si nerva constituisset, ut alter ex millesima parte, alter ex duo millesimis partibus socius esset? illud potest conveniens esse viri boni arbitrio, ut non utique ex aequis partibus socii simus, veluti si alter plus operae industriae gratiae pecuniae in societatem collaturus erat.

What, for instance, if Nerva had established that one should be a partner from a one-thousandth part, the other from two-thousandths? That can be suitable to the judgment of a good man: that we are not necessarily partners from equal parts, as, for example, if one was going to contribute more labor, industry, favor, or money into the partnership.

Dig. 17.2.81

Digest 17.2.81

Papinianus 9 quaest.

Papinian 9 questions

Si socius pro filia dotem promisit et prius quam solveret herede ea relicta decessit: quae postea cum marito de exigenda dote egit, accepto liberata est. quaesitum est, an, si pro socio ageret, dotis quantitatem praecipere deberet, si forte convenisset inter socios, ut de communi dos constitueretur. dixi pactum non esse iniquum, utique si non de alterius tantum filia convenit: nam si commune hoc pactum fuit, non interesse, quod alter solus filiam habuit.

If a partner promised a dowry for his daughter and, before he paid it, died, having left her as heir: she later, together with her husband, brought an action for exacting the dowry, and, having received it, she was released. The question was asked whether, if she were proceeding pro socio, she ought to pre-take the amount of the dowry, if perchance it had been agreed among the partners that the dowry should be constituted out of the common stock. I said the pact is not inequitable, especially if it was not agreed only concerning the daughter of one of them; for if this pact was common, it does not matter that the other alone had a daughter.

ceterum si numeratam dotem pater defuncta in matrimonio filia reciperasset, reddi pecuniam societati debuisse, pactum ex aequitate sic nobis interpretantibus. quod si salva societate divortio matrimonium solutum foret, cum sua causa dotem reciperari, scilicet ut ea vel alii marito dari possit. nec, si prior maritus facere non posset, denuo de societate constituendam dotem, nisi si nominatim ita convenisset.

But if the father had recovered the dowry paid in cash after his daughter died in matrimony, the money ought to have been returned to the partnership, we thus interpreting the pact according to equity. But if, the partnership remaining intact, the marriage were dissolved by divorce, the dowry is to be recovered for its own cause, namely, so that it may be able to be given to the same or to another husband. Nor, if it could not be done with the former husband, is a dowry to be constituted anew out of the partnership, unless it had been expressly so agreed by name.

verum in proposito largiter interesse videbatur, dos numerata esset an vero promissa: nam si filia datam dotem, posteaquam patri heres exstitit, iure suo recepisset, non esse referendam pecuniam societati, quam mulier habitura fuit, etsi alius heres exstitisset: quod si accepto a marito liberata esset, nequaquam imputari posse societati non solutam pecuniam.

but in the proposed case it seemed to make a large difference whether the dowry had been counted out or rather promised: for if the daughter, after she had become heir to her father, had, by her own right, recovered the dowry that had been given, the money was not to be referred back to the partnership, since the woman would have had it even if another had become heir; but if, upon a receipt from the husband, she had been released, by no means could the unpaid money be imputed to the partnership.

Dig. 17.2.82

Digest 17.2.82

Papinianus 3 resp.

Papinian 3 responses.

Iure societatis per socium aere alieno socius non obligatur, nisi in communem arcam pecuniae versae sunt.

By the law of partnership, a partner is not obligated by another partner’s debt, unless monies have been turned into the common coffer.

Dig. 17.2.83

Digest 17.2.83

Paulus 1 manual.

Paulus 1 Manual.

Illud quaerendum est, arbor quae in confinio nata est, item lapis qui per utrumque fundum extenditur an, cum succisa arbor vel lapis exemptus eius sit cuius fundus, pro ea quoque parte singulorum esse debeat, pro qua parte in fundo fuerat? an qua ratione duabus massis duorum dominorum flatis tota massa communis est, ita arbor hoc ipso, quo separatur a solo propriamque substantiam in unum corpus redactam accipit, multo magis pro indiviso communis fit, quam massa? sed naturali convenit rationi et postea tantam partem utrumque habere tam in lapide quam in arbore, quantam et in terra habebat.

This is to be inquired: a tree which has sprung up on the boundary, likewise a stone which extends through both estates—whether, when the tree has been cut down or the stone taken out, it is to be the property of him to whose estate it belongs, and yet ought to belong to each also for that part for which it had been in his estate? Or, by the reasoning whereby, when the two masses of two owners have been melted, the whole mass is common, so the tree, by this very fact, whereby it is separated from the soil and takes its own substance reduced into a single body, becomes much more common in undivided ownership than a mass? But it agrees with natural reason that thereafter each should have so great a part, both in the stone and in the tree, as he had in the land.

Dig. 17.2.84

Digest 17.2.84

Labeo 6 post. a iav. epit.

Labeo book 6 of the Posteriora, epitomized by Javolenus.

Quotiens iussu alicuius vel cum filio eius vel cum extraneo societas coitur, directo cum illius persona agi posse, cuius persona in contrahenda societate spectata sit.

Whenever, by someone’s order, a partnership is entered into either with his son or with an outsider, one can proceed directly against that person whose person was had in view in contracting the partnership.